



General Assembly

UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT
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POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
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Twelfth special session
Agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND DISARMAMENT
DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES

ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MACHINERY IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT
AND STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS FIELD,
INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

MEASURES TO MOBILIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF DISARMAMENT

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session*

Rapporteur: Mr. Omer ERSUN (Turkey)

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* By its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982, the General Assembly approved the present report as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 1st plenary meeting of the twelfth special session, on 7 June 1982, the General Assembly decided:

(a) To establish an Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session, which would be a committee of the whole, with a Chairman, 13 Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur, and that its Chairman, after being elected by the General Assembly would also be a member of the General Committee;

(b) That the Ad Hoc Committee would establish a working group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, another working group on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and any additional working groups as necessary;

(c) That the General Assembly should adopt two documents, one containing the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and a second encompassing all other items on the agenda.

2. At the same meeting, the General Assembly unanimously elected Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria), Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

3. At the same meeting, the General Assembly, without reference to the General Committee, adopted the agenda of the twelfth special session (A/S-12/10). It was also decided that items 1 to 8 and 14 would be dealt with in plenary meeting and items 9 to 13 would be allocated to the Ad Hoc Committee, which would be entrusted with the task of considering all the proposals submitted under those items during the special session and reporting to the Assembly.

4. At the same meeting, the General Assembly, further to its resolution 36/81 of 9 December 1981, in which it had endorsed the recommendations submitted by the Preparatory Committee in 1981, 1/ endorsed the recommendations adopted by the Preparatory Committee in 1982. 2/

5. Also at the same meeting, the Assembly decided to launch the World Disarmament Campaign.

6. In the course of the general debate, 19 heads of State or Government and 44 Foreign Ministers and other heads of delegations addressed the special session.

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-12/1 and Corr.1), paras. 17-29.

2/ Ibid., paras. 40-54.

7. Several heads of State or Government sent messages to the session. Also in the course of the general debate, the executive heads of the following organizations and bodies of the United Nations system made statements: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

8. At its 4th meeting, on 23 June, the Ad Hoc Committee heard statements by Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Chairman of the Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Mr. Olof Palme, Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

9. At the same meeting, the Committee also heard a statement by the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation. At its 9th meeting, on 28 June, the Committee heard a statement by the Secretary-General of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

10. At its 5th to 8th meetings, on 24 and 25 June, the Committee heard statements by representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions (annex VI).

11. At its 1st meeting, on 9 June, the Committee unanimously elected the following officers:

Vice-Chairmen:

Mr. Mario Alessi (Italy)
Mr. Juan José Calle y Calle (Peru)
Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)
Mr. Baruch Grinberg (Bulgaria)
Mr. Guy Hazoumé (Benin)
Mr. Davidson Hepburn (Bahamas)
Mr. Gerhard Herder (German Democratic Republic)
Mr. Miljan Komatina (Yugoslavia)
Mr. Mehdi Mrani Zentar (Morocco)
Mr. Yoshio Okawa (Japan)
Mr. Waliur Rahman (Bangladesh)
Mr. David Sadleir (Australia)
Mr. A. P. Venkataswaran (India)

Rapporteur:

Mr Ömer Ersun (Turkey)

12. At its 2nd meeting, on 14 June, the Committee decided that the deadline for the submission of all proposals to be included in the final documents of the special session would be 25 June. At its 4th meeting, on 23 June, the Committee decided to extend the deadline to 28 June.

13. Also at the 2nd meeting, the Committee decided to establish an open-ended working group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (Working Group I) and elected Mr. A. García Robles (Mexico) as its Chairman.

14. At its 3rd meeting, on 17 June, the Committee decided to establish a working group to deal with agenda item 9 (Working Group II) and elected Mr. D. Sadleir (Australia) as its Chairman.

15. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to establish a working group to deal with agenda items 11 and 13 (Working Group III) and elected Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic) as its Chairman.

16. The Committee had before it the following documents:

Telegram dated 6 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba transmitting the communiqué issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana from 31 May to 4 June 1982, addressed to the second special session devoted to disarmament to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/1);

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting a resolution of the Commission on Human Rights (A/S-12/AC.1/2);

Letter dated 28 May 1982 from the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund to the President of the General Assembly (A/S-12/AC.1/3);

Letter dated 7 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/4);

Letter dated 7 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/5);

Letter dated 8 June 1982 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/S-12/AC.1/6);

Letter dated 8 June 1982 from the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/7);

Letter dated 11 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/8);

Letter dated 15 June 1982 from the First Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/9);

Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/10 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/11 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/12 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/13);

Letter dated 16 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania to the President of the General Assembly (A/S-12/AC.1/14);

Letter dated 17 June 1982 from the Permanent Representatives of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/15);

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting a resolution of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (A/S-12/AC.1/16);

Note verbale dated 16 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/17);

Note verbale dated 16 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/18);

Letter dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/19/Rev.1);

Letter dated 17 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/20);

Letter dated 15 June 1982 from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/21);

Letter dated 18 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/22);

Letter dated 21 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/23 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 22 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/24);

Note verbale dated 23 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/25);

Note verbale dated 23 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/26);

Letter dated 23 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/27);

Letter dated 24 June 1982 from the Acting Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/28 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 24 June 1982 from the Acting Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/29 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 24 June 1982 from the Acting Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/30 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 24 June 1982 from the First Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/31);

Letter dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/32);

Note verbale dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/33);

Note verbale dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/34 and Corr.1);

Note verbale dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/AC.1/35);

Letter dated 23 June 1982 from the First Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/36);

Note verbale dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/37 and Corr.1);

Note verbale dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/38 and Corr.1);

Letter dated 27 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/39);

Note verbale dated 24 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/40);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/41);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/42 and Corr.1);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/43 and Corr.1);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/44 and Corr.1);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/45 and Corr.1);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/46 and Rev.1);

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/47);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the First Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/48);

Note verbale dated 28 June 1982 from the Permanent Missions of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/49);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/50);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/51);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/52);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/53);

Note verbale dated 28 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/54);

Note verbale dated 26 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/55);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/56);

Letter dated 25 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/57);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/58);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/59);

Letter dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/60);

Letter dated 29 June 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/61);

Note verbale dated 22 June 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat (A/S-12/AC.1/62);

Letter dated 28 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/63);

Note verbale dated 5 July 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/64);

Note verbale dated 6 July 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/65);

Note verbale dated 7 July 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/66);

Note verbale dated 9 July 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/S-12/AC.1/68).

17. At the 12th meeting, on 2 July, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution (A/S-12/AC.1/L.1) which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Convinced that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

"Further convinced that the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

"Recognizing the urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons,

"Recognizing further the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination,

"Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes."

18. At the same meeting, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution (A/S-12/AC.1/L.2), sponsored by India and Mexico, which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Gravely concerned by the continuing threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the arms race,

"Reaffirming that removal of the danger of a world war, in particular nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

"Bearing in mind the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States in this regard,

"Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to initiate action to save succeeding generations from nuclear war,

"Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and paragraphs 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

"Declaring the unacceptability of nuclear war, which would cause the destruction of not only the peoples of the warring States but also the peoples of all other States,

"Seeking to ensure the survival of mankind through avoidance of nuclear war,

"Stressing the vital importance of maximum self-restraint in the conduct of States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, and of the scrupulous observance by all States of well-established humanitarian laws and principles as well as Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Conscious that public opinion world wide has been demanding urgent and effective measures for removal of the danger of nuclear war,

"1. Takes note of the views submitted by Member States in response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981;

"2. Urges those States that have not yet done so to send their replies to the Secretary-General as soon as possible;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a representative group of public persons of great eminence, consisting of statesmen, scientists, physicians, jurists, religious leaders, philosophers and other suitably qualified persons, for the purpose of advising on special measures and procedures - practical, political and legal - designed for the collective control, management and resolution of critical or confrontational situations which could escalate to nuclear war, in addition to those already provided for in the Charter of the United Nations;

"4. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit, for the consideration of the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, a report incorporating the considered views, suggestions and recommendations of the eminent persons mentioned in paragraph 3 above;

"5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session an item entitled 'Prevention of nuclear war'."

19. At the same meeting, the representative of Mexico introduced a draft resolution (A/S-12/AC.1/L.3), sponsored by Mexico and Sweden, which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling that at its tenth special session, in 1978, it expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

"Recalling also that on the same occasion it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons were more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, and stressed that mankind was therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

"Noting that the conditions prevailing today are a source of even more serious concern than those existing in 1978 because of several factors, such as the deterioration of the international situation, the increase in accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of illusory doctrines of 'limited' or 'winnable' nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred owing to malfunctioning of computers,

"Believing that it is a matter of the utmost urgency to stop any further increase in the awesome arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, which already have ample retaliatory power and a frightening overkill capacity,

"Believing also that it is equally urgent to activate negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

"Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step for the achievement of the above-mentioned two objectives, since it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of the reduction negotiations while, at the same time, preventing the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations would take place,

"Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an over-all rough parity,

"1. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze which would be a first step towards the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following:

"(a) It would embrace:

"(i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

"(ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

"(iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;

"(iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

"(b) It would be subject to all relevant measures and procedures of verification which have already been agreed by the parties in the cases of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, as well as those accepted in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva;

"2. Requests the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a report to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its thirty-seventh session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

"3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled 'Implementation of resolution S-12/___ on a nuclear arms freeze'."

20. On 2 July, India submitted a draft resolution (A/S-12/AC.1/L.4), which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining systems posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

"Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

"Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Reaffirming the declaration that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, contained in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

"Decides to adopt an international convention as annexed to this resolution, prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pending nuclear disarmament.

"ANNEX

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

"The States Parties to this Convention,

"Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

"Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

"Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

"Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

"Have agreed as follows:

"Article 1

"The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

"Article 2

"This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

"Article 3

"1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

"2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

"4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

"5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

"6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

"Article 4

"This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at _____ on the _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____."

21. On 8 July, India submitted a draft resolution (A/S-12/AC.1/L.6), which read as follows:

/...

"The General Assembly,

"Reaffirming the recommendations and decisions of its first special session devoted to disarmament,

"Noting with deep concern that, despite efforts to attain the objectives agreed upon at the first special session, the international situation has continued to deteriorate and there has been a severe intensification of the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect,

"Convinced that the arms race is incompatible with the search for economic and social development and the achievement of the new international economic order,

"Alarmed at the growing danger of the outbreak of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all mankind and which therefore necessitates the adoption of urgent measures to prevent such a nuclear war,

"Taking note of the relevant unilateral declarations made by nuclear-weapon States in this regard,

"Conscious of the growing popular movements throughout the world against the testing, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons,

"Recognizing the right of each State to security and the need to maintain undiminished security of all States at each stage in the process of disarmament,

"Convinced that real and lasting peace can only be ensured through strict observance of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and through the effective implementation of the security system provided therein,

"Emphasizing the need to establish a world order free from the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation, interference in the internal affairs of States and denial of the inalienable rights to self-determination and independence of peoples and nations under colonial and alien domination in flagrant violation of the Charter,

"Determined to continue negotiations on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for adoption at the earliest possible time by the General Assembly as a step towards the eventual conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

"Reaffirming the commitment of States to pursue efforts for the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, to that end, to initiate new and intensify ongoing negotiations in the bilateral, regional and multilateral context, in accordance with the fundamental goals, priorities, and procedures laid down in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

"1. Calls upon States to undertake the following urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament:

"(a) A convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

"(b) Cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons pending the conclusion of a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons;

"(c) A complete freeze on the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes;

"2. Decides to keep the progress in the implementation of these measures under review."

II. WORK OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE

A. Consideration of agenda item 10

22. Working Group I, established by the Ad Hoc Committee (see para. 13 above) to deal with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, held four meetings between 14 June and 7 July.
23. At its 1st meeting, on 14 June, Working Group I established four open-ended drafting groups to proceed with the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the basis of the draft Programme submitted by the Committee on Disarmament. 3/ Drafting Group A was assigned to consider chapter II (Objectives); Drafting Group B was assigned to consider chapter III (Principles); Drafting Group C was assigned to consider sections A to E, entitled "Nuclear weapons", "Other weapons of mass destruction", "Conventional weapons and armed forces", "Military expenditures" and "Related measures" respectively, of chapter V (Measures and stages of implementation); and Drafting Group D was assigned to consider the remaining sections of chapter V, entitled "Other measures", "Disarmament and development" and "Disarmament and international security", as well as chapter VI (Machinery and procedures).
24. Also at its 1st meeting, Working Group I appointed Mr. Francois de La Gorce (France) as co-ordinator of Drafting Group A. At its 2nd meeting, on 15 June, the Working Group appointed Mr. Anatoly Nikitich Sheldov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) as co-ordinator of Drafting Group B; Mr. Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) as co-ordinator of Drafting Group C and Mr. Curt Lidgard (Sweden) as co-ordinator of Drafting Group D.
25. The Chairman of Working Group I orally reported to the Committee at its 9th meeting, on 28 June, on the progress of the work of the Working Group.
26. At its 3rd meeting, on 3 July, Working Group I reviewed the work of the four drafting groups. The Working Group had before it texts submitted by Drafting Groups A, B and C (A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.1, L.2 and L.3, respectively). The co-ordinator of Drafting Group D orally reported to the Working Group on the work of that Group.
27. At the same meeting, one delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 2 of chapter IV (Priorities) of the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by the Committee on Disarmament; the amendment was referred to Drafting Group C in view of the close relationship between the substance of the amendment and that of the work of the Drafting Group. The Drafting Group decided to include the proposed amendment between brackets in the chapter. 4/

3/ Ibid., Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2), appendix I.

4/ With the proposed amendment, paragraph 2 of chapter IV of the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by the Committee on Disarmament would read "Effective measures of nuclear disarmament [which maintain or enhance security] and the prevention of nuclear war ...".

28. In the four drafting groups, intensive efforts were made to achieve agreement on the sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament assigned to them. Drafting Group A held 3 meetings, Drafting Group B 10 meetings, Drafting Group C 12 meetings and Drafting Group D 19 meetings. In addition, informal consultations were held under the guidance of the co-ordinators of the drafting groups. Progress was achieved on a number of issues, particularly those concerning the chapter entitled "Objectives" and, to a lesser extent, the chapter entitled "Principles". However, significant differences of opinion persisted on various aspects of the Programme, notably on the chapter entitled "Measures and stages of implementation". With respect to the question of time-frames and review mechanism, informal consultations were held under the guidance of the Chairman of Working Group I but, while some progress was achieved and promising approaches were explored, it did not prove possible to reconcile divergent views.

29. At its 4th meeting, on 7 July, Working Group I had before it a draft of the Introduction prepared by the Chairman (A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.5).

30. Also at its 4th meeting, Working Group I considered the results of the work in the four drafting groups. The Working Group had before it, in addition to the texts submitted earlier by Drafting Groups A, B and C (see para. 25 above), a text submitted by Drafting Group D (A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.4), a text submitted by the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group D (A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.6) and additions and amendments to document A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.3 (A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.3/Add.1). 5/

31. At the 14th meeting of the Committee, on 7 July, the Chairman of Working Group I submitted a final report on the work of the Group.

32. The texts for the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by Working Group I appear in annex I.

B. Consideration of agenda items 9, 11, 12 and 13

33. Working Group II, established by the Ad Hoc Committee (see para. 14 above) to consider in its entirety agenda item 9 entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", held seven meetings from 18 June to 2 July.

34. At its 3rd meeting, on 21 June, Working Group II established two drafting groups (A and B) to consider the item assigned to it on the basis of the composite paper contained in annex I of the report of the Preparatory Committee. 6/ Drafting

5/ Subsequently, additions and amendments to document A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.4 were circulated (A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.4/Add.1).

6/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-12/1 and Corr.1).

Group A was entrusted with the consideration of section III of the composite paper and Drafting Group B with sections I, II, IV and V, as well as the question of studies.

35. At its 5th meeting, on 22 June, Working Group II appointed Mr. A. T. Jayakoddy (Sri Lanka) as co-ordinator of Drafting Group A. At its 6th meeting, on 23 June, the Working Group appointed Mr. Nana S. Sutresna (Indonesia) as co-ordinator of Drafting Group B.

36. Drafting Group A held eight meetings, in the course of which it completed a general examination of all subjects assigned to it. Drafting Group B held seven meetings, which were devoted to a general examination of the various sections contained in the composite paper as well as a preliminary discussion on the question of studies.

37. As a result of the general examination of various subjects under agenda item 9, a Chairman's working paper was produced which served as the basis for subsequent deliberations.

38. At the 12th meeting of the Committee, on 2 July, the Chairman of Working Group II reported on the progress of its work. In view of the large amount of work which remained to be accomplished, the Chairman suggested that the Committee might wish to consider a different approach with a view to completing the consideration of the item. Consequently, the Committee established a Contact Group to continue consideration of the item. To this end, the Contact Group set up, on 3 July, a small drafting group. At the 14th meeting, on 7 July, the Chairman of the Committee informed the members that despite strenuous efforts, the Drafting Group of the Contact Group had not been able to conclude its work.

39. The Committee recommended that the documents transmitted to the special session by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly, a list of which is contained in paragraph 38 of the report of the Preparatory Committee, 6/ as well as the proposals that were submitted during the special session and that could not be considered, be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

40. Under agenda item 9 (b) and (c), the Working Group took note of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament to the special session 7/ as well as the report of the Disarmament Commission to the special session. 8/

41. Working Group III was established by the Committee (see para. 15 above) to deal with agenda item 11, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and consideration of initiatives and proposals of Member States", and agenda item 13, entitled "Measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament". The Working Group held 17 meetings between 18 June and 6 July when the Chairman submitted his final report on the work of Working Group III.

7/ Ibid., Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2).

8/ Ibid., Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3).

42. In its discussion of agenda item 11, Working Group III focused its attention on the consideration of initiatives and proposals of Member States.
43. Working Group III decided that the proposals submitted by Member States to the twelfth special session should be inscribed in a list (annex III) for subsequent consideration.
44. At its 12th meeting, on 2 July, the Committee decided that the question of the prevention of nuclear war submitted for the consideration of the special session by resolution 36/81 B, would be taken up by Working Group III, under agenda item 11.
45. In the consideration of the question, the discussions mainly revolved around resolution 36/81 B, and two proposals contained in annex II (a) and (b) to document A/S-12/AC.1/WG.III/L.1 as well as a proposal by India (see annex III).
46. At its 13th meeting, on 6 July, the Committee, having heard the report of Working Group III, established a drafting group to continue consideration of the proposals concerning the question of the prevention of nuclear war. It was not possible to reach agreement on a text on the subject.
47. At the request of the sponsors of draft resolutions A/S-12/AC.1/L.1, L.2, L.3, L.4 and L.6 (see paras. 17 to 21 above), the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit the draft resolutions for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.
48. Under agenda item 13, Working Group III agreed on a text regarding the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament as contained in annex IV to the present report.
49. In considering the World Disarmament Campaign, Working Group III had before it the reports of the Secretary-General contained in documents A/36/458, A/S-12/14 and Add.1, A/S-12/15, A/S-12/27 and A/AC.206/19 and Add.1-4. The Group discussed the question on the basis of a Chairman's paper (annex III (b) to document A/S-12/AC.1/WG.III/L.1).
50. The Committee subsequently established a drafting group to continue consideration of the question. The agreed text on the World Disarmament Campaign is included in annex V.
51. Regarding item 12, entitled "Enhancement of the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a World Disarmament Conference", the Committee decided that a preliminary discussion would take place in the Committee itself. Subsequently, the Committee would endeavour to co-ordinate matters in such a way that the "review" aspects of the question would be taken up by Working Group II and the "forward-looking" aspects would be considered in an informal contact group. It could thereafter form an appropriate subject for a drafting group as necessary.
52. The initial exchange of views on the subject took place at the 10th and 11th meetings of the Committee, on 2 and 3 July.

53. Subsequently, the Committee decided that a contact group of the Chairman would be convened to deal with the question of machinery as well as any other subject that might be appropriate. Accordingly, the Contact Group met on 1 July and undertook an exchange of views on some aspects of the question of machinery.

54. The discussion on the question of machinery centred mainly around deliberative bodies, the negotiating body and secretariat support. Comments were also made with respect to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

55. The exchange of views focused on the enhancement of the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. With that objective in mind, suggestions to expand the membership of the Committee in a limited and balanced manner, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness, received wide support. Several suggestions were also made, namely:

(a) That the Committee meet for a period of eight months or all year round;

(b) That a pledge be obtained from its members, in particular from the nuclear-weapon States, not to use the practice of consensus to obstruct the adjustment of the structure of the Committee, in particular the establishment, as appropriate, of new ad hoc working groups;

(c) That the Committee's name be changed to "Standing Conference on Disarmament" in order to reflect properly its present status.

56. In the views concerning aspects of secretariat support, general satisfaction was expressed with the work of the Centre for Disarmament and the need for strengthening the Centre including the strengthening of the support for the Committee on Disarmament, was recognized. Views were also expressed for enhancing the status of the Centre; in this connexion, other views were also expressed.

III. CONCLUSIONS

57. The tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was an event of historic significance. The special session was convened in response to a growing concern among the peoples of the world that the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, represented ever-increasing threats to human well-being and even to the survival of mankind. At that session the international community of nations achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy, the immediate goal of which was the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The final objective of the strategy was to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The conviction that all peoples had a legitimate right to expect early and significant progress in disarmament and a vital interest in its success led to the United Nations being given a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.

58. The historic consensus embodied in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) was rooted in a common awareness that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, constituted much more a threat to than a protection of mankind. It was also based on recognition that the time had come to put an end to that situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the current level of armaments. The Final Document recognized that in the contemporary world, the security of States could be greatly enhanced by effective action aimed at preventing nuclear war, ending the arms race and achieving real disarmament. Progress in disarmament would significantly contribute to pursuing the goals of economic and social development, particularly of developing countries. The consensus embodied in the Final Document sought to place disarmament negotiations in a unified perspective and became a most significant and integral part of the context within which negotiations on disarmament have been pursued.

59. In the course of the twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly has noted that developments since 1978 have not lived up to the hopes engendered by the tenth special session. Despite the efforts that have been made by the international community to implement the decisions and recommendations of that session on a multilateral, bilateral and regional level, including action in the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, and steps that have been taken on some specific measures contained in the Final Document, the objectives, priorities and principles there laid down have not been generally observed. The Programme of Action contained in the Final Document remains largely unimplemented. A number of important negotiations either have not begun or have been suspended, and efforts in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums have produced little tangible result. There has been some progress in certain negotiations and bilateral negotiations in the nuclear field have been initiated. The arms race, however, in particular the nuclear-arms race, has assumed more dangerous proportions and global military expenditures have

increased sharply. In short, since the adoption of the Final Document in 1978, there has been no significant progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the seriousness of the situation has increased.

60. The Final Document stated that disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. The past four years have witnessed increasing recourse to the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation and interference in the internal affairs of States and denial of the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination. The period has also witnessed other actions by States contrary to the Final Document. The consequent tensions and confrontations have retarded progress in disarmament and have in turn been aggravated by the failure to make significant progress towards disarmament.

61. It was stressed that in a world of finite resources there is an organic relationship between expenditures on armaments and economic and social development. The vastly increased military budgets since 1978 and the development, production and deployment, especially by the States possessing the largest military arsenals, of new types of weapon systems represent a huge and growing diversion of human and material resources. Apart from the significant capital costs that these military expenditures represent, they have also contributed to current economic problems in certain States. Existing and planned military programmes constitute a colossal waste of precious resources which might otherwise be used to elevate living standards of all peoples; furthermore, such waste greatly compounds the problems confronting developing countries in achieving economic and social development.

62. The General Assembly regrets that at its twelfth special session it has not been able to adopt a document on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on a number of other items on its agenda. However, on two agenda items, relating to the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament and the World Disarmament Campaign, there are agreed texts (see annexes IV and V) for consideration and appropriate action by the General Assembly. The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action. Taking into account the aggravation of the international situation and being gravely concerned about the continuing arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, the General Assembly expresses its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The General Assembly urges all Member States to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered. The General Assembly also stresses the need for strengthening the central role of the United

Nations in the field of disarmament and the implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations in accordance with the Final Document and to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body. In this regard the Committee on Disarmament is requested to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session on its consideration of an expansion of its membership, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness.

63. Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. To this end, the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

64. The other items on the agenda on which the special session has not reached decisions should be taken up at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly for further consideration.

65. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussion of disarmament problems, which it has undertaken at the special session and in which representatives of Member States - among them some heads of State or Government and many Foreign Ministers - have participated, and the active interest shown by peoples all over the world will provide a powerful impetus to Member States to redouble their efforts in the cause of disarmament. The General Assembly hopes that the World Disarmament Campaign, which it solemnly launched at the opening meeting of the special session, will further contribute to the mobilization of public opinion to the cause of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security. In this regard the campaign should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions.

66. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held at a date to be decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

ANNEX I

Texts for the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
submitted by Working Group I

I. Introduction a/

1. The threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, which already in 1978 gave rise to the justified alarm of the General Assembly, far from disappearing has considerably increased during the four years that have elapsed since the holding of its first special session devoted to disarmament. It was thus natural not to unduly delay the convening of the second special session, which, with the same purpose as the first, had been explicitly provided for in the Final Document of that session. b/

2. Both in the general debate of this second special session of the Assembly, in which an impressive number of heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs participated, as well as in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Working Groups, it became evident that there had been no erosion in the support of all fundamental conclusions of the Final Document, such as the following:

(a) The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind since, far from helping to strengthen international security, it on the contrary weakens it, and since existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth.

(b) The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

a/ Draft prepared by the Chairman of Working Group I.

b/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.

(c) Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

(d) Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

3. It was undoubtedly for reasons like the above that, in one of the last paragraphs of the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document, the General Assembly decided that the implementation of the priorities defined therein should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which "remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament". The Assembly completed this statement adding that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament and deciding that, with this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a "comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

4. The General Assembly did not only stress several times the importance of this goal which it called the "ultimate goal" of all disarmament efforts. On more than one occasion it stated also its opinion as to which should be the "immediate goal" defining it as "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace".

5. Bearing in mind those antecedents and taking as the main basis for its deliberations the draft transmitted by the Committee on Disarmament, c/ the General Assembly has elaborated this Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which received the approval by consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations which

participated in its second special session devoted to disarmament. In addition to the present introduction, the Programme comprises five chapters whose titles, clearly indicative of their contents, are the following: "Objectives", "Principles", "Priorities", "Measures and stages of implementation", and "Machinery and procedures".

6. It has not been possible to reach agreement for the Comprehensive Programme to become a treaty, as some States would have preferred in order to make its provisions legally binding. There has been, however, unanimous support for the idea that all necessary steps must be taken to enhance the political and moral value of the Programme. It has thus been agreed that a special copy of the Programme shall be carried by a personal representative of the Secretary-General to the capitals of all States Members of the United Nations, in order to have it signed by the respective heads of State or Government. This symbolic act will be a clear sign that this time there is the required "political will" to proceed along the road of uninterrupted negotiations in good faith in the field of disarmament. Should there be some States where constitutional obstacles prevent recourse to the above procedures, alternative methods of similar significance should be employed. Thus the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, although not a treaty in itself, would indeed become a source of numerous successive treaties thanks to which mankind may start the twenty-first century in conditions totally different from those that prevail at present and are the cause of deepest concern.

II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to [eliminate] [avert] the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:

- To maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- To initiate or engage in further negotiations, to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear-arms race;
- To consolidate and develop the results reflected in agreements and treaties achieved so far, relevant to the problems of disarmament;
- To open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

2. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is fully achieved.

3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:

- To strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- To contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;
- To make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;
- To increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;
- To establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;
- [To stimulate in all countries the contribution that public opinion could make to the cause of disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament] [to stimulate world public opinion on behalf of disarmament through information, education and furthering understanding in all regions of the world in a balanced and objective manner] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament through information, education and further understanding in all regions of the world] [to mobilize world public opinion in all regions of the world in favour of disarmament in conformity with the above-mentioned objectives] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament with the objectives of informing, educating and generating understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament in all regions of the world] [on a universal basis, generate public understanding of and stimulate/mobilize world-wide support for disarmament, through balanced, objective and factual information concerning armaments and through education for disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, through balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world, so as to generate further understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament].

III. Principles

1. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that [the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance] and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 1

[The question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance. Peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 1

[The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the preservation of peace through the elimination of all causes of war and through the realization of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

2.* The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

Alternative proposal for merging paragraphs 1 and 2

[The Members of the United Nations are fully aware that the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost significance, that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal should guide their efforts to bring about the end of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament, which are considered to be tasks of utmost importance and urgency.]

3.* Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

Alternative proposals for paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

[The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.]

[The question of general and complete disarmament is of the utmost importance.]

[Peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible.]

* The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.

4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

5. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

6. (Paragraph has been deleted.)

7.* The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

8. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10.* Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective

international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

11. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

12. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

13. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

14. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other military significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

15-16. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

17. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.

18.* Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

19. [The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be carried out without interruptions and proceed at a rapid pace, so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of weapons which are the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.]

20. [The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the [fundamental principles enshrined in] [relevant provisions of] the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

21. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage [, taking into account the existing situation regarding armaments of different kinds, and in particular the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.] At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. [In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

Alternative proposal for merging paragraphs 20 and 21

[The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the fundamental principles enshrined in the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. This process should ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. It should take into account the over-all existing situation regarding armaments of all kinds, and in particular, the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

22. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field,

whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

23. (Paragraph has been deleted.)

24. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

25. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

26. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. [The negotiations on the [balanced] reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 26

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, in particular those which possess the largest military arsenals, have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 26

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. It is therefore urgent to initiate or engage in appropriate negotiating processes, bilateral, regional or multilateral, especially in areas with a high concentration of armaments. States with the largest military arsenals, whether they be nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 26

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 26

[Together with negotiations on nuclear measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. The negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

27. [States with the largest military arsenals have the primary responsibility for disarmament. They should immediately halt their arms race and take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments. After they have substantially reduced their armaments, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments.]

28. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

29. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. [All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]

Alternative proposal for merging the fourth and last sentences of paragraph 29

[Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification, national and international, as well as other compliance procedures should be employed, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 29

[Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification, national and international, as well as other compliance procedures should be employed, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. Questions relating to monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 29

[Disarmament and arms limitation agreements must provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. As appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification, including national and international measures, as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.]

30. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

31. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.
32. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.
33. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.
- 34.* The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.
35. (Paragraph has been deleted.)
36. (Paragraph has been deleted.)
37. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
- 38.* Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

* (Paragraph 68 of Final Document)

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

* (Paragraph 69 of Final Document)

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel-cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

39. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

40. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

41. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

42.* It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

43.* Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

44. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

45. [In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

Alternative proposal for merging paragraphs 44 and 45

[Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to strengthen international peace and security, to build confidence among States, to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures, and to further the relaxation of international tension. Commitment to confidence-building measures would significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

46. [Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 46

[In taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security, the input by studies carried out by the Secretary-General in the field of disarmament with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts should be taken into account.]

47.* In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

48. [Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, States hereby declare that they will respect the principles stated above [and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme in strict adherence to them] [in full implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament].]

V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons d/

1. e/ Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

2. f/ The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

d/ Nos. 1 to 8 have been set out in accordance with the structure proposed by the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C.

e/ Paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 of the Final Document.

f/ Paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

Proposed insertion in paragraph 2 (b), second line

After the word "fissionable" insert the words "[and fusionable]".

3. Nuclear test ban:

Text proposed by the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C

[Conclusion of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban [with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States] [[within the framework of] [as a measure relating to] an effective nuclear disarmament process]. [All possible efforts should be made to achieve this objective.]]

Proposed alternative to the Co-ordinator's text

[The immediate conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(a) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake without further delay multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test-ban treaty. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come. It should be equitable and non-discriminatory and thus be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system also negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament and to which all States will have access.

(b) The parties that have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should immediately resume and intensify their negotiations and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty.]

4. Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, the USSR and the United States should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.

5. Proposed texts concerning a "freeze"/halt in qualitative development etc., by the USSR and the United States pending negotiations:

[As a starting point for the negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms, the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals should consider without delay the possibility of agreeing to a freeze in qualitative and quantitative terms of their nuclear arsenals and the number of delivery vehicles at the present level.]

[In the first stage, there should be a freeze on nuclear weapons which would, inter alia, consist of two inseparable elements, namely: (a) a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and (b) a cut-off in the production of fissionable [and fusionable] materials for weapons purposes. Such a step would enable an effective and economical safeguards system which could be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria to be applied to nuclear facilities in all States.]

[The USSR and the United States should agree not to introduce any further strategic nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for an initial period of two years, during which time negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms should be pursued vigorously. There should also be an undertaking to renew this agreement for further periods of two years if progress is being made in the negotiations.]

[Mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals, as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, their complete elimination.]

6. (The USSR and the United States undertook to hold consultations on the text.)

Proposal to consolidate Nos. 6 and 7, with amendments

[Bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on [[intermediate] [medium] range nuclear forces and strategic arms [limitations and] reductions] [nuclear disarmament].

Urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations already under way or about to be initiated with a view to [reaching a more stable and verifiable global balance of] [achieving [limitations and] significant reductions in] the nuclear arsenals of the [USSR and the United States] [two sides] at progressively lower levels [of delivery systems and/or warheads] [on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security].

Specifically,

- Early initiation of negotiations designed to achieve [, in a progressive, verifiable and balanced manner,] an agreement between the USSR and the United States for [substantial] [significant] quantitative reductions and [verifiable] qualitative constraints on their stockpiles of nuclear intercontinental strategic weapons and means of delivery.

- Within the above referred framework, pursuit between the negotiating States of the current endeavours aiming at the limitation and reduction of [their] [intermediate] [medium] range nuclear [missiles] [weapons] [capable of striking targets in Europe].]

7. (The USSR and the United States undertook to hold consultations on the text.)

Texts proposed in connexion with intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe

[Limitations and reductions of nuclear-weapon systems in Europe

Pursuit of the bilateral negotiations already begun on medium and intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe with a view to the early conclusion of an agreement on substantial reductions of such and analogous systems.

Initiation of negotiations aimed at the limitation and reduction of all tactical nuclear weapons systems in Europe. These negotiations should be carried out within the framework of the bilateral Geneva negotiations or in some other suitable context.]

[As the negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe concern the security interests of all nations of that continent, all European States should be given the possibility to participate, in an appropriate manner, and to bring their constructive contribution to an urgent and successful conclusion of these negotiations.]

8. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament:

Text proposed by the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C

[The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed below, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems through negotiations on proposals [such as those relating to: new types and new systems of nuclear weapons, flight-testing of new delivery vehicles, anti-satellite weapon systems, anti-ballistic missile systems, "neutron" weapons, etc.];

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, accompanied by appropriate declarations and verification procedures;

(c) The elaboration of a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

The over-all objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and of those included in subsequent stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear-weapon arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.]

Proposed amendments to the Co-ordinator's text

(a) Replacement of the first two sentences by the following text:

[Multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations are of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Such negotiations would be greatly facilitated by substantial results in the bilateral negotiations between the States which possess the largest nuclear arsenals and therefore, have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament.]

(b) Replacement of the second and third sentences by the following text:

[The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area. Also multilateral negotiations with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament.]

(c) Replacement of the third sentence by the following text:

[Progress on measures of nuclear disarmament in the multilateral context would have a beneficial effect on such negotiations.]

(d) Deletion, in subparagraph (a), last line, of the words "neutron weapons".

(e) Addition, in subparagraph (a), of the words "proposals on limitations on the numbers of nuclear warheads consistent with stability".

(f) Addition, in subparagraph (b), second line, of the words "and fusionable" after the word "fissionable".

(g) Replacement, in subparagraph (b), third line, of the word "declarations" by the word "accounting".

(h) Deletion, in subparagraph (c), first line, of the words "The elaboration of".

(i) Inclusion of the last paragraph at the beginning of the section on nuclear weapons.

Proposed alternatives to the Co-ordinator's text

Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

The cessation of the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects and substantial progress towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament would constitute important measures during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned. The prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war should also be considered as a matter of urgent priority in the first stage.

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, for the prohibition of:

- (i) The development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently retargetable vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles;
- (ii) The research, development and testing of new nuclear-weapon systems, covering all categories of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;
- (iii) The replacement of nuclear-weapon systems currently deployed, by new and modernized versions of such systems;
- (iv) The development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems;

- (v) The development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes:

Along with measures to halt the technological arms race in nuclear weapons, steps should be taken to halt the production of such weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Commencement of negotiations on an agreement to bring about a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step-by-step manner:

- (i) Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable material for weapons purposes, to be submitted to the Secretary-General.
- (ii) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspection to establish the base on which the treaty prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would be implemented.
- (iii) Negotiations on the general and complete prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, along with a cessation of production of nuclear weapons involving the application of international safeguards to all nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis to all States.]

[Negotiations on this subject should be oriented towards elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. Such a programme could include:

- Cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;
- Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons;
- Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles;

- Gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles;
- Total elimination of nuclear weapons.]

9. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:
(Introduction as in draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD)) g/ h/

(a) [A binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, [that are committed to a non-nuclear status,] without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.] [An international instrument [or binding unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States] on the basis of an agreed common formula assuring, without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, the non-nuclear-weapon States [, which are committed by international law to a non-nuclear-weapon status,] against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.]

(a bis) [Measures to strengthen the commitment of all States to renounce the use or threat of use of force in international relations should be taken in order to make more effective the security guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.]

(b) (As in draft CPD) g/

(c) (As in draft CPD) g/

(d) Proposed alternative to subparagraph (d) in draft CPD g/

[(d) Expanded measures to enhance mutual confidence and to improve communication between Governments in both time of peace and time of crisis. These measures should include:

(i) Maintenance of hot lines;

g/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2), appendix I, chap. V.

h/ There was a proposal to include paragraph 56 of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

- (ii) Measures to reduce nuclear accidents;
- (iii) Notification of missile test launches;
- (iv) Notification of strategic exercises;
- (v) Exchange of strategic forces data.]

In this regard, the respective roles of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified.

(Text on notification to the Secretary-General to be provided by India.)

10. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]:

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States [- horizontal proliferation -] and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether [- vertical proliferation]. [The pursuit of measures on nuclear non-proliferation requires, in the first instance, the elimination of the existing inequitable and discriminatory situation as between nuclear-weapon States [and their alliance systems], on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, as well as the need to avoid disincentives for the reduction and eventual elimination of the existing nuclear-weapon arsenals.] The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include effective measures at the national level and through international agreements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures should include:

- [Measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above;]
- [The full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs [under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons];]

- [Universal adherence to and full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; universal adherence to and full implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;]
- [Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy;]
- [Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons including the full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis;]
- [[Unhindered] access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of developing countries [, under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through IAEA];]
- [Respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel-cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [provided that agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied. In this context, the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) should be developed as a potentially valuable instrument for improved arrangements which would permit nuclear trade to flow more freely under reliable and equitable non-proliferation arrangements];]
- [Agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis];]
- [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.]

11. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

Proposed alternative to the introduction in draft CPD g/

[The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned and with the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States outside the region to fully respect the denuclearized status of the zone constitute[s] an important measure in the field of disarmament and should be encouraged in order to achieve full assurance for the States of the zone against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons [and to contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons] with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones and the nuclear-weapon

States should comply fully with the [spirit,] objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones [, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons].

The nuclear-weapon States [must] [are called upon to] give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.]

Proposed additions to the introduction in draft CPD g/

[In order to be realistic, the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world must be pursued within the framework of and integrated with an effective nuclear disarmament process. The establishment of such zones would have no meaning if the accumulation and refinement of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world continues at an accelerated pace. [The consideration of this question must also deal with] the problem posed by the possible existence of clandestine nuclear-weapon arsenals in certain regions of the world [could be resolved through mutual acceptance of international safeguards by the States of the region concerned].]

[Such zones would contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as well as facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in regional contexts.]

(a) Proposed alternative to subparagraph (a) in draft CPD g/

[Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the [full observance of the spirit and full application of the letter] [Full application] of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and other relevant forums and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.]

(b) (As in draft CPD) g/

(c) (As in draft CPD) g/

(d) (As in draft CPD) g/

Proposed text merging subparagraphs (e) and (f) in draft CPD g/

[Efforts aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world [, including in various parts of Europe,] at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone, taking into account the specific security conditions of those regions.]

/...

(g) (As in draft CPD) g/

12. (As No. 8 in draft CPD) g/

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. [[Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with] [Strict compliance with and promotion of universal adherence to] [State Parties should [, in accordance with the general principles of international law,] strictly comply with, and all States which have not yet done so should [consider adhering] [adhere] to the following international instruments in order to achieve universal acceptance for them]:

(a) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925; and

(b) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction.

2. (a) (As in paragraph 3 (a) in draft CPD) g/

(b) Proposed alternatives to paragraph 3 (b) in draft CPD g/

Conclusion of an international convention [on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction] [on the prohibition of chemical weapons] [for the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons] [on chemical weapons] [on the complete and effective prohibition of all types of chemical weapons].

3. [or 3 (a)] Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes] [, including the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities] [, bearing in mind the negotiations initiated in the Committee on Disarmament and all related proposals made in the course of those negotiations].

4. [or 3 (b)] [The conclusion of an international instrument which would comprehensively prohibit attacks against nuclear facilities [, from which [inter alia,] mass destruction effects would emanate].] [Negotiations with a view to [elaborating] [strengthening] international measures aimed at the prevention of attacks against [civilian] nuclear facilities [in an appropriate context].]

5. Commencement of negotiations [, when appropriate,] with a view to an early conclusion of a [comprehensive] agreement or specific agreements on [the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of] such weapons [of mass destruction which may be identified], taking into account recent developments in science and technology.

Proposed alternatives

[Commencement of negotiations, when appropriate, with a view to the conclusion of specific agreements on such weapons of mass destruction which may be identified ...]

[Commencement of negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of a comprehensive agreement or specific agreements on the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons based on new scientific principles and achievements.]

[As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.]

Proposed alternative

[As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the States with the largest arsenals of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction should make similar declarations to renounce the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.]

Alternative text proposed by the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C

1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

2. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. [States Parties to these international instruments should strictly comply with their provisions.]

4 (b). Conclusion of an international convention [on] [providing for] the complete and effective prohibition and elimination of all types of chemical weapons.

5 (and 6). Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, bearing in mind the negotiations initiated in the Committee on Disarmament and all related proposals made in the course of those negotiations [, including consideration of the possibility of elaborating [further] international measures to prevent attacks against nuclear facilities [in this context or separately].]

7. [Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such weapons including consideration [and early conclusion] of an international [comprehensive] agreement [or agreements] on this question. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review. [The possibility of appropriate declarations on the renunciation of the development of such weapons may be considered also.]]

Proposed alternative to paragraph 7 of the Co-ordinator's text

[In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.]

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

Proposed alternatives to the introduction in the draft CPD g/

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.] Agreements and other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis relating to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved throughout the Programme, taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general

and complete disarmament. All States share a general responsibility for the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

Proposed addition to the introduction

[Conventional disarmament, both in the regional and global context, would be facilitated through the elimination and renunciation of the confrontation and conflict between opposing military alliances in various regions of the world and the recognition of non-alignment as a critical factor for stability and peace in the world as a whole.]

[1. As a first step towards a subsequent reduction of their armed forces and conventional armaments the permanent members of the Security Council and the countries which have military agreements with them shall exercise restraint in the conventional field and resolve not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments, effective from an agreed date.]

2. (As paragraph 1 in draft CPD) g/

3. (As paragraph 2 in draft CPD) g/

Proposed alternative to paragraphs 2 and 3

[The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and, accordingly, the USSR and the United States should negotiate to reduce significantly their conventional armaments and armed forces. After such reduction by the USSR and the United States, other militarily significant States should negotiate to undertake an agreed reduction in the levels of their conventional armaments and armed forces.]

[3. (a) In the course of the process of conventional disarmament emphasis should be placed on the reduction of the armed forces [and conventional armaments] which are predominantly for offensive purposes, primarily [tanks, airplanes, as well as] airborne assault forces, amphibious forces and rapid deployment forces.]

4. [In the course of the above-mentioned process, a more stable and secure situation in Europe at a lower level of armed forces and armaments on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved.

This objective should be pursued in particular through:

- Ongoing negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe;
- Convening of a conference on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe as a substantial [and integral] part of the

multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. i/

4 bis. [The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) The demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) The destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment, especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) Measures for confidence-building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.]

5. The above-mentioned measures should also include, as appropriate, agreements for a gradual reduction in the production of conventional weapons, taking into account the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.

6. During the first stage, [consultations and conferences should also be held [and, as appropriate, negotiations initiated] at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, [among States] [where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned] for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence-building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments [, particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension [and minority domination], etc.] [. In particular, States in regions of arms concentration or areas of tension have a special responsibility to pursue discussions and negotiations leading to substantial, militarily significant, and verifiable reductions of conventional armed forces and weapons] [appropriate negotiating processes, bilateral, regional or multilateral, should be initiated or pursued, especially in areas with a high concentration of armaments].

[In this context,] account should be taken of the right of each State to safeguard its security, the necessity of maintaining a military balance, especially in regions of tension, and the need to ensure the undiminished security of States at each stage.]

[In this context,] consultations should also be held among [major] arms suppliers and recipient countries with a view to the conclusion of agreements on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons [, including provisions aimed at preventing the acquisition of these weapons by unlawful clandestine entities. Such consultations should be conducted] on the basis in particular of the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a

i/ The mentioning of the Vienna talks and the European Conference under the heading "Conventional weapons and armed forces" is without prejudice to the content of the negotiations in those forums.

view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

[Further efforts to this end should be pursued on bilateral, regional or multilateral levels.]

7. (As paragraph 6 in draft CPD with brackets around subparagraph (iii) deleted) g/
8. Proposed alternative to text in paragraph 7 in draft CPD

[An agreement or agreements for the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of conventional armaments, in particular of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.]

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military [expenditures] [budgets]

1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

2. During the first stage,

[Alternative 1]

the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should start to negotiate [verifiable] [mutually acceptable] agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain their military [expenditures] [budgets] with the aim of concluding such agreements before the end of the first stage. Other States may also freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain their military [expenditures] [budgets] in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament.]

[Alternative 2

States, particularly those with the largest military arsenals, should make reductions in their military [expenditures] [budgets] taking into account their reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, reductions in the production of such weapons, reductions in their armed forces and any dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc. Such reductions should be verifiable, gradual, balanced on a mutually agreed basis.]

3. Measures to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military [expenditures] [budgets] should be without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty.

4. In order to [achieve] [facilitate progress towards the achievement of] the above-mentioned measures further efforts should be made to harmonize the views [, to promote political will] and to create confidence among States. To this effect the activities [within the United Nations] in the field of reduction of military budgets [in particular the consideration of this issue in the Disarmament Commission] [in particular those relating to the comparability and verifiability of [expenditures] [budgets]] should be continued and intensified.

5. [Alternative 1

All States and in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should endeavour to use the reporting instrument or to provide by other means the necessary elements for measuring their military [expenditures] [budgets].]

[Alternative 2

The positive political will of States, particularly, nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States, is the main prerequisite for an early conclusion of agreements on freezing and reducing their military budgets. The achievement of concrete results to this end may be rendered impossible if it is made conditional on the implementation of preliminary measures affecting security of States. The introduction of abstract or irrelevant issues in the consideration of problems relating to the reduction of military budgets may further contribute to an indefinite delay of the beginning of the process of defining the concrete dimensions of actual reduction of military budgets.]

[Alternative 3

As an essential first step toward the balanced reduction on a multilateral level of military [expenditures] [budgets], States should seek to achieve greater openness in military postures. Such openness could be facilitated by broader participation in a standardized reporting system for military [expenditures] [budgets], enabling their comparison between different periods of time and between different countries. This system should include, as an integral part, provision for verification satisfactory to all parties. To

achieve this objective the following steps should be taken. All States and in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should make use of the reporting instrument as contained in document A/35/479. An international conference should be convened to review implementation of the United Nations reporting system, further refine reporting to facilitate comparability, and consider means of data verification.]

6. In the process of [any] future negotiations, the parties should be prepared to make available to each other [the] [official] statistical data [necessary for measuring and comparing their military [expenditures] [budgets]] [relating to military budgets].

7. Pending the achievement of the above-mentioned measures all States, in particular the [most heavily armed States] [permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States], should exercise self-restraint in their military [expenditures] [budgets] with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

E. Related measures

1. (As in draft CPD) g/

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration [and adoption]] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account [the recently adopted provision on] the law of the sea].

3. (As in draft CPD) g/

Proposed alternatives

[Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) The Committee on Disarmament should consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet their objective;

(b) Measures should be pursued to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.]

[Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

(b) All States in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race and refrain from any action contrary to that aim.

(c) The Committee on Disarmament should consider [negotiations on] the question of [negotiating] [effective and verifiable] [an] agreement[s] aimed at preventing an arms race [in outer space, [including] in particular, [and as a matter of priority,] an agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems [and the development of anti-ballistic systems]] [, in particular the stationing of anti-satellite systems, in outer space].

(d) Measures should be implemented to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.]

4. [The establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document [, in particular paragraph 64]:

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at by the States concerned should be encouraged as such steps can contribute positively to [the elimination of military presence of outside powers] from the respective regions, lessening of tension, strengthening the security of States concerned, peaceful settlement of disputes and to international peace and security as a whole.

(a) The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace

[The establishment of conditions of peace and security in the Indian Ocean area is of the utmost importance]. All States should take urgent action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [to ensure conditions of peace and security in the Indian Ocean area].

In this connexion, steps should be taken immediately to create necessary conditions to facilitate preparations for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean scheduled to take place at Colombo [not later than the first half of 1983] [in accordance with decisions taken by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean].]

(b) South-East Asia

(Text pending - consultations between Indonesia and Viet Nam)

Proposed alternative to subparagraph (c) in draft CPD g/

(c) [To take positive steps towards lessening tensions and towards exerting efforts of all parties concerned, in order to find just, viable and lasting solutions through peaceful means to the outstanding problems, crises and conflicts in the Mediterranean, as well as, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to refrain from intervention, interference and threat or use of force in this region, so as to increase confidence and security and to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and co-operation.]

5. (As in draft CPD) g/

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence- [and security-] building measures

(a) While strictly observing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and fulfilling in good faith the obligations under existing agreements on disarmament, all States, especially the militarily significant States, shall undertake confidence-building [and security] measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:

- Measures relating to the improvement of communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" on the basis of mutual agreement and other methods of reducing the risks of conflict with a view to prevent attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure;
- Other measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack;
- [- Assessment of the possible implications of military research and development [, as well as of the acquisition of new arms, [and of disarmament proposals] for existing agreements and further efforts in the field of disarmament;]
- Promotion of economic co-operation bilaterally, regionally as well as globally.

(b) States shall seek to reach agreement on [effective] confidence-building measures at a global and regional level, especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist, taking into account the right of all States to undiminished security, as well as the specific needs and the situation of the region, such as the following:

- Publication [and exchange] of information on military and security-related matters, including those related to the process of disarmament;
- [- Regular bilateral and/or regional consultations of governmental representatives on such security-related matters;]
- Provisions of scholarships in military schools for the military personnel of other States;
- Exchange of military delegations and military attachés;
- [Provision] of information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres, specified movements according to pre-established procedures;
- [- Notification well in advance of major military ground manoeuvres involving a substantial portion of the State's ground forces independently or combined with amphibious and airborne components. Each State would notify the Secretary-General of each reportable manoeuvre at the same time the neighbouring States are notified;]
- Invitation to [appropriate foreign experts to observe notifiable] [military observers in connexion with] military manoeuvres;
- [- Annual universal reporting to the Secretary-General of national military expenditures [according to the established United Nations reporting system;]]
- Limitations [and exclusions] of certain military activities;
- [- Renunciation of military manoeuvres and demonstrations, particularly those with the participation of several States, near the national borders of other States;]
- [- Disengagement of armed forces deployed or stationed on international borders;]
- [- The development of [effective] confidence- and security-building measures on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), in particular by achievement of an agreement on the convening of a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe [as an integral part of the process initiated by the CSCE] [as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE.] [The measures to be negotiated within the scope of the Conference would be of military significance and politically binding, and would be provided with adequate forums of verification which correspond to their content;]
- [- The extension to the Mediterranean Sea area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of

warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory;]

- [- Application of confidence-building measures adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the Mediterranean Sea area, particularly the extension of those measures to major military-naval activities, in accordance with the provisions and goals set by the Final Act of the Conference and relevant recommendations in the context of the follow-up process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;]
- [- Efforts aimed at achieving agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory.]
- [- Development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries;]

[c. Unilateral measures such as reduction of armaments, military forces or military expenditure, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to strengthening the confidence among States.] The exercise of self-restraint by all States, particularly by the most heavily armed States, in their military expenditure could also have a positive influence in strengthening the confidence among nations.

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will bear in mind the comprehensive study on the subject prepared by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.

2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

In addition to measures aimed at the strengthening of international peace and security at lower levels of forces by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the following measures, which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, should be undertaken during the first stage:

(a) Withdrawal of all foreign [occupation] [aggression] forces from the territories of other States [and dismantling foreign military bases] in accordance with the relevant United Nations [Security Council] resolutions and the purposes and principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations [and the definition of aggression contained in resolution 3314 (XXIX)].

[The urgent settlement of international disputes and conflicts by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and through full implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.]

A Declaration by the General Assembly on the peaceful settlement of disputes between States should be adopted in order to strengthen the commitment of States to solve all their disputes by peaceful means. [Efforts should be made to encourage States to make full use of the United Nations machinery for peaceful settlements of international disputes between them] [and to further enhance the effectiveness of this machinery.]

[(b) International agreements for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the elimination of the military presence [and rivalry] [and confrontation] among foreign powers in various regions of the world, [as the situation in specific regions may allow] [including in particular the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces from the territories of other States] [including the sea areas in particular the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.]]

(c) [Mutually agreed limitation and reduction of naval activities by member States of military alliances, particularly in areas where military conflicts are most likely to arise; mutually agreed withdrawal of missile submarines from their present extensive patrol areas and restriction of missile submarine patrol areas. Extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas with major shipping lanes.]

(d) [An undertaking not to enlarge existing [or to establish new] military alliances.]

(e) [The ending of the division of Europe into military-political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations of both groupings, starting with mutual reduction of military activities.]

(f) [Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.]

(f) [In order to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, States are called upon to strictly abide by the Charter and to pursue efforts [to avert aggression and particularly bring about a complete withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops to facilitate the reaching of agreement on the prevention of the use and the threat of use of force] on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis to reach agreements to that end.]

(g) [Adoption by the Security Council of a decision forbidding any co-operation [and collusion] in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid régime of South Africa to manufacture nuclear weapons.]

[(h) To reduce secrecy and ambiguity with respect to strategic nuclear forces; nuclear-weapon States should take steps to expand the exchange of strategic forces data and provide notification of strategic exercises and test missile launches.]

3. Preventing the use of force in international relations

(a) Strict adherence to and effective compliance with all the principles and purposes embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, [in particular Article 2, paragraph 4,] which imposes on Member States the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State [or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations].

(b) In order to facilitate the full implementation of the above-mentioned provisions, States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means. In this context the following measures should be adopted:

- Full implementation of all procedures and mechanisms, referred to in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council for prompt action according to Chapter VII of the Charter.

Resort to regional arrangements or agencies, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter, for dealing with matters relating to international peace and security.

[Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty, all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.]

4. [Mobilization [Activation] of world public opinion in favour of disarmament]

[(a) In order to [mobilize] [activate] world public opinion in favour of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

(c) It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which war, in particular nuclear war, would lead. It is equally imperative to demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear [or conventional] catastrophe [, inter alia,] [by

the establishment of an authoritative international committee]. [To that end, throughout the implementation of the Programme, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connexion with Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a programme to further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular]. [The holding of a world disarmament campaign, world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect.] [All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.]

As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. [Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.]]

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

[There is a close interrelationship between disarmament and development, that is, between balanced measures to reduce military expenditure and improve the way of life of all peoples, particularly those in developing countries.

[Although the development and implementation of the new international economic order cannot depend on disarmament,] The process of disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social progress. At national level, converting resources now used for military purposes into productive use in the civilian sector. At international level, channelling some of those liberated resources to the co-operation with the developing countries. Agreement on the existence of such possibilities can be a strong incentive to move vigorously on disarmament negotiations, and can help create the public and political will to take positive steps to reduce military expenditure.

In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects

of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.]

1. There is a close interrelationship between disarmament and development.

2. [Progress in disarmament would greatly help in the realization of development. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of annihilation due to a vigorous arms race which threatens the vital security of all States.] Security has not only military and political aspects, but also involves the active promotion of the economic and social development of all States in particular of the developing countries.

3. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing States, by removing obstacles to the [required] restructuring of the international economic system on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation. An [immediate] contribution could be made to economic and social development, both nationally and internationally, by the release of resources from military purposes [through disarmament measures]. This would be of particular benefit to developing countries.

[3. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, within the framework of an international system based on justice, equity and co-operation. A contribution could be made to this end, both nationally and internationally, by the release of resources from military purposes. This would be of particular benefit to developing countries.]

[3. The economic and social development of all nations, especially the developing countries, requires fundamental changes in the present inequitable structure of international economic relations, with the objective of establishing the new international economic order. Disarmament could contribute to the achievement of this objective. In the short term, resources released from the military expenditure of the most heavily armed States should be transferred primarily as additional assistance to the developing countries. [However, the efforts to be undertaken in favour of development [in particular] of the developing countries as well as the establishment and the implementation of the new international economic order should not in any way be made dependent on progress in the field of disarmament.]]

4. A comprehensive programme of disarmament can make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States, in particular of the developing countries, through the implementation of the following measures, inter alia, with the co-operation and contributions of appropriate organs of the United Nations.

5. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress should be made in disarmament [by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States] by the [two most heavily armed States] [five permanent members of the Security Council, countries associated with them by military agreements], [major arms race participants] so that [, inter alia,] funds could be released from the [huge] military expenditure for the benefit of all countries, in particular the developing countries].

Measures

6. Against this background and bearing in mind the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development (A/36/356), effective follow-up on the disarmament-development perspective should be undertaken at different levels so that national and United Nations activities may reinforce each other.

7. [The economic and social consequences [at national and international levels] of the military spending of all States, in particular of all militarily significant States, should be assessed nationally and internationally and their public be informed about them. States have a special responsibility in this matter as regards to their own military spending.]

8. The Secretary-General, assisted by qualified experts, should up-date periodically the study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditure.

[9. [In pursuit of] [During the consideration of] the conversion of defence industries to civilian production [of the most heavily armed States] during the process of disarmament, taking into account the specific internal impacts of such measures [and the importance of international exchange of data on this issue], the following measures could be pursued:

(a) The creation [, inter alia,] by Member States in conjunction with the progress of disarmament, measures of the necessary prerequisites to facilitate the conversion of resources freed through disarmament measures to civilian purposes, including planning.

[(b) International exchange of conversion experiences [, inter alia, through the submission of reports by Member States] [through appropriate channels] from time to time on possible solutions to conversion problems]

(c) [The Secretary-General should explore methods for collection, reporting and dissemination of national information on experiences in conversion.]

(d) [The Secretary-General should take] appropriate action for identification and analysis of the possible benefits of conversion in the field of economic and social development.

(e) The matter of conversion should be included in the periodic review of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

10. All States [especially those with the largest military arsenals] should facilitate the development and implementation, at the national level, of methods for identifying and analysing the benefits that could be derived from the reallocation of military resources, following disarmament measures, to address economic and social problems at the national level and to contribute towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing [a] [the] new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. [Studies could be conducted in this field].

11. [All Member States, especially the militarily significant States, should make public data on their utilization of human and material resources for military purposes [and military transfers and participate in the United Nations reporting instrument for military budgets].

12. The Secretary-General should take appropriate action to promote and co-ordinate the incorporation in concrete and practical ways of the disarmament and development perspective in the appropriate programmes and activities of the United Nations system. In this regard, the Centre for Disarmament should be given a major role. j/

13. (a) [Bearing in mind the urgent need for increased flows of resources to promote the development [in particular] of developing countries, there exist several practical measures by which disarmament could contribute to the process. To embody the relationship and channel resources flows, there have been proposals for special funds, special accounts, a special committee, armament levies and voluntary contributions. Taking into account the capabilities and needs of the agencies and institutions currently responsible for the international transfers of resources, further consideration should be given, as an integral part of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and in its review process, to the administrative and technical modalities of establishing a special account or an international disarmament fund for development. In the first stage of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament such a new facility could be based on voluntary contributions, with further funding possibilities being considered as progress in disarmament permits. The methods adopted for generating such resources should encourage the disarmament process and the resulting funds should be allocated on a just and non-discriminatory basis [in particular] among developing countries.]

j/ This paragraph should also be considered in the chapter on machinery.

13. (b) [The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries as a result of disarmament measures should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the developing countries, and without any discrimination. A special Committee should be set up for the allocation of such funds.]

13. (c) [Immediately after the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a separate account should be established under an appropriate United Nations agency such as United Nations Development Programme, to receive voluntary contributions from Member States, particularly the most heavily armed States, and utilize these for the purposes of economic and social development of the developing countries. A study on the modalities and practical aspects of establishing a special United Nations Disarmament Fund for Development on the basis of proposals submitted on this subject should be undertaken, including the question of taxation on the military expenditure of the most heavily armed States.]

14. States should endeavour when possible to transfer to the purposes of internal and international development all resources released by disarmament measures rather than transfer them from one type of military expenditure to another.

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Disarmament and international security are directly related to each other. Together they constitute the fundamental elements of the system for the maintenance of international peace and security contained in the Charter of the United Nations. All States are fully committed to the purposes of the Charter and to the observance of its principles as well as of other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and the threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

3. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international

peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

4. In view of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces. [In the negotiations [between States with equal levels of armaments and armed forces] the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

5. Progress in disarmament has a beneficial effect on the strengthening of international security and would also help to enhance the security of States; at the same time, the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, including the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, would facilitate the adoption of measures of disarmament. Failure in one sphere has negative effects on the other. Progress in disarmament and in the strengthening of international security should thus be pursued on a parallel course.

In the elaboration of measures in this field, the conclusion of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security should be borne in mind.

- In particular, in the pursuit of security, States should take urgent measures to halt the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and to avert any kind of military conflict, in particular a nuclear war. With the same intention, the issue of conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

At the same time it is imperative to pursue in parallel the following measures:

- States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
- States should urgently settle their disputes through the strict implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law and in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
- In order to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, all States should support the strengthening of the role of the United Nations, in particular by enhancing its effectiveness in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [particularly Article 43] in the following areas:

- Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression;
- Pacific settlement of disputes as well as in international co-operation in the widest possible range of spheres.

VI. Machinery and procedures k/

[1. In conformity with its central role in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should assume the primary responsibility in the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament including [its review and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary] [through negotiations relating to specific measures included in the Comprehensive Programme as well as the review of the implementation of the Programme and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary].]

[1. In conformity with a central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations should play a more active role in this field and make every effort to facilitate the implementation of the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, its review and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary.]

2. Negotiations on the various disarmament measures that are susceptible to multilateral negotiations and specified in the comprehensive programme should, as a rule, be conducted within the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. Immediately after the adoption of the Programme, the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to initiate [as appropriate] negotiations on such measures pertaining to the first stage of the programme.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. [The States involved in such negotiations should undertake to provide at regular intervals full information on the status and details of such negotiations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Committee on Disarmament.] [Wherever feasible and appropriate, the United Nations should be invited as an observer to such negotiations and could be requested to assist these negotiations by providing objective information and advice and such other support as may be required.]

4. As a general rule, the Secretary-General of the United Nations could be designated as the depositary of international agreements negotiated within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme.

k/ This text is tentative.

[5. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened to review its implementation. [The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in] [Such special sessions of the General Assembly] shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the readjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in stages [II, III and IV] of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology.]

6. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out [at the end of each stage] of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

7. During its annual review, or [at its periodic special session] to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

8. The Disarmament Commission should play an active role in preparing the ground for subsequent negotiations on concrete agreements [including through the in-depth consideration of various expert studies in the field of disarmament prepared under the aegis of the United Nations.] It could also assist the General Assembly in the review and appraisal of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme, particularly in the interval between review conferences [including by further elaborating as appropriate the disarmament measures belonging to the later stages of the Programme.]

9. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken [either through ad hoc groups of experts or relevant institutions of the United Nations family, including as appropriate, UNIDIR] on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Whenever feasible, studies should contain concrete proposals and suggestions for negotiations or other steps to be taken.

9a. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the United Nations should make use of the necessary technical expertise of scientists. As it may deem appropriate, the United Nations could request scientists to provide it with information on technical questions.

[10. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.]

[11. Wherever feasible, the United Nations should be entrusted with the primary responsibility of monitoring the implementation of and compliance with disarmament agreements reached within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme. In this context, the United Nations should gradually develop the necessary organizational capacity and expertise required for a co-ordinated and effective and equitable international verification system designed to monitor and ensure compliance with various international, regional and bilateral disarmament agreements. As a first step, necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations so as to enable it to co-ordinate information and data concerning verification of various disarmament agreements and to discharge such responsibilities as may be entrusted to it in the field of verification under agreements reached on the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme.]

[11. The United Nations machinery for disarmament should be appropriately strengthened in order to enable the United Nations to carry out its role in contributing to and carrying out a review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In particular, the Centre for Disarmament should be provided with the resources and personnel necessary to strengthen its functions relating to (a) support and assistance to multilateral negotiations, (b) dissemination and co-ordination of information relating to disarmament matters and (c) research studies with respect to specific areas of disarmament.]

[12. An independent unit should be established within the United Nations Secretariat in order, inter alia, to assist in the negotiation of the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme, monitoring progress in such negotiations, co-ordinating verification and compliance procedures provided for in disarmament agreements, and providing such other support, advice or information as may be required by States or intergovernmental organs. This unit should be provided with adequate staff and resources and should be headed by an official at the appropriately senior level.]

[12. In order to expand and strengthen the United Nations disarmament machinery, as has been done up to now, in a gradual manner, the next step should be to change the existing "United Nations Centre for Disarmament" into a "Department for Disarmament Affairs", to be headed by an Under-Secretary-General. The Department would report directly to the Secretary-General and would be at the same level as the other Departments, such as the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.]

[12. With regard to specific measures of disarmament, parties engaged in negotiations on such measures should, as appropriate, in accordance with the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, provide for the fullest possible utilization of United Nations machinery and procedures in ensuring compliance with specific agreements. Necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations to enable it to discharge such responsibilities as may be entrusted to it in the field of verification under agreements reached on the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.]

[13. An international disarmament organization under United Nations auspices should be established, charged, inter alia, with the following tasks with respect to existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements:

- (a) implementation
- (b) verification, including fact finding
- (c) organization of review and amendment conferences
- (d) provision of information]

[13. The General Assembly decides in particular to establish a United Nations Disarmament Agency. The Secretary-General shall submit a concrete proposal to the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session regarding the practical implementation, organization and staffing of such an agency, bearing in mind, inter alia, that the agency should have sufficient resources, that it should have an independent position within the United Nations system, that it should have a governing body elected by the Assembly and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States, and that it should report directly to the Assembly.

As a first step towards an independent disarmament agency within the United Nations framework the Centre for Disarmament shall be transformed into a Department for Disarmament Affairs within the United Nations Secretariat.]

[VII. VERIFICATION]

1. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. Verification measures should be designed to not only ensure that specific agreements are being complied with, but also to contribute to confidence among States. [Disarmament measures concern the vital security interests of the States involved, and the implementation of these measures must provide for the maintenance of undiminished security of States during the disarmament process.] For this to happen, States must be assured that obligations contained in disarmament agreements are being fulfilled. [Effective verification must, therefore, in practice be reflected by the inclusion of necessary and appropriate verification measures and arrangements in specific disarmament and arms limitation agreements.]

2. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Adequate and effective verification and means to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements are significant factors in making progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control [and a key factor to ensure undiminished security to the parties involved. The importance of adequate and effective verification in the process of general and complete disarmament is twofold: as one of the essential principles upon which progress towards disarmament is based; and as an indispensable part of specific agreements to be negotiated in the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.]


[3. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. States should take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures [without exaggerating difficulties involved in their implementation].]

[A most important [pre-condition] [element] for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments: references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement [on verification measures] [on such measures and] on measures for halting the arms race].]

4. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. In the negotiation of specific agreements, where the scope of the agreement and verification measures have reciprocal influence, questions of scope and verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. [Questions relating to verification should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.]

Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures [should] [may] be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures of verification that are non-discriminatory in nature and which do not [unduly] interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development. Such methods and procedures [may] [should] encompass, as appropriate, both national and international means and include provisions as necessary [and appropriate] for on-site inspection. Consideration should also be given to experience gained to date in the development and implementation of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. [National technical means constitute the most reliable form of verification of compliance with agreements concluded thus far. However, different methods of verification can be envisaged for carrying out, on voluntary basis, depending on the purposes, scope and nature of specific agreements.]

[5. In the implementation of the comprehensive programme on disarmament, multilateral disarmament negotiations will play an important role and experience has increasingly demonstrated the need for closer attention to the development by parties to multilateral agreements of appropriate, equitable, and non-discriminatory machinery and procedures to ensure verification of and compliance with multilateral agreements. Since many States may not possess a national capability to effectively make national evaluations of compliance with agreements to which they may be a party, such agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. The United Nations should therefore play an appropriate role in monitoring and implementation of and compliance with multilateral agreements reached within the Comprehensive Programme. In this context, the United Nations should gradually develop the necessary organizational capacity and expertise in the light of the increased responsibilities that may devolve upon it as a result of the conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements. [In particular negotiations should be pursued with a view to the conclusion of an agreement for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency.] [Also, the establishment of an [international disarmament organization] [international verification agency] under United Nations auspices would be of great significance in this respect.] Necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations so as to enable it to co-ordinate information and data regarding various disarmament agreements.]



ANNEX II

List of proposals by Member States

1. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction that the active participation of the Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of the special session and the proposals and suggestions submitted by them have made a valuable contribution to the work of the session.

2. Since a number of these proposals and suggestions deserve to be studied further, taking into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made in both the general debate in plenary meeting and the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the twelfth special session, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit, together with this document, all the official records of the second special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the General Assembly may adopt at its thirty-seventh session, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating bodies dealing with the questions of disarmament. Proposals put forth for the consideration of the special session are listed below, together with résumés provided by the States concerned. a/

India

A/S-12/14/Add.2

India's approach towards and views on the World
Disarmament Campaign

In India's view, the World Disarmament Campaign should aim at educating the public opinion on the following basic matters: (a) goal; (b) priorities; (c) role of the United Nations; (d) disarmament machinery; (e) link between disarmament and development.

a/ In view of the decision to limit the length of the résumés, the following abbreviations appear in the text:

CBMs	Confidence-building measures
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD	Committee on Disarmament
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CW	Chemical weapons
DPI	Department of Public Information
GA	General Assembly
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NW	Nuclear weapon
SSOD I	First special session devoted to disarmament
SSOD II	Second special session devoted to disarmament
WDC	World Disarmament Campaign

Netherlands

A/S-12/22

International disarmament organization

The Netherlands proposed a study on the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization under United Nations auspices as the operational framework for the implementation of international arms control and disarmament agreements, including verification. Such an organization could also be charged with, inter alia, the organization of review and amendment conferences and the provision of information.

Cuba

A/S-12/AC.1/1

Telegram dated 6 June 1982 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the Secretary-General containing the communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 31 May to 4 June 1982, welcoming the convening of the second special session on disarmament

Nigeria

A/S-12/AC.1/4

The reduction of military budgets and its effect on world economy and employment and on the economic and social development of the third world

The Inter-Parliamentary Union, calls upon all Governments and Parliaments to exert their best endeavours in favour of disarmament and peace, as well as an end to the arms race; implement the decisions of the second special session on disarmament; support the provisions of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament; give absolute priority to nuclear disarmament and channel research and development efforts and resources from military pursuits to socio-economic goals particularly for the benefit of third world countries.

Hungary

A/S-12/AC.1/5

Messages on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

(1) The message of the Hungarian Peace Movement calling for the elimination of chemical and neutron weapons, for ending the arms race, for the prevention of nuclear war; (2) the letter of the Hungarian intellectuals to the President of the General Assembly; (3) the appeal of the Hungarian intellectuals addressed to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

German Democratic Republic

A/S-12/AC.1/6

Message from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic to the President of the General Assembly

Regards it as imperative that decisions on measures aimed at ending the nuclear arms race be adopted and vigorous follow-through action ensured without delay since the danger of a nuclear inferno, primarily preoccupying the minds of peoples, has been made even more acute by doctrines proclaimed about the feasibility of a limited nuclear war. What is required now is readiness to conduct honest and fruitful negotiations taking as a basis the principles of equality and equal security.

Bulgaria

A/S-12/AC.1/7

Statement issued by the participants of a meeting of the Bulgarian public

The participants call upon the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to lend fresh momentum to the policy of détente, to adopt concrete measures for limiting and halting the arms race and for achieving disarmament. They support the proposals to organize a World Disarmament Campaign and a world-wide action for collecting signatures, as well as the idea of turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Czechoslovakia

A/S-12/AC.1/8

Message from the Deputies of the Czechoslovak Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

Deputies of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly supported the programme of effective disarmament measures adopted at the 68th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the comprehensive peace programme of the USSR. Doctrines on the feasibility of a limited nuclear war put at stake the survival of mankind. Dialogue must continue and action must be taken without delay, otherwise the developments may get beyond rational control.

Bulgaria

A/S-12/AC.1/9

Message from the reunion of national committees for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Europe

Expressing their deep concern over the increasing threat of a nuclear war, the participants welcome and support the 1982 UNICEF Executive Board's message to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and address the participants of the session with the appeal to take urgent measures in order to stop the nuclear arms race and to embark on real disarmament.

USSR

A/S-12/AC.1/10
and Corr.1

Message from L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The USSR undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Reciprocal steps are expected on the part of the other nuclear States. The idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and complete elimination is close to the Soviet point of view; there is no type of weapons which the USSR would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity. The need for complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles is stressed.

USSR

A/S-12/AC.1/11
and Corr.1

Memorandum entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race"

The memorandum recapitulates USSR positions of principle and its major specific proposals on disarmament - inter alia, on the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme; limitation and reduction of strategic arms and nuclear arms in Europe; prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces; reduction of military budgets; prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space; etc.

USSR

A/S-12/AC.1/12
and Corr.1

Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction

The proposal contains provisions for ensuring that States party to the convention never and under no circumstances develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer CW and that they destroy or divert for permitted purposes accumulated stockpiles of CW and destroy or dismantle appropriate facilities. Provisions for strict control which would also comprise, along with the use of national means, international procedures, including on-site verification on an agreed basis, are envisaged.

India

A/S-12/AC.1/13 and
A/S-12/AC.1/L.4

Draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

The proposal calls for the adoption of an international convention which would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The text of such a convention has been provided.

Romania

A/S-12/AC.1/14

Appeal of the Romanian people to the second special session devoted to disarmament

The citizens of Romania appealed to the United Nations and the leaders of all States to adopt concrete measures to bring about disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament, to eliminate the nuclear weapons from Europe and to safeguard the basic human right to peace, life and freedom.

Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia

A/S-12/AC.1/15

Views of the Swiss Government on some problems dealt with at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The document refers firstly to the lack of important progress toward disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field (NPT, etc.), despite certain positive results from efforts relating to the use of certain conventional weapons. The Swiss Government attaches great importance to the activities in connexion with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) with respect to disarmament in the European region. Finally, the document reiterates Switzerland's willingness to participate in the verification of agreements in these fields.

Belgium

A/S-12/AC.1/17

Memorandum on regional disarmament with reference to resolution 36/97 H

Confirming the importance and effectiveness of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative of the States concerned, as a contribution to the realization of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control, Member States are requested to take, where appropriate, initiatives and consult with each other in the various regions with a view to agreeing on such measures which should be communicated to the Secretary-General so that they can be included in an annual progress report to the General Assembly on this matter.

Belgium

A/S-12/AC.1/18

Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons

Since the need for monitoring compliance with the prohibition of use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons has been expressed on

several occasions in the last decades, Belgium presents suggestions for an international instrument to that effect. This could take the form of a protocol whose main element would foresee the possibility of setting up an advisory committee composed of the States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons.

Italy

A/S-12/AC.1/19/Rev.1

Working paper on the institution of an international body for the verification of disarmament agreements

Italy proposes that an international body, to be created within the framework of the United Nations, be entrusted with the task of verifying the implementation and the observance of agreements in the disarmament field. This body would be established following a step-by-step approach aimed at eventually assigning to it direct responsibilities on verification, inter alia, through a corps of international inspectors established along the lines of the IAEA precedent.

Italy

A/S-12/AC.1/20

Control and limitation of the volume of the international transfer of conventional weapons

Taking into account the very large percentage of military expenditures devoted to conventional weapons and the fact that the international arms transfer is a significant factor of the large build-up in this field, Italy proposes, inter alia, that the Centre for Disarmament be entrusted with the task of keeping a register of all international transactions in conventional weapons. Member countries would provide the Centre regularly with all information relevant and necessary to the performance of that task.

India

A/S-12/AC.1/22

Message from the Prime Minister of India to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The Prime Minister proposes a five-point concrete programme of action as follows: a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons; a freeze on nuclear weapons; an immediate suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests; a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and educating the public regarding dangers from nuclear weapons and benefits from disarmament. The proposal also calls for a UN expert study on restrictions on scientific and technological research which would be inconsistent with humanitarian laws and principles.

China

A/S-12/AC.1/23

Proposal on the essential measures for an immediate halt to the arms race and for disarmament

All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and pledge unconditionally not to use NWS against non-NW States. The USSR and the USA should cease all tests, improvement and manufacture of NWS and reduce by 50 per cent their nuclear arsenals. Thereafter, all NW States should undertake to reduce their NWS according to agreed proportions and procedures. Conventional disarmament measures should be undertaken in conjunction with nuclear disarmament measures.

Romania

A/S-12/AC.1/24

Considerations of the Grand National Assembly, of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, presented to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Romania proposed, inter alia, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their gradual elimination, with special emphasis on Europe, the freezing and reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent until 1985, effective measures to increase confidence, the prohibition of the use and threat of force and peaceful settlement of all conflicts and disputes between States, the convening of a world conference of mass media on peace and disarmament, the strengthening of the United Nations role in the field of disarmament.

France

A/S-12/AC.1/25

Change of status of the Centre for Disarmament

In view of the central role and the prime responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the status of the Centre for Disarmament should be altered in order to enable it to perform its role more effectively and, in particular, to ensure better co-ordination of activities in this field. To this end, the Secretary-General is requested to create a new Secretariat department headed by an Under-Secretary-General.

Mongolia

A/S-12/AC.1/26

Measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament

The annual observance of Disarmament Week serves as an important means of mobilizing the public against the growing threat of nuclear war and for disarmament. The experience of the observance of such a Week since 1978 gives clear evidence of the need to continue and intensify United Nations activities. In view of the fact that Disarmament Week has played an important role in mobilizing world public opinion, the week starting 24 October should continue to be widely observed as a Week, devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

Viet Nam

A/S-12/AC.1/27

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam totally supports the stand mentioned in the 5 June 1982 Message addressed by Mr. Hun Sen, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to Mr. Ismat Kittani, President of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, particularly with regard to the sole authentic legitimate right of the State Council of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in all international organizations and forums including the United Nations.

German Democratic Republic

A/S-12/AC.1/28
and Corr.1

Working paper on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon

Stresses the necessity of the ban on the nuclear neutron weapon and requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. Non-nuclear-weapon States are called upon not to permit the deployment of such weapons on their territories.

German Democratic Republic

A/S-12/AC.1/29
and Corr.1

Working paper on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons

Calls for an immediate cessation of the improvement of chemical weapons and stresses the necessity of the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. States are urged to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations and from the production, stockpiling and development of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as the stationing of chemical weapons in the States where there are no such weapons at present.

German Democratic Republic

A/S-12/AC.1/30
and Corr.1

Working paper on the obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations

Emphasizes the prominent responsibility of all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to conduct without pre-conditions serious negotiations in good faith on arms limitation and disarmament on the basis of equality and undiminished security. Current negotiations should be intensified, suspended negotiations resumed and new

negotiations started on effective international agreement on items of highest priority.

Bulgaria

A/S-12/AC.1/31

World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament

The world-wide action could become an effective instrument for ensuring the broadest and active support of the world public for the decisions and recommendations of the SSOD II. If carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and with the active participation of NGOs and in the context of the WDC, this action could play a major role in generating such support and in focusing on their practical implementation.

Norway

A/S-12/AC.1/32

Committee on Disarmament, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be expanded to allow countries with special interest to become members. UNIDIR should be made an autonomous United Nations Institute with the framework, keeping a close relationship with the United Nations Secretariat. The mandate of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should be more precise. It could serve as the Advisory Board of UNIDIR and assess activities undertaken in connexion with the World Disarmament Campaign.

Turkey

A/S-12/AC.1/33

Composition of the Committee on Disarmament

Paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD I stipulates that the composition of the CD be reviewed at regular intervals. General Assembly resolution 36/97 J provides for the completion of this review during SSOD II. Paragraph 28 of the Final Document reminds all States of their duty and right to contribute to multilateral disarmament negotiations on an equal footing. Some States expressed interest in membership of an expanded CD. Consequently, a reasonable expansion of the CD is proposed.

Turkey

A/S-12/AC.1/34
and Corr.1

Confidence-building measures

In view of the current lack of international confidence and mutual trust, adoption of CBMs is more urgent than ever for facilitating the process of

disarmament. Such measures should contribute to the reduction or elimination of the causes of mistrust, misunderstanding and fear and they should provide for the exchange of information on military facts and figures. To be credible, CBMs should be militarily significant, verifiable and binding. As a first step, measures in paragraph 93 of the Final Document of SSOD I should be implemented.

Netherlands

A/S-12/AC.1/35

Structure of the Committee on Disarmament

The Netherlands considered that, although the Committee on Disarmament is master of its own procedures, it would be advantageous for this main multilateral disarmament body to have more time available for its negotiations on the different items on its agenda. The Netherlands therefore proposed that on the one hand the Committee on Disarmament should consider the possibility of being in session the year around and on the other hand that it should improve its working structure.

Bulgaria

A/S-12/AC.1/36

Declaration of the Bulgarian Inter-Parliamentary Group

The Bulgarian parliamentarians call upon the SSOD II to make energetic efforts focused on: (a) preventing nuclear catastrophe; (b) banning the production, stockpiling and deployment of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction; (c) freezing nuclear arsenals and taking measures for their radical limitation and reduction; (d) creating nuclear-free zones in different parts of Europe and in other regions of our planet; (e) checking the growth of armed forces and armaments of the conventional type and reaching agreements on their reduction.

Federal Republic of Germany

A/S-12/AC.1/37
and Corr.1

Principles and rules for verifying compliance with
a chemical weapons convention

The paper affirms that reliable and effective verification of a chemical weapons convention through a consultative mechanism is possible. It suggests rules for verification which are based on a system of regular on-site checks to be determined by random selection, as well as provisions for on-challenge inspection. The concept described is effective and practicable as it will involve only comparatively limited financial and personnel resources, but provides a strong disincentive to any possible breach of the future convention.

Federal Republic of Germany

A/S-12/AC.1/38
and Corr.1

Working paper on confidence-building measures within
the United Nations system

On the basis of the consensus results of the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures (A/36/474), the paper establishes the significance of these measures for progress in arms control and disarmament. A major task of confidence-building measures is seen in providing for more openness and transparency in military matters. The paper suggests, among others, the elaboration of a "code of conduct" for confidence-building measures.

Sweden

A/S-12/AC.1/39

Proposed amendments in the document to be elaborated on the basis of the composite paper as contained in Supplement No. 1 (A/S-12/1), annex I

This document proposes amendments in favour of the importance of verification, the environment effects of the arms race, the naval arms race and the continuation of the work of the expert group on comparison of military expenditures. A decision to establish a United Nations Disarmament Agency is proposed and as a first step a Department for Disarmament Affairs. Furthermore, a study on some technical problems concerning the comparison of military expenditures is proposed.

France

A/S-12/AC.1/40

Universal Conscience Council

The establishment, as part of the World Disarmament Campaign, of a Council consisting of eminent persons representing the main categories of spiritual, scientific, cultural and philosophical life, whose role would involve reflection and general information on the various aspects of problems relating to disarmament.

France

A/S-12/AC.1/41

Specific fact-finding arrangements for use in cases of suspected violation of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

In view of the provisions of the agreement between the United Nations and WHO, specifically articles V 2 (b) and VII, the Secretary-General might proceed, with the aid of competent experts, including representatives of WHO, to investigate the specific arrangements which could be envisaged with a view to fact-finding in the case of alleged use, or suspected violation of the 1925 Protocol relating to the use in war, of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Japan

A/S-12/AC.1/42
and Corr.1

Visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki of participants in the United Nations programme of disarmament fellowships

Offer by the Government of Japan to extend co-operation to the United Nations for a visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki of participants in the United Nations programme of disarmament fellowships, so that they will have the opportunity of observing for themselves the consequences of nuclear explosions there and of exchanging views with Japanese experts.

Japan

A/S-12/AC.1/43 Strengthening of the role of the United Nations
and Corr.1 in the field of verification

Proposal by the Government of Japan on strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of verification including the establishment of a special unit responsible for the collection of information concerning compliance with and verification of disarmament agreements, and a study on ways of assuring compliance with existing agreements that lack provisions for verification.

Japan

A/S-12/AC.1/44 Installation in the United Nations of documentation
and Corr.1 and materials concerning Japan's atomic bomb
 experiences

Proposal by the Government of Japan on the installation in the United Nations of documentation and materials concerning Japan's atomic bomb experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in order that they might be widely available to the people of all nations in support of renewed efforts for nuclear disarmament.

Japan

A/S-12/AC.1/45 Strengthening and expansion of United Nations
and Corr.1 peace-keeping functions for the promotion of
 disarmament

Proposal by the Government of Japan for a United Nations study to be carried out by a group of experts on the role the United Nations might play in the prevention and peaceful solution of international conflicts as well as in the field of peace-keeping, with a view to promoting disarmament.

Ireland

A/S-12/AC.1/46/Rev.1 Proposal for a limited moratorium

The USSR and the United States of America should agree on a moratorium on the introduction of any further strategic nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for an initial period of two years, during which time negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms should be pursued vigorously. There should also be an undertaking to renew the moratorium for further periods of two years if progress is being made in the negotiations.

Sierra Leone

A/S-12/AC.1/47

Enhancement of the effectiveness of disarmament machinery; mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament

The Secretary-General should take concrete steps within the existing resources to promote disarmament information, education and training in all countries particularly in the developing countries and should take the necessary steps to assure better utilization of United Nations information centres around the world within the context of the campaign and in particular in the developing nations.

Bulgaria

A/S-12/AC.1/48

Declaration of the Ninth Congress of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front

Expresses its full support for the Soviet pledge on non-first use of nuclear weapons and demands of all nuclear-weapon States to follow this example. Supports the turning of the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Calls upon the SSOD II to contribute to reducing and eliminating the danger of nuclear war, to curtailing the arms race.

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden

A/S-12/AC.1/49

Proposal on the follow-up decisions regarding the report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and development

The five Nordic countries propose concrete future action to be undertaken by the United Nations system and by all Member States involving, inter alia, increased flows of information on their military use of resources; studies on the social and economic costs of the arms race; the benefits of disarmament measures; and preparations for conversion of military resources to civilian purposes, following disarmament measures.

Finland

A/S-12/AC.1/50

Working paper on the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects

Finland has proposed, pursuant to paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the SSOD I and in view of important developments in both the practical implementation of existing arrangements and consideration of modalities and issues closely related to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones since the completion of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, carried out by an ad hoc group of governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD in 1975, a supplementary study on the question.

United States of America

A/S-12/AC.1/51 Statement on the World Disarmament Campaign

To ensure a balanced and universal World Disarmament Campaign, the United States proposes that seminars and discussions by, inter alia, world leaders, journalists and parliamentarians be televised or disseminated in other effective ways, and that there be a periodic, impartial review of the implementation of the Campaign.

United States of America

A/S-12/AC.1/52 International conference on military expenditures

The United States proposes that an international conference on military expenditures be convened to review the progress of the United Nations experts' group on comparison and verification of military budgets, and the implementation of past proposals aimed at making reporting more universal.

United States of America

A/S-12/AC.1/53 Proposal on the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos

The United States urges the Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, to grant full and free access to areas where chemical attacks have been reported so that the United Nations Group of Experts can conduct an effective, independent investigation to ascertain the facts concerning the use of chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

Turkey

A/S-12/AC.1/54 Organs of the disarmament machinery

Alongside measures for improving methods of the CD and reviewing its composition, SSOD II should make recommendations, based on past experience, aiming at increasing the effectiveness of the deliberative organs and of the Secretariat units concerned with disarmament. Document A/S-12/AC.1/54 contains a number of suggested recommendations, relating to the Centre for Disarmament, the Advisory Board and UNIDIR, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

France

A/S-12/AC.1/55 International satellite monitoring agency

Following the report and the expert study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency (A/AC.206/14), the Secretary-General is requested to report on practical arrangements for implementing the conclusions

of the study with regard to the institutional aspects of the proposal under consideration. The General Assembly is requested to include the item in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session.

Viet Nam

A/S-12/AC.1/56

Message on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

In acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam supports all international effective measures guaranteeing security for non-nuclear-weapon States against aggression or threat of aggression by nuclear weapons and estimates that all Member States should enjoy the same opportunities and be subjected to the same conditions in their peaceful research, development and use of nuclear energy, as well as in the exercise of their legitimate right of self-defence.

Viet Nam

A/S-12/AC.1/57

Letter on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session; dossier on United States chemical warfare and its consequences

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam brings to the notice of the General Assembly a dossier on United States chemical warfare in Viet Nam and its consequences thus emphasizing both the urgency of a total ban on chemical warfare and the responsibility of the US, vis-à-vis, the damage done to human beings and environment in Viet Nam.

Canada

A/S-12/AC.1/58

Strategy of suffocation designed to halt the technological momentum of the nuclear arms race

Proposal of Canada for a strategy of suffocation which is complementary to current negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear forces. The negotiations seek to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels; the strategy seeks to inhibit the development of new nuclear weapons systems. Taken together they represent a policy of stabilization.

Austria

A/S-12/AC.1/59

Measures to improve the reliability and objectivity of information in the military area

Efforts to increase the flow of information on military matters and to enhance its reliability and objectivity are a promising approach to dampen the arms race

and to promote disarmament. International mechanisms for the objective evaluation of the state of armament on a regional, interregional and global level could contribute to defuse international tension, build confidence and prepare the ground for disarmament measures.

Liberia

A/S-12/AC.1/60

Message on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Security guarantees of all States are important for advancing the cause of disarmament. Disarmament has to be seen in its economic and social context. Reducing military and nuclear expenditures, would encourage the development of positive interactions between States, leading to better social and economic co-operation and hopefully ensuring that mankind would be provided with the means to fight misery, disease and ignorance.

Guatemala

A/S-12/AC.1/61

Statement by the President of Guatemala on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament

Guatemala believes that arms reduction is vital to world peace and development and the prosperity of peoples. General and complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would help to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The resources currently devoted to arms could be channelled so as to help third world countries achieve economic and social development.

Bangladesh

A/S-12/AC.1/62

Organs of disarmament machinery

The Government of Bangladesh believes that there is urgent need for strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The Bangladesh Government also believes that in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament as a single multilateral negotiating body, the membership of the Disarmament Committee should be expanded in a balanced manner without any further delay.

Egypt

A/S-12/AC.1/63

Measures to enhance the effectiveness of the activities of the United Nations information centres related to the programme for the World Disarmament Campaign

(1) The United Nations should seek the role of Governments to help carry out the Campaign's objectives. (2) Elimination of factors that deem the world public thinking receptive to the concept of armaments. (3) Employment of psychological methods to instil the concept of disarmament through educational programmes for children. (4) Conducting periodical assessments of the activities of DPI in which the Disarmament Commission should be given a role.

Yugoslavia

A/S-12/AC.1/64 Strengthening of security and co-operation in the
Mediterranean

Lessening tensions and exerting efforts of all parties concerned in order to find just, viable and lasting solutions to the outstanding problems, crises and conflicts in the Mediterranean, as well as, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of the Final Act of the CSCE, to refrain from intervention, interference and threat or use of force in this region, so as to increase confidence and security and to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and co-operation.

Sweden

A/S-12/AC.1/66 The need for a study on military research and
development and its impact on the arms race

A study on military research and development and its impact on the arms race, with particular regard to the consideration of concrete measures for the prevention of the further use of science and technology for military purposes is deemed important.

Sweden

A/S-12/AC.1/67 The need for a study on the naval arms race

The naval arms race is an issue that has attracted relatively little attention. Only a few measures have been undertaken. At the same time the increase of the military capabilities at sea, including nuclear capabilities, is dramatic. Recent agreement on basic law-of-the-sea concepts has paved the way for a United Nations study now of this issue.

India

A/S-12/AC.1/L.1 Freeze on nuclear weapons
and Corr.1

The proposal calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

India and Mexico

A/S-12/AC.1/L.2

Prevention of nuclear war

The Secretary-General is requested to appoint a group of eminent persons to advise on special measures and procedures designed for the collective control, management and resolution of critical or confrontational situations which could escalate to nuclear war.

Mexico and Sweden

A/S-12/AC.1/L.3

An immediate nuclear-arms freeze

A draft resolution which, at the request of the sponsors, the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (see paras. 19 and 47 of the present report).

India

A/S-12/AC.1/L.6

Urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war
and for nuclear disarmament

As a minimum programme of urgent measures for the purposes of prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament, the proposal calls upon States to undertake the following three urgent measures, progress in the implementation of which should be kept under review: (a) non-use of nuclear weapons; (b) cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons; and (c) a nuclear freeze.

ANNEX III

Text of proposals

A. Bulgaria

PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

1. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stated that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It further stated that effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority. In its Final Document, the General Assembly declared that measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.
2. Moreover, the General Assembly, expressing the views of the overwhelming majority of Member States, has consistently reiterated that the use of nuclear weapons or the first use of nuclear weapons would constitute a crime against humanity. The General Assembly has adopted various resolutions on this subject, in particular, resolutions 36/81 B, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war"; 36/92 I entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"; and 36/100 entitled "Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe".
3. Conditions prevailing today are a source of even more serious concern than those existing in 1978 because of several factors, such as the deterioration in the international situation, the growth of nuclear arsenals, the increase in accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of dangerous doctrines of "limited" or "winnable" nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred owing to malfunctioning of computers.
4. The time has come to realize that nuclear war would have devastating results on the whole of humanity. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives.
5. Although the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a first step in this direction, the use of nuclear weapons and the waging of nuclear war should be outlawed.
6. While it is the common responsibility of all Member States to initiate action to save succeeding generations from nuclear war, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibility. In this connexion, the obligation by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons should be welcomed and those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet assumed such an obligation should take reciprocal steps to this effect.
7. It is also the duty of nuclear-weapon States to show restraint and responsibility and act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

8. The General Assembly is convinced that no contradictions between States or groups of States, no differences in social systems, ways of life or ideologies and no transient interests can eclipse the fundamental need common to all the peoples - the need to safeguard peace and avert a nuclear war.

9. Today, as never before, a resolute, purposeful, considered action is required of all States in order to achieve this lofty goal.

B. Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and Netherlands

PREVENTION OF WAR, IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR WAR

1. The text could start with language to express the grave concern of all people about the continuing arms race - particularly in its nuclear aspects - and could express the profound preoccupation over the danger of war - in particular nuclear war - the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day. It could reiterate that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to initiate action to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, in particular nuclear war. The text could also indicate that conditions prevailing today are unimproved since 1978 because of several factors, such as the deterioration of international confidence, the increase of regional conflicts and the growth of arsenals - both conventional and nuclear.

2. The text could then continue by recalling the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and the provisions of Article 51 regarding the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.

3. The text could underline the primary responsibility which nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, must bear for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

4. It could call upon all nuclear-weapon States to maintain, as a priority objective, their policies to remove the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, and of the use of nuclear weapons.

5. It could urge again all States to adhere to a policy of constraint and act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing dangerous exacerbation of their relations, so as to avoid military confrontations and exclude the outbreak of war, and in particular nuclear war, between nuclear-weapon States and between any of them and other States.

6. The text could continue with a reference to existing commitments not to use any weapons, whether conventional or nuclear, except in response to attack.

7. The text could then take note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States concerning security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and stress the need to harmonize those assurances with a view to concluding effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

8. In the context of the prevention of nuclear war, the draft could underline the importance of inhibiting a further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

9. The text could also urge all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to promote the objective of the prevention of nuclear war through the preparedness for more openness and transparency, including on military budgets, and an expanded exchange of information and views on military strategy, in particular as related to nuclear weapons, with a view to enhancing both confidence and stability.

10. The text could stress the necessity to prevent attacks which may take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure, by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, such as advance notification of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches within, as well as beyond, national boundaries, advance notification of strategic exercises and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data.

11. In a final paragraph, the text could call upon the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two major ones, to attain the objective of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race by concluding agreements on significant and verifiable reductions, thereby establishing a stable equilibrium of forces at the lowest possible level on the principles of equality and undiminished security.

Appendix

List of official documents other than existing treaties:

- (a) Agreement between the United States and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War;
- (b) Resolution and decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its tenth special session;
- (c) The declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (d) Resolution 36/81 B adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981, entitled: "Prevention of nuclear war";
- (e) Special report of the Committee on Disarmament on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament; a/

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2).

- (f) Substantive report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on its work to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament; b/
- (g) Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn on 10 June 1982;
- (h) Replies of Governments in relation to resolution 36/81 B adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war".

C. India

PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Concern

1. Should a nuclear war break out, the escalation to an all-out exchange of all kinds of nuclear weapons will be rapid and inexorable. Civilization as we know it will cease to exist. All people, whether combatants or non-combatants, will perish. There will be a grave threat to the very survival of mankind and indeed of any life on the planet earth. The earth's environment may even become unfit for any kind of life in the future.

2. The international community is therefore gravely concerned at the possible outbreak of nuclear war and believes that urgent, effective steps should be taken without any further delay for the prevention of nuclear war. Any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will, therefore, be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.

Danger of nuclear war

3. The danger of the outbreak of nuclear war stems basically from the very existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of any nation or nations. This danger has grown with the increase in both the quality and quantity of nuclear arsenals, as also with the advocacy of various theories and doctrines regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in certain situations, which have continued to erode trust among nations and which have increased fear and insecurity all around.

Measures for the prevention of nuclear war

4. The prevention of nuclear war can be ensured only by stopping all kinds of proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all those States that possess them. The imperative need is to work for nuclear disarmament as part of the process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Pending nuclear

b/ Ibid., Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3).

disarmament, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. A nuclear freeze should be agreed to so that there is no further growth of nuclear weapon arsenals. Pending a comprehensive test ban, there should be an immediate suspension of all testing of nuclear weapons.

Responsibility of States

5. The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility for the prevention of nuclear war. All Member States have a shared responsibility to make their contributions to international deliberations and negotiations for the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, with the highest priority being accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

Appeal

6. The General Assembly of the United Nations met at its second special session devoted to disarmament appeals to all Member States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to initiate urgent action for the prevention of nuclear war. The General Assembly is also convinced that an aroused public opinion against the very existence of nuclear weapons and for their elimination is the best hope of mankind for the prevention of nuclear war.

ANNEX IV

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

1. The United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament was established by the General Assembly at the initiative of Nigeria during its first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 in order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries. The specialized training of government officials undertaken within the framework of the programme since its inception in 1979 has become one of the more concrete results of the special session.

2. The result of the implementation of the programme thus far, including the continuing contribution to disarmament negotiations by former fellows, confirms the view that the programme has justified the hopes which inspired its establishment. In view of the growing interest which continues to be manifested in the programme by an ever-increasing number of States, an expansion of the programme in terms of its content and number of awards has become desirable. To this end, the Working Group recommends that the General Assembly should decide:

3. (a) To commend the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme of fellowships on disarmament has been conducted so far;

(b) To endorse the report of the Secretary-General on the programme as contained in document A/S-12/8 and Corr.1;

(c) To continue the programme;

(d) To increase the number of fellowships from 20 to 25 from 1983 onwards;

(e) To request the Secretary-General to continue to apply the same criteria of objectivity and balance in drawing up the future programme for fellowships as he has done so far, in accordance with the guidelines established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session (resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978);

(f) To express its appreciation to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden for inviting fellows to their countries to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the over-all objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows; in this connexion, to welcome the offer of the Government of Japan to enable participants in the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki and encourage other Member States to extend similar support for the programme;

(g) To request the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session the financial implications of awarding 25 fellowships for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations, taking into account the necessary staffing requirements to meet the level of activities and structure of the programme and bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

ANNEX V

World Disarmament Campaign

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 7 June 1982, the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, launched a World Disarmament Campaign under United Nations auspices in conformity with the principles laid down in paragraphs 15 and 99 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978 and bearing in mind the measures contemplated in paragraphs 100 to 107 of that document. The World Disarmament Campaign is intended to promote public interest in and support for the goals set out in the paragraphs referred to above and in particular for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Recognizing that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful measures of arms limitation and disarmament and the need for it to be well informed to discuss and debate all points of view relating to disarmament issues, its objectives and conditions, the General Assembly is aware of the public concern at the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and its negative social and economic consequences, as expressed in the oral and written presentations addressed to the second special session devoted to disarmament by non-governmental organizations and research institutes. Taking into account the operational guidelines and modalities defined in the reports of the Secretary-General contained in documents A/36/458 and A/S-12/27, the World Disarmament Campaign should be conducted on the following basis.

II. OBJECTIVES

2. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament as stated in the Final Document adopted at the first special session, with particular reference to the priorities and measures set out by its Programme of Action, the decisions taken at the second special session, the views expressed by Member States, and the recommendations in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.
3. The Campaign should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner.
4. The universality of the Campaign should be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war.

5. The United Nations system, Member States with respect for their sovereign rights, and other bodies, in particular non-governmental organizations, all have their roles to play in achieving the objectives of the Campaign.

III. CONTENTS

6. The United Nations information and education activities conducted in accordance with the principles and purposes the Charter of the United Nations must be global in scope and content, and use those means of communication which are most appropriate in reaching the largest number of people. Although the means of informing and educating may vary from region to region, the basic thrust of the activities for the Campaign should be equally effective in all regions of the world. The elements of the Campaign should be of such a nature that they could be implemented at the global, regional and national levels.

7. The Secretary-General is requested to make every effort to make available to the public in all States, and on as wide a scale as possible, through the United Nations information centres, United Nations Development Programme offices or other appropriate United Nations offices, the substance of the statements in the general debate at the second special session as soon as possible in the official languages of the United Nations. Similarly, the texts adopted at the first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament should be brought to the attention of the public in all countries.

8. Member States should be encouraged to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of paragraph 4 above to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information. In carrying out the Campaign, emphasis should be placed on the relationship between disarmament and international security and between disarmament and development, given the benefits that could be derived from the reduction of military outlays and the reallocation of released resources for socio-economic development.

9. In this regard, the Campaign should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions.

10. The Campaign should encourage bilateral and multilateral exchanges on the basis of reciprocity and mutual agreement and give the widest possible dissemination to such exchanges, for example, among government officials, experts, academicians and journalists of differing countries.

11. The Campaign should give full consideration to the role of mass media as the most effective way to achieve wide access to the public with a view to promoting a climate of understanding, confidence and co-operation conducive to peace and disarmament.

12. In view of the fact that Disarmament Week has played a useful role in fostering the objectives of disarmament, the week starting 24 October should continue to be widely observed as Disarmament Week.

IV. MODALITIES

13. In the light of the guidance given at the second special session, the United Nations should provide the substance of information for and generally co-ordinate the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign which should be carried out at the global, regional and national levels under the United Nations auspices. The Secretary-General is urged to take the necessary steps to ensure that all appropriate resources available, human, financial and material, within the United Nations system are adequately co-ordinated in order to further the objectives of the Campaign as set out above.

14. Taking into account the existing mechanisms of co-ordination and in view of the need for reinforcing co-ordination, the Centre for Disarmament should provide the central guidance in co-ordinating the Campaign activities within the United Nations system and in maintaining liaison with the governmental and non-governmental organizations and research institutes. The Centre should also provide the substance of the information material to be disseminated in the implementation of the Campaign. Within the Campaign, the Department of Public Information should play its role as assigned by the General Assembly in utilizing its expertise and resources in public information to ensure its maximum effectiveness.

15. The Campaign should facilitate and complement existing programmes of information, research, education and training in the areas of disarmament. The promotion of such programmes should be encouraged, particularly in the developing countries, and the United Nations and its agencies should be instrumental in this process.

16. Considering the ongoing activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in promoting disarmament education as a distinct field of study and the materials produced thereby, the programme of action to be implemented by the Campaign should set out appropriate tasks for UNESCO in its fields of competence and in co-ordination with the Centre for Disarmament. The United Nations information centres should be drawn into the process of giving the widest possible dissemination to the materials for distribution, particularly among those countries where the existing facilities are not adequately utilized or equipped, bearing in mind the special needs of the developing countries in this respect.

17. Every effort should be made to ensure an equitable and timely distribution of materials in accordance with the principle of conducting the Campaign on a universal basis.

18. The General Assembly commends the Secretary-General for outlining a programme of a World Disarmament Campaign as contained in document A/S-12/27 and requests him to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh regular session the specifics of such a programme, taking into account the views expressed by Member States during the second special session.

19. Specific proposals for inclusion in the Campaign were made by delegations pertaining to: the holding of a world conference on the role of mass media; instituting a council of consciences representing eminent personalities in the spiritual, scientific, cultural and philosophical field; world-wide action for collecting signatures in favour of measures to prevent a nuclear war, curb the arms race, and for disarmament; installing in the United Nations the documentation and materials concerning Japan's atomic experiences; banning of war movies and war toys; televising or disseminating in other effective ways, addresses and discussions by world statesmen of various regions and philosophies; and disseminating in an unhindered way a range of relevant materials provided by Governments and recognized international studies institutes.

20. The Secretary-General is further requested to submit at each subsequent regular session of the General Assembly for its review, a report on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign during the preceding year, and to convey to the Assembly the relevant views of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, taking into account the tasks the Assembly may further entrust to it.

Financial implications

21. Bearing in mind the need for additional human, financial and material resources which may be necessary to implement an effective World Disarmament Campaign, the Secretary-General is urged to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh regular session a report in this respect. Member States are invited to supplement available United Nations resources with voluntary contributions to carry out the objectives of the Campaign on a world-wide basis. Voluntary contributions made by non-governmental organizations, foundations and trusts and other private sources would also be welcome.

22. Member States should co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of all the recommendations mentioned in this document.

ANNEX VI

List of non-governmental organizations and research institutions which
addressed the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session

A. Non-governmental organizations

1. Action Reconciliation/Service for Peace
2. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
3. Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace
4. Baha'i International Community
5. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
6. Christian Peace Conference
7. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the
World Council of Churches
8. Friends of the Earth
9. Friends World Committee for Consultation
10. Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation/Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Casualty Council
11. Inter-Church Peace Council
12. International Association for Religious Freedom
13. International Association for the Work of Dr. Albert Schweitzer
14. International Association of Democratic Lawyers
15. International Committee for European Security and Co-operation
16. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
17. International Co-operative Alliance
18. International Fellowship of Reconciliation
19. International Organization of Journalists
20. International Peace Bureau
21. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Inc.
22. International Union of Students
23. International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations
24. National Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign
25. Pacific Concerns Resource Center
26. Parliamentarians for World Order
27. Pax Christi International
28. Project Ploughshares

29. Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
30. Russian Orthodox Church
31. SSD II National Liaison Committee for Nuclear and General Disarmament
32. Soviet Peace Fund/Soviet Liaison Committee of Peace Forces
33. Swedish People's Parliament for Disarmament
34. Union of Arab Jurists
35. United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
36. War Resisters International
37. Women for Peace
38. Women's International Democratic Federation
39. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
40. World Association of World Federalists
41. World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession
42. World Conference on Religion and Peace
43. World Federation of Democratic Youth
44. World Federation of Scientific Workers
45. World Federation of Teachers' Unions
46. World Federation of Trade Unions
47. World Federation of United Nations Associations
48. World Jewish Congress
49. World Muslim Congress
50. World Peace Council
51. World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations
52. World Veterans Federation
53. Yugoslav League for Peace, Independence and Equality of Peoples

B. Research institutions

1. Centre for Conflict Studies
2. Center for Defense Information
3. Council for Arms Control
4. Foundation for the Study of National Defense/French Institute of Polemology

5. French Institute of International Relations
 6. Gandhi Peace Foundation
 7. Heritage Foundation
 8. Hungarian Institute of International Relations
 9. Institute for Peace Research
 10. Institute for Peace Science-Hiroshima University
 11. Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses
 12. Institute for World Economy and International Relations
 13. International Institute for Peace
 14. International Peace Academy
 15. International Peace Research Association
 16. Israeli Institute for the Study of International Affairs
 17. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
 18. Peace Research Institute-Dundas
 19. Romanian National Committee of Scientists for Peace
 20. Stanley Foundation
 21. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 22. Tampere Peace Research Institute
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