

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION
*Official Records**



FIRST COMMITTEE
19th meeting
held on
Friday, 30 October 1981
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 19TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. CARIAS (Honduras)
(Vice-Chairman)

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81-64110

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/36/PV.19
2 November 1981

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): This has been a particularly disheartening year for the cause which we members of the First Committee share so deeply. Warlike acts, terrorism, armed conflict and further acceleration of the nuclear-arms race among many other Powers have been the rule, not the exception. Weapons systems once set aside as destabilizing, as alarming - adding to tension and fear - and as leading to new ascents in the nuclear-arms race have been reintroduced and have led to inevitable responses in kind.

At the same time, the negotiating process among the major Powers has been stalled for a year. In spite of the General Assembly's earnest appeal, the Committee on Disarmament was unable to establish working groups on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban or on nuclear weapons. Work on a treaty controlling and destroying the deadly nerve gases remains incomplete. The efforts to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace have proved unsuccessful, and a prime opportunity for the demilitarization of a major part of the world is thus being wasted.

The odd and disturbing notion continues uncontradicted that supplying many sides and parties in the Middle East with vast new arsenals is conducive to peace; and, as is well known, economically poor nations are spending increasingly large portions of their national income in conventional arms races on increasingly expensive and sophisticated weapons. States remain in control of territory not their own in Kampuchea, Afghanistan and in the Middle East, among other areas, despite the best efforts of the United Nations.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Lord Bertrand Russell once wrote: "Man refrains from no folly of which he is capable." Today the world seems bent on proving him right - even to its own destruction.

It appears increasingly clear that our approach to the question of disarmament is based on a series of erroneous assumptions: some are quite obvious, some by no means self-evident. It may be helpful to our work to examine some of those assumptions upon which Member States currently base their approach to disarmament and security.

The first assumption is that increased armament means increased security. This assumption has long and historic roots. The advent of weapons of mass destruction, however, has rendered it false. Among Powers which have nuclear weapons only a relatively small number is necessary to provide a deterrent against attack, since a small number of those weapons can wreak unacceptable devastation. Among Powers which have not yet acquired nuclear weapons their acquisition may seem desirable for security; yet the surest result is that they themselves will then qualify as targets for the nuclear weapons of others.

There is also the economic factor. Any country or countries which pursue the arms race to ever higher levels will find that it is economically devastating to internal stability and well-being and, therefore, serves to increase insecurity.

Increased levels of conventional arms can be dangerously destabilizing and can raise levels of fear and threat in the minds of neighbours and possible adversaries - achieving, again, the opposite of the purposes intended.

The second assumption is that delaying negotiations in order to build up more military strength will result in a better outcome. The past 36 years of the nuclear arms race suggest otherwise. The desire to negotiate from "parity" or from "superiority", or to hold additional "bargaining chips" in order to drive a harder bargain has led to the continuous escalation of the arms race. From the time a nuclear Power acquired 200 or so nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, regardless of what the other party did or would do,

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

functional parity was achieved and the essential destruction of a society was assured. Delaying negotiations has always led to new and more dangerous levels of arms, to increased distrust and with it increased difficulty in negotiations.

The third assumption is that disarmament, if achieved, will in itself provide security. That is wrong. States may agree to general and complete disarmament and carry that out, without achieving lasting security. Even under a system of substantial inspection for compliance, there is no guarantee that compliance will continue. If a State feels that it has been treated unfairly, if a State has unworthy ambitions with respect to the territory or resources of another, and if a State feels that other States are arming secretly or might discover a new secret weapon that is considered theoretically possible, that State will begin to rearm for its own security, as security is understood at present. Disarmament may provide relatively more security, at least temporarily, but that security cannot be depended upon to last.

The fourth assumption is that States will disarm without a workable and proved system for the maintenance of international peace and security on which they can rely. In such a circumstance, States would be asked to surrender the means on which they have historically depended for security - national arms and armies - without the existence of a modality of adequate strength or authority to provide an acceptable alternative source of security. Our experience demonstrates exactly the contrary. States will not even reduce their arms, let alone seriously consider disarmament, in the present circumstances in which no viable alternative security systems exist.

In my view, those false assumptions underlie the continued and still accelerating pace of the arms race throughout the world. If they remain unexamined, it is likely that we shall continue to be disappointed by the meagre results of all the efforts that we may mount. Our emphasis during the session undoubtedly and properly will be on the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Yet, we must be realistic about our expectations concerning the special session.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

We can, and we should, press for the completion and the adoption of a comprehensive programme for disarmament. Yet the prospects for its being either comprehensive or a programme for disarmament are not very bright. Chances are that it will remain a catalogue of steps for slowing down the arms race and of partial measures which would help to produce an atmosphere more conducive to disarmament. But, in that case, the programme will be mislabelled and inherently disappointing to an anxious world expecting much more substantial progress.

Regarding the document, or documents, to emerge from the special session, I should like first of all to caution against efforts to "update" or otherwise revise the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. In the circumstances prevailing today, I have serious doubts that we can do as well. In my delegation's view, we should, rather, give our attention to the performance or non-performance in achieving the goals delineated by the first session and should most particularly examine the false assumptions I have already listed as well as other causal aspects of the arms race. Unless we are willing to do so, I expect even less enlightenment in the international community than currently exists on these issues of life and death import to the world.

I should like to suggest an example. For the past two years, under the programme of studies of the Secretary-General, there has existed a Group of Experts considering the interrelationship between disarmament and international security. While not wishing to prejudice or prejudge the results of that study, which, it is intended, will be completed during the current session of the Assembly, I think I can state that it will show more of what we do not yet know than of what we do know about this difficult and new subject. We do not yet understand how to provide for security in the world in the absence of national arms and armies. The system provided for in the United Nations Charter depends upon the armed might of the major Powers acting in concurrence and upon national armed elements contributed by other countries. This system as we know has been dysfunctional since its conception.

The system for United Nations peace-keeping which has evolved outside the strict descriptions of the Charter, however hopeful, is at this stage wholly inadequate to the taking over of security responsibilities for a disarmed or disarming world.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Let us candidly admit the bankruptcy of our situation. Our efforts in disarmament are in a state of essential paralysis because we have not understood, or undertaken to provide for, the basic security requirements for disarmament. By the latter phrase I do not mean the requirements of inspection for compliance with disarmament agreements, important as they certainly are. By that phrase I refer, rather, to much more substantial needs, especially the need to conceptualize and to implement a global arrangement for security under conditions in which States will feel that it is both safe and feasible seriously to consider disarmament. It is my contention that no State is today in a position so to do.

Is not this dilemma, then, a proper and central issue for the second special session? It could, of course, be otherwise reserved for a special session on security. I wish to mention here the statement of the recent meeting of the Pugwash Council in Banff, Canada. That prestigious international group recorded strong support for a special session devoted entirely to security. I support that recommendation, for I believe that it is at this point that the major logjam in the way of achieving disarmament exists and that it is largely unrecognized.

States have yet to accept the first premise of the nuclear age: security can no longer be provided on a unilateral basis. The corollary is that security can be provided only through a system developed by common consent and implemented in the common interest. This is a truly revolutionary precept in a world of semi-sovereign States. Yet logic and experience brings us to one and the same conclusion. When I say "semi-sovereign", I mean that absolute autonomy and self-interest are wholly at odds with the capacity of the international community to develop the modalities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The principles I have defined are carefully enshrined in our Charter, but they remain unimplemented in ways which are sufficiently effective to provide for human survival.

During the second special session it would seem imperative to support steps moving us in the direction of developing a capacity for maintaining security - in the first instance, for the carrying out of arms reduction and stages of disarmament and, in the second, for the provision of positive elements of security to replace those being diminished and/or relinquished by States. With regard to both, the proposal of France for a United Nations satellite monitoring agency seems to us to have great merit. Further, it seems to be more

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

feasible than some had expected. Such a programme would provide substantial experience in an area for which the United Nations would later in any case be required to assume increased responsibility. Yet the programme is innocuous in terms of the legitimate internal affairs of States not requiring in itself ground personnel for the performance of its tasks. The existence of such an agency could also provide the basis for rationalization of the range of provisions for compliance existing in the numerous separate treaties now in force. Furthermore, it would provide the basis for an international disarmament organization long foreseen by the major Powers in particular and by the international community in general as essential to the implementation of a substantial arms reduction and disarmament programme.

I turn now to the existing situation in the world. This past year has tended strongly to support a thesis I have discussed frequently in the Committee, namely, that new and major steps taken by the major Powers to bolster their illusory security by increasing the level of arms or introducing new weapons systems are perceived by others as directly hostile acts requiring specific countermeasures. These countermeasures then have, of course, an equal and opposite effect on the first party, and the arms race is thereby accelerated. We cannot but marvel that arms expenditures can rise to the rate of \$650 billion per year without the implied disaster having yet occurred, but we hold no hope for an endless continuation of this perilous and self-defeating game.

I have therefore put great weight on confidence-building measures as contributing to the creation of a context within which meaningful negotiations and significant arms reductions can be achieved. I regret being proved correct by events this dire and foreboding in nature. However I should deeply appreciate being again proved correct were we to witness - say in the interval between the present session and the second special session on disarmament - a series of steps or events undertaken by the major contestants in the nuclear arms race the effect of which would clearly be to de-escalate and cool off the present fever pitch of preparations and to allay fear. I have year after year listed a series of such steps. In the present atmosphere, any armament step may be more seriously misjudged than would otherwise be the case and lead to counteractions of incalculable consequences.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

The more the major Powers attempt to manoeuvre against one another in the present context, the more completely they are enmeshed in the dangerous net of their own mutual creation and the more tightly the shrouds of catastrophe are pulled by them around the entire world. We have found by experience that they are versed in the means to act on behalf of their self-interest. Now, self-interest demands a radically different response to the dilemmas, particularly the nuclear dilemma, which characterize the closing years of this century. It remains to be seen whether these are also the closing years of the human race. Again, may I say: it remains to be seen whether these are also the closing years of the human race.

From other sciences we learn that adaptation has been a law of evolutionary survival. In this age, as in any other, adaptation remains the law and the requirement. Adaptation for survival in international affairs today implies a concern for the survival of humanity as a whole, and not only for any particular division or race. Interdependence is our inescapable condition. We can regard interdependence as an historic human achievement and a promise of a greater future, or we can continue to act in disregard of this new and fundamental reality which has overtaken us simultaneously with the nuclear age.

Should we be wise enough to recognize interdependence as our own new condition, then security, disarmament and survival present us with new demands. They are, first of all, seen as indivisible. Secondly, they are seen as unachievable outside of a concerted and commonly agreed effort or programme in which no State sees itself outside the commonly agreed conditions. However, our efforts to describe those conditions remain inadequate. The willingness of States to accept those conditions, once described remains extremely doubtful.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

Of course, we must prepare in the best way possible for a second special session on disarmament. We should also consider preparing urgently for a special session on security. But we need first and urgently to accept the lessons of the interdependent nuclear age. Many States have as yet failed to do so, most particularly those which dispose of the most power to affect the future. A new revolution is required; a revolution in perspective that puts the well-being of the world community at the centre of our vision. In the nuclear age, and particularly where disarmament and security are concerned, the well-being of the global community is synonymous with our own. May I repeat that: a revolution in perspective that puts the well-being of the world community at the centre of our vision. In the nuclear age, and particularly where disarmament and security are concerned, the well-being of the global community is synonymous with our own.

Miss WORKU (Ethiopia): May I first of all express to the Chairman the very sincere felicitations of the Ethiopian delegation on his well-deserved election as Chairman of this Committee. It is a great pleasure to see him, the representative of friendly and non-aligned Yugoslavia, in the Chair. My congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee. I am confident that their able guidance will enable the First Committee to reach a successful conclusion in this, one of its most difficult sessions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia in his general statement in the plenary meeting of the current session of the General Assembly has given a candid expression of Ethiopia's concern and anxiety over the disturbing state of affairs prevailing in the world today. In particular, he expressed in no uncertain terms our concern over the new spiral in the arms race and the emergence of new military doctrines which seem to be suggesting the "winnability" and hence the possibility of nuclear war. He further emphasized the pressing need for disarmament particularly in its nuclear aspect, as a means of reversing the present global instability and of creating a world order based on the rule of law as envisaged in the Charter of our Organization.

(Miss Worku, Ethiopia)

With the Committee's indulgence, I should now like briefly to reiterate Ethiopia's views on some of the items before this Committee.

Recent years have dramatically demonstrated that the nuclear arms race has by far outstripped all efforts aimed at curbing it. Not only has vertical nuclear proliferation multiplied through the further development, production, stockpiling and deployment of a whole spectrum of nuclear weapons, including the high technology enhanced-radiation bomb, but the threat of the horizontal proliferation of these weapons to additional States has become an increasingly growing reality. All the available evidence unmistakably shows that nuclear armaments have led to an unprecedented catastrophe for human life and that they have, in fact, made thinking along the lines of universal death possible. The accumulation of ever more overkill capacity has long surpassed the bounds of absurdity and seems to be stretching even beyond the realms of what is conventionally known as madness. The compelling and, indeed, pressing task facing the world today is to heed the voice of morality and wisdom and call for disengagement from the nuclear arms race. Clearly, the responsibility for this lies with the nuclear-weapon States, and especially those which have the largest nuclear arsenals.

A few years ago we were led to believe that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was within reach. We were encouraged since this is an issue which was accorded the highest priority at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban would be an initial step towards halting the nuclear arms race, thereby paving the way for the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons until the universally accepted goal of general and complete disarmament is attained.

(Miss Worku, Ethiopia)

There is no doubt that a comprehensive nuclear test ban not only will be effective in preventing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons but will also provide new vitality for the now seriously challenged régime of the non-proliferation Treaty. Unfortunately, however, the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating party we have on the subject, has been unable even to start negotiations on this important question of a nuclear test ban. Still worse, the tripartite negotiations on the subject have been suspended. I cannot fail to emphasize the widespread disappointment over the suspension of these tripartite talks as well as over the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented from commencing multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

A subject closely related to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and to the vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. The General Assembly, as early as 1965, endorsed the declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the denuclearization of Africa. Since then the item has been regularly appearing on the agenda of this Committee, and numerous resolutions have been adopted. Yet, with the encouragement and collaboration it has received and continues to receive from its Western partners, and with every intention of frustrating the legitimate aspirations and the firm resolve of the African peoples, the racist régime of South Africa is today fully equipped to produce a wide range of both conventional and nuclear weapons. These ominous developments in southern Africa, and particularly the nuclear-weapon capability in the hands of the apartheid régime, represent a grave danger not only for Africa but also for international peace and security as a whole and even for the survival of mankind.

The denuclearization of Africa is also a matter closely linked to the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. This too is a subject to which Socialist Ethiopia attaches great importance. The struggle to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is a struggle of the littoral and hinterland States to preserve their independence, sovereignty and

(Miss Worku, Ethiopia)

territorial integrity and to solve their political, economic and social problems in conditions of peace and tranquillity. These are the imperatives on the basis of which the States of the region are calling for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace free from the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect. Ethiopia has been consistently calling for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It is a matter of regret that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has failed to convene the conference on the Indian Ocean during the current year as called for in General Assembly resolutions 34/80 B and 35/150. It is our earnest hope that reason and prudence will prevail on those permanent members of the Security Council that have so far been impeding progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The Ethiopian delegation wishes to note its satisfaction with the progress on multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons during the recent sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. The elements of the draft treaty which have been formulated painstakingly by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons provide the groundwork on which further negotiations can be continued for the concluding of a treaty on chemical weapons. It is to be hoped that the momentum so far generated on this important subject will not suffer setbacks.

Finally, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, for her succinct introduction, at an earlier meeting of this Committee, of the very important study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The study has brought into sharp focus the historical fact that, in the words of Mrs. Thorsson:

"Governments have, over the past 30 years, spent vast resources on armaments, resources which - on grounds of morality, on grounds of equal human justice, on grounds of enlightened self-interest - ought to have been directed to ending world poverty and building for human and material development." (A/C.1/36/PV.5, p. 23)

(Miss Worku, Ethiopia)

I do not have better words for concluding my brief remarks than the words used by Mrs. Thorsson herself:

'the world can either continue to pursue the arms race /with characteristic vigour/ or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more sustainable international economic and /social/ order. I cannot do both." (A/C.1/36/PV.12, p. 40)

Mr. KOHIVFS (Hungary): In my statement today I should like to deal briefly with two questions: chemical weapons, and new weapons and systems of mass destruction.

My country continues to attach great importance to the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The importance and timeliness of this task have become more evident with the dangers of new developments in this sphere. I have in mind first of all the question of binary weapons.

As the report of the Committee on Disarmament shows, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee has made considerable progress this year in elaborating important elements to be included in a future convention. This represents a good basis for the continuation of the activities of the Working Group in 1982.

Despite the considerable progress, many important issues remain to be solved. In this connexion I should like to mention only the questions of the scope of prohibition and verification.

To achieve further progress in the negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament should come to an early understanding on the scope of prohibition, that is, state in clear terms the two main objectives of the future convention: the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, on the one hand, and the obligation of destroying the existing stockpiles and means of production, on the other. The insistence of some delegations on the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons has been one of the main stumbling blocks to achieving more substantial progress. In this connexion my delegation, like many others, is of the considered opinion that the prohibition of use is already fully covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The question of verification is closely connected with the scope of prohibition. Progress on the question of scope would definitely facilitate finding a common approach and thus elaborating an adequate, realistic and workable system of verification of a future convention on chemical weapons. My delegation continues to hold the view that the verification system of a future treaty should be based on an appropriate combination of national and international means applicable to all parties.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation expects that the present session of the General Assembly will adopt a resolution on this issue such as will be conducive to the further work of the Committee on Disarmament in this important disarmament question, and it is ready to co-operate to that end. One more matter: for the efforts to succeed in the field of chemical weapons we consider it very important that the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on this issue should be resumed as early as possible.

My delegation continues to attach great importance to the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, in order to create a reliable barrier to the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of such weapons. The importance and urgency of this question was clearly reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Based on this consideration, and since the Committee on Disarmament has not devoted appropriate attention to this question, the Hungarian delegation in the Committee on Disarmament this year initiated the holding of informal meetings on this important and timely issue. The discussion, held with the participation of experts, has shown that many delegations are seriously concerned about the possibility of the emergence in the future of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and are ready to agree on measures to prevent it.

The Hungarian delegation prefers a comprehensive solution leading to the prohibition of the development of such weapons. An ad hoc group of governmental experts to be established in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament would be the appropriate body to deal with the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement and to consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual weapons of mass destruction. My delegation wholeheartedly supports the proposal made by the Soviet delegation, according to which the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States should, as a first step towards the conclusion of an agreement, make identical or similar statements renouncing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The decision of the United States on the development and production of the neutron bomb, which is a challenge to the cause of peace and disarmament, gives new urgency and importance to the prohibition of the development of new weapons and systems of mass destruction. Hungary, like other socialist States, holds the view

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

that an international convention should be elaborated and adopted on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. The socialist States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had put before it as early as 1978 a draft convention and, during this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, called for the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group for this purpose. The opposition of Western Powers prevented the Committee on Disarmament from establishing such a working group.

My delegation hopes that the Committee will take appropriate action for furthering the solution of this important question, and is ready to co-operate towards that end.

The year 1981 was the third consecutive year when the Committee on Disarmament dealt with the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group, of which I had the honour to be the Chairman for the second consecutive year, worked hard, but could not reach a breakthrough in the elaboration of such a treaty. Serious differences continue to exist on such vital questions as the scope of prohibition, to mention but one.

The Hungarian delegation considers that further and increased efforts should be made to accelerate the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject so that a treaty might be presented to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation is ready to work and to co-operate with other delegations towards that end, in preparing and submitting an appropriate draft resolution which, we hope, will be adopted by consensus as was the case last year.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Today I wish to make a statement on nuclear questions, and especially on those questions that, for one reason or another, are of special interest to my Government at this moment in time. At a later stage, early next week, I hope to have the opportunity of speaking on a cluster of disarmament questions other than the nuclear ones.

With those two statements I shall once again have placed on record, at this thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the views of the Netherlands Government concerning the main issues in the field of disarmament and arms control, in so far as they are of concern to this Committee.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

However, I shall not discuss today one important issue - or should I say non-issue - that has been placed before this Committee by the Soviet Union as a separate agenda item, that is, the question of the non-first use of nuclear weapons, submitted under the title of "Prevention of nuclear catastrophe".

The reason why I do not intend to speak on that subject today is that I prefer to deal with it in an appropriate way separately, when we come to the second phase of our work, the debate on the resolutions. I have, however, asked the Secretariat for an early opportunity to do so, perhaps on 5 November.

This session of the General Assembly is not taking place in the best of circumstances, in any case as far as disarmament is concerned. The international political climate cannot be described as conducive to arms control measures, let alone disarmament. In his address to the Assembly meeting in plenary on 24 September this year, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Max van der Stoep, posed the question of where our world is heading, what with the global problems of the nuclear arms race, the worsening of the environment, growing mass poverty and the lack of progress in the reconstruction of the world economy, the alarming levels of unemployment everywhere, the continued violation of human rights and the disrespect for the rule of law in international relations.

I should like to quote what Mr. van der Stoep had to say on the single most dangerous threat to the survival of mankind, the threat of nuclear annihilation:

"...the quest for nuclear arms control should be vigorously pursued, regardless of the international climate. In a period of mounting tension, the rationale for arms control and disarmament should be even more apparent to all. By their very nature the nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, have a special responsibility. Within and outside the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Netherlands Government aims at arms control and in particular the reduction of the role of nuclear arms. It attaches the utmost importance to the forthcoming negotiations between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to a mutual and substantial reduction of the level of armaments, in particular through the reduction and, if possible, elimination of certain types of long-range theatre nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

"The Netherlands Government considers these negotiations, which will be pursued within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), to be vitally important. This pertains also to the rest of the SALT process. Failure to achieve results in that process would lead to an unrestrained nuclear arms race. Such unrestrained vertical proliferation could increase the danger of a widening proliferation in a horizontal sense."

(A/36/PV.12, p. 112)

He concluded that portion of his statement by saying:

"A viable non-proliferation régime is essential for the security and survival of us all. The threat of a steadily growing number of potential nuclear Powers calls for the speedy achievement of a consensus in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." (Ibid., p. 113)

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

That was the statement made by my Minister of Foreign Affairs in plenary meeting some weeks ago.

From this quotation it is once again evident that the Netherlands Government accepts that there is a close relationship between nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the maintenance of a non-discriminatory and credible non-proliferation régime by the non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other. The mainstay of that régime remains for us the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For that reason my Government welcomed earlier this year the ratification of the NPT by the Government of Egypt, under the leadership of its great President Sadat.

While today more than two thirds of all nations are party to the NPT, the Israeli attack on the safeguarded Tammuz facility in Iraq last June constituted a serious threat to the entire safeguards régime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is the foundation of the NPT.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be set in an atmosphere of confidence, which can only be achieved by effective safeguards. We hope that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply can indicate new ways of reaching a new international consensus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We hope that our active participation in that Committee as well as in the preparation for the United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1983, will contribute to the formulation of building blocks for such a new international consensus which, in turn, will also strengthen the viability of the present non-proliferation régime. One such building block is an effective international plutonium storage régime.

A substantial reduction of nuclear weapons would be the most important step to nuclear disarmament, and thus a step also that strengthens the NPT. But for the nuclear-weapon States there are also other possibilities of creating a credible perspective for nuclear disarmament. In the rest of my statement I shall first address the questions of a comprehensive test ban, of the so-called cut-off and of negative security assurances, and then I shall make a few remarks about nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

A comprehensive test ban in itself would not remove the threat of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless it is an arms control measure of the highest priority, simply because it locks the door to further vertical proliferation, and to horizontal proliferation as well.

It is a matter of great concern to the Netherlands Government that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have been suspended. We appeal to the Governments concerned to resume their trilateral talks at the shortest possible notice and to report on progress made to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Parallel to and in support of these trilateral negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament should establish procedures to deal with this item which happens to be the first on its agenda.

As I stated in this Committee last year, on 30 October 1980 - that is, exactly a year ago - we think that the appropriate procedure in this case is the establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of a working group on a comprehensive test ban with a meaningful mandate, enabling all nuclear-weapon States to take part in its activities. We hold the role of the Committee on Disarmament in achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty for all time to be an essential one if the ensuing treaty is to attract, as it should, the widest possible international support and adherence.

In our view it is not only necessary to arrange adequate verification measures in a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but we are convinced that adequate verification is also possible. And as far as there are technical problems, we are sure that they can be overcome, inter alia, by drawing on the experience gained and to be gained in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events, in which the Netherlands plays an active role. I wish to recall that significant progress has been made by this Group, in particular is the development of national and international co-operative measures to detect seismic events aimed at setting up a global verification system. Effective continuation of these efforts, including a full-scale test of the seismic system, is called for.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

While a comprehensive test ban would prevent the testing of new nuclear devices, a so-called "cut-off agreement" would stop the production of fissionable material for weapons use. This too would be an effective step in stopping the nuclear arms race. We have lost nothing of our interest in this matter and remain convinced of the desirability of early and serious negotiations on such an agreement. We are not unaware of the verification problems involved, but a cut-off presents one of the few effective nuclear arms control measures for which in principle an international verification system has been worked out: the nuclear safeguard system.

The link between negative security assurances and nuclear arms control and disarmament is a close and evident one. I outlined an approach to this matter which we wish to suggest in my statement in the First Committee on 30 October last year. Since then we have actively pursued the deliberations on this matter in the Committee on Disarmament. We offered a common formula for a Security Council resolution covering the common ground contained in the national statements of the nuclear-weapon States. We found the progress on this subject in the Committee not discouraging. We hope that the new elements which we have tried to supply will be taken into positive consideration by the nuclear-weapon States which could thereby contribute decisively to the success of the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

It should be noted that in none of the exploratory conversations we had with the nuclear-weapon States were we discouraged from further explorations. On the contrary, some of the nuclear-weapon States showed active and positive interest. We are therefore convinced that, with some goodwill, positive results might be achieved in the not too distant future. At the same time we are perfectly aware of the fact that some non-nuclear-weapon States would favour a more ambitious and far-reaching approach. We share to a large extent their reasons and their feelings. Nevertheless one should be satisfied with what is obtainable rather than reach for the impossible. It happens all too often in the United Nations that the possible is killed by demands for the impossible.

(Mr. Fein Netherlands)

Another corollary to nuclear arms control and disarmament is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The interest we attach to that matter was placed on record in the statement which I devoted to the subject in this Committee on 18 November 1980. What was said on behalf of the Netherlands Government in that statement **still holds true**. We listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of Egypt a few days ago and we are looking forward to hearing more about his suggestion.

We were much encouraged by the adoption last year, by consensus, of General Assembly resolution 35/147 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, introduced by Egypt. We think that the consensus under reference contains great promise in regard to the indispensable participation of all countries concerned in setting up appropriate procedures for this undertaking.

We also continue to support the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, although we are not sure that the requirements such as geographic delimitation and full participation by the States concerned can be met under the present circumstances. Our continued support for this idea demonstrates our wish to trust and honour commitments given in this context, even in the face of some unsettling reports. We call upon the States in the region and other interested States to start consultations with a view to developing arrangements capable of providing assurances that nuclear energy will be used in such a manner that nuclear explosions are ruled out. We urge those States, pending the adoption of such measures, to refrain from any action contrary to that goal.

In the same vein, we shall continue to support efforts aimed at an effective denuclearization of Africa. We would hope that States in that region would take the initiative to pursue this idea further.

(Mr. Fein Netherlands)

With respect to the only formally existing nuclear weapon-free zone, based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we strongly hope that all countries in the region will become full parties to the Treaty as soon as possible. In this connexion we also welcome the steps taken by the United States Administration to pursue ratification of Protocol I of that Treaty.

I have set out in my statement today a catalogue of measures that are capable of constituting a genuine contribution to two distinct goals: prevention of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and promotion of nuclear arms control and disarmament on the other. During the next phase of our work, in the debate on resolutions, I shall undoubtedly have occasion to refer to these matters in more detail.

Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): I have already had the opportunity to express my congratulations to the Committee's Chairman upon his assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee while introducing the Report of the Committee on Disarmament. Allow me, however, to extend once again my delegation's felicitations upon his unanimous election, which is a recognition not only of his personal capacities but also of the important contributions made by his country, Yugoslavia, to world peace and disarmament. I should also like to take this opportunity to offer my delegation's felicitations to the other officers of the Committee: to the two Vice-Chairmen -- that is to you, Sir, and to Ambassador Yango of the Philippines -- and to the Rapporteur, Mr. Makonnen of Ethiopia.

When speaking about disarmament, what can one say that has not been said already over the years in this Committee and in other United Nations forums? It is not possible to avoid repeating what has been expressed many times before by others and by one's own delegation.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

When, in 1978, the first special session devoted to disarmament adopted the Final Document, there was some hope that the international community would be able to move towards agreements on concrete measures in the field of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. In that Document, which was adopted by consensus, principles were established, as was a programme of action and the machinery to implement the decisions and recommendations contained in it. The Disarmament Commission was re-established as a deliberative forum while the Committee on Disarmament was constituted as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. In this connexion I should like to quote paragraph 126 of the Final Document:

"In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security, eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.
(A/S-10/4, para. 126)

It is a matter of great disappointment and of great concern not only to my delegation but certainly to others as well that not much of that solemn determination has been translated into action. In fact, one can say that the world situation has become worse.

We had hoped that the trend of events in the 1970s would perhaps open the way for the world to move finally from strife and confrontation into a new era marked by genuine co-operation among all States in promoting

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

the cause of disarmament, world peace and security. Our cautious optimism has, however, proved illusory. Instead of a progressive relaxation of tension, we are witnessing confrontation everywhere and armed conflicts in various regions of the world. The intensified rivalry, the crisis in détente and the greatly increased level of the arms race have led to the worsening of the global situation.

Indeed, there have been serious setbacks in the search for progress in arms control and disarmament. Since the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament efforts to forge ahead have not resulted in significant progress and practically all the decisions and recommendations resulting from that special session have remained unimplemented. It is under these sombre circumstances that our deliberations are taking place in this Committee which according to paragraph 117 of the Final Document should be dealing with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

Allow me now to comment briefly on the work of the Committee on Disarmament, which is, as I have already stated, to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, although in the words of paragraph 121 of the Final Document.

Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. (A/S-10/4, para. 121)

During the nearly three years of its existence the Committee on Disarmament, like its predecessors the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has been unable to achieve much progress. The international climate, marked by increased tension and the escalating arms race, the nuclear arms race in particular, has created a situation which is not conducive to the achievement of tangible progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

The special session and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly have identified in the Final Document and in resolutions several items which they want the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate as matters of the highest priority.

With regard to two of them, the comprehensive test ban and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, actual negotiations have not even been started in spite of the fact that they were accorded the highest priority. The Committee could not even agree on the establishment of ad hoc working groups to start discussing these issues.

In its efforts to draft international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Committee has not gone beyond the pre-negotiating stage. In the field of chemical weapons, although progress has been made, the Committee has not yet entered the stage of actually drafting a legally-binding international instrument on the total elimination and prohibition of such weapons, which was considered as belonging to the category of weapons of mass destruction by the Final Document and which was supposed to be treated as a matter of high priority. While some progress has been made in the drafting of a text of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons, intensive negotiations continue to be required to narrow down differences on the important elements of a future convention. Despite the tireless efforts exerted by the members of the Committee, the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is still far from its conclusion.

I am afraid that the very meagre achievements of the Committee on Disarmament in the discharge of the task entrusted to it as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament by the first special session on disarmament do not respond to the expectations of the international community. This does not mean that the Committee on Disarmament has not been working very hard. In introducing the Committee's report, I have referred to the many meetings that have taken place during its session this year. But circumstances -- the international political climate -- have not been conducive to enabling it to achieve concrete results. While recognizing that improvements in the organizational and procedural aspects would contribute to a more effective functioning of the Committee, my delegation holds the view that an improved international political climate and a genuine and sincere will to negotiate and arrive at agreements, especially among the nuclear and major military Powers, remains the key to its successful performance.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

We have decided to convene a second special session on disarmament by the middle of next year. My delegation earnestly hopes that the second special session will succeed in agreeing, at least, on some concrete measures on disarmament which can be implemented to set the process of disarmament in motion, and that its results will not merely be a reaffirmation or a reformulation of the Final Document of the first special session. There is not much time left between now and June 1982 for serious preparations for the second special session

As the Committee on Disarmament is going to meet again next January for the first part of its 1982 session, my delegation would like to express the hope that it will be in a position to make the necessary progress in its work and that it will be possible for the Committee to conclude successfully its negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which can be its concrete contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The Group of 21, of which Indonesia is a member, has submitted a working paper to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament which can be used as a basis for negotiation.

When discussing disarmament, we should not forget the conventional-arms aspect of the arms race, as these arms have become highly destructive. Of course, we should continue to give priority to nuclear disarmament, but we should also keep in mind that we have to find ways and means to stop and reverse the conventional-arms race. We cannot be just opposed to the nuclear arms race, while at the same time increasing our arsenals of sophisticated conventional arms of tremendous destructive capability.

The implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has reached an impasse despite the overwhelming wish of the littoral and hinterland States for the establishment of such a zone. Failure to reverse the current trend of arms build-up and rivalry in and around the Indian Ocean cannot but worsen the situation in the region. Last year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which

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reference was made to a time-frame for the holding of the conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in 1981, but the resolution could not be implemented because of a lack of consensus. As a littoral State of the Indian Ocean and a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia continues to believe in the need to convene the conference as a necessary initial step to achieving the goals of the Declaration.

My delegation remains of the view that no country is really interested in starting a nuclear war, which everyone knows would result in the destruction of mankind and civilization as we know it today. That is why it is very difficult for us to understand why the nuclear Powers continue to be reluctant to work sincerely towards an agreement on concrete measures leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Quite frequently, the absence of political will is cited as the main obstacle. In my delegation's view, however, it is no longer merely a matter of political will: nuclear disarmament has become a matter of absolute necessity. It is also the view of my delegation that an issue of such critical importance to all mankind cannot be left to the super-Powers alone, but should be the vital concern of all of us, as the effects of a nuclear holocaust cannot be limited to the nuclear Powers alone but would engulf the whole world. It would be useful if we and, for obvious reasons, especially the nuclear Powers, could exercise the necessary introspection - or, as we call it in Indonesian, mawas diri: that is, first to scrutinize one's self, one's own stand, words and actions before criticizing others or preaching to one another.

Indonesia, as a developing country, is vitally interested in peace. We are of the view that peace is a necessary condition for the success of our development efforts. The nuclear arms race is threatening world peace and security. That is why Indonesia is participating in and supporting the efforts to stop the arms race - the nuclear arms race in particular - and to bring about disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Much has been said about the approximately \$600 billion being spent a year for armaments. Success in our disarmament efforts may not necessarily

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make all of those \$600 billion available for development aid, but certainly a substantial part of the funds, energy and know-how spent on the arms race - if we succeed in stopping it - can be channelled to help the development efforts of the developing countries.

Indonesia will continue to support actively and participate in the endeavour of the international community to achieve disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

My delegation realizes that disarmament, nuclear or conventional, is a complex and sensitive matter, since it directly affects the vital security interests of countries. But we must persevere in our efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, for an increased arms race and the possibility of nuclear holocaust cannot be an acceptable alternative.

As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Indonesia will continue to co-operate with others to try to halt and reverse the arms race - the nuclear arms race, in the first place - and to achieve general and complete disarmament. We call upon the nuclear Powers to co-operate sincerely with the efforts within the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in order to reach agreement on concrete and effective disarmament measures, especially nuclear disarmament. We are convinced that they themselves would also like to free themselves from the servitude of nuclear weapons and avoid a nuclear holocaust, which would mean their own destruction as well.

There is an old adage: Si vis pacem para bellum, which I think has become outdated, definitely in the case of a nuclear war, because in such a war there certainly would be no winners or losers - only total destruction for all.

Mr. HENG (Singapore): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would be grateful if you would convey our congratulations to Mr. Golob of Yugoslavia on his election as Chairman of the First Committee. My delegation is also encouraged by the fact that he represents a country which is a working model of

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non-alignment in a much-divided world. I should also like to express our regard for you and the other officers of the Committee and to assure you of our co-operation.

There really is nothing left to be said about the danger of an escalating nuclear arms race which has not already been repeated ad nauseam in this forum. Over the last two weeks, voices more eloquent and more knowledgeable than mine, and representing a broad cross-section of political affiliations, have warned us of the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the entire human race. It is also generally acknowledged that resources devoted to the production of increasingly deadly nuclear weapons would be better used to improve socio-economic conditions, especially those of the poorer nations. My delegation understands these noble sentiments but is not optimistic that noble sentiments alone will bring us nearer to these objectives.

(Mr. Heng, Singapore)

I am not even sure that a world without nuclear weapons would really be a safer place. We could not be sure that if the balance of nuclear terror had not existed, a third world war would not have broken out during the last 36 years; nor could we be sure that there would not have been more conventional wars during the period. Please do not misinterpret my doubts as an apology for nuclear weapons or for the continuation of the nuclear arms race. We are decidedly against both. We are, however, just as concerned about the use of conventional arms by one nation against another.

In recent years we have seen several invasions of small countries by their bigger and stronger neighbours perpetrated with the use of conventional arms. Singapore, as a small country located in a region where one such invasion took place in December 1978, is as concerned about conventional military build-up as about the nuclear politics of the super-Powers.

My delegation is also concerned about allegations that chemical weapons are being used in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. It will be recalled that about 10 years ago chemical weapons such as agent orange and other defoliants were being used in Indo-China. Whatever our feelings for or against that war might have been, we were justifiably horrified by the environmental and human destruction brought about by those weapons.

We should all be thankful that during that war knowledge of such inhuman conduct was easily available. The international media was there in full force and in many cases journalists were courageous and impartial enough to criticize their own Government for those violations. Unfortunately, some wars nowadays are not so accessible, and those reporters who have access are not so brave. However, thanks to the efforts of the international press, we have testimony from refugees who claim to have been the victims of chemical warfare in different parts of the world.

My delegation is aware that there will be differences in this Committee over the truth behind these press reports, and the international press is also not the best tribunal to investigate these suspected incidents of chemical warfare. At the moment, there can be no final word on this question and it would be futile to make charges and countercharges. Such tactics would only reduce this issue to a propaganda war, and that is not in the interest of those who

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might have been or may be the victims of chemical weapons. Nor would it be in the interest of this Organization to be party to any country's propaganda exercise.

My delegation believes that the international community's response to the issue of chemical warfare should be substantive and objective. For a start, it would be useful to improve our investigation process so that the search for evidence could be thorough and unhindered. I am sure that countries which are denying accusations of having such chemical weapons would have no cause to obstruct investigations, for what can give their denial better credibility than the impartial findings of a United Nations body of experts?

Whatever this Organization decides to do to reduce the arms race, I hope it will go beyond just passing resolutions. Passing resolutions is easy. In 1965 this Committee produced nine resolutions; in 1975 we had 28; and last year we had a total of 45. Meanwhile, as the resolutions on disarmament increase, the world becomes increasingly better armed. In 1965 the world military expenditure was close to \$US 300 billion. By 1980 the figure had reached almost \$US 450 billion. This is not a record we should be proud of.

I must add that my delegation is not blind to some of the achievements of the international community in the field of disarmament, limited though they may seem. We note that at of 31 December 1980 there were eight major multilateral arms control treaties and conventions in force. In this connexion, we are particularly encouraged by our colleagues in Latin America, who have managed to make a good start with their Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Here in this Organization we have constantly made efforts to find ways of controlling or reducing military build-up. I think everyone knows the reasons that some of our constructive efforts have met with obstruction and non-implementation and I shall not repeat them. Basically the question of disarmament is one of trust in one's international neighbours, for, in a perfect world where one can trust one's neighbours and be assured that it have no evil intention, what need is there for arms? However, I do not think that it is within the capabilities of this Organization to find a formula for universal trust, if there is one at all. Perhaps the next best thing that

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we can do is to find ways of reducing tension in the various areas of conflict in the world today. Nations must be persuaded that peace can be negotiated and that in most cases this is less costly and more effective than military confrontation.

Promoting dialogues between conflicting parties may at least give us a situation in which one can trust one's neighbour's to a certain extent, if not totally. Under such circumstances, it will also be reassuring to know that one's partially trustworthy neighbour is no better armed than oneself. Hence my delegation supports efforts to find realistic and accurate means of verifying arms parity. Even if we are hindered in our honest efforts, this in itself will have its benefits, for by these hindrances we shall be able to perceive which among us is the real threat to peace.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): My statement today is devoted to preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, in particular, to activities aimed at mobilizing world public opinion in favour of disarmament, to which the special session is called upon to give a fresh impetus.

In this statement I should like to stress above all the relationship between science and the arms race, first and foremost the nuclear arms race, and the responsibility and special role of scientists in the over-all efforts of the international community and the United Nations to ensure the success of the policy of disarmament and peace.

The role and special responsibility of science has been stressed repeatedly in disarmament forums and in international conferences devoted to that question.

More than ever, any enlightened evaluation of the situation obtaining today in the field of armaments must necessarily take into account this relationship between science and technology on the one hand and the arms race on the other.

That relationship and the role that science and scientists must play vis-à-vis the serious problems we are witnessing at present were discussed at length on the occasion of the international symposium "Men of science

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

and peace", an important international gathering of scientists in Bucharest last September. Held under the patronage of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, that event brought together outstanding personalities from the world of science, Nobel Prize winners, presidents of academies of science and other representatives of scientific institutions in many countries, who, in a broad and fruitful dialogue, discussed the fundamental question of our era, peace, and addressed to scientists and intellectuals everywhere a ringing appeal to unite their efforts for the protection of that supreme blessing of mankind.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

Participants in that symposium stressed the need for scientists, their national and international associations to establish appropriate forms of co-operation transcending national ideological or political differences so as to ensure that science will be used exclusively for purely humanistic purposes. To that end an international projects committee was set up with a view to organizing scientific action to show the dangers presented by the unbridled arms race, first and foremost the nuclear arms race, and to inform world public opinion of those dangers and to prepare a world congress of scientists at the service of peace.

In the message to the participants in the International Symposium from the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, which has been circulated as an official document of this session, it is emphasized that:

"In the serious international situation which now obtains, scientists bear a tremendous responsibility for the present and future of mankind. No one knows better than the scientist or researcher the destructive power of modern weapons and the danger which the continuing arms race poses to civilization, to the security of peoples and to the very survival of humanity." (A/36/528, annex I, p. 2)

The message reiterates a thesis that the President of Romania has maintained on many occasions, namely, that in our time the peoples, the popular masses of the whole world, play a fundamental role in the determination of the course of history. Scientists, regardless of their political, philosophical, religious or any other convictions, are vitally interested in the cause of progress and peace and their place is at the side of those peoples which act in defence of life and their peaceful work, the right freely to build their destiny and to devote their resources and energy to material and spiritual prosperity.

Like other countries, Romania has always attached the highest importance first and foremost to the role that world public opinion and, above all, men of science must have in triggering an effective process of disarmament.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

It was those ideas that guided the Romanian Government in proposing that the first special session devoted to disarmament stress should stress the following:

"A primary role is that of the scientists, who must struggle to ensure that the breath-taking advances in knowledge and the bold conquests of the human spirit are no longer directed against mankind but instead are used exclusively for the well-being and happiness of peoples, for life on earth and for prosperity on our planet."

(A/S-10/14, annex, p. 10)

That position of my country was reiterated in the reply of the Romanian Government concerning the second special session devoted to disarmament.

In that document we emphasized that, more than in the past, it is necessary to stimulate interest in international public opinion about disarmament questions. In that sense, it might be important to recommend to Governments that they adopt measures to create organizational structures at the national level so as to enable public opinion in each country to understand correctly and wholly the dangers represented by the escalation of armaments. To that end, it is necessary for scientists, who bear a heavy responsibility to the peoples of the world and our civilization, to act in order to ensure that scientific conquests should no longer serve war or destruction but rather progress and the well-being of peoples.

As can be seen from the lengthy debates and the appeal adopted at the conclusion of the Bucharest Symposium - an appeal which has been circulated as a General Assembly document - participants stressed that in our time science has achieved an unprecedented dynamics. We are living at a time when scientific thought has achieved dimensions never before known in the past, marked by extraordinary discoveries which are directly influencing constant changes in the conditions of material production, the discovery of the secrets of matter and the increasingly effective development of natural resources. The development of a nation today is inconceivable without the contribution of science and advanced technology.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

However, we must recognize that many of the great discoveries in scientific research and technical creativity are used for the manufacture of the most sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, to begin with atomic weapons, which enable us to say that, unfortunately, today science and technology represent the motive power at the root of the development of existing weapons and the creation of new weapons and systems of such weapons.

In the present circumstances where we are witnessing an unbridled arms race and an unprecedented increase in military budgets, science and its servants find themselves before a redoubtable alternative: peace or war, an alternative which does not admit of a middle-of-the-road position.

These are not technical questions; they are political and social, and the response given to them may affect the present and future of mankind for many generations to come. This is even more important in the conditions prevailing in Europe where, as stressed a few days ago by President Nicolae Ceausescu in an interview for the press of the Federal Republic of Germany, an extremely dangerous situation has been reached, given the intensification of the arms race, first and foremost the nuclear arms race, and decisions to station medium-range missiles, as well as the manufacture of the neutron bomb. The President of Romania said:

"We must do everything in our power to halt the development of weapons, and to end the arms race and, especially, the development of nuclear weapons.

"In particular, we believe we must do everything in our power to prevent the deployment of new American missiles in Europe and, at the same time, secure the withdrawal of Soviet missiles. We are in favour of negotiations on the subject, as scheduled, but believe that the European countries themselves must be more active, because it is their life that is at stake."

Awareness of the moral responsibility devolving on scientists demands that they resolutely say "no" to war and armaments, so that the enormous resources squandered for military purposes may be used for the economic and social development of all countries, first and foremost of the developing countries. Fully aware of their responsibilities, scientists

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

who participated in the Bucharest International Symposium urged in their appeal:

"Let us act now, before it is too late, now, when we have so great a responsibility for the fate of mankind, to end the arms race, to bring about disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, to create a world without weapons and without wars and to defend the basic right of individuals and peoples - the right to life and to peace." (A/36/528, annex II, p. 1)

It would appear more necessary than ever that among the efforts aimed at halting and reversing the arms race all States ensure that they do everything in their power so that the opinions of scientists be heard in the United Nations and in all international forums discussing questions of disarmament, peace and international security.

As we have already emphasized, from this point of view, too, the second special session offers an opportunity that we cannot miss. As is well known, the Final Document of the first special session stressed that it is indispensable, not only for Governments but also for the peoples of the world, to recognize and understand the dangers inherent in the present situation in respect of armaments.

The Declaration on the Second Disarmament Decade also requests the United Nations to undertake action to alert world public opinion.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The recent study on the organization of a world disarmament campaign (A/36/458) is devoted entirely to the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament through sustained co-operation between the United Nations system, Member States and both governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Although the study implicitly embraces United Nations activities pertaining to scientists, in our view, it does not give that important part of public opinion the special place it deserves. The express inclusion in chapter V of the study of a special section devoted to co-operation between the United Nations and scientists is therefore necessary. This is all the more so since the report recognizes that certain sectors of public opinion, as is the case with scientists, are especially important and should play a fundamental role in the process of mobilizing world public opinion, because no one is more aware than they are of the destructive force of modern weapons and the enormous danger they represent to the security of peoples.

The Romanian delegation expresses the hope that the General Assembly will be in a position to adopt at this session specific recommendations on measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament having in mind the second special session next year, and that in those recommendations a special place will be given to scientists and the important role they can and should play in the struggle for peace within the context of the world disarmament campaign.

We are convinced that the United Nations has the duty and the opportunity to adopt practical measures to ensure that the opinions of scientists will be heard in the United Nations and better disseminated in all international bodies dealing with disarmament questions or matters of international peace, security and co-operation, including the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

The establishment of direct communication on a reciprocal basis and true co-operation between the United Nations and organizations grouping men of science, with a view to enhancing their role in the promotion of an awareness of the need to give an impetus to the disarmament process and the adoption of effective measures to that end, has become a necessity.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

We believe that those recommendations of the General Assembly relating to scientists will add to and enrich the report on the world disarmament campaign which the Secretary-General is to submit to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

The Romanian delegation for its part is ready to play an active role in consultations on the subject, with a view to the elaboration of relevant draft resolutions in the First Committee.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The present discussions in our Committee are taking place just before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and it is natural that there should be a kind of preliminary summary taking place of what has been achieved on this in past years. In this connexion many speakers have expressed disappointment at the fact that the United Nations is approaching the special session on disarmament empty-handed, as it were. Indeed, although negotiations have taken place on highly important problems, we have not managed to achieve agreements on many of them. There has also been no progress on other aspects charted by the first special session and certain persons are casting doubt on some of the existing agreements. What is the reason for this?

Many delegations explain the situation which has emerged in the field of disarmament by the exacerbation of the international situation. The representatives of some States have not only used that exacerbation to justify the absence of progress in limiting the arms race - exacerbation which, in essence, was caused by them - but have also tried to persuade the world community to abandon efforts in this field until tension is reduced. Others - and I am speaking of the overwhelming majority here - have expressed another viewpoint, which we fully share: that, in conditions of an increased threat of a nuclear catastrophe, not only can we not renounce the struggle to prevent it and wait, doomed to disaster, for somebody to press the "nuclear button" first, but we must more than ever exert our efforts to curb the arms race through negotiations.

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Thus the question of negotiations, bilateral and multilateral, has proved to be one of the central topics of our discussions, and the Soviet delegation would also like to express its view on this question.

First of all, I wish to recall that the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament solemnly proclaimed that

"All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations." (resolution S-10/2, para. 28) We fully endorse that statement. Talks on disarmament have become an essential instrument as well as a means of pursuing international policies aimed at strengthening peace and the security of peoples.

During our discussions we have heard various viewpoints about who is to blame for the fact that efforts in the disarmament field have been undermined and impasses have been reached in disarmament talks. Some have tried to put the blame on the two main military political blocs - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization - others on all five nuclear Powers; and some others put the blame on the two so-called super-Powers alone. Let us try and introduce some clarity into this question and see what actually happened, basing ourselves, naturally, on facts, not inventions.

As members know, three or four years ago, together with the multilateral talks on disarmament which were being conducted within the Committee on Disarmament and also at the Vienna meetings on the limitation of armaments and armed forces in Central Europe, a dialogue was in progress between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on a very broad range of questions having to do with limiting the arms race. Naturally, the most important were the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which began at the end of 1969. During the second half of the 1970s talks started between these two States - the USSR and the USA - on many other important aspects, namely: a ban on chemical weapons, limiting and subsequently cutting back on military activities in the Indian Ocean, a ban on the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and, in this context, radiological weaponry; anti-satellite systems; and, finally limiting the sale and delivery of conventional weapons. In 1977 negotiations were started between the Soviet Union, the United States and the

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United Kingdom on a complete and general nuclear test ban. What is happening now? Now, as members know, apart from the multilateral forums, the other negotiating channels for the limitation of armaments have been cut off. What is the reason for this situation?

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The fact is that, having adopted a policy aimed at acquiring absolute military superiority at the expense of the security of, in particular, the Soviet Union and its allies, and having made the question of armaments control dependent on the implementation of its military programmes, the United States has curtailed its participation in those talks on practically all disarmament problems.

This policy has been reflected most clearly in the Soviet-American dialogue, the condition of which has a great impact on the international situation as a whole and on the solution of questions concerning the limitation of the arms race in all multilateral forums. This has been mentioned by many delegations during the present discussion. If we take the first item on the agenda for today, in the matter of disarmament and the limitation of strategic weapons, no sooner had SALT II been signed than the United States started to discredit it and the process of ratification was exploited by the opponents of the treaty to try to hamper its implementation as much as possible. At the beginning of 1980 the President of the United States took the decision to freeze for an indefinite time consideration of this treaty in the Senate, and thus dealt a serious blow to bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons. Now he is stating definitely that United States strategic planning should not be sacrificed to the SALT process.

So, because of the United States, the dialogue on one of the key problems of military détente has been broken off, although the Soviet Union and the United States agreed during the Vienna meeting in 1979 to begin serious talks on further measures to limit and reduce strategic weapons immediately after the entry into force of SALT II.

The United States policy of slowing down the dialogue on questions of arms limitation has spread to other areas of the Soviet-American talks on these matters. At the end of 1978 the bilateral talks on limiting the arms trade were unilaterally broken off. In 1979, because of the United States, talks with the Soviet Union on anti-satellites and on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace were broken off. Finally, in May 1980, Soviet-American talks on banning chemical weapons were broken off and at the end of the year the

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trilateral Soviet-English-American talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests were also broken off.

So, up to the present day, the Government of the United States, in violation of the agreements achieved and the obligations it assumed on a number of matters, and notwithstanding the many decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and appeals of the international community, has suspended the dialogue with the Soviet Union initiated in the 1970s on a number of questions having to do with military détente. The negative nature of this unilateral action of the United States is made even more obvious in that a certain amount of progress had been achieved at some of these talks I have mentioned. Let us take, for example, the Soviet-American talks on banning chemical weapons, which were conducted from 1976 onwards. During 13 rounds of these negotiations the parties reached, inter alia, an agreement in principle on the comprehensive nature of the chemical weapons ban and they agreed that in addition to the general aim criterion it would be expedient to use the toxicity criterion as well. A certain rapprochement in our positions was noted too on the question of monitoring the fulfilment of obligations under a future convention and on a number of other questions as well.

The progress made during the Soviet-American talks on banning chemical weapons was warmly welcomed in the Committee on Disarmament, to which the delegations of the USSR and the United States submitted in July 1979 and June 1980 joint statements on the results of the talks. These statements provided the basis of the multilateral talks on the question of banning chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament itself.

Very important work has been done within the framework of the dialogue between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the matter of a general and complete nuclear test ban. Over a period of more than three years the parties to the trilateral talks managed to find solutions to many complex aspects of this problem and this created favourable conditions for a successful outcome. Much that was useful was done in the course of the exchange of views between the delegations of the USSR and the United States in other negotiations.

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When the United States is guilty of blocking many important Soviet-American channels for negotiating and establishing contacts, the only multilateral forum, apart from the Vienna negotiations, in which States pledged to hold negotiations on limiting the arms race, is in fact the Committee on Disarmament. Since 1979 all five nuclear Powers have been members of that body, together with the militarily most developed States. Its agenda has included the most pressing questions relating to military détente. The rules of procedure and the organization of the work of the Committee are in accordance with the main thrust of all its activities, that is, that all States, meeting on an equitable basis, should draft international documents, agreements, conventions and treaties which are mandatory in character.

However, notwithstanding all these conditions, the Committee on Disarmament has recently been marking time. The Committee has not even been given the opportunity of conducting a business-like dialogue on a number of pressing problems relating to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet delegation in its statement on 28 October went in some detail into the position of the Soviet Union on questions relating to the limitation of nuclear armaments and nuclear disarmament. I would recall that we, together with the other socialist countries, introduced a specific proposal for negotiations on this matter, including the procedural aspects as well as matters of substance. We demonstrated flexibility regarding the organizational forms of these negotiations and we expressed our readiness to hold consultations within the Committee and to establish a working group or sub-committee to deal with nuclear disarmament matters. However, all our proposals in that regard - and this has been mentioned several times - were totally blocked by the United States and other nuclear Powers, alleging that talks on nuclear weapons are "untimely".

Because of the counter-action by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Committee was unable to move ahead with talks on banning nuclear-weapon tests and to that end establishing a special working group. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries supported the proposal put forward by the non-aligned group for the establishment of a working group on this matter. To put it mildly, we were surprised by the statement of the delegation of Sweden to the effect that all the participants in the tripartite negotiations,

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including the Soviet Union, were hampering negotiations in the Committee on the banning of nuclear-weapon testing. That is totally at variance with the facts.

I want to repeat once more, the position of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union favours the resumption of the tripartite talks on the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, because we think they are highly important. We have expressed ourselves in favour of the Committee on Disarmament playing an active part in resolving the problems concerning the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, and to that end in the Committee on Disarmament we supported the establishment of a working group on that matter with the participation of all nuclear Powers. Here we are abiding strictly by the decisions taken at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and in particular paragraph 51 of the Final Document, which says:

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind." (resolution S-10/2, para. 51)

Here we see that "all States" are mentioned. The opinion of the Soviet Union is shared by many others as well. The representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Fein, stated as much, and I should like to quote what he said:

(spoke in English)

"As I stated in this Committee, ... on 30 October 1980, ... the appropriate procedure in this case is the establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of a working group on a comprehensive test ban with a meaningful mandate, enabling all nuclear-weapon States to take part in its activities." (supra, p. 32)

(continued in Russian)

We fully share that approach. We believe that mankind is really interested in a general and comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing. It does not want some countries to stop such testing and others to continue it. It would be even worse if other countries were to embark on a course of manufacturing nuclear weapons and testing them. We hope that that viewpoint is shared by

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the majority of delegations. A fictitious pretext is being advanced by the United States representatives and some of their colleagues from Western countries for not holding talks on the banning of the manufacture and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction with the object of drafting a treaty on this matter. Allegations to the effect that the Soviet proposal relates to types of weapons that do not exist are at the same time accompanied by articles in the press to the effect that the United States and other Western countries are working on other types of death-dealing weapons. Naturally, if we adopt the United States position on disarmament problems, that is, that there is a need first of all to create these weapons, effectively test them and introduce them into the arsenals of States and then talk about superiority in this field - if we take that as a basis, our proposal is then really "unrealistic", because it is suggesting that possible channels for the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction should be closed off now, even before they have been manufactured. Certainly we did not manage to grasp the logic of the position of the United States delegation, which in its statement on 27 October said that we could not talk about 'non-existent' types of weapons, while at the same time it called for the early completion of negotiations on radiological weapons, which still do not exist at this time.

This is not the first year in which the world community has called insistently for a ban on the neutron weapon. In 1978 the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, introduced in the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty on that question to that very end. In view of the decision taken by President Reagan to manufacture the neutron weapon, this question has become particularly pressing, and representatives of the socialist and non-aligned countries are mentioning this fact in this Committee and in the Committee on Disarmament. But here again, the American veto, supported by the allies of the United States, made it impossible for the Committee to work out measures to ban the neutron weapon.

Finally, throughout the past year the American delegation has been hampering the review of the mandate of the Committee on Disarmament's working group on chemical weapons.

Thus, the United States has not only curtailed the bilateral dialogue on questions relating to limiting the arms race, but is in fact trying to block the multilateral talks on various disarmament matters as well.

The Soviet Union is in favour of talks on a broad range of questions. All the talks in the disarmament field begun in various forums, as well as bilateral talks, have been stopped for various reasons; they must be resumed and continued. We are convinced that, in our nuclear age, there is no sensible way to resolve controversial matters other than through negotiations which are honest, equitable and free from any preconditions or attempts to impose diktat. We honestly and openly proposed, and still propose, to the United States that we hold businesslike discussions on the vitally important question of the cessation of the very dangerous arms race. Furthermore, as has repeatedly been stated by my country, there is no type of weapon - nuclear or non-nuclear - which we would not agree to reduce on a mutual basis. It is understood, of course, that we are not appearing in the role of a petitioner pleading a partisan cause as we believe that all are equally interested in this matter.

We decisively rebuff all attempts to lay any responsibility for the deadlock in the negotiations at the door of the Soviet Union. In this connexion, we simply do not understand the appeals made to us in the statements of many representatives - and I mention in particular the representative of Malaysia - including statements made today, to show a readiness to talk. Those appeals should be made in one direction only, and I think members know which direction I mean.

With regard to the question of negotiations, I should like to touch on another matter as well. The entire history of international relations in the post-war period has shown that the best-beloved way of the opponents of disarmament talks to subvert those talks has been artificially to inflate the problem of verification. They have tried to divorce the examination of this question from the examination of disarmament measures, and have even tried to hold separate negotiations on verification. To our mind, that approach means only one thing: the replacement of efforts to curb the arms race with pointless talks. It is no accident that now the person who has cut off disarmament talks is precisely the one who has not permitted the establishment of working groups in the Committee on Disarmament and is at the same time threatening to give priority to abstract discussions on the problems of verification.

During the general debate in the First Committee, the problem of verification has been touched on by many delegations, and I should like briefly to speak to this subject.

The approaches of principle to the solution of the problem of verification have been enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We agree with the provisions of the Final Document and consider them to be important and strictly balanced. Attempts to circumvent or revise those provisions will hardly promote a solution of the problems of control, which are already complicated, and will certainly not promote progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is no less interested than other States parties to the agreements on disarmament in seeing the provisions of all those agreements fulfilled unswervingly by all. To that end, during the negotiations we have been consistently calling for the elaboration of such methods of verification which, giving due account to character, scope and specific nature of the concrete disarmament measures that have been discussed, would reassure States that all provisions of the Final Document are being implemented.

In our approach to the problem of verification, we take as a basis the following fundamental principles: first, there can be no verification without disarmament. Verification should proceed from a clear-cut agreement on measures on arms limitation and disarmament. Secondly, the scope and form of the

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verification should be commensurate with the scope and form of the concrete obligations established by the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Thirdly, implementation of verification should in no way infringe the sovereign rights of States or allow interference in their internal affairs. Therefore, international forms of verification are limited. Fourthly, a detailed all-round elaboration of verification provisions is possible only after agreement has been reached on the scope of the ban.

We believe that States will become parties to a convention not in order to violate, but in order strictly to abide by the obligations they assume thereby. Therefore, verification should not be devised according to the principle of complete distrust among States. They should not be turned into global suspicion, and should not be used for a hostile, slanderous campaign by one State against another. They should not serve as a means of complicating international relations. Provisions relating to verification can only be a link - albeit a very important link - in the chain of other measures which serve as guarantees that all parties are abiding by the convention.

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We decisively object to the elaboration of control measures divorced from the practical content of any specific measure having to do with the limitation of armaments or disarmament, its character and significance in the broader context of disarmament, divorced from the fact of the possible existence of other international norms or agreements which guarantee compliance with such a measure and not taking into account the sensible balance between the danger of non-observance of this measure and the negative consequences of undue interference in the peaceful activities of States and the discovery of commercial and technical secrets in various industrial spheres. In other words, we are against making control absolute, making a fetish of control. We are against its being reduced ad absurdum. We are in favour of sensible, balanced control, no more, no less.

A realistic and honest approach to questions of control, taking due account of the legitimate interests of all sides and complying with the principle of undiminished security, is the true path to the resolution of even the most complicated aspects of this problem. Our experience in disarmament talks tells us that when the participants adopt such an approach, strengthened by the political will to reach agreement, the elaboration of the control mechanism does not give rise to any insuperable difficulties. Thus, notwithstanding the difficulties connected with resolving complicated technical problems relating to control, it was, for example, possible to conclude treaties between the USSR and the United States on limiting strategic weapons and on peaceful nuclear explosions which contain provisions concerning control.

The bilateral and multilateral treaties in force, which now number several dozen, provide the most varied methods of control: national means, international procedures, consultations, the establishment of consultative organs, various types of monitoring, including on-site monitoring, and so on. Our experience of these agreements reaffirms that these control mechanisms are effective instruments, and that is not our conclusion alone. These conclusions have been reached repeatedly by participants in various conferences which have examined the different treaties and conventions relating to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

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In conclusion, I should like to emphasize once more that the Soviet Union shares the opinion of the majority of States that international security can be strengthened only through disarmament, through negotiations to curb the arms race. In order to carry out this task in present-day conditions it is even more necessary to activate the efforts of all members of the international community. We need dialogue, not confrontation, on questions the solution of which will determine the very future of mankind. We hope that this conclusion will be reflected in the decisions taken at this session and that the General Assembly will appeal to the ones that are really blocking the talks here to change their position and to make a real contribution, not merely a verbal contribution, to the strengthening of peace and security. The Soviet Union, for its part, is ready to make this contribution.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.