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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 9TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. CARIAS (Honduras)
(Vice-Chairman)

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Statements were made by:

Mr. Canales (Chile)

Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Mr. Carasales (Argentina)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. CANALES (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): The Chilean delegation associates itself with other delegations which have congratulated the Chairman on his election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Likewise, my delegation wishes to congratulate the other officers of the Committee upon their election to their high posts.

We hope that in the course of this year our deliberations will enable us to make substantive progress while providing useful elements to continue to improve instruments which, like the Final Document, should guide us in our work.

In the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, we should complete the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament embodying all the objectives and priorities, strict compliance with which is the only means that will enable us gradually and resolutely to curb the arms race.

This aim is one of the primary aspirations of all delegations, since its achievement would safeguard us from the danger of a world conflagration, the consequences of which would be catastrophic for the whole of mankind.

Lately, many distinguished personalities have been speaking about the imminence of a world war, a view which is certainly not shared by my delegation.

Under the Chairman's able guidance we should achieve those goals and I wish to assure him that in the pursuit of those objectives he has the resolute co-operation of my delegation.

We hope that the resolutions or declarations to be adopted at this session will be realistic and aimed at those goals rather than mere propaganda rhetoric which over a period of 35 years has led to the accumulation of countless resolutions which have proved ineffective in achieving true disarmament goals.

General and complete disarmament, which has been pursued for so many years, is the sole guarantee of lasting peace and stable international security.

That item was included for the first time on the agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1959 at the request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and since then to date all States have said they were in favour of that final objective.

However, it has still remained a Utopian dream, since even the authors of that initiative have not only failed to respect it, but have even contributed to the escalation of the greatest arms race ever known in the history of mankind.

That widespread stockpiling of weapons is surprising in view of the enormous military expenditures it entails, the gigantic accumulation of destructive weapons, especially in the nuclear field, and the sophistication of weaponry which each year makes our disarmament objective appear to be more unrealistic and unattainable.

After the end of the Second World War this Organization was created. It was designed primarily to protect future generations from the scourge of a new war through the unrestricted observance of certain basic universal principles, the achievement of general and complete disarmament and international co-operation for the construction of a more just and equitable international economic order.

All these laudable objectives are breached continually, thus making our task impossible unless international sanity should prevail in the long run and creates a climate of peace and harmony.

The need to ensure the international security of each State makes it necessary to create more or less powerful armed forces, depending on the greater or lesser degree of the threat confronting it or the strategic and political objective each State sets for itself as its national goal.

If defence of the territorial and sovereign integrity of a country is the sole aim, the military forces required to repel any external or internal attack will be provided. That is being done in many third-world countries, including my own.

On the other hand, if the objectives are expansionist, an aspiration that certain States have made quite obvious, countries will need greater military power capable of enslaving all nations that stand in the way of their designs or their interests, since war is nothing but a continuation of policies through other means. That is the reason for the unbridled arms race which we are witnessing and which makes it necessary each year to increase military expenditures. At present those expenditures have reached the astounding figure of almost \$600 billion, which are used to the detriment of the satisfaction of the most elementary needs of the international community.

Therefore, regrettably, we cannot aspire to general and complete disarmament unless we are first able to create a climate of confidence, while eliminating some of the causes, which I shall now outline and which, in our view, appear essentially to influence world armament, with which not even the poorest countries can dispense, depending upon their relative geographic position.

The first cause is the flagrant and constant violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of our Organization, in particular: interference in the internal affairs of States, with the use of the most varied direct and indirect means for that purpose; the use of force to achieve expansionist objectives, while avoiding the peaceful settlement of disputes; aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other States.

Those principles are the ones that have been the most often breached, especially during recent years. I shall cite only a few examples. Force is used to invade a defenceless nation like Afghanistan, maintaining occupation of that country, flouting resolutions of the General Assembly and bringing about the tragic plight of millions of refugees, who must depend on the generous assistance of neighbouring countries. Kampuchea is invaded in order to overthrow a Government and replace it by one that is more flexible and therefore more in keeping with the purposes of the aggressors, thus creating even greater problems than those in the first case, since a much larger region is involved. There is interference in the internal affairs

of other States throughout the third world, through the use with impunity of the greatest scourge of modern times, terrorism and subversion, by people who are trained and financed by States which in this Assembly present themselves as the champions of peace and disarmament. Latin America is a very desirable objective for the proponents of those policies.

The second cause is that the process of détente, confined to Europe and to the political field alone, has made it possible to move conflicts to other regions of the world and to stimulate an unbridled arms race in those areas to enable them to protect their own security, to the detriment of the social and economic development which should be the fundamental objective.

The third cause is the hegemonistic aspirations of one of the great Powers, with the clear objective of world domination and using the powerful master weapon of ideological political infiltration to bring about internal subversion in those countries where suitable conditions have been created by their poverty and trustfulness.

The fourth cause is the transfer of weapons without international control, which has influenced the formation of major and highly profitable military-industrial complexes, thereby stimulating the arms race in all those States which do not possess competitive weapons factories.

The fifth cause, another factor which militates against disarmament, is the continued confrontation of the interests of East and West in those regions of the world that are at opposite ends of the scale geographically, because of their geographic situation, their energy resources or their advantageous strategic position.

The sixth cause is the growing tendency of international bodies to become politically oriented, their discriminatory actions and the creation of automatic majorities which impose their views and distort the true solution of the problems affecting mankind while endlessly postponing items that continually appear on our agenda.

The seventh cause is an unjust eocnomic world order which allows hunger and poverty to exist in many countries of the third world while the richer countries are unable to find appropriate and adequate solutions to those problems.

If we want to achieve success at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982, we must create a climate of peace and harmony and achieve greater stability in international relations.

The discouraging picture that I have described, which is today's reality, must not make us defeatists; rather we must become more acutely aware of the fact that disarmament tasks have priority in the United Nations and that we must do everything in our power to devise appropriate solutions which will improve the Programme of Action for disarmament already adopted and make it possible to implement it in the near future in a realistic and flexible manner.

We have given our views on some general aspects of policy and security in particular as they relate to disarmament questions, because that is the primary objective of the First Committee and because it makes it possible for us to tackle the many and sometimes repetitive items on the agenda which has been adopted and which we put into groups in order that they may be better understood: nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, the use of outer space, and efforts in favour of peace.

In keeping with the traditional general debate in the First Committee, we have adopted the method of grouping similar items in order to consider several subjects under each of those headings, while referring briefly to all of them, since we shall be speaking only once in this general debate.

With respect to nuclear weapons, there are already more than 10 items dealing with different aspects of that question. It would appear to be inappropriate to introduce new topics for study in connexion with nuclear weapons because an increase in the number of topics relating to nuclear weapons would hamper our work rather than facilitate it.

The time has come to complete work that is unfinished and to give effect to decisions taken to curb the nuclear arms race and not to add further statements, which would only divert attention from the fundamental questions.

Nuclear disarmament is undoubtedly the essential priority and most important goal of the whole disarmament programme of action. That is obvious because nuclear weapons both tactical and strategic give those Powers that possess them the greatest destructive capacity ever seen in the world; because nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of a few States, especially the great Powers, and those are the ones that must bring it about through bilateral talks: and because the time factor is against us since, if the solution of this problem is delayed further, within a few years many States will have the capacity to use nuclear energy for military purposes.

Treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other conventions have not prevented vertical and horizontal proliferation of such weapons. Vertical proliferation has led to the accumulation in the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers of a destructive capacity capable of devastating the whole world, and SALT I and the talks on SALT II at present under way have not led to nuclear disarmament with a view to the reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, scientific and technical progress has made it possible to change vertical quantitative proliferation into qualitative proliferation, thus making it even more difficult to control this type of weapon.

It becomes more alarming every day that only the balance of the nuclear might of the super-Powers offers a guarantee that general nuclear war will not break out, because that would imply the self-destruction of the two States since the second-strike possibility exists as part of the guarantee of world security. However, the fact that intercontinental strategic nuclear

weapons are not used does not mean that limited nuclear war could not be waged in a smaller theatre of operations.

Tactical nuclear weapons - that is, those used on the battlefield - of a smaller capacity, 20 to 80 kilotons, could be used in any region of the world without unleashing a general nuclear war. This is the danger of horizontal proliferation. Any State that is in a position to develop atomic weapons anywhere in the world compels other States to seek that kind of balance.

In order to avoid every kind of proliferation it is essential to conclude a treaty prohibiting all kinds of nuclear tests. It must be recalled that underground nuclear tests are still being carried out.

We have always encountered the obstacle that not all States accept systems of verification or control of disarmament or nuclear tests accompanied by on-site inspection. If we do not arrive at an agreement that will make verification effective, we shall make no progress with respect to a programme of action for disarmament.

There exist defensive means that could narrow down the field of a nuclear war - that is, the declaration of nuclear-free zones. In this connexion the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is an example that should be imitated.

In this connexion we hope that items that have been on our agenda for many years may be given practical effect. We are referring to the declaration and creation of nuclear-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and southern Asia. We want this to happen also in regions of the world which hope to be declared zones of peace. Any progress along these lines would be a great relief to the States in those regions whose territories would be threatened by whatever conflicts might arise locally.

There are other items with the same objective, such as that concerning better guarantees that nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Lastly, with regard to nuclear war, we hope that common sense will prevail and that it will be possible in the last analysis to control production of this type of weapon.

Any new type of nuclear weapon that is produced will certainly not be less destructive than the earlier ones. The launching system may change, its size may be reduced without a change in destructive capacity or it may lead to a different kind of action, but it will in no way help disarmament and will rather promote competition to counteract such action.

Regarding conventional weapons, the sum total of the damage they can produce can be as great as or greater than that produced by a nuclear war. Each year 80 per cent of military expenditures is devoted to the production of conventional weapons, which each year become more sophisticated — that is, the production of various types of equipment, aircraft, warships and tanks and various types of specially designed weapons. This means that the armed forces of States must continually evolve and change in order that their combative capacity may be maintained, all of which leads to enormous military expenditures. Thus regional disarmament becomes more and more difficult to attain with each passing day, and the reduction of military budgets becomes impossible to control.

Among these weapons, weapons of mass destruction have second priority as regards control and reduction. However, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, of 1971, constitutes a guarantee in this respect.

In connexion with bacteriological weapons, considerable progress was achieved with the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, of 1972, but we regret that that Convention was not extended to cover chemical weapons.

The use of such weapons in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Kampuchea has been denounced. Such use causes us concern, especially if such weapons have been used indiscriminately and against the civilian populations in flagrant violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

With respect to the use of outer space, the progress achieved by science and technology through the exploration and exploitation of outer space has been astounding. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has since its inception done a large amount of work through its subsidiary bodies. Thus a number of treaties and conventions regulating a number of activities in outer space have been adopted.

Although some treaties prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere and in outer space and the use of nuclear weapons in celestial bodies and in outer space, the Committee in question has confined itself to the study of all aspects connected with the exploration and use of that environment for peaceful purposes, as its name implies.

My delegation, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, of which my country has been a member since 1974, has reiterated the need for a military study of that dimension, inasmuch as 80 per cent of all activities carried out in that environment have been for military purposes. For that reason we believe that that Committee should consider both peaceful and military uses of outer space.

We have emphasized that point because we have noted the gradual advances achieved with, <u>inter alia</u>, military intelligence monitoring satellites, navigational guides, observation and vigilance of the seas, meteorological studies which have perfected environmental war, satellites which follow the trajectory of intercontinental missiles, achieving a margin of no more than ten metres from the objective that is to be brought down, and satellites providing advance warning of the use of missiles to be destroyed before they reach their target.

All of this has brought about the need to create anti-satellite weapon systems. Thus the militarization of outer space has materialized and must be curbed before it reaches unprecedented proportions.

We believe that the United Nations should play a relevant role in the future in controlling that type of activity through its Outer Space Affairs Division, which could be restructured for that purpose.

An interesting initiative might be to establish an international satellite monitoring agency, as proposed initially by France in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and subsequently considered by the General Assembly and by a group of experts who submitted a report to be considered at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

Such an initiative could contribute to verification of compliance with certain agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. On the other hand it could play an important role in the prevention or solution of international crises, thus helping to promote confidence among States.

In conclusion, we are in favour of the initiation of a study on the militarization of outer space in order to improve existing legislation on the subject.

With respect to efforts in favour of peace, as we are convinced of the dangers inherent in a third world war of either a conventional or a nuclear character which would expose mankind to partial or total destruction, we must make every effort in order to arrive at the adoption of effective measures for the benefit of the improvement of international relations and in our quest for definitive peace through general and complete disarmament.

To achieve that aim which we all share we must ensure faithful compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the solution of existing international problems and the early implementation of a programme of action for disarmament. That is why we wish to state our views on some matters conducive to the creation of this climate of peace and harmony.

First, the reduction of military budgets, an item which has been on our agenda for many years, cannot be achieved as long as the existing hotbeds of tension persist and confrontation between the super-Powers becomes more acute because of the need to curb the expansionist aims of Soviet imperialism.

Secondly, we must convince ourselves that the arms race is harmful to development, especially in the poorest countries of the third world, and makes the New International Economic Order unattainable.

Thirdly, we believe that it is essential to give the United Nations greater powers and means in order that it may exert a greater influence in the implementation of the programme of action for disarmament.

Fourthly, although there exists a clear priority with respect to disarmament measures, we believe it is necessary to make more bilateral and regional efforts in those areas of the world where there is greater harmony, in order to carry out measures conducive to curbing the arms race.

Fifthly, there is no doubt that there exists a wide spectrum of legal instruments to prevent the nuclear and conventional arms race, but what is lacking is the political will on the part of some States to respect those norms and that leads to a climate of mistrust which is propitious to the arms race. As long as effective measures are not adopted with a view to more drastic sanctions, the principles of the United Nations Charter will continue to be violated with impunity.

Sixthly, we resolutely support the holding in 1982 of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It would be very interesting and useful to have a report clearly assessing the progress achieved during the 1978 session and the scheduled second session, both as regards the legal and the practical aspects. That would serve in the future to establish real and flexible deadlines for disarmament measures.

Similarly, in 1982, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we must complete the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will be the central theme on the agenda, encompassing short and long-term measures for the achievement of the final disarmament objective which we all share. We must set out in detail our disarmament priorities to be achieved within a reasonable period of time, in order to determine the effectiveness of our work and the real chances of achieving arms control.

The oft-mentioned special session of the General Assembly to be held in 1982 will enable the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Conference for Disarmament - of which my country is a member - to determine the feasibility of those activities which we regard as being of the highest importance for the achievement of our disarmament goals.

Seventhly, the "World Disarmament Campaign" (agenda item 51 (i)) should be promoted in order to inform world public opinion about all the ideas covered by some of the items and reports which we consider in our discussions. In accordance with the provisions of resolution 35/152 I, the Secretary-General, with the advice of a Group of Experts, has prepared a study on the subject (A/36/458) which is short but of great interest for the promotion of disarmament.

We must disseminate information about the horrors of a war in which the present means of destruction would be used, so that world public opinion will give an impetus to the disarmament measures that we are proposing.

Full information on confidence-building measures (agenda item 55 (c)), study on disarmament and development (agenda item 51 (d)), and relationship between disarmament and international security (agenda item 55 (f)) should be given to schools, colleges and universities.

Lastly, we believe that as regards disarmament everything has been said, and that there are many treaties and conventions, ratified by most States, to control the arms race. Therefore, the time has come to comply with them, control their implementation and denounce violations of them, applying the sanctions which our Charter empowers the Security Council and the General Assembly to impose.

If all that is not effective in reducing military expenditures and normalizing international relations, we shall have to reach the regrettable conclusion that we are contributing to our own self-destruction - and those responsible can be easily identified.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): At each session of the General Assembly, from among the large number of questions there is one problem that can be singled out as the most immediate and urgent; it is, as it were, the keynote of the whole political and emotional mood and climate of the session. This problem is defined by the political circumstances and the course of events on the international scene.

This year, without any doubt, this keynote is the concern at the growing threat of nuclear war. The most important means for averting war - a material guarantee for peace - is seen by the Soviet Union, as it always has been seen, in the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Efforts to this end not only do not weaken but indeed do a great deal to consolidate other security guarantees for States, including political and legal ones, and promote the elimination and prevention of conflicts.

In the circumstances of the day, when the United States and its allies are once again increasing the pace of both material and doctrinal and propaganda preparations for war and the use of weapons - and what is particularly dangerous, nuclear weapons - the immediate need for taking concrete, genuinely feasible, tangible measures in this area is growing.

The Soviet Union has stated its readiness to do everything possible for this purpose and to co-operate with all countries. That is stated in the decisions of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the message of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world. Those documents contain a whole range of proposals encompassed in a peace programme for the 1980s. It affects all types of armaments and all geographical areas of the world. The importance of this programme not only has not dwindled but has actually grown with every passing day.

Because of the urgent need to halt the slide of the world towards nuclear war, the Soviet Union proposes that this session of the General Assembly pronounce firmly in favour of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and to that end adopt a declaration which in broad and clearcut terms condemns as a most grievous crime against mankind the first use of nuclear weapons.

The allegations that the Soviet Union considers it possible to be victorious in a nuclear war are sheer fabrications. Our position in this matter is consistent and unambiguous. Just a few days ago the President of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, replying to a question from a Pravda correspondent, reaffirmed something which had been publicly announced from the rostrum of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Party. He said: "To attempt to beat each other in the arms race, to count on victory in a nuclear war, is dangerous folly."

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev explained:

"... to begin a nuclear war in the hope of emerging from it victorious is something of which only someone bent on suicide could be capable. No matter how powerful an attacker, no matter what means he might choose for launching a nuclear war, he will not succeed in his goal; retribution will follow inexorably."

That is the Soviet Union's approach of principle to this subject.

Addressing himself to the American leadership, Mr. Brezhnev stated that it would be good if the President of the United States were also to make a clear and unambiguous statement. ejecting the very idea of a nuclear attack as criminal, and if at this session of the General Assembly the United States were to support the Soviet Union proposal on not being the first to use nuclear weapons. And, indeed, if there was no first nuclear strike, then obviously there would be no second or third nuclear strike. In this way it would become entirely pointless to waste time thinking about the possibility or the impossibility of victory in nuclear war. The question of nuclear war would simply disappear from our agenda as such. And that is precisely the aim of all peace-loving peoples on earth; that is precisely the goal of all the Soviet Union's efforts.

The reply given by the White House to the appeal of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to eliminate the very idea of a nuclear attack can hardly satisfy those who are anxious to eliminate the threat of nuclear-missile war. To state that "all will suffer from such a war" is simply to note the possibility of a nuclear war and is not a decisive repudiation of the idea of such a war as an instrument of policy or the first use of nuclear weapons. We hope that this will not be the last word from the United States.

If they really want to strengthen international security, stability and trust, they must demonstrate this in deeds and work towards the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, and not divert the General Assembly from the principal task of the day.

We believe that the adoption of a declaration is the very minimum that the United Nations can now - this very day - do in order to exert a restraining influence on the dangerous course of events in the world. The adoption at this session of such a political document would be a visible demonstration of the intentions of States to undertake large-scale action for the restoration and consolidation of trust in their relations. The result would be the creation of a much more propitious atmosphere for progress on a broad range of questions pertaining to the limitation and reduction of armaments, primarily, of course, nuclear armaments.

In order to prevent the spread of the arms race into new spheres, the Soviet Union has submitted to this session a draft international treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. Its purpose is to be a concrete, practical step in the area of restraining the arms race. We note with satisfaction that our proposal has already met with a positive response from a number of delegations.

In proposing new ideas here in the United Nations, the Soviet Union believes it necessary, in the present difficult circumstances, to tackle also, seriously and in a businesslike way, those questions which for so many years now have been on our agenda.

We do so in the belief that resolutions and decisions of the United Mations express the opinion of a majority of members of the international community and indicate specific routes towards complete and general disarmament and also partial disarmament measures. They contain useful practical injunctions for the work of bilateral and multilateral negotiating forums, including such an important, authoritative body as the Committee on Disarmament.

Generally speaking, we can note with satisfaction that our work together - difficult, meticulous and lengthy work - has created quite a good basis for strengthening and expanding the system of agreements in the area of arms limitation and for embarking finally on the adoption of real disarmament measures. It appears that all the conditions for this now exist.

It is becoming clear, however, as has been amply demonstrated in these very first days of the work of our Committee, that certain States still lack the necessary political will for this. In any case, one of them - indeed the most powerful - the United States, does not conceal its allergy to anything which is in any way connected with arms limitation. And this allergy has reached such a point now that representatives of the United States do not even hesitate to say that black is white, distort the facts of history and resort to out-and-out slander. They can even bring themselves to the point of saying that there is no such thing as an arms race - that very race which, throughout all the post-war years and at all stages of it, has constantly been launched and instigated by Washington. Another thing is typical here: the lofty, dismissive attitude to everything positive that has been achieved in arms limitation and disarmament to this day.

Following the logic of United States representatives, United Nations decisions, including the Final Document of the General Assembly special session on disarmament, can simply be stricken out and forgotten. This is the logic of those who still persist in thinking in imperial terms and who, to the collective search for decisions, prefer the methods of diktat and compulsion in international relations.

Speaking in the First Committee, the representative of the United States did not put forward a single concrete proposal on items on our agenda which are of concern to Member States. Instead, he simply put on the table a selection of played-out clichés from the time of the cold war, including the tired old arguments about control which, as we know, have repeatedly been used to undermine arms limitation talks. I should like to remind the United States representatives that our Committee is not a shop for second-hand goods.

The international community has produced its concept of the questions of control. Paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament quite clearly states that:

"The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon... the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement." (resolution S 10/2, sect. I, para. 31)

Those words sum up existing practice whereby all agreements and treaties in the field of disarmament contain appropriate provisions for control and also formulate a mandate for the future.

The United States delegation in essence is raising the question of paralysing once and for all the work of our Committee and that of the General Assembly itself, and indeed the work of multilateral negotiating bodies. If we are to believe that the resolutions we adopt here are useless and even harmful, then all that is left is to sit idly by and uncomplainingly wait while the United States builds up its own military power and that of its allies, henchmen and clients and, in the meantime, absorb ourselves in fruitless abstract discussions, dating from the time of the cold war, about control in general.

However, the hard facts of the development of military technology demonstrate that today as never before what we need are not words but genuine deeds in the realm of limiting and reducing armaments. Every day lost in our efforts to eliminate the danger of war brings this danger closer to home.

It is worth pointing out in this regard that in the process of development now there are such qualitatively new types of weapons, primarily weapons of mass destruction, as would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exercise control over them, to verify compliance with the limitations contained in agreements and, hence, also to attain further agreements about such limitations.

In the circumstances, it should be a matter of extreme concern for the international community that the majority of negotiations on various aspects of limiting the arms race and of arms limitation which were conducted in the 1970s have been either undermined or blocked by the United States.

Why was it necessary to give up the negotiations on arms limitations and why was it necessary to obstruct progress in this field either here at the United Nations or outside it? The answer to this is actions on the part of the United States. As long as representatives of the United States in the First Committee attempt to divert us from the path to disarmament laid down in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, we shall be witnessing an ever greater acceleration of the military preparations of the United States.

The direction of the efforts of the Pentagon - military supremacy, the undermining of the existing military strategic balance and the arms race - is a fact. There are material manifestations of it. Even in this session we have seen one further extremely dangerous step taken by the United States Administration towards the escalation of the nuclear arms race. President Reagan announced a new programme for a further build-up of American nuclear arsenals which embraces the triad of strategic forces - land-based intercontinental missiles, nuclear submarine missile carriers and strategic bombers. That programme alone will cost no less than \$180 billion. The United States intends to spend over the next five years a total of \$1.5 trillion. That is almost as much money as it has spent on armaments over the past 12 years.

The threat to peace of those actions is made even worse by certain doctrines which not only remove the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons but permit the possibility of the use of the nuclear potential and are oriented towards its first use. Thought is even being given in Washington to an exchange of strikes using such nuclear weapons, which the Americans call tactical, apparently because they cannot reach the territory of the United States itself. In this way it is not the USSR which is trying to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States; it is the trans-Atlantic strategists themselves, who frankly want to insulate themselves from the fate of Europe. Although their calculations are vain, they count on converting the European continent into the theatre of nuclear conflict while they remain spectators.

Washington's military preparations are becoming ever more dangerous, since practically all parts of the world have been declared spheres of vital American interest. Furthermore, in those spheres the United States arbitrarily assumes the right to take any steps it deems fit, up to and including the use of force. Those are the facts. They leave us in no doubt that what we face is a flagrant attempt to overturn the principle of the strengthening of security through disarmament, for which the international community has worked for so many years and which is embodied in decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Nations that the strengthening of security is possible only by means of stockpiling new mountains of armaments are doomed to failure. The session must confirm the decisions of the United Nations about the need to step up negotiations on all aspects of limiting the arms race and of disarmament - those basic principles which should guide Member States in such talks. There is also the need to achieve concrete agreements leading to tangible results on the basis of preserving a balance of armaments at a lower level, without any detriment to the security of any of the parties, and there is the principle of universality, which provides for active participation by all States in work on, and implementation of, measures aimed at limiting armaments and at disarmament. Finally, there is the production of effective control measures to ensure observance of agreements reached in each specific case, as appropriate to the character and scope of the treaty in question.

The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to this session's taking decisions which will promote progress in all the most important areas of arms limitation and disarmament, and thus reduce the danger of war, particularly nuclear war. Of vital importance in eliminating the nuclear threat is the limitation and reduction of the nuclear arms race. It is natural that most delegations attach the highest priority to this question. Of particular urgency in present circumstances is undoubtedly the task of halting any further growth in strategic nuclear arsenals of States and a subsequent constant and steady qualitative and quantitative limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems. Unfortunately, the SALT II treaty, which provides for large-scale and far-reaching measures towards that end, including a genuine reduction of strategic offensive weapons, has not yet been put into effect. For that the Americans are to blame.

The Soviet Union is firmly in favour of an early resumption of the strategic arms limitation process. We are ready to resume the talks with the United States on the subject - of course, on the basis of all the positive gains which have been made in this area. It was recently possible to reach agreement with the United States on holding talks about medium-range nuclear

devices in Europe. The Soviet Union is ready to hold talks seriously, honestly, constructively and with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security of the parties. It supports an early start to talks in the Committee on Disarmament on halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of them, up to and including their total elimination. Unfortunately, the appeal to start these talks made to the Committee on Disarmament, by the last session of the General Assembly, was ignored by the Western Powers and China. We are convinced that the present session of the General Assembly should again stress the need to start such talks. We note the profound interest being shown by most States in the idea of talks in the Committee on Disarmament on this subject.

Furthermore, many delegations are not content merely with approving that idea, but are putting forward concrete, purposeful proposals to develop it. Although, because of the position of certain States, talks have not yet started, the Soviet Union is attentively studying the proposals and is trying to take them into account in its own approach. It would be ready, as a first step, to embark on a discussion of possible stages of nuclear disarmament and their approximate content, particularly that of the first stage.

In our view, it would be affood idea to include among the first-stage measures consideration of halting the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons. Progress towards restraining the nuclear-arms race would be helped considerably by accurate information about the destructive consequences for mankind of nuclear war. As was proposed at the XXVIth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, an authoritative international committee of outstanding scientists from various countries, which would indicate the vital need to prevent nuclear war, would be able to compile such information.

An important and extremely timely measure for limiting the nuclear arms race and reducing the nuclear danger would be a total and universal prohibition on nuclear-weapon testing. In the course of talks begun in 1977 between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom it was possible to reach agreement on a majority of provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, and this included many very important substantive provisions on control.

Much ground has thus been covered, and the fact that there is no such treaty yet is to be explained not at all by the difficulty of resolving the outstanding issues, but rather by the lack of political will and readiness on the part of the United States to conclude the treaty.

The recent statement by a representative of the United States in this Committee dots all the i's of this question. With total disregard for the views of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations, who have consistently seen the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing as one of the most urgent and high-priority tasks for the international community, the United States representative believes that, as he sees it, the time is not yet ripe for such a decision. No doubt, it will only be ripe when the United States has carried out tests of the effectiveness of its unprecedented programme of building up its nuclear arsenal.

If the trilateral talks are undermined, and the way thus opened up to the accelerated development and manufacture of ever more deadly and destructive nuclear weapons, the entire responsibility will lie with the United States.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have repeatedly expressed our readiness immediately to continue the trilateral talks and to bring them to a successful conclusion.

At the same time, we believe that the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should occupy its proper place on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, whose potential for finding generally agreed and acceptable accords on this question have been far from exhausted. This is shown in particular by the businesslike mood of participants in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and by the concrete proposals they have put forward at meetings of that Committee this year.

Of ever-growing urgency and timeliness is the question of the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States. As we know, talks are under way on this question in the Committee on Disarmament, and concrete proposals for finding universally acceptable agreements are being put forward and discussed. But there has been no perceptible progress. What is the reason for this? The reason is that the United States and its NATO allies want to retain a broad choice of possibilities for the use of nuclear weapons; even in the case of those States from whose territories there cannot possibly be any nuclear threat to anyone. We should

like to draw attention to the need for intensifying negotiations on this subject. The most effective means of resolving this problem would, of course, be working towards and concluding an international convention on the subject. By way of a first step, all nuclear Powers could, as they are called upon to do under resolution 35/155 of the thirty+fifth session of the General Assembly, speak out in favour of a common approach to the conclusion of a convention to assure the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which have no such weapons on their territories.

Members of the Committee will recall that at the thirty-fifth session resolution 35/156 C was adopted calling for the beginning of talks on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. That appeal too has not been complied with, owing to the obstructionist position of a number of Western States and of China. But the question is no less acute for that. It is a question that must be and can be resolved; therefore it is necessary to make a start without delay on the talks on that subject.

The Soviet Union would be ready to take into account the views of States which believe that it is important to erect a barrier not only to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, but also to the build-up of foreign nuclear arsenals in countries where such arsenals already exist. In other words, in our view, it would be useful and relevant if the General Assembly were to issue an appeal to nuclear Powers to refrain from any further action aimed at stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of other States. This would be a far from unimportant step towards the prevention of nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet Union has always been a staunch champion of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, for it views this as one of the measures that could reduce the threat of nuclear war and strengthen the non-proliferation régime and regional military détente. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that, besides Latin America, Africa and the Middle East should also be declared nuclear-weapon-free zones. We also support the proposals for the creation of such zones in other parts of the world, in particular in northern Europe and the Balkan region.

The strengthening of security and stability in various parts of the world would also be promoted to a considerable degree by the implementation of proposals

for the creation of zones of peace and co-operation, in particular in South-East Asia and the Mediterranean. In practice, the decisions of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are aimed at making the whole of Europe such a zone.

The Soviet Union has consistently supported the initiative of the non-aligned countries for convening an international conference on drafting an agreement declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. This year, because of opposition by the United States and a number of its allies, it was not possible to arrange such a conference which would, obviously, not have been in keeping with the plans and actions of Washington for the build-up of its military presence in that part of the world. We believe that a conference on the Indian Ocean should be convened as soon as possible, and without any preconditions.

The task of eliminating the nuclear threat calls for focused attention by the United Nations on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although that problem is not listed on the agenda of this session as a separate item, it is very closely linked with many disarmament items now being considered in the First Committee. The USSR is in favour of a comprehensive strengthening of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime. In this context, we believe that it is necessary to work towards a further expansion of the list of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the basis of that régime.

It is with great concern that the Soviet Union views the possibility of the emergence of nuclear weapons in the hands of States not possessing them at present. This relates primarily to such countries as Israel and South Africa, which are situated in explosive parts of the world, which pursue an aggressive policy towards their neighbours, and make no attempt to conceal their nuclear ambitions.

A report was recently prepared by the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament. It demonstrates once again that the appearance in Israel of the nuclear weapon would represent a serious threat to peace and security not only in the Middle East, but throughout the world.

The nuclear ambitions of Israel and South Africa would not, of course, be so real if it were not for the West's co-operation with those countries in the nuclear field. It is precisely that kind of co-operation, along with the

comprehensive support of the United States for the aggressive policies of Israel, which made possible the barbarous Israeli attack against the Iraqi atomic research centre, which, as we know, aroused such indignation throughout the world. We must not allow such acts to be repeated in the future. Israel must pay material compensation for the damage sustained by Iraq as a result of this criminal action.

The existing nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime, founded on the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by no means excludes the peaceful use of atomic energy - rather, it promotes such use. We believe that the atom should serve exclusively peaceful purposes and that there should be a comprehensive development of co-operation among States in this field. However, it is important here for commercial interests not to be allowed to block considerations of a higher order; this pertains, of course, in equal degree to nuclear and non-nuclear States.

There is another question that in our view has too long awaited a solution - the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. A number of resolutions have already been adopted on this subject. However, we must say that on most of its aspects we cannot observe even the slightest progress. This is, of course, shown in the report which the Committee on Disarmament has presented to us.

The Soviet delegation believes it to be vital that negotiations on that subject be reactivated within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, and that qualified experts be brought in.

In our view it would be useful for the General Assembly to make an appeal to that organ for multilateral negotiations on this subject.

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction remains unchanged. We continue to believe that a comprehensive agreement on the subject and agreements on individual aspects of this weapon should be concluded. It is understandable that negotiations on these questions, even if they are not artificially delayed, will take time; but time will not wait.

Therefore, the Soviet Union proposes that permanent members of the Security Council, and also other States of military importance, should, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, make statements similar or identical in content renouncing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, bearing in mind that these statements could subsequently be approved by a decision of the Security Council. Of course, such a step would be of great political and moral significance, and would undoubtedly facilitate a future final decision on the question of protecting mankind from the threat of the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The urgency of the task of immediately adopting measures to prevent the emergence of new means of the mass destruction of people is becoming particularly clear in the light of the recent decision of the United States to commence manufacture of the neutron bomb. As we know, this decision was

adopted on 6 August 1981, the anniversary of the atomic annihilation of Hiroshima. It is said that this is not a mere coincidence, but, even if that is so, it is certainly ominous. Members of our Committee are well aware of the extremely dangerous consequences of the emergence of the neutron weapon in the arsenals of States. The major consequence of such a step would be a further growth of the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the neutron weapon is clear and consistent. We are against the appearance of this weapon in the arsenals of States. As far back as 1978 the Soviet Union, along with other socialist countries, introduced in the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. In 1981 the USSR proposed that talks be held on this subject and that a working group be established for this purpose. Once again the matter was blocked because of the negative attitude of the Western members of the Committee. We remain convinced that in the interest of all peoples it would be desirable to reach agreement as soon as possible on renouncing on a reciprocal basis this new type of weapon of mass destruction.

The Soviet delegation believes that this session of the General Assembly should give its most earnest attention to the neutron danger, point out the threat inherent in the plans for its manufacture and deployment and call for the renunciation of such plans.

In our view the possibilities and prospects of the early and successful conclusion of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of another new type of weapon of mass destruction, radiological weapons, are quite good. Detailed consideration of this question has been going on in the Committee since 1979, and we can now say that the positions of the parties have emerged clearly and distinctly enough for the talks to be concluded successfully. What we call for and what the situation requires is simply a realistic approach and the political will. The questions concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons that it has not been possible to settle are not, in our view, insuperable obstacles. They could be resolved in the light of the interests and positions of all the parties to the talks.

It would be advisable for the General Assembly to express its support for an acceleration of the talks on the subject in the Committee on Disarmament in order that a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons could be presented to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1982. The conclusion of the talks on radiological weapons would promote the success of the second special session on disarmament and would indicate that, even in the present complicated international situation, it is possible to solve problems of disarmament.

Another problem that is becoming even more acute is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Delaying action concerning the conclusion of an international agreement on the subject has encouraged efforts to create new kinds of chemical means of waging war, the accumulation of military chemical arsenals, and an ever broader deployment of such weapons of mass destruction.

It is precisely action of this kind that has been indicated by reports in the United States, particularly with regard to appropriations in that country for the manufacture of new types of chemical weapons, such as, for example, the binary weapon. In carrying out preparations to build up the military chemical potential of the country, those in militaristic circles in the United States are carrying out active psychological conditioning of public opinion and diverting attention by the dissemination of various trumped-up horror stories about other countries, which the official representative of the International Red Cross most eloquently described as "irresponsible gossip". The carrying out of talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it would appear, is clearly interfering with the carrying out of the current programmes of the United States. Bilateral Soviet-American talks on this question in spite of the four years of experience and, most important - I stress this - the amount of progress which has been achieved on a number of questions have been halted by the American side for more than a year. Along with this, the efforts of the international community to achieve early practical results in the field of prohibiting chemical weapons should not be halted. The experience accumulated in the Committee on Disarmament in the consideration of this question should be actively drawn upon to promote progress towards the goal of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

In our view, the attainment of this goal would be promoted by an appeal from the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly for a redoubling of efforts in this field, both in the Committee on Disarmament and as far as the resumption of the Soviet and American talks on the subject is concerned.

This is the position of the Soviet Union on the matters which are being considered in our Committee. I should like to stress, in particular, that there is no type of weapon, especially weapons of mass destruction, which the Soviet Union would not be ready to limit, to ban, on a reciprocal basis, in agreement with other States, and subsequently to eliminate from military arsenals.

The 1980s have been declared by the United Nations a Disarmament Decade. If this decision of our Organization is to be put into practice, and these years are not to become a decade of confrontation, as desired by the leaders of certain States, we need specific deeds and not words. The time has come for action, decisive action, aimed at eliminating the threat of war, and above all nuclear wars from the lives of mankind. These actions must be taken here and now at this session of the Assembly. Of course, great significance should be attached to the forthcoming second special session on disarmament. In our view that session can and must give further momentum to genuine negotiations on the urgent problems of limiting the arms race and of disarmament.

The session must be oriented towards the adoption of decisions which would promote the implementation of concrete measures to limit the arms race and not the misinterpretation of principles and the restructuring of the negotiation machinery.

We can hardly challenge the fact that along with the efforts of States, an important role in the matter of arms limitation and disarmament can be played by broad strata of world public opinion.

In the light of this, the Soviet Union declares its full support for the proposal of Mexico for a world disarmament campaign. In our view, such a campaign would promote the formation of world public opinion in favour of the activating of further efforts to prevent the danger of war.

Even now, at a time in the development of international events which is so difficult, the Soviet Union flatly rejects the mood of hopelessness and lack of confidence in the possibility of taking effective measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. We cannot agree with the conclusion that the prospects in this field are gloomy because of the existing international tension, a conclusion cynically advocated by those who by their very actions, including their actions in undermining talks and agreements on arms limitation, themselves artificially create and intensify such tensions, and then invoke them to justify their own militaristic policies. We believe that measures to curb the arms race can and must be immediately adopted precisely so as to break this vicious circle. Every measure of this kind will make it possible to improve the international climate and, in its turn, that will facilitate further progress towards arms limitation and disarmament.

We believe that step by step we must make progress towards the consolidation of international security by means of lowering the level of military confrontation. We hold that belief because of our conviction that for all peoples and Governments which recognize their responsibility to history, there is nothing in the world more important than peace, than the prevention of the threat of war. We proceed from the belief that every people has a vital interest in living in peace and security.

We believe that the time will inevitably come when the sharp and heavy sword hanging over the head of mankind in the form of stockpiles of vast amounts of the most sophisticated weapons will be broken. Of course, this will not be done tomorrow, but it makes ever more justifiable any steps, any movement, even a small one, towards the restraining of the arms race and disarmament.

The important thing now is not to waste time, the continuation of the arms race for even one further day is too costly to the peoples of the world and the danger inherent in the further stockpiling of instruments of destruction is too great.

It is our profound conviction that despite the difficulty of the problems of limiting armaments and achieving disarmament, the solution of these problems can and must be found by means of the honest and purposeful efforts of all peace-loving States based on the widespread and powerful support of world public opinion.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina)(interpretation from Spanish): To begin with, I should like to ask you, Sir, to convey to Ambassador Golob the congratulations of the delegation of Argentina on his election to the chairmanship of this Committee and to express our readiness to co-operate with him in the completion of the Committee's work. At the same time, may I extend to you personally my congratulations upon your election to the post of Vice-Chairman of this Committee. I congratulate also the second Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

This general debate is taking place just a few months before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That fact invests these discussions with special relevance, since they should be a prologue, as it were, to that far-reaching event and should somehow prepare the ground to ensure that the work of the special Assembly session will yield real and positive fruits.

Unfortunately, the omens are not very favourable. The work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, in which I had the honour of participating, was in general marked by stagnation and frustration, save for rare exceptions such as the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which, under the leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, achieved valuable progress. But even in that case it was not possible to extend the mandate of the group to enable it to begin specific negotiations on a draft convention.

The far-from-encouraging climate in Geneva underwent no substantial change in the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly. Quite the contrary, time was spent in sterile, time-consuming discussions which, while they finally led to the adoption of a draft agenda, prevented us from making full use of an excellent opportunity seriously to prepare the work of the forthcoming special session.

All this is but a symptom of the degree of concern and insecurity with which the international situation is seen today and the growing scepticism with which the disarmament process is viewed, not only by world public opinion but also by the representatives whose task it is to deal with it.

That far from propitious climate undoubtedly has various causes, from among which I should like to highlight two. On the one hand, the arms race is being steadily intensified. This is not the time to adjudge the responsibility for this, but we must confront that reality. The right of every State to seek better levels of security is unquestionable, and it is an illusion to deny that that requires the possession of the appropriate weapons. Yet, at the same time, it cannot be claimed that the mere possession of a large arsenal is a sufficient condition to ensure security.

Truly meaningful security requires the concurrence of at least two fundamental conditions: military and economic power on the one hand, but also relations with other members of the international community which are based on respect for the principles of coexistence of States enshrined in the United Nations Charter. One of those elements alone is not enough to produce security. Whoever thinks so runs the risk of unleashing a conflict or of falling into unbearable isolation in an increasingly interdependent world.

A second cause of the present situation lies undoubtedly in the lack of consistency - and that is yet a further example of what appears to be a repeatedly noted feature in the behaviour of the great Powers - between the commitments assumed at the first special session devoted to disarmament and the actions or omissions that have occured since. Not only has reality failed to meet the well-founded hopes aroused in 1978, but less than four years after solemnly adopting a Final Document of incalculable value certain trends are observed which imply that basic elements included in that all important consensus are called into question. Nothing could be more alarming.

More than the singling out of responsibilities for the present state of affairs, which incidentally are shared and from which no one is exempt, the important thing is to overcome it. And for that special responsibility does devolve on those countries whose mutual relations are axes around which a goodly part of the substance of international relations turns. The effects of their policies and attitudes surpass the sphere of the immediate interests of the States involved. Their greater might, the multiple nature of their links and ties of every kind, the weapons they possess, the network of their alliances, the availability of forces far from their own frontiers give them a maximum capacity to create hotbeds of tension or situations of detente. The future depends on their mutual spirit of co-operation and the specific actions with which they express that spirit.

That, of course, does not exempt the medium—size and small Powers from the obligation to contribute to the extent of their ability to the establishment of a favourable framework for the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament. It is just and fair to recognize that those have been by and large the guidelines underlying the contribution of those States to the Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly. Their approaches have been constructive and positive and they have endeavoured to direct their proposals towards the achievement of positive progress in that field. In doing so, they have given, and continue to give, expression to a legitimate concern for situations which as a rule they did not bring about but the consequences of which would affect them all vitally.

All States should take as many steps as they can to contribute to the achievement of those common goals. Argentina, for example, has just deposited the instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and on the Subsoil Thereof, which was signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 11 February 1971.

In a different context, we recently concluded two new safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The first relates to the acquisition of a quantity of heavy water in the Soviet Union. The second relates to a plant for the production of heavy water which was supplied by Switzerland, including the corresponding technology. We should point out that this is the first example of safeguards covering that kind of installation and represents a clear demonstration of the intentions of the Government of Argentina in its endeavours to make the best use of that important source of energy.

A highly important task lies ahead for this Committee. In carrying it out, we must focus on essentials and avoid dispersing our efforts on secondary matters. Once again the agenda contains a very large number of items and subitems, which testifies to the complexity and vastness of the different facets of disarmament and the interest that each arouses. But that proliferation of questions is meaningful only insofar as they are translated into deeds which lead to a single, final objective, namely, disarmament. The United Nations must not be diverted into a whole series of roads and meandering paths which never converge and which never go outside the purely procedural field. Worse still, it would be extremely dangerous and frustrating if all those questions were to produce the ultimate result, albeit never intended or sought, of giving the impression of activity while concealing true stagnation or, what would be even worse, virtual regression with regard to disarmament.

Neither should we allow ourselves to be impressed by two trends that we often see. One is the absence of specific proposals and the lack of support for the present stage of the disarmament process, while reserving for hypothetical future opportunities the presentation of novel initiatives and their subsequent

negotiation. The value of such eventual proposals cannot a priori be called into question, but six months from the second special session on disarmament it is quite clear that such an attitude implies the impossibility of elaborating such initiatives prior to that event.

There is also a second trend characterized by a skeptical position which qualifies proposals on disarmament as "realistic" or "unrealistic". The former, the realistic, relate generally to secondary or collateral aspects whose importance, although sometimes considerable, does not aid them in substantially influencing the general picture of the situation. The latter, the unrealistic, are as a rule related to fundamental factors of disarmament and, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament. No one can deny the complexity of the question or the vital interests at stake, but neither can anyone deny that therein lies the essence of international concern and also that that is where the first priority of the whole disarmament undertaking is to be found. Efforts aimed at triggering a process having that objective, however remote it may appear to be, cannot be discarded with pragmatic arguments, whose authors, however, spend their time in exercises aimed at the prohibition of non-existent weapons or in formulations of a political type, the practical use of which is rather doubtful.

At this time, the international community, as reflected in this Committee, is faced with two challenges in the field of disarmament. To one of those challenges a response must be given specifically within the realm of the United Nations, while making every possible effort to ensure the success, or at least to prevent the failure, of the second special session devoted to disarmament. There is not too much time left, but if put to good use possible results can still be achieved. Attention should focus on what should become the most important document to emerge from that Assembly: a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

A Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament is working actively on the subject and next year it will advance the customary date of its session to make it possible to achieve further progress. As the Chairman of that Working Group, Ambassador Garcia Robles, said a few days ago, the area of disagreement is still wide, but the ingenuity and sound thinking of its members and subsequently of representatives in the General Assembly should make it possible to reach a consensus on a carefully considered, viable and well-structured programme that in itself would justify the holding of the Assembly session.

Two valuable reports have in recent days been submitted to this Committee for consideration: one concerning the relationship between disarmament and development introduced by Mrs. Thorsson, Chairman of the Group of Experts that drafted it; and one concerning institutional arrangements within the framework of the Secretariat, submitted by the Chairman of the other Group of Experts, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas. This is not the right time to comment on those documents. We wish merely to point out that both should be carefully considered by Governments with a view to ensuring the adoption of significant decisions at the second special session.

The second challenge confronting the international community concerns the unavoidable necessity of re-embarking on a course that has in the past led to considerable albeit insufficient achievements in the field of disarmament. I refer to the re-establishment of an international climate that has disappeared.

In his statement of 22 September last in the general debate, the Foreign Minister of Argentina said:

"The idea of disarmament has been replaced ... by the parity of military power ... a vicious circle has been created. True parity can never be established in such times of technological build-up. Every effort to close any real or imaginary gap inevitably creates yet another gap, imaginary or real.

"... There is not the slightest doubt that the distrust between the main protagonists has increased. Nor is there any doubt that nothing deserves higher priority at this stage than efforts to recreate appropriate conditions for dialogue." (A/36/PV.7, pp. 6,7)

The debates in the First Committee should help to promote the resumption of that dialogue and not to exacerbate or increase existing differences. That would be yet another demonstration of the role of the United Nations in the general field of the maintenance of peace and the specific area of disarmament. Support of such action by the United Nations will guide the actions in this body of the Argentine delegation, which will subsequently explain its views on the various items on our agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.