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Chairman: Mr. YANGO (Philippines) (Vice-Chairman)

CONTENTS

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

General debate

Statements were made by:

Mr. Al-Hamzah (Democratic Yemen)

Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola)

Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia)

Mr. Francis (New Zealand)

Mr. Rambissoon (Trinidad and Tobago)

Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda (Zaire)

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2

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

It is a source of great pleasure to the delegation of Democratic Yemen sincerely to congratulate the Chairman on his unanimous election. His experience and ability will undoubtedly guide us to success. We also congratulate you as well as the Vice-Chairman from Honduras and the Rapporteur.

The First Committee is once more considering disarmament matters in extremely difficult circumstances - the escalation of confrontation, which some feel enthusiastic about, and disparagement of the importance of dialogue and detente in international relations, as well as work to heighten tension and create zones and spheres of influence and to fan the fires of regional conflicts throughout the world.

The same period witnesses attempts to resort to violence and threaten the use of force and to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States, threatening their security and stability. With all these examples, we see that the arms race is spiralling all the time and military budgets are reaching astronomical figures. This is coupled with a continuous deterioration in the international economic situation.

The international imperialist attempts to return to the cold war have outweighed the appeals of the majority here to achieve concrete results in the field of disarmament. These attempts have implications for the United Nations and the effectiveness of its deliberative and negotiating organs — the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, which did little work this year as a result of that approach. Despite all that the majority of member States continue to be optimistic, putting forward or supporting constructive proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and at the maintenance of international peace and security, the reinforcement of the principles of peaceful co-existence and détente

in international relations, the renunciation of the use of force, the relaxation of tension and the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

We are pleased to welcome the two new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, which appear on the present agenda of the General Assembly. One concerns the adoption of a formal declaration on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, a proposal which we consider to be a serious step in support of the purposes for the achievement of which the United Nations was founded. The other proposal, which we also support aims at the formulation of an international treaty to prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We believe that this will stress the unanimous desire that outer space shall be free of military rivalry and shall be a sphere for peaceful activities and co operation between States.

The ending of the First Disarmament Decade and the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade requires a sense of responsibility on the part of all especially those States that possess the largest military arsenals, in order to respond to the appeals of international public opinion and comply with the several proposals made by the United Nations aimed at the ending of the arms race and the allocation of some of the resources thus released for economic and social development in the developing countries.

The continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, the development of new weapons of mass destruction, the intention to produce the neutron bomb and the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, all represent at present the principal challenge to the efforts of the international community to achieve progress in the field of disarmament. All that has been accomplished so far by way of multilateral and bilateral conventions and treaties would be rendered useless without the political will of all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to continue negotiations aimed at a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the reduction of the military forces in Europe and the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

That cannot be realized without the positive participation of the nuclear-weapon States, which assume major responsibility in that respect.

The majority of States Members attach great hopes to the convening of the forthcoming second special session on disarmament. We hope that the results of that special session will live up to our expectations. The resolutions adopted by the present session of the General Assembly should assist the second special session on disarmament in accomplishing successful work. We regard that session as an international event of paramount importance.

My delegation will deal briefly with certain items under consideration in this Committee. We should like to express our support for the work that has been achieved so far in the field of disarmament. The priorities in negotiations, laid down by the tenth special session in 1978 demonstrate the special importance given to nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapons are considered to be the gravest danger to mankind. The quantity of nuclear weapons at present available is sufficient to devastate the world several times over. It is important to eliminate those weapons and to end their testing. We also support the resumption of the trilateral negotiations aimed at concluding an international treaty to ban all nuclear tests as well as the continuation of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to curb strategic weapons. It is essential for the United States to ratify SALT II. The declaration of zones of peace and denuclearized zones would help in the achievement of that goal.

We have always supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as well as the Declarations on the denuclearization of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The implementation of the latter declarations is threatened by the expansionist and aggressive policies that are practised by Israel and South Africa. The whole international community knows that those two racist régimes possess nuclear weapons because of the unlimited assistance and support that they receive from their Western allies. The aggressive policy of Israel based on invasion, occupation and expansion against the Arab countries as well as by South Africa against the front-line States in Africa prevent implementation of the desire of the Arab and African States to declare the Middle East and Africa as nuclear-free zones. The strategic alliance between the United States and Israel has added more complications to the achievement of those aspirations.

The comprehensive military manoeuvres which the United States forces contemplate conducting in the Middle East pose a grave danger to the security and stability of the area, and the flexing of muscles are dangerous for international peace and security. The recent Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor has raised many doubts as to the effectiveness of the present international order with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That aggression was denounced throughout the world; it clearly demonstrated the aggressive and expansionist policy of Israel.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The hinterland States, as well as other States of the region of the Indian Ocean, have been embittered by the non-implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on the need to convene an international conference this year in Colombo on the implementation of the Declaration. The manoeuvres and obstructionist policy practised by certain Western countries in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, under the pretext of co-ordinating points of view under what is called studying the political and security aspects of the region, have led to the failure of the efforts of the United Nations to convene that conference. We hope that the conference will be held at its new suggested time, which is during the first half of 1983.

Democratic Yemen, as one of the littoral States of the Indian Ocean, attaches great importance to that conference. We believe that the conference should adopt a declaration that will embrace all the natural extensions of the Indian Ocean, such as the Arab Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea. The increasing military presence in that area has doubled the fears of its States and peoples that imperialism and dependence will return to the area. The flagrant threat to occupy the oil fields, the rapid deployment forces and the installation of new military bases all represent a fresh threat to peace and security in the area and a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of these States, which have declared their utter rejection of such aggressive policies.

Democratic Yemen has taken the initiative, as declared by
President Ali Nasser Mohammed at the beginning of this year, to convene a summit
conference for the Gulf, the Horn of Africa and other concerned countries, to
discuss measures aimed at dismantling foreign bases. This was mentioned
in the statement by our Foreign Minister in the General Assembly last month,
when he said:

"This call by Democratic Yemen is aimed at the consolidation of security and stability in the region and conforms to the special concern we have in making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace in accordance with the relevant General Assembly declaration." (A/36/PV.19, p. 58)

We welcome the convention on the prohibition and curbing of certain harmful conventional weapons and the three additional protocols which have been submitted for signing and ratification this year. We also support the holding of an international conference on disarmament as well as United Nations efforts to demonstrate the relationship and link between disarmament and development, on the one hand, and disarmament and the reinforcement of international security, on the other. In this connexion, we cannot fail to denounce the use by the United States of biological weapons against Cuba, which inflicted material damage and the loss of lives. That is another event in the chain of United States aggression against the Cuban revolution and a continuation of the economic embargo as well as acts of sabotage against Cuba.

In conclusion, we support all activities that would lead to the reinforcement of the role of this international Organization, as well as of those organs in the Organization related to disarmament questions.

Mr. de FIGUEIREDO (Angola): Today is the last day of Disarmament Week, on which I spoke on behalf of the African Group on 26 October. The Week may be over, but the issue of the arms race and its connexion with development and survival remains. None of us, not even the smallest and poorest countries, can afford to take the position that arms and disarmament do not involve them. All of us are involved, whether as protagonists, antagonists or simply victims.

Conventional and nuclear arms, chemical and biological weapons, weapons delivery systems, while they were originally developed to avert war, now may become the cause of it. Arms and armaments kill, not countries, but human beings, and they kill in various ways - through direct hit and annihilation, through genetic damage which damns unborn generations, through the irrevocable modification of the environment, through the changes in the delicate balance of the ecological systems which have nourished life as we know it for millions of years and through the destruction of tangible and intangible institutions and structures created by mankind to give form and content to his life. And, finally, the arms race, even without arms use, is consigning to a living hell the millions of the poor and destitute on earth, human beings whose conditions of life are beyond comprehension and should be beyond acceptance.

Today the world spends between \$600 billion and \$800 billion annually on the production and sales of arms. The figures are so astronomical that they too acquire an unreal dimension, an abstraction beyond our comprehension. And barely a fraction of this sum is being spent on development assistance. It is not only the super-Powers and the industrialized countries which have vast arms expenditures. Even those developing countries which can least afford it are building up their arsenals over and above legitimate defence requirements and at the expense of the satisfaction of the needs of their peoples in vital areas such as health, food, education and employment.

(Mr. de Figueiredo, Angola)

There is a moral link between arms expenditure and development expenditure. And there is a close link between development and survival. If the developed countries were to increase their official development assistance and if the developing countries were genuinely committed to alleviating the conditions of poverty and destitution in their countries, half the battle for a new international economic order would be won.

The Brandt Report points out that just one half of 1 per cent of one. year's military expenditure would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production and approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit low-income countries by 1990; the price of one jet fighter, \$20 million, could set up about 40,000 village pharmacies; and the cost of one modern tank, \$1 million, could build classrooms for 30,000 children. I am not suggesting that the non-production of one item would immediately lead to development activity in a poor country. No, what we need is a series of simultaneous and consecutive actions. We need the political will of nuclear and other countries to undertake negotiations; we need to slow down and stop the upward spiral of the arms race; we need eventually to stop the arms race and the build-up of arsenals; we need to ban nuclear and chemical weapon testing; we need to encourage the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, we need to prohibit the stationing of weapons in outer space and on the ocean floor; we need to stop the development of weapons of mass destruction and their systems.

In addition, while this process, or series of processes, may be going on, we, the small and medium-sized third-world countries, most of us belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, need the guarantee that we will be protected against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; that neither we nor future generations will be exposed to nuclear radiation arising from the production, testing or use of nuclear weapons or from the leakage of radioactive wastes dumped by industrialized countries off the shores of defenceless third-world coastal or island countries.

(Mr. de Figueiredo, Angola)

On our own continent of Africa we have one nuclear Power whose capacity for mischief and trouble stems from its racist apartheid system, from its imperialist links, from its policy of military adventurism and expansionism and from its policy of State terrorism against the sovereign independent States of southern Africa. The racist régime in Pretoria, which has neither signed the Treaty on the Mon-Proliferation of Muclear Weapons nor accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, has acquired with the help of some Western imperialist friends the nuclear capability to threaten the entire continent of Africa. This co-operation in the nuclear field, which has never been suspended, has now been made more overt. South Africa's defence laws have been amended to include as its defence periphery an area up to the equator and its delivery systems can threaten the entire continent. But for racist South Africa's nuclear arms, the continent of Africa would be nuclear-free. The situation in southern Africa is extremely dangerous and could easily erupt into a regional war at any time. Therefore the peace and stability of Africa, and hence of the world, is threatened by the racist régime's policies and the arms with which it implements and supports those policies.

The People's Republic of Angola, which is in a constant state of mobilization against invasion and other acts of armed aggression directed against it by the racist South African armed forces, nevertheless reaffirms its commitment to peace and disarmament. We support all proposals and initiatives aimed at decelerating and limiting and eventually stopping the arms race. We support the calls by progressive forces for measures to decrease world political and military tension, to avert nuclear catastrophe and to build the conditions for peace.

(Mr. de Figueiredo, Angola)

We have already had before us for three years the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. We have enough proposals and declarations. We now need the political will for their implementation; we need to increase public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, of the madness of chemical weapons of the insanity of bacteriological arms. We need to tell people that one day they may be blown off the face of this earth at the push of a button, we need to tell mothers why they may have defective children. And we need to tell ourselves that unless this madness is controlled there may not even be the issue of development, because there may not be an earth left which requires it.

The People's Republic of Angola strongly condemns the racist South African régime for the threat it poses to our region. We condemn the attack of Zicnist Israel on a fraternal non-aligned country, Iraq and for the threat it poses to peace in the Middle East by its covert nuclear capability. And we condemn the nuclear collaboration between the racists of South Africa and the Zionists in the Middle East. Control over the actions of Tel Aviv and Pretoria falls as much under the unbrella of disarmament as do other issues.

A fertile earth, clean air, undisturbed ecosystems, a peaceful outer space, a non-militarized ocean floor - these are the common heritage of mankind, and, in fact, a sacred trust for us to use and pass on unblemished to those who come after us. No one is entitled to destroy the earth, or any part of it, and render it unfit for life. Disarmament has never been as vital as it has become now, because never before had the arms race reached the proportions it has now acquired, and never before was man's capacity to destroy himself as great as it is now. It takes 10,000 years for a forest to grow: it takes a few moments to destroy it. It takes years to create an environment in which flora and fauna flourish: it takes a few seconds to devastate it.

The earth needs peace, not war. We need to build grain silos, not neutron bombs. We need mobile clinics, not cruise missiles. We need literacy vans going from village to village, not Pershing missiles. We need delivery systems for health care, nutrition and vocational training, not delivery systems for nuclear warheads. We need fewer declarations and more implementation of existing ones. And, since we must never give up hope, we call for an attitude

cf negotiation and progress in the arms limitation and reduction talks to be held in Geneva next month. We also look forward with expectation and hope to the 1982 second special session on disarmament, which must bring the world closer to disarmament and, hence, also closer to development. The arms race not only diverts manpower, resources, money, energy, materials, technology and research away from areas needed for development: it blocks development by according more priority to arms than to food production, health care and other services. And this is true vis-à-vis not only developing countries, tut also developed ones, where social welfare cuts are made to feed an everhungry military exomplex.

Until total disarmament is achieved, the struggle continues; victory is certain.

Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia): I have already had occasion to congratulate Mr. Golob on his election as Chairman. I should like now to express my satisfaction at the election of the other officers of the Committee - you, my colleague Ambassador Yango, Ambassador Mario Carias of Honduras and, of course, Mr. Makonnen, our Rapporteur.

May I also thank most warmly all my friends and colleagues who have expressed their wishes for my speedy recovery. I am very happy to be here with you, and I should like to assure you that through your support and friendship you have contributed to this.

The current session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is particularly important. The situation that we are faced with today in international relations is exceptionally grave and gives cause for the greatest concern. Therefore, the assessment that the world was never closer to the danger of war than it is today, repeated in the debate several times, does not surprise us. Among other things, this session is being held in the year preceding the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our decisions should contribute most directly to the further preparation for and the successful outcome of that particularly important gathering and to the endeavours aimed at the solution of problems of disarmament and the strengthening of peace and security in the world.

The dangerous development of international relations is a result of several factors whose negative impact could have been noticed for a long time.

In the course of the past year relations between the leading Powers and blocs have been further exacerbated. The indications of cold war are becoming more evident; mutual accusations of great Powers and reproaches as to who is responsible for the present negative development have replaced substantive negotiations on essential issues of contemporary international relations. Previous contacts between the two leading Powers concerning certain questions of disarmament have mostly been interrupted. Détente, even in its most limited form, has fallen into a deep crisis, which has only confirmed that its confinement to inter-bloc relations cannot last long. That is to say, it has been confirmed time and again that détente, in order to become a positive factor in the development of international relations, must be universal. This means that it should encompass all fields of international relations and that it should lead to the solution of key problems with the participation of all countries on an equal footing. Détente cannot be applied selectively. This extraordinarly significant process in international relations cannot exist concurrently with the use of force, the arms race, or the maintenance of inequality in economic or any other relations. Détente cannot be the cover for interference in internal affairs, armed intervention or other forms of encroachment upon the freedom and independence of peoples and countries - that is, cover for the maintenance of special rights and positions of some States in international relations. In the present unstable situation it is most important to draw lessons from the past and to embark upon roads which will lead out of the existing crisis in international relations. For, although détente cannot be limited to bloc relations, it cannot be achieved without normal relations between the great Powers.

The worsening of the situation has affected all spheres of international life. The existing hotbeds of crisis are being exacerbated and the increasing confrontation of leading Powers and their endeavours to establish new spheres of influence in various parts of the world and to reinforce existing ones cause new disputes. With this aim, the pressure upon small and medium-sized countries, most often non-aligned ones, is being intensified. Use of force, threats and interventions are becoming ever more frequent, thus jeopardizing peace and security not only in those regions but beyond as well.

The big-Power arms race is constantly accelerating. Never in the history of mankind has there been as much accumulated armament as today, and never in peacetime have new systems of ever more lethal weapons been so feverishly produced and existing ones so ceaselessly improved. The nuclear arms race, in particular, is escalating. In almost all categories of major weapons completely new models emerge every five to eight years. Together with scientific and technological development, a variety of armaments whose functioning is based on new principles and greater operational specialization is also emerging. The arms race, with all its irrationality and inherent risks, is becoming an ever more universal phenomenon.

It absorbs enormous human, natural and material resources, making all other economic interests subject to the carrying out of armament programes. One of the essential aims of the arms race is to strengthen bloc positions and to maintain the existing system based on force and on the privileges of the big Powers, particularly nuclear ones. Forced to obtain armaments to defend their independence and territorial integrity, developing countries are slowing down or postponing the solution of the vital questions of their economic and social development. This has a specific impact on the increase of instability in the world, since the issues of economic and political emancipation are the crucial components of peace and security in the world.

The bloc division has brought the world to the edge of one of the deepest crises since the Second World War. The so-called concept of security based on the balance of power has constantly led to the expansion of spheres of influence, spheres of interests and bloc domination, using various forms of force, including open aggression and armed intervention. The basic leverage for the maintenance of this system is the arms race. Hence the constant concern of blocs to increase their military arsenals and their aspiration to achieve the decisive superiority.

The bloc concept of balance of power is one of the main sources of the arms race. The doctrines of balance of terror, balance of fear, deterrence first, second or who knows which nuclear strike, are its driving force.

It is in the very nature of this concept to seek advantages which create a constant tendency to establish balance at an ever higher level of armament.

So-called nuclear deterrence also gives rise to many doubts. It has not only failed to prevent the use of force against independent countries or liberation movements in various parts of the world, but has also provided an unbrella for local wars and armed intervention and other kinds of encroachment upon the freedom, independence and self-determination of countries and peoples. How can one speak of the validity of the concept of deterrence and at the same time elaborate doctrines on waging limited nuclear wars? Everyday practice has confirmed time and again the position of the non-aligned countries that lasting international peace cannot be based on the foundations offered by bloc bipolarity. On the contrary, it must be founded on the new concept of security which would be built by the radical transformation of international relations and the establishment of a new system in which every country and every people would have access to freedom, independence and equality.

This year is the twentieth year since the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade. This anniversary was recently observed in our Organization as marking one of the most significant efforts of mankind to embark upon the road of peace.

The creation and growth of the Non-Aligned Movement were motivated by the refusal of an ever greater number of States to accept the division of the world into blocs and by their determination to oppose such divisions and confrontations by the policy of peace and the universal application of the principles of peaceful coexistence among all peoples and States, irrespective of differences in their social systems. Thus, a new approach to contemporary

international relations and to the solution of problems of peace and security was initiated. The substance of that concept is based on the indispensability of overcoming bloc division of the world, not by "abolishing" blocs, but by creating new democratic and equitable co-operation among peoples and countries, co-operation that will make possible the solution of the contradictions of the modern world by mutual understanding. Non-aligned countries have for that reason continuously and persistently resisted all forms of action that endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries, intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, the use of pressure and denial of the right to development. In that context, they have persistently advocated the undertaking of concrete measures for the lessening of tension, which could lead to the solution of crucial international issues.

Disarmament is one of the key elements of the non-aligned concept of security since, in the shadow of huge arsenals of modern weapons, particularly nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, a reliable system of peace and security in the world cannot be created. The lessons of the past are still too vivid for us to remain indifferent and passive.

That is the very reason why the present state of disarmament negotiations gives cause for the greatest concern. It is caused by several factors. Among them, the most troubling are certainly the long-standing absence of concrete results of negotiations and their unacceptably slow pace, as well as the choice of issues under negotiation.

Recently we have been witnessing an obvious stalemate at all levels of negotiation. The agreements reached in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the USSR and the United States, known as SALT II, and signed more than two years ago, have been called into question, while the announced negotiations on SALT II have not yet begun. Bilateral and trilateral negotiations among some nuclear Powers on several important issues of disarmament have been suspended. The Vienna Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armament in central Europe have been bogged down for years.

The Committee on Disarmament has been prevented from engaging in genuine negotiations on the issues of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, which had unanimously been given priority. Today, three and a half years after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the negotiations on substantial matters have not yet begun. Some of the members of the Committee - and among them certain nuclear Powers - contrary to the demands of the overwhelming majority, refuse to agree to such negotiations in the Committee. They are against the establishment of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, thus preventing the Committee, the only multilateral negotiating body, from fulfilling one of the most essential tasks given to it.

The situation is similar with regard to the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is a very important aspect of the halting of the nuclear arms race. The efforts to start negotiations on this issue in the Committee exerted for years by a group of non-aligned and neutral States have remained fruitless. As in the further case, the same nuclear weapon States have continuously rejected proposals to set up an ad hoc working group, thus blocking any substantial involvement of the Committee with relation to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is paradoxical that today there are no comprehensive negotiations on the most important international issues, such as nuclear disarmament. It is unacceptable that the international community should remain for ever a passive witness to the nuclear arms race, unable to respond to the nuclear challenge and thus its hostage. Those who by their views have contributed most directly to that situation bear the greatest responsibility.

Within the deliberative and negotiating system on disarmament established at the first special session, the United Nations Disarmament Commission has been given an important place. The decision to revive its activity represented a significant contribution to the strengthening of the role and responsibility of the United Nations, and to the efforts to make the process of negotiations on disarmament more democratic. By its concrete recommendations, the Commission should contribute to the process of speedier solving of the problems of disarmament, paving new ways and launching initiatives for the urgent realization of common aims.

We cannot agree with attempts to push the Commission to the sidelines and to prevent it from dealing with the substantive issues of disarmament. Furthermore, at this year's session, the Commission was not able to adopt its recommendations unanimously due to the last-minute opposition of some countries on questions already agreed upon. In our view, the Commission is an important forum of all members of the international community for consideration of disarmament and international security questions. Everything must be done to make it so in practice.

I should now like to present the views of my delegation on some other issues on the agenda of our Committee.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as zones of peace and co-operation, will become difficult if the arms race is not halted and if there is no gradual withdrawal of nuclear weapons and armed forces from foreign territories, and from seas and oceans. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will not yield the expected results if it is meant to force the non-nuclear States to accept and confirm the obligations already undertaken by the terms of other international agreements. Such zones should be established and expanded, first of all, by undertaking effective measures for the reduction of existing nuclear armaments, by restricting the area of their deployment and by prohibiting and eliminating them. Of course, this does not in any way deprecate the importance and usefulness of the creation of such zones in those regions where there exists interest on the part of all countries of the region in their establishment. In those cases such agreements would constitute an additional factor for the strengthening of mutual confidence in the region.

As a European country, Yugoslavia attaches exceptional importance to all issues concerning the promotion of co-operation in the field of peace and security in that turbulent region of the world. Yugoslavia advocates the

undertaking of all necessary measures that would be conducive to the lessening of political and military tensions, based on the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. Its activities at the Madrid meeting, which has just resumed its work, are oriented in that direction.

Together with other non-aligned, neutral and non-bloc countries of Europe, Yugoslavia strives for the formulation of a framework of a future European conference on disarmament, and for the establishment of the foundations for the beginning of the process of European disarmament. We hope that the countries resisting this initiative will accept that the negotiations should be conducted on disarmament measures and not only on confidence-building measures, which are certainly significant, but which cannot replace effective disarmament.

The Preparatory Committee for the second special session devoted to disarmament has recently ended its session. Agreement was reached on the series of questions relating to organizational and technical preparations for the special session. The provisional draft agenda was also adopted, which makes it possible to consider all issues of disarmament and to reach agreement on future joint actions. The Preparatory Committee has thus completed an important part of its work. The second stage of its work, however, is still before it. When it resumes its activities, it should direct its efforts to the substantive preparations for the special session, and to the elaboration of positions and recommendations which could serve as the basis for deliberation and decision-making at the special session.

The first special session determined the principles, responsibilities and duties of States, pointed to the ways of solving priority tasks of disarmament, and confirmed the primary responsibility of the United Nations. The second special session should consider and assess the development of international relations in the period between the two sessions from the viewpoint of the implementation of recommendations and decisions adopted at the first special session in order to determine responsibilities and to adopt appropriate decisions on future actions.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament which should be adopted by the second special session would be of great significance. In our view, it should not be a general document, but should contain an elaborated programme of concrete measures. It should outline the appropriate time-frame for their implementation, determine principles, and define goals which should be realized in separate stages; as well as through implementation of the programme as a whole.

The second special session should not be a meeting for the continuation of futile dialogue, but for reaching genuine agreement in the international community to give impetus to the process of disarmament. The readiness of all participants to strive for acceptable solutions is indispensable to the achievement of this goal. We believe that the immediate task is to resume the negotiations on the priority issues of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, as well as to speed up the achievement of agreements on those questions which have been in negotiation for years. Every wasted moment is irretrievably lost, and that can be costly to us all. Joint efforts, therefore, are indispensable, since the solution of problems cannot be restricted to a narrow circle of chosen ones.

Mr. FRANCIS (New Zealand): Sir, I should like first to ask you to convey my congratulations to the Chairman, who, I am sure, will fulfil his tasks with same distinction that we have come to expect in the Chairmen of this Committee. I should also like to congratulate you and the other officers of the Committee most warmly on your election.

It is now over three years since the first special session on disarmament provided a new framework for disarmament efforts and presented a standard against which progress in disarmament could be measured. The expectations generated by that session have not been fulfilled. We are still discussing disarmament in terms of agreements hoped for rather than agreements reached. Expenditure on arms and armed forces has continued to increase. There has been no reduction in the resources allocated to the development of deadlier and more accurate weapons of war. And armed conflict has continued to bring misery and destruction to people in many parts of the world.

One of the things that history demonstrates is that the impulse to disarm is not a strong one. It shows too that, more often than not, States are drawn by circumstances to the conclusion that their national security can only be safeguarded through the acquisition of more arms. We all know that disputes can seldom be settled peacefully except in an atmosphere of international confidence.

We know too that some of the surest ways of destroying that confidence are the display of aggressiveness and the pursuit of expansionist policies totally at variance with the principles of the Charter. The response to that sort of behaviour is for others to seek improved security by means of increases in their military strength. That is what has been happening in recent years, and it goes a long way towards explaining why there has been so little progress in disarmament negotiations; for disarmament is not a short cut to peace but a function of it.

However, the need for effective measures of arms control has in no way diminished. Therefore it is disappointing that so little progress should have been made in implementing the broad strategy outlined in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. It is of particular concern to us that that should be the case in relation to that section of the Programme of Action to which highest priority was given, namely, nuclear weapons. Over the years several agreements have been concluded with the aim of reducing the risk of nuclear war. Some of them have included a measure of arms control; but they have been limited in scope and they have not removed the threat of nuclear war. If the risks of nuclear disaster are to be reduced, renewed efforts will be needed to halt and reverse the arms race. This objective can be achieved only by negotiated and verifiable agreements. As has so often been said, the primary responsibility for initiating and carrying forward negotiations to this end lies with the nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand has, therefore, welcomed the announcement that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit theatre nuclear forces in Europe are to begin next month and that strategic arms talks will resume in the new year. It is our hope that these negotiations will result in a strengthening of security at lower levels of armament and will provide impetus to other disarmament negotiations.

Among negotiations begun but not concluded are those on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a matter to which New Zealand has always attached the greatest importance.

For a good many years the New Zealand delegation has taken an active part in the initiation of resolutions calling for the early conclusion of negotiations among the three nuclear-weapon States which, in the 1963 partial test ban Treaty, as in the non-proliferation Treaty, pledged themselves to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time and to continue negotiations to that end. It was with great satisfaction that we learned of the initiation of the trilateral negotiations on this issue in 1977; but we have, since then, been disappointed by the failure of the three negotiating States to fulfil the expectations of the Assembly by concluding their work and submitting their proposals to the Committee on Disarmament. We have been no less disappointed by their refusal to co-operate with that Committee in its efforts to engage in the negotiation of a multilateral treaty on this issue; and we are profoundly concerned that after a year of inactivity the negotiating States should have no firm plans to resume their efforts to bring their work to an early conclusion.

There is, in our view, no subject on the disarmament agenda to which, at this time, higher priority should be accorded. Tests are still being conducted, including some in the South Pacific, and they are not becoming fewer in number. But that is not the only reason why the tests should be halted. A comprehensive test-ban treaty could also restrain further innovation in regard to nuclear weapons and help to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons to other countries. It would at the same time fulfil the commitment given by the three negotiating States in the 1963 Treaty and put an end to their inconsistency in seeking to persuade others that nuclear weapons are undesirable while they themselves continue their test programmes.

The non-proliferation Treaty is not a perfect instrument but, whatever its defects, it is the only comprehensive non-proliferation instrument available to the world community. It is reassuring that so many States have agreed to be bound by its provisions. In February this year we were pleased to learn that the Government of Egypt had ratified the Treaty and was considering what further steps it could take to bring closer the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In contrast, Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear research centre a few months later had adverse effects on the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty and weakened the trust placed in its safeguards system. We believe it to be important that steps now be taken to renew confidence in the Treaty and its safeguards system.

Among additional measures that could be taken to strengthen the non-proliferation régime are two that have been under consideration by the Committee on Disarmament. The first of these is the proposal for an agreement prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and other explosive devices. Though this is not a matter on which it would be realistic to expect early progress, we would urge the Committee on Disarmament to keep the item, including the question of verification of such an agreement, under review.

Of more immediate relevance to the objective of non-proliferation is the question of negative security assurances. It is evident from the report of the Committee on Disarmament that there continues to be difficulties in reconciling the several unilateral declarations on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We hope that the various assurances can before long be reduced to a common formula that might be incorporated in an international instrument of a legally binding character and that the Committee on Disarmament will continue its deliberations and negotiations to that end.

Nuclear disarmament rightly has the highest priority on the disarmament agenda, for nuclear weapons, in the words of the Final Document, pose "the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization" (S-10/2, para. 47). At the same time, we cannot afford to ignore the implications of the spreading of conventional weapons and the expansion of conventional forces in many parts of the world. It is to those forces and weapons that most of the world's military expenditure is allocated; and all the casualties of conflict since 1945 have resulted from conventional war. There is no greater consumer of development resources and none that is more wasteful. All States are, of course, entitled to maintain armed forces for their defence, and in some cases those forces may be a factor in restraining conflict. In others, however, the effect is to increase the potential for conflict, with all the risks of involvement by the great Powers and the threat to international security that that can entail. All States have an obligation to contribute in any way they can to the maintenance of peace and international security, and we believe that this Organization could contribute to that end by enlarging the scope of its work on conventional arms control. Accordingly we welcome the Danish initiative for a study on conventional disarmament as a first step in that direction.

The Final Document referred specifically to the problem of weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. The Convention prepared by the conference on prohibitions or restrictions on such weapons has now been signed by over 40 States including New Zealand. Since the Convention was opened for signature, a number of Governments have declared their intention to continue efforts for the establishment of machinery for the verification of compliance with the Convention. New Zealand fully supports those efforts and hopes that it will not be too long before suitable mechanisms are developed for that purpose.

Another task of great priority is the conclusion of an agreement on the probabilition of chemical veapons. We have been gratified by the progress made by the Committee on Disarmanent on this issue progress which gives grounds for hope that the negotiations for a convention on chemical veapons will be concluded before too long. New Zealand continues to be concerned by indications that chemical veapons are being used in conflict in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of customary international law. This organization has accepted responsibility for investigating recent reports of use to determine whether or not they can be verified. We believe that the persistence of reports of use of chemical veapons reinforces the need for setting up standby machinery to investigate allegations of use pending the establishment of permanent arrangements for that purpose. There is no other way that the authority of the 1925 Protocol can be upheld.

It has never been more evident than it is today that confidence in the value of international agreements relating to arms control depends on the adequacy of the verification arrangements which they put in place. The arms race - arms competition may be a more accurate term - appears now to be proceeding by the improvement of weapons more than by their increase. From being quantitative, it has tended to become qualitative. In general, each advance has made international inspection arrangements more desirable or urgent.

For some years now, national technical means of inspection have fulfilled essential verification requirements. But there are indications that this may not hold true for much longer. If States are to be ready to pursue serious disarmament negotiations, they must be satisfied that the agreements they enter into will satisfy the requirement of increased security at lower force levels. If that cannot be guaranteed, if each party cannot be certain of the compliance of the others, the outlook for real measures of disarmament will be bleak indeed. Greater openness in the provision of information and flexibility in considering verification proposals, especially on the part of those States which have so far shown reluctance to co-operate in those areas, would contribute substantially to the prospects of disarmament in future years. We would agree too with those who have suggested that the United Mations should gradually develop the capacities to implement and to control the implementation of disarmament agreements.

Next year we will be called to the second special session of the Assembly on disarmament. It will provide an opportunity to review what has been achieved since the first session and, through the comprehensive programme of disarmament that is expected to provide the focal point for the second session, to consider ways of improving the prospects for further progress in this area. Clearly, we need to be realistic in our assessment of what the session can be expected to achieve. But the opportunity will be there to pursue arrangements that will reduce the burden and danger of the arms race and strengthen the fabric of peace. It will be up to us, the Member States, to see what can be made of it.

In PARTICION (Trinidad and Tobago): On behalf of the Trinidad and Tobago delegation I wish to extend congratulations to the Chairman and to the other officers of the Committee on their election. We are confident that under the Chairman's knowledgeable guidance this Committee will enjoy a productive session.

This week we are once again observing Disarmament Week and are afforded yet another opportunity to focus our attention on the critical issue of halting and reversing the arms race. This task is perhaps today more urgent than it has ever been previously, given the general deterioration in the climate of international relations as witnessed by the foreboding strains, crises and conflicts in various parts of the world and the accompanying escalation in the arms race. Armaments, and in particular nuclear weapons, which were originally said to be for the purpose of greater security, are proving as has been pointed out over and over again, to have the opposite effect by causing greater insecurity. In the words of the Secretary-General in his message on the occasion of Disarmament Week, 1981:

The vicious circle of suspicion and hostility leading to increased armaments, which in turn cause greater insecurity needs to be broken. $(A/C.1/3\ell/PV.11, p. 4-5)$.

My delegation read with great interest the study of the relationship between disarmament and development contained in document A/36/536, and could not help but lament the tremendous squandering of resources on armaments while the basic needs of so many people in the developing world remain unmet. The world's military expenditure today is of the order of \$500 billion annually, or some 6 per cent of world output. This represents a four-fold escalation over the post-war period, and in excess of a twenty-five-fold escalation since the turn of the century. And notwithstanding this can we honestly say that the world is a more secure place today than it was then?

It is difficult to translate an expenditure of \$500 billion into anything comprehensible, except to provide some prospective of the sheer bulk of resources devoted annually to military use. For many years world military expenditure has been comparable to the combined gross national product of all the countries in Africa and Latin America, or put another way, nearly 19 times as large as all the official development assistance provided by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to the poorer countries. On a smaller scale it has been pointed out that the World Health Organization (WHO) spent 10 years

and somewhat less than \$100 million to eradicate smallpox, while over the same 10-year period one country spent considerably more than that merely to develop a more advanced version of a small air-to-air missile.

In addition to financial expenditure, it has been estimated that over 100 million people are affected, directly or indirectly, by military activities, whether as soldiers, sailors, airmen, bureaucrats, scientists, engineers or general workers. Roughly 50 million are employed in meeting the demand for military goods and services, either directly or indirectly.

But men and money do not of and by themselves produce weapons. Scarce supplies of oil and minerals, that is, non-renewable raw materials much needed in other areas of productive activity, are being shifted away for military use. It has been estimated, for example, that the quantity of petroleum used for military purposes, including indirect consumption in military industry, has been put at 5 to 6 per cent of total global consumption. Five per cent of global petroleum consumption is more than that accounted for by France, and close to one half of the consumption of all developing countries combined, excluding China.

In all of this the opportunity cost assessments of the arms race impinge on the whole gamut of international and political relations. The negative effects of global military efforts have been variously described as socially harmful, economically unjustifiable, politically counter productive, ecologically hazardous and morally intolerable. The industrialized world consumed more petroleum and non-fuel minerals during the 25 years after the Second World War than those utilized in all of previous history, and in terms of patterns of consumption, 75 per cent of the resources were consumed by less than 25 per cent of the world population.

To quote from chapter IV of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development:

The interrelated processes of over-development and under-development on the one hand and the continuing claims of a high level of global military activities on the other constitute twin assaults on the economic environment, which perhaps for the first time in human history, is signalling that the continuously expanding demands on global resources... may override the capacity of new technology to offset the constraints inherent in the natural systems on which life depends. (A/36/356, para.174)

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has always viewed with hope the very positive role which science and technology can play in the development process: in other words, the positive results which could be yielded from the application of science and technology for development. Regrettably, however, these expectations have not materialized. Instead, we note that global expenditure on military research and development in 1980 were of the order of \$35,000 million, or approximately one quarter of the total expenditure on all research and development. Six countries account for about 85 per cent of world research and development activities; military research and development is even more highly concentrated than total research and development, with just two countries accounting for a similar share of research and development. In 1979 some 2.25 million scientists and engineers were estimated to be employed in global research and development, and of these some 400,000 were engaged in military research and development. More recently it has been estimated that this number may be of the order of 500,000. In other words, approximately 20 per cent of the world's qualified scientists and engineers were engaged in military work in the 1970s. It has also been estimated that the average military product is some 20 times as research-intensive as the average civilian product, and only a very small part of the fruits of military research are transferred to areas of civilian activity.

It is virtually impossible to dispute the desirability of reversing the arms race in order to speed up the process of socio-economic development. The world can continue to arm itself to death or can use resources in more productive and beneficial directions. It cannot do both. The present arms race represents a critical and intensifying challenge for mankind. The danger of war is contin continuously present on the horizon owing to the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of new arms production, both conventional and nuclear, and owing to the use or threat of use of force by States, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. Yet it has been clearly demonstrated that a very positive change would emerge if human and material resources were to be diverted from the production of commodities and services for military purposes to the production of goods and services that can contribute to economic and social development.

Of all the weapons which threaten the world today, nuclear weapons pose a unique threat. Latin America has recognized this fact, and the States of the region have thus ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, a unique regional disarmament measure which seeks to ensure protection for the continent against the threat of an armed nuclear attack. In this regard, the Treaty contains two Additional Protocols which impose obligations on the Member States of the region, on nuclear-weapon States and on extra-regional States having responsibility for territories within the contemplated nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this regard, my delegation is pleased to note the statement made by Mr. Rostow of the United States delegation that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has favourably reported Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that the Senate is expected shortly to give its advice and consent for ratification. My delegation would like to think that the concept of the nuclear-free zone is one which would spread to other areas of the globe.

At this point my delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the training opportunities which have been presented to representatives of developing countries through the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament to enable them to develop expertise on the subject. We believe that this programme has demonstrated its value since its inception in 1979, and we would like to express our support for its continuation.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament produced few tangible results as far as arresting the spiralling production of armaments is concerned. Mext year a second such session will be held, for which preparations are now under way. It is my delegation's fervent hope that this session will make a more positive contribution to activities related to disarmament. But disarmament in itself is not enough, unless steps are taken to improve relations among States. International relations must be based on the fundamental principles enshrined in the United Mations Charter, including those relating to the prohibition of the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. It is my delegation's belief that until such time as the world disarms or reduces the level of production of armaments, strict respect for these principles could go a long way towards ensuring peace and security in our troubled world.

Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire) (interpretation from French): May I depart from the rules of procedure and extend to Ambassador Golob the warm and sincere congratulations of the delegation of Zaire on his election as Chairman of the First Committee. In addition to being a testimony to his skill, his experience and his countless merits, his election must also be regarded as a tribute to his country, Yugoslavia, which has always made a notable contribution to the work of the First Committee and the efforts of the United Nations to promote disarmament.

I particularly wish to express my pleasure at seeing in our midst our colleague, Ambassador Komatina, to whom we wish good health in the future.

My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee - that is, to you, Sir, the other Vice-Chairman, Mr. Carias, and the Rapporteur, Mr. Makonnen.

We are living in a world in which people are arming in order to guarantee their security while believing at the same time that general and complete disarmament is essential to ensure their security and to guarantee progress and development. Thus, while they believe that the armaments of States have reached alarming proportions and that there is over-armament that threatens the security of mankind, that is, each and every one of us, they nevertheless continue to arm to ensure their security.

Dissuasion, the balance of forces or of terror, hegemonistic expansionism, the desire for power and supremacy, insecurity, the defence of others and self-defence, are the reasons which seem to explain, or are resorted to in an attempt to explain, the arms race and the difficulties of halting and reversing it.

We are living in a world whose crisis contains the seeds not only of numerous wars but of the threat of the final, supreme war, a threat which, by putting war itself in a state of crisis, allows us to find hope only in what is essentially hopeless.

As serious thinkers of our time have reminded us, in the generalized crisis of societies and of civilization, war itself is in a state of crisis. The mutual fear which the mastodon States and empire builders inspire in each other has become the only real brake which has postponed the third world war. The imperial Powers, the great Powers, believe this. If we wish to get to the root of this evil, we should start by eradicating that conviction. For the backdrop behind the efforts of the international community and the very concept of general and complete disarmament is that States can achieve their legitimate political, economic, social and cultural objectives without war, without the spirit of war and confrontation, and therefore that it is not necessary to mortgage the future of nations, peoples, generations and even humanity by an excessive stockpiling of sophisticated weapons all the harder for man to control because man is suffering a crisis of values. It seems that we are living in the golden age of violence, excess, and delirium, all of which can lead to the extravagances of destructiveness.

The potential annihilation of mankind thus becomes an end in itself, which so far has prevented partial destructions from spreading. The empire builders believe that in imposing on mankind, through the manufacture and stockpiling of ever more sophisticated weapons capable of destroying our planet several times over, the fear of total annihilation which goes with those weapons, States will abstain from anything which could lead to the use of such arms, and will refrain from obtaining or trying to obtain such dangerous and pernicious weapons. They believe that as a result small wars will not turn into general wars and that the possibility of another world war will be put off to the Greek kalends.

However, that line of reasoning is erroneous, because, in practice, the States which are afraid and which do not wish to acquire such weapons are, owing to all kinds of affinities, putting themselves under the umbrellas of those which do possess them, in order to counter the possibility

of a State in possession of such arms one day using them against them, because one never knows these days with what weapon the other will attack one, nor the consequences of the strategic views that the great Powers will take of a new or unforeseen situation. Thus, to arm for the defence of others seems to become another reason, another justification, for the arms race. What should be borne in mind above all is that these two concepts salve the consciences of the great Powers taking part in the arms race, which becomes almost an act of generosity in the service of mankind, an act of humanity with the purpose of protecting the world, our planet and the human race from annihilation.

War has thus reached a state of crisis when the development and multiplication of the technology of annihilation has stripped it of all meaning. War used to pit against each other adversaries fighting for a precise cause or over a precise dispute, and the idea was that one side would win and one would lose, that there would be a victor and a loser. With the arms that we possess today it is possible - indeed, certain - that there will be neither a victor nor a loser, because the world itself will have been destroyed; the entire world and, above all, the planet earth will therefore stand to lose. Therefore, war is not the answer, for why take the risk of war if one will simply lose? Why risk nuclear war simply to come out the loser?

War is certainly not the answer, but that does not mean that human folly will not bring it about, for there is such a thing as the suicide of peoples. Hitler would undoubtedly have taken the whole world with him on his death if he had had the neutron bomb or the bomb which was first used on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. When the empire builders stake their all, will they have any scruples about dragging down mankind in their ruin? Will thermonuclear destruction be the final brake or will it be the last resort?

All those are disturbing questions, which justify the recommendations contained in the Programme of Action adopted by the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament.

Ever since man organized himself into society, his individual security and that of his society have been guaranteed by principles and rules of communal life or of conduct. It is the law that organizes relations in society and makes possible the harmonious development of society and its components. That is why we are convinced that States can achieve all their legitimate goals without war.

No substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament. Negotiations on the priority matters in the Committee on Disarmament are marking time. Here I think particularly of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the nuclear-weapon test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, among others too numerous to mention.

Already, over and above the recognized priorities, the question is now being raised not so much of facilitating or speeding up nuclear disarmament, but of ensuring that no one is the first to take the risk of resorting to the offensive use of nuclear weapons. However, in the opinion of the delegation of Zaire, that is tantamount to recognizing the impotence of our efforts and the fact that the nuclear arms race can no longer be stopped, and that the only thing that we can do is to prevent anyone being the first to use these weapons.

But it seems to be precisely those who can halt and reverse the nuclear arms race - that is, bring about nuclear disarmament - who tell us today implicitly that it is no longer possible, or that they do not think that it is possible, to stop the escalation of the nuclear arms race, and that the only thing ato do is to prevent someone being the first to use those weapons. Who can prevent a super-Power, or two or three super-Powers, which disregard all relevant recommendations of the United Nations, and which would not feel bound by any number of international instruments on the subject, having recourse to nuclear weapons? Who in the present international community can claim to have methods to check or control human folly? We believe, therefore, that we should insert the legitimate concern, indicated by the item entitled "The prevention of nuclear catastrophe: declaration of the General Assembly", into its real context, which is the priority which must be given to nuclear disarmament.

Here the delegation of Zaire wishes to refer particularly to paragraphs 20 and 47 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. In paragraph 20 we read:

"effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority." (S-10/2, para. 20)

Paragraph 47 says:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." (ibid, para. 47)

We view the problem in this global light.

The head of the Soviet delegation said in the general debate in the General Assembly:

"We are convinced that to prevent war is not only necessary but also possible if this is actively fought for." (A/36/PV.7, p. 43.45)

He added:

"The immediate and most pressing task today is to struggle for easing world tensions, curbing the arms race, eliminating the threat of war." (<u>ibid.</u>)

He also said:

"Hand in hand with all States, our country is prepared to wage the struggle for curbing the arms race, removing the threat of war, settling outstanding problems. In this respect we are not politically allergic to any partner, irrespective of differences in social systems or ideologies." (ibid.)

We cannot but agree with that approach. But it seems today that the fact that we have on the agenda the question of preventing the first offensive use of nuclear weapons departs from that approach. For some, it is tantamount to inviting them to expose their flanks, which they believe, rightly or wrongly, to be threatened. For others it is tantamount to giving justification for their conviction that:

There are and can be no grounds or motives, there are and can be no circumstances or situations which would give a State the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It would be a crime against all the peoples, against life itself on earth. (A/36/PV.7, p. 46)

As can be seen, it is quite clear that this question solves nething and the very fact that it has been included on the agenda has indeed been a reason for dissenting views.

Who could remain unmoved at any news about the existence of nuclear and deadly weapons in the space above us, that is, outer space? Certainly no one. But who knows exactly what is going there? Is it not essentially those who have precisely the means to place weapons there because of their advanced scientific and technological knowledge in that field? Therefore, the real problem facing us today is to ascertain whether or not they have all refrained from placing deadly weapons in outer space, particularly since there are United Nations resolutions and international instruments which refer to the peaceful uses of outer space. Can we assume that the correct interpretation of the principle of the peaceful use of outer space would necessarily imply that one should refrain from placing engines of war there? The problem is one both of preventing the emplacement of such weapons in outer space as well as of ensuring respect for the commitments undertaken by States.

Once again it is abundantly clear that in principle no one would like outer space to be used for military purposes. Nevertheless, believe me, a number of delegations here, rightly or wrongly again, are not entirely convinced of the guilelessness of including that question on the agenda. Why is that so?

Here I should like to take up a problem which I consider to be essential and which is indeed the very focus of our debate on disarmament. We are living in an era of troubling paradoxes. Here the paradox is that we are caught up in such a tangle that we can no longer even usefully discuss useful ideas. We are no longer capable of carrying out a dialogue in the true sense of the word on essential matters, that is, we can no longer marshal our views in order to try and convince each other and to overcome opposing views. Why is that? The reason is quite simply because of the struggle of closed and imperialistic ideologies and of the rejection mechanisms we have developed with regard to the positions and arguments put forward by others.

In this kind of debate, it seems to me that we are both afraid of being infected and, at the same time, afraid of being won over by the opposing ideas and by those who support them. Thus we reject everything and every idea, however inoffensive it may be, which comes from others as if it contained some hidden and hostile virus within it. The fear of infection and that of being won over conspires to block out any idea with which the enemy or adversary agrees. The inability to recognize the same facts as those recognized by the opponents seems to become a salient feature of our deliberations.

The rejection mechanisms which we have developed against our opponents are: disqualification, diversion, and real or feigned indignation.

By disqualification we mean that everything that comes from the adversary, or those who support opposing ideas, does not even deserve to be considered. And if he is not lying outright, the opponent is in error. His declarations therefore automatically call for intellectual rejection in the form of contempt or disdain, and moral rejection in the form of accusing him of bad faith, because, since any honest thinking must confirm our own ideas, everything which challenges those ideas must presumably be dishonest.

By diversion, we distract people's attention by speaking about something else as soon as we are questioned about any particular aspect of our behaviour. As soon as we are accused of having violated certain principles of the United Nations Charter, principles of international law, even human rights, in the empire of Monomotapa, we reply by referring to the subversive action, the violation of those same principles and destabilizing activities in the countries of the Incas or Gonduana. If the adversary tries to make one feel guilty by referring to one's trespasses, then it is necessary to heap ignominies upon his country.

Here we are witnessing more and more a sort of defensive-offensive strategem which consists in assuming extreme contrary positions, so as never to have to get down to basics. And it is that relegation of what is paramount that prevents us from making progress in the field of disarmament. That defensive-offensive strategem which tries to protect one's own pure cause by rejecting contamination and taking over, that is, everything which comes from the opponents and which might well shatter the system in which we are living, has led us to a sort of two-person, three-person or four-person

monologue, rather than a dialogue, on the major problems of international concern. In the face of that situation, the other medium-size and small nations also tend to "steal away", particularly in disarmament matters, leaving it to the major Powers to unravel their intrigues or to solve their problems, while remaining aware of the fact that they will never do so.

The scenario of false or real indignation can be summarized as follows: Let the scum hold their peace, let the riff-raff hold their peace; because scum and riff-raff are the opponents who question us and try to make us feel guilty.

It is that atmosphere which makes completely pointless certain legitimate proposals which are put forward during our debate. It is not by begging the question or by putting forward good ideas with innocent intentions that we shall bring about general and complete disarmament.

I should like to say that it is the powerful who have laid the foundations for this extraordinary mistrust which prevails in international relations, a mistrust which may one day paralyse any progress in human thinking for the service of man. Everything has therefore become dependent on the degree of truth or error in any proposition.

If we unanimously recognize that those trends should be reversed, where should we start? Where will disarmament start and where will it end? As an eminent modern writer, Edgard Morin, declared:

"Today the death-dealing forces are moving faster than the life-giving ones, although those are growing rapidly. The forces of idiocy continue to move faster than the forces of enlightenment, which nevertheless have themselves been accelerating since 1970. The forces of enslavement are developing their methods more rapidly than the forces of emancipation....

"Today we consider as an accomplishment the fact that a third world war has been put off since 1947. But shall we not stand to lose everything in the few years that we have won? ... Will the process of idiocy, enslavement and annihilation continue to be the most rapid? ... There is a mortal danger here. But the mortal danger is not in the bomb alone, whether it be the uranium or the hydrogen bomb. It is in the concertation of powerful States, of techniques of manipulation, enslavement and

annihilation, which are all outlandish myths. The danger resides in the confluence of the forces of political, technological, biological and informational enslavement and the burgeoning of the demographic, economic and ecological processes. ..."

But, he concluded, everything can still change in this agony which bears within it the seeds of the end of the world and the possible birth, or shall I say, rebirth, of the world.

And it is in the context of that conviction that everything can still change on the basis of the efforts of the United Nations in questions of general and complete disarmament. It would be depressing, therefore, for those who possess the very means of halting on reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, to tell us today implicitly that the nuclear arms race is irreversible.

The delegation of Zaire had an opportunity during the work of the Preparatory Committee to present its views on what the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament should represent or could represent. In that context, we drew attention to the importance that we attach to the discussion of studies on the relationship existing between disarmament and security and disarmament and development, disarmament and confidence-building measures in international relations as well as negative guarantees, regional disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular the denuclearization of Africa, and studies on all aspects of forces and conventional weapons. We shall not repeat all that here.

I should simply like to express the hope that the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament will give us an opportunity to review what has been done in the context of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session, and also and above an opportunity to consider very closely the deep underlying reasons for the absence of progress which has been noted, in order that conditions can be created that will lead to an accelerated implementation of the recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Ambassador of the United States, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States): The Soviet representative this morning made some true statements. But when he attempted to lay at the door of the United States all blame for negotiating failures in the 1970s he was not making true statements at all. Let me briefly explain why.

The Soviet representative today ended his remarks by saying: "international security can be strengthened only through disarmament" (A/C.1/36/PV.19, p. 77). This, of course, means first through sincere negotiations and secondly through restraint on military expansion. Let us look at the record.

As the Soviet representative stated this morning, the SALT II treaty was indeed held up in the United States Senate by the American President, Jimmy Carter, not Ronald Reagan, for an evident and justifiable reason. The brutal invasion by the Soviet Union of the small non-aligned country of Afghanistan chilled the United States Senate, as it chilled nations and individuals around the world. President Carter deemed it unreasonable, indeed impossible, to insist on pursuing a solemn treaty on military matters with the Soviet Union then while the Soviet Union was militarily invading a poor neighbouring State. Negotations on agreements to limit strategic weapons were thus stalled. We hope that they will begin again soon, as will the now scheduled United States-Soviet talks on theatre nuclear weapons. I can assure the Committee that the United States will conduct them in a most serious and responsible manner.

The second half of the equation for disarmament is, as I have stated, restraint. The Soviet representative stated this morning that the United States had caused the failure or stoppage of a number of other disarmament efforts, such as those on a comprehensive test ban, chemical warfare, anti-satellite measures, conventional arms transfers and others. The United States acted during the period of these negotiations with restraint.

What were the Soviet actions during the same period? The Soviet Union was then responsible for beginning and is now responsible for sustaining the most massive peacetime military build-up of any major Power in history. Let me document this statement, which may initially sound sweeping, but which is grounded on hard evidence.

Since the signing of the SALT I agreement in 1969, the Soviet strategic offensive threat against the United States, according to various measures, has increased sevenfold. The Soviet Union has flight-tested or deployed 11 new or modified land-based missiles and seven new or modified submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has developed and deployed its fourth generation of land-based missiles, which are capable of threatening our land-based systems, as well as its backfire bombers and a modernized strategic defence system that includes a major civil defence programme.

Meanwhile, because of our belief in, or at least hopes for, sweeping success in arms control negotiations, the United States as a matter of policy did not threaten the survivability of the Soviet land-based missile force. Through the 1970s we delayed our land-based missile modernization efforts, hoping for Soviet restraint. United States research and development on the antiballistic-missile system was scaled down to a minimal percentage from the 1960s level. The United States civil defence programme was funded at a most token level, something around one twentieth of the comparable Soviet effort. In 1977 the United States cancelled its follow-on manned bomber, hoping for Soviet restraint. Sadly, American restraint has not been reciprocated by Soviet restraint. Such restraint is evident nowhere in the Soviet military establishment, a military establishment constantly and relentlessly expanding its arsenal far beyond that Justified by national defence.

Nor is any restraint evident in Soviet arms transfer shipments overseas. The Soviet representative this morning criticized the United States for ending arms transfer talks a few years ago. But in fact the Soviet Union has been in the forefront of moves not towards the success of those negotiations but towards spreading even more weapons to incendiary regions around the globe. According to recently published reports, the Soviet Union just last year signed agreements for \$15 billion worth of arms sales to developing countries. Today, here again, the Soviet Union far surpasses any other single country in its deliveries of specific major weapons to such countries. Since 1977 the Soviet Union has sold in the developing world approximately twice as many tanks - 5,750 compared to 3,030; three times as many artillery pieces - 7,150 compared to 2,780; four times as many fighter jets - 2,290 to 540; and twice as many anti-aircraft missiles - 11,400 to 4,960 - as any other single supplier.

Let me address another issue. The Soviet representative has made a major point during his speeches of attempting to refute published Soviet sources on the possibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war. Since he refutes not the sources we have given but the prevalence of such terrifying statements in official Soviet literature, I feel obliged to tell this Committee that we did not at all exhaust the relevant Soviet literature during our statement on 27 October here in the First Committee. Indeed, let me cite more published sources, such as The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War by General-Major Milovidov, which was awarded the Frunze Prize by the Soviet authorities for its contribution to the edification of Soviet officers and soldiers. Since the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia frequently cites this source, I feel that I can do likewise, particularly this revealing passage:

There is profound error and harm in distorting claims made by bourgeois ideologists that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear war. The peoples of the world will put an end to imperialism, which is causing incalculable suffering."

Or, to cite another Soviet document, this one by Mr. Lomov in his "Scientific and technical progress and the revolution of military affairs", this article includes this statement: One of the decisive conditions for success in an operation is the anticipating of the enemy in making nuclear strikes."

Soviet literature provides many more well-known examples. These suffice for now to make the point that, no, the Soviets do not and have not excluded the possibility of nuclear war or discounted the possibility of making a nuclear exchange winnable.

Finally, it was surprising to hear the Soviet representative this worning speak of the inhumanity of the reduced-blast weapon, mistakenly and, by some, mischievously called the neutron bomb. It is surprising, since President Brezhnev himself informed a group of United States senators, some years ago, that the Soviet Union itself was testing and preparing this very type of weapon for its own arsenal.

Let me remind you that this weapon is, first and foremost, a defensive weapon designed to deter a Soviet attack - particularly a Soviet tank attack - against Western Europe, where the Warsaw Pact forces have expanded their advantage in tanks to approximately three to one. This weapon is designed to do less damage to civilian populations than current United States nuclear weapons.

We hear all too little, here or elsewhere, of the inhumanity of Soviet nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, which are designed to strike at populated cities - and not at tanks of aggressing armies. When President Carter decided in 1978 to defer production of this reduced-blast weapon, he made it quite clear to everyone that the United States expected similar restraint by the Soviet Union. Instead, we have witnessed the massive military build-up by the Soviet Union which I have just described. It has continued since 1978, and it is continuing to this day.

We have heard many fine words about Soviet readiness to negotiate on a variety of arms control measures. Their sincerity would be more believable if they were supported by what the Soviet Union actually does in terms of stemming its accelerating arms-build-up. Unfortunately, the record shows that their primary purpose is to throw a smokescreen on true Soviet actions and intentions around the world.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.