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Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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Draft resolutions were introduced by:

Mr. Krutzsch (German Democratic Republic) - A/C.1/36/L.14, L.36 and L.25

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

Mr. KRUTZSCH (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has the honour to introduce to the First Committee three draft resolutions.

The first draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/36/L.14. I introduce it on behalf of its sponsors, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the German Democratic Republic. The draft resolution is entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects".

There is every reason that the subject of this draft resolution should also be the central theme of discussions in the First Committee of the General Assembly at this session. The basis of the draft that it is my honour to introduce is drawn from experience gained in recent years, when the United Nations and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament started their efforts with a view to implementing the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, on matters of nuclear disarmament.

The first four preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution rely on relevant provisions of the Final Document. They make reference to the fact that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and that therefore the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. The decision at the special session that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that it is essential to halt and reverse the arms race and to proceed to disarmament is endorsed.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German
Democratic Republic)

The fifth preambular paragraph recalls resolution 35/152 B of 12 December 1980, in which the United Nations General Assembly noted with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated with both the intensification of the nuclear arms race and the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict. That doctrine has led to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race and seriously hampers the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament.

The preambular part deals also with, inter alia, activities in the Committee on Disarmament.

As far as the operative part is concerned, the demand contained in operative paragraph 1 that there be initiated, as a matter of high priority, negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to and including their total destruction is congruent with the Final Document of the tenth special session, particularly its paragraph 50.

According to operative paragraph 3, the continuation of consultations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament scheduled for 1982 would include the establishment of an ad hoc working group. Particular attention should be focused on the definition of a clear mandate in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

Operative paragraph 4 recommends as a first step the consideration of possible stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative contents. That paragraph leans on ideas expressed in both working papers and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament as well as here in this Committee.

The same is true of operative paragraph 5, which deals with discussions on the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons, particularly measures to be carried out during the first stage.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

My explanatory remarks in introducing draft resolution L.14 have been brief, but on no other item has the overwhelming majority of speakers been more convincing when pointing to the urgency of making genuine headway. No other topic has been dealt with in greater detail. Hence let me express the hope that this position will be reflected in the action on the draft resolution before the Committee.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

The next draft resolution my delegation has the honour of introducing is that contained in document A/C.1/36/L.36, on chemical and bacteriological weapons. My delegation has the honour, on behalf of the sponsors, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and the German Democratic Republic, to introduce this draft resolution.

To begin with, I should like to point out that the German Democratic Republic is also a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35, on the same subject. We support draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35 and hope that it will be adopted by consensus.

Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.36, which my delegation is now introducing, in no way contradicts draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35. Both drafts contain, in the view of all the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.36, statements and invitations complementing each other. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.36, particularly in its preambular part and in operative paragraph 3, takes account of the state of affairs in the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both States are urgently requested to resume those negotiations.

Such negotiations in the past have yielded fruitful results. That has been recognized by a large number of States. Resumption of those negotiations will have a beneficial impact on efforts to ban chemical weapons as a whole. This is especially true of the work of the relevant working group of the Committee on Disarmament. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations taking place at the same time in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament can be complementary and may enhance the effectiveness of either form of negotiation.

In operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, all States are invited to refrain from any action that could impair the negotiations. In this connexion, especially such actions are mentioned as the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons, including binary chemical weapons, and the stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of States where no such weapons exist at present.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

It is on record that the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons would be a step that would greatly worsen prospects for achieving the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would be a step towards a new round in the arms race in the chemical field. It would encourage the proliferation of chemical weapons and tend to promote the use of such weapons. It would also cause considerable problems in regard to the verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Therefore it is in the interest of achieving early results in the negotiations not even to allow the emergence of chemical weapons of such a qualitatively new type.

The appeal contained in operative paragraph 2, inviting all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, is urgent in the interests of substantial and responsible co-operation.

The adoption of the two draft resolutions, A/C.1/36/L.35 and L.36, by the Committee could be indicative of an approach to the conclusion of an urgently required convention.

Because of their interrelationship, I express the wish, on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.36, that action be taken on the two draft resolutions together.

I should like now, on behalf of my own delegation, to introduce A/C.1/36/L.25, the draft resolution on the obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations. The draft before us follows up similar measures by the German Democratic Republic in the two previous years. Recently, the timeliness of this question has grown.

First, since the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, threats to peace have increased. The alternative - either the beginning of meaningful negotiations on the basis of equal undiminished security or the further aggravation of military confrontation - must be decided in favour of peace and disarmament.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German
Democratic Republic)

Secondly, the balance-sheet in respect of the implementation of the objectives set by the Final Document is a disappointing one. With the exception of the Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, no further agreements in the field of disarmament have been adopted.

Thirdly, negotiations in the field of disarmament are being carried out only on a few questions, and progress is slow. This applies both to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and negotiations held in the regional framework, in particular at Vienna. On major objectives of the Final Document, the limitation of strategic armaments, no negotiations are under way. The bilateral or trilateral negotiations among the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have been broken off by one side.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German
Democratic Republic)

In the field of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe the beginning of negotiations is imminent. This implies the possibility of a turn for the better if such negotiations are being held on the basis of the principle of equal security and not of only unrealistic steps taken with a view to lulling the opposition of public opinion to the policy of super-armament of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Fourthly, the new impulses which are expected from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament presupposes sincere and intensive support by all States.

The draft resolution before us, contained in document A/C.1/36/L.25, states in the preamble that "no tangible progress has been achieved in the implementation" of the Final Document, the Declaration of the Second Disarmament Decade and resolutions calling for an intensification of disarmament negotiations.

Furthermore, it stresses the importance of the Final Document of the tenth special session, notably, its paragraph 28, which states that:

"All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament." (resolution S/10-2, part III, para. 28)

The preamble also emphasizes the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States and the other militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race. Further preambular paragraphs point to the fundamental importance of disarmament for the accomplishment of the principal purpose of the United Nations of maintaining international peace and security. The active participation of States in effective disarmament negotiations, therefore, corresponds to their fundamental obligation to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. We believe that the United Nations should reaffirm that objective. This includes the general obligation of States constructively to participate in disarmament negotiations. Readiness for negotiations must not be taken for granted or considered as an object for bargaining.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German
Democratic Republic)

This is endorsed and spelled out in valid international treaties and other basic documents on disarmament matters to which the preamble refers, such as, for instance, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose article VI reads:

"Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (resolution 2373 (XXII), art. VI)

This relates also to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; it relates to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; to the Treaty on the Bases of Relations between the USSR and the United States; and to the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, which was concluded in 1979 and which states that the United States and the Soviet Union are

"Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war".

(A/34/27, appendix III, vol. I, document CD/28, p. 14)

The operative part of the draft resolution deals with the questions referred to in the preamble in a concentrated form. Paragraph 2 emphasizes the prominent responsibility of all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and the other militarily significant States, with regard to disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

Reference is made to their commitment undertaken in international instruments and to the political and moral demands contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session. States shall be committed to conduct serious negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament on the basis of equality and undiminished security. Paragraph 3 derives therefrom an urgent appeal to States to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums, and to proceed with or resume the negotiations according to the priorities.

In presenting this draft resolution, the German Democratic Republic wishes to contribute towards progress in the field of disarmament negotiations. There cannot be any doubt that the significance of this issue will grow even more in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

Mr. ELLIOT (Belgium) (interpretation from French): I wish to make a brief statement in the context of the discussion of agenda item 55 G, concerning radiological weapons.

For several months now there has been no progress on that question, which has been the object of negotiations for two years in the Committee on Disarmament. And yet, the Committee has devoted a substantial part of its work to it.

It is true that the different views put forward on the subject, essentially with respect to the scope of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons, all have their merits. However, the constant repetition of divergent positions could well rapidly be transformed into a dialogue of the deaf. My delegation would prefer the Committee on Disarmament to make greater efforts to seek the necessary compromises inherent in any negotiating process.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

We are especially aware of the importance of the problem raised by Sweden with respect to deliberate attacks against nuclear facilities. We also attach great importance to the arguments of those who feel that the inclusion of such a prohibition in the convention on radiological weapons poses on the one hand complex juridical problems and on the other difficulties stemming from the need to work out a particularly relevant verification procedure.

(Mr. Elliot, Belgium)

In the light of these two positions, which have, it seems to us, been long familiar, we believe that there would be an advantage to seeking a different course. We would endeavour to conclude the negotiation on the other elements of the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons and we would embody in that convention the principle contained in the Swedish proposal while assuming the commitment to negotiate at a later date a legal instrument covering all possible implications.

We would thus respond, in part, to the concern expressed by those who wish to enhance the existing prohibitions on deliberate attacks against nuclear installations, while acting within a reasonable period of time, given the number and importance of the tasks to be carried out by the Committee on Disarmament, to add a new instrument to the body of international legislation relating to disarmament.

In addition, we would be demonstrating the capacity of the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate and its ability to conclude an agreement in the elaboration of which, for the first time in the field of disarmament, the five nuclear Powers would have participated.

It is in that spirit that Belgium will support draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.6.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): I wish to address myself to agenda items 53 and 54 relating to the problem of the so-called negative security assurances and to the draft resolutions introduced under those items.

Negative security assurances originate in the need to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, they have a wider significance, since they also contribute to the safeguarding of peace in a framework of security and stability. Negative security assurances represent, therefore, an objective of general concern which all countries, regardless of their political or military status, have a shared interest in promoting. Moreover, provided they are conceived in terms which are

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

realistic and mutually acceptable by all parties concerned, they can indeed represent an objective that could be pursued in a short time-span. They are not to be construed as a substitute for nuclear disarmament because they cannot dispose of all the problems arising from the very existence of nuclear weapons. They can, however, have a positive role in removing some elements of precariousness and uncertainty that characterize the present structure of international society.

To this end, the search for negative guarantees must be based on the fundamental principle of undiminished security for all the parties concerned. Were such a principle not strictly respected, the assurances themselves would risk creating new problems instead of contributing to the solution of existing ones.

The approach outlined in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.10 does not, in our view, conform to the principle of undiminished security. It calls upon nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories. That approach preempts the negotiations that are currently taking place with a view to reaching a common agreement, since it prejudices the content of the assurances by seriously qualifying them. Indeed, the various declarations of the nuclear-weapon States would become identical in substance through the mere acceptance of the formula advanced by one nuclear-weapon State, the Soviet Union. A universal application of such assurances would then prove impossible without corresponding mutual measures which would upset the existing equilibrium to the advantage of one super-Power, thus making more precarious the present international order.

Another approach that has been suggested is to embody in a single international juridical instrument, such as a Security Council resolution, all the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States. In our view, this approach does not constitute a suitable avenue either. It would imply a mutual recognition of the contents of such declarations and would be tantamount to sanctioning formally a disparity in the scope of application and in the conditions of the assurances, with the result of subdividing into different categories the countries

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

that are to benefit from the assurances themselves. Furthermore, such an approach would be likely to lead to a freezing of the present situation, making it more difficult to advance towards the goal of adopting assurances of a general and uniform nature.

In view of the foregoing, it is our considered view that, in the present situation, the most promising approach is that of trying to elaborate a "common formula" to be embodied in an internationally binding instrument. We note in this context that draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.17 points in this direction.

We cannot ignore the difficulties encountered in the course of the negotiations held in the Committee on Disarmament on this issue. During its 1981 session, it was possible to enlarge the discussions and to take into consideration new options for a common approach or a common formula. We are convinced that this direction is a promising one, and we also believe that the specific proposals put forward with a view to elaborating a common formula represent a good basis for further discussions.

The fundamental problems to be solved are those that relate to the requirements for eligibility of the recipient States and those related to the circumstances that could limit or suspend the application of negative guarantees.

Those problems have been debated at length within the Committee on Disarmament. We feel, however, that there is still ground for pursuing the exercise and reaching useful results. In this context, while we reaffirm the need to preserve in all cases the balance of forces at increasingly lower levels, we favour a solution that allows the broadest extension of negative security assurances and, thereby, their effective universalization.

Assuming that negative guarantees could take on a universal character, they would still not be fully credible if they could be unilaterally withdrawn. For this reason, we are ready to co-operate in the search for an internationally binding instrument of a collective nature embodying a common formula. We feel, in particular, that in the present circumstances a Security Council resolution

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

would prove to be an instrument well suited to this end. A Security Council resolution would allow, in its preambular part, for the definition of those principles and objectives that form the framework in which security assurances must be placed. A solution along such lines, although not an ideal one for some countries, would in any case represent a decisive step towards the promotion of greater international security. We ought, therefore, to exert our best endeavours from the beginning of the next session of the Committee on Disarmament in order to achieve concrete results in this field.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I have asked to speak this morning to make a statement on outer space, but before doing so I should like to thank the United States delegation for the statement it made yesterday and for its courtesy in informing this Committee immediately of President Reagan's important announcement. My delegation welcomes that announcement with gratitude. It could well be the beginning of a new and more fruitful era in our quest for arms control and real disarmament.

We had always looked forward with confidence to that opening and we trust that in the coming years other similarly courageous offers to negotiate arms reductions and even total elimination of systems will be put forward.

In my statement on 3 November, I had the opportunity of stating the views of the Netherlands on the prevention of an arms race in outer space as well as our views on the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space". On that occasion, I set out in detail why the draft treaty in question, in our view, falls short of providing for a complete ban on the development, production, testing, deployment and stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and therefore does little to "prevent an arms race in outer space", as the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament required us to seek. Through the combined effect of its operative paragraphs the draft amounts to not much more than a vague non-use commitment, and even then very much at the discretion of the State party that has undertaken such a commitment. That, in our view, is not enough.

Turning now to draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.8 submitted by the Soviet Union and others and introduced by the representative of Mongolia, it follows from my observations that the Netherlands cannot subscribe to its last preambular paragraph that would take account exclusively of that draft treaty, while ignoring an initiative that Italy took in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in 1979, when it submitted a draft protocol to the Outer Space Treaty that had a much larger scope. That was a serious initiative to start negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a prohibition of a general character.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Since then time and events have not stood still. It must now be doubted whether a single treaty or a draft protocol is the appropriate way to deal with the situation as it has developed in the meantime due to continuing reasearch, development and testing. Therefore, it is our view that, unlike the suggestion in operative paragraph 2 of A/C.1/36/L.8, the question of the appropriate form of an agreement or agreements could best be left to the Committee on Disarmament.

In operative paragraph 3 of A/C.1/36/L.8 it is suggested that an agenda item to be included in the provisional agenda of next year's thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly should be the "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space". It is the view of the Netherlands that this would not be advisable, both with regard to the scope and the form, and would not be in conformity with the task entrusted to us in paragraph 80 of the Final Document.

In conclusion, with respect to A/C.1/36/L.8 my delegation feels, on grounds that we believe to be sound, that the draft resolution sponsored by the Netherlands and several others in document A/C.1/36/L.7, must be preferred over A/C.1/36/L.8, for the reasons I mentioned. We, for our part, believe that consensus on the outer space issue before us must be considered an essential and indispensable component of achieving general and complete disarmament and that a generally acceptable approach to consensus could be based on the draft resolution sponsored by us in A/C.1/36/L.7. We, for our part, are prepared to take part in discussions with all interested delegations with a view to achieving that goal and we shall be happy to consider all constructive suggestions.

Before concluding my statement, I should like briefly to refer to the statement made a few days ago by the representative of Brazil. We thank him for the positive remarks he offered on document A/C.1/36/L.7. In so far as he considered that the sponsors of A/C.1/36/L.7 intended to narrow down the mandate to be given to the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, I can assure him that no such intention was or is in our mind. The mandate that is recommended to the Committee on Disarmament is laid down in operative paragraph 3 of our draft resolution in document A/C.1/36/L.7, and aims at "the prevention of an arms race in outer space" in conformity with paragraph 80 of the

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. In operative paragraph 4, we have identified the most immediately threatening aspect to be dealt with within the more general and broader task of "prevention of an arms race in outer space". In doing so, we did nothing less or more than to observe the provisions contained in disarmament agreements and arms control, both in force and in the drafting stage, prohibiting interference with national technical means of verification, which can be seen as reflecting an emerging general opinion on this issue that lends itself to further elaboration.

We also noted that the United States and the Soviet Union have conducted a series of bilateral talks on the same issue. At the same time, I emphasize again, as was done by the representative of Italy in this Committee, that we do not in any way intend to change the accepted order of priorities on the disarmament agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

Finally, in reference to the specific suggestion made by Ambassador Souza E Silva, we would maintain that the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, - and I must stress the word "peaceful" - is not the appropriate organ to which to refer the subject. We recall that a number of States participating in the work of that Legal Sub-Committee opposed the reduction in time of the session of the Committee in 1982 precisely because they considered that a number of important issues appeared on the agenda, such as the definition of the limits of outer space and the questions relating to the geostationary orbit. It follows from that position that those issues will have to receive adequate attention in the Legal Sub-Committee so that little or no time would remain to initiate the formidable project of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, for which in all likelihood a single treaty or additional protocol would prove not to be sufficient. It therefore appears to be inopportune for more than one reason to refer the matter to the Legal Sub-Committee, apart from the serious questions of principle that would involve a decision to bypass the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body that, as the representative of Brazil also observed, is beyond doubt the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Speaking at the conclusion of the general debate in our Committee, the Soviet delegation referred to the fact that the discussions that had taken place demonstrated, I think we can say, a single political attitude on the part of Members of the Assembly - namely, the desire to remove the threat of nuclear war which, as never before, is looming over mankind in a very acute form.

It is precisely this purpose that is sought by the Soviet proposal concerning the adoption of a declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, which affects the very core, as it were, of world politics today. We wish to take this opportunity once again to thank the delegations which have displayed interest in our initiative and supported it. At the same time, we should like to answer some of the questions and comments put forward by representatives of a number of countries during discussion of that proposal.

First, we have been told here that the Soviet Union is introducing far too many proposals on disarmament questions, and there was almost displeasure voiced over this. It has also been asserted that these proposals, dealing, in a sense, with one and the same question, are different in terms of their legal form and are not consistent. Indeed, since the appearance of nuclear weapons in 1945, we have introduced well over a dozen proposals aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, and we are proud of that. Here the line we hew to is a firm one and is based on principle. All our proposals have pursued, and pursue, one and the same purpose, and so long as nuclear war has not been outlawed we shall actively and persistently continue to adhere to this policy.

As for the multiplicity of the forms of these initiatives, there is but one explanation, and it is indeed a rather simple one: in view of the fact that all our proposals, on one or another pretext, have been rejected by the Western countries, we have been compelled to seek constantly new forms for the solution of one and the same problem. Naturally, times and circumstances have changed; accordingly, our approaches to the solution of this problem have changed. But, I repeat, the purpose - to exclude the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons and to achieve the eventual elimination of all their stockpiles - has remained unchanged.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Here it should be pointed out that in our approach to the solution of this problem we have steadfastly tried to take into account the position of other countries. Thus, for instance, taking into account the views of those States that were calling for a relationship between the obligation of non-use of nuclear weapons and that of non-use of force in general, we proposed consideration of these two questions in an undivided manner. When we were told that various resolutions and declarations in this respect could be only recommendatory in nature, we proposed the conclusion of binding agreements, both in the context of specific regions - Europe, for instance - and on a world-wide basis.

All those proposals of ours, although rejected by the NATO countries, remain in force.

Secondly, we were asked why we felt it necessary to come forward now and place major emphasis on just this problem of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. This attitude of ours is most easily explained. It is no secret - and no one will dispute this - that the threat of nuclear war today has increased. This is evident, in particular from the wave of demonstrations against nuclear war which has rolled over the whole world. And this threat has increased precisely because of the fact that in certain States as guidance for action, various doctrines are adopted which regard nuclear war as permissible or possible. Consideration is given to limited nuclear war; preventive nuclear strikes are contemplated, and so on.

In our opinion, the least the United Nations can do under the present circumstances in order to cool off the hotheads, as it were, is to express its attitude towards such doctrines and to condemn the first use of nuclear weapons as a most grievous crime against humanity.

Thirdly, it is said that the declaration proposed by us will not be mandatory in character. That is true, yes; it will not be obligatory. It will have the character of a decision adopted by the General Assembly. Well, who is to blame for that? If our proposals had been adopted - for instance, concerning the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force, or of a non-aggression pact among States parties to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, we would already have had a legally binding set of agreements which would exclude the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the same time, more than 150 States are now represented in our Organization. While they cannot prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, at least they have the right and all the full authority to condemn their use. This beyond any doubt would to a large extent improve the situation for the subsequent elaboration of specific concrete arrangements on this question. Moreover, the very fact of the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the declaration proposed by us, the awareness of the fact that the first use of nuclear weapons would be condemned by the whole of the world community as the most grievous crime against humanity may act as a brake, as a moral and political factor which would once again cause us to reflect on the possibility of pressing on the nuclear button. Thus to a large extent the threat of the outbreak of nuclear conflict would be removed and there would be an improvement in the political climate of our planet.

Fourthly, I should now like to speak of a different matter. Some of those who have spoken in our Committee have tried to find some sort of discrepancies, differences of attitude, inconsistencies, variations, in our statements and in our position on the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons. I must say quite candidly that it is all the more surprising for us to hear assertions of this kind from the camp of those States in which there are countries which, during the post-war period, at least five or six times have changed their military, political and strategic doctrines. Suffice it to recall the doctrine of mass retaliation, or flexible reaction, and so on. All this is well known and I shall not dwell on it. It is surprising that this is being voiced by the allies of that State which has itself proposed and has conducted negotiations, and then unilaterally interrupted those negotiations virtually half way through, which signed treaties at the presidential level and then itself wrote off those treaties.

In this connexion, I should like to recall to our opponents what I think is a French proverb which says that ones does not speak of rope in the house of the hanged.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As for the Soviet Union, we can state quite definitely that there are no contradictions in our position: there are none and there were none, and our present proposal is an illustration of the systematic and consistent approach of the Soviet Union to the solution of the task of the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the life of society. In proposing to condemn as a grievous crime against humanity the first use of nuclear weapons, we thereby obviously confirm that we ourselves are not going to use those weapons first. If our example is followed by the other nuclear Powers, this will mean that there will be neither a first, nor a second, nor a third strike at all, and that therefore there will simply be no nuclear war. This would be the first step on the way towards total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons which, in the final analysis, could be supplemented by measures of genuine nuclear disarmament, all the way to the total destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

There is no contradiction either in our position concerning the question of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. As we have stated on numerous occasions and are again ready to confirm, the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which have forgone the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons and do not have such weapons upon their territories. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude special agreements with any such country on this score. As for the security of those States which make their territories available for the deployment of nuclear weapons by others, these States hereby themselves undermine their own security, because they do not guarantee that a nuclear strike will not be made by the aggressor from their territory, and therefore they cannot expect to have guarantees against a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Fifthly, in the statements of certain representatives, the argument was adduced that the proposal of the Soviet Union could allegedly divert the international community from the solution of concrete problems of nuclear disarmament. We are completely in disagreement with this. In this connexion, we can but recall again that it is precisely the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, that has put forward a whole range of proposals on these problems, including the proposal on conducting

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

negotiations on the cessation of production of nuclear weapons in all forms and the gradual decrease of its stockpiles, down to their total elimination.

In this connexion, however, we believe that measures of genuine nuclear disarmament do not exclude in any way the possibility of the adoption of other measures, including political, legal, as well as moral measures to prevent nuclear war. On the contrary, they should complement each other. This idea, as a matter of fact, is set out in paragraph 54 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and which, as we believe, reflects the point of view of the majority of countries on this question.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In the present circumstances, given the absence of any will on the part of the Western countries to get down to considering concrete problems of nuclear disarmament, the relevance of measures capable of increasing trust between countries has, as we see it, increased.

Sixthly, may I now comment on another thesis that was expounded in this Committee during the discussion of a Soviet proposal, a thesis that we consider not only wrong but even dangerous. In the statements of a number of NATO countries we have heard remarks that are at least perplexing, to the effect that the proposals of the Soviet Union are almost in contradiction of the United Nations Charter. Why? Because that proposal allegedly binds the hands of the victims of aggression and deprives the victim of the possibility of using nuclear weapons as a means of self-defence.

But the point is that our proposal is aimed precisely at preventing a nuclear catastrophe and saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war: in other words, it is aimed at realization of the goal set out at the very beginning of the text of the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, were we to approach this question from the point of view of those representatives, it seems to us that the whole process of disarmament would become pointless.

Indeed, a country could, for instance, consider using napalm, booby-traps or bacteriological weapons as the best means of self-defence. What are we to do, then? Are we to repeal agreements reached on this matter? Or perhaps go back on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? On the basis of that kind of logic, the Treaty is in conflict with the Charter inasmuch as it deprives practically the whole world community of the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons for purposes of self-defence. Non-nuclear States could then conclude that for them the best means of self-defence would be nuclear weapons.

I should like to ask a question of the authors of such concepts. Why, in general, are we sitting here, and why are we discussing disarmament problems? Of course, if one were to approach the solution of this problem in the same way as certain States - that is, only from the point of view of the need to prohibit or to limit that which the opponent possesses, while retaining what is present in one's own arsenals - then that kind of logic would be entirely understandable. That approach, which is so unpromising, is very familiar to us, and we were

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

reminded of that recently, by the way. However, we hope that such opposition to the question will never be acceptable to world public opinion, just as it is not acceptable to us.

When, during the 1960s, we proposed the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, this Organization, in view of the impossibility of the elaboration of such a treaty at that time, decided to proceed along the course of partial measures, which in the final analysis would take us towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. First place among these measures has always been assigned to the task of preventing nuclear war and prohibiting nuclear weapons. That is why we feel that our proposal on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe is not only not contrary to the United Nations Charter but fully compatible with it and indeed fully responsive to the aspirations of the majority of States of our Organization.

Finally, we wish once again solemnly to emphasize that our proposal is not aimed against anyone, and any attempts to ascribe to it or to impart to consideration of it any confrontational character are deliberately dishonest. In this connexion we can but express regret that in some statements on our initiative, in particular that of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, there could clearly be perceived formulations having a cold-war flavour. I will not conceal the fact that the tone of the statement to which I have just referred is particularly difficult to understand on the eve of the bilateral summit meeting. At the present time all the peoples of the world, whatever their convictions, whether they are of the East or the West, of the North or the South, are calling for one and the same thing: protection of our planet from the conflagration of a war of total destruction, the threat of which has grown as never before.

That is why we ask that we not engage in legal casuistics, that we not lower ourselves to confrontational rhetoric but seriously consider those measures that could move the world away from the nuclear brink.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

For our part, we are ready to engage in any negotiation that would bring us closer to our purpose. We are ready to conduct such negotiations in any forums, existing forums or new ones. In this connexion we consider that it is impossible to overlook the United Nations.

Guided by that very conviction, the Soviet Union is today proposing for the consideration of States a draft declaration of the General Assembly on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe (A/C.1/36/L.2). In that declaration States Members of the United Nations would solemnly proclaim that they are opposed to first resort to the use of nuclear weapons and that such use is the gravest crime against humanity. At the same time the declaration would condemn as incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe.

We are convinced that our proposal is in harmony with the desire of many States, in particular the non-aligned States, that the use of nuclear weapons or threat of their use be prohibited until nuclear disarmament has been brought about and that such use or threat of it be considered a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity.

Bearing in mind that desire of the non-aligned States we have included in our draft declaration further provisions in which it is once again reaffirmed that the universally recognized purpose is totally to exclude the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons through cessation of their production and subsequent liquidation of stockpiles, and that, given that purpose, at negotiations on disarmament priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The conviction is expressed that as a first step in that direction the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear war must be outlawed.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We hope that our draft will receive the support of the States Members of the United Nations. I can assure you that such a decision against the unleashing of nuclear war, will be responded to positively and be understood by the ordinary man in the street, in the United States, in the Soviet Union, in Western and Eastern Europe and in all corners of the world.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): This afternoon, Ambassador Field will address the subject that has just been discussed by the representative of the Soviet Union. This morning, we should like to talk about the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The subject of peace and security in the Indian Ocean region, the home of many diverse and important nations and a crossroads of international trade and commerce, is of deep concern to all Members of this Assembly. It is a subject of special urgency today, in view of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which has cast a dark cloud over the political and security climate of that region and has shaken the very foundations of world order.

The far-reaching consequences of this event are by now apparent to all of us. It has had a shattering effect upon the prospects for the continued stability of South Asia and the Persian Gulf. It has deepened anxieties throughout this vital region and raised the spectre of a wider conflict, beginning in the area of the Indian Ocean.

This is particularly disturbing to the United States, which has close relations with littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean region. We share their deep interest in the search for ways to resolve the conflict and tension that trouble that region so that they may move on to real economic development in a free and secure environment.

It is for this very reason that we joined other permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime nations two years ago in accepting the invitation from the littoral and hinterland States of the region to join the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

This expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee marked a major change in the evolution of that Committee's work. We hope and trust it will be judged as a constructive change, constructive in revealing wide differences which do exist on how to bring about peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

Such differences include differences on the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate, for some representatives single-mindedly pursue an Indian Ocean conference to implement the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, while others, including those of the United States, never accepted the 1971 Declaration, nor have we supported the goal of a conference in order to implement that Declaration. We have presented our views consistently and frankly - calling for a re-examination by the Committee of the principles that should be embodied in the concept "Indian Ocean zone of peace," and calling for a change in that concept to reflect the real world, especially the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet deployment of some 30 divisions in nearby southern Soviet Union military districts, the Soviet deployments of a vast array of tactical and strategic aircraft - Backfires and Bears, as they are known - and the Soviet naval presence.

We hope that, when the realities are considered, a new concept will emerge on this question which will be acceptable to all members of the Ad Hoc Committee and to the United Nations.

Our expectation is fully consistent with resolution 35/150, adopted by the General Assembly in 1980, which calls on the Ad Hoc Committee to harmonize views on the issues related to the convening of such a conference, taking account of the political and security climate in the region, before deciding on a conference date.

During subsequent debates of the Ad Hoc Committee, it became evident that there was no harmonization of views on the basic issues. It became evident that, because the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its invasion and occupation forces from Afghanistan, the climate of confidence needed to hold a successful conference was utterly lacking.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

The United States, along with many other delegations, thus recognized the futility of holding any such conference under the circumstances. Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee reached no decision on a conference.

The draft resolution under consideration by this Committee was adopted by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee. Like its predecessor, this year's draft resolution acknowledges the real obstacles to progress in the process of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, particularly the need for the Committee to reach a harmonization of views, to reconcile differences over basic principles, and to take account of the ominous political and security climate in the Indian Ocean region, before deciding to hold a conference.

The United States supports the consensus draft resolution on that basis.

To be frank, these are considerable obstacles to overcome, for today the Indian Ocean is anything but a zone of peace. No conference could make it so, not with the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, a hinterland State of the Indian Ocean region, by some 85,000 Soviet troops; not with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 mobile missiles having the range to encompass all the Persian Gulf States, the South-Asian States of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma and all through South East-Asia; not with the 30 Soviet divisions in the general Central-Asian area, many equipped with tactical nuclear and chemical weapons; and not with the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, an average of 20 to 30 naval vessels in that area at present.

Unless these objective conditions change - particularly the ending of the brutal Soviet invasion of the small, non-aligned nation of Afghanistan - then no conference can make the Indian Ocean area into a truly peaceful one. Indeed, holding a conference in such a time of aggression is more likely to aggravate tensions than to alleviate them.

This view is entirely consistent with recent actions of this world body. Only yesterday, a record number - 116 nations - here in the United Nations voted for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and the restoration of that historic and proud nation's right of self-determination.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

However, the Soviet Union has shown no more willingness to comply with resolution 36/34 than it did with resolutions ES-6/2 and 35/37, notwithstanding the Soviet Union's boasts in the Ad Hoc Committee -- repeated as recently as 21 October -- of fidelity to pertinent United Nations resolutions.

The second major obstacle we face -- related to the first -- is the lack of agreement on what should form the basis of a zone of peace.

Some Committee members, including certain regional Powers, insist that the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace -- which calls for removal of great-Power military forces from the region -- must be the basis for such a zone and a conference. The United States, along with a number of other Committee members, regards the 1971 Declaration as faulty and outmoded. First, it is inconsistent with the right of all States, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to individual and collective self-defence. Secondly, it is difficult to reconcile with internationally recognized rights to freedom of navigation. The fact that the 1971 Declaration was supported by a minority of United Nations Members also raises questions as to its viability. We believe that its implementation would lead to even greater instability and tension in the Indian Ocean region, precisely the opposite of the resolution's original intent.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

For the removal of Western naval forces and facilities from the Indian Ocean region - even if accompanied by a similar removal of Soviet forces - would enhance the great preponderance of Soviet land and air power in the region. This would increase the threat, already demonstrated in Afghanistan, in Ethiopia and in South Yemen, of further Soviet expansion into the Indian Ocean region.

While the Soviet Union is clearly the major threat to peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region, other serious problems also exist. Some regional conflicts in the area are unrelated to major Power tension and these too must be taken into account.

None of us, neither small nations nor large, can afford to ignore these frightening realities. As for the United States, our future participation in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean will be guided by the ability of the Committee to continue to operate on the basis of consensus, and further, to see it as it is - a region marked by occupation and aggression and invasion - rather than as we all would like it to be - a true zone of peace. The work of harmonization of views on basic issues - taking into account the actual political and security climate in the region called for by this resolution - provides a framework for such a new, more realistic approach. Let us get on with the job in a serious way.

I cannot in good conscience close these remarks without paying a tribute to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Fonseka of Sri Lanka, a man blessed with an abundance of patience but who, I am sure, has exhausted that generous supply in this tortuous exercise. Mr. Fonseka has guided the Committee for the second time in its history to a draft resolution that should command adoption by consensus in the First Committee.

As Mr. Fonseka himself stated at the final meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee this week, the latest product of the Committee's work, its report and draft resolution, is a document which fully satisfies no delegation. It could not have been said any better, nor could it be any truer in the case of the United States. We found neither the report nor the draft resolution, nor the process by which the report was adopted fully satisfactory. Still, we applaud Mr. Fonseka and his country, Sri Lanka.

Mr. LIANG Yufan (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In the course of the general debate in this Committee, the Chinese delegation has already expressed in a preliminary way its views on the Soviet proposal concerning the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. Now I should like to make a few remarks on this question and on the proposal by the Soviet Union on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

The prohibition of nuclear weapons and the elimination of the danger of nuclear war are questions of great concern to the peoples of the world. The super-Powers are stepping up the nuclear arms race and strengthening their preparations and deployment for war, thereby casting the shadow of the serious threat of nuclear war on the world. It is only natural that people should demand that the super Powers assume their responsibilities with regard to nuclear disarmament and adopt practical measures in disarmament to reduce their colossal nuclear arsenals. Many small and medium-sized countries also demand that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, there should first be a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and particularly of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, in order to reduce the nuclear threat against them. These demands are entirely proper.

However, for many years, the Soviet Union, which has been developing nuclear weapons at the fastest pace, has all along been adopting the tactic of only paying lip-service to this. Every year, it submits new disarmament proposals while, at the same time, the quality and quantity of its nuclear weapons keep escalating every year. This year, as a new proposal, a declaration is submitted to the effect that the first use of nuclear weapons constitutes the gravest crime committed against humanity. This is no more than another version of the same tactic. First of all, it is necessary to point out that this proposal of the Soviet Union is not a new one. During the mid-1950s it submitted a similar proposal. At that time it proposed that, as a first step, the nuclear Powers should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. However, it is disappointing that the Soviet Union itself has never taken the initiative in undertaking such an obligation and has never taken this first step.

(Mr. Liang Yufan, China)

Now the Soviet Union has again come up with the proposal for the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and has been energetically touting the role to be played by the declaration on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Now, in the Soviet proposal there is no distinction made between different nuclear strikes - whether the strike in question is one which results in the massive destruction of cities and buildings, or whether it is a strike aimed mainly for defence facilities and for offsetting the Soviet Union's conventional superiority, particularly in tanks. Without clarifying this point, the aim of the Soviet Union in referring to refraining from a first nuclear strike is clearly to try to use the so-called second and third nuclear strikes to engage in nuclear blackmail and to give full advantage to its conventional superiority and threaten neighbouring States while its neighbours could do no more than submit to its superiority in conventional weapons.

The Soviet representative in his statement talks at some length about the fact that without a first nuclear strike there could not be a second or third nuclear strike and that therefore there could no longer be any danger of nuclear war. The Soviet proposal attempts to use a scrap of paper of a declaration to produce a false sense of security and to make the peoples of the world feel that, perhaps after this all their worries would be over. However, it can be seen very clearly that as long as the super-Powers nuclear arms race does not cease, as long as their enormous nuclear arsenals are not drastically reduced, as long as their nuclear weapons deployed against other countries are not dismantled, the world will continue to be under the threat of nuclear war.

(Mr. Liang Yufan, China)

If the Soviet Union is sincere about preventing nuclear war, it should immediately cease the nuclear arms race and adopt practical nuclear disarmament measures, instead of concocting empty declarations, without at the same time taking a single step towards practical reduction of its nuclear weapons.

It is also necessary to point out that not only has the Soviet Union not carried out its responsibilities in respect of nuclear disarmament, but it has also refused to undertake explicit obligations with regard to the non-use of nuclear weapons. It uses the pretext that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons must be linked with the prohibition of the use of force and has stressed that it would only extend non-use guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States which do not produce or acquire nuclear weapons or station such weapons on their territory.

Everyone knows that in the present world it is the super-Powers possessing huge military strength which are carrying out threats and blackmail against numerous small and medium-sized countries with inadequate defences. The Soviet Union not only possesses superiority in conventional weapons, but also possesses long-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons with enormous capacity, seriously threatening the security of many countries. Under these circumstances, the non-nuclear-weapon States are fully entitled to demand that the nuclear Powers, and first and foremost the super-Powers, undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Faced with the military threat of the super-Powers, they are also fully entitled to adopt the necessary measures for self-defence in order to defend their own security, while the Soviet Union demands that the non-nuclear-weapon States first undertake not to produce, acquire or station nuclear weapons. This implies that if the non-nuclear-weapon States do not do so, according to the Soviet Union's demands, they would not be able to avoid the danger of a Soviet nuclear attack. What is this then, if it is not nuclear threat or nuclear blackmail?

(Mr. Liang Yufan, China)

On disarmament questions, the Soviet Union often stresses the principle of equality and equal security, but the real state of affairs is that between the Soviet Union and non-nuclear-weapon States, with one side possessing huge nuclear arsenals and the other side having no nuclear weapons at all, there clearly exists neither equality nor equal security. The Soviet Union is not even content with this. While it is continuing to develop and step up its deployment of nuclear weapons, it wants the non-nuclear-weapon States to make such a guarantee. Can it be suggested that such an approach is in conformity with the principle of equality and equal security which it has been trumpeting? Can it be suggested that to demand that the non-nuclear-weapon States, faced with nuclear threat, make a guarantee and beg for safety from attack constitutes a practical application of what the Soviet draft resolution calls "moral standards" and "lofty ideals"?

The above-mentioned situation shows that in proposing the non-first use of nuclear weapons and the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Union's real aim is to rely on superiority in conventional arms and superiority in strategic and theatre nuclear weapons to threaten and blackmail its neighbours. The so-called prevention of nuclear war and so-called strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, are nothing more than a camouflage. China has always advocated the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and has opposed nuclear war. We consider that in order to defend world peace and prevent the outbreak of war, we must oppose and curb a super-Power using huge military might to threaten and commit aggression against other countries. Therefore, any proposal designed to achieve the aim of blackmail and threat under the signboard of nuclear disarmament is not acceptable to us.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): On behalf of the delegations of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Benin, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Burundi, the People's Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the Mongolian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Mozambique, Niger, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the Yemen Arab Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, I should like to present draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.13 on agenda item 48 concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The urgent need to hasten the solution of this problem, which has been on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1975, is clear to every sensible person. The present tempo of the militarization of science that is being forced upon the world by certain circles is one of the most acute problems of disarmament. Its speed forces us to speak of trends that are highly dangerous for the future of mankind. The growing concern that is being expressed on this problem by scientists and the public at large, as well as by the Governments of a whole series of countries, is totally justified.

For example, the participants in the International Symposium "Scientists and Peace" that was held early in September of this year in Bucharest emphasized the following in their appeal:

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

"Let us do all we can to ensure that the immense potential of scientific and technical research is not used for weapons production but contributes exclusively to economic development and progress in every country, to the preservation of the finest that the human spirit has accomplished and to the creation of new and important values." (A/36/528, annex II, pp. 1-2)

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

I do not intend to quote here the growing number of statements and appeals that have been made on this subject, but I should like to refer to the communiqué adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which, in particular, they:

" ... reiterated their concern over the acceleration of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear armaments race, the stockpiling of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the development of newer and more destructive and lethal weapons systems ... ". (A/36/566, Annex, p. 3)

On the basis of United Nations data, more than 20 per cent of all persons engaged in scientific pursuits - that is approximately 500,000 people - are now working in the military sphere. Expenditures exclusively for the development and planning of weapons and military technology have increased from \$13 billion in 1960 to \$35 billion in 1980. The achievements of the scientific and technological revolution are being incorporated into the military sphere at such a rapid pace that every day the threat increases of developing new and more threatening types of weapons of mass destruction, such as radiological, radioactive, infrasonic, radiotechnological and other weapons. Such weapons seem incredible today, but they can in the near future become an integral part of military arsenals. It is time to put an effective barrier to the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of the emergence and use of such weapons cannot even be imagined.

As far back as 1975 the Soviet Union submitted proposals for the prohibition of such development and manufacture. Somewhat later, the Soviet Union also provided an illustrative list of new types of weapons of mass destruction which should be subject to prohibition in the first instance. By now that problem has acquired particular significance and urgency. Further confirmation of that fact is the increasing number of sponsors of General Assembly draft resolutions over the years on the problem and the support which they have received by States Members of the United Nations.

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(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

The point is that as a result of the speedy and profound transformation in the development of science and military technology, qualitatively new types of weapons of mass destruction are being devised, which could make control over them, and therefore agreement on their prohibition, very difficult and perhaps even impossible to achieve. That new stage in the arms race would weaken international stability and greatly increase the threat of the outbreak of war. It would divert enormous additional resources, both financial and human, from the needs of development and socio-economic progress.

Yet today, military expenditures are already exceeding \$500 billion a year and are diverting approximately 100 million people from the production of material and spiritual benefits for mankind.

Proceeding from those considerations, which are set out in the preambular part of the draft resolution, together with references to the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the sponsors of the draft resolution propose in operative paragraph 1 that the General Assbmbly should request.

... the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons".

Thus, the proposed formulation clearly provides for the possibility of work in the Committee on Disarmament on the basis of both existing approaches to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, i.e. from the point of view of the preparation of a comprehensive agreement to prohibit the development and manufacture of all new types of weapons of that kind as well as from the point of view of drafting an agreement on particular types of such weapons. The two approaches are treated as complementary in the draft resolution.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

In order to establish conditions that would contribute to the successful course of the negotiations which are provided for in operative paragraph 1, it would be appropriate for the General Assembly once again to urge all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks. That appeal is set out in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. In the context of establishing a favourable climate for the negotiations and for an eventual successful outcome that would prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, as called for in paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the sponsors of the draft resolution propose that the General Assembly call

" ... upon the States permanent members of the Security Council as well as upon other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council".

The sponsors consider the value of such declarations unquestionable, in view of the acceleration of scientific and technological progress in the military field. That would also apply to the preparation of agreements on specific types of weapons of mass destruction. In that respect, such declarations would cover areas not encompassed by the agreements.

The draft resolution also contains the customary paragraph concerning transmittal to the Committee on Disarmament of all documents relating to the consideration of the item by the General Assembly along with a request for the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its next regular session. Provision is also made to include in the provisional agenda of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

In conclusion, I should like, on behalf of the 27 sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.13, express the hope that in view of the increased danger of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction which are beyond control, or nearly beyond control, all delegations will support the concrete measures proposed to combat that danger.

Mr. TAVARES NUNES (Portugal) (interpretation from French): My delegation wishes to make some remarks on agenda item 40 concerning the reduction of military budgets.

Military budgets have not ceased to increase since 1945. Today even the most conservative estimates show that expenditures devoted to military purposes are of such a magnitude as to make it virtually impossible for the man in the street to understand their true scope, and that growing trend shows no sign of abating, much less of reversing.

And yet we have lived through a period of relative peace in the sense that the world has been spared a major armed conflict.

However, the increase in military budgets is not a spontaneously generated phenomenon. It is the result of international relations.

The causes of that growth are of course very complex and varied. But a sizeable, even a decisive part, of those causes is to be found in the mistrust that poisons international relations. Therefore, effective action which could have a lasting effect on the rising curve of military expenditures must be directed against those causes which impel States to increase their military budgets.

An important element in the efforts to reverse the present trend in military expenditures is the political will of States to work towards that end.

While keeping in mind the logical consequences which derive from such a state of affairs, my delegation is of the opinion that the elaboration of principles which should govern the action of States in the freezing and reduction of military budgets has considerable merit and is fully warranted. Such principles would provide Governments with a frame of reference to guide them in their efforts to reverse the escalating military budgets. However, it is a complex issue which has a direct bearing on the security of States and on their capacity successfully to repel a possible attack. We must proceed with caution in our consideration of that question and with patience in our search for results.

In this sense, my delegation understands and accepts as natural the fact that the Disarmament Commission was unable to complete the elaboration of principles that should govern the action of States in the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

(Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

The few days that were devoted to the examination of that question were simply not enough for the kind of consideration that so delicate an issue appears to require, because if we want the principles to be truly meaningful for disarmament and arms control we must have a very clear understanding of the problems their practical implementation will give rise to, and I would go even further and say that we must be very clear as to the means required to solve such problems,

Some of those principles, to which my delegation attaches great importance, as, for example, the basis on which the reduction is to be made, the openness of military budgets, verification, the capacity of States to acquire adequate defence capability, comparability, and so forth, entail many practical problems.

Let me quote simply by way of example and without wishing to be exhaustive some problems arising out of the comparability between the military budgets of States. Those problems exist not only between States having different political and social systems, but also between States having similar systems. For instance, in countries organized according to market-economy principles prices are determined by the rules of the market. But in the planned economy countries, prices are not determined by such mechanisms. They are therefore political prices. That difference between price determining mechanisms creates distortions in the figures given in national accounts.

Another set of problems that it is difficult to solve is that of the transformation of national figures into a common accounting unit. Suffice it to consider the difficulties encountered in solving differences caused by the rate of exchange in national currencies resulting from the mere existence of exchange rates determined or simply influenced by the political powers, independently of the play of the rules governing the economy. How can we solve such difficulties and distortions?

A pilot reporting instrument of current military expenditures pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly would certainly help to solve an important part of problems relating to the comparability and openness of military budgets.

(Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

My delegation considers that the Disarmament Commission should continue to elaborate principles governing action of States in the freezing and reduction of military budgets. However, we believe that a document setting out the principles to which we have just referred will not have any practical and valid effect on the achievement of the disarmament objectives if it does not contain, in addition to principles, the means of solving at least the major problems that will arise during their practical implementation, unless, of course, the international community contents itself with merely wasting its time and resources in producing a document doomed to be yet another exercise in futility.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): It is my privilege to introduce in the Committee today the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which is contained in document A/36/29.

By resolution 35/150 of 12 December 1980 and in pursuance of the decision contained in resolution 34/80 B to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, Sri Lanka, during 1981, the Ad Hoc Committee was requested by the General Assembly to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the issues related to the convening of the Conference and, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean, to finalize all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening. Accordingly, the Ad Hoc Committee held two preparatory sessions earlier this year, from 17 February to 6 March and from 1 to 19 June, and one regular session, beginning in mid-August, which was devoted primarily to the drafting of the report now before the Committee. As indicated in the introduction to the report, the Committee held a total of 50 formal meetings this year, as well as several informal meetings.

Section II of the report contains a brief account of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1981. During the two preparatory sessions, the attention of the Committee was focussed mainly on item 4 of its agenda, which calls for (a) the continuation of the efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the issues related to the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean; (b) the consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean;

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

and (c) the finalization of the dates for the Conference. Beyond saying that the exchange of views were both intensive and protracted, it is not my intention to go into detail on the discussions that took place. This would be no surprise as the issues involved are of great interest to all members of the Committee and are also in themselves complex and sensitive. Towards the end of the second session, it was apparent that, while there was agreement on the need to hold a Conference on the Indian Ocean, the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on finalizing the dates for convening the Conference in 1981.

Sub-section C of section II of the report provides a very brief account of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during its regular session. Although the Ad Hoc Committee was able to adopt the report by consensus, a reservation was made on paragraph 15 of the report. At the same final meeting of the Committee it was agreed that an asterisk be placed next to the paragraph and that the Secretariat would merely reproduce the exact language to be submitted by any delegation for the purpose of its being incorporated in the foot-note corresponding to the asterisk.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

Under sub-section D, concerning the expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee, on the basis of the Committee's recommendation, Thailand was appointed as an additional member of the Committee in March of this year. Several other countries had also applied to participate in the work of the Committee. However, the Committee was unable, in the time available, to reach consensus on their applications.

Section III of the report contains the draft resolution which the Committee would recommend to the General Assembly for adoption. The concerns of Member States at the continued military presence of great Powers and all other foreign Powers in the Indian Ocean area, the grave and ominous developments in the region and the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area are embodied in the preambular part of the draft resolution. Accordingly, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would express its regret that the Ad Hoc Committee failed to reach consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening of the Conference during 1981. By operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution the General Assembly would therefore request the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining issues related to the convening of the Conference and to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983. The inclusion of a time frame, even though qualified, was a matter of some satisfaction. The Ad Hoc Committee would also be requested to hold further sessions in 1982, of a total duration of six weeks, including the holding of a meeting at a venue outside New York to be decided upon. Finally, the resolution also renews the mandate of the Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions.

My introduction of this report has been anticipated by the representative of the United States, a member of the Ad Hoc Committee, who spoke a while ago. Other members of the Ad Hoc Committee will, no doubt, make their comments on this report, as well as on the remarks of the representative of the United States.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

His concluding remarks included a reference to the process by which the report was adopted. I would prefer to refrain from saying anything more than that the report and the recommendation were adopted by consensus at a plenary meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at which every member of the Committee was given the opportunity to express his views and, as you can see, his reservations.

I would be less than courteous if I did not acknowledge his very kind references to me personally. I should like to assure him that, as a member of the Committee, the abundance of patience with which he has credited me is not quite exhausted. Any chairman, and no less the chairman of a committee dealing with an ocean - let alone peace - must at least aspire to oceans of peace.

This consensus resolution could not have been reached had it not been for the spirit of accommodation shown by all members of the Ad Hoc Committee. Our meetings and consultations extended up to the beginning of this week. You helped, Mr. Chairman, perhaps unwittingly, by setting a deadline for the submission of resolutions to this Committee. To the friends of the Chairman I owe a debt of gratitude. The report and the draft resolution are the best that we could achieve, given the circumstances that condition our times - a situation which you yourself, Sir, have witnessed in the proceedings of this Committee.

This introduction of the report would be incomplete without an expression of sincere appreciation for the Secretary of the Committee and the enterprising members of his staff, who have extended to the Committee their unstinting co-operation.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. May I commend the draft resolution contained in section III of the report for this Committee's acceptance also by consensus.

Mr. KAHN (German Democratic Republic): My delegation also would like to avail itself of this opportunity to reaffirm the German Democratic Republic's persistent support for the efforts of the littoral and hinterland States to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

We therefore welcome the submission of draft resolution in A/C.1/36/29 by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, Ambassador Fonseka. At the very last minute, the Committee succeeded in adopting the draft, which proves that there have been enormous difficulties in its drafting. The efforts of the Chairman also deserve special acknowledgement because of the fact that they were in danger of failing as a result of the opposition of some delegations.

My delegation deems it necessary, before the First Committee, to put on record how it understands the draft resolution.

First, failure to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo in 1981 was caused by the attitude of a few States members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which, according to what is stated in its report to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly

"... felt that the adverse current political and security climate in the area militates against the early convening of a Conference".

(A/36/29, para.14)

My delegation has no doubt about the fact that the assertion by those States that the climate was not conducive to a Conference is, indeed, used by the latter as a pretext to delay or even block the convening of that Conference. In the meantime, further accomplished facts aimed at an all-out militarization of the area of the Indian Ocean are to be created.

Attention may be called to the extension and enlargement of the network of military bases, the increasing number of military exercises involving the so-called rapid deployment forces, the continuation of the undeclared war against one of the hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, as well as the overt support to such aggressors as South Africa and Israel, which continue to attack neighbouring States.

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

These actions also adequately characterize that great Power which, by its continued military presence

"gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". (Ibid., tenth preambular paragraph)

This afternoon its representative stated quite frankly the unwillingness of his country to end its military presence in that region altogether.

Secondly, the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, now "not later than the first half of 1983", is not linked to any pre-condition whatsoever. In its activities so far the Ad Hoc Committee has made progress in the harmonization of views. More progress will be made in the course of its work, in "constructive efforts through the exercise of political will", but in all probability it will not be possible to achieve the full harmonization of all views until the Conference. What else could be the purpose of such a Conference?

As far as the political and security climate is concerned, my delegation shares the view expressed in the draft resolution that:

"... the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of the Conference achieving success". (Ibid., sixteenth preambular paragraph)

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

The most reliable path towards easing tension, however, is the Conference itself. That is why my delegation is resolutely opposed to any attempts at further obstructing or even preventing the Conference.

The aim of such manoeuvres is obvious: to gain time for further militarization of the area of the Indian Ocean. That would increase the danger of war and threaten the existence of the States of the area.

My delegation feels that the draft resolution before us confirms our view that the preparation, convening and holding of the Conference are on the agenda. Any attempts to obstruct the Conference by insisting on preconditions contradict that resolution.

Thirdly, the draft resolution reaffirms that the project of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should remain unchanged. We therefore advocate that the Ad Hoc Committee in 1982 continue its preparatory activity for the Conference on the Indian Ocean and that altogether six weeks should be placed at its disposal. That proposal was submitted by my delegation in document A/AC.159/L.37 of 18 August 1981. Of course, meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee cannot replace the Conference itself.

Finally, it should be noted that, since the meeting in August of the Ad Hoc Committee, important statements of different groups of States on convening the Conference on the Indian Ocean have been made.

In the communiqué on the meeting of Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations of the non-aligned States to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the latter's determination has been expressed:

"... to work for the convening not later than the first half of 1983 of the Conference on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka".

The Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, in their final communiqué of October this year, expressed the hope:

"... that agreement would be reached to convene the Conference at an early date".

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

As far as the German Democratic Republic is concerned, it suggested at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee held in August that the convening of the conference should be not later than the end of 1982. That proposal was also supported by other States members of the Ad Hoc Committee.

During the general debate in the First Committee, we have noted that the creation of a zone of peace plays an important part. Numerous delegations have come out in favour of an early convening of the conference.

In view of such agreement, my delegation hopes that those few States which have not yet pronounced themselves in favour of an early convening of the conference will support the preparation, convening and holding of the conference and will contribute towards its success.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to begin by offering a brief clarification. The draft resolution to which I am about to refer is draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.41/Rev.1. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.41 was distributed a few days ago, and in view of the statement we heard yesterday morning from the representative of the United States, the sponsors consider that it is desirable to amend the fourth preambular paragraph to read as follows:

"Noting also with satisfaction that the United States of America has announced that it will ratify the Protocol in the very near future,"

As in previous years, today I shall have the honour in my capacity as representative of the depositary Government of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco to present to the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.41/Rev.1, sponsored by the 21 States parties to the Treaty which are listed in that draft, that is to say, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The text of the draft is almost identical with that of General Assembly resolution 35/143, adopted on 12 December 1980, since the only substantive difference from that resolution is the fact that the draft includes an additional paragraph wherein the Assembly would note with satisfaction that the United States of America had announced, as stated by the United States representative at the morning meeting of Wednesday, 13 November, that it would ratify the Protocol in the very near future and, according to the information at my disposal, that date will apparently be next Monday, 23 November.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.41/Rev.1 trust that France, which has so many historic cultural and economic ties with the countries of Latin America, will heed the invitation which the Assembly addressed to it in the resolution that it will adopt on the basis of the draft we are submitting, and that, when its implementation is considered at the thirty-seventh session, all we shall have to do is to express our satisfaction at the realization of an aspiration of the Assembly, as we did in December 1979 in General Assembly resolution 34/74, concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.