



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 23RD MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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Mr. Fein (Netherlands)
Mr. Klestil (Austria)
Mr. Al-Ali (Iraq)

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Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/36/PV.23
4 November 1981

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ERSUN (Turkey) (interpretation from French): The delegation of Turkey, which wishes to contribute to the effectiveness of our work at all levels, has in previous years strictly observed rule 110 of our rules of procedure, according to which the outgoing Chairman is the only person authorized to congratulate, on behalf of all members, the Committee's Chairman-elect as well as the other officers of the Committee. But this year, Mr. Chairman, I would beg your indulgence and understanding because I cannot fail to express my deep satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the work of this Committee.

You represent a country that is sincerely devoted to the cause of peace and international stability, a friendly neighbouring country with which Turkey has traditional relations of friendship based on our common interests and on fruitful co-operation in all fields. It should be noted here that Yugoslavia has in past decades played a central role in the promotion of peace and the process of détente and has contributed substantially to the work of the United Nations. Inspired by the same concerns and the same desire to preserve regional and world peace, to resolve all problems through negotiations and to establish a just and equitable international order, Turkey and Yugoslavia have engaged in harmonious and natural co-operation. Your outstanding experience and your personal qualities, together with these general considerations, lead us to feel that we have good reason to expect that the work of our Committee will be successful and that we will achieve concrete results.

Just a week ago the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Bulend Ulusu, in a public statement reiterated that Turkey's policy towards all States was characterized by a basically peace-loving attitude. As a consequence Turkey has the deepest respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all States. The founder of the Republic, Ataturk, on many

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

occasions declared -- and the present Head of State, General Kenan Evran, was merely repeating his words in a declaration of 9 September last -- that Turkey had no territorial claims on anyone whatsoever, that it was prepared to maintain the best of relations with all States and respected their independence, territorial integrity and legitimate rights.

I have just listed the basic elements of Turkey's foreign policy for a very simple reason. In the past two centuries our people has had to face continuous war under the thrust of imperialism and the expansionist policies of certain major Powers. In 1923 Turkey completed the Treaty of Lausanne, through which the independence, borders and legitimate rights of the Turkish nation were recognized by all States. That was a decisive turning-point for the Turkish people, because after that date successive generations did not experience war. We are therefore in a good position to appreciate the value of principles such as respect for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of States.

In relating our own experience it has been our aim to stress the absolute need strictly to observe the fundamental principles of international law regarding the preservation of peace among nations. It is true that for some years now the international situation has been in a state of constant deterioration. I do not believe it wise to seek the causes of this deplorable state of affairs in philosophical explanations, since we are facing very concrete problems. As you, Mr. Chairman, stated in your opening remarks:

"Increasingly large numbers of countries rightfully consider themselves to be threatened. Regardless of their size, whether possessing the most complicated systems of arms or being poorly armed, all of them are apprehensive about their own security and their future."

(A/C.1/36/PV.3, p.2)

Unfortunately it becomes more and more difficult to convince those countries of the usefulness of disarmament measures, and as you, Sir, stated in very eloquent terms, "The arms race is at the same time the cause and the consequence of such a state of affairs".

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

Are we, then, in a vicious circle and doomed to perish as a result of nuclear disaster, the spectre of which haunts the entire human race? My Government believes that we have no right to be pessimistic; in our view the United Nations is the best possible framework within which to give new impetus to efforts at arms control.

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

In this connexion, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to take place next June, will afford us an opportunity to assess the situation and act accordingly. The Turkish Government attaches particular importance to that second special session and deems it absolutely necessary to guarantee its success. In our view, success means adoption of a comprehensive, sufficiently detailed, programme of disarmament, established on the basis of the Final Document of the first special session, and the adoption of appropriate decisions and the preparation of other adequate measures aimed at promoting the process of arms control and disarmament.

Moreover, the growing importance of the Final Document of the first special session must be reaffirmed and its validity solemnly reiterated. We would hope that in 1982 the world might witness a reversal of the present situation. True, it is hard to expect rapid progress, but, despite the presence of thorny problems, the United States and the Soviet Union have fortunately been able to reach agreement on the opening of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces at the end of this month of November. We are also very pleased to learn that parallel negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces will begin at the start of 1982.

Those negotiations are of capital importance to the continuation of other efforts aimed at arms control - nuclear and conventional alike. Indeed, the agreement reached on limitation of the strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 ushered in a new era of détente and co-operation in international relations. We hope that, next May, on the tenth anniversary of that event, conditions will be ripe for the second phase of the détente process to begin. If history repeats itself, there is every reason to expect three developments from that occasion:

First of all, an agreement of principle between the United States and the Soviet Union, not only on limitation but also on a substantial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, the hope for which was expressed two weeks ago in this Committee by the United States. That agreement,

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

so hoped for and so long awaited, should involve the promising beginning of negotiations on the difficult and complex problem of medium-range nuclear weapons.

Secondly, concrete results from the already protracted Vienna talks, on a mutual, balanced reduction of armed forces and weaponry in central Europe, thanks to a preliminary agreement on basic data.

Thirdly, conclusion of the Madrid Conference by the adoption of a satisfactory final document and, in particular, by the preparation of a specific mandate for the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe. Turkey attaches particular importance to the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, more specifically, to the declaration of principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act. That document constitutes a code of conduct adopted by consensus by the 35 States participating in that Conference, and represents a solid basis for the development of political, economic, cultural and social relations among the participating countries.

The conference on disarmament in Europe will be the natural extension of the process begun at Helsinki and will provide an opportunity to deepen the military dimension of détente on the basis of experience acquired through the implementation of measures aimed at building confidence among States. Actually, it is not even a matter of arms-control measures per se but of diplomatic arrangements involving notification of manoeuvres and troop movements, as well as mutual military visits aimed at establishing the necessary climate of trust on the European continent, which was the scene of the two world wars.

The Turkish Government considers it high time to go beyond the minimal measures provided for in the Helsinki Final Act and to make them mandatory while supplementing them with new, significant measures in the military field. As a first stage, that will be the main task of the conference on disarmament in Europe.

(Mr. Frsun, Turkey)

We believe that there is a link between the three categories of limited negotiations that I have just mentioned and the preparatory work for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Any progress in those three fields in the near future could contribute substantially to the success of the second special session, during which we shall be examining a whole series of complex problems involving nuclear and conventional weapons. In your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, you appealed for efforts to make the work of this First Committee more effective. In point of fact, during consultations and negotiations on the draft resolutions, we shall be dealing with each of these problems separately, and every delegation will have an opportunity to speak in detail on each specific item. With that possibility in mind, during the general debate I have confined myself to the essential points which currently occupy the attention of my Government. The Turkish delegation believes that a more orderly, specific discussion of each topic will increase our chances of obtaining satisfactory results and eventually dispel the confusion stemming from the heterogeneous nature of the debate.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): May I once again, Sir, extend to you the congratulations and good wishes of my delegation on your election to the important and very honourable and responsible post of Chairman of the First Committee.

The general discussion on disarmament in the First Committee is drawing to a close and we have already heard more than a hundred statements. While the views expressed and heard on these matters have not always concurred, this discussion has, in our view, been a useful and, on the whole, fruitful one, despite the statements of one or two delegations that tried to frighten everyone, confuse everything and make it difficult to take decisions aimed at preventing a nuclear catastrophe and curbing the arms race.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

It is important that the overwhelming majority of the statements we have heard in the general debate have one common denominator. They all expressed alarm for the future of mankind in the light of the threat of possible nuclear war and emphasized the need to prevent this. They also reaffirmed the need to curb the arms race, to achieve disarmament and to initiate for this purpose equitable discussion and negotiations without any preconditions.

Thus, because of its own importance and because of the significance all States which cherish peace and progressive world public opinion attach to it, this task is item one, figuratively speaking, on the agenda of all mankind.

The task of averting the nuclear threat is not something which arose either yesterday or today. It is coeval with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. It was urgent at that time, when plans were being hatched in the West to carry out a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union, as has become known from recently published documents. However, it is precisely now that the threat of nuclear catastrophe has taken on a particularly acute dimension in view of the fact that one of the nuclear Powers, the United States of America, has openly taken over a doctrine which would permit and would even provide for the utilization of nuclear weapons as a means of achieving its political and hegemonistic purposes. Despite the broad wave of condemnation of this cannibalistic doctrine, including that which was voiced in resolution 35/152 B of the General Assembly, it continues to remain a strategic mainstay of Washington's politicians.

At the same time, all this is being done in the senseless hope that it is possible to win a nuclear war or to restrict it to Europe or to some other part of the world remote from the United States. This point was made by the President of the United States, who has not so far made any clear-cut statement rejecting the idea of a nuclear attack as a criminal act. This was referred to by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency when he stated that it would be "naive to suppose that one single use of nuclear weapons would immediately detonate the entire arsenal" of both sides and the United States delegation at the United Nations has refused to support the proposal of the Soviet Union regarding the first use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

Furthermore, a few months ago, on the sad anniversary of the destruction of Hiroshima, we witnessed the United States adopting the decision to go ahead with the full-scale production of a new form of nuclear weapon, the neutron weapon. This weapon, which is designed to destroy people and leave valuable material objects intact, has lowered the threshold of nuclear war and in this way has considerably increased the danger of its outbreak.

This decision was followed by a decision on the part of the same Power to set up and to deploy new and even more devastatingly aggressive systems of the strategic nuclear missile triad - land-based intercontinental MX ballistic missiles, new submarine missile carriers and the new B-1 supersonic strategic bomber.

All these steps to which I have referred should be viewed against the backdrop of the decision taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to station hundreds of guided and other missiles in Europe, targeted on the Eastern part of that continent. It also envisages the stationing of missiles which could strike the territory of the USSR, whereas the Soviet medium-range missiles are not intended to reach United States territory. Thus, the United States, in using its missiles to create an additional unilateral nuclear threat against the Soviet Union and its allies, is itself trying to remain, as it were, on the sidelines.

In the present conditions, the very least which could be done by the present General Assembly session and the community of States in order to exercise a restraining influence on the dangerous development of world events is to ensure the adoption of the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union, which would solemnly proclaim that States and statesmen who would be the first to use nuclear weapons would commit the gravest crime against humanity.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

There are and can be no grounds or motives, there are and can be no circumstances or situations which would give a State the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It would be a crime against all the peoples and against life itself on earth.

The Soviet State has directly and unambiguously rejected the very idea of a nuclear attack and has repeatedly and at the highest levels announced that to hope for victory from nuclear war is dangerous folly. These statements are widely enough known and attempts to ascribe the very opposite to the Soviet Union are either gross falsehood or evidence of incompetence. As was stated quite recently by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev:

"... only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging a victor from it. No matter what might the attacker possesses, no matter what method of unleashing nuclear war he chooses, he will not attain his aims. Retribution will ensue ineluctably."

(A/C.1/36, p. 7)

As the Committee knows, in response to the appeal made by Comrade Brezhnev, to make a clear-cut declaration condemning the idea of being the first to use nuclear weapons, the President of the United States made a statement which not only allowed ambiguous interpretations, but also directly implied the possibility of the United States being the first to use nuclear weapons.

In the statements of the representative of that Power in the First Committee, we have seen it confirmed once again that the very foundation for its approach to the problems of disarmament is its course of further stepping up the arms race and then, possibly, negotiations on disarmament could take place, but from a position of strength. In direct contrast to this, the representatives of the socialist and non-aligned States have not only objected to such an approach, but they have also made constructive proposals in order to reverse the arms race and in favour of specific disarmament measures.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

Many delegations have expressed concern at the attempts that have been made to undermine the provisions contained in the Final Document, which were adopted on the basis of a general consensus. In this connexion, it would be appropriate to recall that in paragraph 13 of the Final Document, the doctrines of deterrence and strategic superiority are condemned. The United States representative asserted in the Committee that the arms race did not exist and he suggested that the Soviet Union had unilaterally been intensifying its nuclear potential. It is clear to everyone how far this is from the truth.

For example, here is evidence from a well-known American diplomat, a former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and now an eminent historian of international affairs, George Kennan, whom I do not think we can accuse of being incompetent.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

In a speech made on 19 May of this year, on the occasion of receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, he said the following with reference to nuclear weapons:

"But we must remember that it has been we Americans who, at almost every step of the road, have taken the lead in the development of this sort of weaponry. It was we who first produced and tested such a device; we who were the first to raise its destructiveness to a new level with the hydrogen bomb; we who introduced the multiple warhead; we who have declined every proposal for the renunciation of the principle of 'first use'; and we alone, so help us God, who have used the weapon in anger against others, and against tens of thousands of helpless non-combatants at that

"But let us not, in the face of this record, so lose ourselves in self-righteousness and hypocrisy as to forget our own measure of complicity in creating the situation we face today." (Disarmament, United Nations, N.Y., Vol. IV, No. 2 (Oct. 1981), p. 8)

It is high time, therefore, for the disciples of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence to embark upon a course of restraint, and this could be given impetus by the draft declaration that has been submitted, which would declare, inter alia, that any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations. The General Assembly must also issue a warning to the effect that there will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take the fateful decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The proclamation of this tenet in a declaration would remind those statesmen who, because of their positions, are very closely involved in the question of the use of nuclear weapons that each of them bears personal responsibility for the fate of mankind.

It is particularly important to draw the attention of the leaders of the nuclear-weapon States to the fact that it is their supreme duty to act so as to

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The declaration should further emphasize that the nuclear arms race must be stopped and reversed by joint effort through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, and that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, to serve life and not against life, and only for the benefit of mankind.

The adoption of such a declaration would be an important milestone on the way to the complete elimination of the threat of nuclear conflict. If there is no first strike, there will be no second or third strike, and it would thus become pointless even to think of the possibility or impossibility of winning a nuclear war. The entire question of nuclear warfare would vanish, as such, from the agenda, and this is precisely the aspiration of all peace-loving peoples on earth, who would then have the opportunity to develop their co-operation in a far more healthy atmosphere. The adoption of such a declaration would be a massive confidence-building measure.

According to the comprehensive study carried out with the assistance of a group of governmental experts on confidence-building measures and contained in document A/36/474, which was compiled with the participation of an expert from the United States as well as from other countries, certain principles are envisaged, such as refraining from the threat or use of force, the constraints on the options available to various parties in the military field and the prohibition or limitation of certain forms of military activity. The study also refers to the fact that in the absence of the will to create legally binding treaty commitments, confidence-building measures could take the form of politically binding commitments. Of course, studies are no substitute for real steps towards confidence-building or disarmament. What we need are practical steps designed to bring these ideas to fruition.

Our delegation is gratified to note that the Soviet Union proposal has been met with considerable interest. An important feature of that proposal is the fact that it would enable us - both the smaller States and larger States, both those possessing nuclear weapons and other major military potential and

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

those that do not possess such potential - to concert our efforts and unite in preventing nuclear catastrophe. No country should stand aloof from tackling that important task.

Some have suggested that they cannot support the Soviet Union's proposal against the first use of nuclear weapons since they allege that that proposal is unrealistic and unfeasible, and some have even gone so far as to suggest that it does, in fact, reduce international security. Such an assertion is tantamount to giving direct support to the realistic and feasible nature of a nuclear first-strike philosophy and to universal nuclear catastrophe. The logic cannot be gainsaid. An argument has also been advanced to the effect that refraining from the use of nuclear weapons would give the States members of the Warsaw Treaty a unilateral superiority in the sphere of conventional weapons. Those who make such an assertion are forgetting the fact that it was on the basis of a Soviet Union proposal in the United Nations that a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is being drafted, as well as the fact that the Warsaw Treaty countries have proposed that all States participating in the European Conference on Security and Co-operation should conclude a treaty in which each party undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against another. That proposal, which is contained in the declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of its Political Consultative Committee in May 1980 clearly states the over-all and fundamental position of the socialist States with regard to disarmament questions, which is:

"For their own part, the States represented...affirm that there are no types of weapons which they would not be willing to limit or reduce on a basis of reciprocity." (A/35/237, Annex II, p. 10)

It should be pointed out that the Western States have not as yet given any positive answer to those proposals.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

The significance of the new Soviet initiative lies in the fact that the ideas contained in the draft declaration could be the generating force for a new and important impetus in the intensification of joint efforts on the part of States to explore other ways of removing the nuclear threat. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries - and this should not be forgotten - are not only proposing political and legal steps, but also material steps that would eliminate the danger of nuclear conflict. It should be recalled that a number of such steps have already been approved by the United Nations, and had it not been for a lack of political will and consent on the part of other nuclear-weapon Powers, those steps could long ago have been stages, already passed, towards eliminating the nuclear threat.

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian, SSR)

Those proposals call for starting negotiations to cease the production of nuclear weapons in all their forms and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they are completely eliminated and taking the initiative to conclude an international convention under which the nuclear Powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten to use them against States which themselves do not possess nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territory. They also include an appeal that all nuclear States should, as a first step towards concluding that international convention, make similar statements that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not possessing such weapons on their territory. They include the provision to conclude an international agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of those States not possessing them at the present time and not to increase arsenals of nuclear weapons where they already exist.

The socialist countries favour the adoption of any steps which can contain and reverse the nuclear arms race and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We actively support the idea of establishing non-nuclear-weapon zones in various parts of the world, including, for example, northern Europe and the Balkans. The Soviet Union, together with other socialist States, favours the speedy resumption and successful conclusion of the tripartite talks on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which have been suspended because of the United States. We also favour continuing talks on strategic arms limitation. In other words, the States of the socialist community favour a continuing dialogue on the entire range of issues which are relevant to curbing the arms race and preventing war, primarily nuclear war.

In conclusion, our delegation would like to make an appeal to all delegations in the First Committee - because we believe it is necessary to protect both the present and the future of mankind - to work for the adoption of a declaration entitled 'Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe'. This question is crystal clear and unambiguous. Anyone who is against the idea of not being

(Mr. Gurinovich, Byelorussian SSR)

the first to use nuclear weapons is in favour of their employment and use and would bear responsibility for such use before both his own people and all mankind. If the General Assembly adopted such a declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, it would represent a positive response by the United Nations to the demands expressed by the peoples that are, actively engaged in the struggle against the threat of thermonuclear wars. The powerful demonstrations and peace marches which have taken place in various countries with the participation of many thousands of people, including those in parts of Europe, should be heeded here in the United Nations, whose Charter starts with the words: "We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... ". It is the duty of the United Nations to respond positively to those urgent demands which have been voiced by the peoples of the earth.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): A few days ago, on 30 October, I spoke about nuclear questions. In my intervention today I intend to submit the views of the Netherlands on a number of disarmament questions other than nuclear ones per se, and, in the first place, on the second special session devoted to disarmament.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide the world community with an opportunity to reflect on what has been achieved in the field of disarmament since the first special session in 1978 and on the reasons why certain measures have not yet been achieved to analyse the root causes of the arms race and to consider further ways to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations agreed on at the first special session.

I should like to refer to the statement made on 20 October by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Douglas Hurd, on behalf of the member States of the European Communities, and I wish to underline the importance we attach to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, which was adopted by consensus. That Final Document is the most comprehensive document on disarmament ever accepted by the world community. Therefore, the validity of

of that document should be unanimously reaffirmed at the beginning of the second special session on disarmament, as the basis for its work. We look back with satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session. We are happy to note that a spirit of constructive accommodation prevailed and that we now have a well-balanced agenda for the second special session. But we realize that the task ahead of us remains difficult. Reconciliation of broad and specific priorities is not an easy assignment. We look forward, however, to accepting the challenge that the second special session on disarmament presents to the world community.

As to the substance of our future deliberations, I wish to place on record our conviction that the need for arms control and disarmament is becoming more and more urgent. Certain deplorable recent developments threatening international security and increasing tensions in the world do not change that. At the same time, the economic world crisis, which affects all States, especially the poorest ones, also demands a reversal of the arms race in order to increase the possibilities of finding solutions to the social and economic problems facing the world, particularly the developing countries.

Arms control and disarmament cannot be successfully discussed in isolation from security interests. Precisely because disarmament measures should enhance security, such measures must be verified effectively, making the remaining armaments situation more transparent and contributing to the strengthening of confidence among the countries concerned. Concrete steps towards enhancing transparency of military potentials, towards the building of confidence among States and towards the improvement of the methods of verification can help to prepare the ground for reaching arms control agreements. Consequently, instead of being merely declaratory in nature, international discussions on arms control and disarmament should focus on proposals which meet those criteria. The second special session devoted to disarmament should take that approach as its starting point.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

The Netherlands has always held that high priority should be given to measures aiming at de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in today's armaments as well as at curbing the destabilizing effects of the nuclear arms race. An important contribution to that would be concrete, balanced and verifiable limitations of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The objective should be substantial reductions and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

In my statement in this Committee on 30 October I outlined how we believe these objectives should be achieved. I stressed in particular the importance of the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which is rightly referred to as the item of the highest priority on the international disarmament calendar. At the same time, high priority should be given to a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, to which subject I shall revert in a moment. We are convinced that some meaningful progress made in the months ahead in achieving those two priority objectives - or, for that matter, absence of such progress - will have no small bearing on the success or otherwise of the second special session.

Useful guidance for measures aiming at the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session can also be derived from the studies undertaken these first few years. I shall not tax the endurance of the Committee by enumerating them all. There is no doubt that the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development is a unique and highly relevant document. The importance we attach to arriving at a balanced and clearer view of the problems existing in this area is evidenced by the fact that a Netherlands expert participated in the activities of the Group. The conclusions and recommendations contained in this report will be the subject of serious consideration by the competent Netherlands authorities. We welcome the idea of having this report circulated amongst a wider audience in a popular version. On earlier occasions we have already pointed out the significance of the study on the subject of regional disarmament, a subject on which our Belgian friends have played a leading rôle. Of equal importance is the study on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, where our French friends have led the way.

We have taken note with pleasure of the report submitted by the Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to assist him in carrying out a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, as requested in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 34/87 B, which resolution was co-sponsored by the Netherlands. We wish to pay a tribute to the Federal Republic of Germany for its leadership in this undertaking. This report is a thorough piece of work, for which the Group is to be commended. Special mention should

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

be made of the illustrative list contained in Chapter VII, indeed a stimulating survey. We cannot but subscribe to the recommendation of the Group that both the United Nations and its Member States should encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security.

The report of the Group of Governmental Experts which carried out a study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament as requested in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 34/87 E, which resolution was also co-sponsored by the Netherlands, merits our special attention. Our continuing interest in this matter was further borne out by the participation of a Netherlands expert in the activities of the Group of Governmental Experts. This report contains quite a few thought-provoking ideas, which we will consider carefully. We look forward to further exchanges of views on this matter both in this Committee and in the Committee on Disarmament. Although I shall not prejudge the outcome of further consideration by my authorities, I can say that we feel encouraged by this report to draw attention once more to the validity of the proposal we submitted to the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the establishment of an international disarmament organization.

I wish to reiterate our support for the proposal envisaging the establishment by the General Assembly of a group of qualified governmental experts to study all aspects of the conventional arms race and disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces. The deliberations of the third substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the general approach, scope and structure of this study constitute a vantage point from which the expert group could set out. A study of conventional armaments would be an indispensable complement to the earlier study on nuclear weapons. It is our belief that, in relation to our future work at the second special session, both studies between them would enlighten us in no small way so that we may agree on how to proceed further in implementing the priorities laid down in the Final Document of the first special session.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

I now wish to say a few words about the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons, under the very able guidance of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has again made progress in the elaboration of the elements of a treaty banning, roughly speaking, the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction. The Netherlands made available for the benefit of this increasingly urgent enterprise the full range of its technical and legal expertise. The fruits of our efforts were contained in a broad working paper on verification of chemical weapons which was introduced at the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament this year.

Strictly speaking, the Committee on Disarmament's Working Group on chemical weapons is on the verge of exhausting its present mandate. The conditions in which the Working Group will continue on the road towards a treaty are, however, much less a function of its formal boundaries than a reflection of the willingness of the Soviet Union and the United States to extend their full co-operation to the Group. Therefore, it is essential that the two main possessors of chemical weapons will resume their bilateral talks, thus enabling the parallel format of bilateral and multilateral negotiations to unwind again, this being undoubtedly the most effective procedure towards the rapid conclusion of a multilateral and confidence-inspiring treaty on chemical weapons.

Alarming reports on the use of chemical substances in certain conflicts in the world have reached us from many sources over the past two years. Recently these reports extended their legal implications to the only existing genuine disarmament treaty, the Convention on biological weapons of 1975. Therefore both the viability of past arms control and disarmament agreements and the international confidence necessary for the concluding of future agreements are at stake. At this moment I wish to confine myself to the expression of our confidence in the scrutiny of all relevant reports by the group of United Nations experts established for this purpose.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

The Netherlands attaches considerable importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. This stems from my country's interest in regional disarmament measures in general, including the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The quest for peace and security in the area of the Indian Ocean must be a shared responsibility of the regional States and of the major outside Powers together. Their endeavours should be based on decision-making by consensus. The result should respect the legitimate security interests of each of them.

The Netherlands Government proposes that the original concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace be widened so as to include provisions relating to economic co-operation and assistance, based on international solidarity.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

This volet would be complementary to a declaration containing a set of rules of conduct between States of the region and those of the outside world. Such a framework for co-operation in the Indian Ocean is obviously predicated, above all, on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. It is therefore only appropriate for me to note that the prospects for agreement on a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean will stand to benefit directly from the withdrawal of Soviet troops from a hinterland of the Indian Ocean, in which they intervened, now nearly two years ago.

May I now finally turn to the subject of outer space, on which I shall have several remarks to make.

The Netherlands Government welcomes the fact that the question of arms control in outer space is coming to the fore. It is a highly technical and very complex question which in the last few years has grown in importance. The time is therefore more than ripe to consider seriously further measures to secure outer space from the arms race. Since the 1960s a number of international agreements have been concluded which restrict the military use of outer space: first and foremost, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This Treaty prohibits the placing in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and prohibits installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. Furthermore, this Treaty provides for complete demilitarization of the moon and other celestial bodies.

Albeit an important step in securing outer space from the arms race, the outer-space Treaty still leaves room for a great variety of military activities in outer space. Outer space is or could be involved in the arms race on earth in three ways: first, the use of military satellites which are increasingly playing a vital role in enhancing the targeting capabilities of weapon systems on earth through, amongst others, better communications and guidance of missiles, aircraft and ships; secondly, due to this growing dependence on satellites, these same satellites are becoming interesting military

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

targets, for their elimination will affect the adversary's military capabilities. This has resulted in increased research and development efforts and in some cases even in tests of so-called anti-satellite weapons capable of damaging or destroying satellites in orbit; thirdly, the increased research efforts in the field of directed-energy laser and particle-beam weapons have also made it conceivable to use these new weapons as a space-based anti-ballistic missile defence, apart from their possible use as an anti-satellite weapon.

None of these three methods of the militarization of outer space is prohibited by the letter of the 1967 outer space Treaty.

Other existing international instruments put important, though limited, restrictions on military activities in outer space. Without going into too much detail I could mention the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear explosions in, inter alia, outer space. The SALT-I Interim Agreement and the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty prohibit the two parties from interfering with national technical means of verification. This prohibition must be interpreted to include reconnaissance satellites. It does not protect other military satellites. The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems (defined as missiles, launchers and radars) which are space-based. It must be noted that possible high-energy laser and particle-beam weapons for ballistic missile defence are apparently not covered by the definition of ABM systems in that Treaty.

For the moment, the vulnerability of militarily significant satellites to action by anti-satellite weapons systems poses a most serious threat to the maintenance of military stability in the world. For the immediate future it is essential that this stability be preserved by calling a halt to the further research, development, testing and placing in space of anti-satellite weapons systems. In this connexion it should be recalled that the Soviet Union has already been testing for many years an anti-satellite weapons system designed to attack other satellites in low earth orbit.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Against this rather negative picture of the present and possible future military uses of outer space and the emerging extension of the arms race to outer space, one should not forget or underestimate the positive importance of some types of military satellites for the maintenance of international peace and security and military stability in particular. Reconnaissance satellites are, for example, used for verifying the implementation of certain arms control agreements and for monitoring conflict areas in the world. As such, they contribute to greater openness and could have an important confidence-building character.

It should also be recalled that in 1978 and 1979, on the initiative of the United States, negotiations were undertaken between the United States and the USSR on limitations of anti-satellite weapons. The holding of those negotiations constituted a clear indication of the mutual recognition of the importance of space systems to military stability. The Netherlands Government considers it therefore of the utmost importance that the United States and the USSR resume their negotiations as soon as possible. Although more and more nations are participating in the exploration and use of outer space and will acquire a direct interest in this subject, the United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility in taking the first step. Meanwhile all States, in particular both major space Powers, should refrain from any action contrary to the goal of securing outer space from the arms race.

It is the view of the Netherlands Government that the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, preferably in parallel with the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations, should also start, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, consideration of the question of negotiating agreements to secure outer space from the arms race. The Committee should, in the accomplishment of this objective, take into account all relevant existing proposals and future initiatives.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

In this connexion, I mention the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, introduced under a new agenda item, 128, and contained in document A/36/192. This draft can be welcomed inasmuch as it broaches some of the aspects I mentioned before. It falls short, however, in so far as it does not take adequately into account certain other equally important aspects I referred to.

The scope of the draft should be carefully studied. The text appears to us to allow for dangerous and inadmissible "a contrario" arguments that could undermine the provisions of the draft and indeed those of treaties already in force. The verification provisions will have to be scrutinized for their adequacy. Furthermore, the draft contains some baroque ornaments that have no place in a legal text.

For example, looking at article 3, many questions arise about the character of the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. Draft article 3 seems to leave open the possibility of disabling space objects of other States parties if such objects are not placed in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1 of the draft treaty. Furthermore, the prohibition applies only to the space objects of other States which are party to the treaty. These restrictions, together with the wording of article 1, paragraph 1, referring only to stationing, mean that the Soviet draft treaty does not prohibit the development, testing or production of "objects carrying weapons of any kind" and not even their use under certain circumstances.

Another important point in this connexion is that a clear definition of the term "weapon" is lacking.

With respect to the verification provisions of this draft treaty, one can wonder why the verification of the implementation of this treaty should be left exclusively to the so-called "national" technical means of verification. These means were recognized for the first time as a legitimate method by the United States and the Soviet Union in SALT agreements. However, what is adequate in a bilateral context is not necessarily adequate or acceptable in a multilateral context. And since we are talking about a multilateral draft treaty, it should in any case leave open the possibility of complementary

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

internationalization of the verification of this treaty. In this connexion, I should like to recall that a report has been prepared by a United Nations Group of Experts on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA), a report which is also very relevant to this subject matter.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Another observation with regard to the proposed verification régime in article 4 is that it does not provide for recourse of any kind to international bodies in case of doubts or complaints about the compliance or non-compliance with the treaty.

From the observations that I have just made it may be inferred that we recognize that the question of arms control in outer space is a very complex one and that it is growing in importance. In the view of the Netherlands Government its importance lies also in the fact that, as far as the prohibition of weapons in outer space is concerned, the prerequisites for an agreement seem to exist. No country as yet has a commanding lead in the relevant technology, which in any case is at present crude and hardly or not at all deployed; whereas the technical problems with new weapon systems, such as laser and particle-beam weapons, are such that speedy breakthroughs are not to be expected.

Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): In a previous statement two weeks ago, the Austrian delegation presented its views on issues related to nuclear disarmament and on the need for more objective and reliable information concerning the balance of military forces. I now wish to explain the Austrian delegation's position on some other matters to which we also attach great importance.

The long-overdue conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is a subject of particular concern to the Austrian Government. The especially cruel and insidious character of chemical warfare and its extremely dangerous implication for the ecological balance make a ban of these weapons a matter of the highest priority. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1971 biological weapons Convention are solid evidence of the feasibility and the great value of disarmament measures in this area. The diminishing usefulness of chemical weapons under the conditions of modern military conflict should make such agreements easier to obtain.

In recent years the Austrian Government followed with some impatience the extremely slow progress of the bilateral talks between the United States

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and the USSR on this issue and noted with disappointment the inability of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate multilateral negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons. In our view the year 1981 has brought mixed results so far. While we regret the interruption of the bilateral negotiating process, on the other hand we note positive developments in the Committee on Disarmament. Under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Lidgard the Ad Hoc Working Group has made considerable progress in defining issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a chemical-weapon convention. The draft elements included in the Working Group's report constitute, in our view, a suitable framework for such a convention and an extremely valuable basis for the actual negotiating process. We are conscious, of course, of the remaining important differences of views, in particular with regard to the convention's scope and its system of verification. But we believe that the progress achieved thus far and the businesslike and constructive atmosphere of the deliberations in the Working Group have demonstrated the validity of the multilateral approach. Austria therefore supports the proposal that, at the beginning of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group should be given a clear mandate to negotiate the text of the chemical-weapon convention.

In view of the difficulty of its verification, the conclusion of a chemical-weapon ban even more than other disarmament measures will depend on the existence of a minimum of trust among States. This was one of the main reasons why the Austrian delegation at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly supported a proposal for the carrying out of an impartial investigation of reports concerning the alleged use of chemical weapons in recent military conflicts. As long as there are doubts - justified or unjustified - about whether States fulfil their obligations under the Geneva Protocol there can be little hope that governments will accept the much further reaching commitments of a chemical weapons ban. We understand that the Expert Group which was entrusted with the investigation has not yet exhausted all options which could shed light on this matter. As the Austrian delegation attributes great importance to a clarification of this issue, it believes that the Expert Group should be given all the time it needs to fulfil its task.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The Austrian delegation is also concerned about reported measures by some States to upgrade and increase their chemical-warfare capabilities. As such actions could undermine the negotiating process, we appeal to all nations to refrain from any activities that would be incompatible with the present endeavours to reach an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I now turn to the subject of conventional weapons. Since the Second World War more than 25 million people have died in conventional warfare and approximately 80 per cent of the total military expenditures is spent on conventional forces. In the light of these facts it becomes evident that the United Nations has so far directed too little effort towards the promotion of conventional disarmament. We understand that the unprecedented threat to human survival posed by the nuclear arms race has absorbed the attention of the international community. But we believe that to ignore the non-nuclear issues of our work could severely impede the disarmament efforts. Since the arms race is a composite whole in which nuclear and conventional arms are closely interdependent factors, we can end it only if we address both categories of weapons simultaneously.

The Austrian delegation was therefore disappointed that the Disarmament Commission at its last session failed to agree on a mandate for a study of all aspects of conventional disarmament. Such a study could constitute an important step towards more substantive work on this subject in the United Nations context. We hope that the General Assembly, which at its last session approved the study in principle, will now reach the final decision on its beginning.

In view of the enormous differences in the levels of military forces in the various regions of the world, the regional approach is particularly suitable for conventional disarmament. The massive concentration of conventional armed forces in Central Europe has for many years been a matter of serious concern to Austria. It is in the interest of all countries in the region to achieve a reduction of these forces and establish a genuine balance at a lower level. We therefore regret that the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe have in eight years not produced any tangible results.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

This situation confirms our belief that the lack of objective and reliable information on the military capabilities of States greatly impedes the disarmament process. We hope, nevertheless, that the enormous efforts that went into those talks will not be lost and that at least a first-phase agreement providing for some reductions of United States and Soviet troops and associated measures can be achieved in the near future.

The Madrid follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has just reached a decisive stage. In difficult negotiations the participating States were able to achieve an informal understanding on large sections of a substantive and balanced final document. Among the remaining questions, however, are some of the key issues such as human rights, information, the mandate for a disarmament conference in Europe, and, above all, the follow-up to the Madrid meeting. It is the firm conviction of the Austrian Government that mutual understanding and willingness to compromise are needed on all sides to overcome these obstacles to a successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting. In co-operation with the other neutral and non-aligned States, Austria will do everything in its power to contribute to such an outcome. We believe that the continuation of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is essential to Europe and to the world. The invaluable benefits which the participating nations of East and West have derived from this process must be preserved and consolidated. We are also convinced that the conference on confidence and security-building measures envisaged in Madrid would open new perspectives for increasing confidence and on this basis for subsequent disarmament on our continent.

Allow me briefly to explain some of our views on the forthcoming second special session devoted to disarmament. The Austrian Government has always been convinced of the validity of the fundamental assumption underlying the multilateral disarmament process: the view that disarmament is a global concern and the collective responsibility of the international community and that all States have to co-operate in responding to this challenge. We believe that the second special session, which will take place during a critical phase of the disarmament process, can in four ways contribute to progress in disarmament.

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First, the special session offers a timely opportunity to examine the developments since the first special session, in particular the implementation of the Programme of Action of the Final Document. We are all aware that the record is far from satisfactory. Indeed, the years since 1978 have been marked by the near-total failure to transform into concrete disarmament measures the universal commitment to the cause of disarmament expressed in the Final Document. At the special session we will have to analyse the causes of the disappointing record of the disarmament process and of the continuing acceleration of the arms race. We shall have to take fully into account the deterioration of international security, the violations of the principles of the Charter, the rising tensions and the erosion of trust among States. We must also examine the structural limitations and deficiencies of the present approaches to disarmament.

On the basis of an in-depth investigation of the causes of the lack of success of past disarmament efforts the special session should then proceed - and this is my second point - to a constructive dialogue on ways to advance the disarmament process. The comprehensive programme of disarmament will be the focal-point of those efforts. The Austrian Government expects the comprehensive programme of disarmament to provide the framework and the guidelines for the future disarmament process. We support the idea of dividing the programme into stages according to the urgency and the attainability of the respective measures. We would welcome the inclusion of confidence-building and other associated measures. While we doubt the advisability of rigid time frames for the various stages, we believe that a system of regular review conferences to monitor and direct the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament could be most useful.

The Austrian delegation is aware that the present state of the preparations of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is far from satisfactory. Not only is the greatest part of the substantive part of the document still in brackets; there also remain considerable divergencies of view on the character and function of the programme. We hope that at the resumption of the drafting work in the Committee on Disarmament in January next the Member States will bear in mind the vital

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importance of an agreement on the comprehensive programme of disarmament for the success of the second session and tackle their difficult task in a spirit of compromise.

While the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be at the centre of its substantive work, the special session will also consider other proposals to promote disarmament. The link between disarmament and security will thereby have to be taken fully into account. Only balanced and verifiable measures can lead to lower levels of armaments and greater security.

Thirdly, the special session will have to review the disarmament machinery and the role of the United Nations in this field. While the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its functions as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters cannot be attributed to its institutional set-up, the introduction of working groups has nevertheless demonstrated that changes in its work methods can greatly improve the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament. The special session should therefore discuss further measures to increase the effectiveness of that body. The Austrian delegation attaches great importance to the arrangements for the participation of non-Member States in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. We also support the proposal that the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament provided for in paragraph 120 of the Final Document should be undertaken in the context of the second special session on disarmament.

As the past session of the Disarmament Commission has demonstrated, an agenda encompassing several controversial items can severely impede the usefulness of that body. As a deliberative organ, the Commission can function more effectively if it takes a comprehensive approach in its work. The special session ought to examine the scope of activities of that body with a view to maximizing its contribution to disarmament.

The special session will also discuss the future institutional requirements of the disarmament process. Since 1978 the growing interest of States in disarmament matters, the proliferation of meetings and the increasing disarmament agenda have multiplied the workload of the Centre for Disarmament. Without doubt that trend will continue throughout the 1980s. In view of the

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need for the adaptation of the respective part of the Secretariat to the greater requirements of the future, we believe that the special session should consider an upgrading of the Centre. In the long term we are interested in the proposal for the establishment of a World disarmament agency within the United Nations system. We feel that there is great potential for a future role of the United Nations in the areas of the implementation and verification of disarmament agreements.

A fourth major aspect of the work of the special session will be the dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament. The world disarmament campaign will be at the centre of the relevant considerations. The Austrian delegation believes that the support of world public opinion is an essential prerequisite for the success of efforts to halt the arms race and therefore favours measures to mobilize this support in all countries. We believe that the study of the Group of Experts on the organization/and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations provides a valuable conceptual framework as well as realistic guidelines for the direction and financing of the campaign.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The Austrian delegation views the second special session as an opportunity to inject new life into the disarmament process. It is an opportunity the international community cannot afford to miss. We are aware that the prevailing international situation is not propitious to a new impetus to disarmament. This became only too evident in the acrimonious exchanges between East and West during the last two weeks of this general debate.

Let me express the hope that by June 1982 the heightened awareness of the danger of the accelerating arms race and a stronger sense of responsibility of States in their international behaviour will break the vicious cycle of rising tensions, increased armaments and growing mistrust, opening the new phase of progress towards disarmament and a safer world.

Mr. AL-ALI (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the Iraqi delegation, may I extend to you, Sir, sincerest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. The fact that the representative of a friendly country, Yugoslavia, is presiding over our deliberations in this important Committee is indeed a source of satisfaction. I also wish to extend our congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur.

On various occasions the General Assembly has reiterated the inter-relationship between disarmament and international peace and security: progress in either field would reinforce and strengthen progress in the other. Therefore, disarmament is organically and directly related to the strengthening of international security and the achievement of stability and prosperity in the world.

The ultimate goals of disarmament are, in essence, the same as those sought by all countries that cherish international peace and security and favour the establishment of a world free of the spectre of war and threatened destruction. There can be no doubt that the achievement of those objectives would provide genuine security for all peoples. It would also avert the danger to peace and promote the allocation of economic, intellectual and social resources for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

It is clear that bacteriological (biological), toxin and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional weapons, of course, are matters of prime importance in the disarmament process. However, the threat posed by nuclear weapons raises the gravest concern and worry among all peoples. The fact that European capitals are today witnessing protest demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people bears witness to this fact. Those weapons, in fact, pose a most serious danger to the human race and to the very existence of human civilization. Thus the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed the importance of nuclear disarmament. As it stated:

"It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." (S-10/2, para. 47)

Therefore, our delegation believes that priority in disarmament should be given to nuclear weapons, as those weapons threaten the very survival and continuation of humanity, particularly the survival of the peoples of the third world. This danger is intensified by the quantitative and qualitative development of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon-States and by the development of new types of such destructive weapons.

Among such developments, we cite as an example the production of the neutron bomb, multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), as well as the production of cruise and ground missiles. The most dangerous development consists in the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the racist régimes of the Zionist entity and South Africa have resorted to developing their nuclear capacity and now possess nuclear arsenals in addition to their delivery systems.

As a result of these grave developments, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions condemning the nuclear armament of those régimes. In this connexion, we would recall General Assembly resolution 33/71 A, "Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel" and resolutions 34/89 and 35/157, both entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

In resolution 34/89 the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General:

"with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament...".

That study has been published this year in document A/36/431 under the heading "Israeli nuclear armament".

On this occasion my delegation wishes to express its sincerest thanks and appreciation for the valuable efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the members of the group of experts, as well as the Centre for Disarmament, all of whom have contributed to the preparation of that report.

My delegation had discussed at length Israeli nuclear armament throughout the last three sessions. We have methodically submitted to the members of the Committee our valid arguments which confirm that the Zionist entity possesses the capability of producing destructive nuclear weapons. This has been reconfirmed by the Secretary-General in his report on "Israeli nuclear armament" (A/36/431), which attests to the credibility of our argument which we have mentioned in our previous statements.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

Therefore our delegation is going to confine itself this year to referring to a number of clear proofs which have been mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General in a brief, but quite intensive manner.

Paragraph 72 of that report confirms that Israel has since its establishment

"... been actively engaged in various aspects of nuclear research.

It has reportedly developed its own sources of uranium and has acquired expertise of various processes that make up the nuclear fuel cycle ...

Israel has maintained close co-operation in the nuclear field with several countries ... which have supplied nuclear equipment, materials and technology." (A/36/431)

Paragraph 73 confirms that:

"All the known nuclear facilities in the territories of the Middle East States are subject to international safeguards. The exceptions are ... the Israeli research reactor at Dimona". (*ibid.*)

Paragraph 74 of the report confirms that Israel maintained complete secrecy concerning the Dimona reactor. Paragraph 77 confirms that nuclear delivery systems would not constitute a problem for Israel. Paragraph 78 concluded that

"... there is no doubt that Israel has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons"

and that its nuclear programme was not under safeguards and its reactor was

"capable of producing ... plutonium and has some means of separating plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel. It has the technological skills and expertise as well as the technical infrastructure required to manufacture nuclear weapons".

It adds:

"Israel could have produced sufficient ... plutonium for a significant number of explosive devices." (*ibid.*)

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

Paragraph 82 states:

"There are...significant indications that Israel reached the threshold of becoming a nuclear-weapon State at least a decade ago."

The Group of Experts confirmed in the same paragraph that they had no doubt that Israel,

"...if it has not already crossed that threshold, has the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons within a very short time."

Paragraph 83 of the Report mentions that

...the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel would be a seriously destabilizing factor in the already tense situation prevailing in the Middle East, in addition to being a serious danger to the cause of non-proliferation in general."

That paragraph requested Israel to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and to submit all its nuclear activities to international safeguards, to adherence to a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Paragraph 65 confirms that the factors which led Israel to possess nuclear weapons included viewing them as a 'presumed defence against the possibility of future Arab military superiority in conventional terms' and added:

"Israel may feel it cannot indefinitely take for granted adequate external supplies of conventional weapons and that it may need to have its own weapon of last resort".

The report continues in paragraph 65 (d):

"... Israel is pursuing an aggressive policy (with regard to its Arab neighbours) and that its land policy, in the occupied territories, including the policy of establishing Jewish settlements, is one of 'creeping annexation'. The acquisition of a significant level of nuclear armament may be regarded as a necessary part of the attitude of territorial expansion".

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

The report of the Secretary-General has confirmed that the Zionist entity has enough political reasons to lead Israel to resort to producing nuclear weapons in order to annex further Arab territories and establish Zionist settlements. The report also confirmed that the Zionist entity was capable from the technical and material point of view of producing nuclear weapons. As for the claims maintaining that the Zionist entity has not carried out nuclear tests, the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons prepared by the United Nations within the framework of resolution 33/91 D confirmed that carrying out nuclear tests was not a precondition for the possession by certain countries of such weapons. In that document, in paragraph 383, it is stated:

"It used to be that the holding of a nuclear-weapon test was the demonstration of a State becoming a nuclear-weapon Power. There is today, however, the emerging phenomenon of the "undeclared" nuclear-weapon State ... In this field there are persistent rumours that Israel and South Africa have acquired ... a nuclear weapon." (A/35/392)

This was confirmed by the Report of the Secretary-General on Israeli Nuclear Armament. Paragraph 56 of that Report says:

"... it is the view of these experts that in the 35 years that have since passed, the field of nuclear explosives design has undoubtedly developed ways, including the use of computer simulations, to be assured that a given type of bomb would work without an actual prior test-detonation."

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

The Zionist entity did not stop at possessing nuclear arms. In fact, it has established a nuclear alliance with Taiwan and South Africa. According to a report by the American journalist, Jack Anderson, writing in the Washington Post of 8 December 1980, those three régimes are now working to strengthen their nuclear capability. They have started a joint programme for the production of cruise missiles with a 150-mile range. Thus the Zionist entity is now in a position to threaten all the Arab capitals. The Middle East is therefore, from a practical point of view, subject to the potential use of nuclear weapons owing to the Zionist entity's possession of such weapons and the possibility that it might employ them against the Arab countries in any future war.

We wish to remind the international community of the grave consequences the use of such weapons can entail. In addition to the fact that the Arab States will be subjected to the disastrous aftermath of such a use, from the practical and human points of view the entire world will also be subjected to grave material danger. The radiation fall-out produced by nuclear weapons will obviously affect neighbouring countries. It will also, in the long run, affect the lives of millions of the present and future generations throughout the entire world. According to The Effects of Nuclear Weapons by Klaston, the total number of victims of the Hiroshima bomb had, by 1950, reached 200,000. That means that if the Zionist entity resorts to nuclear weapons against the Arab peoples, the total number of victims will be in excess of tens of millions of civilians and that the major proportion of buildings and factories in cities will be completely destroyed. In addition to the disastrous economic consequences of such destruction and the destabilization of the social structure through lethal diseases caused by the use of such weapons, nuclear radiation will spread throughout the entire region, and those who survive such a catastrophe will develop cancer. Congenital disabilities will also be created in future generations.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

According to the United Nations comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, all economic and industrial facilities will be affected by lethal radiation. This means that oil facilities and exports will be so affected, and it will therefore not be possible to export oil to other countries. That will have a serious adverse effect on international economic activity. For all the foregoing reasons, my delegation therefore calls upon the international community to assume its responsibility with regard to the Zionist entity's possession of nuclear arms and the ensuing human, material and economic effects of the development of such weapons, which constitute a danger not only to the countries in the Middle East, but to the entire world. In this respect, the international community is being asked not merely to condemn the Zionist entity. It is being requested to adopt the necessary effective measures to prevent the Zionist entity from perpetrating this crime against the Arab peoples by calling for complete Israeli nuclear disarmament and the placing of all its nuclear facilities under international control, including the production of fissionable material either locally produced or acquired by means of theft.

This Committee, which has taken upon itself the responsibility for bringing about nuclear disarmament, is being requested, above all, to condemn the Zionist entity by voting in favour of the relevant draft resolution. The international community is also requested to boycott the Zionist entity and to stop providing it with any form of nuclear facility.

The goal being promoted by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is to prevent the proliferation of such destructive weapons throughout the world. Such zones can also contribute to the establishment of international peace and security and to reducing the danger of the use of nuclear weapons.

At its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3261 F (XXIX), which requested that a study be carried out by an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. That ad hoc group of experts completed its study in 1975. The first

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the ultimate goal of which was to create a world completely free of nuclear weapons.

In recent years, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions with regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East. With regard to the Middle East, the General Assembly took a further step with the adoption of resolution 33/64, which invited the countries concerned, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and during the process of its establishment, to declare their support for establishing such a zone in the region and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council. Resolution 34/77 of 11 December 1979, which was adopted by a majority of 136 votes in favour, none against and one abstention by the Zionist entity, reiterated that appeal. Last year, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/147 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. That resolution was adopted by consensus, and the Zionist entity was therefore forced to agree with its contents. Its own draft resolution, which failed to win assent, asked for the establishment of the area as a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the lines set forth in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was clear that the draft resolution submitted by the Zionist entity was self contradictory, for the first article of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides the following:

"The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

"(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way"
(Treaty of Tlatelolco, article 1).

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

The Zionist entity has actually produced nuclear weapons and has used its nuclear facilities for non-peaceful purposes. Israel has refused to place its nuclear facilities, particularly the Dimona reactor, under international control, including that of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has thus violated the first operative article of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

We should state again here that making a comparison between the Middle East and Latin America is indeed not valid. There is a unique situation in the Middle East. The countries of the area, with the exception of the Zionist entity, have undertaken to respect international commitments and have signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite the fact that they do not possess nuclear weapons. The Zionist entity has not signed that Treaty and has refused to place its nuclear facilities under international control. The Zionist entity has carried out flagrant acts of aggression in violation of international law by attacking the Iraqi nuclear facility. That has been confirmed by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in document PR 81/9 dated 9 June 1981, in which he stated:

"From a point of principle, one can only conclude that it is the Agency's safeguards régime which has also been attacked."

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted a decision on 12 June 1981 to the effect that the military act perpetrated by Israel evidently demonstrated its clear disregard of the safeguards régime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Lusaka in 1970 agreed to work for the adoption of a declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free from great Power rivalries. It stated that it was necessary to dismantle all military bases and eliminate great-Power military presence in the area.

The General Assembly in 1971 adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI), in which the Indian Ocean was designated as a zone of peace. That resolution called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases and military installations and nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

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the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with a view to implementing the Declaration.

Since that time, the General Assembly has adopted various resolutions, in one of which the Committee on the Indian Ocean was established in order to implement that Declaration through the holding of a conference on the Indian Ocean. That conference was supposed to have taken place this year in accordance with the provisions of resolution 35/150. It is indeed to be regretted that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was not able to agree on holding that conference this year in view of the objections of certain countries concerning the prevailing political atmosphere in the area.

Despite the fact that the Indian Ocean has been designated as a zone of peace, the military presence of major Powers has intensified and there has been an increase of the military and naval installations of those countries in the area. The major Powers have been able to obtain new military facilities in the area and in its natural extensions. That situation poses a grave danger to international peace and to security and stability in that most important and vital area of the world. Therefore, we call upon all the major Powers to dismantle their military bases in the area, particularly the Diego Garcia base, and to cease threatening the use of force against the coastal and hinterland States, which they have been doing so as to prevent those countries from freely exploiting their natural resources. In that connexion, we should like to refer to the continued threats by successive United States administrations to use the so-called rapid deployment forces against the coastal and hinterland States, and particularly against the oil-producing countries. Such activity is contrary to the principles of international law and the aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter. The attempts by certain countries to impede efforts to convene the conference on the Indian Ocean are designed to consolidate their military presence in the area within the framework of the rivalry between the major Powers. Therefore, our delegation fully supports all measures that seek to renew the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and that call for the holding of the Conference on the Indian Ocean as early as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.