United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION Official Records\*



FIRST COMMITTEE 37th meeting held on Friday, 20 November 1981 at 10.30 a.m. New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 37TH MEETING

<u>Chairman</u>: Mr. YANGO (Philippines) (Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia) (Chairman)

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Draft resolutions were introduced by:

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Mr.	Salman (	(Iraq)	-	A/C.1/36/L.30
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Distr. GENERAL

A/C.1/36/PV.37 25 November 1981

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

81-64218

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that it will take action upon the following draft resolutions in the following order during the course of this afternoon's meeting: A/C.1/36/L.1, L.4, L.6, L.9, L.11, L.19, L.26, L.35, L.36, L.37, L.38, L.39, L.40, L.42 and L.22.

Mr. KORNEENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has already had occasion to speak in the Committee on the proposal of the Soviet Union entitled Prevention of nuclear catastrophe: declaration of the General Assembly". "e continue to believe that the adoption of that declaration, in the present international circumstances, could exert a restraining effect on the dangerous development of events in the world and would promote the creation and enhancement of the necessary climate of trust in international relations and open up additional prospects in the search for mutually acceptable solutions in negotiations concerning the limitation of nuclear We note with satisfaction that this approach to the new weapons. Soviet proposal has been supported by a large number of States. At the same time, we cannot fail to draw attention to the attempts being made by the representatives of a number of countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cast doubt on the intentions of the Soviet Union. In doing so, they express all kinds of reservations or objections and they ask many questions. Of course, we acknowledge the right of delegations to ask questions, but even a reasonably serious analysis of all these doubts, misgivings, questions, reservations and objections reveals that what we have here is, unfortunately, a situation which has become all too familiar, where yet another Soviet peace proposal runs up against a negative attitude on the part of the West and all kinds of objections, ranging from the form of the proposal right up to its consistency with the United Nations Charter.

# A/C.1/36/PV.37

#### (Mr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

Certain delegations are trying to lock for non-existent discrepancies between this proposal and other Soviet proposals with regard to limiting the nuclear arms race - proposals which were, incidentally, rejected by those very delegations.

The impression is created that, in the raising of these questions, what is really going on is an attempt not so much to clarify the nature of the Soviet proposal - which is one of extreme clarity and is aimed at the prevention of the first use of nuclear weapons and thus the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe - as, because of reluctance to accept this proposal, to try to drown it in a sea of abstract discussions, to sow confusion and distort its meaning. The way chosen for doing this is to distort not only the attitudes of the socialist countries to questions of limiting and prohibiting nuclear weapons, including the use of nuclear weapons, but the very essence of the military and political strategies of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

We believe it is necessary to repeat that offensive doctrines have nothing whatsoever in common with the policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community as far as military production is concerned. That has been repeatedly and most clearly stated by the leaders of the Soviet State. Answering questions put to him by the editor of the West German magazine <u>Der Spiegel</u> at the beginning of this month, Mr. Brezhnev stressed:

"The Soviet Union does not threateh anybody, is not planning to attack anyone. Our military doctrine is of a defensive character. It rules out preventive wars and the 'first strike' concept." (<u>TASS press release, 2 November 1981</u>) Permit me also to refer to the statement by the Defence Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Ustinov, made on 6 November this year. Speaking at a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 64th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he stated, among other things:

The orientation of military doctrine depends entirely on the class nature of the State and its policy. Aggressive aims are inherently alien to the Soviet socialist State. Its foreign policy is a policy

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## (IIr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

of peace, friendship and co-operation among peoples, and from this is derived the unvarying defensive orientation of our military doctrine.

As we can see, these statements are entirely unequivocal and do not give grounds for any other interpretation whatsoever. Some members of this Committee - for example, the representative of the United States at yesterday's meeting - in considering the draft declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, are attempting, by crude distortion of the facts, to ascribe the responsibility for the continuing arms race, and primarily the nuclear arms race, to the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. However, if one is the slightest bit objective and deals in facts and not demagogic devices and shuffled figures, one cannot help recognizing that it is not the Soviet Union but precisely the United States which has been and remains the initiater of every new spiral in the nuclear arms race, both in the creation and refinement of nuclear weapons and in the development of delivery vehicles: missiles, strategic bombers, missile-carrying atomic submarines, cruise missiles and so on. It is precisely the United States that has surrounded the Soviet Union with a circle of military bases armed with nuclear weapons. It is precisely in the United Nations that it is playing around with different versions of the idea of pre-emptive use of this weapon and its surprise effect, and Presidential directives are being issued about the acceptability of a so-called limited nuclear war.

Incidentally, the so-called SS-20 missiles were created and deployed in response to the United States medium-range nuclear missile systems aimed at Soviet towns and factories, and those missiles were, incidentally, deployed on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union in numbers offsetting equivalent weapons of those who have declared themselves our potential adversaries. PS/4/brs

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#### (Mr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

Certain delegations also allege that the draft declaration does not take into account the link between nuclear and conventional armaments. All this is an attempt to represent matters in such a way as to suggest that this draft has been introduced actually to undermine the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the military-strategic balance existing in Europe. But we would remind the Committee that the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed to member States of NATO as far back as in 1979 that agreement be reached on the non-first-use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, that is, to conclude a non-aggression pact between the parties to the European Conference. If the Western countries are really concerned about the possible outbreak of a conflict in which conventional weapons would be used and for that reason are not ready to undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, we see no reasons to prevent the conclusion of such a pact. However, this proposal of the socialist countries has still not received any positive response. So the critics of the Soviet proposal are, it would appear, still enmeshed in their own inconsistencies.

In this regard I should also like to point out that the Soviet proposal is of a universal nature. It affects not only Europe, but also Asia and Latin America and Africa, countries which, in particular, are threatened by the nuclear blackmail of racist South Africa. This is a point that is stressed in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.15, which was submitted by a large group of States. We were equally struck by another strange idea, to put it mildly, namely, that the indefiniteness of doctrines relating to the use of nuclear weapons supposedly creates a particularly stabilizing and restraining effect. This is an approach with which we absolutely cannot agree. It is not a matter of stability at all; the only result is to increase the risk of a nuclear strike and create fear of an unprovoked nuclear attack. That is all that is created by such indefiniteness. PS/4/brs

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## (Mr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

We have also been told, by the Netherlands representative, for example, that the Soviet proposal, as he put it, is not timely and first of all, so he says, we must work for progress in limiting nuclear and other weapons. Unfortunately here again we are up against a very familiar theme. As everyone knows, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries began several years ago to put forward proposals for the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of those weapons, the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and many other proposals.

In putting forward all those proposals, the socialist countries - and indeed, this is the case now - have always come up against surprisingly similar ploys. And at that time too we were told that the time for prohibiting, for example, the manufacture of nuclear weapons, so they said, had not yet come, or that the proposal was too complicated, and so on and so forth. And again, the United States and other Western countries continue to block the very creation even of a working group in the Committee on Disarmament on questions pertaining to the limitation of the nuclear arms race. It is the United States which undermined the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty and, at the same time, expanded on an unprecendented scale and in all quarters the nuclear-missile arms race, which is taking ever more dangerous turns.

The history of the struggle for disarmament has, I am afraid, produced too many examples of this kind, where, under the cover of various reservations, the adoption of concrete measures for limiting the arms race has been torpedoed. In this way, action has been thwarted largely because of the absence on the part of the Western Powers of the political will to adopt a declaration aimed at preventing the first use of nuclear weapons, an attitude dictated by the desire to free their hands to use nuclear weapons wherever and whenever it suits the Pentagon and NATO strategists.

#### (Mr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

And this is the whole sense and point of the search for pretexts - to get out of supporting the draft declaration. Of course, nothing could be easier than to declare any given proposal to be oversimplified or propagandist and in this way cover up one's own reluctance to solve any given problem.

However, the question of preventing a nuclear catastrophe is too serious and too urgent for the future of countries and peoples of all continents and, indeed, for the very existence of mankind, for it simply to be brushed aside. It is the duty of the United Nations not to permit this and to adopt the draft declaration contained in document A/C.1/36/L.2/Rev.1, thereby making a weighty contribution to the prevention of nuclear var and the preservation of mankind. We appeal to all delegations to do this.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker I should like to inform the members of the Committee that action will not be taken on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.19 this afternoon.

<u>Mr. KOSTOV</u> (Bulgaria): The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognized the potential influence of world public opinion and incorporated in the Final Document a number of specific paragraphs dealing with the need to mobilize world public opinion in behalf of disarmament.

In the years following the adoption of the Final Document, we have witnessed concerted efforts on the part of Member States, Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations to implement those important provisions. A prominent place among them belongs to the proclaiming of Disarmament Week. The special meeting that our Committee devoted to marking that occasion clearly shows that the Week has gathered momentum as a focal point of broad activities in the field of promoting public awareness of the problems created by the continuing arms race and of the urgent need to stop and reverse it, and to proceed with the process of disarmament.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The eagerness with which the international community has responded to the observance of the Week is a clear indication of the need to continue and further expand the activities of the United Nations in mobilizing world public opinion. The world disarmament campaign that has been proposed by Mexico is designed to provide another suitable opportunity for appropriate channelling of such activities on a permanent basis. We welcome and support this important initiative.

Apart from the objectives that have been followed so far in the field of information, research and education, there is another important aspect of the question of mobilizing world public opinion to which the United Nations has not yet given the attention it deserves. It is the question of identifying on the broadest possible basis the will of world public opinion concerning the course of action to be followed in the field of disarmament.

This is especially important now in view of the continuation and escalation of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and of the urgent need to halt and reverse the arms race and to prevent the imminent danger of nuclear war.

#### (Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

It is now more than ever important that the peoples of the world express, clearly and unambiguously, their will to embark on a course of practical measures aimed at checking the arms race and proceeding with disarmament. Such an actionoriented endeavour of a world-wide character would give a strong impetus to the efforts of the United Nations by providing an opportunity to test priorities in the field of disarmament and to concentrate efforts on issues of vital importance to all the peoples of the world, those peoples in whose name the lofty ideals of the Charter of the United Nations were proclaimed. Let us not forget that the Charter begins with the words "We the peoples of the United Nations...".

This is the background against which my delegation, together with the delegation of Mongolia, has put forward the idea contained in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.32, entitled "World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament," which I have the honour of introducing now.

It should be pointed out, first of all, that the idea is not a new one. Similar actions have taken place in the past and have unequivocally shown their usefulness. The recent intensification of the activities of a broad range of governmental and non-governmental organizations has demonstrated anew that recourse to such actions is considered to be one of the most effective tools for the action-oriented involvement of the broad masses of the population in the decisionmaking process on issues of vital importance to the peoples. There is hardly any need to substantiate such a conclusion. The mass media provide ample evidence to that effect in their daily news coverage. Moreover, a large number of organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, have recently emphasized the need to carry out such an action on a wider scale and have to that end elaborated specific proposals for consideration. For example, the World Congress on Disarmament Education held last year by the United Nations Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) contains a similar idea among its recommendations. Recent polls and public-opinion surveys indicate that an overwhelming majority of the population in a number of countries is strongly in favour of carrying out such an action.

## (Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

With these few general remarks, I should like now to turn briefly to some of the basic provisions contained in the proposed draft resolution.

The third preambular paragraph reflects the raison d'être of the idea, which I have already explained. The fourth preambular paragraph sets forth some basic requirements that we considered essential when discussing the idea. Their purpose is to indicate the general scope and possible organization of such an action by expressing the desirability of its being carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and with the active participation of non-governmental organizations.

In operative paragraph 1, Member States are invited to give their reaction to and comments on the idea, as well as their suggestions, in order to enable the Secretary-General to prepare the report requested in operative paragraph 2. In so doing, the Secretary-General will undoubtedly be greatly assisted by the experience gathered so far by the Centre for Disarmament, and especially in connexion with the organization of the activities within the framework of Disarmament Week and the World Disarmament Campaign. In this regard, the experience of UNESCO, as well as that of other organizations in the United Nations system, would also be very helpful. The sponsors of the draft resolution do not foresee any financial implications, for its respective provisions can be implemented within the existing resources and personnel of the Secretariat.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that the main objective of the present draft resolution is to provide an opportunity for considering this important idea, both by Member States and, subsequently, by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. In view of the reneral, constructive and largely procedural nature of the draft resolution, we hope that it will have the support of the members of the Committee and that it will be adopted by consensus, if possible. <u>Ir. SUMMERHAYES</u> (United Kingdom): I should like now to make some remarks on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community on five of the draft resolutions which we have before the Committee.

I should first like to comment briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.40, which deals with the Convention on certain conventional weapons. This draft resolution has been sponsored by a number of member States of the European community, which reflects the importance that we attach to the Convention on certain conventional weapons, one we consider to be a significant step in the development of humanitarian law to reduce the suffering of victims of armed conflict. The Convention represents a considerable encouragement of our continuing efforts to implement the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. We are therefore pleased that as of 31 August, as reported by the Secretary-General, a total of 41 States had already signed the Convention, including, I would mention, all the member States of the European Community. We hope that all States will become parties to the Convention as soon as possible so that it may enter into force in the near future. We hope, therefore, that draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.40 will be adopted by consensus.

While the member States of the Ten willingly lend their support to draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.40, we consider that an important aspect of the work in this field has not yet been given adequate consideration by Members of the United Nations. This is the question of how to ensure that the Convention will be fully implemented and its obligations honoured in times of actual conflict. Last year, we drew attention to the need for States to give further careful consideration to the question of a binding fact-finding and complaints mechanism to give greater assurance of compliance with the Convention. A proposal on that subject was put forward last year at the United Nations Conference by a number of States, including several members of the Ten, and was introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany. The proposal recommended that a Consultative Committee of Experts should be set up under the Convention to investigate matters arising in connexion with its implementation. It is the firm conviction of the member States of the Ten that an adequate mechanism for the proper investigation

## (Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

of alleged breaches of the Convention would deter possible violations and contribute to strict and effective observance of its provisions. We believe that that conviction is shared by many members of this Committee. The proposal on this subject, therefore, is still before us, and we hope it will be pursued further during the next session of the General Assembly.

I should now like to speak on agenda item 55 E, relating to the study on all aspects of regional disarmament.

We welcome the consensus expressed in General Assembly resolution 35/156 D, which, <u>inter alia</u>, took note with appreciation of the study prepared by a group of governmental experts and expressed the hope that the study would encourage Governments to take initiatives and to consult within the different regions with a view to agreeing upon appropriate measures of regional disarmament.

The interest of the member States of the European Community in the regional approach to disarmament has been highlighted by their answers to the Secretary-General's letter of 28 January 1981, in which he asked for the views of States on this study and its conclusions.

The Ten are encouraged to see that this interest is also widely shared by many others in Europe and in other regions of the world.

## (Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

The report which has been submitted this year by the Secretary-General in document A/36/343 and Rev.l contains several valuable comments and suggestions. Those ideas deserve a thorough examination with a view to elaborating them further and, if appropriate, taking action upon them.

We therefore believe that it would be useful to submit the study and the views expressed by the Member States to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

It is in this spirit that the Ten share the hope that the General Assembly will adopt draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.37, which has been submitted by many delegations, including member States of the European Community, and that it will renew the consensus which was so happily expressed last year on this subject.

I should like now to make a few brief comments on the Study on the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament", contained in document A/36/392, which is at present before this Committee. The Ten believe that this excellent study, produced by the Group under the able guidance of Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, will make an important contribution to our future work. The Ten are very aware that the report, which we welcome wholeheartedly, raises a number of important questions. Among those to which the Ten attach particular importance are, for example, the need for better co-ordination between the United Nations and other disarmament organs and the institutions listed in annex 2 of the report - a list which in itself raises some important issues - the potential for rationalizing our approach to expert studies and the role which the recently created United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research might play in this context; the verification of disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations in this sphere and, of course, the question of the status of the Disarmament Centre for Disarmament upon which we all rely so heavily.

Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.9 will be considered for action by the First Committee tomorrow. The Ten are confident that it will be adopted by consensus. We look forward to a detailed consideration of the content of the report at the forthcoming second special session. BHS/gt

#### (Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Finally, I should like to make a few brief remarks on agenda item 40, entitled "Reduction of Military Budgets". The Governments of the Ten member States of the European Community have consistently supported the efforts of the General Assembly aimed at the reduction of military budgets. We have before us today two draft resolutions on this subject draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.38, introduced by Romania and draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.39, introduced by Sweden. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.38 requests the United Nations Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts with a view to identifying and elaborating principles which might govern the further actions of States in the field of the reduction of military budgets, while draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.39 emphasizes the need to increase the number of States participating in the regular reporting exercise in order to contribute to greater openness in military matters, which is particularly important for the conclusion of international agreements to reduce military expenditure.

The Ten welcome the emphasis in A/C.1/36/L.39 on the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Fanel on Military Budgets which is currently examining the fundamental problems concerning comparability and verification while working further to refine the standardized reporting instrument.

We feel we should build upon the valuable work of the <u>Ad Foc</u> Panel. In particular, we should develop a pragmatic approach based upon what has already been achieved through the use of the standardized reporting instrument. In the view of the Ten, the process of regular reporting on military expenditures could of itself make a significant contribution to the strengthening of international confidence. But if this exercise is to fulfil its promise, it is essential that a representative sample of States from different geographic regions and differing budgeting systems should contribute by completing the standardized reporting instrument. In this context, the Ten have noted with regret that as yet no contributions have been made by those States with centrally planned economies.

The Ten believe that one of the foremost objectives in the field of arms control and disarmament nerotiations must be to halt the arms race and stop the increase of world military expenditure. If we are to achieve the objective

## A/C.1/36/PV.37

## (Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

of balanced and equitable reductions in military expenditure, we feel that our approach should be based upon generally accepted procedures which provide for adequate comparability and verification while safeguarding the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence as set out in the United Nations Charter.

<u>Mr. DJOKIC</u> (Yugoslavia): The sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/36/L.25and A/C.1/36/L.26, concerning the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament, have had contacts the last few days, fuided by the desire to elaborate a draft resolution which would receive support from both sides. It is my particular pleasure to inform our Committee that such endeavours have yielded results and that now I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.26/Rev.1

I should like to point out the amendments contained in our revised draft.

First, after the second paragraph of the preamble of the original draft, a new paragraph has been included, which reads:

"Reaffirming the importance of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly which constitutes a comprehensive basis for further efforts towards promoting international security, halting and reversing the arms race and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,". Secondly, after the sixth paragraph of the preamble of the original draft, a new paragraph has been included as follows:

"Mindful of growing awareness among States and peoples of the dangers of the continuing arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and of the need to eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war,". Thirdly, operative paragraph 3 of the original draft has been amended to read:

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## (Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

"Urges those States also to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums and to proceed to or resume negotiations on effective international agreements on items of the highest priority as laid down by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;".

Finally, a new operative paragraph has been included, operative paragraph 4, which reads:

"Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results in order to contribute to the success of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade;".

In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the sponsors of the two draft resolutions, and particularly to the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, which, through their understanding and their readiness to co-operate, contributed most directly to the successful outcome of our consultations. I wish to express my conviction that our revised draft will receive general support and that it will be adopted by consensus.

## A/C.1/36/PV.37

<u>Mr. KRUTZSCH</u> (German Democratic Republic): My delegation fully endorses the statement just made by the representative of Yugoslavia. It is correct that parts of the draft resolution introduced by my delegation yesterday (A/C.1/36/L.25) have now been included in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.26/Rev.1. My delegation regards this revised draft as a satisfactory basis for a decision to be taken at this session. Therefore, we would ask that no action be initiated on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.25.

In addition, my delegation wishes to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.26/Rev.1. We thank all delegations that were ready to support our draft and would ask them to support the new draft in A/C.1/36/L.26/Rev.1.

However, we think there are ideas in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.25 which can make a contribution to further discussions on the problem of the obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations, especially in connexion with the tasks envisaged for the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. We will return to those ideas later.

In conclusion, I wish to express the high appreciation of my delegation to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.26, and especially to the representative of Yugoslavia for their fruitful co-operation.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): Israel has studied draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.34 submitted by Egypt with great care and attention. The subject matter is of utmost importance to Israel and should be so to all Member States of the Middle East. We regret to have to say that, in our opinion, the Egyptian draft does not deal with a number of fundamental as well as practical aspects of the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a realistic manner.

Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.34 is declaratory in character, and no problems in the field of arms control have as yet been solved by declarations, however solemnly given or festively proclaimed. United Nations documentation for the last 35 years is a veritable graveyard of international declarations, adopted mostly with the full support of all Member States.

The Middle East is a region characterized by conflict and tension. Besides the Arab-Israel dispute, there exist in the area other serious conflicts, some of which have developed into armed confrontations, such as the current war between

## (Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Iraq and Iran, which has already entered its second year. In such regional circumstances, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could serve as a credible barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 67 of the Final Document of the tenth special session clearly recognizes that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones will be an important contribution to non-proliferation and may be interchangeable with adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In short, a region such as the Middle East requires the employment of concrete measures if a nuclear-weapon-free zone is ever to come about.

Some such measure was proposed by the Chargé d'Affaires of Egypt in his letter to the Secretary-General of 20 April 1981:

"In the light of the step taken by my Government and to safeguard the momentum generated therefrom, it may be appropriate to consider undertaking a study to explore the modalities for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the characteristics particular to the region. In this connexion, the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones undertaken by an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1975 may be a source upon which the study in question may draw." (A/36/220, para. 5)

On 9 June of the same year, in a letter to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Israel accepted the Egyptian proposal and suggested, inter alia, as follows:

"In the meantime, the Government of Israel has taken careful note of the contents of the letter to Your Excellency from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, dated 20 April 1981 (A/36/220), in which the preparation of a study on the modalities for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is suggested. The Government of Israel welcomes this idea and, for its part, proposes that the study be undertaken by qualified experts from Middle East States, including Israel, as recommended in paragraph 248 of the Secretary-General's report of 8 October 1980 (A/35/416). There is no need to wait until all Governments in the Middle East see their way to endorsing such a study: undertaking it in the manner proposed by Israel would, by itself, constitute a valuable step in the direction of building much needed confidence between the States of the

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region prior to the holding of the preparatory Conference proposed above." (A/36/315, p. 2)

We regret that draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.34 makes no mention of this original Egyptian proposal. However modest its scope, it provided a framework for a fruitful exchange of views among qualified experts from Middle East States on the modalities required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We believe that such a committee of experts could have generated a more realistic momentum for the attainment of our common goal than can be attained by the itinerant efforts of a representative of the Secretary-General.

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No credible and practical alternative has as yet been found to direct negotiations as a way to securing common agreement.

The creation of mutual confidence among the States of the Middle East is of paramount importance to the establishment of such a zone. Therefore, Israel included in the preambular part of its draft resolution last year the sentence which stipulated:

"the establishment of a system of mutually-binding obligations which would provide each State in the region with a contractual assurance of others' compliance with the commitment to abstain from introducing nuclear weapons into the region." (A/C.1/35/L.8)

If confidence of Member States in others' compliance with the terms of the treaty is the essence and the <u>sine qua non</u> of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the treaty itself also has wider implications.

This is Israel's vision for a better future for the Middle East. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.34, though designed to attain the same aim, omits the mention of the negotiating process without which, as I have already stated, a treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is unlikely to come about. We have also other reservations to the text of that draft resolution and we shall make a statement about them at a suitable opportunity.

Nevertheless, because Israel wishes to signify its wholehearted support for the very idea of the establishment of such a zone, we shall not break the existing consensus in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.34.

<u>Mr. SHUSTOV</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The report which has been submitted to us by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Indian Ocean in document A/36/29 shows that its participants did a great deal of difficult work and although because of the position of certain delegations, it was not possible to make any progress in the matter of convening a conference on declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, as desired by the overwhelming majority of members of the Committee, the draft resolution proposed in the Committee's report in our view does nevertheless create prospects for the continuation of efforts to bring about the holding of such a conference. The

(Mr. Shustov, USSR)

draft proposes the renewal of the mandate of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee, and paragraph 5 of its operative part contains an appeal:

'to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of  $1983^{\circ}$ . (A/36/29/para. 25)

As will be recalled, the basis for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly on designating the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and a resolution of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly to convene in 1981 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, a conference on the Indian Ocean, to give effect to the idea of converting that region into a zone of peace.

The Soviet Union wholeheartedly accepts this basis. We agree with the idea of embodying in an international legal document the fundamentally important aspects of a future zone of peace, provided for in the Declaration of 1971, that is to say, the elimination of foreign military bases in the area of the Indian Ocean; non-emplacement there of nuclear weapons; cessation of the escalation of the military presence of non-littoral States, renunciation of creating any threats to the security of States of the Indian Ocean; and free and unimpeded use of the expanses of the ccean by craft of all States, subject to the observance of the principles and norms of international law.

In a compressed form, this position of ours was expressed in a joint Soviet Indian declaration, adopted following the visit of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to India in December 1980, which stated:

"The Soviet Union and India confirm their readiness to co-operate in putting into effect as soon as possible the United Nations Declaration designating the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and support the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations to hold a conference on this subject. They call for the elimination of all foreign military and naval bases in that region, such as that of Diego Garcia. They call for the prevention of the creation of new bases and condemn any attempts to build up any foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean on any pretext whatsoever".

(Ir. Shustov, USSR)

In taking this stand, the Soviet delegation categorically rejects the idea which was put forward yesterday by the United States representative which amounts to renunciation of the Declaration of 1971 and the revision of the mandate of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Indian Ocean contained in the resolution of the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Unfortunately, the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee did not succeed in carrying out that decision of the Assembly which provided for preparations to be undertaken for convening a conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981. Other time-tables were proposed, but none of them satisfied the United States or its associates.

One does not have to be particularly far-sighted to understand the sources of such a negative stand. Having declared whole regions of the Indian Ocean, in particular the Persian Gulf, as a zone of its special interest, the United States has concentrated there a military force far greater than that of all the other countries of the region taken together, or of any other State at all, for that matter. This military force continues to be built up uninterruptedly, and this is demonstrated by the military manoeuvres now being held by American troops in the Near East and the north-west portion of the Indian Ocean. In order to justify the introduction of their military, naval and air forces into the region of the Indian Ocean, the United States is using as a pretext the events in Afghanistan. But the furore which has been created on this score is a very flimsy smokescreen. It cannot conceal the well known and irrefutable facts which make it amply clear that long before the events in Afghanistan, the United States broke off talks with the USSR on the limitation of the military presence of these countries in the Indian Ocean, and began to create the base on Diego Garcia, bringing their aircraft carriers and other ships into the Persian Gulf, to prepare plans for forming a rapid deployment interventionist force and laying down a very broadly based infrastructure for their military bases in the Indian Ocean.

(Mr. Shustov, USSR)

The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to discuss in international negotiations the question of the situation around Afghanistan, either together with the problem of ensuring security in the Persian Gulf region or separately. It made it unambiguously clear that, upon agreement with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, it would withdraw its troops from that territory, given the necessary international guarantees, as soon as a halt was called to the undeclared war being waged against that country. But when does the United States intend to withdraw its armed forces from the Indian Ocean region? It has not told anyone; it has not said anything on the subject. To all appearances its military presence there is something it wants to maintain seriously, and for a long time.

Of course, those plans have nothing in common with converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. It is precisely for that reason that the United States has prevented the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee from indicating specific time frames for the holding of the Conference on the Indian Ocean and preparing its agenda. That is precisely why at yestersay's meetings the United States delegation, instead of substantively and constructively examining the question under discussion, simply engaged in perfectly useless rhetoric. That kind of approach cannot fail to give rise to incomprehension on the part of the overwhelming majority of delegations in this chamber who come here in a businesslike spirit and not just to engage in empty polemics.

For our part, our delegation would like to state that we should not like to conduct work on converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace along the lines of a bilateral or multilateral confrontation. Like other socialist countries, we are ready, for the sake of resolving the problems we face, to co-operate with both the delegations of the Non-Aligned Group and the delegations of Western States. In order to be successful in this we must give up any attempts whatsoever to impose any preliminary conditions for convening the Conference on the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union believes that there must be an improvement in the situation and that there must be an easing of tension in the Indian Ocean region, and it believes that

#### (Mr. Shustov, USSR)

it is precisely the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean that should promote the attainment of that objective.

<u>Mr. BALETA</u> (Albania) (interpretation from French): In this statement the Albanian delegation intends to make a few observations on the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

For years now this problem has been discussed on many occasions here at the United Nations, especially here in our Committee. This year we are once again considering a report of 'he Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/36/29), which our colleague and friend the representative of Sri Lanka has submitted to the Committee. That report tells us that, despite the tireless and dedicated efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and the sincere efforts of its members, that Committee has been unable to produce tangible results or to achieve any of its objectives, the most important of which is the convening this year of an international conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. As can be seen from the report, the good intentions and the sincere and understandable wishes of all have not been satisfied, leaving much to be desired.

But we do not think anyone has been taken by surprise by the meagre results of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee this year. From the beginning one expected such results, bearing in mind the enormous difficulties the Committee faced even at the last session, especially bearing in mind the still unfavourable political climate that has been prevailing in the Indian Ocean region and throughout the world.

After those very general remarks on the activities and report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Albanian delegation would like to analyse the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. There are two aspects of this problem that we should like to address.

First, we wish to express our position on the concept of a zone of peace or nuclear-weapon-free, a concept that appears in so many United Nations documents on disarmament. That concept continues to be under discussion and is subject to quite diverse and contradictory interpretations. Without the least risk of being mistaken, one can say that the concept is also subject to a great deal

## (Mr. Baleta, Albania)

of speculation. The history of the discussions on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace provides eloquent testimony to the difficulties encountered in defining the concept. The various formulas that have been used to establish the degree to which the risk of war should be reduced or the conditions that would indicate elimination of that risk in a given part of the world so that it may be termed a zone of peace, do not seem to satisfy everyone. It would not even be possible, and the first problem to be resolved is how to define a "zone of peace".

There is still another problem that arises in this connexion, one that is more thorny still, namely the real possibility of establishing true zones of peace. In this connexion our delegation has already given its opinion, when in the past we have said - and we remain convinced of this - that initiatives relating to the establishment of so-called zones of peace or nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean for example, or ideas such as the establishment of such a zone in the Balkans do not really eliminate the danger of war or the threat of weapons. The fact that from time to time the imperialist super-Powers support or urge the establishment of such zones is revealing of their intentions. Their very intensive aggressive acts throughout the world and their aggressive and hegemonistic designs lead to the conclusion that there cannot be islands of peace in an ocean of armaments and war practices, in a world in which there are very marked hotbeds of tension.

We believe that this kind of thinking can also be found regarding the situation that prevails in the Indian Ocean region. We are referring to the obstacles to the establishment of a zone of peace in that ocean. We have always quite rightly understood the concerns of a large number of countries that are faced with the serious situation that has been building up for years in the Indian Ocean and continues to deteriorate. We have also supported the desire of the countries of that region to work for the removal of factors of tension and danger from that region. In particular, we attach importance to the efforts that have been undertaken from time to time, including those of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee, as well as some of the conclusions contained in various documents which tend to identify the rivalry of the two imperialist super-Powers as the main source of the tense situation prevailing in the

## (Mr. Baleta, Albania)

Indian Ocean. We shall continue to consider just and important the requests for the withdrawal of the military troops and fleets from the Indian Ocean, the dismantling of military bases and other measures that should be adopted to the same end.

But our analysis of the situation and of developments there, especially in recent years, leads us without any doubt to say that the Indian Ocean, instead of becoming a zone of peace, continues increasingly to be a theatre of the military and political rivalry between the super-Powers, which endangers peace and security.

(Mr. Baleta, Albania)

The risk of armed confrontation is increasing. Many conflicts are already going on.

The idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace dates back to the mid-1960s, when there was an expression of concern by the littoral countries of that region in view of the military penetration and the increasing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Many years have elapsed since then, and one can see that the two super-Powers have enormously increased their military activities in the region.

The main objective of the United States in the Indian Ocean has been and continues to be the establishment of a dense network in that Ocean, in order to station military fleets, armed forces and military supply bases in the area. After the failure of the Nixon doctrine and the collapse of the Shah's régime in Iran, the military strategists of the United States intensified their efforts to prepare new doctrines and to secure other bases and staging areas in the littoral countries as well as on the territories of some hinterland countries. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan offered the United States an opportunity to speed up the pace of its military build-up and to complete its series of military bases with the super-base on the island of Diego Garcia as the central point. The Indian Ocean is considered to be one of the most likely areas for using United States rapiddeployment forces, for which it provides landing-stages and supply bases.

The activities of the Soviet Union keep pace with those of the United States, pursuing the same hegemonistic and expansionistic aims and methods, consisting of maintaining an impressive military presence, obtaining military bases and other facilities in various littoral and hinterland countries. The military occupation of Afghanistan is part of the efforts of the Soviet Union to strengthen its military preparedness to act in the Indian Ocean region, especially to ensure logistic support by air for its naval fleets and long-range weapons.

There is no need to try to describe in detail all the military power that the two imperialistic super-Powers have concentrated in the Indian Ocean

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## (Er. Baleta, Albania)

zone. It is enormous, and, since the confrontation between these two super-Powers increases with every day that passes, their military presence also acquires new dimensions and becomes qualitatively superior. In order to realize their objectives and to camouflage their aggressive actions, the super-Powers resort to every possible means of pressure and demagogy, especially in two zones which have now become very sensitive: that of the Red Sea, extending towards the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf, one of the most important oil field regions.

The two super-Powers persistently claim to have important interests they must protect in the Indian Ocean, as if the littoral countries of that Ocean did not have any interests of their own or as if those interests did not deserve to be protected. At the same time, or in turn, the United States and the Soviet Union foment disturbances in countries of that region or intervene in them directly. The hostile and aggressive policy of the United States towards Iran, the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, the bloody conflict in the Persian Gulf and the worsening of the situation in the Middle East are specific examples of the policy of intervention and domination of the two super-Powers.

There have been moments when the two super-Powers have tried to find means by which to accommodate each other in their attempts to dominate the Indian Ocean region and have even initiated negotiations to that end. At present they have opted for a harder line, one of direct confrontation and military competition. This has led to the idea that the super-Powers should have further discussions. Hopes have arisen that the two super -Powers might return to the negotiating table because of their participation in the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee and their commitment to participate in the international conference, but it seems to us that the opposite has occurred. Since the United States and the Soviet Union have net in the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee, that Committee has encountered additional difficulties, and the convening of the international conference envisaged for last summer has met with a setback.

In these conditions we believe it is even more imperative to denounce the presence and the military activity of the super-Powers in the Indian Ocean,

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#### (Mr. Baleta, Albania)

as well as their manoeuvres designed to hinder the work of the Special Committee. As for the work of that Committee in the future, we see no possible chance of achieving better results than in the past, and consequently we will take the same position as last year when the Committee acts on the draft resolution.

<u>Mr. SALMAN</u> (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the delegations of Bahrain, Chad, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic and Iraq, I have the pleasure of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.30, entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", under agenda item 56 relating to disarmament.

This draft resolution constitutes culmination of the efforts to condemn Israeli nuclear armament. As members know, the First Committee and the General Assembly have adopted at previous sessions a significant number of resolutions relating to Israeli nuclear armament. In accordance with resolution 34/89, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, appointed a Group of Experts to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament. The Group of Experts concluded that study this year, and it is contained in document A/36/431, entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

Nost of the paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.30 are tased principally on the report of the Group of Experts. In fact the fourth preambular paragraph is mainly a quotation from the report of the Group of Experts, where it states:

"Noting with concern that Israel has persistently refused to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty despite repeated calls by the General Assembly and the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under Internation Atomic Energy Agency safeguards". Operative paragraph 2 states:

"Expresses its deep alarm that the report has established that Israel has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possesses the means of delivery of such weapons".

(Mr. Salman, Iraq)

Operative paragraph 3 states:

"Also expresses its deep concern that Israel has undermined the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in particular by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities which were under Agency safeguards".

That is also confirmed in the report of the Group of Experts. Operative paragraph 4 states:

"Reaffirms that Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities and Israel's capability constitute a serious destabilizing factor in an already tense situation in the Middle East, and a grave danger to international peace and security".

Operative paragraph 8 is also derived from the report of the Group of Experts and it states:

"Demands that Israel should renounce without delay any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards".

#### (Fir. Salman, Iraq)

Nost of the draft resolutions adopted by this Committee emphasize the importance of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament. After the conclusions in the report on Israeli Nuclear Armament, it has been confirmed that Israel now has the capability of producing nuclear weapons, in addition to some political motivation which leads Israel to produce those weapons. It is therefore now imperative that the international community should assume its responsibilities by denouncing Zionist nuclear armament on the basis of the noble objectives which constitute the foundation of this international Organization and its persistent efforts to maintain international peace and security, particularly in an explosive area such as the Hiddle East.

For all those reasons, the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.30 call on all countries to take up their full responsibility by voting in favour of this draft resolution.

Mr. TAVARES NUMES (Portugal) (interpretation from French): My delegation has asked to speak in order to rake a few remarks on agenda items 55 (e) and (h) relating, respectively, to the study on all aspects of regional disarmament and to the review of the membership of the Cormittee on Disarmament.

Ly country supports general and complete disarmament under effective international control in a manner acceptable to and accepted by all parties concerned. However, present-day conditions in international relations and their foreseeable development give no grounds for hoping, if we wish to be realistic, that such an objective can be attained in the short term. On the contrary, if we wished to be pragmatic we would have to include that aim among ideal objectives which should guide the general trend of the process of disarmament and whose realization would be possible only in the long run.

On the basis of the same pragmatic attitude, if we wish truly to make significant progress in the field of disarmament, why should we not pursue less ambitious objectives, that is, objectives of more limited scope but which are more compatible with present-day conditions in international relations.

## (Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

A regional approach to the question of disarmament thus appears to be a method whose merits are self-evident. The study made following the adoption of Ceneral Assembly resolution 33/91 E, document A/35/116, has the advantage of showing very clearly what are the possibilities such an approach offers to the development of efforts by the international community to attain the objectives of disarmament.

In drawing up an inventory of disarmament measures already being applied at the regional level and those which could be subject to negotiation at the same level, the study produces a valid frame of reference for the States which wish to undertake disarmament efforts in their regions. The overall review of regional disarmament contained in that study will contribute to a better understanding of the links between the efforts and negotiations aimed at regional disarmament measures and universal disarmament.

The history of international relations shows that the tensions and the causes of conflict are frequently related to specific regions, a factor which promotes the stockpiling of weapons and the buildup of armed forces, thus increasing the risk of armed clashes and conflagrations. The importance of the regions and of negotiated disarmament measures, as well as their implementation at the regional level thus seems fully justified in the process of general and complete disarmament desired by the international community.

Those measures, negotiated in order to be applied within a limited geographical context, could easily take into consideration the specific conditions of the region. In the regional context as well as in the global, the verification of measures acquires essential importance.

The Portuguese Covernment believes that the problem of verification should play an important role in the framework of regional negotiations, because it is only effective verification machinery which will guarantee to the parties the effective realization of commitments.

## (Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

Another basic element for the effectiveness of regional arrangements aimed at disarmament measures is the initiative and the agreement of all States concerned. In particular, the support of the major military Powers of the region for the measures which have been adopted is of decisive importance. Of course, there are aspects under study which should be considered more thoroughly. That is a task which this Committee may fulfil at a later date whenever it is deemed appropriate.

My country hopes that the study of all the aspects of regional disarmament will give new impetus to the efforts of the international community to promote the objectives of disarmament, bearing in mind the fact that its conclusions and ideas are elements which can be used to advantage in negotiations relating to regional disarmament measures. In this connexion, the consideration of the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as is proposed in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/3 $\epsilon$ /L.37, seems to be fully justified.

When my delegation spoke in the general debate in this Committee, it expressed support for having the Committee on Disarmament adopt the measures needed to implement the recommendations of the tenth special session and General Assembly resolution 35/156 I.

At this time I shall make a few comments on that question, that is, on the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. That committee is at present the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament whose vocation is universal. One can therefore understand that points of interest to all States dominate its agenda, since those are questions which affect the national security of every State. Nevertheless, since the Committee on Disarmament has a limited membership of only 40 members, most members of the international community cannot take part in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

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#### (Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

Here we have a contradiction between the democracy essential in international relations and the structure adopted and employed by the multilateral negotiating body which limits the participation of States in disarmament negotiations. That democratic element was one of the concerns that governed the work of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as can be seen from paragraph 28 of the Final Document, which states that:

"all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament". (resolution S-10/2, part II, para. 28)

The recommendation to the Committee on Disarmament to review its composition at regular intervals arises from that concern. My delegation, however, believes that such an arrangement is inadequate, and that new means should be found to ensure that all States will be able to exercise the right which they have under paragraph 28 of the Final Document.

The first special session devoted to disarmament appears to have been aware of that shortcoming and attempted to lay down some guidelines to remedy it. In paragraph 120 of the Final Document, it recommended that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament be reviewed at regular intervals.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which will be held next year, provides, in our view, a particularly appropriate opportunity in this regard. In reviewing the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, the second special session will be following up the recommendations of the first special session. My delegation is extremely interested in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and hopes that the members of that body and the second special session on disarmament will be creative in working out procedures that will enable interested States to exercise their right to take part in disarmament negotiations.

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<u>Mr. KHAN</u> (Pakistan): First of all, I should like to introduce, on behalf of Argentina, Canada, the Philippines and Poland, and on behalf of my own delegation, the procedural draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.47. This draft resolution concerns a programme of research and studies on disarmament and contains a request that the Secretary-General submit his report on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. This is a purely procedural draft resolution and one that is needed because of the fact that one of the tasks of the second special session on disarmament will be to review the institutional arrangements relating to the disarmament process. Here there is certainly a link with the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, which is one of the bodies engaged in studies on disarmament and in preparing recommendations towards that end, a link that has been fully emphasized in the Secretary-General's report in document A/36/654.

Paragraph 7 of the report states:

"There was general agreement in the Advisory Board that, with the approach of the second special session devoted to disarmament, which is expected to deal, <u>inter alia</u>, with the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament ... it would be appropriate if the Board apprised the Secretary-General of the experience it had gained in the first three years of its existence and conveyed to him its views on possible future activities". (A/36/654, para. 7)

It is in view of that link, as made clear in the Secretary-General's report, that we felt the need to propose this procedural draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to submit a report on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We hope that this draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

My delegation would also like to make some comments with regard to the draft resolutions in document A/C.1/36/L.3, entitled "Study on conventional disarmament", and in document A/C.1/36/L.4, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

## (Mr. Khan, Pakistan)

The views of my delegation on the request to initiate a study on conventional disarmament take into account the decisions of the tenth special session on disarmament relating to general and complete disarmament. While fully acknowledging the high priority the tenth special session rightly assigned to nuclear disarmament, we feel that the conventional arms race and its consequences also deserve appropriate attention in our deliberations. One manifestation of the conventional arms race is the increasing resort to the use of force in international relations which, if left unchecked, would push the world closer to a wider conflict. Conventional arms also remain a principal vehicle of the great Powers for the advancement of their influence and ambitions in various parts of the world. Another serious consequence of the conventional arms race is that are situated in areas of political tension.

The study proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3, in our view, will be useful in contributing to a better understanding of the consequences of the conventional arms race and will inform world public opinion about them. It will also provide reliable information on the expenditures of a number of militarily significant nations on the acquisition of conventional arms over and above their legitimate needs for self-defence, as well as the scale of benefits accruing to a few from the sales of arms at the cost of developing nations.

#### (Mr. Khan, Pakistan)

We further believe that the study proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3 will in no manner detract from our primary concern over the escalating nuclear arms race. However, this concern with the nuclear threat must not make us oblivious to the need to understand the various aspects of the conventional arms race with a view to bringing it also under check.

Here I should like to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.4, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which calls for the renewal of the Commission's mandate for the 1981 session. At the conclusion of the last session of the Disarmament Commission, my delegation expressed its disappointment over the fact that the Commission was unable to fulfil its assigned mandate. One aspect of the mandate was to elaborate elements for the study on conventional weapons. The efforts of the Disarmament Commission, although short of a consensus, were, however, not altogether futile. The paper introduced by the representative of the Bahamas, after considerable discussion in the working group on the study of conventional weapons, set up by the Disarmament Commission during its last session, provides a valuable reference outline which can help in the elaboration of the study proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3.

We do not see any particular contradiction between draft resolutions A/C.1/36/L.4 and L.3. If the General Assembly commissions the study proposed in A/C.1/36/L.3, the Disarmament Commission, at its organizational session, can address itself appropriately to the disposal of that specific question under the renewed mandate. In any case, the Disarmament Commission has yet to complete its work on the remaining items of the agenda of its 1981 session, for which it must continue its deliberations during 1982. We hope that the Disarmament Commission will be able to overcome the difficulties that it faced during its last session. That will require a demonstration of the necessary political will on the part of Member States so as to enable it to take positive consensus decisions on the items which continue to be part of the mandate of the Commission.

<u>Mr. IBRAHIM</u> (Ethiopia): I should like to make a few comments on agenda item 49, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Indian Ocean".

First, my delegation would like to convey its congratulations to the Chairman of <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee, Ambassador Fonseka of Sri Lanka, for his painstaking and untiring efforts in guiding the Committee towards a consensus text. There had been several occasions when differences appeared insurmountable but, thanks to his dedicated efforts, it has been possible to arrive at a minimum common denominator and we have a consensus text, which appears in the report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee, document  $\Lambda/36/29$ .

My delegation deeply regrets that the <u>Ad HOc</u> Committee has been unable to prepare for and convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981, as it was specifically requested to do by the General Assembly in resolutions 34/80 B and 35/150. It had been, in fact, for that very purpose that the Committee vas expanded to include all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. It was earnestly believed that the participation of all concerned would provide the opportunity to strengthen mutual confidence, allay fears, defuse political and military tension in the region and demonstrate good-will, as well as a positive and constructive attitude and practice, on which the concept of a peace zone will ultimately depend. Instead, the United States, a new member, noting the sincere desire of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to reach a consensus, wishes to twist the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee into another Security Council, where it resorts to its veto power even to block condernation of a brutal invasion of an independent African State by <u>apartheid</u> South Africa.

Still worse, the representative of the United States in this Committee yesterday, while commenting on the report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Indian Ocean, chose to engage in gross falsification and distortion of facts in relation to my country. We regard that as either "loose talk", with which we have become familiar lately, or an attempt to score cheap propaganda points if not as a manifestation of utter imperial arrogance and contempt for the peoples of Africa and Asia. Ethiopia has always been and continues to be free, independent and sovereign. BHS/td

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### (Mr. Ibrahim, Ethiopia)

The representative of the United States also declared that his delegation regards the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as "faulty and outmoded". That naturally prompts us to take yet another close look at the contents of the Declaration as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI). The first paragraph of the preamble of that resolution underlines the determination of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to perserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, the key essence of the Declaration is the determination of those States to protect their independence and territorial integrity in accordance with the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The fact that those principles, which have been so painstakingly out together, do not sit well with the United States is not surprising, given the arrogant and warmongering policy of Washington. The attempt to dismiss them as "faulty and outmoded", has therefore little or nothing to do with whether the principles are workable or not, but has everything to do with the United States' policy of unhindered interference in the internal affairs of other nations, its arrogant unilateral declaration of spheres of interest and the naked use of force to protect that presumed interest.

For the large multitude of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, which, after a long tenacious struggle, have secured the emancipation of their land from colonial bondage, any kind of overlordship exercised through the modern version of gunboat diplomacy or the maintenance of extensive military bases, such as the one on Diego Garcia, or provocative war games, such as those now going on in the region, are totally unacceptable.

It is in this spirit that the Indian Ocean was declared a zone of peace and that the great Powers were called upon to remove their military bases and to reduce their military presence steadily and gradually until their final elimination is achieved. Nothing in the Declaration even remotely seeks to challenge the inherent right of a State to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. BHS/td

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### (Mr. Ibrahim, Ethiopia)

The Declaration also stipulates a commitment by the Indian Ocean States to conduct their relations on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality and respect for the political independence and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; an agreement not to acquire or introduce nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean region themselves or to allow their introduction by an external Power: the renunciation of the threat or use of force against any other State; and the affirmation of the need to settle their disputes with one another by peaceful means and without resort to force. Those, together with the wellestablished right to free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean by the vessels of all nations in accordance with the norms and principles of international law and custom, are all matters stipulated in the Declaration for reaching a binding international agreement in relation to the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. A/C.1/36/PV.37 56

(Mr. Ibrahim, Ethiopia)

It is these fundamental aspirations and principles that the 1971 Declaration embodies. And that same Declaration has been challenged, only yesterday, as "faulty and outmoded".

It is essentially a question dealing with the concerns and determination of the States of the region to preserve their independence and to exclude their own area from the great-Power competitive military presence, particularly in its nuclear aspect, and to create conditions of peace and tranguility that would enable them to devote their efforts to the pressing task of economic and social development. The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, nearly all of which are also non-aligned, have consistently supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace because, in it, they find a reflection of their common historical heritage, aspirations, apprehensions, and determination. These elements, as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), have been providing and continue to provide the basis for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. In this connexion, my delegation is gratified to see the mandate of the Committee renewed, as provided for in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution before the First Committee.

On the other hand, my delegation is aware of some of the constructive suggestions such as those made by the representative of Canada in his statement yesterday, and we look forward to considering them positively in the future work of the Committee.

I started my brief comments by expressing my delegation's congratulations to the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee. Permit me now to express the gratitude and appreciation of the Ethiopian delegation to the Secretary of that Committee and the other members of the Secretariat for their diligence, patience and valuable assistance. <u>Mr. JAROSZEK</u> (Poland): I should like to comment briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.2/Rev.1, concerning the initiative of the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. I have not asked to speak in order just to voice my delegation's support for that initiative: the position of Poland in this regard was authoritatively expressed at the United Nations General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland on 24 September 1981, when he said, <u>inter alia</u>:

"It is with special attention that we have noted the important proposal contained in the statement from this rostrum by Minister Andrei Gromyko concerning the adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration on preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Particularly noteworthy is the profoundly humanistic essence of the new initiative. We extend our full support to all these proposals." ( $\underline{A/36/PV.ll, p. 67}$ )

In his comprehensive statement in the disarmament debate in this Committee on 20 October, the Deputy Foreign Minister of my country subsequently restated Poland's full and resolute support for the Soviet initiative. He stressed in particular that

"... it would be fitting and proper for the Assembly to brand the first resort to  $\underline{/\mathrm{nuclear}/}$  weapons as the gravest crime against humanity and to condemn military doctrines which advocate or seek to justify such use of nuclear weapons as totally incompatible with the United Nations Charter. The moral condemnation by the international community of the first use of these weapons would be tantamount, in our opinion, to the condemnation of any use of nuclear arms. A fully effective ban on the first use of these weapons would mean that there would be neither 'second use', nor any use of nuclear weapons whatsoever." (A/C.1/36/PV.4, pp. 43 and 44-45)

I repeat: "... would be tantamount ... to the condemnation of any use of nuclear arms".

My delegation has listened with attention and great interest to the lucid and convincing statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union yesterday, in which he so ably introduced draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.2/Rev.1. The statement bears out not only the flexibility of the Soviet delegation but, as the revised text of the draft resolution indicates, the willingness to accommodate views and suggestions expressed in the course of our debate.

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#### (Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

It was quite correct of Ambassador Issraelyan to underline the general interest which the Soviet initiative had evoked. That interest, regrettably enough, has not always been entirely constructive. While it led some delegations to voice a number of questions in a spirit of co-operation and with a view to seeking a solution satisfactory to all, others did not hesitate in their choice of language to signal their negative position.

Some delegations expressed the view that the Soviet initiative limits itself to the non-first use of nuclear weapons, whilst a comprehensive ban would be preferable. Other delegations, to our surprise, found the initiative deficient because it either restated, overlapped or did not entirely coincide with earlier proposals which the Soviet Union had submitted in the United Nations. They also argued that the proposal put forward by the USSR failed to provide for a comprehensive prohibition of the use or the threat of use of force, thereby leaving open the possibility of the use of means of warfare other than nuclear.

Surely, those delegation must be aware of the 1972 Soviet initiative on the non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They must also be aware of the 1976 initiative of the USSR concerning the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Regrettably, General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII), containing the Declaration on the non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which, <u>inter alia</u>, recommended that the Security Council should take, as soon as possible, appropriate measures for the full implementation of the Declaration, has not, in fact, been acted upon so far. Naturally, it was through no fault of the Soviet Union that it failed to act. I need not stress either that the initiative of 1976 is still on the agenda of the United Mations.

As will certainly be recalled, vigorous opposition to the Soviet initiatives came from the same delegations which now appear to object to the latest USSR proposal. In our view, that line cannot but cast some doubt upon the sincerity of the position of those delegations. MP/gt/bo

# (Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

As far as the Polish delegation is concerned, we consider that the proposal to denounce the first use of nuclear weapons in no way detracts from those earlier initiatives of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it represents yet another expression of the determined and tenacious policy of probing all possibilities to avert a global nuclear conflict simply by proscribing the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons. It is our firm view that an effective ban of such a nature would be the first and major step towards eliminating any possibility of unleashing nuclear war.

Speaking in this Committee on 17 November, the representative of one of the NATO countries went so far as to comment on what he chose to call the "clearly offensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact". As a member of that defensive alliance, Poland most categorically refutes such an allegation.

### (Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The Warsaw Treaty was set up in response to, and following, the creation of NATO. It has always been and remains a purely defensive alliance. The Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty, Poland among them, have repeatedly stressed on the highest authority, confirming it also at the current session of the General Assembly, that their alliance has no purpose other than defensive. Their military doctrine does not approve of the concept of a first or pre-emptive strike. The first use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the socialist doctrine. More generally, a war of aggression is alien to our ideology and our politicomilitary concepts. It is also, of course, incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations.

The proposals contained in document A/C.1/36/L.2/Rev.1 seek to restate and reaffirm the relevant principles of the United Nations Charter within the context of the international situation which obtains in the world at present.

Bearing in mind the exceptional and critical importance of the Soviet proposal, as well as its timeliness, my delegation wishes to reiterate its full support for the Soviet proposal. We confidently expect that the General Assembly, sharing some of these concerns and considerations, will accord the draft resolution in question its overwhelming support.

<u>Mr. VENKATESWARAN</u> (India): We have before us the report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Indian Ocean, adopted by consensus, along with the consensus recommendation of the Committee. The <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee has just emerged from its travails and, despite the controversies that were generated in the course of its work over the last several months, it is to the credit of the Committee, and particularly to the patience and dedication of its Chairman, Ambassador Fonseka of Sri Lanka, that we have been able to come out with some agreed results, even if these results are less than entirely satisfactory.

My delegation is, however, seriously concerned and disturbed at the trend of deliberations in the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee. Some of the statements which we have heard from delegations on the report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee also reflect that trend. We feel that it is relevant to restate the facts concerning the setting up of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee, lest there be any confusion, doubt or wilful misrepresentation of the facts.

The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), represents the expression of the interests and aspirations of the littoral and hinterland States, most of whom had won their freedom from colonial rule after the Second World War and had decided to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean from which great-Power rivalries and military presence could be excluded, enabling the States of the area to embark on the task of national reconstruction, free from external interference and influence. The call for the removal of great-Power military presence from the Indian Ocean was our expression of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States to preserve their hard-won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In 1971, when the General Assembly adopted the Declaration, the Indian Ocean was relatively - though by no means entirely - free from great-Power military presence and rivalries. Apprehensive that in the years to come this rivalry could grow dangerously and pose a threat to their security, the non-aligned States brought up the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for endorsement before the General Assembly. The Declaration was not meant to restrict the freedom of navigation traditionally enjoyed by the great Powers and other maritime nations. For this purpose it contains a specific provision.

Unfortunately, however, our security concerns have proved right, and in spite of the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland States the military presence of the great Powers, instead of decreasing, has been increasing in such magnitude that the area of the Indian Ocean today face: a strategic and security situation which is unprecedented in its history. Never before has the Indian Ocean littoral witnessed such a massive display of destructive potential as that evidenced by the presence of the vast panoply of aircraft carriers, forward bases, and so on. It is this fact that has been the prime focus of the concerns of the littoral and hinterland States, and to which the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee should properly be addressing its attention.

Successive resolutions since 1971 have reiterated the call upon the great Powers to enter into consultations with the littoral and hinterland States with a view, first, to halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and, secondly, eliminating from the Indian Ocean bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and any manifestation of great-Power

military presence in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of their rivalry and confrontation.

It is this process of consultation which, strictly speaking, has begun since the enlargement of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee. The Committee itself, set up in terms of resolution 2992 (XXVII), is charged with the implementation of the Declaration, and it is this objective that the littoral and hinterland States have sought to achieve in the Conference on the Indian Ocean, which was scheduled to be convened during this year in Sri Lanka, in terms of resolution 34/80 B.

The expansion of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee was designed to secure the co-operation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users in the implementation of the mandate of the Committee. It was not as if the General Assembly had agreed that the objectives and mandate of the Committee should be changed in order to suit the convenience of the new members as a condition of their joining it. It was legitimate for the original members of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee to expect that the decision of the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users to join the Committee was an indication of their preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Committee's mandate, and not to overturn and scuttle it.

The attitude manifested by some delegations, however, leads one to believe that this is their precise purpose. If delegations wish to put forward a new concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, or covering any other relevant area, it would have been more appropriate for them to have put forward their suggestions separately in a resolution of the General Assembly, which my delegation might or might not have voted for, and constitute another <u>ad hoc</u> committee, which my delegation might or might not have participated in. As it stands, we find that the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee has been subjected to a systematic attempt at whittling away its very basis in order to suit the interests and preoccupations of a few new members, which are certainly contrary to the expressed will, interests and aspirations of the overwhelming number of littoral and hinterland countries of the Indian Ocean.

We are firmly of the view that the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee cannot go about examining or changing its mandate but should instead concentrate on the urgent implementation of its mandate. The draft recommendations which have been adopted by the Committee specifically confirm and continue the mandate of the Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions, which are General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII), which determines the Committee's general mandate, and resolution 34/80 B, which defines its mandate as the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

We have been told that, while there is general acceptance of the decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean as a necessary step for the implementation of the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, preparatory work of a substantive nature cannot be completed overnight and requires time. We should like to ask if since its very inception the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee has not been directed towards substantive preparations for such a Conference. Is it now intended that preparations for such a Conference should extend <u>ad infinitum</u> into the blue horizon, or is it still considered unrealistic to set a date, as all the non-aligned members of the Committee have suggested -namely, that it be convened not later than the first half of 1983?

The setting up of preconditions either with regard to the harmonization of views or with regard to the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area are, we feel, merely a pretext to kill the proposal for a Conference. While it is generally accepted that some degree of harmonization of views is necessary before a Conference of this kind can be convened, surely such harmonization is an on-going process and cannot become a precondition for its convening.

As regards the political and security clinate, it is the very seriousness of the political and security situation in the Indian Ocean, caused by the presence of great Powers and their confrontation in the area, which necessitates the early convening of such a Conference. We should not like here to state the obvious and to refer to instances of the military night and muscle of the great Powers being flexed in the Indian Ocean as well as the variations in form of this military and strategic presence

which are being employed in an effort at power projection or to serve as a deterrent to other perceived great-Power advances in the area. It is only necessary for us to refer here to the meeting in February 1981 of the Foreign Ministers of Hon-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, where concern was expressed over the growing build-up of great-Power military presence in the Indian Ocean area. I should like to quote the relevant paragraph of the New Delhi Declaration, which states as follows:

"The Ministers, seriously concerned at the dangerous tension in the area caused by the expansion of existing foreign bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the search for new base facilities, warned of the dangers of any actions that would provide pretexts for the intervention or the presence of the great Powers in the area. They also reaffirmed their determination to work for the success of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, scheduled to be held in Sri Lanka in 1981, to achieve the objectives of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and to this end urged all great Powers and other major maritime users to participate in the Conference in a constructive spirit, and to start a process of reducing their military presence in the Indian Ocean area meanwhile." (A/36/116, Annex, para. 41)

We deeply regret that the Committee has been precluded from arriving at an arrangement on the finalization of dates for the convening of the Conference in 1981 and has now to consider its being convened not later than the first half of 1983. We hope that this new deadline, at least, can be adhered to.

There has been an attempt to portray the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace as a purely regional disarmament measure. This kind of an approach flies in the face of the facts, since the peace of the Indian Ocean is threatened with being disturbed because of the escalating military presence of the great Powers. It is precisely this extra-regional

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military presence in the area which has necessitated the declaration of the area as a zone of peace.

In a very real sense the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace embodied in the Declaration contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) represents a proposal that has emanated from the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Over the years it has also represented their continued hope that this is perhaps the chief way to ensure the return of peace and tranquillity to the area. It also has represented the refusal of those States to allow the waters that wash their shores to become the battleground of outside Powers, not only affecting their political security and their economic well-being but also becoming a potential hazard for the free and unimpeded use in, innocent passage, of the ocean by the vessels of all countries.

# The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.