

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**  
THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION  
*Official Records \**



FIRST COMMITTEE  
21st meeting  
held on  
Monday, 2 November 1981  
at 10.30 a.m.  
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 21ST MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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81-64122

Distr. GENERAL  
A/C.1/36/PV.21  
2 November 1981

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

#### GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. de LA GORCE (France)(interpretation from French): The French delegation wishes first of all to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, its warmest congratulations and its best wishes for the complete success of your endeavours. It is convinced that, under your guidance, the First Committee will pursue its task most successfully. Your talent, your authority and your experience are a guarantee of that success. Lastly, we are happy to see in the Chair the representative of a country which is linked to France by a long tradition of friendship and which makes a most valuable contribution to the task of international co-operation.

Disarmament Week has just ended; it was marked by the repeated affirmation of a wish and a hope: disarmament at the service of peace, and peace at the service of economic and social progress. At the same time, disappointment was expressed at the at best slow rate of progress and, more often, the stagnation or even regression.

These are legitimate feelings, but the profound wish of peoples, the action of political forces and that of the mass media will only effectively support governments' efforts if there is on all sides a clear understanding of the conditions indispensable for any progress in the field of disarmament. There are, on the one hand, the political conditions: non-recourse to force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention in internal affairs. In essence, this means respect for the principles laid down in the Charter and without which the necessary confidence cannot exist. There are, on the other hand, the intrinsic conditions of the disarmament endeavour: the maintenance or restoration of security at progressively reduced armaments levels, the maintenance of the balance necessary for security, due consideration of the specific conditions prevailing in each region, international verification and, finally, the establishment or strengthening of confidence thanks to appropriate measures.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Consideration of the present situation leads to the disappointing conclusion we all know with respect to the political conditions of disarmament. Recourse to force continues in various regions of the world: the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, those of certain States in South-East Asia, and other acts of force taking place in the Near East and in Africa. There are also interventions in internal affairs. At the same time, certain balances regarded as necessary for security are called into question, in particular in Europe. Confidence and the feeling of security are greatly undermined. Negotiations of major importance - in particular those dealing with strategic and chemical weapons - are still suspended.

However, the very dangers that derive from that situation compel us to act. While in the debate on the effects and the causes we firmly believe that it is the deterioration in the international situation which leads to failure in disarmament - and not the reverse - we also recognize that the resumption of efforts in favour of disarmament may help to restore confidence and reopen the path to progress. In addition, after the recent disappointments, it is important for the General Assembly to be able, at the special session next year, to take cognizance, if not of any far-reaching results, at least of clear and concrete signs which show, on the part of the international community and in particular the more powerful States, a willingness to take further action in favour of disarmament.

The French delegation therefore wishes to consider here briefly the state of progress of the disarmament endeavour a few months before that deadline. At the same time it will also give its views as to future prospects and our approach to those issues.

A number of those questions fall within the purview of the Committee on Disarmament. May we recall in that connexion that, for the first time this year, the Committee was able to devote itself almost exclusively to those negotiating tasks and in that connexion did a considerable amount of work of high quality; and, if results appear obviously to be meagre, it is not the fault either of the institution or of its methods.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Let me mention first the questions posed by the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The French Government attaches the highest importance thereto. It understands the preoccupations expressed in that connexion in the international community. At the same time, we note that in the present historic phase those questions arise in connexion with a concrete, specific situation, namely, that of the region where France is situated, and which we cannot disregard without also disregarding the fundamental intrinsic conditions of any action in the field of disarmament.

That situation is dominated by two primary realities. First of all, the nuclear weapon is very largely in the hands of the two major Powers; secondly, it constitutes a fundamental element of balance, therefore of security, in the region of the world in question. Any progress towards the cessation of the arms race and then towards nuclear disarmament implies a twofold effort: that of the two Powers to reach an agreement on a strategic nuclear balance defined by ceilings, and then the gradual reduction of those levels. On the first point, that was the purpose of SALT. Today the same aim must be sought by the same parties with respect to theatre nuclear weapons. On the other hand, there is the effort to be made within the geographic context of Europe in order to improve the conditions of security and then gradually to reduce the level of conventional weapons in Europe. The objectives pursued in both cases are essentially interlinked: the global balance cannot be dissociated from balance in the European theatre.

The French Government's policy is based on that twofold approach. As stated on 24 September by the President of the French Republic:

"The armament-negotiation debate must turn around this fundamental notion: only the balance of forces maintains peace. That is why I have alerted world public opinion to Soviet over-armament in Europe. That is why I hope negotiation will begin, but on clear bases and without either of the parties being able to speculate on a momentary advantage."

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

The French Government therefore welcomed with satisfaction the forthcoming opening of negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons; it would also be gratified at a resumption of negotiations on strategic weapons whose object would be not only to achieve their limitation but also their reduction. We consider that those two negotiations are part of a whole and fall within the same framework.

At the same time, France is pursuing its action in favour of a conference on conventional disarmament in Europe. To that effect it has put forward proposals which are being discussed at the Madrid Conference and to which I shall revert in a moment.

The nuclear negotiation remains therefore the responsibility of the major Powers. France, for its part, cannot envisage any commitment as to its nuclear forces unless, following reductions agreed among those Powers, the massive disproportion between arsenals is to change. It is compelled, in the meantime, to maintain its means at the levels required to ensure their deterrent effect, bearing in mind the quantitative and qualitative increase in the most important arsenals.

The same concern is at the root of France's attitude with respect to the prohibition of tests. We believe that such a measure cannot be taken in isolation from, or prior to, nuclear disarmament as such and that it must find its rightful place in a process of nuclear-arms reduction.

Action to be undertaken with respect to those nuclear weapons is first and foremost the responsibility of the nuclear Powers themselves, but it is also of major interest for the international community as a whole. Questions relating thereto are on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and the French Government hopes they will be discussed in a substantive and businesslike manner. That is why, last year, it advocated, here, the initiation of discussions on that subject in the Committee on Disarmament; those discussions took place, perhaps in too summary a fashion, but we hope that the Committee next year will devote all the necessary time to them. Also, when negotiations are resumed among the nuclear Powers, we believe it would be appropriate to define the method which will enable the Committee on Disarmament to follow those negotiations and to express its views in substantive and comprehensive terms.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Along with questions relating to nuclear disarmament, that of the use of weapons comes up from time to time. Thus, the delegation of the Soviet Union has this year submitted a draft declaration aimed at outlawing the first use of nuclear weapons. The French delegation will of course have occasion to speak more fully on the subject, but it wishes today briefly to put forward its objections.

The condemnation of first use and the commitment it seeks to impose is tantamount to guaranteeing a possible aggressor - even if he himself possesses nuclear weapons - against defensive recourse to such weapons. Thus, a State which violates the undertaking not to use force stipulated by the Charter would be the beneficiary of the non-first-use commitment to the detriment of the victim of its aggression, whereas the latter would have imposed on it a fundamental limitation on the exercise of its right to self-defence. In addition, the non-first-use commitment, regardless of the circumstances, in fact reduces the commitment not to use force to a relative matter, affects its fundamental and absolute character, and deprives it of its highest place among the obligations of States, because in the draft in question the first use of nuclear weapons is proclaimed as the most serious crime against humanity and its authors are outlawed, even if such use is imposed by the imperatives of self-defence. The gravest offence is the violation of the Charter. What then would a commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons assumed by a State violating the Charter by launching an aggression be worth?

Lastly, bearing in mind the geographical and strategic facts that are well known, one cannot without serious risk for stability, security and finally peace deprive of its deterrent effect, through a commitment not to be the first to use it, the nuclear component of the overall balance existing in a region of the world.

In the absence of nuclear disarmament, assurances relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons can only be granted to States which do not possess such weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones established by treaty have a special claim to such assurances and France has declared its readiness to enter into formal commitments with such States to that end. The question of negative security assurances remains on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and the French delegation is ready to continue the quest for a positive solution.

In any event, States that have renounced nuclear weapons and accepted the controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency have the right to accede to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The French Government has joined the international community in condemning Israel's attack on an Iraqi nuclear installation subject to the Vienna Agency's control.

Like nuclear weapons, conventional weapons today are not the object of any multilateral negotiation under the aegis of the United Nations. Yet they still constitute a fundamental aspect of the disarmament exercise. The problems they pose lend themselves more to regional solutions. This is so in Europe, which offers a specific and exceptional case. The concentration of conventional weapons there is, admittedly, very great. But above all, those weapons constitute one of the components of the overall balance necessary for security. The other component includes nuclear weapons.

As has just been stated by our representative at the Madrid Conference:

"In either case, negotiations must be undertaken on the sole bases possible, i.e., they must seek to guarantee a real and verifiable balance: balance from the Atlantic to the Urals as regards conventional elements; global balance, that is to say, between the two super-Powers as regards the nuclear element."

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

The first stage of the conference on disarmament in Europe, proposed by France, would relate to militarily significant confidence-building measures which would be restraining and verifiable. The next stage should cover the reduction of conventional weapons.

Can the limitation or restriction of conventional weapons be applied to other regions of the world? As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Claude Cheysson, stated before the General Assembly:

"Can we not rather imagine that the group of countries most concerned by a confrontation... among two or more neighbours might have the wisdom to limit the effects of the dispute, establish a regional or subregional system for the evaluation of military forces, and even to conclude a genuine agreement on self-limitation of armaments in the region, accompanied, of course, by appropriate means of control and verification?" (A/36/PV.9, p. 16)

Bearing in mind its scope and complexity, the question of conventional disarmament, like other aspect of disarmament, deserves to be studied by experts under the responsibility of the Secretary-General.

That is why the French delegation supports the initiative taken to that effect by Denmark.

The only multilateral negotiations under way on disarmament are those which continue in Geneva on chemical and radiological weapons.

The first is of primary importance. The Working Group entrusted with it has done a commendable piece of work. We hope that its terms of reference will be extended so as formally to encompass the negotiation of a convention; we also hope that it may make progress in the search for common positions on the important outstanding issues, such as its scope and, above all, verification.

Negotiation on radiological weapons, which is also under way in the Committee on Disarmament, should, in our view, be completed next year. We hope that the difficulties raised by proposals aimed at settling in that convention questions alien to its true purpose may in fact be set aside and that their consideration be undertaken in another framework.



(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

With regard to the work under way in Geneva, I should like, finally, to recall that done by the Ad Hoc Group entrusted with the elaboration of the draft comprehensive disarmament programme. The outcome of these discussions, under the guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles, is of such importance to the success of the forthcoming special session that it need not be underlined.

On the other hand, we wish to express our interest in a multilateral negotiation undertaken within the framework of the United Nations and relating to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Since it is present in that region, France is concerned at the continued violations of the sovereignty and the military occupation of certain non-aligned States, especially the hinterland States.

These circumstances have prevented the convening in 1981 of the diplomatic conference on the Indian Ocean, which was to define the principles and modalities for the establishment of the zone of peace. We hope, however, that the Assembly will extend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the preparation of that conference and that substantive progress will be made in 1982, in particular with respect to the harmonization of the views of Member States in that Committee as to the goals to be set for the conference so that its convening may not be deferred indefinitely.

This brief review of the disarmament endeavour, in its present stage and current prospects, would be incomplete were I not to mention the fundamental question of international verification.

Any disarmament agreement must include appropriate provisions on the subject. The opening of boundaries and on-site inspection wherever necessary are the very conditions of mutual confidence which must exist between the parties to any convention on disarmament.

Respect for commitments undertaken on the subject are of such importance that the international community must, in our view, assume its share of responsibility. It was in that spirit that a large number of States Members of the United Nations - about 40 - sponsored the proposal for an international satellite monitoring agency.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

The Group of Experts entrusted by the Secretary-General with studying the proposal has submitted its report this year. The document presents positive conclusions concerning the possibilities of implementing the proposed system and the services it might render with regard to verification of respect for disarmament agreements and control of crisis situations. The French delegation hopes that that proposal will be carefully considered next year at the special session of the General Assembly.

If international verification is necessary in the field of disarmament, it is equally so if we are to ensure respect for agreements on the banning and limitation of the use of certain weapons. We therefore hope that appropriate provisions will be negotiated as soon as possible to complete on this point the Convention relating to certain conventional weapons concluded last April. For the same reasons, we attach great importance to the work of the Group of Experts entrusted with examining allegations relating to the possible use of chemical weapons.

The strengthening of security and economic and social development are today the two great objectives of international co-operation. Disarmament must serve both. That is why the French Government attaches the greatest interest to efforts to be undertaken in order to determine the relationship between disarmament and development. In this connexion it takes note of the contribution made by the work of the Group of Experts chaired by Mrs. Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Government. While having certain reservations on the methods followed and on certain aspects of the report submitted by the Group, the French delegation supports its recommendations and hopes that the study will help to promote the specific proposal submitted by the French Government with a view to the creation of a disarmament fund for development.

The reports of the experts to which I have referred concerning the satellite monitoring agency and the relationship between disarmament and development show the importance which studies by the United Nations on disarmament will have in the future. The role and the responsibilities of the Centre for Disarmament have been enhanced. It would appear to us normal and desirable that this situation should lead to a review of the status of the Centre within the United Nations Secretariat.

Another manifestation of the interest shown in those studies was the creation last year of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. That Institute has rapidly established a programme and has undertaken a number of tasks. We have no doubt that it will most satisfactorily fulfil the task entrusted to it, in particular with respect to long-term studies. We hope that its final statutes will be approved at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly.

That session should mark a milestone on a very long route. It will have a place in the history of disarmament if the aims we have set ourselves are fully achieved. Those aims include: the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will orient and organize future negotiations; giving impetus to the consideration and negotiation of specific measures; and finally, we hope, the renewal of the motion initiated four years ago by the tenth special session of the General Assembly. For its part, the French Government is determined to make its full contribution to the common endeavour.

Mr. SHEIKH (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)(interpretation from Arabic):

Sir, I am pleased to express, on behalf of the Libyan delegation, our warm congratulations to you on your election to the Chairmanship of the First Committee. We are confident that with your wisdom and experience you will be able to ensure that the work of this Committee will be crowned with success. We also express our congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur.

It is stated in the Charter that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. In the light of that responsibility, which falls upon the shoulders of our Organization, subjects such as the arms race and disarmament take priority among the tasks that have been entrusted to the United Nations over the past 35 years. Despite the efforts exerted throughout those years by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the Organization has been unable to achieve any concrete results, due to the presence of some negative elements in the international climate, including the arms race among the big Powers, in particular the nuclear arms race, the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, mutual distrust among States, and the fact that some States Members of the Organization have not respected the principles set forth in the Charter and have not committed themselves

(Mr. Sheikh, Libyan Arab  
Jamahiriya)

to the implementation of United Nations resolutions, particularly those relating to the protection of the independence of States and the non-use of force in international relations.

Responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the achievement of disarmament is shared by all Member States in proportion with the role played by each of them in international affairs. Thus, the responsibility for strengthening the role of the Organization, including the achievement of disarmament, falls primarily on the shoulders of the big nuclear Powers and other military Powers.

The current arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is a dangerous turning-point for international relations. Unless concerted efforts are made, first of all by the nuclear Powers, to halt the production of those types of weapons of mass destruction, the day will come when mankind finds itself on the brink of nuclear catastrophe, the consequences of which will not be confined to the users of nuclear weapons, but will affect everyone.

Studies on nuclear weapons have shown that for each man, woman and child on the face of the earth there exists weaponry equivalent to more than three tons of TNT, and this at a time when many people do not possess the bare necessities of life such as food, housing and health care.

The current arms race has led to the dissipation of the capabilities of man. The presence of colonialism and neo-colonialism has overburdened the budgets of many countries, and has obliged them to devote a great part of their resources to the acquisition of the means of defence. In his report, the Secretary-General referred to the increase in military expenditures. He noted that military expenditure is absorbing more and more resources without leading to any strengthening of international security. This year \$500 billion has been earmarked for armaments while no progress has been achieved in development assistance, which could make a basic contribution to international security.

A mere 5 per cent of that sum would have been sufficient to attain the official development assistance targets set forth in the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade.

We are talking about the maintenance of international peace and security and calling for disarmament at a time when we see some major Powers pursuing certain practices that threaten international peace and security and impede the

(Mr. Sheikh, Libyan Arab  
Jamahiriya)

march towards disarmament. Those practices also increase tension in international relations. Foremost among those countries is the United States of America, and there is much evidence of this including the following: the decision by the American Government to manufacture the neutron bomb; the proliferation of American military bases in numerous parts of the world, particularly in some areas of the Arab homeland, the Mediterranean and Africa; the establishment of the so-called rapid deployment forces to protect so-called American interests, thus threatening the security, sovereignty and independence of countries situated in those areas. My delegation calls for the elimination of those bases, particularly from the Arab homeland, the Mediterranean and Africa.

The acts of provocation carried out by American military aircraft over the territorial waters and in the airspace of some countries pose another threat. In this connexion, I should like to refer to the American act of aggression to which my country was subject on 19 August 1981, when two aircraft of the American Sixth Fleet opened fire on two Libyan aeroplanes which were carrying out routine reconnaissance flights over Libyan territorial waters in the Gulf of Sidra, thereby violating one of the basic principles of the Charter, which calls for all Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

The American aggression against the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which was condemned by all peace-loving States and peoples, is a sure confirmation of the aggressive policy pursued by the United States of America with a view to imposing its domination and hegemony in the political, economic and military spheres over the peoples struggling to achieve freedom and independence. The absolute support given by the United States to the racist régimes in occupied Palestine and South Africa, in all political, military and economic fields, is further evidence of the fact that the United States supports the forces of aggression against the Arab and African peoples. It is thanks to American support that the two racist régimes are able to pursue their aggressive policies against Arab and African peoples, particularly the Palestinian people. It was thanks to American military support that the aircraft of the Zionist entity were able to carry out their act of aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, whose activities, it has been confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, were fully in keeping with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Sheikh, Libyan Arab  
Jamahiriya)

In this connexion, I should like to refer to the latest American conspiracy against the Arab people, manifested in the declaration of a so-called strategic alliance between the United States and the Zionist entity.

Two reports of the Secretary-General deal with the nuclear armament of the two racist régimes in South Africa and occupied Palestine, their constant refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and their rejection of the principle of inspection of their nuclear facilities. All this confirms the fact that the nuclear reactors of those two régimes are actually being used for military and aggressive purposes and are directed against the Arab and African peoples, threatening peace and security not only on the African continent and in the Arab region, but in the world at large.

The nuclear capability acquired by those two racist régimes was attained with the support of some Western countries including the United States of America; therefore, those countries must assume their responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security by ceasing assistance of all kinds to the two racist régimes and joining the international community in forcing the Zionist entity and the racist régime in South Africa to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear facilities under international control.

(Mr. Sheikh, Libyan Arab  
Jamahiriya)

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, motivated by its desire to ensure peace and avoid the danger of nuclear weapons, has always supported resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, Asia and Latin America; it also supported, at the thirty fifth session, the resolution concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Moreover, we support the efforts to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and the proposal by Madagascar concerning the convening of a conference to deal with that subject. In addition, we reaffirm the right of all countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of atomic energy for development purposes, and in this connexion my Government has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has also signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of its safeguards system in Libya relating to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The responsibility for disarmament is a joint one, but the bulk of it falls upon the shoulders of the nuclear Powers. Disarmament should be carried out according to the priorities set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament - namely, to achieve nuclear disarmament and to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction.

The creation of a suitable atmosphere at the Committee on Disarmament is likely to help the Committee overcome the obstacles referred to in its report (A/36/27), particularly since we are on the threshold of the convening, next year, of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. That session will have to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament that would include practical steps in the field of disarmament.

Mr. KRISHNA (India): In my statement today, I should like to set forth the views of my delegation concerning the forthcoming second special session on disarmament, as well as on some of the agenda items before this Committee.

The second special session will offer the international community an opportunity to give a much-needed impetus to efforts at achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is imperative that the second special session unequivocally reaffirm and build further on the consensus arrived at by the international community concerning the principles underlying a programme to achieve general and complete disarmament, as embodied in the Final Document of the first special session, held in 1978. In addition, the forthcoming session should consider various urgent and immediate measures of disarmament which would lead to the strengthening of international peace and security and reduce the risk of war, especially the much-dreaded nuclear war.

Quite obviously, the main item on the agenda of the second special session would be the consideration and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which is at present being negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. As we see it, the following issues are still unresolved and are likely to stand in the way of achieving a consensus.

First and foremost, controversy surrounds the very nature of the type of document to be adopted by the second special session. Some delegations look upon the programme as nothing more than broad guidelines for action in the field of disarmament, which they feel should contain neither specific measures of disarmament nor any binding commitments for their implementation. The large majority of States, however, including India, have a very different conception of the programme. If our aim is merely to provide a broad and general outline for the achievement of general and complete disarmament, then do we really need to go beyond what is already contained in the Final Document of the first special session? Do we really need to rewrite the kind of outline which the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) worked out by consensus in its Draft Elements for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in 1979? The task before the Committee on Disarmament was to elaborate a self-contained



(Mr. Krishna, India)

comprehensive programme. Elaboration, as we see it, of the draft elements prepared by the UNDC involves the listing of specific and concrete measures of disarmament which must be implemented in well-conceived and time-bound phases. These phases of implementation must follow the priorities laid down in the Final Document and accepted by consensus. This implies that measures of nuclear disarmament must have the highest priority.

This has been the approach adopted by the group of non-aligned and neutral countries in the Committee on Disarmament.

Secondly, the majority of delegations in the Committee on Disarmament are convinced that, to be meaningful, the comprehensive programme should have a clear-cut plan for its implementation. Negotiations on concrete and specific issues should take place within a definite time-frame which takes into account the complexities involved in a practical manner. But the complexity of an issue should not be a pretext for diluting the urgency of concluding negotiations on it. If, for example, the commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States is to have any credibility, the concept of a time-frame would be essential to underline their political will to achieve this objective. Obviously, the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States cannot be expected to reconcile themselves to an indefinite division of the world into nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other.

Some delegations have taken another view: They hold that the concept of a time-frame is unrealistic and that the results of negotiations on specific disarmament issues cannot be pre-determined. And yet, it is also a fact that in 1962 both the United States and the USSR had presented draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which were to have been implemented in their entirety within a decade or so.

Finally, some delegations question the wisdom of the comprehensive programme detailing specific and concrete measures of disarmament. According to them, the programme ought to identify only the broad issues, while concrete measures would be worked out in the course of the negotiations themselves. However, in the Committee on Disarmament our experience has been that the conduct of negotiations on broad topics, such as nuclear disarmament or new weapons of

(Mr. Krishna, India)

mass destruction, are held up precisely on the argument that they are not specific enough. Here again, the non-aligned and neutral countries in the Committee on Disarmament have recommended concrete and specific measures which it should be possible to include under each broad heading.

While divergences of approach exist, we are convinced that, through a spirit of compromise and mutual accommodation, the Committee on Disarmament will be able to produce a comprehensive programme of disarmament which would meet the expectations of the international community.

Our delegation's approach to the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is well-known. The creation of such zones makes sense only if they are conceived of as part of a credible programme for the urgent achievement of nuclear disarmament. The international community has also acknowledged that the initiative for the creation of such zones must come from the countries of the region concerned and must follow a process of mutual consultations among them.

(Mr. Krishna, India)

Further, the region to be covered by any such zone must be viable in the sense that it is a well-defined geographical and geopolitical unit. We continue to believe that the proposal to set up a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, does not, in any of its aspects, meet these requirements. South Asia is an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region, and cannot be artificially isolated as a self-contained entity. One should also not ignore the fact that nuclear weapons are deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, foreign military bases are maintained, and more are being sought in the Indian Ocean. The situation is also complicated by the fact that not all countries belonging to South Asia share common perceptions and security concerns. The proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been put forward without any prior consultations among the countries concerned.

For all these reasons, our opposition to the proposal has been consistent and clear-cut. Should such a proposal be presented to the First Committee again this year, in defiance of the internationally accepted principles that must be observed in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, India will, as in the past, reject it emphatically. We hope that members of this Committee, all of whom have subscribed to these principles without reservation, will not countenance their flagrant violation which is so patently evident in this proposal.

I would now like briefly to clarify our position on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament put the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the correct perspective. Paragraph 65 of the Final Document states:

"The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether". (S-10/2, para. 65)

Since the first special session on disarmament no new nuclear weapon State has emerged, but the nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled,

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in any way, their undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve disarmament by urgent application of measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document. The international community must explicitly recognize the fact that a non-proliferation régime which emphasizes only the danger of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, but deliberately neglects the serious consequences of the vertical proliferation of the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States, can never be enduring or effective.

The Final Document unambiguously states that:

"Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries."

(S-10/2, para. 68)

However, since 1978 several nuclear supplier States have imposed unilateral restraints on the export of nuclear equipment, material and fuel supplies to developing countries and pursued export policies which have seriously disrupted the peaceful nuclear programme of many developing countries. Such actions, which are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Final Document, have adversely affected the economic and social development of developing countries and widened the already substantial technological gap between the advanced industrialized countries and the rest of the developing world. The denial of nuclear technology, equipment and fuel to developing countries with the ostensible aim of halting the spread of nuclear weapons is not only counterproductive, but has also sharpened tension and suspicions among nations of the world.

The international community must reject the view that the spread of nuclear technology necessarily and inevitably increases the risk of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons, both in its vertical and horizontal aspect, is

(Mr. Krishna, India)

essentially a political and not a technical problem, and must be solved through political means. One of the most vital components of such a political solution is the urgent negotiation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, for which special responsibility rests with the nuclear-weapon States.

This Committee has traditionally considered the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. It is now a decade since the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI), and over the years the Ad Hoc Committee has been working towards the implementation of this Declaration with varying degrees of interest from the Powers most responsible for the steady deterioration of the security climate in that part of the world - the great Powers. Ever since the expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee as a result of a resolution adopted in 1979, it was the earnest hope of the littoral and hinterland States that the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the ocean would, as a result of their participation, contribute towards the early convening of a Conference on the Indian Ocean, and to the eventual realization of the objectives of the 1971 Declaration.

The evidence of the past two years has belied this expectation. As a result of the systematic dilatory tactics adopted by some of those countries, the date for the convening of the Conference scheduled to be held in 1981 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, could not be finalized. Indeed, the position has been advanced that no time frame at all can be considered for convening such a Conference. The persistent refusal on the part of those States to commit themselves to a time frame, the systematic interposition of preconditions relating to the harmonization of views, and the political and security climate, lead one to question the motive of their very participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

My delegation remains committed to the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean as a necessary step in the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) of December 1971. The mandate of the Ad Hoc

(Mr. Krishna, India)

Committee as defined in resolution 2992 (XXVII), as well as in resolution 34/80 B, is clear and unambiguous. There is only one Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and if we are to work under the ambit of the Ad Hoc Committee it should be for the implementation of this Declaration and not to scuttle it. We earnestly hope that before long we shall be in a position to move ahead in this regard.

The general debate in our Committee will soon be concluded. In the days ahead my delegation will join others in taking initiatives and supporting proposals which reflect the mainstream of international concern and opinion. Our work here would be relevant only to the extent that we succeed in giving reassurance to the troubled man on the street, who looks with increasing despair and helplessness at the unbridled course of the arms race and its likely consequences, which is a nuclear disaster. My delegation ventures to believe that on the issues relating to the well-being and, indeed, survival of our countries and peoples, we will all be able to speak and act in unison.

Mr. DJIMRANGAR (Chad) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to associate itself with previous speakers in extending to you congratulations on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of this Committee. Your election is without a doubt a testimony to the confidence that the international community has in you and your country in the field of disarmament. We are convinced that under your leadership and wise guidance our work will be most successful. My delegation would therefore assure you of its whole-hearted co-operation in the performance of your responsible tasks.

We should also like warmly to congratulate the other officers of the Committee.

Our Committee has the special task of dealing with questions relating to disarmament, which indicates a realization of the complex problems posed by the arms race, the danger it constitutes for the survival of mankind and the need for the United Nations to discharge its obligations under the Charter by striving to preserve future generations from the scourge of war. The scope and content of the various items on this Committee's agenda make it sufficiently clear that Member States are preoccupied by questions connected with disarmament.

Many delegations here have deplored the growing tensions that have appeared on the international scene for some time now. The mad arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, has become more and more dangerous and has assumed greater momentum. Five hundred billion dollars are being spent on armaments annually. Vast human and material resources are being used for military purposes. Relations between the two nuclear super-Powers have worsened over the last few months. The spirit of confrontation and rivalry between the two blocs is manifesting itself in all parts of the world, aggravating local conflicts and giving rise to new disputes between States. Recourse to violence and the use of force, although generally condemned by our Assembly, has nevertheless become common. A growing number of countries, including my own, quite rightly consider themselves threatened.

(Mr. Djimrangar, Chad)

In this dangerous situation nothing could be more urgent than the preservation of humanity from a nuclear catastrophe. That is why the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament gave the highest priority to the attainment of nuclear disarmament. In spite of the precise commitment of the international community urgently to embark on the elimination of nuclear weapons, some still strive to defer the essential effort and to concentrate on secondary matters such as conventional disarmament. We think that efforts undertaken to that end should be conceived within the global framework of general and complete disarmament, in the light of the realities specifically recognized in the Final Document.

My delegation believes that any approach to nuclear disarmament should take as its point of departure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all aspects, horizontal and vertical.

The review conferences on the Non-Proliferation Treaty have made us keenly aware of the extremely high level of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This state of affairs was provoked by the refusal of certain States to participate in that Treaty, and their disregard of the existence of an international non-proliferation régime.

We should like to take this opportunity to repeat our whole-hearted support for Iraq, a State party to that Treaty and hence a State that has accepted the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose reactor was the victim of a barbarous raid by the Israeli air force. An attack of that kind must be vigorously condemned to safeguard the notion of the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.

We vigorously support the solemn terms of the United Nations Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. As many delegations have pointed out, only denuclearization enshrined in an international treaty under the auspices of the United Nations whereby African States undertake not to manufacture or to acquire nuclear weapons will be capable of ensuring the security of our States, of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of channelling the funds saved thereby to the more useful and urgent tasks of development.



(Mr. Djimrangar, Chad)

The arrogance of the South African authorities, their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the support that racist South Africa receives from certain Powers are the main reasons demanding conclusion of such a treaty, and this is the right place to urge those Powers to put an end to that support, which is contrary to the cause of international peace and security.

The delegation of Chad believes that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world can play an important role in quite a number of respects.

However, in an interdependent world, on a planet that is shrinking constantly under the thrust of modern technology, partial or regional disarmament measures can only be of limited scope. For example, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world will work only if it is accompanied by certain disarmament measures and measures related to the use of nuclear weapons. If a nuclear war were to break out, the nuclear-weapon-free zones would not be immune to its catastrophic effects. Similarly, regional disarmament measures would prove useful only if they were conceived within the framework of a process having the ultimate aim of general and complete disarmament.

The disarmament of certain parts of the world while other parts continued to accumulate growing arsenals of sophisticated weapons would not ultimately serve the cause of lasting peace and stability throughout the world.

(Mr. Djimrangar, Chad)

My delegation has studied with interest the Secretary-General's report on the study on the relationship between disarmament and development (A/36/356). The conclusions and recommendations of the study generally speaking reflect the concerns of my own country and those of the developing world in general. The study has conclusively demonstrated the incompatibility between the persistence of the arms race and the goals of the New International Economic Order.

It is our view that disarmament as a catalyst would make it possible to expand the basis of détente, the use of the resources that would be released and the allocation of those resources to the economic development of developing countries, and this would serve to strengthen that process even further.

In 1982 the General Assembly will hold its second special session devoted to disarmament. The first special session, which took place in 1978, did not produce the results hoped for. The forthcoming session should enable us not only to consolidate what has been achieved since the first special session, but also to embark on constructive and concrete discussions on ways and means of eliminating the obstacles to disarmament and achieving true progress in future.

All delegations have been unanimous in recognizing that the world today is closer to a nuclear catastrophe than ever before in the atomic era. That is the result of the policy of confrontation pursued by the great Powers and the constant accumulation of armaments on which they have embarked. This gloomy fact should encourage the international community to give consideration without further delay to concrete measures for disarmament. It is alarming to note that, while tens of thousands of people are homeless and dying of hunger every day, the great Powers are displaying total indifference to this state of affairs and continue to lavish astronomical sums on armaments to slake their thirst for world domination.

Mr. ALGARD (Norway): The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament raised hope in the world community that there was now a political will among nations to negotiate a halt to the arms race. The declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade strengthened that hope. In spite of this, the arms race continues at an accelerating pace.

As the Secretary-General says in his annual report:

"Unfortunately, the disarmament strategy adopted by the special session, which might have become a landmark in the quest for a reduction of the burden of arms, has yet to be translated into substantive action and has been followed instead by a further escalation of the arms race".

(A/35/1, p. 12)

However, it is important that we do not allow this lack of substantial progress in the field of disarmament to undermine our will and resolve. We have no choice but to continue along the path of negotiations.

In this connexion, I should like to recall that, following general elections in Norway, a new Government has recently been formed. In this context, I am instructed to reiterate what was said in its policy declaration delivered in Parliament less than three weeks ago, that is, that the new Government is strongly committed to pursuing Norway's policy in favour of a "real lessening of tension and for arms control and mutual disarmament.

It is essential to keep consideration of disarmament questions closely tied to specific political realities and to the ways in which Governments actually respond to those realities.

Above all, we believe it to be a fundamental truth that disarmament cannot be conceived in a political vacuum. There is an intimate relationship between disarmament and security.

Disarmament and arms control must be seen as an integral part of every nation's security policy. As such, arms control and disarmament are not to be viewed as concessions or gestures of goodwill, but rather as part of every nation's enlightened self-interest.

This is all the more important as the ramifications of the arms race become ever more complex and the nuclear arsenals continue to grow.

A cessation and reversal of the nuclear-arms race, together with non-proliferation of nuclear arms, today represent the most important and

(Mr. Algard, Norway)

challenging task facing the international community. These two problems are interlinked. Lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament will also create difficulties in upholding the non-proliferation régime. Dissatisfaction about the state of nuclear disarmament negotiations, however, is not a legitimate excuse for the failure of non-nuclear Powers to recognize their own self-interest in accepting obligations under the régime of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

We know that progress in disarmament will increase confidence among nations. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a climate of confidence will facilitate disarmament agreements. This is indeed the dilemma facing all negotiators in the disarmament field.

The overriding concern and aim must thus be to reduce the role of the military factor in international relations and instead to focus on political and diplomatic elements conducive to balanced solutions and restraint in international policies.

For the great majority of States the perceived threat to their security and the need for military preparations are primarily connected with conditions in their own region. Some of the problems hindering progress in disarmament are therefore of a regional character.

Norway attaches special importance to the situation in Europe. In that region, military concentrations and armaments are at a very high level. The need for stability and mutual confidence in order to obtain a lower level of forces and armaments is therefore of crucial importance.

Norway has strongly supported the ongoing negotiating process within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) on confidence- and security-building measures. In our view, such measures could lead up to and constitute the first phase of a conference on disarmament in Europe. That conference could then be used as a basis for further talks on arms reductions in Europe.

Norway has furthermore supported the talks on mutual and balanced-forces reductions in Europe as a military complement to the CSCE. My Government has also repeatedly urged the resumption of talks on the reduction of continental nuclear forces. We hope that the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, scheduled for 30 November, will bring substantial and urgently needed results.

(Mr. Algard, Norway)

Although regional arms control and disarmament are of a vital nature, the quest for global disarmament is of equal importance. In this connexion, my delegation would like to reiterate its continued support for the efforts undertaken within the framework of the United Nations. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held next year could be an important event. We hope it will provide a significant contribution to the efforts aimed at achieving arms control and disarmament.

Norway is concerned about the vertical as well as horizontal aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Norway welcomed the conclusion of the SALT II agreement as a most important achievement during 1979 in the field of nuclear-arms control.

For its part, the Norwegian Government will urge the continuation of the SALT process as a matter of the highest priority and welcomes recent reports that such talks will get under way early in 1982.

A priority objective of that next round of talks should be an agreement on substantial and comprehensive reductions of strategic arms.

(Mr. Algard, Norway)

It is disappointing that it has not been possible to make significant advances towards solving the problems related to nuclear weapons. In our view, halting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most urgent task facing the world community. Norway therefore finds it especially regrettable that the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) held last year ended without the reaching of agreement on a final declaration, especially since general agreement had in fact been attained in many significant areas of concern.

Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty the nuclear-weapon States are obliged to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament effectively; this applies particularly to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is the view of my Government that such a treaty would constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of essential relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation. It would also represent a significant step in the direction of meeting the obligations of the nuclear Powers under article VI of the NPT and would signal the first step in the direction of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.

It is of great concern that several threshold States from regions of tension and conflict have not yet abandoned the option to acquire nuclear weapons. Further proliferation would increase the risk of regional conflicts developing into nuclear confrontation. It would also stimulate the perception that nuclear war is somehow inevitable, and such perceptions carry the dangerous seed of self-fulfilment.

In this connexion, the Norwegian Government views as particularly serious all acts undermining the NPT régime, including respect for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. Norway fully endorses the concept that all non-nuclear-weapon States should accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. In this regard the Norwegian Government welcomes Egypt's decision to become a party to the NPT. It is hoped that that example will be followed by other States in the region which have not yet accepted the same obligations.

(Mr. Algard, Norway)

Progress towards a chemical test ban has been all too slow. There remain several technical issues connected with the problem of verification. However, the benefits of an agreement must be emphasized. Whereas appropriate verification is essential, one should not underestimate the political costs of breaking away from a chemical test ban once it has been internationally agreed to.

In this connexion, I should like to underline the special interest of Norway in the work being undertaken in this field within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. In its seismic group Norwegian experts are among those who actively contribute to the efforts being made in this regard. Norway also participated as an observer during this year's session. If the next special session should so decide, Norway would hope to become a full member of that highly important multilateral negotiating body.

My Government would also like to see the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes halted altogether. We therefore support the idea of a ban on such production. That would constitute a useful contribution to the search for more effective non-proliferation instruments. Such a ban would place nuclear-weapon States on a more equal basis with non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States would then have to accept much the same IAEA safeguards that are required of non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby eliminating one important element of discrimination between the two categories of States.

The most recent but potentially very dangerous aspect of the arms race concerns outer space and the ramifications of the spread of the arms race to that region. Norway urges the resumption of the so-called anti-satellite (ASAT) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union at the earliest moment. Such negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space are called for in paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

A treaty prohibiting anti-satellite weapons would have a stabilizing influence on the relationship between the super-Powers. It would also enhance the possibilities of verifying arms control and disarmament treaties.

The question of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack is also an important condition for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. This problem has so far not received a satisfactory solution.

(Mr. Algard, Norway)

Norway accepts the arguments of those States which hold that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 29 June 1968 does not provide sufficient guarantees to non-aligned States. Those States which are not parties to alliance security systems involving nuclear security guarantees and which have been asked to renounce their own option to acquire nuclear weapons have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility for finding a solution to this problem.

Progress is also urgently needed in the follow-up of the Convention on biological weapons with a similar convention banning the development, production and storage of chemical weapons. It is with great concern that we witness the potential for chemical warfare increasing. The Norwegian Government therefore reiterates the decision taken last year not to allow the stationing or storage of chemical weapons on Norwegian territory - paralleling Norway's policy with regard to the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons on its territory.

Finally, let me underscore the importance that we attach to disarmament efforts in relation to the establishment of the New International Economic Order and the reallocating of scarce human and material resources from military purposes to social and economic development, in particular for the benefit of the developing nations. In this connexion, the reduction of conventional arms is of central importance since they comprise 80 per cent of the world's military expenditures.

We therefore lend our support to the useful and constructive Danish proposal for a United Nations study of all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.

Among the many valuable United Nations-sponsored studies, the work of the Expert Group on disarmament and development has made a very useful contribution to the understanding of this problem. We believe that that Nordic initiative has been both timely and necessary and should be followed up. In its report, the Expert Group has drawn up useful guidelines for the future work of the United Nations. We attach special importance to recommendations which call



(Mr. Algard, Norway)

for compilation and dissemination of data on the military use of human and material resources and military transfers. This recommendation should be viewed in the light of the work on the standardized system of reporting on military expenditures, to which Norway has contributed. I should like to confirm that Norway is prepared to take an active part in the follow-up work of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

While we are speaking here the weapons arsenals continue to increase, in spite of the fact that that wasteful race is a threat to everyone and can be won by no one.

The expectations of real progress in the field of disarmament which were created by the first special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament have not been fulfilled. In fact political developments, the arms race and the development in weapons technology give reason for deep concern.

(Mr. Algard., Norway)

As we now embark upon the Second Disarmament Decade we are facing a more dangerous world-wide arms race than ever, qualitatively and quantitatively, in the nuclear as well as in the conventional field.

This continuous and escalating arms competition represents at worst a threat to the survival of mankind. At best it constitutes a deplorable misuse of scarce resources in a world marked by increased poverty and disease.

This enhances the importance of the second special session, which we hope will result in intensified efforts to halt and reverse the arms race.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): While discussing questions of disarmament in this Committee we are bearing in mind the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Resolution 35/152 E of the previous session of the General Assembly stated that

"...one of the most important contributions for the preparation of the special session on disarmament to be held in 1982 will be to achieve tangible progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action".

It is of primary importance to meet the danger of a nuclear war. Millions of people in all continents are agreed on this. Many politicians, former military men, representatives of social organizations, scientists and members of movements of protest against the arms madness display a high sense of responsibility. Such mass movements are unique in history since the Second World War. Instead of paying attention to them, in certain capitals old methods of misrepresenting and distorting the situation existing in the field of armaments are being resorted to.

Some of the ideas submitted to this Committee make it virtually imperative to put things right. We should like to contrast the allegations that have been made of armaments superiority by the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty States, and an alleged threat to the United States owing to a window of vulnerability, with additional facts.

In the 1950s an alleged gap in the field of long-range bombers equipped for nuclear operations was discovered in the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. After having implemented an arms programme adopted thereupon by the United States Congress, the then Defense Secretary, Mr. McNamara, stated on 12 April 1965:

"The Russian intercontinental bomber force today is very weak compared with ours. I said we have a superiority of three or four to one. Actually it is five or six to one today in terms of true intercontinental bombers and associated tanker forces."

In 1960 a campaign referring to a missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union was started in the United States. The then Senator John F. Kennedy demanded an arms programme that was huge in its dimension for that time. He demanded that the United States

"... step up our ultimate missile programme that will close the gap when completed: Polaris, Minuteman and long-range air-to-ground missiles - meanwhile stepping up our production of Atlas missiles to cover the current gap as best we can..."

After that alleged gap had been closed and the number of American intercontinental missiles had been increased from 200 in 1962 to 1,054 in 1967 and 656 submarine-launched missiles had been installed at the same time, Mr. McNamara, on 18 September 1967, stated:

"...by using the realistic measurement of the number of warheads available, capable of being reliably delivered with accuracy and effectiveness on the appropriate targets in the United States or Soviet Union, I can tell you that the United States currently possesses a superiority over the Soviet Union of at least three or four to one."

At the same time Mr. McNamara stated that the United States was in a position to find out the number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, with a tolerance of five to six missiles.

In other words, there cannot be any doubt that all these gaps and windows are but an international manipulation. The same applies to the alleged gap in Euro-strategic weapons and the window of vulnerability.

With its new nuclear-arms programme the United States is not trying to bring about a military-strategic balance, for such a balance already exists; it is concerned about so-called strategic superiority and about the capability to strike first. This goal is illusory but the steps taken towards its attainment are extremely dangerous and destabilizing. Cruise missiles, Tridents, neutron weapons and doctrines of an imaginable, wageable, limited and victorious nuclear war belong together. The United Nations will have to bring all its authority to bear to stop the trend towards a nuclear inferno and to open the way to disarmament agreements. In the contrary case, the consensus reached in the Final Document of the first special session as to the priority of nuclear disarmament threatens to become a deceptive facade, behind which the material and spiritual preparations for nuclear war are being pushed ahead with increased intensity.

Every war starts with a first shot being fired; a nuclear war by a first nuclear weapon being ignited. The adoption of a declaration against the first use of nuclear weapons is a timely and necessary step to avert that danger. The Soviet draft also draws attention to the aggressive doctrines regarding the use of nuclear arms that are spiritually paving the way to nuclear war. With reference to such doctrines, many steps towards disarmaments have already been blocked. In spite of the fact that they were clearly rejected in the Final Document adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament, they are being maintained and even further extended. Nothing expresses the personal thoughts and fears of people in all countries more clearly than their response to the statement made by competent authorities of this country that it is possible to wage a limited nuclear war.

The position taken on the declaration against the first use of nuclear weapons is an answer to the question of what stand anyone takes on the question of preventing a nuclear war.

Resolution 35/152 B, which was adopted one year ago by a big majority, demands with the utmost urgency the beginning of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, in which all nuclear-weapon States should participate. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament should hold the respective consultations to that effect.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

When submitting working paper CD/193, the German Democratic Republic endorsed the beginning of negotiations. A working paper of the Group of 21 - CD/180 - pursued the same objectives. Both documents contain the sensible proposal to review the steps of implementation of paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action of the Final Document. In this context the statement of the USSR of 20 October 1981 in our Committee is of special interest. As a first step, it provides for a discussion on the possible stages of nuclear disarmament.

Among the measures of the first stage, the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and the non-deployment of such weapons should play a significant role. This approach takes into account the special dangers which result from the qualitative arms race in the nuclear field. It would be of great benefit to the further activities of the Committee on Disarmament if the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly advocated such a method.

Unfortunately, the endeavours to achieve progress in solving the most important of all disarmament questions are seriously hampered by the resistance of States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They prevented a consensus on the establishment of a working group on the subject. Obviously they do not want to negotiate on the most burning question of our time in the Committee.

We are firmly convinced that the demand for active consideration of nuclear disarmament in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament is not inconsistent with the continuation of the SALT process. On the contrary, both negotiating channels should complement each other. This has already been expressed in document CD/4, in which the socialist States took the initiative of translating paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action into reality after the first special session devoted to disarmament.

For 20 years an agreement on a ban of all nuclear-weapon tests has been on the agenda. All States have recognized that this concern is of utmost priority. The trilateral negotiations could not be resumed last year because of the strong opposition of two of the three participating States. Both states also prevented this question from being considered in the Committee

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on Disarmament. In July, in Geneva, the representative of the United States referred to "honest differences" on substantive questions, but now here in the Committee he simply says that the international conditions for immediate action are not favourable. Other NATO States avoid raising the issue of a comprehensive test ban in their statements. This fact too speaks for itself.

Our Committee should, in any case, vigorously call for the resumption of the trilateral negotiations and an intensive consideration of this problem in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

With good reason many non-nuclear States urge a strengthening of their security guarantees. Thanks to the initiative of socialist and non-aligned States, negotiations were held on that subject in the Committee on Disarmament. However, it has become obvious that some nuclear-weapon States do not want to admit any restriction on their options for the use of nuclear weapons. This is only logical because whoever intends to wage war at any time and in any region he chooses tries to evade aspirations for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The German Democratic Republic will continue to work for unrestricted security guarantees for those non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory.

In the face of aspirations on the part of imperialist forces to include more and more regions in the military confrontation, the conclusion of a convention on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present becomes even more urgent. We therefore advocate a resolution calling for negotiations on such an international convention.

In addition, it is becoming increasingly evident that new foreign nuclear weapons in States which already have them on their territories would do great harm to confidence and stability. The introduction of qualitatively new nuclear weapons must necessarily increase the dangers emanating from such areas of deployment. This is bound to undermine also the security of the areas themselves.

An appeal to the nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from any new stationing of nuclear weapons in the countries of deployment would take account of the desire of broad public sections in many countries and greatly facilitate steps for

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the reduction of such weapons. This aspiration also guides us in supporting the demand for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, including Northern Europe and the Balkans.

The German Democratic Republic is working in favour of a convention banning chemical weapons. However, we are alarmed about developments casting doubt on the goodwill of some States participating in the negotiations. While the United States refuses to continue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on a chemical-weapon ban, it is at the same time allocating \$6 billion for the production of binary weapons over the next five years.

This time again, representatives of certain States place problems of verification in the foreground of discussions. We ask: Are the difficulties of verification not bound to grow with the introduction of a new quality of weapons, namely, binary weapons? Everyone is aware of the fact that the components of this weapon hardly differ from those used for chemical products for civilian needs.

We also deem it necessary to call a halt to the further deployment of chemical weapons in other countries. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament should again be invited to give high priority to drafting a convention on a chemical-weapon ban.

The German Democratic Republic, like the other socialist countries, advocates a comprehensive preventive prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The pertinent discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, in which experts also took part, resulted in new findings on the urgency of this task. It is essential to entrust an expert group of the Committee with a more thorough consideration of these questions. An effective step in this direction would be identical or similar statements on the renunciation of the development of such weapons by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and other militarily important States. Such statements could be reaffirmed and endorsed by the Security Council. Considering that paragraphs 39 and 77 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and taking account of the fact that practically all States have agreed to at least one of the resolutions directed against the development of new weapons of mass destruction, this proposal should be generally acceptable.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic  
Republic)

On 6 August the world commemorates the victims of Hiroshima. On that very day this year, a fateful decision was made: the United States Administration decided to produce at least 1,000 neutron weapons. That decision considerably increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. It is envisaged that the neutron bomb will be used in Europe and other regions. Its production proves that the doctrine of a limited nuclear war is not merely an academic exercise. The threshold for the outbreak of a nuclear war has been lowered.

We recall the socialist countries' proposal of March 1978 to conclude a convention on banning the neutron weapon. The present session of the General Assembly should urge the immediate start of the relevant negotiations in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

There is general agreement on the importance of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Like other States, the German Democratic Republic is working towards the completion of such a programme and towards its adoption at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The programme should serve as a guideline for practical measures aimed at the cessation of the arms race and at disarmament. Concrete arrangements should supplement the individual stages. We cannot tolerate attempts to abolish the priority of disarmament measures in the field of nuclear arms. For instance, in a proposal in connexion with the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is demanded that such negotiations should be given priority commensurate with how promising they are according to the state of international relations. We have learned here in this Committee that some States maintain that that should not apply to nuclear disarmament and to a comprehensive test ban.

As substitutes, we are offered, under the slogan of realism, negotiations on the verification problem as a subject unto itself, on so-called transparency, and so forth. The call for more realism is a false flag when the discussions and negotiations on urgent disarmament measures are, under that flag, denounced as propaganda. With the help of the slogan of realism all the things achieved by great efforts are to be called into question. Proven agreements in the field of disarmament are attacked because, allegedly, the verification issue was not sufficiently clarified in them. This plea for more realism from that side is nothing but an appeal to sit still and not disturb the striving for military superiority: that is what it is all about, and it must be rejected with all determination.



(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

To show realism means to acknowledge that any attempt to regain military superiority for the successful waging of a nuclear war is dangerous madness. Realism means to recognize that the resolutions of the United Nations are endorsed by the majority of States and that they are more than sheets of paper which can be swept away at one's discretion. Realism means to take into account the fact that there are forces in the world which have ideas and possibilities of their own for shaping their independent development. Realism is shown today by responding to the fundamental question of whether the way of war preparations or the way of peace stabilization is the way to travel. The United Nations has only one choice.

#### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: The officers of the Committee met at the end of last week and considered several questions with regard to the programme of work for the month of November. First of all, we are well aware that according to our timetable the Committee will begin consideration of reports and action upon draft resolutions on 5 November, Thursday of this week, with the general debate coming to an end on Wednesday evening.

As has been the practice of the Committee in previous years, draft resolutions may be introduced as soon as their sponsors are ready to do so, rather than in order of agenda item. In this connexion, I should like to invite sponsors of draft resolutions to introduce them early in our discussions so that other delegations may address their comments to those draft resolutions.

The officers have considered the question of the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions and have decided to recommend that it should be Monday, 16 November at 1 p.m. The officers feel that the Secretariat should apply that deadline strictly with the exception of draft resolutions under agenda items where relevant reports have not yet been submitted.

The officers also recommend to the Committee that the final four working days between 20 and 25 November be reserved for action on all draft resolutions.

I am sure that all representatives will agree that the consideration of draft resolutions should be viewed as an important phase of our debate on

(The Chairman)

disarmament items. Thus, to allow the maximum time and opportunity for the consideration of all draft resolutions, the officers do not propose at present to close the list of speakers on draft resolutions; the date for closing the list will have to be set as we move into that phase of our work, but I should like to ask that all representatives inscribe their names on the list of speakers, now open, as soon as possible so that the Committee can make full use of the time available to it. Members know that we decided at the beginning of the session that no meeting will be held unless there are at least four speakers on the list.

I should like to note further that, during the period of 20 to 25 November, delegations will be notified in advance as to which draft resolutions are to be considered at each meeting.

If I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with those recommendations.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.