



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 4TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

CONTENTS

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

General debate

Statements were made by:

Mr. Hurd (United Kingdom)
Mr. Uchuno (Nigeria)
Mr. Okawa (Japan)
Mr. Wiejacz (Poland)
Mr. Klestil (Austria)

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550, 866 United Nations Plaza (Alcoa Building), and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 56, 128 and 135 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. HURD (United Kingdom): I am very glad to have this opportunity to speak to the Committee on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, of which the United Kingdom is at present the President. I shall also, with your permission, take the opportunity of adding some very brief remarks from the point of view of the British Government.

Mr. Chairman, first of all, it gives me great pleasure to offer to you our warmest congratulations on your assumption of this office. I do this partly on grounds of ancient and personal friendship, but also because we are all aware of the distinguished contribution which you have made to the work of this Organization and we are delighted that the deliberations of the First Committee will be in such good hands.

If we review the results of the First Disarmament Decade, as the 1970s were designated, we are bound to conclude that the expectations of members of our European Community have been disappointed, for the military potential of many States has been hugely increased, and armed conflict continues to cause widespread suffering and destruction in many parts of the world. Particularly disturbing is the resort to military force and the failure to use consistently the right machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

The invasion and continuing occupation of a non-aligned country have threatened international security and led to increased tension throughout the world. They have diminished the prospects for real progress in the disarmament negotiations by undermining mutual trust and confidence. At the same time, they serve to underline the importance of making progress on arms control and disarmament as a means of preserving and if possible enhancing international peace and security.

The massive increases in worldwide expenditure on armaments also emphasize the need to control the level of armed forces in order to reduce the resources devoted to them and thereby help to tackle the social and economic problems faced by all countries, particularly the poorest ones. This is another reason why there is an undiminished - indeed, growing - need for arms control and disarmament in both nuclear and conventional forces. Technological advances have led to the possibility of a new dimension in military activities, namely, the use of space. The Ten attach great importance to preventing an arms race in space.

The declarations favoured by some States can do little to enhance international security if they are not accompanied by realistic, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements. For disarmament cannot be decreed by declaration, any more than peace can be preserved by petitions. For this reason, the members of the European Community are unable to give their support to vague proposals such as those for no first-use of nuclear weapons, which in our view are unrealistic, unenforceable and declaratory. The Ten believe that disarmament will come about only through serious and painstaking negotiation, resulting in concrete agreements on measures for the limitation and reduction of armaments, taking into account the principles of parity and equality. This is the way to increase confidence and assure the security of all States.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

In Europe, which is naturally the area of prime concern to us, we count ourselves fortunate that our continent has not known the scourge of war since the time the United Nations was founded 36 years ago. But we recognize that the unbalanced and unconstrained growth of armed forces represents a serious threat to that peace. We wish to see equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements to reduce current levels of arms and armed forces with the objective of maintaining or enhancing security at the lowest possible level of military strength. We are under no illusions about the difficulty of achieving this; yet it is essential if we are to protect the security of all States and prepare the way for general and complete disarmament.

One forum for the East-West dialogue is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), in which the Helsinki Final Act established in effect a code of conduct for participating States. When the Madrid CSCE Review Meeting resumes its work in a week's time, the Ten will, as part of their efforts to secure a substantial and balanced concluding document, renew their full support for the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe to negotiate in a first stage confidence-building measures of genuine military significance which will be binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe up to the Urals. We urge all participating States to accept these criteria unequivocally so that future confidence-building measures will make a real contribution to reducing tension, instability and the danger of armed conflict.

It is also important to seek to reduce the size of conventional forces in Europe. The Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions continue to work for agreement on common ceilings. Those members of the Ten which are joining in those negotiations are working initially for a first-phase agreement which would bring about reductions in the level of United States and Soviet forces.

But there is no doubt at all that one of the most immediate problems facing Europe is the level of theatre nuclear forces (TNF). We have therefore

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

given strong support to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on limiting TNF. The news that those negotiations are to begin on 30 November, and the preliminary meetings that have taken place here during the General Assembly, are the culmination of diplomatic efforts to which European countries have contributed. It is our common wish to see effective control and a reduction of these arms on both sides at the lowest possible level.

We are also encouraged by the prospect of a renewed dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation. This is entirely in keeping with the responsibility of the super-Powers to take the first steps in nuclear disarmament. We have noted the positive emphasis in American statements on negotiating reductions rather than ceilings. We believe that this would help to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. It should also give a much-needed stimulus to other arms control negotiations.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide us with an opportunity to review what has been achieved since 1978 in the field of arms control and disarmament and to consider why progress has been so slow. It should also analyse the underlying causes and the effects of the arms race and consider further ways to speed up the implementation of the recommendations agreed at the first special session on disarmament. The members of the European Community consider it essential that the second special session should take full advantage of the work already done by the first special session, which concluded with the adoption by consensus of a substantial Final Document.

The special session will need to consider the valuable work of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the multilateral negotiating body of the United Nations. In particular, good progress has been made during the past year in the negotiations on a verifiable convention to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Member States of the

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

European Community have contributed constructively to those negotiations as well as to those pursued on other subjects, namely, radiological weapons, negative security assurances and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

We the members of the European Community attach great importance to the discussion of United Nations disarmament studies at the second special session. We urge all States to consider the valuable material contained in the studies on regional disarmament, confidence-building measures, disarmament and development, the international satellite monitoring agency, and disarmament institutions. We appeal to States to accept the immediate launching of the Secretary-General's study on all aspects of conventional forces and weapons.

The problems of achieving success in the various disarmament negotiations should not be underestimated. In particular, we note that there is still wide disagreement over the nature of verification provisions. We in the European Community believe that there is no virtue in any arms control agreement which cannot be adequately verified so as to give all parties confidence in the compliance of others. Indeed, such agreements without adequate verification could be positively harmful.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

There are two topical points which may be cited as a practical illustration of the need for international co-operation in ensuring that agreements are observed, the first being the importance of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C in setting up an independent investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons. The members of the European Community greatly appreciate the work done so far by the Secretary-General's Committee of Experts and trust that this work may be continued.

Secondly, and for similar reasons but of a more permanent nature, the Ten would favour the establishment of a mechanism for investigating alleged breaches of the United Nations Convention on certain inhumane conventional weapons, taking into account the proposal for a consultative committee of experts.

This statement, with which I conclude my remarks as President of the European Community, has been concerned with some of the principal arms control negotiations in which the members of our Community have a special interest. We are making the attempt in Europe to tackle the issues of arms control and disarmament across the spectrum of nuclear and conventional forces and in the vital field of confidence-building measures. We suggest that similar efforts should be made in other parts of the world where tensions exist in order to strengthen both national and international security.

Noting that the United Nations Disarmament Week opens in four days' time, I would like in conclusion to say a few very brief words on behalf of my own Government, the British Government. In the towns and villages of my country, we are now taking part week by week in a serious and anxious public debate about peace in our world. We are not alone in this; the same is true in many other countries in other parts of the world. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the people of Britain find that the world has become a more dangerous place. They are aware that the build-up of Soviet arms goes beyond what can reasonably be required for defensive purposes, and they recognize the need for us and our friends to make a response. But they are particularly anxious - and this comes through in debate after debate - that our response in Britain should include

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

the patient and serious search for agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies on arms control and disarmament. Of course they are not alone in this. I believe that the Russian people, scarred by their terrible experiences of 40 years ago, are equally anxious for peace.

It is in this belief that I ask the representative of the Soviet Union in this Committee to consider one change of attitude which could be crucial. In most of the various negotiations now under way or about to begin, negotiations on which our peoples pin such hopes, the problem of verification will be near the heart of the discussions. If the Soviet Union and its allies could move from their tradition of secrecy towards a freer exchange of information, that would be excellent news for us all. I am thinking of the forthcoming negotiations on theatre nuclear forces and on strategic weapons; I am thinking of the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna, now held up on this question of data; and I am thinking in particular about the hideous possibilities of biological and chemical warfare. If we are to satisfy the common desire for peace and stability at lower levels of force, we must redouble our efforts for the conclusion of disarmament agreements, but - and this is the final point I should like to make -- the conclusion of such disarmament agreements can only be built on confidence, and confidence can only be built on a willingness to disclose to others what, in earlier and safer times, governments might have preferred to conceal.

It is in the spirit of our genuine search for a more secure peace, a more stable international order, that I end my remarks today with that appeal.

Mr. UCHUNO (Nigeria): As the First Committee of the General Assembly again addresses itself to the arduous task of harmonizing the differing views and complex interests of Member States on the burning question of the arms race and disarmament, permit me at the outset, Sir, to express the satisfaction of my delegation on your unanimous election as Chairman of our Committee. My delegation is convinced that your wealth of experience and diplomatic skills will see the Committee through the tangled haystack of difficulties and

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

sensitivities which litter the path of disarmament negotiations. We are particularly encouraged by the fact that you represent a country which has been in the forefront of the struggle to establish peace as a way of life for many a nation to which the concept of non-alignment in international politics gives form and content. I can assure you, particularly in view of the amity that exists between our two countries, that you can count on my delegation for the fullest possible co-operation in the discharge of your onerous duties and responsibilities. We also extend our warmest congratulations to the officers of the Committee.

We would merely be stating the obvious were we to say that the times in which we live are indeed troubled. The current international climate is uncertain. It is marked by hotbeds of tension which are being further exacerbated by the continuing spiral in the arms race. The existing situation is not only a sad commentary on the value judgement of States but a disconcerting paradox that the world should find itself increasingly engulfed in an unsettling concern over its very survival because of the advances in technology that human ingenuity has placed at its disposal. But, of course, we place no constraints on the potential and development of the human mind. Rather, we posit that our ambitions should be made of sterner but more humane stuff.

The arms race represents for the international community the bestial aspect of the human mind, which seeks a recourse to arms in order to prove a point because of the apparent inability or unwillingness to carry through the process of dialogue and debate with conviction. The pertinent question to ask, therefore, is whether extinction will really prove any point. Nations should, in fact, and in their interests, be disposed to accept the validity of constructing the peace process.

Our Committee has been specifically charged with consideration of disarmament questions out of a recognition of the complex problems posed by the arms race, its challenge to human survival and the necessity for the United

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

Nations to fulfil its obligations under the Charter by striving to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The thrust and content of the various items on the Committee's agenda reflect the varying concerns of Member States about the seemingly intractable nature of disarmament. However, it would be unproductive to give up in despair. Rather, it will be the task of our Committee to strive to combat the inherent fluctuations in the attitudes of Member States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the militarily significant ones which bear a special responsibility for the arms race and disarmament. Such attitudes have ranged from indifference to outright unwillingness to undertake meaningful disarmament measures in the erroneous belief that security is a function of the quality and quantity of weapons possessed.

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

It is incontrovertible to state that disarmament is of universal concern. To that extent, the nuclear-weapon States in general and the two super-Powers in particular should accept the merit of not conducting themselves in a manner which would suggest that the rest of the international community owes them an obligation for its continued existence. They must adopt a positive attitude towards, and interest in, disarmament. In a nuclear war there are no victors, but only victims. Therefore, the countervailing theories of limited, survivable or winnable nuclear warfare which are being propagated as plausible postures by States should be discounted for lack of validity and convincing evidence. The economic and social conditions obtaining in the various countries suggest that all countries, including the nuclear-weapon States themselves, stand to gain from disarmament and its related processes, particularly when the human, material and natural resources currently utilized for military purposes are ploughed into peaceful development goals.

It is regrettable that the relationship between the two super-Powers should continue to show signs of strain because of varying perceptions of their national interests and the conceptual analysis of the motivations of the other side. Both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have a clear responsibility to promote peaceful co-existence and détente in their bilateral relations, both for themselves and in the interests of the international community, because the state of play of those relations has a profound impact on the evolution of the international climate. They cannot therefore abdicate that responsibility. The two super-Powers must accept that a change from the status quo in the direction of a downward turn in relation to their current military capabilities does not hurt their national interests, either in the short run, or even in the long run. They will lose nothing from security achieved at a lower level of armament, armed forces and military expenditure.

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

The two aspects of the arms race - the nuclear and the conventional - have been marked not only by their destructive capacities but by their tendency to distort national priorities in favour of an unproductive and uneconomic arms race. Having regard to the pervasive nature of the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament decided in 1978 to accord priority to the consideration of efforts and measures leading to nuclear disarmament. It is the view of my delegation that the established priorities continue to retain their values and validity. They must not be distorted. Unfortunately, however, the history of efforts towards nuclear disarmament both within and outside the United Nations system has presented a dismal picture. In the circumstances, a clear duty imposes itself on our Committee to assist the General Assembly in seeking ways and means to brighten the disarmament picture on the road to the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament.

At this juncture, it seems pertinent to my delegation to point to a direction in which negotiations on nuclear disarmament appear to be heading. First, there is an emergent posture on the part of some nuclear-weapon States which would like to predicate progress towards disarmament on the acceptance of the fact that each State's judgement of its security requirements is not subject to a challenge, no matter what the existing reality is. While it is true that it is the inalienable right of every State to protect its sovereignty and national interest, it is my delegation's view that the quantitative and qualitative accumulation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States bears no direct relevance or proportion to their realistic defence requirements. We also think that a posture of sovereign infallibility as enunciated above runs counter to the expectation contained in paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, which states, inter alia, that:

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons." (A/S-10/4)

Secondly, there is a creeping paralysis in disarmament negotiations, particularly in the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament. As a general comment one may wish to suggest that the on-going review of the American Administration's posture on arms control would benefit the international community if it were to accept the necessity of an accelerated tempo in that review with a precise indication of the country's stand on disarmament and related issues. It seems unlikely that the recently projected expenditure of some \$180 billion to close the "window of vulnerability"; with its implications for the production of new weapons of mass destruction, including, for example, the neutron bomb, provides the Administration's realistic answer to arms control and disarmament. Neither is the impregnable margin of information disadvantage currently surrounding the military intentions and capabilities of the other side conducive to the generation of mutual confidence necessary for disarmament. Thirdly, the Committee on Disarmament, which was established by the first special session on disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament endowed with both a moral and a technical competence and authority, should be enabled to justify the purpose of its creation through its ability to function according to the administrative machinery which it has itself set up or wishes to set up, including the establishment of ad hoc working groups, particularly on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. The spectre of the institution of co-chairmanship which bedevilled proceedings at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament seems to persist in the Committee on Disarmament, albeit in a modified form. This ought not to be.

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

Fourthly, the impression is conveyed that certain matters relating to negotiations on nuclear disarmament are outside the competence of the Committee on Disarmament and it would be considered ultra vires if the Committee on Disarmament were even to contemplate making suggestions to the trilateral negotiators on a possible way forward in the interminable and complex negotiations by the former on a comprehensive test ban, for example. We think that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban should not be mutually exclusive, but should be parallel with and complementary to those in the multilateral negotiating forum, the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation cannot accept that the platform of the trilateral negotiators constitutes the only valid basis for a comprehensive test ban which is the crucial first step to nuclear disarmament, in which all nations have a vital interest.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, whose revitalization as a deliberative organ of the General Assembly was an offshoot of the first special session on disarmament, has tended to ride roughshod over its mandate. Observable in its performance has been the possibility for a few to exercise the semblance of a veto in arriving at a consensus decision on substantive issues. It is not the expectation of the international community nor, indeed, of the moving spirit behind the revitalization of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, that the scenario in the Security Council should be allowed to prevail in a deliberative subordinate organ of the General Assembly. This state of play has been particularly evident on substantive issues relating, for example, to the nuclear capability of South Africa.

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

My delegation holds the view that the security and stability of the African continent are neither negotiable nor subject to the whims or caprices or the geopolitical or geostrategic considerations of any nation or group of nations. To that extent, the desirable objective of a denuclearized Africa must not be frustrated by anyone, least of all by South Africa or its collaborators. We reiterate our call to those countries which have found it very comfortable to prop up the Pretoria régime in order to enable it to destabilize the rest of Africa to rethink their value judgment as well as the morality of their actions, in relation to their deeply held constitutional beliefs and democratic principles.

The pattern of conventional arms transfer to the third world represents a basic malaise which seems to afflict every country in which the perception and conception of security are predicated upon the quantum and level of armaments possessed. We believe that the consequent lopsided distribution of available scarce resources to armaments, to the detriment of social and economic needs constitutes not only a disservice to the order of national priorities but a flight from its realities. This is an added reason why conventional disarmament should also be pursued.

Permit me now to address myself to yet another area of concern to most delegations. This relates to talks on the mutual force reductions in Europe, which have been going on interminably in Vienna. We would like to suggest to the countries taking part in those talks that we all have an abiding interest in their successful outcome, since a peaceful Europe constitutes a major contribution to international peace and security. To that extent, it would be a contribution to the building of confidence if the rest of the international community were periodically briefed on the status of those negotiations.

The journey from 1961, when the United States and the Soviet Union issued a statement on agreed principles as a basis for disarmament negotiations, has been long and dreary. The first principle of that agreement was stated in the following terms:

"...the goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems".

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

For 20 years, that goal has eluded the two super-Powers, which have hung their State relations on a tenuous détente, played the game of disarmament quite adroitly to the discomfiture of the weaker Member States and outplayed an unwitting world public opinion into resignation and acceptance of a persisting arms race. It took ten years for the two super-Powers to agree to negotiate the first of their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). When SALT I was eventually signed in 1972, with an undertaking to commence negotiations on SALT II, the expectation was that that marked the beginning of the end of the arms race. SALT II took yet another seven years to negotiate, and although it was signed in June 1979, it is yet to be ratified.

Although the SALT process has been conceived as an arms limitation effort between the two super-Powers, it is considered capable of contributing to the generation of a suitable climate of confidence conducive to disarmament negotiations. In the circumstance, my delegation wishes to reiterate its appeal to the two super-Powers to ratify SALT II and undertake the continuation of the SALT process towards SALT III, leading to significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles.

The second substantive session of the Preparatory Committee of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982 has just completed its consideration of a provisional agenda for the special session. It is the expectation of my delegation that the opportunity offered by the second special session on disarmament would be used to reassess the attitudes of all States to disarmament, revamp its disarmament machinery and adopt concrete instruments and measures, particularly the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in a renewed international commitment to disarmament.

Finally, we reiterate our belief in the concepts and possibility of time-frames in disarmament negotiations and hope that the indicative programme of measures to be accomplished during the second Disarmament Decade will induce in Member States the necessary political will to undertake meaningful disarmament so as to increase the possibility of the release of real resources for social and economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

(Mr. Uchuno, Nigeria)

Although it is our expectation that our acceptance of the need for increased mobilization of public opinion in favour of disarmament will continue to find ready expression in the form of disarmament education, seminars and training such as the existing United Nations Fellowship Programmes on Disarmament and other public information activities, permit me to make one final comment on the question of institutional arrangements, which constituted a major study by a Group of Governmental Experts, in which my country was represented. On this very question, my delegation would like to re-state the view which was also very lucidly presented yesterday by the representative of Mexico. We think that the possibility of upgrading the United Nations Centre for Disarmament into a Department of Disarmament Affairs, under the direction of an Under-Secretary General, will enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role for disarmament efforts.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I had the pleasure of making your acquaintance at last year's Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and I wish to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the proceedings of this Committee. We offer you and the other members of the Bureau our congratulations on your election and your pledge of full co-operation under your able guidance.

The Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Sonoda, in his general statement in plenary at this year's session of the General Assembly, took up first of all the question of disarmament as a means of reversing the trend of world instability and setting the international community on a more solid foundation. He emphasized the need for disarmament in order to bring about the cessation of the arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Minister was expressing in the most candid of terms, on the one hand, Japan's strong concern at the ever-intensifying nuclear arms race in recent years and the ensuing danger of nuclear war and, on the other, our recognition of the urgent need for disarmament as a means of ameliorating the dire situation in which we find ourselves.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

I myself said in the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament this year, on 6 August - the 36th anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb - that Japan had been reminding the world for the past 36 years that it was the "only country" which had suffered from nuclear weapons, but that if the world continued to behave as it was behaving I felt inclined to change that wording slightly and say that Japan was the "first country" to know the horrors of those weapons, the implication being, of course, that many other countries could follow in our wake. I was thus trying to stress that nuclear disarmament is the most urgent task faced by the international community of today.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Recognition by the peoples of the world of the need to strengthen disarmament promotion efforts and the clamours for concrete action in that direction are intensifying - as is indicated, for example, by the formation in Japan in May this year of a non-partisan group of parliamentarians called the Japanese Parliamentary Association for the Promotion of International Disarmament, in addition to the activities of Japanese non-governmental organizations.

It is against that background - of the increasing urgency of disarmament and the mounting world concern in this regard - that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be held next year. Japan strongly hopes that the special session will provide an opportunity for a review of developments since the first special session and for concrete and constructive discussions, free of polemics of a political nature, on the ways and means of removing the obstacles to progress in disarmament and of achieving actual progress in the future. Japan is determined to contribute towards that objective in a positive manner.

In my statement today I intend to reiterate my Government's position on two items on the disarmament agenda and appeal to Member States to make greater efforts towards their realization. One is the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests which my country has always regarded as the task of the highest priority in the whole field of disarmament; the other is the prohibition of chemical weapons which are weapons of mass destruction second only to nuclear weapons and on which early conclusion of a convention would appear to be within reach depending on the efforts devoted to the subject. As to the other principal items on our agenda, I shall be stating my Government's position at the appropriate moment.

It goes without saying that not only a comprehensive test ban but many other arms control and disarmament measures in the nuclear weapons field which are closely related to a comprehensive test ban must also be sought as being equally important to achieving nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, my Government is convinced that a comprehensive test ban will be effective not only in preventing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons - by putting the brakes on their further sophistication - but also in preventing the appearance on the scene of additional nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

States, in other words, horizontal proliferation. At the same time, we have been grappling with the comprehensive test ban problem as being of the highest priority in the field of nuclear disarmament because we think it will provide a realistic basis, or starting point, for efforts towards the reduction and, eventually, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In other words, a comprehensive test ban would indeed be an important first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

Up to the present day, more than 1,200 nuclear tests have been conducted, and that figure represents only those tests which we know have taken place. Even since the coming into effect of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the number of tests has not even been diminishing and more than 780 tests have been carried out during that period. Nuclear-weapon tests are still continuing to this day in spite of the fact that the accumulation of more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons developed through those tests has long since brought us to the state of so-called overkill.

One cannot but express deep regret at such a situation, which makes our common goal, the total elimination of nuclear weapons, seem to be receding into the remotest future.

The partial test-ban Treaty is the greatest achievement so far in the field of nuclear test bans, and as many as 110 States have adhered to it. My Government attaches importance to seeing the partial test-ban Treaty adhered to by all States; universal adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty would constitute a significant stage towards a comprehensive test ban and I am instructed once again to urge the two nuclear-weapon States that have remained outside the partial test-ban Treaty, China and France, to adhere to that Treaty at an early date. May I also draw the Committee's attention to the hazardous effects of nuclear testing, and especially testing within the atmosphere, on the human body, as well as the dangerous contamination of our planetary environment which inevitably results from those tests.

Over a decade after the partial test-ban Treaty came the treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes signed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Japan considers that the entry into force of those two

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

treaties would constitute an important step towards achievement of a comprehensive test ban; in particular, it attaches importance to the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions and its accompanying protocol as suggestive precedents for a comprehensive test ban - since they include important provisions on the carrying out of on-site inspections as well as on exchange of data between the parties.

However, those treaties remain unratified by the two signatories. My Government maintains that the threshold of 150 kilotons recognized by the two treaties is by far too high. It nevertheless regrets that the Soviet Union and the United States do not find it possible to ratify even those two instruments.

The comprehensive test ban is something the international community has been waiting for since more than a quarter of a century ago, when negotiations were first initiated on the task, and yet whatever progress there may be is being made at a snail's pace. That the principal difficulty lies in the problem of verification goes without saying. In approaching the comprehensive test ban question Japan fully recognizes the importance of verification and has played an active role in international efforts to achieve real progress in that field. As part of efforts to set up an international network for detecting seismological events, Japan took part in the 1966 Stockholm conference on the exchange of seismic data, the so-called detection club, sponsored an informal meeting of Japanese, Canadian and Swedish seismologists in Tokyo in 1972, and invited scientific and seismic experts from 12 countries to an informal meeting in Tokyo in October 1978. Japan is also playing an important role in studies on the computerization of elements extracted from seismograms as well as on the transmission of seismic data which are being undertaken within the context of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts established by the Committee on Disarmament.

In the context of the work of the Ad Hoc Group, a second trial exchange of seismic data is going to be held shortly. Japan places hopes on the success of that experiment which could contribute towards the establishment of a verification system based on the exchange of seismic data.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

It urges not only countries participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group but as many other countries as possible, notably the nuclear-weapon States, including China, France and the Soviet Union, to participate in that important exercise.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

The tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have been suspended, and progress has stopped. The Japanese Government requests the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to reopen their negotiations at an early date. It also requests them to give early replies to the questions regarding the tripartite negotiations which were put to them by several delegations, including my own, in the Committee on Disarmament.

At the same time, my Government strongly hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will set up an ad hoc working group on a comprehensive test ban which would take up such matters as the modalities of the international seismic detection network and the verification system in general, as well as other questions related to a comprehensive test ban, in a manner and to the extent that its work would supplement the parallel tripartite negotiations. The setting up of such a working group would be meaningful in the sense that it would enable those countries that are not participating in the tripartite negotiations to join in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban; this could be useful in expediting the negotiations and could also allow such countries to make their own concrete contributions in the quest for a comprehensive test ban. It was based upon that assessment that the Government of Japan proposed at the Committee on Disarmament in February this year the establishment of such a working group, and I cannot but express my Government's great disappointment that it has still not materialized. Japan continues to hope that such a working group, with a mandate agreed upon by consensus including all the nuclear-weapon States, will be set up at the earliest possible date, and at least before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We will continue to exert our efforts towards that objective.

Japan also once again urges that all countries refrain from all nuclear explosion tests, including those for peaceful purposes, even in the period prior to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

One hardly needs to say that lack of progress in nuclear disarmament measures such as the comprehensive test ban has adverse effects on international efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We must recall in this connexion that the second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held last year, was unable to adopt a final declaration, as a result of the dissatisfaction expressed by a great many countries at the lack of progress in

nuclear disarmament, although it is true that nobody challenged the system of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself.

In these circumstances, the Egyptian ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in February this year was an event that gave us bright hopes, and my delegation wishes to welcome again the courageous decision of the Government of Egypt taken under the leadership of the late President Sadat. On the contrary, the Israeli air force's bombing last June of the nuclear reactor of Iraq - a State which is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which accepts International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards - should be called a grave challenge to the non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. Japan wishes to point to the necessity of keeping to the minimum the nefarious effects on international non-proliferation efforts of the Israeli attack, and the urgency of intensifying such efforts in the future.

I also wish to mention in this connexion the keen interest of Japan - a country with 23 nuclear reactors on a small expanse of land territory - in the idea of prohibiting military attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities.

Finally, the Government of Japan strongly calls for much greater efforts in the future from the nuclear-weapon States, which after all bear a special responsibility, in achieving a comprehensive test ban in particular and nuclear disarmament in general.

I now wish to turn to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, a question to which for a great many years the international community, including my own country, has been seeking an early solution, as a task of an urgency second to that of a comprehensive test ban.

If and when chemical weapons are employed in armed conflict, the resulting widespread and indiscriminate injury and damage will not be limited to combatants alone, but will inevitably affect entire civilian populations. Chemical weapons can thus, depending on the way in which they are used, become weapons of mass destruction second only to nuclear weapons. They are incorporated into the weapon systems of a number of countries; there are reports of their inclusion in operational plans for use in co-ordination with other types of weapons, and even of their actual use.

It cannot be denied that the fear of becoming the victim of chemical weapons has been spreading internationally in recent years. To the States parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, my delegation calls for strict observance of that Protocol. To those States which have not acceded to the Protocol, my delegation urges them to do so quickly and, in the interval, to pay regard at least to the spirit of the Protocol and refrain from using chemical weapons under any circumstances.

It is true that we have not just been sitting idle against this dangerous background. The prohibition of chemical weapons has been the subject of priority deliberation in the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors over a great many years.

Typical examples of such efforts are the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, presented by the socialist States of Eastern Europe in 1972, the working paper calling for a comprehensive ban with adequate verification measures, presented by 10 non-aligned countries in 1973, and the draft convention presented by the United Kingdom in 1976. Japan also presented a draft convention in 1974 which, while envisaging as the ultimate objective the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, proposed a stage-by-stage approach beginning with prohibition of chemical agents regarding which the application of verification measures would present no difficulties. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the United States, as a result of their summit meeting in July 1974, announced their intention to take a joint initiative regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons; they have since been conducting bilateral negotiations on the subject parallel to the Committee's deliberations.

The setting up of an ad hoc working group on chemical weapons at last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament was a valuable step forward towards the concrete solution of this problem. Members of the Committee on Disarmament have continued their consideration of the various issues that should be included in the future negotiation of a convention on a chemical weapons ban, and the many and varied initiatives and efforts of the past have served as a basis for the work in the Ad Hoc Working Group. It must be recalled at the same time that the presentation to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States of a progress report on their bilateral negotiations on the subject was a significant contribution to our discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

At this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, under the inspired leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, the body of a possible chemical weapons convention emerged in its entirety, so to speak, for the first time. This should be commended as an important concrete step forward, and it gives us hope that, depending on our efforts, a chemical weapons convention may indeed be concluded in the not-too-distant future.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

In order to accelerate the recent momentum towards the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, the Government of Japan wishes to express its positive support of the proposal made by many countries to revise the mandate of the Committee on Disarmament Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. It hopes that the work beginning again in February next year can be undertaken under a new mandate. Japan feels that the Working Group's mandate should be revised to enable the drafting of convention language to begin, at least on the issues on which a convergence of views has emerged, or on which the divergence of views has been narrowed down considerably in the course of past discussions.

Furthermore, the Japanese Government hopes that next year's session of the Committee on Disarmament Working Group on Chemical Weapons will concentrate its efforts on seeking solutions to the question of the scope of the prohibition and to the problem of verification, and that greater progress will be made in these fields, which will undoubtedly form the two main pillars of the eventual convention. Particularly in the field of verification, which would guarantee the effectiveness of the convention, there appears to be general agreement, both in the Committee on Disarmament discussions and in the bilateral USSR-United States negotiations, that the verification system should be based on a combination of national and international means and that the international verification organ should take the form of a consultative committee. However, the question of on-site inspections - an important element of the international verification mechanism - remains as a large problem awaiting solution. The wide range of chemical agents that would fall under the prohibition, as well as the variety of the activities that would need to be prohibited, make the task difficult in any case. And it is to be anticipated that the methods and means of verification will have to vary according to what is to be verified; this will be a further complicating factor which we will have to face. All this leads us to believe that if we try to establish too strict a verification system the result may be a system that is too complicated and too difficult to implement, let alone it having a chance of obtaining the consent of all countries.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Japan, therefore, hopes that in future discussions we can study the way to establish a verification system which would be both realistic and yet sufficiently effective to guarantee the viability of the convention. This delegation is convinced of the indispensable need, first of all, to agree upon verification provisions which would envisage on-site inspections by the international verification organ, at least with regard to the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and prohibited chemical weapons agents, as well as the demolition of existing facilities for the production, etc. of these weapons and agents.

Finally, the Japanese Government urges the Soviet Union and the United States to respond to the strong demands of the international community and exert their utmost efforts to reopen their suspended bilateral negotiations with despatch, with a view to allowing the final outcome of their negotiations to be reflected at an early date in the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament.

My delegation firmly believes that if these various points I have mentioned can be incorporated into this year's General Assembly resolution on chemical weapons and the resolution can be approved by all Member States, it would constitute the most encouraging support to those who are struggling with the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention in the Committee on Disarmament.

Prior to coming to attend the meetings of this Committee I had the privilege of taking part in the work of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session devoted to disarmament to be held next year. The past two weeks in the Preparatory Committee have led me to feel that we must make absolutely sure that we overcome all difficulties in order to ensure the success of that second special session. There are a great many problems to be solved and the time remaining is short. I wish to conclude my statement by pointing out that each and every hour that we spend and each and every meeting that we hold in the interval must be utilized to the utmost in order that we may achieve the most concrete results as is humanly possible at next year's special session.

Mr. WIEJACZ (Poland): I should like first to associate myself and my delegation with the congratulations and good wishes expressed to you on your well-deserved election to the Chair of the First Committee. I am particularly pleased to offer our felicitations to a distinguished representative of a country with which Poland has traditionally enjoyed close and friendly relations. The well-known dedication of Yugoslavia to the cause of disarmament, your personal expertise in that vitally important area, and your all-round diplomatic experience will, I am sure, be instrumental in the most effective discharge of your mandate. I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that in this difficult task you will have the full and constructive co-operation of the Polish delegation.

In my statement today I would like to deal, in particular, with those questions which are referred to in the report of the Committee on Disarmament and in other documents. At the same time I want to put on record that my delegation may wish to take the floor again at a suitable later date to express its views in greater detail on item 128, which was added to the agenda at the request of the Soviet Union.

The questions of peace and international security have traditionally constituted the keynote of the general debates in the plenary of the Assembly. The debate which the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly has recently concluded differed from the past, however, in one important respect. It underscored in no uncertain terms the growing alarm of the international community at the aggravation of the international climate. People everywhere, particularly in Europe, especially in countries like my own, have been understandably concerned over the tendency, not to say the policy, of certain States to look for solutions to difficult international issues of mutual concern by relying on sheer force rather than reason, by seeking superiority rather than parity, by preaching confrontation rather than accommodation, by pursuing a policy of strength rather than one of détente and negotiation.

No one could legitimately quarrel with the conclusion that at this particular moment in time the greatest and the most immediate threat to international security comes from the combined effect of two equally

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

negative developments: the near total breakdown in the bilateral strategic arms negotiating process on the one hand, and the sharp escalation of the nuclear arms race on the other. Ominously enough, the most frightening dimension of the latter was given in the recent decision to proceed with the construction of new weapons systems.

Against this background my delegation has listened with keen attention to the penetrating assessment of the state of the world made in the statements of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, and other speakers. We have also read with interest the remarks of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in his annual report on the work of the Organization. We agree with Mr. Waldheim, in particular, when he states that:

"Relations between East and West have once again become severely strained. The arms race, especially the competition in nuclear weapons, continues unabated, representing not only a perennial risk to human survival but also an inordinate waste of human and other vital resources." (A/36/1, p.2)

(Mr. Wiejacz Poland)

As a country in the centre of the European continent, in an area claiming the sad distinction of having the world's highest per capita concentration of nuclear and conventional explosive power, Poland has a compelling vital interest in curbing the nuclear arms race.

Addressing these issues in his statement in the plenary General Assembly in September, Poland's Foreign Minister, Jozef Czyrek, said:

"Contrary to the noble objectives of the current Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, the arms race continues unchecked. We are confronted with a situation in which it is becoming not only more intense, but also more universal. It constitutes the central problem of our times; it adversely affects the security of all States; it saddles national economies with a huge burden, especially in the case of those countries which are at this stage overcoming the effects of under-development. Decisions concerning deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the production of new kinds of nuclear arms, like the neutron weapons, offer a striking illustration of the intensification of the arms race."

(A/36/PV.11, p. 61)

Public opinion in the world, particularly in the community of the socialist States and in Europe at large, has watched with growing dismay the steady erosion of the policy of détente, a policy which during the decade of the 1970s brought the peoples of Europe a far greater sense of security and identity of purpose than ever before.

The failure of the United States of America to proceed to the ratification of the SALT II agreement and above all the decisions on the deployment of new nuclear missile forces in Western Europe and to produce neutron warheads are likely to have repercussions going far beyond the confines of Europe. These negative developments cannot but force upon the peoples of that continent - and, ultimately, the world - a new round of the technological arms race. In consequence, instead of redressing the alleged military imbalance in Europe, these decisions, if put into effect, may destroy the actual strategic parity in the world. No assessment of these developments can escape the conclusion that a nuclear conflict in Europe would not be contained in Europe alone. The fallacy of a doctrine claiming that a limited nuclear conflict is thinkable and winnable

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

is obvious, yet it is highly dangerous. It was in the context of such a doctrine that neutron weapons have been developed and are now coming off the assembly line. While it can be argued that there is no such thing as a humane weapon, the neutron weapon arouses moral revulsion for it has been conceived to "weed out" human beings without harming the material spoils of war. Moral indignation notwithstanding, the neutron weapon is unacceptable because it dangerously lowers the nuclear threshold and makes nuclear war more likely.

Poland, like other socialist countries, has resolutely and consistently followed a policy of seeking to resolve through negotiations the international problems affecting the security interests of States. Such a principled approach accounts for Poland's participation in the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. At the meeting in Madrid of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe it was the motive behind our advocacy of, and involvement in, a proposal to hold a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. My country has offered to host such a conference in Warsaw. We hope that it can, indeed, be held next year. We intend shortly to confirm our readiness to commence the conference in our capital.

The policy of constructive negotiations on the broadest range of issues relevant to the security concerns of States was reaffirmed at the recent twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As far as the SALT process and the question of nuclear weapons in Europe are concerned, that policy has contributed to the resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue during the first phase of the current session of the General Assembly.

The Government and the Polish people, as, I am sure, the Governments and people in many other countries, welcome with satisfaction the important decisions announced here in New York following the intensive and wide-ranging discussions between Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. We interpret these contacts as a commendable effort to re-establish the crucially important channels of communication between the USSR and the United States of America, which are essential for a constructive approach to the key issues of arms limitation and disarmament, especially in Europe.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

Poland looks forward to an early and constructive outcome of the forthcoming talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. We also trust that the stated intention of the USSR and the United States to continue the high-level political dialogue in Geneva next year is a good augury and that it may help to revive the now dormant SALT process.

Speaking on behalf of Poland, I want to stress that we confidently expect the new lines of communication between the two great Powers to be sufficiently broad to allow also for a positive consideration of other pressing arms limitation questions. In our view, such questions include the prohibition of neutron weapons and the concept of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. It is with traditional interest and support that Poland has followed the discussion among the Nordic countries in that regard. We also attach major importance to the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation between all States concerned.

Poland gives its full and resolute support to the two latest initiatives of the USSR: the proposal to curb the arms race in outer space, an issue on which we plan to comment at a later date, and the proposal that the General Assembly adopt a declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. The latter proposal, which would have the Assembly proclaim the first use of nuclear weapons a crime against mankind, fully coincides with and corresponds to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. No one will dispute that it is totally consistent with the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as with other United Nations documents.

Given the nature of the weapons involved, the proposed legal qualification of nuclear aggression is fully warranted. The Polish delegation believes that it would be fitting and proper for the Assembly to brand the first resort to such weapons as the gravest crime against humanity and to condemn military doctrines which advocate or seek to justify such use of nuclear weapons as totally incompatible with the United Nations Charter. The moral condemnation by the international community of the first use of these weapons would be tantamount, in our opinion, to the condemnation of any use of nuclear arms. A fully effective ban on the first use of these weapons would mean that there would be neither the

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

"second use" nor any use of nuclear weapons whatever. That objective would be brought closer to reality if States were willing to embark immediately on the route mapped out in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, the important document adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 at the initiative of Czechoslovakia.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

I should now like to turn to those agenda items which held the attention of the Committee on Disarmament at its last session, the session I had the honour to address. At this juncture, let me first restate the great importance which my country continues to attach to the multilateral negotiating endeavours pursued at Geneva. At a time when other frameworks of negotiation have come to a standstill, the Committee has remained as the only working disarmament negotiating body whose representative character had the unique distinction of making it possible for the representatives of all the nuclear-weapon Powers to remain on speaking terms in matters of disarmament.

As the informative report of the Committee confirms, its activity in 1981 was pursued with determination in a constructive and matter-of-fact atmosphere. And yet, the net result of the Committee's endeavours in Geneva this year has been disappointing, to say the least. It is regrettable, indeed, that the Committee has failed to elaborate and agree upon any of the draft agreements which for quite some time have been under its active consideration. Obviously, it would be unwarranted to pin on the Committee the blame for the lack of resolve or insufficient political will of some of its members. Working as it was in a specific political environment, not in a vacuum, the Committee could hardly be immune to the negative effects of the spreading international malaise. As will be appreciated, specific progress and tangible results are conceivable only when all the negotiating parties are clear in their minds about their priorities and are prepared to engage in a constructive give-and-take negotiating process. For the better part of the Committee's 1981 session, that was not the case, at least as far as some delegations were concerned.

Notwithstanding the sense of disappointment that we share with many other delegations, we derive satisfaction from the fact that considerable work has been accomplished by the Committee's working groups. Provided there is political readiness on the part of the States concerned, that work in certain areas could be regarded as a promising starting point for the finalization and conclusion of widely acceptable international agreements.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

In our view, this statement applies in particular to the results of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons which, owing to the competent and dedicated leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has made considerable progress. The report of the Working Group containing, inter alia, important elements of a future convention and commentaries, represents an adequate substantive basis on which to continue the efforts of the Group in 1982.

Poland, which attaches major importance to the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, believes that a broadly acceptable agreement must provide for a comprehensive and verifiable ban that neither overlaps with nor detracts from other multilateral arms limitation or disarmament agreements. By 'verifiable', we mean a verification mechanism combining both national means of control and international procedures, a mechanism both effective and consistent with the scope of prohibition.

For efforts in the area of chemical weapons to be successful in the long run, we deem it absolutely essential that the Soviet-American bilateral talks in Geneva be resumed at the earliest possible date.

My country, true to a tradition of close involvement in questions relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons, will not be found wanting in the resolve to work towards such an objective. In keeping with that tradition, we are prepared again to seek, together with other interested delegations, an appropriate language for draft resolutions which, responding to the concerns of the international community, would command general support by this Committee.

A closer perusal of the part of the Committee report concerning radiological weapons confirms that all along there has been and still is an entirely satisfactory basis for the early elaboration of a multilateral instrument on the prohibition of those weapons. The joint Soviet-American document is a starting point which, given goodwill, can and should lead to a broadly supported agreement.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

Apart from any subjective judgements as to the importance of an accord on that specific type of weapon, we believe that the submission to the second special session of a final draft treaty would help the Committee to establish its effectiveness, thus allowing it to live up to its designation as a "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum". We are aware, of course, that certain negative factors tend to hinder the efforts to draft the final language of a treaty banning those weapons. The unprovoked Israeli air attack on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-safeguarded nuclear research centre in Iraq, totally unprecedented in peacetime, is certainly one such factor.

We have noted with satisfaction the progress reported with respect to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, although important issues still remain to be worked out. It is therefore commendable that the Working Group plans to resume its efforts even before the parent body formally reconvenes in Geneva.

Poland, for its part, has consistently striven to make a valid contribution to the Group's work continued under the able guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico. We intend to continue doing so in the future. We deem it rather important that, apart from specific priorities, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament envisages a concrete procedure and a mechanism whereby the principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace could be translated into practical disarmament-oriented action. The Programme should also unequivocally recognize and reaffirm the rules and principles of disarmament negotiations, such as the sovereign equality of States, undiminished security for all at the lowest possible level of military force and a balance of rights and obligations.

With respect to the question of security assurances, Poland has consistently supported and supports a position that the legitimate security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States must be assured in an international, legally binding instrument, preferably in the form of a convention. In

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

view of the differing perceptions of the scope and form of such assurances, we believe that serious consideration should be given to the adoption, as an interim measure, of identically worded declarations by the five nuclear Powers, possibly confirmed in a solemn Security Council resolution. As far as Poland is concerned, we have always considered that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its universalization, strengthening and preservation in the years ahead, constitutes a basic premise of world security now and in the future. We look forward to the day when the Treaty is universally accepted by all countries of the world, including all the nuclear Powers. We think that basically its effectiveness depends on its ability to prevent the horizontal spread of those weapons and to check the territorial scope of the nuclear arms race. The key instrument in that regard is the further development of the IAEA safeguards system, specifically the universal application of full scope safeguards. In that connexion, we have noted with interest the suggestion of the outgoing Director-General of the Agency, made at the recent session of the IAEA General Conference, that the Committee on Disarmament examine the possibility of a general prohibition against attack on nuclear establishments -- a measure which would serve to strengthen the NPT.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

Turning to the problem of nuclear disarmament, I should like to stress that Poland attaches the highest importance to the curbing of the nuclear arms race. Regrettably, as the relevant sections of the Committee's report confirm, the work of the Committee on Disarmament in that area at its 1981 session was hampered by a lack of resolve and political will on the part of some States. It proved impossible for the Committee to reach a meeting of minds on the establishment in 1981 of the proposed ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the nuclear test ban. An equally inflexible attitude made it impossible to reach a consensus on the proposed establishment of a subsidiary organ on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

Poland fervently hopes that this situation will change in 1982 so that the Committee will find it possible to report to the second special session on disarmament that it is willing and ready to sit down and talk on nuclear disarmament. Unless this happens, the international community will be hard put to comprehend why mankind's highest priority issue failed again to be addressed by the disarmament body that is uniquely qualified, if only by virtue of its membership and a situation in which all the nuclear-weapon States or, to be precise, their representatives, are seated at the conference table side by side or facing each other.

My delegation strongly feels that the negotiating potential and expertise of the Committee on Disarmament should be put to the best possible use with regard to nuclear disarmament as well. This could take the form of a sub-committee on nuclear disarmament or some other subsidiary body.

The great importance of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is an unchallenged fact. We expect that the agenda adopted by the Preparatory Committee will make it possible for that session to make a genuine and meaningful contribution to the cause of disarmament. We hope that the session's primary objective will be the consideration of effective steps conducive to early and full implementation of the decisions contained in the consensus Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

The comprehensive programme of disarmament, which is yet to be finalized in Geneva, will naturally enough become the focal point for discussions at the second special session. We are confident that it will turn out to be an entirely satisfactory document and one which the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament will adopt as a practical and pragmatic guide to disarmament efforts in the years to come. In the view of my delegation, that guide, to be realistic, must envisage the convening at an early date of a world disarmament conference.

The second special session will provide a convenient context for an in-depth consideration and approval of such arms limitation agreements as the Committee on Disarmament is able to finalize. Assuming goodwill on the part of all its members, we should be able to see at least two such documents on the prohibition of radiological weapons and on chemical weapons.

As for Poland, we will spare no effort and will not be found wanting, either in the Committee on Disarmament or at the second special session, in our determination to make a constructive and useful contribution so that productive results of disarmament efforts can be assured in the overriding interest of international security and peace among nations. As was stated at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers Party in Warsaw last summer, Poland, notwithstanding its internal problems, will in no way decrease the international activity it is pursuing with a view to helping to resolve such key international issues as the cessation of the nuclear arms race, disarmament, the consolidation of European security, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the education of the younger generation in the spirit of peace and friendship among nations.

Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): First of all, Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of your high office. My delegation is looking forward to working under your able guidance. My congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee, and I sincerely hope that during this session the work of our Committee will have the positive results which the world situation so urgently requires.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The precarious geopolitical situation of their country between the two major military blocs in the most highly armed region in the world makes Austrians acutely aware that their security and well-being are heavily dependent on the stability of the relationship between the armed camps in East and West. The unceasing accumulation of armaments and the stationing of thousands of nuclear weapons in the region has made this dependency even more apparent. Today, we have to live with the knowledge that any armed conflict between the two alliance systems could mean death and destruction for the Austrian population. Contribution to the lessening of the tension and to the evolution of a stable and constructive relationship between the two camps remains, therefore, a central objective of Austria's foreign policy. We have been heartened by the positive results of the détente policy of the 1970s, which brought a sense of relaxation and security as well as innumerable concrete humanitarian benefits to the people of Central Europe. We are deeply concerned about the recent deterioration of the relations between East and West. This development does not only threaten the accomplishments of the past decade. It is also leading to an immensely dangerous acceleration of the arms race.

Allow me to point to two lessons we can learn from the experience of the past few years. First, the ongoing revolution in the speed of communications and the progressively increasing economic interdependence among the regions of the world have a closely related counterpart in the sphere of international security. Here again, we are confronted with the phenomenon of the shrinking world. Nowadays, military conflicts and armed interventions can have immediate repercussions around the globe. It becomes increasingly difficult for a State to engage in confrontational policies in one region while maintaining a conciliatory posture in others. The indivisibility of détente and its opposite are undeniable facts. What are the consequences of this development? Clearly, an increasing need for restraint and responsible behaviour by the major Powers and for their scrupulous adherence to the code of conduct of international relations. But the enormous risks of a smaller and more vulnerable world also

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

call for greater collective efforts by the international community. The Austrian Government is convinced that the United Nations must play a central role in this context. In the management of crisis, the settlement of disputes and the facilitation of peaceful change we see the urgent need for the greater utilization and further development of the mechanisms of the United Nations system. If we do not respond to these challenges, the international situation will further deteriorate and the United Nations will become a mere arena for propaganda warfare.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Our second point concerns the inseparable link between détente and disarmament. It has become a truism that the success of disarmament negotiations depends on the existence of an essential minimum of trust and goodwill between the parties concerned. The present stagnation of the arms control process is further evidence of the need for détente as a basis for disarmament. But the experience of the past years has also taught us that the process of détente remains fragile and unstable if it is not accompanied by significant cuts in the military arsenals. Indeed, the build-up of military power by some States which continued throughout the years of détente was to a high degree responsible for the decline of détente towards the end of the last decade. For the future, we have to keep in mind that disarmament and détente are not two goals that can be pursued separately. We must strive to rekindle the spirit of détente, to lessen tensions and to build confidence among States. But if the process is to continue, we must ensure that any improvement in this climate between East and West is soon transformed into concrete, significant disarmament measures.

The nuclear arms race continues to cause us the most serious concern. Within the past year the nuclear-weapon States have added further nuclear weapons to their stockpiles and committed themselves to major new weapons programmes that will, if carried out, prolong the arms race beyond the turn of the next century. Even more worrisome are recent technological developments and changes in strategic thinking that confirm the shift by both super-Powers towards the so-called counter-force posture, the strategic doctrine which emphasizes the targeting of the opponent's military and nuclear-weapon installations. The implications of this change in planning for nuclear war are well known. It means greater time, and psychological, pressure on nuclear decision-makers in times of crisis, increased risks of the outbreak of nuclear conflict through human errors or technical malfunctions, a premium for pre-emptive nuclear strikes, and, last but not least, the emergence of dangerous illusions of 'limited' and 'winnable' nuclear wars.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The causes for the present destabilizations of deterrence which are so obviously detrimental to everyone are controversial. Some experts believe that the inherent contradictions of the traditional concept of deterrence have tempted nuclear policy makers to turn to options that make nuclear weapons politically and militarily "usable". Others hold the self-propelling momentum of technological change responsible. A third group puts the blame on bureaucratic and military-institutional special interest. But whatever the reasons for this development, there is general agreement on its immense danger, and even on the remedy. The only way to bring the present dangerous tendencies under control is negotiations to achieve quantitative and qualitative limitations of the nuclear arsenals.

With regard to strategic nuclear weapons, the Austrian Government wishes to reiterate its urgent appeal for an early resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process. In the past 10 years the SALT negotiations have gained a political significance which exceeds their limited impact on the nuclear arms race. As the most important expression of the super-Powers' willingness to diminish the risk of nuclear war, SALT has become the central element, the backbone of the entire détente process. A breakdown of the SALT process would therefore have disastrous consequences for international security. Allow me to quote from a report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the so-called Palme Commission.

"If the process comes to an end, what little progress had been made in containing the risk of nuclear war would be set back immeasurably. It would mean a return to the futile propaganda wars of the 1950s in place of serious discussions of practical limitations on weaponry. And it would mean removal of one of the most important initiatives to ease the risk of nuclear war.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Politically, the failure of SALT would mean an intensification of disputes, greater instabilities, the diminishment of peaceful ties and exchanges virtually throughout the world. It means further diversions of resources to the armed forces of many nations, with all the economic problems and adverse political consequences that would entail. It could mean increased risk of war in Europe, the aggravation of tensions in East Asia, and more frequent confrontations elsewhere in the world. And it would mean a greater danger of nuclear proliferation in most regions of the globe." (CD/143, p.9-10)

This passage clearly demonstrates the overwhelming need for an early resumption of the SALT process. We believe that the new negotiations should build on the achievements of the SALT II Treaty. We also attach great importance to the extension of the treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems which comes up for review in 1982. Only on this basis can we hope for an eventual agreement on more comprehensive instruments providing for substantial cuts in the strategic arsenals and significant limitations on the development of new weapons. I should also like to emphasize that future arms control negotiations will only succeed if the super-Powers realize the futility of the quest for nuclear superiority and exercise greater restraint in their armament policies. This holds particularly true for the military uses of outer space. Developments of space-stationed anti-satellite and anti-ballistic-missile technology by both super-Powers indicates the growing danger of a wasteful and destabilizing arms race in this area. As none of these weapons programmes seems to be fully operational at the present time, there is still hope of countering this threat. Austria would welcome the conclusion of additional agreements to preserve outer space for peaceful uses only and will therefore consider carefully any related proposals submitted to the present session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

We believe, however, that the most promising approach to the solution of this vital problem would be the resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the only two States possessing the relevant technology.

The build-up of nuclear arsenals in Europe is a matter of great concern to Austria. Both military blocs are in the process of either deploying or preparing the stationing of many more weapons on European territory. It is therefore particularly urgent to negotiate measures to prevent a further increase and to achieve reductions in the number of these weapons. Austria welcomes the decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to renew in November of this year their talks on theatre nuclear forces. In view of the considerable gaps between the positions of the parties and the highly explosive political issues at stake, these talks can easily degenerate into propaganda warfare. But if they are undertaken in a spirit of compromise and with the essential political will, they could also signal the beginning of a new productive phase of the arms control process.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Let me add a word on the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. These are the weapons most likely to be used in the course of a military conflict in Europe. We are aware that the escalation which would follow the first use of tactical nuclear warheads would in all probability lead to the destruction of Europe, if not to all-out nuclear war. The Austrian delegation is therefore gravely preoccupied by the threat of a further lowering of the nuclear threshold. Indeed, we are convinced that the security of our continent demands a raising, not a lowering, of this threshold and a reduction of the stockpiles of tactical weapons. Austria therefore appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to exercise utmost restraint in this area and to include these forces in the arms-control process.

The danger of a further proliferation of nuclear weapons has for many years been a central item on the international agenda. During this time, the focus of attention has shifted from the technical feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons to the political incentives and disincentives for doing so. Since a large number of States have the technological capacity to produce weapon-grade fissionable material today, the international non-proliferation régime is the foremost barrier against a further spread of nuclear weapons.

The fact that more than 115 States are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) proves that the idea of non-proliferation has been accepted by the great majority of the international community. It is true, however, that the continued absence of a number of States with significant nuclear activities remains the weakest point of the system. Only a universally accepted non-proliferation régime will be truly stable and credible. It will therefore be essential for efforts to be continued to create stronger incentives for non-member countries to join the Treaty. The discussions on ways and means to assure more predictable and long-term supplies of nuclear-material equipment, technology and fuel cycle services conducted in the Committee of Assurances of Supplies are one important element in this task. The Austrian Government also believes that arrangements for the internationalization of nuclear fuel facilities deserve further serious consideration.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The extension and further development of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system could contribute greatly to the strengthening of the NPT-régime. Let me state at this point that the Austrian Government has condemned in strong terms the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear installation. This action was not only a grave violation of international law but also constituted an assault on the IAEA control system. It is the firm conviction of the Austrian Government that any unilateral military action to prevent nuclear activities of other countries poses a severe threat to the NPT-régime and might even provoke regional nuclear arms races. Austria has great trust in the effectiveness of the safeguards procedures applied by the IAEA. We are also convinced that an extension of the scope of the safeguards would greatly further the cause of non-proliferation. Austria therefore supports the proposal that parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should require as a condition of all future nuclear supply commitments the application of IAEA safeguards to all sources of special fissionable material in all present and future nuclear activities.

Unfortunately, all efforts to strengthen the NPT-régime and to make it truly universal face one great obstacle - the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to live up to their obligation under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament. Vertical and horizontal proliferation are ultimately two aspects of the same problem. Persistent failure concerning one of them undermines the fragile achievements with regard to the other.

It is the inseparable link between disarmament and non-proliferation that makes the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty a matter of such importance and urgency. Since a comprehensive test ban would contribute greatly towards controlling both vertical and horizontal proliferation, it is a logical and essential first step towards nuclear disarmament and a safer world. The international community has called in countless resolutions and declarations for this measure. There is general agreement among experts that the technical and scientific aspects have by now been sufficiently explored. It is therefore

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

with some frustration and impatience that we note once again the absence of any progress towards a comprehensive test ban. In 1981, the slow and halting trilateral negotiating process was interrupted, while certain States persisted in obstructing the commencement of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, and nuclear-weapon testing goes on undiminished.

The Austrian delegation continues to attribute the highest priority to the comprehensive test ban. We appeal to the Governments concerned to reopen their negotiations without delay and to allow the convening of a working group on this subject at the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament.

I now turn to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Austrian delegation, which prefers to speak in this context of security commitments to non-nuclear weapon-States, attaches considerable importance to this issue. In our view, such measures can to a certain extent alleviate the threat perceived by non-nuclear-weapon States and thus strengthen their commitment to non-proliferation. Austria has therefore welcomed the unilateral declarations issued by the nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, as these undertakings reflect the different strategic doctrines and security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon States, they are burdened with loopholes and limitations. Clearly, only co-ordinated, binding commitments free of conditions and escape clauses will have the desired confidence-building effect.

We therefore support the efforts undertaken in a working group of the Committee on Disarmament to develop, on the basis of the unilateral declarations, more effective arrangements and regret that those endeavours have so far not yielded any tangible results. We believe that the lack of progress in the working group is largely due to the fact that far too much emphasis is placed on the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States. If the attention would focus rather on the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, it would prove easier to reach agreement on a common approach.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The Austrian delegation holds the view that the Committee on Disarmament should continue to concentrate its efforts on the substantive issues rather than on the legal form of the security commitments. But it wishes to reiterate its reservations with regard to the idea of a convention. The quid pro quo concept of a convention would imply that the non-nuclear-weapon States would have to enter into new obligations. We believe that this cannot be expected of States which already adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In particular, a mechanism of compulsory consultations would be unacceptable to Austria.

The great difficulties of developing more effective arrangements for the security commitments to non-nuclear-weapon States has deepened our concern with regard to one specific aspect of the problem. I refer to the uncertainty about the legally binding force of existing unilateral declarations. Austria believes that the clarification of this issue is not only needed to to preserve the confidence-building value of these declarations but is also essential for the future work of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject. I would therefore like to direct the attention of the First Committee to a suggestion already put forward in a statement by the Austrian delegation in Geneva. We believe that the General Assembly should consider asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal character of the existing declarations. No other institution is more competent to help us understand the legal implications of this issue.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

A few weeks ago in his statement in the general debate the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Willibald Pahr, directed the General Assembly's attention to a problem which in our view lies at the heart of the unsatisfactory situation of the disarmament process. I refer to the lack of objective and accurate information concerning the balance of military forces. Time and again it has happened in the past that governments influenced by their natural desire for a "margin of security" have arrived at exaggerated assessments of an opponent's military strength. The armament measures based on those "worst case" estimates have then in an action-reaction pattern led to a further acceleration of the arms race and a rise of international tensions. We are convinced that a greater accessibility of reliable information on military capabilities could eliminate many of the anticipatory measures and over-reactions caused by those misperceptions. It would thus not only dampen the arms race but also through the building of confidence create a climate more conducive to successful disarmament negotiations.

Austria therefore supports all efforts directed at achieving greater openness in the military area. Let me just name the reporting system for military budgets and the recently concluded study on confidence-building measures. It seems to my delegation that in addition to those efforts other approaches should be explored with courage and imagination. In particular, we believe that in cases of regional and inter-regional crises it would be helpful if independent international organs could be asked to assess the military situation. Such an objective evaluation could have a calming influence and even pave the way to the limitation of the military forces concerned. That function could be fulfilled by fact-finding methods or other appropriate mechanisms of the United Nations. The Austrian delegation does not intend to propose at this point any specific measures or institutional arrangements. Rather we should like to initiate an exchange of views on ways and means to achieve more objective and reliable information on the balance of military forces.

In a second intervention during the course of the general debate, the Austrian delegation will explain its position on some other items on our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: This brings us to the end of the list of speakers for this morning's meeting.

One member has requested to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I should like to remind members of the Committee that it is the normal practice for the first intervention of a member in exercise of the right of reply to be limited to ten minutes and for the second intervention to be limited to five minutes. I do not possess a splendid time-piece such as the one at the disposal of the President of the General Assembly, but I shall inform any member speaking in the exercise of the right of reply when his ten minutes are up.

I call on the representative of the United States.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, you may not have a splendid time-piece, but I think you have done a remarkable job in keeping to our schedule this morning.

Yesterday during the opening meeting of the First Committee on the question of disarmament the representative of the Soviet Union suggested that the United States seeks confrontation with his country now and throughout the decade.

That is just not true. The United States does not seek confrontation with the Soviet Union here in the First Committee, in the United Nations, or anywhere in the world.

It is for that very reason that Secretary Haig devoted his entire address before the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly to positive contributions that the United States and others can make towards the alleviation of real poverty and misery in the developing world, while Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke - in a rather unhelpful vein - of big Power confrontation with the United States around the world.

And it is for that very reason that I speak now, immediately after the opening meeting, in an attempt to set a positive and constructive tone for this Committee throughout its deliberations.

In this Committee we shall all be discussing serious matters, security - the highest priority of any nation, but by no means the sole priority - and the United States delegation will discuss these matters in a most serious manner. We shall conduct our deliberations on the basis of facts, evidence and plain truth. Members will hear no rhetoric and no polemics from the seat of the United States delegation. The main United States address to be given tomorrow by the

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a most distinguished American of outstanding calibre, Eugene Rostow, will set a high standard for the Committee's work.

The facts that the United States delegation will present over the coming weeks will be historical and evidential in nature. We shall point out time and again - as we start to do now - that it is simply not true, as stated yesterday, that the Soviet Union sought the control and elimination of nuclear weapons since the dawn of the nuclear age. Rather the contrary is true.

On that, the record is quite clear. The very best chance for mankind came when the United States alone possessed nuclear weapons and when the United States alone sought and planned to place those dastardly weapons in the hands of the international community.

That was the Baruch Plan of June 1946, in which the United States proposed that the United Nations establish an international atomic development authority to ensure full exploitation of the peaceful potential of atomic energy and to ensure full security of all States from any atomic attack. The United States unilaterally offered to dispose of its atomic weapons - the only existing such weapons in the world then, to accept the total ban on all manufacturing or use of such weapons and to turn over to the international agency all our scientific and technological knowledge on atomic energy, peaceful or military. All that the United States was fully willing to do.

More precisely, all that the United States volunteered to do. Sadly, that was not possible. One week after the United States announced the proposal, the Soviet Union demurred. One year after that, the Soviet Union declined, as it apparently was intent on developing its own nuclear weapons outside any international control. That, in effect, scuttled the plan for all time.

Opportunities lost are most lamentable. Had the Soviets accepted the Baruch Plan, we would be living in a much better world today. Rather than lament, however, we must move forward, but always bearing in mind the truth of what actually occurred in the past rather than rhetoric and what is claimed by the Soviet representative to have occurred.

Neither is it factually correct to speak, as did the Soviet representative yesterday, of the "arms race" between the super-Powers over the past decade or so. That is a widespread myth: a fetching thought but again one unsupported by historical evidence.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

Indeed, over the past 10 years, the Soviet Union has spent 40 per cent more than the United States on defense. This year alone, the Soviet Union has spent 50 per cent more than we on military expenditures. The decade of the 1970s opened with the Soviets spending two thirds of the total United States defense budget and closed with the United States spending two thirds of the Soviet total. By no definition of the term can that be considered a "race". It is rather a unilateral arms buildup of staggering proportions.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

For it is no "race" when the Soviets have built an average of 4 to 5 per cent in real terms each and every year over the past 10 years while the military expenditures of the United States have declined in real terms by 25 per cent since 1968.

It is no "race" when the Soviets have spent three times the American total over the past decade on strategic offensive forces, and today spend three times the United States amount in the entire strategic realm.

It is no "race" when the Soviet Union over the past decade has developed and deployed four generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) far more powerful than the American land-based missiles, and thus put in question the survivability of the United States land-based ICBM force, while the United States force is today essentially the same as it was when SALT I was signed.

It is no "race" when the Soviet Union has been deploying its highly mobile, MIRVed long-range SS-20 missile at the rate of about one per week, while the United States theatre nuclear force in Europe, on which our allies rely in part for their defence, has not been modernized in years, but rather has been reduced by 1,000 warheads over the past two years.

It is no "race" when the Soviet Union has spent 50 per cent more on military research, development, testing and engineering than the United States over the past decade.

It is no "race" when the Soviet Union has spent 60 per cent more on general purpose forces, that is, conventional forces, than the United States.

In essence, there has been no actual super-Power "arms race" at all over the past decade, just a steady Soviet buildup at the highest peacetime pace of any major country in history.

It is our hope, and mankind's prayer, that there will be no "arms race" in the future. A rehashing of age-old proposals in this Committee by the Soviet Union -- or by anybody else for that matter -- cannot advance that hope and that prayer. Careful adherence to the facts and to the evidence at hand in the First Committee, as elsewhere, will, we hope, advance that hope and that prayer. We intend to try, seriously and doggedly.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to make one brief announcement. Members of the Committee will be happy to hear that we shall be able to complete the election of the officers of the Committee by the election of a Vice-Chairman at tomorrow morning's meeting.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.