


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GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION

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FOURTH COMMITTEE
11th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 21 October 1981
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. JAMAL (Qatar)

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AGENDA ITEM 93: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued)

Requests for hearing (A/C.4/36/2/Add.9-11; A/C.4/36/5/Add.12)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to three communications containing requests for hearing concerning the question of East Timor (A/C.4/36/2/Add.9-11) and a letter on the subject from the representative of Indonesia (A/C.4/36/5/Add.2).
2. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) reiterated the position of his delegation, namely, that consideration of the item "Question of East Timor" by the Committee constituted interference in matters within the internal jurisdiction of a sovereign Member State and was therefore out of order. The granting of a hearing to any petitioner was therefore unacceptable and would serve no useful purpose.
3. The Indonesian delegation maintained its strong opposition to the granting of the requests for hearing of the so-called "petitioners" for the reasons already expressed in previous statements.
4. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to accept the requests.
5. It was so agreed.

Hearing of petitioners

6. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that, at its third meeting, it had agreed to the requests for hearing submitted in documents A/C.4/36/2 and Add.2, 3, 10 and 11.
7. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Xavier (Movimento Nacional para a Libertacao e Independencia de Timor-Dili - MNLITD) took a place at the petitioners' table.
8. Mr. XAVIER (Movimento Nacional para a Libertação e Independencia de Timor-Dili - MNLITD) said that it was regrettable that the years had rolled on without a solution being found to end the suffering of the people of Timor-Dili since its invasion by the Republic of Indonesia in 1975. Since his Movement's previous statement to the Committee in 1980, the situation had not changed: the oppression, imprisonment, ill-treatment, murder, forced roaming in the jungle, hunger and diseases continued in East Timor. Abroad, in Portugal and other countries, the refugees remained far away from their families, often in poor circumstances.

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9. In order that the problem could be judged on its merits, he would give a short historical introduction. The island had been colonized by Portugal in the 16th century. In the 17th century, with the arrival of the Dutch in the area, the division of the island had begun and it had been made official in a treaty between the Netherlands and Portugal, ratified in 1860. Over four and a half centuries, the people of Timor-Dili had developed a culture of its own, influenced by the Portuguese and the Catholic Church. In 1951, Timor-Dili had become a Portuguese province, and in 1961 the people had been given Portuguese citizenship. The people of Timor-Dili had no reason to dislike the Portuguese nor any reason to wish for their replacement by the Indonesians with whom they had nothing in common - not even a racial community - as the great majority of them were of Melanesian and not Malay origin. The evolution of Portuguese colonization would have led Timor-Dili to independence, once the necessary conditions and structures had been created. When, however, following the change of régime in Portugal in 1974, the new Portuguese Government had declared that it was prepared to grant independence to the people of Timor-Dili, the decolonization process had been interrupted by the Indonesian invasion. The question arose as to why the invasion had taken place, as Indonesia had never laid claim to East Timor. It had been said that the reason was in order to protect the Territory against Marxist influence. That trick had worked splendidly not only in Washington but elsewhere, in Canberra, and Jakarta's troops had stepped in without even any moral intervention. But the Indonesians ought to have known that a people of Christian tradition such as that of Timor-Dili could not be converted into Marxists by propaganda, however disguised it might be, and could have shown the world their concern by granting independence to East Timor after learning that the Territory would never succumb to such propaganda. It could at least have treated the people it was claiming to defend as friends. Instead, the invasion by Indonesia had been marked by such barbarity that even Indonesian officials had admitted privately, at the start of the take-over, certain units had "got out of hand," to quote Dr. Keith Suter of the United Nations Association of Australia in a report of the London-based Minority Rights Group. For some time, even the people of East Timor had believed what Jakarta had tried to make the world believe, but it had become more and more difficult not to loathe Indonesia for what it was doing.

10. East Timor has sought and found consolation and support in other peoples victimized by the Jakarta régime, namely, the South Moluccans and the Papuans of West New Guinea, and had established with them the West Melanesian Triple Alliance for the defence of their rights to live in liberty and in freedom from the oppression and neo-colonialism of the Asians of Jakarta. The contacts among those three peoples had made it clear that the annihilation of their populations was not an isolated case of torture and murder by Indonesian individuals, but part of Indonesia's deliberate policy of extinguishing non-

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Indonesian minorities. It was now known that Timor-Dili had never been, as the world had been made to believe, a threat to Indonesia's and the regions external security. An independent area, however small, in the vast Indonesian archipelago had to be put down, because it had meant new hope for the victims of Indonesian oppression and thus a threat to Indonesia's internal security: Indonesia having eliminated the right of other peoples to self-determination, had also to destroy that of Timor-Dili at the very outset. To do so effectively, Indonesia had been massacring or imprisoning hundreds of thousands of East Timorese in the same way as it had ammassed or imprisoned as many Moluccans and Papuans in West New Guinea. The Republic of Indonesia, the alleged advocate of self-determination, was using terror and military power to hold its colonial empire together.

11. For years in succession the General Assembly has celled upon Indonesia in vain to withdraw its troops so that the people of Timor-Dili could exercise its right to self-determination in freedom. While the great patience of the United Nations was admirable, a longer delay in taking effective measures against Indonesia would only lead to the near annihilation of the people of Timor-Dili, of whom in the end only a small minority would live on as savages in the jungle as a sight for tourists, or in an Indonesian national park. That was a bleak picture for the peoples of the West Melanesian Triple Alliance, and for the international Organization of which history would one day say that, contrary to its principles, it had allowed entire peoples to be destroyed by one of its Member States. To avert that fate, and to save Indonesia from going down in history as the great exterminator of the latter half of the twentieth century, his Movement was submitting two proposals to the Committee. The first, to be submitted to the General Assembly, consisted of the following items: (a) Indonesia should be called upon to withdraw from Timor-Dili entirely and completely within six months' time, as it had no legal, racial or historical rights to the country and its invasion and occupation were illegal and in defiance of all the principles of self-determination for colonial peoples and territories, and as the brutal behaviour of Indonesia in Timor-Dili was a constant violation of human rights and an imminent threat to the survival of its people; and (b) that adequate steps should be taken by the United Nations in case Indonesia should persist in its refusal to comply with that summons; that Portugal should be asked to resume its task in the Territory, as was the desire of the Portuguese Government and the people of Timor-Dili, and to prepare the people for the speedy exercise of its right to self-determination. The second proposal was that the Fourth Committee should grant a hearing at an early date to the other two peoples of the Triple Alliance, whose plight was much the same as that of the people of Timor-Dili and

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whose cases, which had been dealt with in various bodies of the United Nations between 1950 and 1969, should be reopened. Only when the three nations were free, could they start working for peace, stability and true democracy in the region and, when time had healed their wounds, could they enter into friendly relations with Indonesia again.

12. He then said that he would read out a message from Mr. Miguel Pereira Coutinho, the representative of Portugal in Timor-Dili.

13. In his message, Mr. Pereira Coutinho said that the Government and people of Portugal insisted that Timor-Dili should be returned to Portugal, which was still to be considered the legal Administering Power for the Territory, and indeed was so considered by the United Nations. Portugal felt fully responsible for the people of Timor-Dili, who had suffered so deeply and who were still, under Portuguese law, Portuguese subjects. Portugal, whose Constitution prohibited diplomatic relations with Indonesia as long as the Timor-Dili problem remained unsolved, would not rest until it could devote itself anew to the self-imposed task of guiding the people of Timor-Dili to self-determination and independence or to any other form of statehood freely chosen by the people of the Territory. Portugal therefore whole-heartedly supported proposal No. 1 put forward by the Movimento Nacional para a Libertação e Independência de Timor-Dili, namely, that the General Assembly call upon Indonesia to withdraw from Timor-Dili so that Portugal could resume its task.

14. The speaker then read out a message from the Reverend J.H. Ritzema-Bos, a member of the Central Committee of the Movimento Nacional para a Libertação e Independência de Timor-Dili.

15. The Reverend Ritzema-Bos said that although he was a Dutch citizen, he had joined the Movimento Nacional para a Libertação e Independência de Timor-Dili because he felt it was a man's duty to help people that were suffering, even if they were not his compatriots. Moreover, the people of Timor-Dili were being victimized by the same Power that had trampled the South Moluccans and West Papuans under foot, peoples with which the Netherlands had had colonial ties and for whose fate it should feel and show a moral responsibility. In East Timor, as in those two territories, the Indonesian policy that had been applied was one of wilful extermination of large numbers of the local inhabitants and of replacing them by Indonesians of Asiatic stock with a view to Indonesianizing the illegally occupied territories of other peoples.

16. However, the inhabitants of East Timor did not evince, as did the peoples of the South Moluccas and West Papua, the feeling of hopelessness of peoples which had been betrayed, for where as the Netherlands had failed to honour its obligations with respect to the self-determination of those two territories,

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obligations that had been laid down in official agreements between the Netherlands and Indonesia, Portugal had had the courage to break off relations, not with the violated but with the violators, and had insisted on resuming its task of leading the people of East Timor to self-determination. The Reverend Ritzema-Bos had felt intense happiness when he had learned that in the cultural world to which he belonged there were still governments capable of taking up that attitude, unlike the Government of the Netherlands, which hypocritically defended human rights anywhere in the world except in those territories for which it bore responsibility. Only ethical behaviour like Portugal's could lead to a better world for all peoples, and it was therefore incumbent on all foreigners of good will to help Timor-Dili by helping the Portuguese of Portugal and the overseas Portuguese in the Movimento Nacional with the sacred task of achieving freedom for the oppressed.

17. Mr. Xavier withdrew.

18. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Pires (Partido do Centro Social Cristão/União Democrática Timorense (CSC/UDT)) took a place at the petitioners' table.

19. Mr. PIRES (Partido do Centro Social Cristão/União Democrática Timorense (CSC/UDT)) recalled that although the question of East Timor had been on the agenda of the Fourth Committee ever since 1975, the desires and aspirations of the people of the Territory had not been satisfied. The international community, particularly the United Nations, was well aware of the terrible consequences of the Indonesian military invasion, namely, the extermination of a people that wanted only to live in peace and freedom and decide on its future without foreign interference. Extermination had been achieved not only through mass executions but also through starvation, deliberately created by refusing to allow the International Red Cross and other international organizations to enter the Territory until April 1979.

20. Indonesia did not convince anyone with its argument that the nationalist parties, in particular the party he represented, had asked for and signed an integration agreement. That agreement had been signed by only a few of the leaders of that party, without consulting the Central Committee or the people, in a contest of desperation and intimidation. Even the Indonesians had failed to respect it, which made it entirely invalid. That was so true that the Indonesian Government itself no longer brandished that agreement as an excuse to justify its invasion and annexation of East Timor. The existence of the so-called "Popular Assembly" of East Timor was not a valid argument either, since that Assembly had neither validity nor legality under international law, namely, the Charter of the United Nations.

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(Mr. Pires, CSC/UDT)

21. What Indonesia had to do was to adopt a solution that was accepted by the United Nations; it was therefore trying to control the people of East Timor so as to guarantee Indonesia's victory in an eventual referendum. For that reason, it had developed a programme of genocide. Since 1979, there had been a Red Beret battalion in East Timor; it was known as the terror battalion and was responsible for the executions, disappearances, imprisonment, torture, etc., aimed at neutralizing its enemies, women and children as well as men. The prisons in the Territory were controlled by that battalion, and civil power was only nominal.

22. The national resistance had been reactivated in the eastern part of the Territory, but the freedom fighters were being exterminated in cold blood. Starvation had again invaded East Timor. Although there was food in the principal population the prices were excessively high compared with the wages earned by the inhabitants. Furthermore, the conscription of young people for military service in other islands meant that they were abandoning agriculture. The agricultural plan in Maliana was nothing more than political propaganda and charitable organizations such as the Catholic Relief Service and the International Committee of the Red Cross, had already left the Territory on the pretext that normal conditions had been re-established. Coffee production and the coffee trade were controlled by the Javanese and the Governor had been forced to set a price that was catastrophic for Timor. The local trade was also in the hands of Javanese and there were only a few small poor shops belonging to local people.

23. Djakarta was trying to convince the world that it had liberated Timor from Portuguese colonialism for the benefit of the Timorese people. In order to overcome the obstacles in the way of such a project, Indonesia was adopting various measures, including a radical change in the educational system and its structure, the banning of local languages, the obligation to learn and speak the Indonesian official language, the forced adoption of an official language that was unknown to the people, the complete lack of teaching of Timorese history, the gradual but unacknowledged attempt to change the people's religion, the sending of Timorese youth to Djakarta and other imperial centres for higher education, which was nothing more than political propaganda in many cases. That was how Indonesia was preparing for an eventual referendum. All those manoeuvres must be borne in mind if what had happened in West Irian was not to happen also in East Timor.

25. The Partido do Centro Social/União Democrática Timorense was defending the right to self-determination and independence a right that could not be denied to any people. It could not be discussed and was even less negotiable. Over its long years of struggle, the people of East Timor had shown that it did not wish to be Indonesian. That was why Indonesia forbade the representatives

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of the international press to visit the Territory and would not allow the people of Timor to go abroad, even those who came under the protection of the Indonesian-Australian agreement.

26. All the countries represented on the Committee must create and offer Portugal and Indonesia the conditions to give effect to the Timorese people's right to self-determination and independence.

27. It was ironic that the international community was much more worried about the invasion of Afghanistan and similar cases and was forgetting a poor and small people like the Timorese. It was surprising that the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations had presented a proposal to the international community condemning - quite rightly - the invasion of Afghanistan without equally condemning the invasion of East Timor. The same could be said of other nations which acted in the same way.

28. In conclusion, he urged Portugal to do everything in its power to obtain the co-operation of its western allies in support of East Timor.

29. Mr. Pires withdrew.

30. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Ramos Horta (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente - FRETILIN) took a place at the petitioner's table.

31. Mr. RAMOS HORTA (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente - FRETILIN) recalled that the General Assembly had first had to deal with the question of East Timor more than two decades earlier, when the Territory had been one of the Portuguese overseas territories. During that period, and for many years afterwards, no Indonesian leader had voiced any claim over East Timor, not even in the 1960s at the height of Indonesia's military expansionism. At the fifteenth session of the General Assembly in 1960, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia had stated that Indonesia made no claim at all to the Territory of Timor, which lay within the Indonesian archipelago but was not part of the Netherlands East Indies.

32. After fighting a long colonial war against the Netherlands (with generous assistance from Fascist Japan) Indonesia had embarked on an anti-imperialist course. Yet even Soekarno, the great anti-colonial fighter, had chosen to ignore East Timor, then under Portuguese domination. With the fall of Soekarno the new régime in Jakarta had inaugurated a policy of accommodation with the Portuguese in East Timor.

33. Following the coup in Portugal in October 1974, FRETILIN leaders, who were aware of Indonesia's desire for territorial expansion and its legitimate security concerns, had hastened to reassure it of their sincere desire to

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establish relations of friendship and co-operation between a future independent East Timor and the Republic of Indonesia. In June 1974, he himself had met in Jakarta with Mr. Adam Malik, then Indonesia's Foreign Minister, and after three days of meetings, had secured a written pledge of non-interference, non-intervention and support for the independence of East Timor. In that pledge, the Government of Indonesia had recognized the right of every country and nation to independence and had affirmed that it had no expansionist ambitions and that, for that reason, it would always strive to maintain good relations and co-operate with the new Government after the independence of Timor.

34. Nevertheless, despite the continued efforts of FRETILIN to calm Indonesia's fears that East Timor might become a threat and a source of instability in the region, despite its demonstrations of good faith, the Indonesian generals had been unable to accept the idea of an independent East Timor. Although Indonesia had been hoping that the people of East Timor would opt for integration, the local elections conducted by the Portuguese Government demonstrated that the population preferred the leaders who were committed to independence (more than 90 per cent of the candidates elected). That had been the beginning of a propaganda campaign, combined with threats of military intervention and infiltration of commandos to cause unrest and instability. Indonesia's pledges of non-interference had been openly violated and on 7 December 1975, on the pretext of liberating the Territory from Portuguese colonialism at a time when the colonial Power had been only too willing to grant independence, and of restoring a peace and order, which had actually been restored by FRETILIN three months earlier, Indonesia launched a large-scale invasion against a country that had in fact been living in peace.

35. Six years after that invasion, more than 200,000 people had perished as a result of the killings and the bombing and burning of villages, schools, medical centres, crops and so on. The Permanent People's Tribunal meeting in Lisbon on 19, 20 and 21 June 1981 to study the complaint lodged by FRETILIN against the President of the Republic of Indonesia, had concluded that the acts of aggression against the Maubere people in East Timor and the intent to destroy the national and cultural identity of the country, both of which were well documented, demonstrated without a shadow of doubt that it was indeed a case of genocide, and it had ruled that the Indonesian authorities must be condemned for the crimes of genocide and aggression.

36. Currently, an Indonesian military offensive, similar to the ones unleashed against FRETILIN in 1976 and 1977, was again under way. Church sources in Indonesia and Australia had confirmed that a security operation ("Operasi Keamanan") was being carried out against FRETILIN, in connexion with which all males from 15 to 50 years of age had been conscripted. Another reputable

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church source in East Timor had affirmed that the current situation was worse than that of previous years; men and women were being forced to fight against FRETILIN in the bush, the schools and public facilities were closed so that the population between the ages of 9 and 60 could take part in the "operation," and people were constantly being imprisoned and deported to the island of Atauro, whose population had now increased from 10,000 to 60,000.

37. The Indonesian generals were not expecting the young people and the elderly of East Timor to accomplish what the generals had failed to do during six years of fighting against FRETILIN, which was a clear demonstration of their racist attitudes to the East Timorese, similar to their attitude to the Indonesian minority groups in West New Guinea, the South Moluccas, Sumatra and elsewhere.

38. The Indonesian assault would provoke a serious outbreak of famine similar to that of 1978-1979, which was a matter of concern to the ecclesiastical authorities who had appealed for international assistance to forestall the tragic consequences of a major food crisis.

39. At the moment there was not a single foreign presence in East Timor that might function as a restraint upon the Indonesians. In April of the current year the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had terminated its medical assistance programme, which had saved many lives despite the fact that it had been limited and hampered by corruption at all levels: more than 50 per cent of the foreign aid had ended up in shops or in other Indonesian islands, and the inhabitants of East Timor had been forced to procure medicines in the local Chinese and Indonesian shops. The abrupt ICRC departure had left no foreign doctors or nurses, and the few Indonesian doctors working in Dili were fully occupied with the Indonesian soldiers wounded in the war. It was not difficult to imagine the desperate situation of a whole country at war without a single doctor or nurse at its disposal.

40. Year after year, the Committee had listened to a barrage of Indonesian propaganda about imaginary economic and social progress in East Timor, while the reality was that during the last six years of Indonesian occupation the country had become a veritable hell. The very members of the puppet Government in the so-called "People's Assembly" had addressed a letter to President Suharto of Indonesia in which they had denounced the torture, assassinations and other acts of barbarity inflicted upon the people of the country, as well as the totally fictitious nature of the claims that economic development and reconstruction projects had been carried out. That document was very significant because it was an expression of frustration and discontent by the local lackeys of the Indonesian military authorities and it told a great

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deal about the blatant lies the Committee had been hearing year after year from the mouth of the Indonesian representative. Again that year the Committee would have to hear a tedious repetition of imaginary developments in East Timor, some of which verged on the ridiculous, an example being the donation of four colour television sets referred to in a press release. It was hard to know whether to attribute such a piece of news to simple stupidity or to a fundamentally racist mental structure. The Indonesian Government might consider advising the régime of South Africa or the Israeli and the United States Governments to try this sort of solution for their respective problems.

41. The people of East Timor had endured a brutal war of aggression for the past six years and numerous United Nations resolutions calling upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw all its forces from the country had gone unheeded. Throughout the world, governmental and non-governmental organizations (among them the Parliamentary Union and the Socialist International), trade unions, student organizations, religious authorities and cultural figures had also called upon the Government of Indonesia to end its occupation of East Timor and allow the East Timorese to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence. The Fifth and Sixth Conferences of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries had made similar pronouncements.

42. Indonesia, a founding member of the non-aligned movement, had trampled upon the principles and ideals of Bandung and resorted to armed aggression to annex territories beyond its historical boundaries, and the third-world nations must condemn that action firmly if they wished to retain their moral authority when condemning other Powers for resorting to the same means. It made a mockery of the United Nations system for Indonesia to claim the moral authority to pass judgement on conflicts in other parts of the world. It was ridiculous for certain countries to sanction Indonesia's invasion, territorial annexation and war of genocide, while they made so bold as to judge other countries in the region and in other parts of the world.

43. Indonesia's response had been an arrogant defiance of the international community, and a rejection of all norms of international law, an attitude that stood in ironic contrast to its pleas for help from the United Nations when more than thirty years earlier it had been struggling for independence. The very same generals who had sent their representatives to the United Nations to appeal for support and recognition were now rejecting its authority. It was equally ironic that the protagonist in the situation was not a European Power subjugating the people of its colony, but rather a third-world nation adopting the attitude of its former master. The very country that claimed

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a historical role in the struggle against colonialism, a place in the non-aligned movement, and a seat on the Special Committee on Decolonization now appeared in the guise of regional gendarme with authority to intervene in other countries.

44. It should not be forgotten that Indonesia's invasion of East Timor had not been an isolated case and that Indonesia had earlier tried to annex Malaysia but had not been able to achieve its objective owing to the firm attitude of the British. In the late 1960s, after the failure of its Malaysian adventure, Indonesia had unlawfully annexed West New Guinea (with a black population whose history, culture and language were totally alien in an alleged act of free choice which had been a shameful farce. The report of the Secretary-General on that action (A/7723) had been deplorable. It was to be hoped that there would be no repetition of that tragic episode in which the United Nations had made the mistake of supporting the manipulations of Indonesia.

45. The Government of Indonesia had realized that it could not repeat the same farce and, instead of an "act of free choice" with the co-operation of the United Nations, it had decided to impose its will by force of arms. While fierce fighting was taking place around Dili, the Government of Indonesia had rounded up 28 East Timorese and had pronounced them elected by the people; they had then been made to vote in favour of the integration of East Timor in the Republic of Indonesia. On that occasion however, Indonesia had not been able to secure the acquiescence of the United Nations and had lost the battle.

46. The absurd claim of the Government of Indonesia that the people of East Timor had exercised their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) was contrary to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which stated that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation; that all peoples had the right to self-determination and by virtue of that right freely determined their political status and freely pursued their economic, social and cultural development; and that all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples must cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory must be respected. Furthermore, resolution 1541 (XV) stipulated

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that a Non-Self-Governing Territory could be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by emergence as a sovereign independent State, by free association with an independent State, or by integration with an independent State. But even if the first two political options were accepted, account had also to be taken of principle IX of resolution 1541 (XV), which spelt out the procedures to be followed before a Non-Self-Governing Territory could become integrated with an independent State. The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization had not participated in the shabby farce mounted by the Indonesian military authorities in May 1976, which had not met the conditions required by resolution 1541 (XV); even Indonesia's closest ally, The United States State Department, had had to concede publicly that the so-called "People's Assembly" had been a farce and that the elections had taken place when the country had been under military occupation. More than 90 per cent of the population had then been living in the 85 per cent of the country's territory controlled by FRETILIN.

47. The people of East Timor, through armed struggle, had demonstrated their strong opposition to Indonesian rule and the Government of Indonesia had failed to achieve its grandiose ambitions although it had 300,000 troops engaged in a costly war. As the ecclesiastical authorities of Indonesia had recognized, Indonesia had not been able to gain control of the country. In spite of the difficulties facing the people of East Timor, FRETILIN would not renounce the sacred principles for which thousands of people had given their lives and it would continue to fight by every possible means and wherever it deemed appropriate until the Government of Indonesia acknowledged the right of East Timor to be free, independent and sovereign.

48. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the international community should reaffirm its support for the right of East Timor to self-determination and independence, extend political and material assistance to FRETILIN, the sole authentic representative of the people of East Timor, provide humanitarian assistance and call upon the Government of Indonesia to desist from further acts of aggression and crimes against its peace-loving people.

49. The FRETILIN flag of freedom and the national flag of the Democratic Republic of East Timor would again wave in Dili from the same flagpole where it had first been raised on 28 November 1975.

50. Mr. Ramos Horta withdrew.

51. At the invitation of the Chairman, Miss Picken (Amnesty International) took a seat at the petitioners' table.

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52. Miss PICKEN (Amnesty International) said that earlier statements by Amnesty International, most recently in June 1981, had clearly established that human rights were still being violated in East Timor; such violations included "disappearances" and summary executions of persons who had surrendered under the terms of an amnesty guaranteeing their personal safety, imprisonment without trial as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Information received by Amnesty International since June indicated that grounds for grave concern remained.

53. Amnesty International had received reports that a number of persons who had disappeared had in fact been killed shortly after being taken into the custody of Indonesian troops. Those had included Maria Goreta Joaquim, Filomeno Alves, Manuel Exposto and Onorio Pereira. The circumstances in which those deaths had occurred must be investigated thoroughly. Amnesty International had also received more extensive reports about the imprisonment without trial of large numbers of East Timorese in the Dili district prison, known as Comarca, and on the island of Atauro. Those held in Comarca were predominantly former combatants although an unknown number of them were former Timorese soldiers of the Portuguese Army who had not engaged in combat against the Indonesians. The previous year, Amnesty International had drawn the Committee's attention to the harsh conditions and poor diet in Comarca, which had seriously endangered prisoners' health. Those deported to the island of Atauro were usually civilians held simply on suspicion of being sympathetic to the cause of independence. In some cases their families had been compelled to accompany them. There were reported to be grave shortages of some essential foodstuffs on the island. Information on the conditions in which they were held was scarce. Other reports of persons imprisoned without trial could not be confirmed because of the strict prohibition imposed by the Indonesian occupation forces, which had prevented access to the territory and the free flow of information. A sufficient number of well-founded reports existed, however, for Amnesty International to renew its recommendation that the International Committee of the Red Cross should be allowed to undertake tracing and prison visiting programmes in East Timor.

54. Amnesty International had accumulated a considerable amount of evidence that East Timorese taken into the custody of Indonesian occupation forces had continued to be treated in violation of international standards. It was concerned that the Indonesian Government had not yet responded to the recommendations made to it in April 1980 for the protection of the human rights of the people of East Timor.

55. Miss Picken withdrew.

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56. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Scott (Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Community Aid Abroad and Human Rights Council of Australia) took a seat at the petitioners' table.

57. Mr. SCOTT (Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Community Aid Abroad and Human Rights Council of Australia) reminded the Committee that, following the withdrawal of the Portuguese authorities in 1975, East Timor had been administered for three months by FRETILIN, the national liberation organization, which had respected Portuguese constitutional authority and had made repeated request to the Government of Portugal to resume the decolonization process. The failure of the Portuguese Government to accept its responsibilities, compounded by support from the Governments of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom for the idea that Indonesia should annex the territory, together with the knowledge that an Indonesian attack was imminent, had obliged FRETILIN to declare the independence of East Timor unilaterally. A week later, Indonesia had launched its unjustified invasion and act of aggression. After a further month the Security Council had unanimously resolved to call upon Indonesia to withdraw and had asserted the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. That decision had been welcomed by those who had bitterly resented the actions of Indonesia. Such optimism had been dissipated when the people of East Timor had been abandoned as a consequence of the inaction of those who could have ensured that the United Nations resolutions were implemented but who believed that the Indonesians would quickly gain control of the Territory, that the people of East Timor would accept the inevitability of their new colonial status and that the world would forget a gross violation of the principle of self-determination. For its part, Indonesia had attempted, with no small success, to isolate East Timor from the rest of the world by closing all the channels of communication. Notwithstanding impediments and barriers imposed, a significant amount of reliable information on the situation in East Timor had reached the outside world, through churches of various denominations and from the few people who had been allowed to leave East Timor to join relatives in Portugal. Official documents relating to events of 1974 and 1975 and reports of visits to East Timor by senior officials of the United States and Australian embassies had also been published. Together, they provided a distressing picture of repression, food shortages and of boys and men conscripted to participate in drives to "clear" the Territory of possible collaborators with those struggling for independence. Despite the difficulties and risks it involved and the statements of Indonesian authorities, the struggle continued to be waged very actively as evidenced by reports of large-scale Indonesian troop movements early in 1981 and the continuing refusal of the Indonesian Government to allow representatives of the United Nations, the Red Cross, foreign missions,

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(Mr. Scott, Australia)

international organizations or the media to enter and freely move about the country, even after 6 years of an occupation which had allegedly been welcomed by the population. Another interesting fact was that the efforts of the Indonesian Government to integrate the Diocese of East Dili into the Indonesian Catholic Church had been resisted by that Church and the Vatican.

58. Equally telling was the despair reflected in letters received by relatives of the inhabitants of East Timor. The tragic news they contained was confirmed by an article published on 1 September 1981 in the Indonesian newspaper Kompas, which stated that the population of East Timor, estimated in 1975 at 680,000 inhabitants, numbered 544,188 according to the 1980 census. The author spoke of the teaching of the Indonesian language in East Timor's schools, the rise in basic food prices to a very high level compared with other parts of Indonesia, the inadequacies of civil administration, the dominant role played by the army and the enormous shortfall of current crops by as much as 33 per cent, compared with what was needed to satisfy minimum food needs.

59. Even more conclusive, because of its authorship, was a recent report dated June 1981 and signed by the youngest and oldest members of the First-Level Regional People's Representative Assembly of East Timor, which indicated that the report had the support of all members of the Assembly. It stated that after 6 years, discipline and respect for law could still not be imposed, that the Assembly continued to receive verbal and written reports and complaints of torture, maltreatment, murder and other indescribable practices, that the authorities given their personal interests precedence over the interests of the community and that the people of East Timor still did not enjoy human freedom. It then described incidents of murder, torture and rape and identified one particularly brutal official. In discussing economic development, it pointed out that people of East Timor did not reap the benefits of their labour and that the vast majority of them did not yet enjoy stable living conditions. It also described instances of corruption which had been investigated personally by members of the Assembly.

60. Despite their abandonment by the international community, the people of East Timor had not accepted foreign rule. On the contrary, there was clear evidence that opposition to Indonesia was unabated. In fact, the people of Indonesia themselves suffered from their Government's action, and its relations with many countries, particularly with Australia and those of the third world, were severely strained as a result of the occupation of East Timor. It was probable that the Senate of the Australian Parliament would shortly initiate an inquiry into Australian-Indonesian relations with particular reference to East Timor.

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(Mr. Scott, Australia)

61. The organizations that he represented, namely the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Community Aid Abroad and the Human Rights Council of Australia, were solely concerned with humanitarian issues and human rights. He requested retention of the issue of East Timor on the agenda of the General Assembly and a commitment to resuming the process of decolonization that had been aborted immediately after its initiation 6 years before.

62. Mr. Scott withdrew.

AGENDA ITEM 19: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 92: INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (continued)

(a) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

(b) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

AGENDA ITEM: 93: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 95: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (continued)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

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AGENDA ITEM 12: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 96: UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 97: OFFERS BY MEMBER STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/36/3/Add.30, A/36/23 (Parts III, V and VI), A/36/116 and Corr.1, A/36/138, 147, 154 and Add.1-3, A/36/155, 156, 160, 287, 412, 421 and Corr.1, A/36/448, 488, 512, 522, 525, 563, 566, 580, 584, 598, 602; A/C.4/36/2 and Add.2 and 3, A/C.4/36/5 and 7; A/AC.109/643-646, 647 and Corr.1, 648-651, 652 and Corr.1, 654-658, 659, 661, 662 and Corr.1, 663, 665, 667, 670, 671; A/AC.109/L.1389)

General debate

63. Mr. MASHAIRE (Zimbabwe) expressed his delegation's profound sympathy and grave concern for and active solidarity with the people of East Timor. His Government's position on the question of East Timor was consistent with the principles of the Charter, the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. His Government was very concerned over the reports of increased Indonesian military activities in East Timor. "Operation Security" was designed to eliminate the popular resistance led by FRETILIN. He recalled that the tragic famine of 1979 - 1980 had been caused by Indonesia's massive assault on FRETILIN-held areas, where the great majority of the East Timorese lived.

64. Zimbabwe, a country born from a long anti-colonial struggle, could not be silent in the face of the struggle of the people of East Timor. As a third world and non-aligned country, it was shocked by the arrogant and neo-colonialist attitude of the Government of Indonesia in regard to East Timor. His country did not intend to teach lessons in anti-colonialism to anyone, least of all to the Indonesians, who under President Sukarno had fought valiantly for their independence. However, that did not relieve them of the responsibility for the horrors that they might perpetuate, nor did their anti-colonial history give them the right to invade East Timor and impose a new colonial domination on its people. It was sad that a third-world country which professed to adhere to the principles established in Bandung should claim the right to intervene in and annex another country, using methods which the members of the non-aligned movement were supposed to condemn.

65. The international community could not condone Indonesia's actions in East Timor, which were a violation of the Charter and of international law, as the Security Council had confirmed in adopting resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976).

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(Mr. Mashaire, Zimbabwe)

66. The Government of Indonesia had disregarded those resolutions and was maintaining its troops in East Timor, waging a genocidal war against its people, and denying them their most fundamental human and political rights. Indonesia alleged that East Timor had become an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia, but that claim must be firmly rejected by all nations that cherished peace and the rule of law. Zimbabwe proclaimed its profound solidarity with the people of East Timor and called upon the Government of Indonesia to live up to its own history and respect the right of the East Timorese to determine their own future.

67. His delegation called upon the international community to uphold the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and national independence. It also called upon the Western countries to do all that they could to bring about a peaceful settlement of the problem of East Timor, and upon Portugal, in its capacity as the Administering Power, to shoulder its moral and historical responsibilities. After subjecting the people of East Timor to colonial rule for 500 years, Portugal was doing very little to assist them, and it should take concrete measures to draw international attention to the tragedy of the East Timorese. His delegation also called upon the specialized agencies of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, relief agencies, the International Red Cross and other humanitarian institutions to take immediate steps to see that famine did not return to East Timor.

68. Mr. SCHLEICHER (German Democratic Republic) said that the General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, had adopted a Plan of Action for the full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 35/118) in which were outlined the steps which States should take to complete the decolonization process. In that resolution, the Assembly had reaffirmed that "all peoples have the right to self-determination and independence and that the subjection of peoples to alien domination constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights and is a serious impediment to the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of peaceful relations among nations." That statement had gained in importance from the exacerbation of international tensions deriving from imperialist policies of armament, threats and intervention, examples of which were the recent developments in southern Africa, the continuing policy of terror and occupation pursued by the apartheid régime in South Africa and Namibia and that régimes escalating aggression against the independent African States.

69. New efforts were also needed to ensure that all peoples still under colonial and racist oppression were able to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. The colonial Powers were still seeking to maintain their rule over the dependent Territories of the

(Mr. Schleicher, German Democratic Republic)

Pacific, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. That was not only an insult to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, but a contravention of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and a major cause of tension and conflict. It was therefore gratifying that the decolonization Committee should have requested the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico in the agenda of the General Assembly's thirty-seventh session.

70. Specifically, the military activities of the imperialist colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration and in Trust Territories were a cause of grave concern, as were the plans of those Powers to use those Territories for strategic purposes. The military bases in colonial Territories were part of the aggressive strategic system of bases which encircled and threatened other States, exerted pressure on the States members of the non-aligned movement, and oppressed national liberation movements. The misuse of dependent Territories for military purposes was particularly important in view of the imperialist policy of overt military threats and intervention in the internal affairs of independent States, in particular States which had set out on the road of progressive development. A recent example was the military manoeuvres known as "Ocean Venture 81" carried out in the Caribbean in the vicinity of the United States military bases on the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands, which had been denounced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/14710) as a special threat to the people of Nicaragua.

71. The military activities of the colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration were a major impediment to the full and effective independence of then oppressed peoples. The military bases in Guam, Puerto Rico, Micronesia, Diego García, Bermuda and the Turks and Caicos Islands directly prevented the peoples concerned from exercising their inalienable rights. The United Nations had been calling upon the colonial Powers for years to terminate their military activities in the Territories under their administration, to dismantle at once and unconditionally their military bases and installations, and to refrain from establishing new ones. Notwithstanding, the documents of the decolonization Committee proved that the colonial Powers were defying those appeals and even intensifying their military activities. For example, on 12 October 1981, The New York Times had published the report of an agreement whereby the United States had secured exclusive military rights for the next one hundred years in the Palau Islands, starting on 17 November 1980, and that similar agreements were being negotiated with the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. The increasing misuse of those Territories for military purposes caused grave concern, particularly in

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light of the dangerous policies of certain imperialist States which claimed vast regions of the world as spheres of interest. There was a close connexion between those activities and such military measures as the deployment of the so-called rapid deployment force, large-scale military manoeuvres in various regions, and military provocations against sovereign States. Obstructionist policies to prevent the Indian Ocean from being converted into a zone of peace must also be viewed from that aspect

72. Although the military Powers maintained that their military presence in the Territories had positive results, the representatives of various non-aligned countries and of the peoples of the affected Territories themselves declared that such bases constituted a threat to the security of most Territories, to their peoples and to the peoples of other regions. In that connexion, he drew attention to the statement by a spokesman for the People's Democratic Movement of the Turks and Caicos Islands (A/AC.109/659). In addition, historical experience confirmed that military bases had never accelerated the independence process but rather had placed enormous obstacles in the way of the peoples of the affected Territories. An example of that was the fate of the people of the Trust Territory of Micronesia, which would be faced with a disastrous economic and social situation because the administering Power totally subordinated the economic, social and political development of the Territory and its own strategic interests. At the same time, the Territory had been fragmented by forced agreements and the virtual annexation of some regions. Those activities shed light upon the scheme of the United States to expand its control over the region of the Western Pacific and strengthen its strategic military position in that zone. Those policies were incompatible with the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement whereby the United States had undertaken to promote international peace and security and to further the self-determination and independence of the Trust Territory as an integrated territory, and posed a threat to the people of Micronesia and the neighbouring peoples of Asia and other parts of the Pacific.

73. The German Democratic Republic was firmly opposed to all practices whereby military and strategic considerations were given precedence over the vital interests of the people, and peoples were deprived of their rights by shows of military strength and the exercise of military pressure. The United Nations must continue to condemn all military activities by the colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration as a serious obstacle to the independence and self-determination of the peoples of those Territories. The German Democratic Republic unreservedly supported the consensus of the decolonization Committee (A/AC.109/674) calling upon the colonial Powers concerned to terminate military activities and to eliminate military bases in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.