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### VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 33RD MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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### The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.

# AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

Mr. BALETA (Albania) (interpretation from French): The Committee now has before it two documents submitted under additional item 128 of the agenda. There is a draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union in document A/36/192, and a draft resolution, A/C.1/36/L.8. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.7, presented under item 55 of the agenda, relates to the same question. The draft treaty, in addition to some vague wording, has a preamble which is pure propaganda. The rest of it is replete with defective formulations and provisions of a purely technical character which one finds in any treaty. The title and content of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.8 make it clear that it has been presented within the same context as the aforementioned draft treaty, while draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.7, as its title and its provisions show, is conceived and presented as a counterweight to the other two documents.

In a statement made to this Committee last month, in the general debate, the Albanian delegation referred briefly to agenda item 128. It expressed a general view on the proposal in document A/36/192 on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and on the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, to use the terms of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.7.

The Albanian delegation has already stated that it considers entirely demagogic the proposal to include item 128 in the agenda, and discussions on this subject will not help to bring about a settlement of the problem of disarmament on earth or in outer space. We believe that it has now been incontestably proved that the sponsors of this proposal, the Soviet social-imperialists, and their main rivals in the fields of armaments and world hegemony, namely the American imperialists, are determined to undermine all disarmament efforts in outer space, as indeed they have done here on earth.

In this statement the Albanian delegation would like to share with the Committee certain thoughts suggested by a reading of the documents before us, particularly when they are analysed in the light of the concrete facts and events of the recent past and the present day.

In our view, after a first glance at these documents the first natural and spontaneous reaction is to pose certain questions, as follows. Hese there been a failure thus far to understand that there should be a prohibition on - and there is no sound and valid reason for - the stationing of weapons in outer space and engaging in an arms race there? Why is there any need to embark on discussions and negotiations in order to produce treaties consisting of clauses that can be just as confused as they are imprecise to prevent something that no one would have any thought of doing in any case if they attached any importance to human values? Instead of the United Nations producing and adopting documents stuffed with phrases that will never have the same meaning for all, would it not be much better to confine ourselves to a simple sentence and to announce that it is an unpardonable crime against mankind and strictly forbidden by law and morality to station weapons in outer space and to engage in an arms race there? Why should one make of that well known principle a negotiable subject or a contractual obligation? Pursuing this line of logic we should like to stress that

although we are not at all superstitious, we do consider that certain proposals coming from the imperialist super-Powers, including the one on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons in outer space or the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, are rather ominous. It is impossible to banish from one's mind, for example, the fact that two years after presentation to this very Committee of the Soviet proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, a proposal that is still being considered in the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Union has openly and brutally used force to commit aggression and to occupy a sovereign State, Afghanistan. At this very moment the General Assembly is engaged in a discussion of the consequences of that act of aggression.

The Soviet proposal, like all the efforts of the super-Powers and their partners to steer discussions on problems of weapons in outer space in accordance with their political goals, provides gloomy testimony of the unimaginable proportions, even cosmic proportions, now assumed by the arms race and the preparations for war of the imperialist super-Powers. It is another opportunity to realize to what extent - beyond all the confines of elementary reason - the aggressiveness of imperialism and social imperialism has gone. The super-Powers seek to deprive man of a pleasure that he has enjoyed since the very dawn of his life on earth. They want to deprive him of the joy of contemplating the beauty of the sky and the stars that fill the universe, a beauty that has been sung by poets throughout the ages. Well, it is the super-Powers who, through their efforts to arm themselves in outer space, want to plunge modern man, with his unprecedented scientific development, into fear and terror every time he raises his eyes to the heavens, knowing that one day American and Soviet weapons coming from outer space may suddenly crash down on his beautiful planet Earth.

In view of this reality we cannot fail to state that the demagogic words that have been very carefully chosen to give a certain attractiveness to the proposal and the explanatory letter on the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union will not succeed in concealing the truth, which is bitter and known to all: that the Soviet Union's bringing here for discussion the question of banning weapons

in outer space, like any other proposal of the kind put forward by the imperialist super-Powers, cannot possibly be taken as a sign of goodwill. It is just a delaying tactic to ward off condemnation of their aggressive activities in space.

For many years the two imperialist super-Powers have been engaged in feverish competition in exploring the possibilities offered by outer space for the conducting of military activities. That competition has always been the reverse side of the coin in all activities and operations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union in studying and exploring the universe in order to master the technology necessary for this purpose. The arms race in space, in the proper sense of the phrase, began a long time ago. In the American and Soviet military doctrines, cuter space is viewed as providing very diverse fields of military activity.

There is no longer any need to demonstrate that the Soviet Union and the United States have launched into outer space a large number of satellites and other military devices that permit them to survey and spy on the territory of the adversary and all States without exception, to undertake studies that may serve their strategies and war tactics, to ensure liaison with bases and fleets scattered all over the world and even to command operations or to communicate with submarines. We do not claim that we are in a position to present here a complete picture of the military operations for which satellites and devices launched into space by the super-Powers are designed. Nor can we say with any precision how far the militarization of space has gone, and at what pace the arms race will proceed. Only the super-Powers have all the facts at their disposal and can give a precise and complete description of these activities. Of course they do not want to do that and when they do say something it is in order to harm the adversary. But we should not exclude the fact that one day they may tell us a little more, when they have decided, for propaganda reasons, to show their cards a little more clearly, as is now the case with chemical weapons.

But everyone has already heard talk about the orbital bomb, anti-satellite satellites, electronic systems for the destruction of objects launched into space and other devices which the ordinary man in the street not too long ago considered to be in the realm of science fiction.

The United States and the Soviet Union have put at the service of their armaments and war preparations the discoveries and most modern achievements of man in the field of scientific progress. They have spent enormous sums of money and have been using huge armies of scientists and technicians to extend their range of military action as far as possible into space, so their competition to share and dominate our planet has also reached the heavens and outer space, and outer space has ceased to be a peaceful environment for scientific co-operation in the service of development for the benefit of all mankind.

The imperialist super-Powers may well claim that it is precisely their concern regarding this situation and their desire to prevent the worst from happening that has prompted them to shoulder their responsibilities and to work to find a solution by bringing the problem before international bodies and proposing the conclusion of treaties. But that kind of claim can hardly impress anyone any longer. Experience accumulated over the last two decades has shown us that bilateral and multilateral treaties in the field of disarmament have yielded no tangible results and have not helped to reduce the arsenals of weapons or to slow down the arms race and other war preparations.

It is our conviction that the present Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons in space and its whole "obsession with treaties" simply serve very clear and dangerous goals. The Soviet Union is acting in this way because, like the United States, it wants to raise a great hue and cry about disarmament in order to conceal the fact that it is arming itself and brandishing its weapons.

A careful examination of the three documents before the Committee on the subject of outer space shows that their content and provisions are drafted in such a way as to offer an opportunity to the super-Powers and to aggressive military blocs to capitalize on them and to wage a lively propaganda campaign against their enemies. As an example we might mention the following case. The Soviet draft treaty and draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.8 particularly stress the necessity for not placing weapons on board reusable space devices. It is easy to see that this is aimed at the United States space shuttle. For their part, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.7 have stressed the necessity of refraining from establishing systems for the destruction of satellites. It is also easy to see that this is aimed at the anti-satellite systems of the Soviet Union. We could continue with comparisons of this kind between the two texts, which illustrate the competition between the two opposing blocs to justify their actions and to cast aspersions on those of the other side, in the name of a prohibition on the placing of weapons in outer space and on engaging in an arms race in outer space. In our view, these documents are conceived in such a way as not to prevent the arms race in outer space but actually to permit the participants in that arms race to establish the means of pursuing it.

For these reasons, the Albanian delegation will not support adoption of these documents when the time comes for a decision to be taken by the Committee on the matter.

Mr. KRUTZSCH (Gerran Democratic Republic): The delecation of the German Democratic Republic has the honour, on behalf of the sponsors - Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and its own country - of introducing the draft resolution on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon contained in document A/C.1/36/L.33.

This draft resolution refers to a disarmament measure which deserves the utmost attention. There is hardly any region in the world where

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

people were not alarmed on hearing about the production of that weapon. Their reaction is only natural in view of the fact that other regions outside Europe, such as the Middle East and the Far East, are conceivable as areas for the deployment and use of that weapon.

The idea that a qualitatively new type of weapon is to be added to the arsenal of the most dreadful weapons has prompted many Governments to call for its prohibition. Again at this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly the representatives of many States have voiced opinions in that sense.

In their joint communiqué of 30 reptember 1981 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and heads of delegations of non-aligned countries participating in the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly expressed concern about the new round of the arms race that is under way. So numerous are the demands by non-governmental organizations and international public opinion that immediate action be taken against the dangers resulting therefrom that they cannot be overlooked. This broad movement reflects the awareness that the specific characteristics of the nuclear neutron weapon would considerably increase the danger of a nuclear war.

Because of the relatively low radioactive fall-out caused by it, this weapon is supposed to be used as a tactical nuclear weapon. The decision on its production reflects doctrines concerning a possible limited nuclear war. Unless there is success in prohibiting such new weapons of mass destruction in good time and in reversing this new stage of the arms race, the inclusion of that weapon in other arsenals must be expected.

The initiative for the adoption of such a resolution is based on the following considerations.

First, the production and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons is tantamount to a particularly severe garavation of the arms race and thus opposed to the major demands contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly in respect of priority being granted to nuclear disarmament. Such production and development would considerably increase the dancer that a military conflict might develop into a nuclear war.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

Secondly, the effect of this weapon of mass destruction is especially cruel and inhuman. It is aimed at the destruction of human lives while at the same time preserving material values. While in military literature reference is already made to effective measures of protection for military personnel, this weapon constitutes a grave threat to the unprotected civilian population.

Thirdly, the special characteristics of this weapon, its imminent inclusion in arsenals and the intentions regarding its deployment make action for its elimination especially urgent. Therefore the Geneva Committee on Disarmament should be requested to start negotiations without delay on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

The present draft resolution is focused on those objectives.

The beginning of the preamble of the draft resolution quotes from paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, which states:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind" and concludes that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race ..." in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons" (resolution S-10/2, para. 47).

The second preambular paragraph, in accordance with paragraph 39 of the Final Document, calls for the termination of the qualitative arms race and the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful purposes.

The operational principles for the use of the nuclear neutron weapon as conceived by its proponents reaffirm the statement contained in the fourth preambular paragraph that the deployment of this weapon would significantly lower the threshhold to nuclear war, thereby considerably increasing the danger of such a war.

The fifth preambular paragraph stresses in particular the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly for the unprotected civilian population.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

The following paragraph refers to the proposals for the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. As is well known, the socialist countries - as early as in 1978 - have submitted relative proposals to the Committee on Disarmament.

In its operative part the draft resolution focuses on concrete measures to be taken for the implementation of an effective prohibition.

In operative paragraph 1 the Committee on Disarmament is requested to start without delay negotiations with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. Such negotiations should be held in the appropriate organizational framework.

The next three operative paragraphs are merely of a procedural nature and require no further comment.

The adoption and implementation of this draft resolution would provide a good opportunity to prevent a further qualitative development of the nuclear arms race. The risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war would thus decrease. The prospects for successful negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament in general could considerably improve.

Therefore my delegation hopes that due account will be taken of that fact during the discussion and decision on this draft resolution. Responsibility for the destiny of mankind and for the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament requires the banning of the nuclear neutron weapon.

I should like to take this opportunity to mention that in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution the word "neutron" was omitted and that it should read: "production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons". I hope that this omission will soon be corrected.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): One of the themes referred to with particular concern by many delegations in the plenary general debate as well as in our Committee has been once again the unpredecented level of military expenditures and their continued growth. The profoundly harmful effects of this serious phenomenon, both for the economic and social development of all peoples and for peace and security in the world, are widely known and acknowledged.

The Romanian Government has repeatedly emphasized the high priority and urgency it attaches, within the context of measures aimed at halting the arms race, to the freezing and reduction of military budgets and has over the years submitted a number of proposals on the subject.

The first special session devoted to disarmament, like subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, appealed to all States to take urgent measures with a view to concluding international agreements aimed at freezing and reducing military expenditures and at reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social progress, particularly that of the developing countries. It is precisely the need to continue United Nations action for the reduction of military budgets that is met by draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.38, which the Romanian delegation has the honour to introduce on behalf of the following sponsors: Austria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, Uruguay and Romania.

The draft resolution requests the General Assembly to envisage its action at two levels.

First, given the gigantic dimensions attained by military expenditures, the sponsors consider that it is necessary for the General Assembly to renew the appeal addressed in two consecutive years to all States, in particular those most heavily armed, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of such expenditures.

## (Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

Secondly, in the terms of the draft resolution, the General Assembly requests the Disarmament Commission to pursue its activities

"with a view to identifying and elaborating on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage". That request, addressed to the Disarmament Commission, to continue at its 1982 session the activities it has already begun, is of particular significance when we bear in mind the forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament.

In its preambular part, the draft resolution includes ideas for establishing, in general terms, the necessary framework for impulsion of the negotiating process for international agreements aimed at freezing and reducing military budgets. It expresses concern over the acceleration of the arms race and the increase in military expenditures, stresses the urgent need to adopt concrete measures to freeze and reduce military budgets and expresses the conviction that it is possible to carry out continued and systematic reductions of military budgets without in any way changing the military balance to the detriment of the security of any State.

The draft resolution reaffirms the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and of many resolutions on the question of military budgets, adopted by the General Assembly at its past sessions. Reference is also made therein to the Declaration proclaiming the Second Disarmament Decade, which, among its priority objectives, includes the adoption of concrete measures for the reduction of military budgets and the reallocation to economic and social development, in particular for the benefit of developing countries, of the resulting savings.

The preamble also refers to the activities initiated this year by the Disarmament Commission in compliance with the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in defining the principles which should govern the actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to the views and proposals on the subject submitted by Member States and included in a working paper annexed to the Commission's report.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

One of the important provisions of the preamble states that the process of identifying and elaborating principles which should govern the actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures and the other ongoing activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of reduction of military budgets have the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures.

The operative part of the draft resolution reaffirms in its paragraphs 1 and 2 the provisions of resolution 35/142 A, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly at last year's session. We consider that the renewal of the appeal addressed to States and, in particular the most heavily armed States, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures is of special political importance. Such conduct would not only create a favourable climate for negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, but would also support the efforts aimed at the economic and social development of all nations and would contribute to expanding international assistance in favour of the developing countries.

Operative paragraph 3 requests the Disarmament Commission to continue in 1982 its work on identifying the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, bearing in mind the possibility of codifying those principles in an appropriate document in due course. That provision derives from the very recommendations in the report of the Disarmament Commission, which was adopted by consensus and transmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The delegations sponsoring the draft resolution consider that the activities concerning military budgets initiated by the Disarmament Commission should be continued and intensified, especially in view of the next special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The final paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolutions provides for the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the thirty-seventh of the General Assembly of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets."

Perusal of the draft resolution highlights the concern and efforts of the sponsors to accommodate the various views expressed by States on the subject of the reduction of military budgets. Thus, only non-controversial provisions have been included which had previously figured in resolutions and recommendations adopted by consensus by the General Asserbly, in particular in resolution 35/1½2 A, as well as in the report of the Disarmament Commission for 1081.

We are firmly convinced that only through a constructive and flexible approach permitting the identification of the elements likely to contribute to a rapprochement of the various attitudes in this very sensitive area, will we be able to arrive at the negotiation and conclusion of real agreements on the reduction of military expenditures.

In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations which have contributed to the preparation of the draft resolution, and particularly the co-sponsors. We would hope that the non-controversial nature of the provisions contained in the text I have had the honour to introduce, as well as the broad-based consultations we have held with other delegations, will enable the Committee to adopt this draft resolution by consensus.

I should also like to point out a minor inaccuracy in the English version of the draft resolution. The sixth preambular paragraph, "Recalling its resolution 35/124 A of 12 December 1980," should continue - and I am sure that everyone has already perceived the error - as follows:

...which requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1981

rather than "1982," as the second line of that paragraph now reads.

Mr. OSAH (Nigeria): The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects was opened for signature on 10 April 1981 at United Nations Headquarters here in New York. It is gratifying to note that quite a significant number of States have signed the Convention. A number of other countries are also considering signing this Convention in the not-too-distant future.

At this stage, it is necessary to refresh our memories on the background of this Convention, which is now commonly referred to as the "Inhumane Weapons Convention." The United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Fumanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, convinced that there was need to develop further and improve upon the laws governing the conduct of war, recommended — and the General Assembly approved — that a conference of Governments on the prohibition or restriction of conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects be convened not later than 1979. The tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament also took note of that request and called upon all States to co-operate with the Preparatory Committee to be convened to deal with this matter in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/152.

The final report of the United Nations Conference, as contained in document A/Conf.95/15, represents the results of hard work and delicate but balanced compromises on the part of all the participants in the Conference. The Convention, contained in Annex I to the report, is a testimony of the yearning of the international community to attempt on the one hand, to bridge the gap between the results of the rapid advance in military research and technology which has often dictated the course and nature of wars and, on the other, the progress in international law relating to the conduct of war. The convention when in force, will further supplement the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that focused on war victims and the Hague Convention of 1907, which sought to regulate the use of weapons. In all these conventions, the main

(Mr. Osah, Nigeria)

objective has always been humanitarian. In essence, they are designed to give concrete expression to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. With this aim of ensuring that the sufferings of civilian populations and combatants should not be unnecessarily put in jeopardy, the General Assembly adopted the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto: Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments, Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, and Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.

My delegation hopes, therefore, that the aforesaid Convention and the Protocols thereto would, upon their entry into force, further supplement the existing laws relating to the conduct of war. It is therefore my privilege to introduce, on behalf of its sponsors, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.40, sponsored by the delegations of Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia and Nigeria.

In its preambular paragraphs, the draft resolution merely recalls previous resolutions and the efforts of the United Nations Conference referred to, which culminated in the aforementioned Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution appeals to all States to exert the best of their endeavours to sign and ratify that Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto.

In view of the fact that the Convention and Protocols annexed thereto have not yet come into force, it is the view of the sponsors of this draft resolution that nothing should be done at this stage to disturb the delicate balance achieved during the negotiations. Any proposals or amendments could be taken

(Mr. Osah, Nigeria)

into consideration later, when the Convention and Protocols enter into force. As members will recall, article 8 of the Convention deals extensively with the review mechanism of the Convention and Protocols. We are not unmindful of the concerns of some delegations with regard to some of the procedural aspects of the Convention, but we would appeal to those delegations to take full advantage of article 8 of the Convention when it enters into force. At this stage, it is the wish of the sponsors and, I hope of others, to see this Convention enter into force as soon as possible. The present Convention and Protocols are not disarmament measures, but they are in themselves useful to us all in view of their humanitarian considerations.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): In my statement today I shall deal with two draft resolutions, namely, documents A/C.1/36/L.21, entitled "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development", and A/C.1/36/L.39, entitled "Reduction of military budgets". I shall also comment briefly on the topic of certain conventional weapons included in document A/C.1/36/L.40. I shall begin with the question of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development.

The main thrust of the Secretary-General's report on this question, contained in document A/36/356, was explained by the Group's Chairman, Mrs. Thorsson, in her introduction of the report to this Committee on 20 Cctober 1981. I shall now introduce draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.21 on behalf of the sponsors, namely, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

In taking the initiative in 1977 for an in-depth investigation into the social and economic costs of military expenditures and the relationship between disarmament and development, the Nordic countries had above all a long-term process in mind. The Group of Governmental Experts which was appointed by the Secretary-General at the request of the first special session on disarmament was given three main areas of work as well as adequate Secretariat support and financial means to complete the task of making a broad analysis of the crucial interrelationship between disarmament, security and development.

The Group's mandate and terms of reference were also laid down at the first special session. Furthermore, the thirty-third session of the General Assembly asked the Group also to examine the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development.

Now that the work is completed and the study has been submitted, attention should be given to its implementation and follow-up. Through the Group's extensive contacts with researchers, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, the study has already attracted broad attention and interest. Numerous examples of follow-up activities at various levels could be cited. Sweden welcomes that trend. In co-operation with others, we shall continue to exert efforts to ensure a continuous effective

follow-up of the process of establishing an awareness of the relationship among Governments and the general public so that concrete action can be taken at the proper moment.

For a substantive discussion of the report, the second special session constitutes am natural focal point. Together with the other sponsors of the draft resolution, Sweden believes that the report on disarmament and development should be one of the basic documents for the special session and that it should be substantively considered and appropriate action taken at that session. The draft resolution, therefore, invites Governments of Member States to inform the Secretary-General, no later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the report and, in particular, its recommendations. Those views should be compiled and circulated well in advance of the second special session.

In addition to the direct responsibility to report back to the United Nations General Assembly, the Group's mandate recognizes the wider task of informing the public at large. As my delegation has often stressed, an enlightened public opinion is an invaluable asset in the quest for peace, security and disarmament. The draft resolution addresses that point by recommending that all Governments assist in the widest possible distribution of the report, including, where appropriate, its translation into national languages, so as to acquaint the general public in their countries with its contents. Such activities would, of course, be facilitated through the reproduction of the report as a publication in the official United Nations languages.

The report will probably be used primarily by researchers and opinion leaders. There are obvious difficulties in communicating a 200-page United Nations document to the general public. For that reason, the General Assembly also asked the Group to make arrangements for a shorter version of the report, aiming at a mass audience. We owe a large debt of gratitude to the Canadian Government for its sponsoring the writing of a "popular version". Arrangements have been made with an indepent writer and journalist to undertake that work under the supervision of the Chairman, Mrs. Thorsson, Many Governments have already indicated willingness to facilitate the translation and distribution of the "popular version". It is now expected that the report will be translated into more than 15 languages.

As I said earlier, the sponsors of the present draft resolution trust that it will be adopted by consensus.

I shall now deal with the draft resolution in document A/C.1/36/L.39, entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

The unstable political situation in the world of today and the strong feeling of insecurity created by worsening international relations have led to an alarming increase of military expenditures. In this rather difficult political climate we must not despair, but must try harder than ever to create an atmosphere of confidence between all States that will help to curb the arms race and eventually be conducive to general disarmament.

The Swedish Government believes that new strong efforts are urgently needed and that it should be in the interest of all countries to arrive at agreements about the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. It is also by Government's firm opinion that such agreements could be concluded and carried out without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State. On the contrary, a halt in the increases of military expenditures and subsequent reductions would no doubt strengthen the security of nations on both the global and regional levels. Such reductions could furthermore release resources from military purposes to economic and social development, inter alia, for the benefit of the developing countries.

Agreements to freeze and eventually to reduce the military expenditures of all countries, especially those most heavily armed, have been advocated by my country for a long time. Agreements on such measures would have the advantage of exerting constraints, not only on certain, often substitutable, kinds of weapons, but on all types of military activities. They would probably also lead to actual reductions in such fields where it is difficult to arrive at restrictions in physical terms.

The question of restricting military expenditures has been discussed for a long time. Some progress has been made towards the solution of the technical problems which are involved. Since the subject was introduced on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1973, a number of resolutions have been adopted and some expert studies have been carried out, mainly concerning the problems of defining and reporting military expenditures.

As a result, a standardized system for international reporting of military expenditures has been developed and tested, and finally the General Assembly, last year, recommended that all Member States make use of the reporting instrument and report annually to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available. This year the first national reports have been received and assembled in the Secretary-General's report (A/36/353 and Add.1). Sixteen States have thus far participated in this new reporting system. We very much appreciate the participation of those States, but it should be stressed that it is highly important to achieve a wider participation of States from different geographic regions and representing different economic and budgeting systems. A proper implementation of the reporting system would help to clarify and harmonize different concepts of military expenditures and to create such definitions as would be needed for fruitful negotiations on the limitation of military expenditures.

This is, however, not enough. Without generally accepted procedures for comparing the military expenditures of different countries and at different periods of time, it would probably be very difficult to arrive at any long-lasting and substantial agreements to restrain or reduce such expenditures. That is why it is so important to deal with the problems of comparability and to find acceptable and practical solutions to those problems. The study of the problems of comparability and verification is being continued by an ad hoc group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B. Sweden attaches great importance to the outcome of the study, which will be valuable in the determination of the possibilities of reaching agreements on restrictions of military expenditures.

In parallel with the ongoing efforts to study problems related to comparability and verification, Sweden considers it also important to elaborate and eventually adopt a joint political document, as referred to in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.38, which a little while ago was introduced by the representative of Romania. In such a document the Member States would express their firm intention to freeze and subsequently reduce their military expenditures. This expression of intent should be regarded as a strong political commitment to take part in future international agreements and to exercise self-restraint in military expenditures pending the conclusion of such agreements.

At the request of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission has started to identify and elaborate the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

The Swedish Government hopes that the ongoing discussions in the Commission will result in a general agreement as to the substantive content of such principles. It should also be stressed that it is important to reach an early agreement on this subject, especially in view of the ever-increasing economic resources which are wasted on the arms race and the growing threat to mankind that this development constitutes. Concrete results relating to military expenditures at the forthcoming second special session would no doubt constitute an important achievement.

Speaking on behalf of the sponsors, I would like now to deal with some details of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/36/L.39, sponsored by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Pica, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Sudan and my own country.

In operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.39 the General Assembly stresses the need of increasing the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems.

In operative paragraph 2 the Assembly reiterates its recommendations to all Member States to report, by using the reporting instrument, annually by 30 April to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available.

The Secretary-General is requested in operative paragraph 3 to examine ways and means to make the collection and assembling of data on military expenditures, reported by States on the basis of the reporting instrument, an integral part of his normal statistical services and to arrange and publish these data according to statistical practice.

Finally, in operative paragraph 4 the Secretary-General is requested also to include these matters in his next annual report on military budgets to the General Assembly.

Finally, as I said I would at the beginning of my statement, I am now going to make a few comments on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.40, concerning certain conventional weapons, which was introduced by the representative of Nigeria.

When the Convention and the annexed three Protocols on particularly inhumane weapons were adopted in Geneva in October 1980, it was frequently admitted that the results of the United Nations Conference were modest. At the same time, however, it was generally felt that this new regulation in the field of international humanitarian law was a significant development: for the first time since 1925 it had proved possible to restrict the use of specific categories of weapons. It was also felt that in an armed conflict the humanitarian effects of the new Protocols should not be underestimated, even if these effects were only expected to be a matter of marginal importance. For human beings falling within the margin, so to speak, the new rules would obviously be a matter of paramount importance.

The cautious optimism that lies behind this kind of reasoning presupposes that the Convention and its annexed Protocols will be signed and ratified by a large number of States and that the new rules will be applied and respected in cases of armed conflict - in short, that these rules will become a live and effective part of modern international law. So far we have only reached the stage of signature; even though the number of signatures is relatively large, the list of signatories is not entirely satisfactory. For instance, some of the most important military Powers have not yet signed the Convention.

That is why the draft resolution we have submitted is so important. The Swedish delegation would like to appeal to Governments speedily to sign and to ratify the Convention and the Protocols so that these new rules become part of the established international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict. The General Assembly should encourage Governments to act without delay so that this aim will be achieved as soon as possible.

I have already indicated that the results of the United Nations Conference could have been more substantial.

With regard to the Protocol on incendiary weapons, no protection of combatants was achieved. This will remain a central issue for later agreement. In this context I should like to make it clear that Sweden has in no way given up its claim that incendiary weapons are apt to have grave and unnecessarily injurious effects. We think that most medical and technical data support this view. In the long run, all use of incendiary weapons, also against combatants, should be outlawed.

With regard to some other categories of weapons there was no final agreement in Geneva, partly because the Conference lacked the time to consider these weapons, partly because these issues were not ripe for agreement. This was the case with regard to small calibre projectiles. It is our opinion that work on this issue should continue in an international framework, both as far as international legislative efforts and basic research are concerned. On the scientific level a lot of work has already been done. In this context I should like to call attention to the fourth International Symposium on Wound Ballistics that was held in Gothenburg, Sweden, in September this year. As a result of the discussions, it may especially be noted that the concept of "energy transfers" to the target now seems to be videly accepted as a basis for assessing the injurious capability of small-calibre-weapon systems. In Gothenburg it was also noted that the international deliberations on the small-calibre-weapon issues have had a substantial impact on national administrations and weapons manufacturers in their plans to develop and introduce new generations of automatic rifles. It is to be hoped that some day this development will lead to an agreement at government level, resulting in a regulation of the use of small-calibre-weapon systems and a standardized test method capable of establishing what systems entail energy transfer and injurious effects reaching an unacceptable level.

The Convention of 1980 does not establish any machinery for implementation and verification. At the end of the United Nations Conference, however, a proposal was tabled by the Federal Republic of Germany and others providing for a consultative committee of experts, a committee that could investigate

alleged violations of the Protocols by means of verification. Unfortunately there was no time seriously to consider this interesting proposal. Sweden appreciates that this matter has been brought up again in this Committee. My country has always supported efforts to strengthen the implementation of international law and would have liked to see mandatory provisions to this effect included in the general Treaty adopted by the Conference. This is a matter to which we shall revert on a later occasion.

To a certain extent it would be possible, for fact-finding purposes, to rely on Protol I additional to the Geneva Conventions. This presupposes, however, that the Additional Protocol, which was adopted in 1977, and the weapon Protocols will become widely ratified. The fact-finding Cormission of article 90, in Additional Protocol I, is competent to look into any alleged grave breaches or other serious violations of the Protocol. Article 35:2 of the same Protocol prohibits the use, in general, of weapons and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. To the extent that various weapon Protocols can be seen as specifications of the general rule in article 35, the fact-finding machinery of 1977 can be of direct relevance for the new weapon Protocols. There is one problem, however: of the 17 States that have ratified Additional Protocol I, only two, namely, Sweden and Finland, have issued a declaration under article 90, accepting the competence of the fact-finding Commission.

Against this background it goes without saying that my delegation attaches the utmost importance to the provisions for a review contained in the Convention adopted. It is essential for the nations of the world to have a treaty machinery available that can be used to further the development of international humanitarian law in the field of conventional weapons. We therefore find it useful and appropriate for the draft resolution to call attention to the need for future review conferences.

We also feel that the situation with regard to the three weapon Protocols should be continuously reviewed in this Assembly. The question of "particularly inhumane" conventional weapons should be a recurrent item on the agenda of the General Assembly. That would enable the Assembly to follow the technical, medical and military developments in this field. It would also enable it to follow the

signing and ratification of the new Convention and its annexed Protocols, and to commend them to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments of international humanitarian law.

Mr. MENZIES (Canada): I wish today to introduce, under item 55, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.28 on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The sixteen sponsors of this resolution are: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Canada, Dermark, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Singapore and Sweden.

It will be recalled that a resolution on this subject has been adopted by the General Assembly each year since 1978; the objective of this resolution was set out in paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, in the same year. Previous resolutions on the subject of fissionable material requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action, to consider the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and to keep the Assembly informed of progress. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.28, which I am introducing today, recalls General Assembly resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, and 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, all of which are procedural in nature. This draft resolution has the same purpose.

This year's report of the Committee on Disarmament indicates that the subject of prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes was addressed on a number of occasions, and is one of the most significant areas for nuclear disarmament. We therefore believe it fitting that the General Assembly reaffirm its interest in this matter. Such an agreement would serve to underwrite, support and guarantee other agreements on the control of nuclear weapons. The adoption of a procedural resolution similar to that of the last three years would promote this concept, the objective of which is to contribute to the realization of the international community's non-proliferation goals. This proposal does not stand in isolation. Its ultimate realization depends upon progress in other negotiations on nuclear matters, and these are affected by the international negotiating climate which is critical for progress across the entire arms control spectrum.

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

The report of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in those sections relating to nuclear disarmament, reflects correctly the constraints of the international situation on prospects for progress in negotiations. While there is little cause for satisfaction, we are convinced that recourse to recrimination will not move matters ahead and that the most effective way to proceed under prevailing circumstances is with an eye on the future to promote practical steps which command the widest possible measure of agreement.

As in the past, we therefore commend this draft resolution in the confidence that it will find support with a large number of delegations.

Mr. RAJAKOVSKI (Finland): Yesterday morning the representative of Belgium formally introduced the draft resolution on the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament contained in document A/C.1/36/L.37. Being one of the sponsors of that draft resolution, my delegation would like to make a few brief comments on the subject, in support of the study.

There is widening recognition of the fact that in several regions of the world the military build-up and the arms race have assumed proportions which have potentially dangerous implications for international peace and security, regional as well as global. The Government of Finland has therefore given its strong support to all efforts within the United Nations disarmament framework to enhance regional measures of disarmament. For the same reason it has participated in and indeed welcomed the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament prepared by a group of governmental experts and contained in document A/35/416 of 8 October 1980.

As the Government of Finland has already had the opportunity to transmit its views and comments on the study to the Secretary-General and they are published in the report of the Secretary-General in document A/36/343, I can be very brief here today.

My delegation shares the common view that the most urgent disarmament issues have a global bearing. I have in mind in particular the danger posed by nuclear veapons and the nuclear arms race. Yet, for the great majority of States the perceived threat to their security and thus the need for military

(Mr. Rajakowski, Finland)

preparedness are primarily connected with conditions in their own regions. Furthermore my delegation feels that regional disarmament efforts, while not being a substitute for efforts at the global level, could for their part greatly facilitate the achievement of global disarmament measures also.

As is pointed out in the study, the link between regional measures and the process aiming at general and complete disarmament is real and should be duly taken into account in future work towards practical achievements in the field of disarmament.

The principles and guidelines to be applied in regional disarmament have been adequately outlined in the study. I shall therefore limit myself to stressing here only two major considerations.

First, the most important principle in connexion with the regional approach to disarmament is that of the sovereignty of States over the region under consideration. It is therefore up to the States concerned to determine the modalities of any regional disarmament measure to be taken.

Secondly, it is evident that disarmament in one region cannot proceed in total disregard of security conditions, and their development, in other regions and globally, if it is to serve its immediate purpose of enhancing regional security. In some cases it may even be of primary concern to the countries of the region to preserve the region from involvement in the confrontations between third States. Therefore the States taking steps aimed at regional disarmament must be able to secure the necessary co-operation with third States.

As to the conceivable measures in the regional approach, the qualitative and quantitative arms race in the field of conventional weapons, which constitutes the bulk of military expenditure in the world and the major burden to national economies, is the most immediate threat to security at the regional level. Furthermore, verification of disarmament measures conceived to facilitate the effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence among States are as important in the regional context as in other contexts. Verification can often more easily take place in the regional context because regional measures can be adapted to the specific needs and requirements of the participating States.

(Mr. Rajakowski, Finland)

In conclusion, my delegation believes that, as regional security conditions vary from case to case, no general formula or preconceived pattern can satisfy all requirements. Consequently the general approach presented in the study should be supplemented by studies to be conducted in specific regional or subregional contexts, taking into account the security needs and characteristics of the regions concerned. In addition to agreeing on a framework for regional disarmament negotiations, there is also a need to create or to strengthen institutional arrangements at the regional level. Such arrangements would set the process in motion and would allow initiatives to develop, concepts to be discussed and concrete measures to be negotiated.

For those reasons my delegation feels that by adopting this draft resolution the First Committee will do much to show that the international community stands by its resolve to support those regional and global disarmament efforts.

Hr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Once again I have the honour of submitting to the First Committee a draft resolution - on this occasion draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.42, sponsored by the delegations of Algeria, Argentina, Cuba, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, relating to the strategic arms limitation talks.

The text of the draft is very similar to that for resolution 35/156 K, adopted last year. This is due to the fact that, unfortunately, the exhortation addressed by the General Assembly in that resolution to the two nuclear super-Powers to ratify the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SALT II) remains a dead letter to this day. Therefore it is pertinent to emphasize once again some of the elements of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.42 even though they may be identical with those contained in the draft that served as a basis for resolution 35/156 K.

Therefore I should like to emphasize, first of all, that the interest of the General Assembly in this question dates back to the very origins of the SALT discussions in 1969 and that since 1972 it has been very clearly reflected in an uninterrupted series of resolutions, not excluding the only one adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament, namely, resolution S-10/2, in the Final Document of which there appeared, among the disarmament measures given the highest priority in the Programme of Action, the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II.

There is a further element in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.42, which I am introducing, that also deserves to be emphasized: the great care with which it was drafted in order to ensure that under its provisions close attention will be paid to something which began to appear early on in the resolutions of the General Assembly on this subject, which were to culminate in the Final Document and in resolutions 33/91 C of 16 December 1978 and 34/87 F of 11 December 1979. That element could be summed up in a few words by saying that the Assembly never regarded the SALT II treaty as an end in itself. Thus the Final Document, as recalled in the second preambular paragraph of the draft, placed stress on the fact that that treaty should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms.

Similarly, in the resolution adopted the year before last the treaty in question is described, as is pointed out in the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft, as:

"a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons". Those negotiations should have as their final objective, as specifically stated in the resolution itself, one defined by the highest representatives of the two contracting States as that of:

"bringing about the complete and total destruction of the arsenals of nuclear weapons and ensuring the existence of a world free from such weapons."

The fact that, as I have already stated and as can be deduced with crystal clarity from the contents of these paragraphs, the Assembly has never regarded the SALT II treaty as an end in itself is sufficient to explain why we do not consider valid the arguments adduced in an attempt to justify the failure to ratify the treaty.

The third element that I believe is necessary to stress, since it is undoubtedly one of the most important elements for a proper evaluation of the draft, is that deriving from the sixth preambular paragraph, wherein we place particular emphasis on the declaration by the General Assembly to the effect that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament and, as an irrefutable justification of that interest, some of the most convincing pronouncements of the Assembly contained in the Final Document are adduced; and, incidentally, those declarations could easily be added to, such as the statement that:

"existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth" (resolution S-10/2, para. 11), the statement that:

"the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it" (<u>ibid</u>.), and the statement that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuance of the arms race:

"pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization" (ibid., para. 47).

If those three elements are kept in mind, together with the fact that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stated in its Final Document:

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility."

(ibid., para. 43),

that responsibility acquires incalculable dimensions when we attempt to remove the danger of a universal holocaust. Thus, no one will be surprised at the fact that, as a natural consequence of the virtually total absence of results from its last resolution — and I say "virtually total" because, as far as we know, the two super-Powers appear to have at least tried to live up to the confidence expressed therein by refraining, until such time as the treaty enters into force, from any act by virtue of which its objects and aims could be frustrated — the Assembly may once again, as suggested in the draft resolution, express its conviction

"that the signature in good faith of a treaty, especially if it is the culmination of prolonged and conscientious negotiations," - and it is well known that in this case they lasted more than six years - "carries with it the presumption that its ratification will not be unduly delayed."

In order to maintain the strictest objectivity and to avoid presenting a totally negative balance, operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution states that the Assembly

Reiterates its satisfaction...at the agreement reached by both parties in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, signed the same day as the Treaty" - i.e. the SALT II Treaty. "To the effect of continuing to pursue negotiations in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation which should culminate in the SALT III treaty, and to the effect also of endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, inter alia the following objectives:

- (a) Significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic arms
- (b) Qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms?

Likewise, operative paragraph 5, which immediately follows the one I have just quoted, reads as follows:

Welcomes the agreed decision of both parties to begin negotiations, on 30 November 1981, on the intermediate range nuclear weapons of the European theatre, and trusts that such negotiations will facilitate the achievement of the objectives enunciated in the above-mentioned joint statement of principles

Let us hope that this draft resolution may be adopted by consensus like the one last year which resulted in resolution 35/156 K and is its closest antecedent. We believe that this is not too much to ask, since the sole purpose of the draft resolution is to contribute to the adoption of tangible measures for control of nuclear weapons, to be soon supplemented by the real nuclear disarmament measures all the peoples of the world have so long been avaiting.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the sponsors, Algeria, Erazil, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Argentina, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.43 and which, we trust, will assist in providing the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with the better elements of judgement when it tackles one of the major issues, perhaps the most important issue, of our time: the prevention of nuclear war.

I need hardly stress that the subject-matter of the draft resolution is the object of the foremost concern of world public opinion. This was explicitly recognized in the Final Document of the first special session, in paragraph 18 of which all States reflected their consensus that

Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. (S-10/4 para. 18)

What have we done since? This is the question we should ask ourselves. In any event, it is a question that is being posed with growing insistence.

The harsh reality is that we have been unable to halt the arms race, nor have we taken any significant concrete steps in the field of disarmament, and we have done less still in the area of nuclear disarmament. The reasons for this are well known to all and I do not intend to refer to them on this occasion. But we must in all honesty accept that reality and acknowledge our failure.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Heither have we achieved success in respect of what, in the words of paragraph 10 of the Final Document, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day, namely, to remove the threat of a nuclear war. Such is the importance that the Final Document attaches to that objective that it mentions it at least a dozen times in various places and contexts.

There have been no achievements in this field since the first special session and the time has come, we believe, for the General Assembly to devote its attention to this question and to take some step, however modest, along the road that we must inevitably follow.

First it is necessary for those States possessing nuclear weapons to state clearly, in writing and in detail, their views, proposals and suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war. It is true that there are bilateral agreements on direct lines of communication, agreements on the limitation of certain weapons, proposals on the non-use or non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and doctrines and declarations on all these questions. But those are separate and limited aspects and, while we do not minimize their value, nor enter into a consideration of their merits, what we seek is a comprehensive, general, simultaneous formulation on the part of each of the nuclear-weapon-States concerning the vaster question of the prevention of nuclear war. Those five Powers have declared on repeated occasions their desire to prevent a nuclear war and it is therefore to be hoped that they will welcome this request for information concerning their ideas and plans on this subject.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

That is the fundamental purpose underlying draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.43 which I am introducing, namely, that the second special session of the General Assembly may have an opportunity to be informed of those positions, to study and consider them and to arrive collectively at appropriate measures and conclusions. The non-nuclear States have the right and duty to assess those positions in order to express their own thoughts and to make their own proposals on the subject, for their own survival is at stake and they cannot delegate to others either the quest for, or the formulation of solutions on this matter.

I wish to make it quite clear that while the draft resolution seeks, first and foremost - and I emphasize the words "first and foremost" - the views of the nuclear weapon Powers, the prevention of nuclear war is a question of common interest to all States. It is true that the instruments for unleashing a nuclear war are in the hands of a small number of countries who bear a special responsibility, as recognized in paragraph 57 of the Final Document. It is equally true, however, that the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and for preserving future generations from the scourge of another war devolves upon all the States Members of the United Nations. For that reason, paragraph 58 of the Final Document notes that all States should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure, inter alia, the prevention of nuclear war. Those concepts are reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution I have the honour to introduce. The content of those paragraphs is derived from the Final Document, with one exception, which is taken from the United Nations Charter.

Although I do not wish to wax grandiloquent, we cannot disregard the fact that the subject we are discussing relates to the very survival of mankind. Our draft resolution is an effort aimed at fulfilling one of the most important tasks set forth in the Final Document and seeks to initiate a process whose initial impetus will be provided by the views, suggestions and proposals of the nuclear-weapon States. That first step will be followed by others to be taken by all Member States at the second special session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Presumably, the road will not end there; subsequent efforts will also be necessary. But we must trigger the process, and this is the basis of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.43.

On behalf of the sponsors of that draft resolution, I would express the hope that it will be adopted by consensus and that the nuclear-weapon States will give it their most careful and thorough consideration. This is a collective requirement that arises from the concerns of the entire world and it has been drafted in the most profound spirit of urgency and seriousness. We trust that it will be received in the same spirit.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): On 21 October of this year, Eugene Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, presented to the First Committee an overview of the United States policies in the area of arms control and in the area that is of direct interest to the Committee.

Since that time, Mr. Fields, the newly appointed Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament, and I have elaborated points of importance in the area of negotiations. This morning, I am happy to tell you that the President of the United States spoke in Washington D.C. and moved many of the arguments quite a bit further along, adding some concrete proposals to agendas around the world on arms control. A member of the Secretariat is now distributing copies of the President's speech, and knowing that we are all inundated with a flood of paper and material, I thought I would make some references to the speech and point out the new and important portions of it to the First Committee.

The President mentioned the fact that the frequent charges of United States imperialism and world domination are unfounded and that, as a matter of fact, after the Second World War, we could well have dominated the world with no risk to ourselves. However, we made no effort to do so. The United States took the opposite tack and in June of 1946 proposed the Baruch Plan, in which it proposed that the United Nations establish an international atomic development authority to ensure the full exploitation of the peaceful potential of atomic energy. The United States also made a unilateral offer to

(Ifr. Adelman, United States)

dispose of its atomic weapons, which were the only atomic weapons anywhere in the world at that time; and to accept a total ban on the manufacturing or use of such weapons. It also offered to turn over to the international agency all its scientific and technological knowledge on atomic energy. The United States was very eager to do this, but the Soviet Union would not go along with such a scheme.

The President basically presented the elements of deterrence and the real success of deterrence so far; that policy has resulted in the longest European peace in this century. Against the background of the proposals the President made later, he undertook a survey of the continuing momentum of the Soviet military build-up. Whereas the United States has reduced the size of its armed forces and decreased its military spending, the Soviets have steadily increased their number of men under arms, which is now twice that of the United States, and in the recent past the Soviets have expanded their real military spending by approximately one third, as we have pointed out to the Committee. The Soviet Union has increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000 compared to our 11,000. Although historically a land Power, it has transformed its navy from a coastal defence force to an open-ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea Power with transoceanic alliances, has cut its fleet in half.

On page 4 of the President's speech, he stated that during a period when the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) deployed no new intermediate-range nuclear missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union deployed more than 750 nuclear warheads on the new SS-20 missiles.

The President basically points out that the three different missile systems of the Soviet Union - the SS.20, SS-4 and SS-5 - all have a range capable of reaching virtually all of Western Europe and that there is no equivalent deterrent to those Soviet intermediate missiles. None the less, the President is proposing a four-point agenda for real arms negotiations.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

The first point concerns the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This would be a historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the Moon, would be a giant step for mankind. The President adds, of course, that the United States will go to Geneva in good faith and willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts. Again, against the background of the last six years, whereas the United States deployed no new intermediate-range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed, as I mentioned, 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union today has an overwhelming advantage, on the order of six to one, in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

(Iir. Adelman, United States)

Secondly, the President does want to relaunch the strategic negotiations. He says that the preparations should be very serious so that there will not be dashed hopes and dashed expectations as happened the last time around. He said, "We will call these negotiations START" - as Eugene Rostow mentioned to this Committee, emphasizing not so much the limitations but really the reductions in strategic arms which the Administration seeks.

Thirdly, we want to move ahead on negotiations in the conventional field. The defence needs of the Soviet Union today hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than there were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on D-Day. Therefore, it is hoped that there will be serious negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe significantly.

Fourthly, the President would like to have a conference to develop effective measures that would reduce the dangers of the risk of surprise attack. He stated that on all four fronts, success can only come if the Soviet Union will share our commitment, if it will demonstrate that its often repeated professions of concern for peace will me matched by positive actions. In this Committee we have heard those professions quite a bit and we hope that they will be met on those four points and move ahead quite seriously.

In the last part of his statement, the President spoke about the concept of peace that goes beyond the mere absence of war. I thought those remarks would be of particular interest to many non-European States represented in this Committee and I shall therefore read out that part. The President said:

"We foresee a flowering of economic growth and individual liberty in a world of peace.

At the economic Summit in Cancun, I met with the leaders of 21 nations and sketched out our approach to global economic growth. We want to eliminate the barriers to trade and investment which hinder these critical incentives to growth. And we are working to develop new programmes to help the poorest nations achieve self-sustaining growth.

### (Mr. Adelman, United States)

Terms like 'peace' and 'security' have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They also mean little to the individual whose State has stripped him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as well as States. We must recognize that progress in the pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military security. Nowhere has this fundamental truth been more boldly and clearly stated than in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. These accords have not yet been translated into living reality.

He ended that address by quoting President Kennedy here at the United Nations 20 years ago. President Kennedy described the goal that President Reagan still pursues today. President Kennedy said:

"If we all can persevere, if we can ... look beyond our own shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure, and the peace preserved." (A/PV.1013, p. 59, para. 98)

He did not live to see that goal achieved, but I hope that all of us will live to see it achieved.

### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I should like now to suggest how we proceed with the voting on the draft resolutions on Friday, 20 November, the first day on which we shall vote. I have held consultations on the best procedure to follow and have been advised by many quarters that we should start with those draft resolutions about which there are not many differences. It is hoped that at least some of them may be adopted by consensus. I have been assisted by the Secretariat, I have consulted with a number of sponsors of draft resolutions and held a meeting of the officers of the Committee this morning. The result of all those consultations is the following.

I suggest that on Fridav morning we start with the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/36/L.1, on agenda item 51 (e) entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" - United Nations Programme of fellowships on disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by the delegation of Nigeria.

## (The Chairman)

Thereafter I propose the following list of draft resolutions: A/C.1/36/L.27, on agenda item 50, entitled "World disarmament conference". That draft resolution will be introduced later. Next, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.4, on agenda item 51 (a), entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" - Report of the Disarmament Commission. That draft resolution was introduced by the delegation of Egypt. Next, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.6, on agenda item 55 (g), entitled "General and complete disarmament" - Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. That draft resolution was introduced by the delegation of Hungary. Next, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.9, on agenda item 55 (b), entitled 'General and complete disarmament' - Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by the delegation of Argentina. Next, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.11, on agenda item 51 (i) entitled, "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" - World Disarmament Campaign. That resolution was introduced by the delegation of Mexico.

(The Chairman)

The next one would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.19, related to item 51 (b), on the subject of review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: report of the Committee on Disarmament. The draft was introduced by the delegation of Yugoslavia.

The next one we would take up according to this suggestion would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.26, related to item 51 (h), on the subject of review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session. The draft was introduced by the delegation of Yugoslavia.

Next would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35, related to item 42 (a), on the subject of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament. This draft has not been introduced yet, but I understand that it will be submitted by Friday.

The next one would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.37, related to item 55 (e), on the subject of general and complete disarmament: study on all the aspects of regional disarmament. The draft was introduced by the delegation of Belgium.

The next one that we would take up according to this suggestion would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.38, related to item 40 (a), on the subject of reduction of military budgets. The draft was introduced by the delegation of Romania.

Next on the list would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.39, related to item 40, on the subject of reduction of military budgets. The draft was introduced by the delegation of Sweden.

Next would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.40, related to item 52, on the subject of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. This draft was introduced by Nigeria.

(The Chairman)

The next one that we would put to the vote would be draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.42, related to item 55 (j), on the subject of general and complete disarmament: strategic arms limitation talks. The draft was introduced by the delegation of Mexico.

Finally, we would take up draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.22, related to item 43, on the subject of the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. This draft was introduced by the delegation of Mexico.

That would be the suggested voting order for our work on Friday. As I said in my introductory remarks, this list of draft resolutions is the outcome of consultations among the sponsors, the Secretariat and the officers of the Committee. It is to be hoped that some of those draft resolutions will be adopted by consensus, but, naturally, I do not want to preclude any voting.

If that procedure is acceptable, we would then start on this, with the best of hopes on Friday morning. I shall indicate later on - at the latest, by Friday afternoon - what draft resolutions we suggest should be voted on, on Monday, and then, on Monday, what draft resolutions we would be voting on on Tuesday.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that all delegations share my view that the information you have given us as to the order in which action would be taken on the various draft resolutions is very useful. It will enable each delegation to prepare its position on a given draft, or on particular drafts.

I should like to clear up what seems to me to be a misunderstanding about draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.27, relating to the World Disarmament Conference, which has been submitted by five sponsors, officers of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

Consultations are still under way between the five sponsors as to which of them will introduce the draft resolution. It may be the Chairman of the Committee, Sri Lanka, or some other officer of the Committee. It is to be hoped that the draft will be introduced tomorrow and that action can be taken on Friday, but I should just like to make it clear that I cannot say at this stage who will be introducing the draft resolution tomorrow.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, on the whole we agree with the proposal you put forward and we welcome the intention to vote on 15 draft resolutions, but I do have a question. Would it not be more convenient for the Committee and for delegations to take decisions on agenda items in the light of all the draft resolutions? I do not quite understand, for example, why we shall be voting on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.22 on the question of prohibiting tests but not on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.31, although both those draft resolutions relate to the same item.

I feel it would be more logical to have a vote on similar draft resolutions, or draft resolutions relating to the same item. We would be saving time; delegations would be explaining their votes, and I am sure that would be more efficient.

The same applies to draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35. You proposed that it should be voted on, and we do not object, but there is another draft resolution on this item, A/C.1/36/L.36. Why shall we not vote on that? Heither has been presented yet, but I hope they will be presented by Friday.

I think you acted quite rightly when you proposed voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/36/L.38 and L.39 on military budgets. I think that is the kind of approach which we should adhere to in the future. I repeat, I am not insisting, but I do think that if there is a possibility, for the convenience of delegations it would be a good idea to vote on the draft resolutions under items of the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that, as far as the inclusion of draft resolutions A/C.1/36/L.35 and L.22 is concerned, we have done this at the specific request of the sponsors of the two draft resolutions. Since we have a rather heavy load for Friday - in fact list 15 draft resolutions - I think that we should then be able to take care of the suggestions made by the representative of the Soviet Union, but we shall have to consult the sponsors of the two draft resolutions which are not mentioned in the list. We shall keep this suggestion in mind. I understand that we are in agreement on how we are going to proceed on Monday.