



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 12TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. YANGO (Philippines)  
(Vice-Chairman)

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Mrs. Thorsson (Sweden)  
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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. RAZAFINDRATOVO (Madagascar) (interpretation from French): In speaking for the first time, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar wishes first of all to extend its congratulations to the Chairman upon his election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. My delegation is convinced that his diplomatic skill and his human qualities will contribute to the happy outcome of the difficult tasks of our Committee devoted to disarmament and international security. Yugoslavia, his country, and my own maintain excellent relations both at the multilateral and the bilateral levels. My delegation wishes in particular to pay a tribute to Yugoslavia for its outstanding role in the field of security and disarmament. May we also extend our congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

It has become commonplace to say that our world is confronted today with countless complex problems whose interactions weigh heavily on international relations.

Far from wishing to minimize the importance of economic questions, to which a satisfactory solution can only be found within the framework of global restructuring between North and South, it is undeniable that the second aspect of present international relations is constituted by the continued existence of problems relating to over-armament in the world today.

During the first special session devoted to disarmament, the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar had occasion to stress the alarm and concern of our country at the fact that

"The major Powers and the super-Powers have tried to out-do each other in the development of sophisticated missiles and nuclear and conventional weapons, although it has been recognized that what they have done has been damaging to collective security." (A/S-10/PV.11, p. 57)

(Mr. Razafindratovo, Madagascar)

Since that time, while the world has had every reason to expect at least a freezing of tests, and the production or deployment of new missiles or aircraft, we have in fact witnessed a new arms race both from the qualitative and quantitative points of view.

In 1981 no progress has been registered in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The prospects for the future appear to be even more threatening with the emergence of the concept of "limited nuclear war", the decisions to increase military expenditures and thus to relaunch the arms race.

On the other hand, the extension of the area of activity of certain military groupings and the arbitrary and unilateral decision to institute so-called "areas of vital interests" have brought about an increase in military forces to the detriment of détente.

It has been repeatedly stated, particularly within this Organization, that only disarmament would really enhance the security of all States, large and small.

(Mr. Razafindratovo, Madagascar)

Priorities have been established and negotiation procedures and mechanisms worked out.

After the numerous resolutions and declarations we have adopted, after the programmes of action we have adopted and especially after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we had all hoped that all of those resolutions would lead to concrete results, in particular, if we kept in mind the participation of all nuclear States in the Committee on Disarmament.

On the eve of the second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982, it appears to us to be obvious that those primary questions concerning the very survival of mankind escape the control of the majority of States, and in fact depend on a limited small club made up of nuclear Powers. Those, which enjoy the right of veto, in fact, exercise control powers over the work of the Committees of the United Nations that deal with disarmament questions.

The developing countries all hope that the second special session devoted to disarmament will be able to draw constructive lessons from the negotiations that have taken place during the last three years in the Committee on Disarmament and that it will thus achieve concrete results.

The results of that session, as of many other conferences such as that on the law of the sea or the global negotiations on international economic relations, will depend first and foremost on the political will of States.

It is our belief that the defence of the interests of all demands that States representing the majority and, in particular the non-aligned countries, should focus their efforts on the following aspects: to maintain and strengthen our unity within those institutions that deal with security and disarmament; to refuse to be treated as objects in the hands of the great Powers, or be given the role of regional police or places for military bases through the interplay of military alliances; to refuse all attempts to rationalization of the arms race.

Lastly, we hope that the Committee on Disarmament, established by our Organization at the first special session devoted to disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, may function as a body

(Mr. Razafindratovo, Madagascar)

with wide autonomy, that it may work in accordance with the mechanism that it set for itself and that it may be able to establish the working groups that it deems necessary for the good conduct of its work.

The Preparatory Committee for the second special session has just concluded consideration of the provisional agenda of that session. The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar ventures to hope that the second special session devoted to disarmament will make it possible to improve the existing mechanisms and to establish a precise calendar of measures to be adopted. We sincerely hope that the second special session will consider measures to be taken urgently with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to evaluating the existing relationships of disarmament, international peace and security and development.

Lastly, how can we fail here to applaud the Final Declaration of the Pugwash Conference, which was recently held in Banff, Canada, calling in particular for an immediate freezing of all existing nuclear arsenals in the United States of America and the Soviet Union, as well as the recent proposal of the distinguished diplomat and historian, George Kennan, to reduce by 50 per cent existing nuclear weapons. On 19 May last, Mr. Kennan, in accepting the Albert Einstein Peace Prize in Washington, asked these questions: Who can fail to understand that when you speak about nuclear weapons, the whole concept of relative advantage is illusory? Who can fail to understand that when you speak of the absurd nonsensical values of overkill, the relative sizes of arsenals has no real significance ... .

Madagascar, which is both an integral part of Africa and, because of its position as an island, is placed in a very sensitive region of the Indian Ocean, strongly supports the solemn terms of the United Nations Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Heads of State and Government as well as by subsequent resolutions of our General Assembly.

(Mr. Razafindratovo, Madagascar)

The Democratic Republic of Madagascar is convinced that only such a denuclearization, enshrined in an international treaty under the auspices of the United Nations whereby African States undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, can guarantee the security of our States, prevent nuclear proliferation and channel the funds thus saved towards more useful and more urgent tasks of development.

So far the arrogant attitude of the South African authorities and their attempts to endow themselves in nuclear weapons, as well as the support which racist South Africa receives from certain great Powers, are the only reasons why it has not been possible to conclude such a treaty.

With respect to the Indian Ocean, and given the increase of military activities in the region and the existence of foreign military bases, of which the best known is that of Diego Garcia, the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, His Excellency Mr. Didier Ratsiraka, aware of the special responsibilities devolving on my country because of its strategic position in the south western part of the Indian Ocean, addressed a solemn appeal to all States concerned, that is to say, not only to the coastal States and the hinterland States, but also to the main users, the great Powers and the members of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries, for the convening of a summit conference at Tananarive in 1982 or, at any rate, as early as possible. The fundamental task of that conference would be to draw up a mandatory international convention to ensure that the Indian Ocean would become truly a zone of peace. Those proposals put forward by the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar at the fifth anniversary of the Socialist Malgache Revolution on 15 June 1980, were for: the establishment of a mandatory international convention guaranteeing the security of vessels and, in particular, of tankers in the region; the reduction of the various military fleets in the Indian Ocean; and the elimination of all foreign military bases.

The Declaration in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), which declared the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, would thus be truly implemented. It is obvious that the holding of such a conference at Tananarive implies a heavy financial burden for a developing country like my own, but given the

(Mr. Razafindratovo, Madagascar)

increasing danger that we witness in that particularly sensitive region of the world, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar felt in duty bound to address that appeal, to which so far we have received 30 positive replies from the nations we invited.

That summit meeting in no way seeks to rival the United Nations conference on the Indian Ocean, to be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, during 1982. Those two conferences, which are at two different levels, are in fact complementary. The work in Colombo and the work of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean will be of primary importance for the success of the summit conference, which the Democratic Republic of Madagascar has proposed, through its President, to be held. Unfortunately, the Indian Ocean has become a prize in the planetary struggle between the great Powers.

For some, it is a question of ensuring the free passage that is essential for their economic survival. For others, it is a question of maintaining their presence until the possible conclusion of a binding treaty which would make of the Indian Ocean a true zone of peace.

We venture to hope that this constructive proposal of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar will command the attention of the great Powers and obtain the support of peace-loving nations.

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): In my statement today, I should like to address agenda item 128, that is, the proposal of the Soviet Union relative to the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, a proposal which Poland welcomes and strongly supports. As will be appreciated, it is also an issue which, owing to my long association with the legal aspects of the peaceful uses of outer space, has a special meaning to me personally.

The general debate in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and the debate in this Committee have unmistakably underscored the grave concern - not to say alarm - pervading the international community at this particular time over the increasingly dangerous turn being taken by international relations. As we know, the political climate in the world is characterized by mounting tensions, distrust and a growing tendency of certain States to rely on force and a policy of confrontation rather than on one of accommodation and negotiation.

Despite the general awareness of the grave risks inherent in the accelerating arms race, especially in the nuclear field, that race continues unabated. It is not a mere figure of speech to say that the arms race is taking on the symptoms of a contagious affliction which, having contaminated the world, is about to spread to the rest of the universe. Therefore, unless imaginative and determined action is generated by the international community, we may live to see soon the star-wars scenarios of science fiction dangerously approach everyday reality.

What the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union is all about, in essence, is a suggestion that urgent action be taken to prevent outer space from becoming yet another testing ground in the technological arms race.



(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

The proposal of the Soviet Union to ban from outer space weapons of any kind comes almost 25 years after the beginning of the successful conquest of outer space, one of the most impressive accomplishments of science and technology of the twentieth century. In that relatively brief span of time, peaceful applications of satellite technology have brought mankind tangible benefits. That technology has become part and parcel of, inter alia, modern communications, geodesy, weather forecasting and navigation. Furthermore, referred to as "national technical means of control", it has come to play, in the context of arms limitation and disarmament, a crucially important role with regard to the security concerns of States.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that the astounding technological developments, and the success of peaceful exploration of outer space to which they led, have been rendered possible largely by the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, and some of the subsequent agreements, under which nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have been outlawed from outer space. However, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, observed in his letter to the Secretary-General, in which he requested the inclusion of this issue on the agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly,

"all these international instruments do not exclude the possibility of the stationing in outer space of those kinds of weapons which are not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the danger of the militarization of outer space still exists and has recently been increasing." (A/36/192, p. 2)

The aspirations of the international community to erect effective barriers with a view to preventing the spread of the arms race to ever new environments and spheres of man's activity date back many years. I believe that the initiative of the Soviet Union is a fitting and direct response, in particular to those concerns which were reflected in paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. As will be recalled, that paragraph reads:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." (resolution S-10/2, para. 80)

We have no doubt whatever that it would be consistent with the spirit of that Treaty if the international community undertook in earnest constructive efforts to ban weapons of any kind from outer space, thus preserving that environment, untainted and free, for exclusively peaceful pursuits. Some recent developments in space technology, pointing to possible use in space of weapons not specifically prohibited by article IV of the Treaty, are compelling factors arguing in favour of urgent measures to supplement the existing international legal instruments with specific prohibitions.

The Polish delegation considers that the draft treaty annexed to document A/36/192 represents a suitable basis for the negotiation of such a prohibition. True, an agreement of that kind may call not only for political will, but also for the concerted efforts and the perseverance of the entire international community, principally of those States which have substantive outer space capability. But it is also true that the impact of our failure urgently to reach the objectives spelled out in the Final Document would be most unsettling as far as the security interests of States are concerned.

For one thing, an unlimited licence to place in orbit weapons other than those already banned as falling within the definition of weapons of mass destruction, especially anti-satellite weapons, would tend to undermine strategic stability as it obtains at present. One can well imagine a situation in which a State, responding to a perceived threat to its surveillance and communication satellites, would seek to develop and put in orbit new, more versatile, less vulnerable satellite defence systems.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

The lack of agreed restraints in the sphere of development and stationing in orbit of weapons of any kind, particularly anti-satellite weapons, could not, therefore, but trigger off a dangerous, costly and futile arms race on land and in outer space. The direct result of such a situation would be a world less secure and less determined to pursue the peaceful exploration of outer space.

On the other hand, the benefits of effective prohibitions, along the lines of the Soviet proposal, would be important by any standard. Without taxing the Committee's patience, let me mention just a few.

First, a widely acceptable agreement to ban weapons of any kind in outer space would carry both political and substantive weight, especially at a stage in international relations when the existing disarmament negotiating forums seem to have precious little to show for their efforts, when many of them seem to have reached an impasse or suspended their efforts sine die. It is only natural that, at a time when political détente seems to be at its lowest ebb, any positive steps to check effectively the qualitative arms race would carry important promise.

Secondly, the conclusion of a multilateral agreement to curtail the military use of outer space would stand as a confirmation of the determination and ability of States to exercise firm control over the ways in which science and technology are put to practical use. What is even more important is that it would bar the development and deployment of offensive weapons in outer space which, from the point of view of security preoccupations of States, are among the most dangerous types of weapons.

Thirdly, the endorsement by the General Assembly of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union as a suitable basis for the negotiations on a legally binding instrument would be telling proof of the determination of the community of nations to preserve outer space as the exclusive province of international co-operation in its peaceful exploration and use. Such a turn of events would be especially auspicious at a time when intensive preparations for the second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to be held in Vienna in 1982, are under way.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

The initiative of the Soviet Union, if agreed upon, would in our view expand the scope of article IV of the 1967 Treaty, thus obviating some of the reservations entertained by some States with regard to that accord. It would therefore be a step towards encouraging a much wider accession to the Treaty, especially of those members of the international community who favour the total demilitarization of outer space. Views in this respect have been voiced over the years both in the General Assembly and in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and also in the Committee on Disarmament. If put into effect, the proposal before us would also be a positive response to more specific concerns, typical of which is the memorandum and a draft additional protocol to the 1967 Treaty, submitted by Italy in the Committee on Disarmament in March 1979.

The Polish delegation considers it highly significant that the USSR proposes to have its draft treaty considered within the framework of the United Nations. This welcome approach must be recognized as a token of a constructive position of a Power which possesses considerable technological capability as far as outer space is concerned.

Its readiness to forgo a part of that capability should be emulated by those with a comparable capability. It should, moreover, encourage other States to refrain from developing their own outer space military programmes to the detriment of peaceful use-oriented programmes.

In the view of my delegation, the endorsement of the Soviet initiative at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly would also make it possible to put to better use the existing frameworks of international co-operation. For one thing, it would expand the scope of such earlier agreements as that concerning the registration of space objects, thereby creating conditions indispensable for effective international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

To conclude, I should like to stress that the initiative before us is commendable and courageous. Stemming, as it does, from the comprehensive programme of peace formulated at the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union earlier this year, it is, we believe, offered in good faith, in a desire to find a way out of the vicious circle of the arms

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race, to promote a sense of greater confidence between States and strengthen international security.

For the reasons which I have presented above, the Polish delegation gives its full support to the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union, hoping that it will also commend itself to the widest support of the General Assembly.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): As this afternoon I participate in the general debate of the First Committee in my capacity as the Swedish representative, I have the pleasant duty first of all to congratulate the Chairman on his high and important office. Not least at this session of the General Assembly at a time when the world seems to be at a crossroads, it is essential that the First Committee of the General Assembly perform its duties with skill and authority. I am confident, both because of his record of competence, knowledge and experience which I have benefited from in working with him in other United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament problems, and because of the great tradition of his country, Yugoslavia, in the field of disarmament, that his chairmanship will be conducive to the best possible results of our work in this Committee.

Likewise, of course, I extend my congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, and I should very much like you, sir, to convey to the Chairman my regards and my congratulations.

Increasingly the vox humana, the human voice, is raised in our time in defence of the right to survival. In all sincerity, this is not a melodramatic way of describing our present human predicament. States, particularly the powerful and mighty among them, pursue national policies aiming at protection by military means of their conceived national interests. The resulting militarization of societies and the accumulation of vast resources of destruction are of such magnitude that the survival in reasonable well-being of this generation of mankind is at stake.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

No wonder, then, that there is increasing awareness among the general public of the dramatically growing dangers inherent in the developments in this field, which is the concern of this General Assembly Committee, that is, the arms race. For a growing number of people, in any country where a free debate on matters of life and death is possible, the issue has changed from one of deterrence, of military balance or of inferiority or superiority, to one of survival. In the recent words of an authoritative West German politician: "What you are witnessing is a fundamental change in people's consciousness."

The fact is that there is a new wave of disarmament, growing stronger week by week, month by month. In my view, it is a serious psychological and political mistake to dismiss this movement, as several prominent statesmen and military leaders have done, as a new wave of "neutralism", "pacifism", and the like. An experienced Swedish statesman advised a young disciple some 40 years ago never to underestimate the knowledge and the wisdom of an enlightened citizen and voter. Likewise, political and military leaders would do well to listen carefully to the voices raised with increasing strength in support of what those leaders themselves voted for in the first paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, namely, that:

"States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms....Yet the accumulation of weapons... today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come...to seek security in disarmament...." (resolution S-10/2, para.1)

The first special session on disarmament established the Committee on Disarmament as the multilateral negotiating machinery for disarmament. Facing, in about seven months' time, the second special session on disarmament, we have to ask ourselves two pertinent questions. What has the Committee on Disarmament achieved since January 1979? And if it has not achieved sufficient results, why not?

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

We have to ask these questions because it is this General Assembly Committee's duty to assess the 1981 report of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament has the task and it possesses the potential - really to negotiate disarmament agreements. Of course, there may be room for marginal improvements of the efficiency of the Committee, but on the whole it constitutes a smoothly functioning mechanism for multilateral negotiations.

Why, then, has not one single agreement emerged from the Committee since the first special session? The obvious reason for this failure is, of course, that the work of the Committee can only reflect the international power structure. The leading military Powers, particularly the two super-Powers, have not demonstrated readiness or even willingness to exploit the rich potential of the Committee on Disarmament, because of the way in which they interpret their own security needs and interests in the present international situation. And it is those perceived needs and interests which draw the line between success and failure. So far, there have been few successes and a number of failures.

Against these unfavourable conditions, and primarily due to the persistent demands from the Group of 21 neutral and non-aligned countries, considerable efforts have been made to achieve some measure of progress. As indicated in the 1981 report, the Committee on Disarmament has after lengthy procedural discussions established working groups in four areas, namely, a comprehensive programme of disarmament, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and negative security assurances. And in spite of the single-minded security perceptions of the leading military Powers, resulting in limited and constraining mandates for the working groups, the intensive negotiations of the groups in many respects created a solid ground for future substantive negotiations on the subjects under consideration.

First, the efforts to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament have gained urgency in view of the general armament-disarmament situation, which the forthcoming second special session on disarmament will confront. The working group in the Committee on Disarmament entrusted with this task has

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identified the main issues involved and is arranging the material in a logical and generally agreed manner. Sweden supports efforts to establish an order of priorities and realistic time-frames for the achievement of concrete disarmament measures. Needless to say, the impact of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will be completely dependent on the political will to implement it through multilateral negotiations, which leads us back to the real parameters dictating the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Sweden trusts that it will be possible to finalize the programme for submission to the second special session.

Secondly, the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on chemical weapons of the Committee on Disarmament again confirmed that there exists a broad political consensus on the need to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

As a result of the active and constructive contributions of delegations, and despite the lack of a clear-cut mandate, the Working Group has conducted a systematic survey of all major issues to be dealt with in an international convention on chemical weapons. The report of the Group comprises an impressive amount of material of a high technical and scientific quality. In Sweden's view, this report constitutes a solid basis for continued negotiations on the subject and for a review of the Group's mandate, in order to permit negotiations on a convention during the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. I would like to suggest that informal consultations on the drafting of a new mandate start right now, in order to avoid a repetition of last year's depressing procedural haggling on this issue.

In this context, I would like to recall the Swedish proposal on banning certain specified activities and facilities that are not included in the classical approach to a chemical-weapon convention. Our proposal gained valuable support but also caused some hesitation and even resistance. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a general recognition that the effectiveness of a chemical-weapon



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convention would be significantly improved if, as Sweden has suggested, loopholes that would allow maintaining a "chemical warfare capability" were closed. Such an expansion of the scope of a convention would, in our opinion, increase confidence among parties and in the convention itself.

A third working group in the Committee on Disarmament deals with the banning of radiological weapons. The negotiations have to a considerable degree focused on the Swedish proposal to include the prohibition of attack against civilian nuclear installations, in order to prevent the massive release of radioactive material. In fact, apart from nuclear explosions, such an attack appears to be the only existing plausible method of waging radiological warfare. The Swedish proposal was submitted as a serious effort to improve the USA-USSR "agreed joint proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", a joint proposal which, in Sweden's view, to put it in undiplomatically blunt language, completely lacks substance.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Certain attacks on civilian nuclear installations are prohibited by the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocols. It should be kept in mind that both those prohibitions have important exemptions and that until now no major or even middle-sized military Power has adhered to them. It deserves to be emphasized that the Swedish proposal is based on realistic scenarios for actual conflict and on the well-documented security interests of many States. To our consternation, however, the two authors of the so-called joint proposal were at the forefront of efforts to discredit the Swedish proposal. But after the alarming attack on the Osirak reactor - which has been condemned by the international community - the realism, relevance and justification of the Swedish proposal can no longer be contested. Nevertheless, the original drafters maintain their opposition to including a ban on attacks on civilian nuclear installations. If they persist in this position they will deprive any possible treaty of its potentially most substantive element. Support for the Swedish proposal, already expressed by many delegations in the Committee, is, however, increasing. I was, for example, very pleased to note the statement made last week by the representative of Japan on that issue. That support is given on the merits of the Swedish proposal. But instead of arguing those merits, the Soviet Union and the United States have resorted to the argument that it is essential to enable the Committee to conclude at least one single, even if non-substantive, agreement before the second special session devoted to disarmament and that it is by now too late to enlarge the scope of the radiological-weapon treaty.

Sweden seriously doubts that an obviously defective treaty would in any way help to restore the already suffering credibility of the Committee on Disarmament. It might on the contrary, further damage the image of the Committee. It is our belief that our proposal is by no means so complicated that agreement on it would be impossible to achieve before the second special session devoted to disarmament. At the same time, it deserves to be underlined that without progress in this direction, Sweden seriously questions the usefulness of proceeding on the basis of the so-called agreed joint proposal.

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An assessment of the 1981 report of the Committee on Disarmament must also address the fourth issue -- the question of so-called negative security assurances. As such assurances are often discussed in conjunction with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, that issue has been the subject of renewed interest in the Nordic countries as an element in the ongoing debate on the feasibility of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area.

In the Committee on Disarmament, a working group entrusted with the item of negative security assurances has concentrated on efforts to evolve a common formula based on the various statements made in 1978 by the nuclear-weapon States -- a formula which in turn could serve as a basis for the conclusion of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The results of those efforts are far from what could legitimately be expected. The nuclear-weapon States did not show any readiness to contemplate even the slightest modification of their respective positions. They firmly cling to their unilateral declarations of 1978, which are mainly functions of their own nuclear-weapon doctrines and are primarily designed to serve their own narrow security interests. The security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those outside the military alliances, receive at best secondary consideration. Some of the suggested arrangements for formalizing present assurances imply the imposition of new and unwarranted obligations upon non-nuclear-weapon States which are unacceptable to most of them.

Sweden is firmly convinced that the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States are, by virtue of their non-nuclear-weapon status, entitled to binding, unequivocal and irrevocable assurances that they will not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons.

The Swedish Government considers the intention behind the existing assurances to be that States which do not belong to any military alliance with nuclear-weapon States and which are committed to a nuclear-weapon-free

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status be covered by the present unilateral assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Swedish Government has declared that it takes it for granted that Sweden -- a country that is outside all military alliances and that, as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and accepted full control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- is covered, without any exceptions, by those assurances by the nuclear-weapon States. No objections have been forthcoming from those States. Sweden takes this as a confirmation that its interpretation of their solemn assurances is correct.

Since efforts to reach agreement on a common formula have come to a dead end, it might be useful to consider an interim measure on the basis of existing unilateral declarations. It should, however, be made absolutely clear that such a measure cannot be regarded as a substitute for the final objective of agreeing on arrangements satisfactory to all States. In an attempt to make some progress, Sweden proposes that the General Assembly consider urging the Security Council to embody present negative security assurances in a formal resolution in order to make them legally binding.

This last point has brought me to the most crucial area of the arms race. Let me therefore now turn to the disarmament issues that are not under negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament, that is, the issues with the highest priority in the United Nations, items 1 and 2 on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament -- the issues relating to a comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament. Why are they not subject to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament? Because, under the consensus rule, certain Powers have denied the Committee on Disarmament its unequivocal right to negotiate them.

Meanwhile, there is again a growing and spreading public anxiety in Europe that the risk of nuclear war is increasing as the international climate deteriorates and the arms race accelerates. While prospects for an early

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improvement of the situation are dim, it is imperative that all approaches towards defusing the situation and starting sincere talks on real nuclear disarmament be daringly explored. It is axiomatic that the nuclear-weapon States -- and in particular, the two super-Powers -- must take primary responsibility for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. They do not honour obligations once accepted by them. Instead, they indulge in dangerous confrontation and world-wide military competition, resulting in incredibly high levels of destructive power at ever lower levels of security. The rest of the world cannot silently accept being dragged along this suicidal course.

My own feeling is that it should be superfluous to repeat for the umpteenth time that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would contribute to halting the qualitative improvement and development of new types of nuclear weapons. But obviously, that is not the case. The present status of the comprehensive test-ban issue is both alarming and confusing. All three nuclear-weapon States that were engaged in the trilateral preparatory talks -- the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union -- refuse, albeit in different ways, to allow multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Committee on Disarmament. Two of the nuclear-weapon States mentioned refuse outright to consent to a working group in the Committee on Disarmament. They do so in open defiance of several General Assembly resolutions and in stark contrast to their own support of one of those, namely, General Assembly resolution 32/78. Those two States try to explain their opposition by arguing that the trilateral talks which started more than four years ago still offer the best opportunity for achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. They maintain that position even though it is common knowledge that the trilateral talks have been suspended since the summer of 1980. Recent indications in this Committee

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

expressed last week are that there is little hope that those talks will be resumed in the near future. Sweden sincerely regrets this. As was stated in respect to the first special session devoted to disarmament, as was stated in respect to the NPT Review Conference, and proved true, a lack of progress in this field would again seriously undermine the prospects for a successful outcome of the second special session devoted to disarmament. How many such failures can the world community take?

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

I did indicate that it would be incorrect to give an impression that only two of the three nuclear-weapon States involved are to blame for the present impasse. The third participant in the trilateral talks has told us that it will agree to multilateral comprehensive test-ban negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, but only if all other nuclear-weapon States commit themselves beforehand to participate actively in the negotiations and to abide by their outcome. Pre-conditions of this nature are indeed not in conformity with established practices in multilateral negotiations. In view of the well-known positions of the other nuclear-weapon States in question, such pre-conditions represent just another but less boisterous method of effectively blocking progress.

I have already stated that, as a result, the Committee on Disarmament is denied the possibility of negotiating a treaty that is contained in the very first item on its agenda, which has been given the highest priority by this Assembly. In view of this abuse by some Member States of the rule of consensus, others, including Sweden, felt compelled to suggest a modification of this rule. No single member of the Committee on Disarmament should have the right to prevent the Committee from establishing subsidiary organs for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee on agenda matters agreed upon unanimously. The Committee may soon approach a situation where this anomalous practice will have to be changed by prohibiting the rule of consensus to be applied to matters of procedure.

The matter with which I have dealt is, of course, closely linked with the two super-Powers' strategic arms talks. As so many others, Sweden deplores the fact that the SALT II agreement was not ratified. Seven years of negotiations were thereby discarded. It is reported, however, that the American administration may aim at future talks, and then introduce the goal of far-reaching reductions in nuclear arsenals. Should such an approach, which is both militarily and strategically desirable and feasible, be accepted it could significantly improve chances for a desperately needed breakthrough. What is imperative, however, is that the super-Powers resume dialogue and talks soon on limitations and reductions of strategic weapons. Meanwhile, Sweden urges the Soviet Union and the United States of America to continue to respect the provisions of the SALT II treaty.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

It must be taken as a positive sign that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an understanding to start negotiations on intermediate range nuclear-weapon systems in Europe. Sweden welcomes this decision and expresses the hope that the parties will initiate early substantive negotiations, avoiding the obvious danger of being bogged down in procedural matters.

The peoples of Europe are alarmed over the deterioration of the political and military climate; it directly affects us. Not least, recent remarks concerning the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons "in the field" without unleashing an all-out nuclear war - the so-called limited nuclear war concept -- give rise to the most serious concerns. Sweden has on several occasions expressed strong warnings against such doctrines which would make nuclear war thinkable.

Let me use this occasion to discuss briefly various aspects of European disarmament.

First of all, there is every reason once again to denounce utterly the decision to produce the enhanced radiation weapon - the so-called neutron bomb - designed specifically for use on European soil.

Secondly, it is of immediate urgency to halt the accelerating buildup of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile and the Backfire heavy bomber started some four years ago. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles is scheduled to start in about two years. In the view of the Swedish Government the introduction of all these weapons has never been necessary to maintain a general balance of forces in Europe and between the super-Powers. It can be in no one's interest to arrive at the likely situation of increased vulnerability and insecurity for both sides after a new round of nuclear-weapon deployment. We must once and for all resist the argument that it really is necessary to achieve a balance at each and every level of armament and between all weapon categories. The objective must therefore be to reduce very drastically the number of existing long-range nuclear theatre systems, including Soviet SS-20 missiles, aiming at their total elimination, and to avoid the deployment of NATO's new long-range theatre weapons in Europe.



(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Europe is already packed to the brim with tactical nuclear weapons. According to the United Nations Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons some 10,000 tactical weapons are said to be deployed there as, for instance, atomic mines, nuclear artillery grenades and rockets, and air-launched rockets. Their military and doctrinal value and significance is disputed by civilian and military leaders. One way of promoting nuclear disarmament in Europe, which is under current discussion, is to start negotiating a drastic reduction, even abolition, of all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Such an important proposal deserves a thorough analysis, inter alia, of the relative importance of nuclear and conventional forces. Sweden invites the military alliances to further explore this possibility with a view to initiating negotiations on the matter. It could also be a subject for study by independent research institutions in order to enlighten the public and to stimulate debate.

The continuation and expansion of the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is an essential part of the efforts to promote peace and security in Europe and the world. The question of convening a special conference on confidence and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe is one of the main items on the agenda in Madrid.

The ongoing negotiations to be resumed tomorrow in Madrid have long been based on a draft concluding document proposed by the neutral and non-aligned participating States. This proposal foresees a European disarmament conference in two stages: the first concentrating on the further development of confidence-building measures and the second stage dealing with negotiations on real disarmament. In Sweden's view these latter negotiations must include questions related to limitation and reduction of nuclear-weapon systems in Europe.

There are no nuclear weapons in peace-time in the Nordic countries. The current discussion in those countries, therefore, is aimed at investigating possibilities for extending this nuclear-free status to all Nordic States in times of crisis or war as well. It is in this connexion that the formulation of negative security assurances on the part of the nuclear-weapon States should be investigated. The Swedish Parliament has recently stated in an unanimously

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adopted resolution that the Swedish Government

"... should continue to keep in close contact with the other Nordic Governments on this issue for the purpose of finding out if there is common ground between the Nordic countries for the purpose of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area as part of efforts for a nuclear-weapon-free Europe. If the pre-conditions exist the work should proceed".

Furthermore, the Nordic Foreign Ministers at their meeting last September, after having informed each other of the prerequisites which, in view of the different national security policy situations of each country, should apply to the work for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area, agreed to continue to keep in contact concerning their future work on this question.

A primary goal of Sweden is to maintain the low level of tension which, in our view, exists in the Nordic area. As a matter of course Sweden is fully prepared seriously to consider any arrangement that would enhance security and stability in our region. Such arrangements would, in Sweden's view, have to include undertakings by the Soviet Union and the United States. To further promote progress in this matter, both super-Powers must be prepared to discuss concrete commitments.

Aggressive research and technological development for military purposes constantly open new possibilities for expansion of military competition into new areas. I should like to mention two examples of this development, outer space and the oceans, which are considered to be the common heritage of mankind.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Outer space has so far remained free from armed conflict. It is, however, obvious that space research and technology have for a long time been of the highest military importance. In fact, most space missions have had purely military purposes. Sweden notes with deep concern current tendencies to expand overt military competition into outer space. This trend is ominous from several points of view. First, it is likely negatively to affect the very considerable and economically and socially important international co-operation which has developed over the last decades in fields such as space communications, meteorology, navigation and so forth; secondly, certain aspects of potential military capacity, such as anti-satellite and, in the longer run, anti-ballistic technologies, are likely to have very serious destabilizing effects.

At the same time, military space systems of the size and nature necessary to achieve a dominating position are likely to be quite vulnerable and costly. In the Swedish Government's view, a decisive effort should be made now, before irreversible decisions are taken.

In this context Sweden notes with interest the recent Soviet proposal to prohibit the placing into orbit of vehicles carrying weapons of any kind. This proposal has the merit of attracting attention to aspects of the military use of outer space. However, several central elements in the proposed draft treaty require further clarification. While the proposal seems to comprise some aspects of militarization of outer space, other aspects of equal and great importance which have been left out would have to be included. Furthermore, the Soviet draft will have to be complemented in the important areas of verification of compliance and in matters concerning complaints and review procedures. Sweden would, however, like to revert to the question of how to regulate military activities in outer space in the course of next year's meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as at the second special session of the Assembly.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

It would seem proper that the special session should decide whether this matter should be negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament or any other appropriate forum, including a resumption of bilateral United States-Soviet talks. Meanwhile, multilateral negotiations could profitably be prepared at expert level.

It is also important closely to follow the expanding military utilization of the oceans and the sea-bed. The first steps to control this development were made in the sea-bed Treaty, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This Treaty will be reviewed for the second time in 1982. Sweden proposes that the depositary Powers take urgent steps towards fulfilling the Treaty's provision in article V that there should be a continuation of negotiations concerning further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

The forthcoming second review of the sea-bed Treaty is desirable, particularly in view of rapid developments in the field of marine technology. The 1977 First Review Conference decided that possible technological developments since the conclusion of the Treaty should be monitored. Sweden therefore proposes that informal consultations should be held during this Assembly to agree on the place and date for such a review and appropriate ways of implementing a technological assessment which, according to the 1977 Review Conference, should take place in the then Committee of the Conference of Disarmament. In Sweden's view such a survey of technological development, relevant to the sea-bed Treaty, can take place at expert level within the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Increased attention should also be devoted to the development of the naval arms race spreading to ever vaster areas of the world's oceans. Present conventional naval and, in particular, amphibious and transportation capabilities, provide the major Powers with improved possibilities not only to outbalance each other, but also to project military force to most parts of the world. Problems related to the naval arms race need to be further studied and clarified. We would hope that this could be done within the United Nations context for possible international consideration.

It is a source of great satisfaction to the Swedish Government that more than 40 countries have signed the Convention on certain particularly inhumane weapons. It is now vitally important that those militarily significant Powers which have not yet signed the Convention do so without further delay and that the Convention be ratified by as many countries as possible and in the shortest possible time.

Last week I had the honour of introducing document A/36/356 containing the final report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Speaking today as the Swedish representative, I want to elaborate very briefly one of the points that I mentioned then, actually at the very conclusion.

In our view the report deals with a crucial problem area of present human relationships in the short and long term perspective. The message that it tries to bring out should not be allowed to be forgotten in the tedious business of dealing with day-to-day problems, important as those indeed are. In co-operation with others, Sweden will exert efforts to ensure an effective follow-up of the process of establishing an awareness of the triangular disarmament-security-development relationship among national Governments and the general public in order to let this lead at the proper moment to concrete action.

At this session of the General Assembly we intend to introduce a draft procedural resolution aimed at securing a thorough review of the report at the national level as a preparation for a substantive debate at the second special session of its findings and its recommendations to Governments and to the United Nations systems.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

In general, United Nations studies on various aspects of the arms race and disarmament complex have been identified as helpful in adding to our knowledge of and clarifying our minds on difficult and complicated issues, as well as in establishing the means by which to reach and inform the general public in order to assist in further strengthening public opinion for disarmament. Sweden for one is and will be consistent in its support for study and information-type activities of the United Nations.

This was one of several main lines of thought when Sweden a few years ago took the initiative in carrying out a Study on the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament. The Swedish delegation will revert to this matter in some detail during the discussions in this Committee of the report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts appointed to study this matter. Already at this stage it should be noted, however, that the hopes Sweden attached to this study from the outset have not yet been fully met. It has been generally agreed that the need for progress in disarmament and arms control in the 1980s is more urgent than ever and that consequently the United Nations must set high goals in this field. A United Nations Disarmament Agency along the lines suggested by Sweden would, to our mind, be the machinery to correspond to such ambitious goals. Against the background of Sweden's strongly felt view on this matter, presented in some detail in the Group of Experts, we will pursue our efforts in co-operation with interested countries, so that a decision along those lines can be taken by the second special session. In so doing, the second special session would ensure that the ambitious work programme which will then be agreed will be matched by adequate Secretariat resources.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

At the beginning of my statement I referred to the decisive role that well-informed public opinion could and should play. A key paragraph of the disarmament-development study brings out clearly that the world can either continue to pursue the arms race or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. In other words, we stand today at the cross-roads. Well-informed, enlightened and involved public opinion can assist world decision-makers and leaders to choose not the road to common suicide, but the road to human survival.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): The present session of the General Assembly and its First Committee have at least two characteristic factors concerning disarmament issues. The first is the undiminished continuation of the arms race, the second the fact that this is the last session of the General Assembly before the second special session on disarmament. The question is clear: will the present session be able to halt and reverse the arms race, thus creating favourable conditions for the disarmament process in general and for the second special session on disarmament in particular, or will it be unable to do so, with the international community facing an even more dangerous situation and with the second special session on disarmament doomed to failure? Very much is at stake, and each and every delegation must be aware of its responsibility and must make all possible efforts to achieve some real progress.

The period between the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly did not lead to a decrease of the arms race and international tension. World military expenditures exceed the astronomical figure of \$500 billion a year, the nuclear arms race continues unabated, new weapons of mass destruction are under development parallel with the further sophistication of existing weapons.

The main reason for that course of development, that is, the well-known decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1978, the effort of the United States to upset the existing strategic military balance for attaining military superiority, the NATO decision on the deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, is clear to everyone. That already very dangerous course has been further aggravated by recent decisions of the United States on the development and production of the neutron bomb and other weapons.

Unfortunately, under those circumstances, it is quite obvious that during the last year no tangible result could be reached in the field of disarmament in the various frameworks of disarmament negotiations, be they multilateral, regional, trilateral or bilateral. No real progress in Geneva, the unchanged situation in the Vienna talks, no breakthrough so far in Madrid in connexion with the European disarmament conference, discontinuation of the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, the failure to ratify SALT-II, are ingredients of the general picture.



(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

I should like to deal very briefly with the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the report of which is before the First Committee.

The Committee on Disarmament in Geneva started in 1981 session with the understanding that it was its last full session before the second special session on disarmament and the majority of delegations expressed a firm desire to reach tangible results on some important questions of disarmament. That responsibility and firm desire were manifested in the submission by many delegations, among them the socialist countries members of the Committee on Disarmament, of important new proposals aimed at reaching progress in the solution of some disarmament issues.

The Committee on Disarmament worked hard in 1981. It never held so many meetings, formal and informal, as it did this year; never had so many proposals and working papers been submitted as there were in 1981. One can state with some satisfaction that the work of the Committee was not hampered by irrelevant political and lengthy procedural and organizational debates, as was the case last year. The four re-established working groups functioned normally from the very beginning of the session and some of them even made some progress. The Committee paid considerable attention to the question of increasing the efficiency of its work.

At the same time, all those facts cannot hide the sad reality that since the reorganization of the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, this has already been the third consecutive year in which the Committee on Disarmament had to report to the General Assembly that it was unable to reach any tangible result. My delegation considers it most regrettable that because of the opposition of some delegations the Committee on Disarmament was even unable to establish two new working groups for the consideration of the most important and urgent questions, that is, the comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In 1979 some delegations said that the Committee on Disarmament was prevented from making progress by the elaboration of rules of procedure of the reorganized body. In 1980 the worsened international situation was the pretext for those delegations to find the lack of progress acceptable. This year, while the international situation remained generally unchanged, an additional factor

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made the work of the Committee on Disarmament more complicated and hampered progress, that is, the fact that a militarily very important Power, the United States, was engaged in a review of its strategic, arms control and disarmament policies.

In the opinion of my delegation, the present session of the General Assembly should give an impetus to the work of the Committee on Disarmament by adopting appropriate resolutions. Unfortunately, some of the statements made so far give us little hope of any significant change for the better in the situation in the Committee on Disarmament. Despite that, the Hungarian delegation will do its best here in the Committee and next year in the Committee on Disarmament to contribute to the attainment of tangible results in the field of disarmament. I should like to hope that the majority of delegations will draw the same conclusion from the existing state of affairs.

I should like now to deal briefly with the most important question of disarmament, namely, nuclear disarmament. In the present international situation there is no task more important and urgent than that of preventing the outbreak of a nuclear holocaust, the danger of which is, unfortunately, a real one. That is why the Hungarian delegation considers the Soviet proposal entitled "Prevention of a nuclear catastrophe: declaration of the General Assembly" as highly important and extremely timely and lends that proposal its full support.

In furthering the cessation of the nuclear arms race the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is of paramount importance. Hungary, together with other socialist delegations in the Committee on Disarmament, has consistently urged that Committee, in which all five nuclear-weapon States are represented, to play an active role in this matter by proposing the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question and supporting the similar proposal submitted by the Group of 21. Unfortunately, some nuclear-weapon Powers prevented the Committee from starting multilateral negotiations on this vitally important and urgent problem. I should like to hope that the resolution on this issue to be adopted at this session would contribute to the solution of this problem and would enhance the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Since the work of the Committee on Disarmament in this connexion would be greatly assisted by the successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations, my delegation appeals to the United States and the United Kingdom to resume those negotiations without any further delay.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Hungary, together with other socialist countries, attaches great importance to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. During the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, these countries put forward a proposal aimed at the creation of an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations on the question of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the position adopted by certain nuclear-weapon States again prevented the Committee from reaching agreement on this proposal. Halting the development of new types of nuclear weapons as proposed by the Soviet delegation would be an important step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

As has been expressed by many delegations, the Soviet Union and the United States have a special role to play in the cessation of the nuclear arms race and in nuclear disarmament. In this connexion, my delegation urges the early ratification of the SALT II treaty, delayed by the United States, which would serve the vital interests of the two Powers and also the interests of the whole world; for the same reasons it expects the continuation of the SALT process.

Hungary continues to attach great importance to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The recent barbaric Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre, condemned by the international community, and the continuing nuclear ambitions of Israel and the Pretoria régime, have made this question still more important and timely. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, everything should be done to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and to make it universal by the adhesion of countries that are at present outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework.

As was pointed out by many delegations, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world can play an important role in many respects. My delegation highly appreciates the consistent efforts of Finland aimed at denuclearizing northern Europe. Hungary endorsed the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones also in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. "Furthermore," as was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country in the General Assembly's general debate, "we hope that other regions of Europe too will be transformed into nuclear-weapon-free zones" (A/36/PV.24, p. 6).

The Hungarian delegation continues to consider that a system of political and international legal guarantees can play an important role in strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion, I should like

to deal with two questions: negative security assurances and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons.

In the Committee on Disarmament, the working group on negative security assurances has accomplished a great deal of substantive work this year. However, it did not get closer to its basic aim of finding a common approach on the basis of which the preparation and conclusion of an international convention on this subject could be reached, as advocated by the socialist countries and some other States. The lack of substantive progress was due to the negative attitude adopted by certain nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The Hungarian delegation is of the view that this work of the Committee on Disarmament should be continued, and it expects that the First Committee will adopt a resolution on this subject that will enhance the work of the Committee on Disarmament in this field.

Last year, the Hungarian delegation had the honour to submit, on behalf of 16 delegations, a draft resolution on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. The draft resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly. It is quite clear that the conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime, could contribute to reducing the danger of a nuclear war and the nuclear arms race, and could enhance the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

My delegation considers this question to be important and timely, and, together with like-minded delegations, intends to submit an appropriate draft resolution on this issue. Taking into account the existing situation, it considers it necessary to broaden the scope of the draft resolution, which would include an appeal not to deploy more nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there already are such weapons.

In conclusion, I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to speak again on other agenda items.

The CHAIRMAN: As representatives know, the Committee is nearing the end of its general debate, fixed for 4 November. I should therefore like once again to urge members to submit draft resolutions as far in advance as is feasible, in order to facilitate the task of the Committee officers and of the Secretariat, and so as to provide sufficient time for consultations.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.