



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 6TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

CONTENTS

ELECTION OF A VICE-CHAIRMAN

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

General debate

Statements were made by:

Mr. Martynenko (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)
Mr. Rostow (United States of America)
Mr. Pradhan (Bhutan)
Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria)
Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany)

UN LIBRARY

OCT 26 1981

UN/DA COLLECTION

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550, 866 United Nations Plaza (Alcoa Building), and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

ELECTION OF A VICE-CHAIRMAN

Mr. O'CONNOR (Ireland): Mr. Chairman, first of all allow me to extend to you, on behalf of my delegation, warmest congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. The role which your country has played and continues to play in the efforts to speed up the disarmament process is an example to all. We recall that the first special session for disarmament was presided over by a fellow countryman of yours. We consider that it augurs well for the progress of our work that another citizen of Yugoslavia should preside over the deliberations of this Committee on what is virtually the eve of the second special session.

Mr. Chairman, on a more personal note, I have not had the opportunity of meeting you previously. However, your reputation has preceded you, as far as I am concerned. My colleagues who have worked with you at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have spoken with admiration of your expertise and skill.

It is an honour and a privilege for me to propose that Ambassador Mario Carias, the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations, be elected to the position of Vice-Chairman of our Committee. It is the belief of my delegation that Ambassador Carias will bring valuable experience and remarkable expertise to the Bureau. His career has been closely associated with the United Nations. By way of illustration, I would point out that he has been a representative of his country to eight of the last 11 regular sessions of the General Assembly, as well as to the last three special sessions of the Assembly. Prior to taking up, in 1977, his present position of Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations in New York, he served as Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva during the period 1972 to 1977. He has also represented his country as representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) General Conference.

(Mr. O'Connor, Ireland)

In view of the particular work of this Committee, I wish to refer briefly to Ambassador Carias' experience in areas likely to be of particular relevance to us. He was the Alternate Head of the delegation of Honduras to the special session on disarmament in 1978. From 1975 to 1977, he was Head of delegation and Vice-President of the Conference as well as Vice-President of the Drafting Committee of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. He also was Vice-President of the Drafting Committee of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It is, I think, clear that in view of his impressive experience and also because of his personal qualities, we will have in Ambassador Mario Carias an excellent Vice-Chairman of our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ireland for his nomination of Mr. Mario Carias of Honduras for the post of Vice-Chairman. I am certain that I am expressing the views of all the members of the Committee when I thank the representative of Ireland for his delegation's important contribution to the work of this Committee as Vice Chairman at last year's session. I also wish to thank him profusely for his comments regarding the foreign policy and international activities of my country and for his kind remarks about me.

There being no other nomination, I take it that, in accordance with rule 103 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and with established practice, the Committee wishes to dispense with the secret ballot and to declare Mr. Mario Carias of Honduras elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

Mr. Mario Carias (Honduras) was elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to express to Mr. Mario Carias my warmest congratulations on the distinction that has been conferred upon him and his delegation and assure him of my confidence that we shall successfully discharge the responsibilities incumbent upon us as officers of the Committee.

Mr. CARIAS (Honduras), Vice Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like through you to express my thanks to Mr. Patrick O'Connor, who presented my candidacy for the post of Vice Chairman of the First Committee with such kind words. We are all well aware, as the Chairman has stressed, of the important contribution made by the delegation of Ireland to our work and, in particular, to the contribution made by Mr. Mulloy and Mr. O'Connor at the last session.

I should also like to express my gratitude to the members of the Latin American Group, who agreed to my nomination, as well as to all the members of the Committee, who supported my election this morning.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure once again to express to you the congratulations of my delegation on your election. We are very pleased to be able, under your skilful guidance as Chairman, together with

(Mr. Carias, Honduras)

Mr. Yango and Mr. Makonnen, to work for the best interests of the First Committee at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 56, 128 and 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MARTYNEKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like to congratulate you, the representative of Yugoslavia, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee, and wish you success in your responsible and honourable work. In circumstances of an exacerbation of international tension and the danger of war, the task of stepping up the struggle for easing the threat of nuclear war and curbing the arms race, primarily the nuclear missile arms race, is something which has now become particularly urgent and important. For no people and no State is there any more important issue today than the preservation of peace and the prevention of a thermonuclear conflagration.

Of course, the United Nations cannot remain outside the process of solving that problem, which is the very raison d'être of our Organization. It is only by ensuring peace and reversing the arms race that we can create conditions for solving other problems which are of concern to mankind, including such questions as preserving the earth's environment and development.

The struggle against the thermonuclear threat is today the most important task of the United Nations. Eloquent testimony of the profound concern which is being felt today by peoples in connexion with the growing arms race and the danger of a nuclear conflict which could destroy world civilization can be seen from the general debate at this session of the General Assembly. Most participants in that discussion wanted to see the United Nations focus its attention on preventing the threat of nuclear war and wanted collective efforts undertaken in that direction.

(Mr. Martynenko, Ukrainian SSR)

In the view of the Ukrainian delegation, the mere recognition of the existence of the threat of a nuclear conflict is not enough. In order to defend peace on our planet we must as a matter of urgency take concrete and, at the same time, decisive measures in the United Nations and elsewhere. As has been stressed by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

"We must today do everything possible to bar the way to those who support unlimited armaments and military adventures. We must do everything possible to ensure the right of people to life. And in this matter, there can be no such thing as indifferent bystanders: it is something which affects each and every one of us."

We therefore believe the proposal of the Soviet Union on the adoption of a declaration in the General Assembly on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe to be extremely important and urgent. The adoption of such a declaration would constitute a practical contribution by the United Nations to the cause of peace and would demonstrate the readiness of Members of the United Nations to agree to take measures to prevent nuclear war and their determination to undertake new measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

In this regard, we should like to point out with satisfaction that a number of delegations, particularly the delegations of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and other countries, have actively supported that proposal. The question might arise as to why the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are placing such particular stress today on giving attention to the threat constituted by nuclear weapons and calling for the adoption of a declaration aimed at preventing a nuclear catastrophe? The answer to that question is absolutely clear: it is primarily because that threat is indeed great, in the light of both the unprecedented scale of the build-up of nuclear arms and also the whipping-up of a war psychosis and hysteria and the policy of relying on force in international relations.

(Mr. Martynenko, Ukrainian SSR)

The socialist countries, by virtue of the very nature of their system, have always stood for the banishment of war from the life of mankind. From the first appearance of nuclear weapons in the world, they have vigorously called for preventing the danger of the outbreak of a war which would make use of that type of weapon, the most dangerous possible for life on earth. They have done this in the belief that a system of ensuring peace and security can be genuinely effective only if the atom is made to serve exclusively peaceful purposes. It is through no fault of ours that it was not possible to outlaw the nuclear weapon as soon as it appeared, when its stockpiles were incomparably lower and when it would therefore have been much simpler to achieve agreement on banning it. All the proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries on this subject have been flatly rejected by the United States.

At this session too, speaking in the General Committee, the United States delegation called the new Soviet proposal "oversimplified". At the same time, when the Soviet Union put forward the proposal for the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles of them up to and including their total elimination, the United States delegation called it "too complicated".

The point here is not the peculiar logic of the United States delegation, but the reluctance of the United States to agree to concrete practical measures to limit the nuclear arms race and eliminate the nuclear threat.

Yesterday, in his statement on behalf of the ten States members of the European Community, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that preventing a nuclear catastrophe can be possible only by means of conducting serious negotiations and achieving concrete agreements. Obviously, no one objects to that; we would just like to draw the attention of the representatives of all the countries of the Ten to the fact that one of the provisions of the draft declaration is aimed precisely at stepping up negotiations on curbing the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race. While we are on the subject of concrete agreements, everyone is well aware that it is precisely the United States that has undermined the ratification of the SALT II treaty, which is by far the most important and concrete of agreements. I would remind representatives that more than seven years went into producing that treaty. It is precisely the United States that has broken off or halted a number of other negotiations on the most important areas of limiting the arms race.

(Mr. Martynenko, Ukrainian SSR)

It is a secret to no one today that the world's present stockpiles of nuclear weapons could now destroy the whole human race many times over. But this appears not to be enough for States that have adopted a course of confrontation and undermining détente and have set the goal of creating for themselves a position of absolute military supremacy. Under cover of the slanderous myth of the "Soviet military threat", there is a lot of talk about the dangerous "military gap" and the "fatal vulnerability" of NATO, and the military-industrial complex and military circles in the United States are raising military budgets to astronomical heights and doing everything possible to implement the plans for stationing on the European continent new American medium-range nuclear missiles. Further, they are supplementing their arsenals with the particularly abominable neutron weapon and are creating qualitatively new and ever more destructive offensive systems of nuclear missiles and other armaments which would, inter alia, be stationed in outer space. Even at the time of this session of the General Assembly, the decision was taken in the United States to deploy 100 intercontinental ballistic MX missiles and to construct 100 strategic bombers of the new B-1 type. Provisions are being made for absolutely fabulous appropriations to pay for that programme.

Something of particular concern is that, along with the stepped up accelerated manufacture of the next generation of strategic and the whole complex of other nuclear and conventional weaponry, Washington is demonstrating a growing readiness to put that weaponry into operation. More militaristic concepts are beginning to hold sway in the United States, and ever more determined efforts are being made to sow the thought in people's minds of the admissibility and acceptability of nuclear war, and the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war, and emerging from it victorious. Hatred and enmity are being incited against other peoples and countries. Suffice it to recall that in the summer of 1979 Directive number 59 was issued, which proclaimed a new nuclear strategy, and the possibility of waging a so-called limited nuclear war.

Together with decisions to manufacture the neutron weapon, which lowers the threshold of nuclear conflict, to deploy the MX missile systems, to manufacture Pershing 2 missiles and cruise missiles and to equip Trident atomic submarines with more modern nuclear missiles, that new nuclear strategy was clearly aimed at bringing about military supremacy and securing the possibility of making the first

(Mr. Martynenko, Ukrainian SSR)

strike. Therefore, it is no accident that that notorious directive was viewed in the world as a concrete programme of preparation for a qualitatively new material basis for nuclear war and a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

Those kinds of doctrines, which attempt to argue for the acceptability of nuclear war and therefore result in a sharp increase in the danger of the outbreak of such a war, contain a serious threat for all peoples, including the American people. With the current level of development of strategic devices and their control systems and of early detection systems for missile launchings, it is impossible to strike a pre-emptive blow without receiving in return an equally powerful retaliatory strike. Furthermore, given today's geo-political situation, it is difficult to imagine a region which could remain outside a nuclear conflict, particularly because, in accordance with their doctrines, Washington's strategists view Western Europe and other parts of the world as possible nuclear proving-grounds designed to reduce the risk to the United States itself.

Those concepts and doctrines are particularly dangerous for another reason as well: they are aimed at subverting the will of peoples to struggle against the threat of a nuclear conflict, to force them to resign themselves to the inevitability of the nuclear arms race and to accustom them to the thought of the inexorability and even acceptability of nuclear war. We vigorously oppose those concepts and are profoundly convinced that the nuclear arms race - including the nuclear missile arms race - can and must be halted and reversed.

The Ukrainian delegation believes that the United Nations should realize its responsibility as an instrument for peace and make a valuable contribution to the cause of strengthening peace. The United Nations should not permit a situation where lethal nuclear weapons could ever be used again; this is something in which all peoples and States, large and small, have a vital interest. That is why we believe that the General Assembly should support the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. By doing so, the General Assembly would define the first use of nuclear weapons as the gravest crime against humanity and would proclaim that there will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take such a monstrous step and issue such a challenge to

all peoples. At the same time the Assembly would condemn as incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons, and would call upon the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and thus, by joint effort, through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, thus arriving at a situation where nuclear energy would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and only for the benefit of mankind.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that the adoption of that declaration would exercise a restraining effect on the dangerous development of world events and would promote a strengthening of trust in relations between States with different social systems. Also important is that the declaration would open up additional prospects for motivating concerted action by States to eliminate the nuclear threat and for the search for mutually accepted decisions at talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons and on nuclear disarmament. All this could provide momentum for the talks in this area themselves.

The urgent need for such action is obvious, as was pointed out in the message from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world:

"The peoples of the world paid too high a price for their not having been able to prevent war or to avert the impending threat in time. We must not permit a situation in which that tragedy repeats itself. It is possible and necessary to do all that can be done to prevent a new world war."

Mr. ROSTOW (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation and I personally are pleased to see you as Chairman of this important Committee, and we warmly congratulate you on your selection. Your career attests to your distinguished qualifications for this high and delicate mission, and we are gratified that your selection is also a tribute to Yugoslavia, a staunch symbol of national independence throughout the world and a State and nation which has mastered the important secret of achieving harmony among the peoples: who are its citizens. The United States delegation is earnestly committed to providing you with full support and assistance in the discharge of your important tasks.

It is a privilege for me to address the First Committee in order to present the views of my Government on arms control and disarmament, both the major items on the arms control agenda of the United Nations and some related problems as well.

If you will permit me a personal note, I have long been involved in the affairs of the United Nations. I served in the Secretariat years ago and look back to that experience with pride. A considerable part of my scholarly work has been devoted to the study of the United Nations as a peace-keeping institutions.

The people and Government of the United States have always viewed the Charter and the institutions of the United Nations as critically important elements of the world political system. The American people know that the United Nations is part of the skeleton and the central nervous system of world politics, and they look to it with hope. The Charter embodies an agreed code of values which define the necessary terms of international co-operation - the rules which should guide and animate the behaviour of States and unite the Members of the United Nations, for all their differences, into a single society and polity. The code of the Charter has grown out of nearly 200 years of trial and error in the long struggle of the enlightenment to conquer, or at least to tame, the aggressive instincts of man. If the Charter rules, and especially its rules dealing with the international use of force, should finally disappear as an influence on the behaviour of States, world public order would collapse into anarchy and general war would inevitably ensure.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

The First Committee is the designated forum for discussions of arms control, disarmament and international security issues. Its authority derives not only from its mandate, but from the distinction of its past achievements. It is surely the premier forum in which the nations can consider what they should do to lift the crushing burden of arms and the threat of war from the backs and minds of their people.

The United States approaches the problems of arms control not as isolated abstractions, but as components of the larger problems of international security and stability. After all, arms control initiatives are meaningless unless they are viewed as aspects of a comprehensive strategy to achieve and to maintain peace. The traditional discussion of many hardy perennials on the United Nations armaments control agenda often has an air of unreality, to say the least. The reason for this tone of unworldliness at the United Nations is that it has become a habit among us not to talk about the central issue in any examination of the problem of peace. The declining influence of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter on the behaviour of States. Article 2, para. 4 reads:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The last two decades have witnessed a rising tide of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and aggressions, actions which involve the use or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of States.

Far too often in the United Nations and elsewhere we write and we talk as if peace could be secured through the adoption of an aseptic formula for limiting or abolishing nuclear tests, controlling international arms transfers, or declaring our undying faith in the principles of universal disarmament. We make such speeches and we draft such resolutions while the manufacture of arms sets new records every year as the leading growth industry throughout the world, while State after State around the world is under threat or under attack, while unprovoked invasions occur without even the pretense of the excuse of self-defence, and while armed bands and terrorists cross international frontiers to assault the political independence of States.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

As the fever of aggression spreads, the world community does less and less to vindicate the basic principles of Article 2, paragraph 4, the principle of the equality and integrity of all States, the rock on which the Charter and the State system rest.

As a distinguished American scholar has commented, the world community now treats such events with "normative silence" which is "deafening" and ominous. As a result, more and more States live in fear and trembling. They turn to arms, even to nuclear arms, to assure their survival, and somehow or other they find arms despite our rules. Unless we confront these facts and restore general and reciprocal respect for the principles of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, the slide towards anarchy will engulf us all.

Achieving peace is not a simple matter to be settled on the cheap and without tears. Peace requires more than the drafting of the treaties and resolutions, however worthy. Until we take effective steps to see to it that the Charter, the arms control treaties and the legally binding decisions of the Security Council are obeyed, until we can verify and ensure compliance with their terms, much of what passes for arms control will be a sterile exercise at best and often, alas, no more than a charade.

My first point today, therefore, is to assure you that in this forum and in all other forums my Government will urge that we examine the problems of arms control and disarmament on our agenda in the full light of reality. To that end we shall propose and support a series of initiatives designed to focus attention systematically on the principal problems of establishing peace.

The underlying cause of the declining influence of Article 2, paragraph 4 in world affairs and the underlying cause of the corresponding eclipse of arms control is the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and the extraordinary military build-up on which it is based. The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence in the world; a great deal occurs because of other factors. What the Soviet Union does is to exploit and manipulate regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its own sphere of dominance.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

I make this comment not to engage in idle polemics, but simply to state a self-evident fact known to everyone in this room. It is a fact of critical importance, which is fundamental to the decisions which my Government has had to take and which other governments are taking as well - decisions to restore the balance of power, to deepen the solidarity of our alliances and other friendly relations of security co-operation, and to allow the community of nations to live in peace.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

In our relations with the Soviet Union, we must insist on the only possible rule of true détente: that of scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the international use of force.

Over the past decade, the world has endured the shock of the Soviet Union's accelerating drive for dominance based upon an extraordinary allocation of its resources for military purposes. That drive is a clear and present danger to world peace and to human freedom. The goal of the Soviet Union's military build-up is to attain military superiority -- superiority in both the destructive power of its nuclear forces and in the global reach of its conventional forces.

As the British and American Governments pointed out some years ago, and as all the independent studies done of the subject agree, the Soviet military build-up cannot be explained solely in terms of defense, however broadly the concept of defense is interpreted. The record speaks for itself, as my colleague Ambassador Adelman pointed out yesterday.

Soviet expansionism is aimed at destroying the world's balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. That drive is being carried on by methods openly in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The instabilities thus created have impelled many developing nations to seek and to acquire weapons with which to protect their perceived national interests.

Thus far, I have recalled only the visible manifestations of the Soviet drive for power in the third world: its quest for client States and strategic positions and its tendency to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its domain by the use of proxy forces, military assistance, subversion or terrorism.

I shall now say a few words about the issue of nuclear arms and nuclear arms control, which are at the centre of Soviet strategic doctrine.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

The United States views the effort to bring nuclear weapons under international control as the most important task of those who seek to realize the promise of peace. Without success in that effort, no other success in the field of arms control will be possible. A basic dilemma has haunted nuclear arms control negotiations from their beginnings in 1948, with the American proposal of the Baruch Plan. For many years, the United States assumed that the Soviet Union shared its view that the objective of arms control negotiations should be to allow each side the same right to maintain deterrence, a retaliatory capacity and stability. There have been occasions when East and West have had the same approach to an arms control problem, for example, on the question of nuclear weapons proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 demonstrated how real gains in security can result when the Soviet Union recognizes its fundamental national interest in the stability of the State system.

It is no longer possible to assume a mutuality of interests. The United States and the Soviet Union have different policies with regard to nuclear and conventional weapons. Therefore, they have different objectives in negotiating to limit the spiral of nuclear and conventional arms accumulation.

SALT is a case in point. The United States nuclear doctrine is clear: our goals are deterrence and stability. Our nuclear arsenal exists to make certain that neither the Soviet Union nor any other country uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes or threatens the ultimate interests of the United States by any other means. Our purpose is to maintain a credible second-strike capability so that the United States, its allies and its interests can be protected at all times. Facing an assured American second-strike capability, no potential nuclear aggressor will feel free to use military force against the United States, against our NATO allies, the nations of the Western hemisphere, Japan or any other strategically critical nations, and we could not be deterred from using conventional force in defense of our interests if it became necessary to do so.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

That is and must remain the goal of our nuclear arsenal and therefore our minimal goal in nuclear arms control negotiations. The Soviet Union has not yet adopted a parallel position; on the contrary, the mission of its nuclear forces is intimidation and coercion and, if necessary, victory in nuclear war. I need not recite the list of the new weapons deployed by the Soviet Union in the past 10 years. The Soviet Union has been and is still adding inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), large medium-range missiles, nuclear-weapon submarines and bombers to its arsenal in an obvious effort to create and maintain a nuclear advantage.

The Soviet strategic build-up is aimed not at achieving and preserving strategic stability but at creating and aggravating strategic instability. Soviet strategic programmes are designed to threaten the survivability of our strategic forces. That emphasis in Soviet military doctrine and action is in itself a repudiation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction resting on mutual vulnerability which many Americans thought both sides had adopted in 1972.

The Soviet lead in heavy and accurate ICBM's capable of destroying a large part of our ICBM force in a first strike undermines the basis for stability and reciprocal restraint in a crisis. Such a situation is a recipe for nuclear blackmail. We cannot emphasize too often that the principle danger facing the world is not nuclear war alone, but political coercion based on the credible threat of nuclear war.

In that situation, what is the position of my Government towards arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? The profound changes in the strategic environment since 1972 have required the United States to review its arms control policies which have failed and to devise new policies adapted to the world as it now is. That process of review is proceeding rapidly and at a high level.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

Apart from those indispensable preparations and the effort they require, the United States has established no preconditions for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not waiting for a military balance to be restored before we parlay with the Soviet Union, and we are setting no political conditions either, despite our deepest concern regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their activities in other parts of the world.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

The United States is, of course, taking steps to restore its deterrent capability, both nuclear and conventional. These steps are indispensable in themselves from the point of view of security. In the world of reality, fair and balanced arms control agreements would be inconceivable without a firm American commitment to maintain a credible deterrent. We shall be seeking arms reduction and arms control agreements which would ensure an equal deterrent capacity for both sides at lower levels of armaments, a deterrent capacity which will require both sides to co-operate in assuring compliance.

We have already begun the first phase of substantive talks on nuclear arms control issues with the Soviet Union. In August, we proposed informal talks on problems of verifying compliance with arms control agreements, on the provision of data and on certain other general subjects which would arise in arms control negotiations. We told the Soviet Union that we thought co-operative procedures would be necessary to supplement national technical means in a number of areas, and we invited Soviet ideas about how best to proceed: through diplomatic channels, through special meetings of experts or through the negotiations themselves. We have not yet had a response to this proposal.

The United States-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces will begin in a few weeks, on 30 November. We welcome the commencement of these talks. We expect to be ready to propose that the companion talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces should begin early in 1982.

I should like now to turn to the specific subjects under discussion in this Committee and at the Committee on Disarmament. Let me state at the outset that the United States Government is strongly committed to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I intend to take a sustained personal interest in the matters to be discussed here and in Geneva, despite the demands of the nuclear arms problem. I expect that during the months ahead the United States will propose a number of initiatives in the Committee on Disarmament in order to take full advantage of the Committee's capacity for seriously considered and deliberate action.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

One area in which we hope and expect this Committee and the Committee on Disarmament to take a strong lead is in addressing the questions of monitoring and verifying compliance with arms control agreements, new and old. New procedures are needed to make verification processes more thorough and more reliable. The cause of peace cannot be advanced if the nations have little confidence that arms control agreements are being complied with. In certain areas, those concerned with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, for example, compliance can be quite literally a matter of life and death. No nation can be expected to respect an arms control agreement unless it can be sure that other signatories are also complying with it.

In this perspective I should mention here again the use of lethal and incapacitant chemical agents in South-East Asia, Afghanistan and elsewhere. This is a matter of deep and continuing concern to my Government. The use of chemical agents and toxins in South-East Asia makes clear the need for concrete international action to restore confidence in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the biological weapons Convention and associated rules of customary international law. The United States supported General Assembly resolution 35/144 C, which initiated the ongoing investigation by the Group of Experts to investigate reports on the use of chemical weapons. We regret that some nations feel obliged to oppose it. We do not understand such opposition. The new evidence concerning the use of toxins makes the work of the Group of Experts all the more important. My Government looks forward to the findings of the Group of Experts in the light of all the evidence before it, including the new evidence. This issue is a matter of critical importance in many dimensions. It requires the full attention of this Committee and of the General Assembly, both because of the implications for the relevant international prohibition on the possession and use of such weapons and because of the broader issues raised by their use.

People are dying. This is not an East-West issue, nor is it a North-South issue. Rather, it is an issue that concerns the security, present and future, of all nations alike. Once more, such weapons are being used, weapons regarded with loathing and revulsion throughout the world. These weapons are

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

not being used on animals, but on human beings in small, defenceless countries. If the nations are not willing or able to take concrete and effective actions to deal with this problem and enforce compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the biological weapons Convention, then the prospects for any arms control initiative will be seriously undermined.

I wish to emphasize two of the principles which will guide our thinking on problems of verification in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. First, we shall not confine ourselves to negotiating only about those aspects of a problem which can be resolved by resorting to national technical means. In the case of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, we shall begin by offering substantial limitations that are strategically significant and then construct a set of measures necessary to ensure verifiability. These may well include co-operative procedures between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as detailed data exchanges and provisions to enhance the confidence of each side in data obtained by national technical means.

Secondly, we shall seek verification provisions which not only ensure that actual threats to our security resulting from possible violations can be detected in a timely manner, but also limit the likelihood of ambiguous situations developing. Ambiguity can never be eliminated entirely from documents drafted by men, but we shall do our best to keep it to a minimum. Ambiguous provisions result in compliance questions, and compliance questions lead to compliance complaints which, even if ultimately resolved, strain the atmosphere for arms control negotiations.

Given the importance of verification for the viability of arms control across the board, Soviet willingness to consider co-operative measures to improve the verifiability of specific limitations may be the best test of its commitment to serious arms limitations on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

Let me turn now to the important issue of nuclear non-proliferation. The position of the United States is clear. President Reagan has identified this problem as one of the most critical challenges faced by the world community. It is the premise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons serves the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. It is manifest that in a world where many nations have nuclear weapons, international politics would be nearly unpredictable and volatile to the point of explosiveness. President Reagan has recognized that political instability can be a cause as well as a consequence of nuclear proliferation. He has pointed out that global and regional stabilization are necessary, although they are not sufficient, conditions for success in the effort to carry out the policies of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition, both supplier and consumer nations must work together to ensure that peaceful nuclear co-operation, an essential factor in meeting global energy needs, is not misused.

In the context of regional approaches to non-proliferation, I am pleased to announce that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has favourably reported Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Senate is expected shortly to give its advice and consent for ratification. President Reagan will, I am sure, move promptly thereafter to deposit our instrument of ratification. This Treaty was a far-sighted initiative of Latin American countries that has contributed significantly to hemispheric security. While the régime envisioned by the Treaty is not yet complete, we hope all the nations in the region will make every effort to ensure the full success of this important achievement.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

The First Committee has on its agenda items relating to the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United States Government has taken a keen interest in supporting the Egyptian initiative to establish a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone. The proposal has great promise which can be realized only if the States in the regions work together to fulfil it. Many problems will have to be solved by those States before the dream of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone can become a reality. The United States stands ready to assist the States of the region, if they wish such assistance, in studying these thorny issues and in resolving them. We hope that this session of the General Assembly will encourage the project and give it further impetus.

The United States is prepared also to participate constructively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, with a view to concluding successfully the negotiation of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. We also believe that the important work of that body in the area of chemical weapons should be continued.

Holding nuclear tests has been an issue before this Committee, the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors for many years. High hopes have been attached to the proposal, and no one can question the goal it is designed eventually to achieve. Of course, the United States Government supports that long-term goal. But a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. We shall co-operate fully in appropriate procedures to examine the problems which the proposal presents. However, international conditions have not been propitious and are not now propitious to immediate action on this worthy project.

As we consider the question of a nuclear test ban, we should keep in mind that, in order for such a ban ultimately to be effective, it must be verifiable and it must be concluded under conditions which ensure that it will enhance, rather than diminish, international security and stability.

The Committee is discussing the possibility of further arms control measures for outer space, a question which the Committee on Disarmament might

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

wish to discuss further. The United States has supported efforts to control arms in space in the past, through such major international agreements as the outer space Treaty and the limited test-ban Treaty. Moreover, the United States military use of space has been non-aggressive in nature and has been conducted with great restraint. Further steps in space arms control are greatly complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union has for many years been testing an anti-satellite weapon, a space system designed for the sole purpose of attacking other nations' satellites, and that it maintains a continuing operational capacity to use this weapon.

As the First Committee conducts its work, it is important to keep in mind that pious rhetoric and vacuous resolutions do not constitute arms control. Moreover the United States is firmly opposed to allowing arms control negotiations, which are the most serious issue any nation can address, to be abused for purposes of political warfare. The serious effort to deal with matters of concern to this body or to the specialized agencies of the United Nations must not become the victim of political disputes which can be considered on their merits in other appropriate United Nations bodies. I hope that members of this Committee will reject propaganda resolutions which tend so often to frustrate our deliberations about serious matters. This would provide a better atmosphere next year for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I wish to emphasize the strong support of the United States Government for the special session and to pledge our co-operation to ensure its success.

Let me conclude by returning to the theme with which I began, that arms control is not a magic formula through which differing views of the international scene can be reconciled. Without fundamental agreement on the basic premises which underly the Charter, the prospects for substantial success in arms control will be dim indeed. Limitations on nuclear arms will not have much chance until the Soviet Union accepts the view that it too must abide by Article 2, paragraph 4.

(Mr. F stow, United States)

This century, bloody as it has been, has in most areas of the world seen the rise of a state system in which self-determination and a tolerance for different political and social systems has become the norm. Most dreams of militarism, empire and expansionism have been abandoned. The great question which remains to be answered is whether the last remaining traditional colonial empire is prepared to join with the rest of us in seeking the new and better world order anticipated by our Charter. In the nuclear age there can be no doubt that peace is indeed indivisible, as a celebrated Soviet Foreign Minister said many years ago. The world community cannot and will not long accept a double standard, as President Reagan has pointed out. We in the West have been patient and we are slow to anger, but no one should take our patience for blindness or passivity. Secretary of State Haig summed up the position of the United States a few months ago in these terms:

"What do we want of the Soviet Union? We want greater Soviet restraint in the use of force. We want greater Soviet respect for the independence of others, and we want the Soviets to abide by their reciprocal obligations, such as those undertaken in the Helsinki accords. These are no more than we demand of any State and these are no less than are required by the Charter and by international law. The rules of the Charter governing the international use of force will lose all of their influence on the behaviour of nations if the Soviet Union continues its aggressive course."

The United States and the Soviet Union, possessing very large nuclear forces, are locked into an extraordinary relation. In a famous article it was once characterized as the relation between two scorpions in a bottle. I prefer another metaphor. There are marriages of love and marriages of convenience; there are also marriages of necessity. The Soviet policy of expansion, fueled by the extraordinary growth of the Soviet armed forces, and particularly of its nuclear forces, has produced a situation of growing tension and instability in the world political system. The efforts of the Soviet Union to split the West

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

and to prevent Western improvement of its defences will surely fail. As a consequence, the Soviet Union should join the United States and its allies and accept the necessity of co-operation as the only way out of the dilemma which both camps now confront. Only on that footing can they hope to achieve conditions of peaceful co-existence, as Secretary of State Haig defined the concept in the speech from which I have just quoted.

As President Reagan sees it, the bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations, which have already begun and which will soon enter their more formal state in Geneva, should, if successful, be a long step towards the goal of restoring world public order. Our work here and in the Committee on Disarmament is equally important and, if conducted in a spirit of realism, can also contribute greatly to that end.

Mr. PRADHAN (Bhutan): On the crucial issue of disarmament, we can only look back with disappointment and a sense of frustration. It is highly ironical that several nations have begun the Second Disarmament Decade with a renewed determination to expand their war capabilities. This trend clearly indicates that these nations continue to believe that their security can stem only from arms superiority. For short-term political gains, such a policy looks attractive. However, if we look ahead into the future, the very basis and assumption of such a pursuit is not only catastrophic but irresponsible and displays a lack of concern for the present as well as future generations.

Looking at the stark reality of the moment, it is vital for us to address ourselves to the most crucial issue of avoiding nuclear confrontations. The idea that it is possible to wage and win a nuclear war of limited proportions must not be allowed to mature. This is a definite and an immediate fear amongst us, and all necessary steps to defuse intentions of this nature must be taken. Nations possessing nuclear weapons must exercise utmost restraint. At the same time, the forthcoming special session on disarmament should continue to give priority to the immediate cessation of the further development and testing of nuclear weapons. In this context, my delegation views the outcome in the Committee on Disarmament with disappointment. We had hoped that a consensus would have emerged for the establishment of the proposed ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. With this set-back in the Committee and the non-resumption of the trilateral negotiations, the efforts to curb the nuclear arms race have been hampered. My delegation, while reiterating our support for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to make further progress in this area.

The vastly increased ability to manufacture nuclear weapons further threatens international peace and security. The effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its attendant system of safeguards should be enhanced. Therefore, the attempts to make the Non-Proliferation Treaty equitable, and thus meaningful, should continue. Both vertical and horizontal

(Mr. Pradhan, Bhutan)

proliferation of nuclear weapons must cease, so that their control and ultimate elimination will not prove to be a Herculean task. My delegation is not against the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, technology and know-how in this area should not be diverted to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

The news media has been reporting the sporadic use of chemical weapons by some countries. It has been difficult adequately to verify such use. Whatever the true situation, such weapons must not be developed, and existing stocks should be safely eliminated. Countries which resort to use of chemical weapons are urged to halt such practices. The second special session on disarmament must attempt to stop the development of such weapons through the proposed multilateral convention.

The arms trade in general has also soared to unprecedented heights. In several countries, especially those of the North, the production of armaments forms a significant part of industry and employment. This trend is now being given further impetus. Many countries, including those in the poorer categories, are squandering their resources in the acquisition of such economically unproductive manufactures. These trends will have to be reversed, and unless conscious efforts are made to do so, the road back could be an arduous process.

We must also look at those international developments that spur nations to expand their war capabilities. We are all aware of the concerns that have caused tensions to escalate, particularly between the power blocs, and how these in turn threaten international peace and security. Even localized conflicts and issues, especially of the third-world countries, get entangled in this web of East-West confrontation. Minor flare-ups in the third world tend to acquire disproportionately larger significance. It is therefore necessary to keep bloc rivalries out of local conflicts. States should fully respect the cardinal principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. International action must also be initiated on a continuous

(Mr. Pradhan, Bhutan)

basis to bring about détente and the relaxation of tensions, especially between the power blocs. Hence we support the work of the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament. We also look towards the second special session on disarmament with much hope and expectation. Besides the efforts of the international community, the dialogue between the super-Powers must become more meaningful. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are an important and crucial ingredient in this process. Recently, however, these talks have been jeopardized. Nevertheless, it is our hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will revive the lost momentum and begin talks at the earliest possible moment on this and other related issues. We also urge the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States to resume their negotiations with a sense of urgency. Such a course would undoubtedly help in minimizing major concerns and, thus, the reasons to arm.

Finally, I would like to state that progress in disarmament will require the complete involvement and the responsible leadership of the bigger countries, and particularly the two super-Powers. If these countries come to terms with each other, then only will it be possible for the international community to make meaningful headway towards our cherished goal of general and complete disarmament.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to join preceding speakers in warmly felicitating you and the other officers of the Committee on your election. We are confident that under your leadership our Committee will be able to conclude its deliberations successfully.

Mr. TSVETKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like first to congratulate you most cordially on your unanimous election as Chairman of this Committee. My congratulations are also extended to the other officers of the Committee, and I wish all of you every success in the accomplishment of your respective duties. I hasten to add that my delegation attaches special importance to the work of this Committee and we are prepared to work with you and other delegations to obtain positive results on all the items of our agenda.

We have before us an item entitled, "Prevention of nuclear catastrophe", which, in our opinion, deserves special attention in view of the present international situation. That item was submitted to the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet delegation, which has also submitted a draft declaration. We consider this an extremely important and opportune initiative for the following reasons.

The debate in the plenary Assembly has clearly shown the deep concern of the great majority of Member States of the United Nations over the serious and continuing aggravation of the international situation and the increasing threat to international peace. The People's Republic of Bulgaria shares that concern and finds it completely justified.

Since the dark days of the cold war, the world has never moved as swiftly as it is now moving towards the abyss of a new military conflict which, considering the existence of enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons and of all types of other weapons, would inevitably lead to a veritable catastrophe for all mankind.

At the end of the 70s and beginning of the 80s, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and first and foremost the United States of America, adopted a political policy directed towards the acceleration of the arms race in order to break the existing strategic and military balance in the world and to ensure the military superiority of the NATO bloc. To that end, in May 1978 the NATO Council adopted a decision to increase considerably military budgets as well as a long-term programme of arms expansion. In December 1979, a plan was adopted to deploy in Western Europe new United States medium-range nuclear missiles, thereby endangering the principle of equality and equal security in NATO and Warsaw-Treaty relations.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

On the pretext of a mythical "Soviet menace", the Government of the United States chose to rearm on an unprecedented scale. Military expenditures in that country have reached astronomical figures. This new, extremely dangerous spiral in the arms race has been undertaken in a conscious and premeditated manner. What is even more disturbing, it is intensifying more and more the quantitative and qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons. The decision to produce the neutron weapon on a large scale has further exacerbated the international situation. The consequences, particularly dangerous for peace following the manufacture of that barbaric weapon of mass destruction, are due less to the quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenals of the United States, which are already enormous, but above all to the fact that it will dangerously lower the nuclear-war threshold. It will also obliterate the line which separates nuclear weapons from conventional weapons and that, in turn, will considerably increase the risk that any military conflict might become a thermonuclear catastrophe. Guided by their rekindled ambitions for world supremacy and to obtain dominant political positions and ensure conditions that would make it possible for them to impose by force of the threat of force their will on other countries, imperialist circles have arbitrarily declared vast areas around the world to be within the sphere of their "vital interests". They have elevated interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States to the level of State policy and have started an open attack against national liberation movements. For that purpose they have created what has been called the rapid deployment force, whose officially proclaimed task is to react rapidly in areas where they themselves consider their interests affected.

The unbridled arms race has been accompanied by political acts which further increase tension. The United States has refused to ratify SALT-II and has rejected the proposal to proclaim a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium range nuclear missiles of NATO and the Soviet Union. Negotiations on all fundamental aspects of disarmament have been blocked. A huge propaganda campaign has been launched in the West to make people military-minded and to create an atmosphere of military psychosis. What is particularly alarming

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

is that certain Western political circles and increasingly invoking aggressive military doctrines, such as those of a "limited nuclear war" or of a "pre-emptive attack", according to which a nuclear war would be permissible and acceptable.

In that connexion, the manufacture of the neutron weapon as well as the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles are aimed at implementing a strategy of so-called "limited nuclear war".

All of the foregoing far from exhausts all the aspects of the dangerous policies pursued by the imperialist forces. However, they suffice to show that it is necessary for urgent measures to be adopted to restrain such madness. My delegation believes that, in the present circumstances, the adoption of a document on the basis of the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union would have a moderating influence on the serious development of events that are taking place in the world, and we are very much in need of such a moderating influence. That would be, of course, a small but a necessary step which the United Nations should take to achieve its high ideals in the eyes of the peoples of the world.

Considering the text of the draft declaration, I should like to point out that first and foremost reference is made to ensuring the survival of the peoples of the world and preserving human civilization. It would be absurd for the United Nations to remain impassive when its very raison d'etre is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The draft declaration in point 1 proclaims that: "States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity;", which is certainly true.

We attach special importance to that part of the draft declaration which states that: "Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations". The interests of no one, no matter what the motives invoked, should take precedence over the vital interests of all mankind.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

I should like to emphasize that we consider as particularly essential and important the provision of the draft declaration that says that it is the supreme duty and direct obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria is strongly in favour of stopping and reversing the nuclear arms race. That can be done only through the joint effort of States, through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, in strict conformity with the principle of equality and equal security.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, like the great majority of States, believes that there is an overriding need immediately to resume the negotiations which were unilaterally broken off by the United States on the limitation of strategic arms, on the basis of, and preserving, what has already been achieved in that area. We welcome the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to resume negotiations on their respective nuclear arms in Europe, and the declarations by both countries that they will do their best to reach an appropriate agreement. With goodwill, this problem can be solved successfully. The Soviet Union has set an example in this regard by stating that it is prepared not to insist on the maintenance of the full quantities of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in its western regions, and that it is ready to reduce them from existing levels, provided of course, that the question of the implementation of the NATO decision about which we know be excluded from the agenda.

The vital interests of mankind and the safeguarding of peace demand that negotiations be immediately begun on the question of the cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles to the point of their complete elimination. Any progress towards the solution of this fundamental problem would shorten the road to the final elimination of the nuclear danger.

The Bulgarian delegation shares the widely expressed concern over the slow progress towards achievement of an agreement on a problem which has long been in need of a solution: the problem of a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. A prerequisite for success of efforts in that area is that all nuclear States demonstrate appropriate political will. It is also indispensable that the appropriate tripartite negotiations be resumed.

(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

We attach special importance to such other vital questions as the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear States and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are none at the present time.

The problem of strengthening the régime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is also of current importance.

My country supports all constructive ideas aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat by the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We are, of course, interested in positive developments along these lines in certain parts of Europe, including the Balkan region.

In conclusion, we wish to express the hope that the adoption of the declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe will increase awareness of the catastrophic consequences of a possible nuclear conflict and will give fresh momentum to efforts to settle the pressing problems of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. van WELL (Federal Republic of Germany): The preservation of peace and freedom are the yardstick and ultimate objective of the foreign policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his speech before the current session of the General Assembly on 23 September 1981, Federal Foreign Minister Genscher underlined our resolve to pursue a policy which is unswervingly directed towards effective, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament. He said that:

"Negotiations on arms control and disarmament with the aim of establishing a balance at the lowest possible level are more urgent than ever".

(A/36/PV.9, p. 22)

In the Federal Republic of Germany, those two topics, namely, the preservation of peace as well as disarmament, have a dimension of their own. The loss of millions of lives and the immense suffering in many countries inflicted by the Second World War are still unforgotten. The people of my country are clearly aware of the vulnerability of peace. Through being situated at the heart of Europe they feel that they are the ones most directly affected by any destabilization of the political situation and by any threat to peace. Arms control and disarmament are therefore perceived in my country to be matters of urgent

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

necessity. In striving for the preservation of peace, my Government can rely upon a broad and many-faceted current of opinion oriented towards disarmament and animated by the desire for peace.

In our nuclear age, all politics must be politics for peace. War or military conflict has become unacceptable as a legitimate means of politics. That is the starting point for all further considerations. At the same time, the total of the resources invested in armaments all over the world constitutes a challenge to the political intellect and the moral convictions of all countries. We share the apprehension that the cost of present armaments levels in the world distorts the priorities of any politics geared to man and his needs, leads to the misappropriation of scarce resources, and curtails the possibilities for promoting the economic and social development which the developing countries badly need.

These problems require solutions on a global scale. The two super-Powers bear a special responsibility in the pursuit of efforts to maintain peace. But the challenge of arms control and disarmament is universal; all regions and all States have to play their part. My Government firmly supports the multilateral disarmament process within the United Nations.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of
Germany)

We therefore attach particular importance to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the assessment to be made at that session, the structural limits of multilateral disarmament policy will become clear. But it would be foolish to underrate the progress achieved since the first special session in 1978. It would be wrong to give up in resignation or, on the other hand, to nourish illusions by putting forward unrealistic demands. It would be equally wrong to content ourselves with verbal declarations of faith. The extensive work meanwhile accomplished in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, the discussions within the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the successful conclusion of the United Nations Convention on certain conventional weapons, are results which should not discourage us. We must now continue this work with tenacity.

In our view, the special session, by adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament and taking other decisions, can lay the conceptual groundwork for future world-wide disarmament negotiations in numerous domains and can play a constructive part in bringing about and concluding such negotiations. Thus, the second special session can provide a strong impetus for the world-wide disarmament process. My delegation for one does not want to return from the second special session empty-handed.

Disarmament policy, however, can only generate success if the international climate does not deteriorate. This presupposes that all States respect the principles which emanate from the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. This means specifically that they refrain from the threat or use of force -- and that means force through weapons of any kind -- as spelled out in the Charter, and that they take seriously their obligation to practise moderation and restraint in the pursuit of their interests.

Non-observance of the Charter arouses doubts as to a country's peaceful intentions. When a major Power interferes with military might in the sovereignty and national integrity of another country, as has happened in Afghanistan, it undermines its own credibility and greatly prejudices the efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control. The international community must not cease to counteract such behaviour.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of
Germany)

Preserving peace in the world is the most comprehensive task with which we are all faced. Our work in this regard commences at the regional level. Destabilization in the regions would have an impact on the world at large. We therefore consider it our most immediate duty to serve peace and stability between East and West. As members of the North Atlantic Alliance, we consider a stable military balance between East and West as an important contribution to security and peace in general. We want to achieve this balance at the lowest possible level of armaments.

In his recent address to the Assembly, Federal Foreign Minister Genscher again pointed to our deep concern over the growing military imbalance in Europe, in particular in the field of medium-range nuclear missiles. In view of this destabilizing development, the North Atlantic Defence Alliance adopted in December 1979 the two-track decision to take the necessary steps to maintain the credibility of deterrence and at the same time to propose negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the mutual limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The beginning of negotiations on such medium-range nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, now scheduled for 30 November of this year, gives us particular satisfaction. My Government has been working for quite some time to see these negotiations come about. It has, together with its allies in the Atlantic Alliance, participated in their preparation and will continue to accompany them attentively.

The objective which the North Atlantic Defence Alliance has set itself is quite clear: we want these negotiations to lead to a treaty limiting medium-range missiles at the lowest possible level on both sides, ideally at zero. We hope that the Soviet Union will display good faith in these negotiations and that it will contribute to the achievement of this solution by eliminating its build-up of medium-range missiles. In any event, and our partners are determined to do everything in our power to bring about a balanced force relationship in this field at a lower level, as well as greater security for all concerned.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of
Germany)

The beginning of these negotiations is one of the results of the resumed dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, which we welcome. We consider them a favourable prelude for further negotiations and for constructive co-operation. We have learned with gratification that the United States Government intends to continue the SALT process in the spring of 1982.

All along it has been our sincere hope that the Vienna mutual and balanced force reduction talks will prove successful and initiate mutual and balanced reductions. This, however, will be possible only if there is an agreed data base. We regret to say that a practical contribution from the East is still lacking in this respect.

We, as a European country, attach particular importance to the process which was initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Of especially high value is the list of principles embodied in the Final Act of Helsinki. Trusting in this code of conduct which was agreed among 35 participating States, it should be possible today for every country to determine its political, economic, social and cultural development without direct or indirect interference in its internal or external affairs by neighbouring countries.

The unmistakable results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe process so far must be consolidated and further elaborated. This is particularly true for the confidence-building measures, which have been agreed upon in the Final Act, the quality of which must be further developed.

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

At the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, my delegation for that reason advocated agreement on a precise mandate for the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe. The task of that conference is to agree on new confidence-building measures which are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and, most important, applicable to the whole of Europe. We attribute particular importance to the applicability of those new confidence-building measures to all parts of Europe, since only such a solution is compatible with the CSCE Final Act and the basic principle that the creation of confidence in Europe cannot be geographically divided.

The concept of confidence-building measures has by now assumed a world-wide dimension. The Federal Republic of Germany, together with other Member States of the United Nations, has devoted special attention to this item. This General Assembly has before it a study prepared by a group of governmental experts from 14 countries appointed by the Secretary-General. It shows the various forms that confidence-building measures can take. The aspects of predictability and the enhancement of communication are, however, always of primary importance. The study has shown that confidence-building measures can help to lessen or even eliminate the underlying causes of mistrust, tensions and hostilities and thus have an effect on the decisive factors which give rise to or aggravate crises.

The Federal Government will, on the basis of the results of the study, continue its efforts to use the principle of confidence-building on a world-wide scale in order to decrease tensions and conflicts. Further efforts must be aimed at creating substantial agreements on a regional and subregional scale which take into account the over-all political and military situation prevailing in the relevant area. We would therefore like to see regional organizations closely concerning themselves with confidence-building measures with a view to setting up negotiating mechanisms or other arrangements which could provide further stimulus for practical confidence building.

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

The Federal Republic of Germany appeals to the Member States of the United Nations to endorse the result of this study, to make further suggestions and to support all efforts aimed at the realization of confidence building on a world-wide scale.

We regard the efforts made within the United Nations over the years to make military budgets more transparent and comparable on a world-wide scale as a particularly important contribution to the process of confidence building. This has been explicitly confirmed by the report of this year's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. A request that a country's defense budget be made transparent cannot be pushed aside with a mere hint at differing economic systems. It is precisely because of that difference that a practical procedure which allows a comparison of the military expenditures of various States is necessary. In his statement at this session of the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Genscher stressed once more the need to apply and to further develop the procedure which has been worked out by the United Nations. He has repeated the proposal that the United Nations set up two registers: one which records how much each industrial country spends per head of the population on armaments and how much it spends on development assistance, and a second register which would serve to list arms exports and imports.

The Federal Republic of Germany, like some other Western and non-aligned countries, submitted a report in 1980 on its defence budget, in line with the standardized reporting system of the United Nations for military expenditures, and it repeated this action in 1981. It has become evident that this system is practicable. We regret that, as of now, not a single State from the East has followed the invitation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to answer the system's questionnaire.

This session of the General Assembly once again deals with questions of nuclear disarmament. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament underlines in its paragraph 57

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in this field. That is why we attach such great importance to the SALT negotiations and the negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles which are about to begin. Proposals for nuclear disarmament without real substance and without provisions for adequate verification are no solution.

The problem of conventional weapons, too, is a task of disarmament policy and requires our full attention. We appeal to the General Assembly finally to adopt at this session the study of the Secretary-General on all aspects of conventional armaments.

My Government attaches particular importance to reliable verification provisions in connexion with the efforts to conclude a convention on a comprehensive ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress which has been made in that regard this year in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Disarmament Committee.

At the same time, we regret that the fact-finding commission set up under General Assembly resolution 34/144 C has not been able to submit to this General Assembly the final report it was asked to provide. The commission should be enabled to continue and conclude its work. If I may again quote what Mr. Genscher said before the General Assembly:

"Anyone who opposes on-site inspections or refuses to accept verification in other forms will be open to the suspicion of wanting to hide something and deceive others; he will be destroying confidence rather than building it." (A/36/PV.9, p.26)

We welcome the successful conclusion on 10 October 1980 of the negotiations within the United Nations on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, which had lasted several years. The success of the United Nations weapons conference gives proof that concrete agreements continue to be possible in the field of security policy as well. The great

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

number of signatory States justifies the hope that, following the necessary ratifications, the convention will soon enter into force. The Federal Republic of Germany would see it as an encouraging sign if further Member States of the United Nations were to adhere to the convention at an early date.

In our opinion, this convention represents a further step, which should not be underestimated, towards protecting the civilian population and combatants in the case where an armed conflict cannot be prevented. At the same time, the convention, by its very constitution, creates a suitable basis for further agreements to that end. We attach particular importance to safeguarding the implementation of that convention. The Federal Government strongly advocates the creation of a mechanism for verifying compliance with the convention. We have in mind institutions of the kind provided for in the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be the focal point of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This gives us the opportunity to create a conceptual framework which will facilitate the commencement of concrete disarmament negotiations. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament has, since the last session of the General Assembly, made considerable progress in this field. My Government has contributed to this progress.

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

We have, together with other Western countries, set out the principles and goals of such a programme in a working paper (CD/198). On 6 August 1981 the Federal Republic of Germany, jointly with Australia, Belgium, Japan and the United Kingdom, submitted the complete draft of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/205). That draft was a serious attempt by my country and our co-sponsors to submit proposals aimed at moving towards the goal of disarmament and arms control through concrete steps politically feasible today and tomorrow. In our view a comprehensive programme of disarmament must, through the definition of goals, the description of principles and the highlighting of focal points, be aimed at facilitating negotiations in order to limit the use of military power and to improve the prospects for crisis management and the prevention of war in a world of persisting antagonisms.

We have suggested that progress in the programme's implementation be periodically reviewed with the object of assessing interim results and providing new impulses. We see such reviews as the centre-piece of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

We are convinced that a comprehensive programme of disarmament can enhance the prospects of achieving concrete and verifiable disarmament agreements. It is true that this calls for a sense of judgement and an eye for what is feasible and what is not. The credibility of the comprehensive programme will depend on how realistic its goals are. Bearing that in mind, we shall continue to assist in the elaboration of that programme in a constructive manner.

What is urgently required today is a preparedness to enter into and pursue seriously negotiations on disarmament and arms control and the capability to contribute through concrete and verifiable results to the maintenance of world peace and the mastering of the great challenges to mankind without military conflicts.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind delegations that the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament items will be closed this afternoon at 6 o'clock.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.