

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1242

4 February 1994

Original: ENGLISH and
RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING TEXTS OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS ISSUED IN MOSCOW ON 14 JANUARY 1994

We have the honour to forward to you the English and Russian language texts of the Moscow Declaration, the Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of their Delivery, the Joint Statement on Issues of Export Control and Policy in the Area of Transfers of Conventional Weapons and Dual-Use Technologies, and the Memorandum of Intent on Cooperation in the Area of Export Control, issued in Moscow on 14 January 1994.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador and United States
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament



Moscow Declaration

President of the United States William J. Clinton and President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, having met together in Moscow from January 12-15, 1994, reaffirmed the fundamental importance of U.S.-Russian cooperation based upon the Charter of American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, the Vancouver Declaration, and existing treaties and agreements. They noted with satisfaction that the relationship between the United States and Russia has entered a new stage of mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other's national interests. From this perspective, they reviewed the full range of bilateral and international issues.

The two Presidents had an extensive discussion of security issues, including arms reduction and non-proliferation. Both parties expressed concern over increasing challenges to global non-proliferation regimes. They agreed upon the need to strengthen those regimes and to create, together with other interested states, a new mechanism to enhance transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies. They also strongly supported completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible time. The two Presidents reiterated their support for a cutoff of production of fissile materials for weapons and considered new measures to strengthen strategic stability.'

Based on ongoing discussions of strategic disengagement measures between the ministries of defense of the two countries,

the Presidents announced that they would direct the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by not later than May 30, 1994, those missiles will not be targeted. Thus, for the first time in nearly half a century -- virtually since the dawn of the nuclear age -- the United States and Russia will not operate nuclear forces, day-to-day, in a manner that presumes they are adversaries.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the accelerating development of a wide range of economic, scientific and technological relationships between the United States and Russia. They also reaffirmed their strong support for the rapid growth of bilateral trade and investment as a special priority. In their view, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has become a dynamic and effective mechanism for coordination and expansion of U.S.-Russian cooperation. A key expression of this relationship is U.S.-Russian joint cooperation in space, especially their partnership, with other interested parties, in the construction of a space station.

The two Presidents reaffirmed their readiness to move forward on the path of openness and mutual trust in American-Russian relations and to create favorable conditions for the comprehensive development of political, commercial, humanitarian, and people-to-people contacts between the two countries. In this connection, a mutual interest in enlarging the consular presence on each other's territory was expressed. In particular, the American side intends to open a consulate general in

Yekaterinburg in February 1994.

With the approval by the U.S. Congress of NAFTA and the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations, President Clinton and President Yeltsin welcomed the accelerating progress toward creation of an open and prosperous world economy and trading system. President Yeltsin informed President Clinton of recent steps among the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States toward increased economic coordination and cooperation. The two Presidents agreed that such initiatives, pursued in an open and voluntary manner consistent with GATT rules and procedures, should be conducive to the rapid inclusion of all the participating states into the global economy.

In this context, President Clinton and President Yeltsin exchanged views on the economic strategies of their respective governments. President Yeltsin described the economic situation in Russia. He affirmed the irreversibility of Russia's transition to a market economy and his intention to further promote reforms and to address social needs associated with this transition. President Clinton stressed his strong support for Russian reform and suggested that social issues could be a new and promising area for cooperation.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin noted with satisfaction that the end of the Cold War has brought continuous progress toward overcoming the division of the European continent and opened the way for broad cooperation among European states on

a new agenda of urgent tasks, with priority being given to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and protection of human rights and the rights of national and other minorities. In this connection, the two Presidents welcomed the decisions of the CSCE Foreign Ministers' meeting in Rome which they consider to be an important step in making the CSCE a key mechanism of international cooperation in Europe.

Proceeding from the conviction that new divisions of Europe must be avoided, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed upon the need to create a new European security order that is inclusive, non-discriminatory and focused on practical political and security cooperation. The two Presidents agreed that the concept of the Partnership for Peace adopted at the Brussels meeting of the NATO member states is an important element of an emerging new European security architecture. President Yeltsin informed President Clinton of Russia's intention to participate actively in the Partnership for Peace and to conclude substantive agreements opening the way for broad and intensive cooperation between Russia and NATO as a partner. Taking into account Russia's international role, President Clinton welcomed the prospect of Russia's active participation in the Partnership for Peace.

The two Presidents condemned aggressive nationalism, violations of human rights, and ethnic and religious intolerance of any kind, including anti-Semitism. They expressed serious concern about the existence and potential for intensification of

conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and a number of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. President Yeltsin apprised President Clinton of the peacekeeping efforts undertaken by Russia on the territory of the former USSR. The two Presidents are determined to intensify the coordination of their efforts, within the framework of the United Nations and the CSCE, to promote rapid and peaceful resolution of conflicts on conditions that correspond to generally accepted standards of international law, including respect for the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the support of the United States and Russia for the United Nations. They will act with other countries to strengthen the potential of the UN to support and establish peace and to prevent conflict. The two sides will work out practical activities among themselves and other countries to improve preparations for participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In connection with the upcoming 50th anniversary of the UN, President Clinton and President Yeltsin consider it important to convene at the appropriate time a meeting of the heads of states and government of the members of the UN Security Council for a review of the work established for the UN at the January 1992 Security Council summit and an examination of tasks for the future.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin are convinced that the United States and Russia will continue to consolidate their

partnership and together promote global stability, peace, and prosperity.

Done in Moscow on January 14, 1994, in the English and Russian languages.

For the United States
of America:

For the Russian
Federation:

**JOINT STATEMENT
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY**

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute threat to international security in the period following the end of the Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.

The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such proliferation.

- Considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis for efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and unconditional extension at a conference of its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that have not done so accede to this treaty.
- They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I and START II treaties.
- They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen security assurances for the states which have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their non-proliferation obligations.
- They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve safeguards.
- They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports, and with the need for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the nuclear field.

- They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the decision to begin negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. They declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held.
- They noted that an important contribution to the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the widest possible participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.
- They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excess stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks.
- They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
 - including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those associated with activities having direct national security significance;
 - steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissile material under IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.
- The presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of non-proliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.
- They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade plutonium.

- The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great significance to further joint work on the separate but closely related problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.

Both presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

- As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support for the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the Convention not later than 1995.
- To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.
- The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons in the United States and the Russian Federation. They applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way for the United States to provide additional \$30 million to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.
- They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the Russian-American-British Statement of September 1992, which provides inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence

in the compliance with the Convention.

- They supported convening a special conference of the states parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the Convention and its effectiveness.

The presidents expressed the determination of their countries to cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

- They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September 1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely implementation.
- The United States welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and undertook to cooperate with Russia in facilitating its membership at an early date. The United States of America and the Russian Federation are certain that further strengthening the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.

The presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to strengthening global norms of non-proliferation and working out agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to develop policies on non-proliferation applicable to specific regions posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

- They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would represent a grave threat to regional and international security, and decided that their countries would consult with each other on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between

IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

- They supported efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a multilateral forum to consider measures in the field of arms control and non-proliferation that could strengthen security in South Asia. They called on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosion and the proposed Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories.
- They agreed that the United States and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle East peace process, would actively promote progress in the activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy development of confidence-building measures and working toward the objective of turning the Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.
- They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.

JOINT STATEMENT ON ISSUES OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND POLICY
IN THE AREA OF TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
AND DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES

The Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation underscored the staunch commitment of their countries to efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to enhance global and regional stability. In keeping with the spirit of the new strategic partnership between the United States and Russia the Ministers have agreed on development of wide-ranging cooperation in the field of export control. Moreover, they have agreed that all necessary steps in this field be taken expeditiously, and have established a senior-level working group for this purpose, as well as to initiate bilateral cooperation in the areas specified in a Memorandum of Intent signed this day in Moscow.

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with steps taken since the last meeting of the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation to eliminate the vestiges of the Cold War, such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which according to the understanding reached by COCOM members will be terminated not later than March 31, 1994. They also welcomed the decision to establish a new multilateral regime for enhancing responsibility and transparency in the transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use technologies. This new arrangement would not be directed against any state or group of states, and would prevent the acquisition of such items for military end uses if the behavior of a state is or becomes a cause for serious concern as determined by the participants of the new multilateral regime.

The United States and Russia, as leading exporters of conventional weapons, military equipment and dual-use technologies, are convinced that additional measures are needed on an international basis to increase responsibility, transparency and, where appropriate, restraint in this area. They expressed their willingness to work with other countries in bringing about the early establishment of a new multilateral regime in order to achieve these objectives, which would supplement existing non-proliferation regimes, in particular through arrangements to exchange information for the purpose of meaningful consultations.

MEMORANDUM OF INTENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF EXPORT CONTROL

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America,

REAFFIRMING their desire to promote the strengthening of measures directed against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and other weapons, as well as the technologies and specialized experience relating to such weapons;

DESIRING to develop cooperation of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in the area of export controls;

NOTING that cooperation in strengthening the export control systems in the Russian Federation and the United States of America will promote the development of economic, scientific, and technological relationships between the two countries in accordance with principles of equality and mutual benefit;

INTEND TO COOPERATE IN ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

a. Conducting bilateral and multilateral discussions at the political and technical level on matters relating to the enhancement of export control systems;

b. Conducting bilateral consultations at the expert and government levels on obligations relating to non-use of export controlled items for unapproved purposes;

c. Conducting bilateral consultations on specific multilateral export control regimes and their implementation and on the technical parameters of the items and technologies covered by them;

d. Participating in seminars, conferences, and other multilateral meetings devoted to considering export control issues;


e. Discussing opportunities to train personnel involved with export control, the work of licensing and customs agencies; and

f. Joint efforts to expand cooperation in the area of export control.

The Parties may establish expert working groups for the purposes of carrying out this Memorandum of Intent.

DONE at Moscow, this 14th day of January, 1994, in two copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

