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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/8807)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8653, A/8808, A/C.1/L.619)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the Secretary-General (A/8809)

1. Mr. OULD MENEYA (Mauritania) [*interpretation from French*]: Mr. Chairman, speaking in this Committee for the first time, it is a source of particular satisfaction to me to offer you the sincere and fraternal congratulations of the Mauritanian delegation on your unanimous election to preside over the work of the First Committee. I am convinced that, under your enlightened guidance and your dynamic approach, and with the effective support of the other officers of the Committee, to whom I am very happy also to offer the congratulations of my delegation, our Committee will fully carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. You can as of this moment be assured of the true and full co-operation of the Mauritanian delegation.

2. The question of disarmament that we are discussing today is without any doubt the most important confronting the international community. It is therefore the problem that calls for the most speedy solution if, on the one hand, we wish to avoid the extremely grave and permanent threats to the survival of mankind itself and, at the same time, to guarantee to our world the security and stability that it so desperately needs, whilst assuring it a balanced economic and social development.

3. This approach which some might term idealistic, even Utopian, but which to me appears to be honest and realistic, has always been one that we have adopted and this will explain why my country has, year after year, continually pressed for true general and complete disarmament.

4. Almost all the countries of the world, including the non-aligned nations, have adopted and repeatedly reaffirmed this self-same position. In other words, all peoples of the world consider that the problem of disarmament takes precedence over everything else and that the international community is in duty bound to find a rapid but effective solution to it.

5. Unfortunately, despite the appeals, despite the exhortations from all four corners of the world, despite the numerous and endless discussions, both bilateral and multilateral, that have taken place, despite the considerable number of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, we are constrained to recognize that the disarmament situation, far from improving, has on the contrary worsened dangerously, thus further threatening international peace and security.

6. In fact, as everyone knows, the great Powers have even speeded up their arms race. They have continued, and still today continue, to accumulate terrifying amounts of weapons of mass destruction while improving and continuing to improve those weapons they already possess, and stubbornly endeavour to invent and produce new weapons of even greater destructive force.

7. This situation of nuclear overkill on the part of the great Powers, particularly the two super-Powers, causes great concern among the countries of the world since it is not only their security but their very existence that is threatened. Those countries have an obligation to do all in their power—regardless of their disappointments in the past, despite the fact that they will probably be misunderstood now, and whatever the international situation may be—to remove or at least reduce the grave danger that threatens them all without distinction, and to bend every effort at their command towards this end.

8. It was in that spirit that the Government of Mauritania welcomed the proposal for the holding of a world disarmament conference.

9. We believe that that conference should be completely different from the international meetings that we have become accustomed to; in other words, in the light of the situation in which we are living, that conference must lead to practical, bold, feasible decisions that will apply to the ills suffered by the world today, ills which—if we are to believe the fair words spoken here and there, and particularly in the United Nations, by the representatives of our countries—each of us is well aware of and is determined to contribute to solving in the interest of peace and security and international solidarity.

10. We prefer to believe that words have the same meaning for everyone and we continue to be convinced that in disarmament more than in other fields the time has come to forgo statements—however eloquent and sincere—and to act.

11. It is in that conviction and with an awareness of its responsibilities that my country would like to state as clearly and briefly as it can its concept of that disarmament conference and the results to be expected from it.

12. First of all, since we all agree here—at least so it appears to me—that disarmament is of equal importance to all peoples and that it cannot be achieved except by the agreement of all peoples, it is obvious that we could not logically or feasibly convene a world disarmament conference until a number of peoples that are still subjected to imperialism, colonialism and Zionism have regained their freedom, so that they too may contribute both to the

preparation and to the success of a world disarmament conference. By the same token we could hardly speak reasonably of disarmament when countries are occupied by force, when acts of aggression are committed against the sovereignty of other States, when military bases are maintained in foreign territories, threatening the independence of a number of countries.

13. Having said that, I would state that the capital problem is the preparation of the conference. In our opinion the success of the conference will to a large extent depend upon very careful preparation in order to create an international climate which will be conducive to the functioning and success of the conference.

14. We share the views of the delegations that have suggested that this preliminary work be entrusted to a preparatory committee to be created for that purpose. My delegation has no precise ideas regarding the composition of such an organ and we will be ready to go along with the opinion of the majority. But we do consider that the five great Powers should normally be members of the preparatory committee and that the composition of this preparatory committee should ensure equitable geographical distribution.

15. Apart from the preparation of the conference on the political level, the committee will also have to deal with material problems such as the date, the venue, the duration and particularly the agenda of that conference.

16. Moreover, we cannot conceive of the world disarmament conference being held outside its only appropriate framework, the United Nations. Along with that principle, there is the principle of universality, which must determine the composition of the conference itself. We therefore feel, like almost all the delegations that have spoken on the matter, that the conference should be open to all States whether or not they are Members of the United Nations, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, and whatever their size and their economic or military power.

17. Particular importance should be attached to the participation of the five nuclear Powers. We have listened with special attention to the views they have expressed on the question of convening this world disarmament conference. Although we consider very laudable the concerns expressed by the United States representative [*1872nd meeting*]—without, however, entirely sharing his arguments—and although we accept the conditions advanced by the representative of China [*1873rd meeting*], we do feel that their reservations should not hinder the convening of the conference, quite the contrary, since the questions which concern them could be included in the agenda of the conference and solved by it. It is here that the need appears to set the goals of the conference very clearly, bearing in mind the suggestions made by all States.

18. On the basis of the fact—recognized by everyone—that the final goal of the efforts of the United Nations must be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, my delegation would like to mention some of the objectives of the conference which we deem to be essential. As we see it, the conference should: first, seek the most effective ways of prohibiting the use and

manufacture of nuclear weapons and of destroying existing stockpiles; secondly, conclude an agreement on limiting and then halting the race in conventional weapons, paying particular attention to chemical, biological and bacteriological weapons, whose production and use should be strictly prohibited without delay; thirdly, reduce the military budgets and the armed forces of each country and keep them at the level that internal security requires—the sums thus freed can be used for peaceful and productive purposes.

19. We are not underestimating the many difficulties that arise in the achievement of the objectives that I have outlined. We know that there can be no progress in disarmament without the genuine political will of all countries, and particularly of the five nuclear weapon States.

20. We therefore feel that the international situation in the field of armaments is today so fraught with grave dangers not only for all peoples without any distinction but even for the human race that it has become imperative for each Government to do all in its power to find the appropriate means of averting the danger. We trust that all Governments will live up to their responsibilities and will not disappoint those who have placed their hopes in them.

21. Mr. SAVAGE (Sierra Leone): There is no doubt whatsoever in the minds of any serious, thinking delegations that the question of disarmament is by far the most important matter confronting mankind in the world today. In his intervention in the General Assembly on 10 October of this year my Minister of External Affairs said, *inter alia*:

“Last year my delegation endorsed the proposal for a world disarmament conference at the level of the United Nations. We then pointed out that a nuclear holocaust would affect not only the super-Powers but also all the other nations of the world. We therefore advocated that the super-Powers should recognize that the peace-loving nations of the earth had an equally potent interest in disarmament and peace research.” [2060th plenary meeting, para. 175.]

22. As a non-aligned nation, we are glad to recall that the call for the convening of a world disarmament conference is not new. Such a call has been made again and again by non-aligned countries since 1964. One result of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in 1964 was General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX) of 1965. At their third conference at Lusaka in 1970, the non-aligned countries again drew attention to the urgent need for such a conference. Also at Georgetown, Guyana, this year at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, those countries, while reiterating their support for general and complete disarmament, welcomed the initiative calling for the holding of a world disarmament conference. We are therefore very happy that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has taken up the call which the non-aligned countries made as far back as 1964.

23. The non-aligned countries have reasons to know that the developed nations do not have all the answers to all the questions confronting humanity, including the problems of

war and peace. We have seen that as a result of their actions the world has become familiar with international tensions and global conflagrations every 20 years or so. In this ever-changing world situation, where the enemies of yesterday become the friends of today, we have awakened to the fact that the survival of mankind has depended during the past two decades on an unstable system of mutual deterrence and a precarious balance of terror. We are only too aware that the thermonuclear might of the super-Powers could destroy mankind unless other nations, especially the smaller and non-committed ones, have a share in the decision-making processes of the nuclear giants which are capable of unleashing these forces of destruction.

24. We have witnessed over the last few years a number of treaties or agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, which have come into being and have helped stave off, at least temporarily, the use of nuclear arms. Such agreements as the limited test-ban Treaty,¹ the outer space Treaty,² the sea-bed Treaty,³ the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [see A/C.1/1026], have to some extent arrested the arms race and served to stimulate further measures to limit the production and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. But it would be misleading to say that the arms race has perceptibly slowed down. As a matter of fact, the armaments race has spiralled to heights never equalled before. It is no secret that in recent years total world expenditure for these purposes has risen to about \$200 thousand million annually. It has been said that the industrialized States spend about 20 times more for arms than for development.

25. The world can ill afford this wanton waste of its resources, especially when, speaking approximately, more than 50 per cent of its total inhabitants live in poverty and hardship. If the arms race were brought to an end, it is conceivable that an appreciable amount of this expenditure could be diverted to the nobler task of helping to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of the developing areas of our globe.

26. My delegation recognizes the value of the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations. We have, on the one hand, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been meeting in Geneva for 10 years under the aegis of the United Nations. There are also the bilateral arms negotiation talks going on between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Both the former and the latter have, in their own way, been making a valuable contribution to the prevention of a global war, but this is not enough. For complete success, all the nations of the world ought to be involved. It

¹ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

² Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

³ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

is therefore necessary to examine on a broad basis all disarmament questions in a world disarmament conference where all States, Members and non-members of the United Nations alike, can meet and give expression to their views. We feel that this area of interrelationship is too important not to include all States, because any State which did not participate in the deliberations might not feel disposed to abide by any decisions taken by such a conference.

27. My delegation would like to see the adoption of an agenda dealing with all questions of disarmament, arms limitation and arms control. In short, the subject should be broad enough to cover all aspects of disarmament.

28. On the question of venue, my delegation has an open mind. Although it would have preferred it to be in the third world, any country which is agreed upon by the majority will be acceptable to us.

29. For a conference of such significance to succeed, it is imperative that adequate attention be paid to its planning and execution. For this purpose, my delegation shares the view that an *ad hoc* committee, comprising some 35 members, should be entrusted with the task. Such a committee should consist of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and other members selected on an equitable geographical basis. Such a preparatory committee would carefully develop an agenda and procedures for the conference on the basis of detailed and comprehensive consultations.

30. Participation in the conference itself must be all-inclusive. It would be futile if all militarily significant States, whether or not they are Members of the United Nations, as well as all States wishing to participate, whether Members of the United Nations or not, were not invited to take part in the deliberations. After the preliminary positions taken by the United States of America [1872nd meeting] and the People's Republic of China, [1873rd meeting], it is hoped that more flexible attitudes will ultimately prevail and that both those States will participate without any pre-conditions whatever.

31. The fears of some members that the establishment of this conference will spell the demise of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and other existing machinery for disarmament, are not well-founded. Such a conference need not prejudice the usefulness of such machinery for disarmament negotiations. This strategy becomes imperative, since, in spite of all the talks taking place, in spite of all the background negotiations, in spite of all the treaties on non-proliferation and so on which have been signed, nuclear tests continue to take place in the atmosphere and in the subsoil. Only last week one such test in the megaton range was detected, to the concern of most peace-loving States the world over. The opportunity of the world coming together in a world disarmament conference should engender hopes for complete disarmament even if its achievement required some time.

32. My delegation would like to stress that the report of the Secretary-General, produced in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2853 (XXVI), entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their*

Possible Use,⁴ provides a frank and useful study for Member nations of the grave dangers resulting from the use of chemical and biological means of warfare.

33. Although some agreement has been reached between the Powers on prohibition of the production and use of biological weapons, the same cannot be said of chemical weapons. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to show results on the question of the liquidation of stockpiles of chemical agents, which destroy the environment to a considerable extent, erode human rights and engender counter-brutality. Incendiary weapons may be defined for this purpose as substances which affect their targets primarily through the action of flame and/or heat derived from self-supporting and/or self-propagating exothermic chemical reactions.

34. The report calls attention to the destructive capacity of incendiary warfare, especially against population centres, and the possibility of its employment against non-combatants, as is the case in Viet-Nam, where thousands of human lives are being wantonly destroyed in this manner. It also stresses the considerable amount of damage caused to the agricultural and rural environment. In these days, when emphasis is squarely placed upon the preservation of the human environment, and an important committee functioning within the framework of the United Nations has been instituted, it is most disappointing to realize that the world has not deemed fit to ban for ever the use of such a weapon of mass devastation.

35. We have been told in the report that the effectiveness of napalm stems essentially from its fierce casualty-producing properties and from its psychological impact on its victims. Since man possesses an inbred fear of fire, napalm weapons are said to unnerve him to an extent which other forms of attack may not do. While from the military point of view this may provide the users with a decided advantage over their armed opponents, it puts at a tremendous disadvantage the civilian or non-combatant population in the localities in which it is used.

36. The social and economic consequences of the use of chemical warfare are indeed grave. Even when they are employed as individual weapons, they have a strike capacity extending over a wide area and can initiate fires that spread far beyond their immediate targets. In short, as weapons of destruction they can be largely indiscriminate with regard to their objectives. In destroying the environment, such attacks may also damage the supply of raw materials, which in turn may result in soil erosion and devastation of the original fauna and flora in a given locality. Napalm and other incendiary weapons emit, in addition, toxic effects of carbon monoxide and other combustion products which are very harmful to animal life.

37. I turn now to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for 1972 [A/8818]. Notwithstanding the fact that the Conference had before it for consideration a number of resolutions adopted in 1971 by the General Assembly, the political will on the part of Member Governments, particularly those of the major Powers, to achieve the aims and objectives of the Con-

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.73.I.3.

ference seems to be lacking. Virtually little or no consensus was achieved on the programme of work before it. As a matter of fact, after 10 years of existence the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament does not have much to show on the balance sheet of its achievements. Of the major Powers, two have categorically refused to participate in its endeavours, giving as reasons certain pre-conditions for their participation. The truth is, however, that entering belatedly into the nuclear arms race they prefer to concentrate on building up their nuclear capabilities unfettered by the basic guidelines of the Conference. Worse still, several States have not even adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

38. That brings me to a rather crucial point—the consummate indifference and almost reckless abandon demonstrated by certain nuclear Powers in continuing to explode nuclear devices in the atmosphere. France, especially, in gross defiance of enlightened world opinion and in a region located thousands of miles from its metropolitan confines has recently done this. The cynicism with which this has been carried out, notwithstanding the well-known fact that such nuclear explosions in the atmosphere spread large quantities of radioactive isotopes which are injurious to human beings, has been remarkable, to say the very least.

39. My delegation is gravely concerned over this act of *insouciance*, and calls upon the international community to bring pressure to bear on France to such a degree that it will bring to an end its nuclear weapon tests in the Pacific region. In furtherance of that goal, my delegation would support, and, if need be, even join the sponsors of, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.611, the sponsors of which are a number of Pacific States whose future is directly at stake.

40. Finally, my delegation would like to call upon all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,⁵ which ensures the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

41. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [*translation from Russian*]: The Soviet delegation would like to explain the position of the USSR on the question of creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

42. First, we should like to stress that the Soviet Union attaches great significance to the creating of nuclear-free zones. In the documents of the twenty-fourth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it is pointed out that the Soviet Union is in favour of the creation of such zones in various parts of the world. In supporting the creation of nuclear-free zones the Soviet Union proceeds from the necessary premise that the creation of such zones should effectively limit the sphere of installation of nuclear weapons and be totally and fully in keeping with the aim of preventing the direct or indirect proliferation of those weapons. It is precisely that approach of principle which determines the attitude of the Soviet Union to the specific proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones. That is entirely applicable to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.⁵

43. From the very moment when the draft on the nuclear-free zone in Latin America appeared, the Soviet Union adopted an attitude of understanding towards the motives of the sponsors of the draft. At the same time the representatives of the Soviet Union pointed out that the viability of such a zone would depend upon how fully and completely the obligations of the States parties to the Treaty would ensure the zone's nuclear-free status, and to what extent other nuclear Powers were prepared to respect that status.

44. In determining our approach to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, we have proceeded from the premise that, together with the provisions which are genuinely and truly designed to attain this objective, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions which are not in keeping with this task.

45. These provisions include article 18 of the Treaty which reads as follows: "The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons . . .". As we know, the technology of the production of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is not different from the technology of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, since nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes have in common a group of characteristics which make it possible to release uncontrollable nuclear energy of high intensity and of instantaneous action. Therefore article 18, which permits the carrying out of peaceful explosions by means of devices "similar to those used in nuclear weapons", clearly provides an obvious loop-hole for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

46. The Treaty of Tlatelolco does not prohibit the transporting of nuclear weapons across the territory of States Parties to the Treaty. In the Final Act of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America dated 21 February 1967 the following is stated: ". . . 'transit' . . . must be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international law; according to those principles and rules it is for the territorial State in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such transit in each individual case, upon application by the State interested in effecting the transit . . .".⁶

47. It follows from this that each Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco has the right of determining independently whether or not to permit the transit of nuclear weapons through its territory and that such permission falls within the competence of the State in question "in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such transit in each individual case . . .". This is the same conclusion drawn by the United States. In a statement dated 12 May 1971 on the ratification by the United States of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the following is stated:

" . . . the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the treaty, as

⁶ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 2.

set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges.”⁷

48. The absence of a prohibition on transit of such weapons through the territory of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America also constitutes an obvious loop-hole for the violation of the conditions of the nuclear-free zone. The transportation of nuclear weapons through this zone could serve as a screen for the installation and also for the use of nuclear weapons from the territory of the nuclear-free zone.

49. On the question of the sphere of applicability of the Treaty of Tlatelolco we believe that the definition of this zone contained in the Treaty is not in keeping with the rules of international law. The existing rules of international law do not grant States or groups of States the right to establish, without the consent of other interested States, any particular régime on the high seas at their own discretion and on conditions which they themselves lay down.

50. We should also like to point out that the draft Treaty of Tlatelolco was not submitted to all interested parties for their consent although the sense of the Treaty does imply that certain countries which do not belong to the Latin American region should assume certain obligations under this international instrument.

51. After preparing the draft Treaty of Tlatelolco, it would have been natural to expect that the Preparatory Commission would have taken measures to agree on its provisions with other interested States. This, however, was not done.

52. For the reasons stated, the Soviet Union will be unable to support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.I/L.619 which deplores the failure of the countries mentioned in that draft resolution to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

53. In conclusion, we should like once again to point out that the Soviet Union, like many other States, has a great interest in ensuring that the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, including Latin America, becomes a reality. In connexion with the appeal of the Senate of the United States of Mexico of 14 September 1970 to the legislative organs of States concerned with the question of adhering to the Tlatelolco Treaty and its Additional Protocols, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on 4 January 1971, sent an answer⁸ to the Mexican Senate which, *inter alia*, contains the following comments:

“The Soviet Union took note of the fact that, on the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the Government of Mexico stated that it intended to seek a solution which would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It subsequently found such a solution in the

signature and ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

“The Soviet Union also took note of the fact that the Government of Mexico does not intend to allow the transport (transit) of nuclear weapons through its territory and that it extends the statute of denuclearization to the whole territory of Mexico, including its land, air space and territorial waters the limit of which has been established in accordance with international law at twelve nautical miles.

“In view of this position of the Government of Mexico, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on instructions from the Soviet Government, informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico that the Soviet Union was ready to undertake a commitment to respect the status of Mexico as a completely nuclear-weapon-free zone provided that the other nuclear Powers, too, undertake a commitment to respect that status.

“If other Latin American States, following Mexico’s example, also genuinely turn their territories into completely nuclear-weapon-free zones, they too can count on the same respect from the Soviet Union for the status of their territories as completely nuclear-weapon-free zones; this will be possible only if other nuclear Powers, too, undertake the same commitments.”

54. From the answer of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Mexican Senate, it emerges perfectly clearly that the USSR wholeheartedly supports the creation of completely nuclear-free zones.

55. That is the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the Treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America—the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

56. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: In this statement my delegation intends to speak specifically on some of the matters included in agenda items 30 and 31.

57. The consideration of disarmament questions and matters of arms control cannot be separated from the historic context in which we live and must include an assessment of the prevailing conflicts and tensions of today. In other words, it is necessary that consideration of these subjects be undertaken bearing in mind the struggle of peoples for their liberation or resistance to imperialist aggression, which in some cases reaches the acute level of war

58. Although it may be true that since the creation of the United Nations the world has been able to avoid another global conflagration, it is no less true that since 1945 many peoples have had to take up arms to defend or win their national independence. Even today, particularly in a number of regions of the African continent, imperialism and colonialism are waging cruel wars against peoples determined to defend their rights.

59. The fact that we have been able to avoid a world war cannot disguise the dramatic, unavoidable reality that from 1965 to the end of August of this year the North American

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 98, document A/8560.

⁸ *Ibid.*, document A/8336/Rev.1.

aggressors launched on the territories of the Indo-Chinese States an amount of explosives three and a half times greater than the total tonnage used by the Allied Forces during the Second World War.

60. As against the 2 million tons of bombs launched during the last world war, up to 1 September 1972 the Indo-Chinese people had been subjected to 7,550,000 tons. These were dropped on an incomparably smaller area than that on which the Allied tonnage in the decade of the 1940s had fallen, and on a society that lacked the European material infrastructure and resources. Furthermore, that tonnage included a large quantity of toxic chemical substances and anti-personnel bombs, specifically intended to annihilate the Indo-Chinese population. It is easy to conclude that the neo-nazi barbarism has exceeded, in its power to destroy, commit crimes and cause material and human suffering and damage to the victims of aggression, all that was achieved and conceived by its Hitlerian predecessor.

61. In the course of this very week, while we deliberate here on the question of disarmament, the North American aggressors continue to exceed their own heights of brutality. According to dispatches from Yankee news services, in 42 hours during 7 and 8 November North American planes dropped at least 2,700 tons of bombs on a single Vietnamese province, Quang Tri; that is to say, more than one ton per minute.

62. The explosion of those bombs did not disturb the ritual procession of speeches in this Committee; the disturbance took place much too far from this hall. But none of us can deny that they point to a political reality on which the validity of these discussions and their possible results must hinge.

63. Any efforts that may be made towards disarmament, regardless of the recommendations that we may adopt here, will fail to create a positive system of international peace and security while the imperialist policy of aggression, interference and exploitation is allowed to persist. Unless we take into account that existing reality, these efforts will always run the risk of falling in a vacuum. The search for a peaceful world in which disarmament would be a necessary component must start with an affirmation of the right of peoples to their independence, the condemnation of imperialists who unleash unlimited aggressive wars, and solidarity with the peoples attacked.

64. The first step towards the creation of an international climate conducive to disarmament negotiations should be a most categorical condemnation of North American imperialism for its aggression against the Indo-Chinese peoples. If we truly wish to create a world of peace, a unanimous cry must be raised demanding an end to the war and the signing of the promised agreement with the Vietnamese peoples.

65. Last year my delegation spoke of the urgency of the international community's condemning the use of chemical weapons and prohibiting their use, calling for a destruction of their stockpiles and the cessation of their manufacture and testing. We stressed the importance of adopting such decisions in the light of the increasing and indiscriminate

use of these weapons of mass destruction, particularly by the North American aggressive troops in South Viet-Nam and other parts of Indo-China.

66. Since December of 1961, the North American Government has been using against the Vietnamese people a series of chemical substances intended to destroy crops, defoliate or kill the plants, sterilize the soil, and annihilate or seriously injure persons. According to official North American statistics, between 1963 and 1971 the Defense Department of the United States spent \$117.5 million in the purchase of chemicals to be used against plants. Between December 1961 and September 1970, these substances were scattered over an area of 58,029 square kilometres in South Viet-Nam, affecting 1,536,016 persons, of whom 1,622 died. On the strength of figures published by the Pentagon, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that between 1962 and 1969 some 20 million gallons of herbicides, approximately 90,000 tons, were dropped on South Viet-Nam. Yoichi Fukushima, chief of the agronomic section of the Scientific Council of Japan, pointed out "that by 1967 the North American chemical attacks had already ruined more than 3.8 million acres, or almost half the arable land of South Viet-Nam".

67. Many of these substances have proven dangerous effects on mankind, and some are teratogenic. The Vietnamese soil has been devastated not only by millions of tons of explosive and incendiary bombs, but also by the full range of toxic chemical substances known to the North American arsenal. In all their forms and varieties, in shocking volume, they have been dropped on the Vietnamese farmers: the four types of defoliants (orange, purple, blue and white) and toxic substances, such as CS and its by-products CS 1 and CS 2, and BZ gas.

68. By its very nature this type of weapon violates the rights of persons and expressly contravenes all internationally accepted humanitarian rules governing behaviour in time of war. These weapons do not distinguish between combatants and civilians. Their effects on the adversary are not purely military; they also cause serious wounds, difficult to heal, sometimes irreparable and often transmittable to later generations. These are weapons specifically intended to go beyond armed confrontation between the two antagonists. They are aimed not only at the soldier, but at the entire population. Their target is not merely the guerrilla contingents. They are also directed at crops, vegetation, the soil—in short, at the human environment.

69. The war in Viet-Nam has thus become a total war. For North American imperialism the enemy is the entire population, its rivers, its mountains, its land and its atmosphere. Military strategy and methods of warfare have been adapted to that reality. Politically and militarily defeated, the Yankees have now decided to annihilate the Vietnamese population, to destroy the environment and to devastate the country. No ethical consideration has stopped them, nor have they blushed with shame at their genocidal, biocidal and ecocidal work. Since the period of their Nazi predecessors, the world has not thus far been confronted by a war in which the most powerful imperialism seeks to wipe out an entire people. General Westmoreland was not joking when he described the North American army in Viet-Nam as "a blind giant".

70. In the last few months the Pentagon has resorted more and more to the use of sophisticated electronic means of warfare. Its false election promises of peace contrast strangely with the relentless bombing of Vietnamese territory. The war continues; the North Americans continue to wage it with ever-greater intensity. Now of course, they wage it from a distance, with more refined technological means and in a more cowardly way. Suffice it to note that between May and September of this year, the United States fired 5,260 laser or teleguided missiles against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

71. We must express our gratitude to the group of experts which prepared the report on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*.⁹ This is a serious study, full of data which allow us to judge the serious consequences which the use of these brutal methods may have on the populations concerned. Their effects are very clearly described in paragraph 102 of the report:

“Under less controlled, or less familiar, conditions, the extensive use of incendiary weapons in rural areas, whether or not it is intentionally directed against cultivations or similar targets, may well produce wide-ranging destruction. In the short term, harvests may be lost on which the livelihood of large numbers of non-combatants depends. In the long term, depending upon the largely unpredictable outcome of the resultant ecological changes, irreversible damage may occur which has little or no bearing on the objectives for which the weapons were used in the first place. Measures for remedying the damage may prove too costly to be undertaken. Severe and long-lasting hardship may then be added to the afflictions of the local population.”

72. In the course of this debate attention has been drawn to the fact that the Government of the United States and its Western allies did not co-operate with the group of experts that prepared this document. The study itself serves to dispel any doubts regarding the reason for such an attitude. In fact, napalm and other incendiary weapons have been and are being used by the imperialists in their aggressive adventures and repression of national liberation movements. That is obvious if we take into account the increase in the use of napalm since the Second World War. Let us therefore turn to paragraph 164 of this same document:

“Compared with conventional ground weapons, the tonnage of napalm weapons used during the Second World War was small. This situation changed during the Korean war, when napalm began to acquire its present reputation as a militarily effective weapon. One of its users described it as the ‘best all around weapon in Korea’. The total consumption during the war was 32,315 tons. Several armed services around the world subsequently adopted napalm, and it has apparently been employed almost as a matter of course in a number of recent conflicts. Its widest use has been in Viet-Nam, where seven months of fire-bombing during 1966 spread as much napalm as had been used during the entire Korean war, with still greater quantities being used subsequently. By March 1968 the total consumption is reported to have been well over 100,000 tons.”

73. I would invite members of the Committee once again to ponder these facts. In Viet-Nam, during only “seven months of fire-bombing during 1966 spread as much napalm as had been used during the entire Korean war . . .” and “By March 1968 the total consumption is reported to have been well over 100,000 tons”, that is to say, approximately three times the quantity used in Korea. Remember that, as the same report mentions in paragraph 159, “during the Korean war . . . a large part of the city of Pyongyang was destroyed by incendiaries in January 1951”.

74. My delegation considers that the report of the group of experts calls for a decision by this Committee that goes beyond mere praise for its work. We fully share the following views expressed in paragraph 193 by the experts themselves in the conclusions of their report:

“It is not the purpose of this report to assess the use of incendiary weapons in the light of legal and humanitarian principles. Nevertheless, in view of the facts presented in the report, the group of consultant experts wishes to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons.”

75. The report is a challenge to the political sensitivity and humanitarian feelings of the members of this Committee. It transfers us from the somewhat theoretical level on which we sometimes carry out our discussions of disarmament to the daily reality being confronted by the peoples struggling and fighting to exercise their inalienable rights.

76. It is the duty of this Committee to heed the constant appeals of these struggling peoples and immediately to adopt specific measures to limit the offensive capacity of the imperialists and colonialists. But first and foremost we must pronounce ourselves in favour of the total prohibition of chemical weapons and napalm and other incendiary weapons. We would then be contributing in a tangible fashion to the cause of international peace and security in its only true meaning: that these are assets to which all peoples have the right.

77. The CHAIRMAN: I understand that the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes to speak on a point of order, and I call on him.

78. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic): On behalf of my delegation I wish to associate myself with every word of the very penetrating statement just made by the Ambassador of Cuba. We owe him gratitude for his courage, his frankness and the correct descriptions of fact he has just given. We hope that his statement will cause this Committee to pay some attention to the real problems affecting humanity at present instead of focusing on rhetoric and false appeasement in order to divert world public opinion from the atrocities committed by the imperialists and their partners.

79. I hope that with your permission, Mr. Chairman, this point of order will be duly recorded in the verbatim record of this meeting.

80. The CHAIRMAN: I would call the attention of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the fact that his remarks constituted, not a point of order, but a short statement.

81. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): My delegation is not ready at this stage to deal with all the complex aspects of disarmament as presented in the various documents and draft resolutions before us. We reserve our right to address ourselves to specifics in the subsequent examination of the topics raised in these draft resolutions.

82. Now I wish to speak—perhaps to the despair of my colleagues—in some generalities, and later I will give some specific attention to the question of the proposed world disarmament conference.

83. Year in, year out, the litany about disarmament goes on in the General Assembly without the progress commensurate with the hopes of the peoples represented here at the United Nations. Our Organization has concerned itself since its inception with the problem of disarmament as an effective means to prevent war, to stave off world catastrophe, to allay the fears and anxieties of humanity and to strengthen international peace and security.

84. The question of disarmament holds a position of primacy in the minds of peoples, as well as in the annals of the United Nations. Article 26 of the Charter entrusted the Security Council and the General Assembly with a well-defined responsibility: that of establishing a system for the regulation of armaments “in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”.

85. The first resolution adopted by the first session of the General Assembly, on 24 January 1946, resolution 1 (I), related to one aspect of disarmament: it established the Atomic Energy Commission with a view to the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals and to the diversion of the utilization of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. Since that time there has been a gap of partial achievements and major failures.

86. In its Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, the General Assembly, on the threshold of the Disarmament Decade, called upon all Governments “to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal—general and complete disarmament under effective international control”. [*See resolution 2627 (XXV).*]

87. We all recall that resolution 2602 E (XXIV) declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade, which coincides with the Second United Nations Development Decade, but, as Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim reminded us in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization: “The balance sheet of the first decade [of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament] shows that the declared goal of general and complete disarmament has not yet been achieved.”¹⁰

88. Nor do we see at present significant indications that we are moving faster during this second year of the Disarmament Decade towards the attainment of that objective. A genuine fear exists that the younger amongst us will be repeating in 1982 the same speeches we are making today. Indeed, our colleague from Turkey, Ambassador Olcay, told us at the 1885th meeting that he had been tempted to re-read a speech he had made on the subject 10 years ago.

89. In a statement he made at the 1819th meeting of the Economic and Social Council on 3 July 1972, the Secretary-General evoked the concept—which in our view is very important—of economic security as a “necessary correlate to the concept of collective political security”.

90. I believe that we must be ever-mindful of past resolutions and declarations we have adopted and not consider them as mere documents for the records.

91. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*] has affirmed the belief that there is a close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and the economic development of countries. A close link has been established, and so often emphasized, between those three essential objectives of the United Nations to achieve progress for mankind and to build a better world. Any slackening of progress in one area is bound to have dire consequences on the others.

92. In our constant quest for peace and security, our efforts during this decade must be applied with equal intensity and vigour to both economic development and disarmament.

93. Furthermore, to fail to achieve substantial and meaningful progress in disarmament by the end of this decade may bring the world face to face with still greater dangers. By then the expenditures on arms will have risen from the present \$200 thousand million annually to \$300 thousand million. The arms in military arsenals will by then have been so refined and sophisticated as to allow the qualitative aspect to offset any quantitative limitation nations may have agreed to put on the production or deployment of weapons.

94. We have shared in the past, as we share today, the general satisfaction expressed in this Committee about the major trends which characterize international relations vis-à-vis the problems of disarmament. I can refer to some of them here: first, the progressive agreement that has been achieved through several treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament, some of which have already entered into effect; secondly, the good faith, more and more discernible, in the negotiations undertaken at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and here at the United Nations to achieve agreements on additional treaties and conventions; thirdly, the relaxation of international tension, the intensified desire for ending wars and for finding solutions to the conflicts afflicting the world, and the spirit of détente permeating international relations—a trend which is bound to create a better international climate conducive to further progress, we hope, on the road towards disarmament; fourthly, concomitant with the trend

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1A, sect. VI.*

of détente and as a contributory factor to it, the fact that at long last the two major nuclear Powers, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have begun a series of strategic arms limitation talks which have produced welcome results in the first round and which, we hope, will lead to still more tangible and positive results in the subsequent rounds due to start soon.

95. However, we should not be deluded by any sense of euphoria which may lead us to believe that real disarmament is at hand. Nuclear testing is still going on in some parts of the world and the peoples' clamour is for the complete cessation of such tests everywhere and by all.

96. The Treaty on non-proliferation has not been adhered to by all Member States, especially those with military and technological capabilities and potentialities. A convention on the destruction and prohibition of chemical weapons is not in sight, despite the desire strongly expressed last year in this Committee. Most of the treaties and conventions, including the ones prohibiting the use of outer space and the sea-bed and ocean floor for the emplacement of nuclear weapons, have been described as lateral agreements. They revolve around the periphery of the disarmament problem; they do not go to the essence of it. The strategic arms limitation talks have been limited to two of the major nuclear Powers and although they have taken place, understandably, outside the context of the United Nations, their results have not been officially communicated to this Organization. Those and similar talks tend to establish a certain equilibrium of armaments. This should not be confused in any way with disarmament. The fact remains that 92 per cent of the huge expenditures on armaments is spent by the few major Powers, while only 8 per cent is spent by the rest of the world, mainly the developing countries. Some of the expenditures of the latter are understandable...from the point of view of self-defence against colonialism, aggression and foreign occupation, while the 92 per cent is spent mainly for the purpose of consolidating the power of the major Powers.

97. One aspect I alluded to before, about which we feel a certain unhappiness, is that, despite all the worthy efforts made within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, no concrete proposals have been presented to us during this session for the cessation and prohibition of the production of chemical weapons and for the destruction of the present stockpiles of these dangerous weapons.

98. Incendiary and napalm bombs are causing great anxiety among peoples and nations. We in Lebanon are very concerned about their use. We have good reason to protest against that use and to condemn it, for Israel, in defiance of all standards of legality and humanity, has used napalm against our civilian population. Scores of innocent persons, including many women and children, have been the victims of Israeli napalm bombs.

99. One of the important aspects of disarmament with which we are dealing is the world disarmament conference. In the debate which took place during the last General Assembly, my delegation welcomed the initiative of the Soviet delegation in introducing a proposal to hold a world disarmament conference. We supported the proposal in principle, and we still do. The idea of holding such a

conference is not a new one, as we were reminded by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Klusák. As a matter of fact, it has gone through the mill of discussions in several sessions of the General Assembly and in conferences of the non-aligned nations since 1961. The Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held at Georgetown last August reaffirmed its support for such a conference.

100. The mainstream of thought during this session appears to be clearly running in favour of holding the conference. Our colleague, Ambassador Johnson of Jamaica, summed up the prevailing thoughts very well when he said: "One thing is clear: no country is opposed to the principle of a conference, and none, presumably, is opposed to the principle of disarmament." [1883rd meeting, para. 146].

101. So much is clear. Confusion sets in when questions of timing, procedures and objectives are discussed. We view the element of timing in a wide perspective; that is, we do not have any particular dates in mind. However, as I have stated previously, we must always have present in our minds the fact that we are in a Disarmament Decade. An intensification of action during this Decade is imperative if we are to achieve our goals, at least partially.

102. Disarmament is a matter of deep concern to all peoples and nations. Some delegations believe that it is premature to convene a full-scale conference. This is true, perhaps, if it relates only to this year or next year or the following year; but it is not true if we look at the question from the angle of the Disarmament Decade. My delegation believes that the middle of the Decade would be an opportune time to hold the conference. Furthermore, we believe that a second conference should be held towards the end of the Decade.

103. Opinions have been expressed here that the conference should be institutionalized and therefore become a permanent organ of the United Nations system. There is a great deal of merit in those opinions owing to the importance and complexity of the problem of disarmament and the time needed to deal with it effectively. It is too early, however, to form a judgement on this aspect of the conference. The conference itself will have to decide upon it. Nevertheless, there is danger in the proliferation of new bodies to which the various responsibilities of the United Nations are allotted and entrusted. This would lead ultimately to the weakening of the Organization and of its capacity to formulate policies and co-ordinate activities. There is the added danger that a permanent organ for disarmament might lapse into the well-known trend of becoming only an unwieldy forum for endless and fruitless discussions. Moreover, the work of the General Assembly and in particular that of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has accumulated a wealth of expertise and knowledge, might be either paralysed or duplicated. Various opinions have also been voiced regarding the modalities of the preparatory stage for the conference. Our colleagues, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina [1873rd meeting], Ambassador Frazão of Brazil, Ambassador Vinci of Italy [1882nd meeting] and others, have earned our appreciation for the constructive thoughts they have advanced regarding the establishment of a study group or an *ad hoc* committee to deal with this aspect, and

in this respect I must not fail to mention Ambassador García Robles of Mexico [1872nd meeting].

104. The delegation of Brazil has made a singular contribution in its working paper [A/C.1/L.618]. The paper deserves thorough examination in the light of the explanations presented to us on two occasions by Ambassador Frazão [1882nd and 1886th meetings].

105. In general, we consider that the question of the world conference on disarmament may have to go through different phases during this decade. Phase one will have to be concerned with the preparatory work. The first part of it will be entrusted to an *ad hoc* committee which will have the specific task of further ascertaining the views of Governments regarding the advisability of holding the conference, its timing and other procedural aspects. It has been widely advocated that members of the *ad hoc* committee should not exceed 33 to 35 and should include all nuclear Powers, the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other members, to ensure a wide spectrum of representation. We support that view.

106. The *ad hoc* committee or preparatory committee in the subsequent stage will have to go into the more substantive work of preparation for the conference once its date has been determined by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. Then it will have to deal with the formulation of definite objectives, the establishment of an order of priorities, the elaboration of general guidelines and directives and the setting of time-limits. It is hoped that during this phase parallel bilateral and multilateral discussions among nations will not slacken but, on the contrary, will be intensified, and that the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly will continue normally in order to promote the necessary conditions for the success of the conference and the achievement of progress in disarmament.

107. This will lead us to the conference itself in about the middle of the Decade, as I mentioned before. The conference, in the light of the objectives, priorities and guidelines already determined, will have to review and appraise the results already achieved in the field of disarmament, sanction new draft treaties and conventions submitted to it and formulate new directives for action in the third phase.

108. A new stage will follow devoted to intensive negotiations to implement the decisions of the first conference. During that phase the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, reconstructed and revitalized to meet new desires and requirements, will play, in conjunction with the General Assembly, a very important role in the implementation of decisions and preparations for the final phase of the Decade.

109. The second conference will necessarily take place towards the end of the Decade. That second conference will have to review all the work of the Decade and set the stage for the solution of the remaining problems in the field of disarmament.

110. This is how my delegation looks at the world disarmament conference: on the one hand we see it from the point of view of the Disarmament Decade; on the other

from the point of view of its close and concomitant connexion with the Second Development Decade. It remains one of the great hopes of mankind that resources channelled for the production of weapons, the means of death, destruction and misery, will be diverted through our common efforts to creative and contributive means of peace and to the happiness of man everywhere in the world.

111. Mr. GABRE-SELLASSIE (Ethiopia): I am particularly pleased to start my remarks by extending to the Chairman the warmest congratulations of the Ethiopian delegation on his well-deserved election. I also wish to convey our felicitations to his colleagues, the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur. Judging by the competent manner in which our proceedings have been conducted so far, we can look forward confidently to harmonious work and constructive achievement in this Committee. I wish to assure the Chairman that my delegation will co-operate fully in the discharge of his onerous duties.

112. In our discussion of the disarmament items we find ourselves in a state of continuous frustration and anticipation in spite of the consistently declared policies of Member States of the United Nations in favour of disarmament ever since they undertook the obligations of the Charter.

113. Nevertheless, the positive developments in arms control measures during the last decade—for example, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof—coupled with the improvement in the international political atmosphere since the last session of the General Assembly, and the conclusion of certain bilateral accords between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on the quantitative limitation of specified types of weapons systems, give us some present cause for guarded optimism.

114. As a result of our action during the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly we now have before us the reports of the Secretary-General [A/8807] and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8818]. Having carefully studied them, my delegation notes with regret the conspicuous lack of progress towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2828 (XXVI) on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

115. In that resolution the General Assembly reiterated “solemnly and most emphatically its condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests” and urged “the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973”. At the same time, the Secretary-General was also requested to transmit the text of the resolution in question “to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session of any measures they have taken to implement it.”

116. In his report the Secretary-General has informed the General Assembly that as of 15 September 1972 he had received no replies to the letter which he addressed on 8 February 1972 to the five nuclear-weapon Powers pursuant to the request of the General Assembly.

117. The Summary by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the exchange of views on the question of a comprehensive test ban is once again limited to a recital of the views of many members to the effect that there is an urgent need for suspending nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

118. Apart from the all-pervasive danger of the continually spiralling nuclear armaments race, my Government is seriously concerned lest the continuation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere and underground is having the effect of eroding the non-proliferation Treaty and creating further difficulties over and above the already existing problems.

119. As regards the present status of the non-proliferation Treaty, my delegation is of course encouraged by the fact that the number of countries which have become parties to the Treaty has continued to grow within the last year. As an original party to that Treaty, my Government welcomes all positive developments leading towards wider adherence to it. On the other hand, we have noted the recent publication of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "The near-nuclear countries and the Non-Proliferation Treaty". One section of this publication which is of particular interest to our present discussions contains case studies of the positions of 15 near-nuclear countries vis-à-vis the non-proliferation Treaty. Having due regard to the fact that only some of those near-nuclear countries are, in the strict legal sense, parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, and having due regard also to the withdrawal provisions contained in article X of the Treaty [*see resolution 2373 (XXII)*], our own conclusion is that the continuation of nuclear tests in any form will tend to encourage the near-nuclear countries with sufficient technology and resources to embark on their own nuclear testing. That development will, in the view of my delegation, defeat the very purposes of the Treaty.

120. My Government is also concerned that the continuation of nuclear tests will inevitably tend to compound existing difficulties on yet another front, namely, the securing of the active participation of all nuclear Powers in all disarmament efforts.

121. That the reversal of the nuclear armaments race and, hence, the process of disarmament itself, remains one of the most urgent and complex problems of our time scarcely admits of any doubt. The urgency of this problem has been repeatedly stressed in numerous General Assembly resolutions. Regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, and the conferences of the non-aligned countries, have consistently appealed for a speedy achievement of nuclear disarmament. The problem also remains one of the principal preoccupations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament ever since its establishment. Moreover, there is hardly any division in our ranks over the fact that international security and peace can only be strengthened to the extent that we make steady progress toward the primary objective of nuclear disarmament. If we are to proceed in the right direction towards our commonly cherished goal of general and complete disarmament, the active participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in all disarmament negotiations is vitally important. We must, therefore, give earnest consideration to all the possibilities of securing their participation.

122. Fortunately, the declared policies of all the nuclear-weapon Powers indicate that they are all in favour of nuclear disarmament. We also believe that the reversal of the ever-spiralling nuclear armaments race, the subsequent reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of these Powers, is as much to their lasting interest as it is to mankind at large. On this basis, it seems to us that strengthening the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty would first and foremost benefit the present nuclear-weapon Powers. If that be the case, then the next step may well be the formal conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty to which all nuclear-weapon Powers will be parties.

123. Among other reasons why my delegation is drawn to this seemingly over-simplified assumption is the fact that there is a similarity of intent in the ideas contained in item 25, which was inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly at the initiative of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the statement of the representative of the People's Republic of China in the First Committee.

124. The Soviet item, entitled "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" is particularly significant to my present remarks in that it seeks to prohibit permanently the use of nuclear weapons.

125. On the other hand, in his statement in this Committee, the representative of the People's Republic of China affirmed that his Government would not participate in a world disarmament conference until all other nuclear-weapon Powers, *inter alia*: "... undertake the obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, particularly not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries at any time and under any circumstances..." [*1873rd meeting, para. 76.*]

126. Could it be that the differences of the two approaches are more apparent than real? With mutual accommodation and genuine compromise, my delegation does not see why something tangible cannot be hammered out in concrete terms, from the ideas which are common to both positions. If these observations sound over-simplified, it is only because we feel that the gravity of the problems demands our grappling with them and one may, therefore, be forgiven for stressing the points in common rather than the points of difference. My delegation feels that there is challenge and opportunity. I say "challenge and opportunity" for the simple reason that if, as we believe, none of the nuclear States has any intention of initiating a nuclear holocaust, then we see no legitimate cause why any of these States separately, or all of them jointly, cannot be forthcoming with such a formal reassurance. The salutary effect of this sort of development on our disarmament efforts would indeed be significant and most welcome by the international community.

127. It is interesting to recall in this context that, as far back as 1946, the official position of both the USSR and the United States was in fact in favour of outlawing nuclear weapons. The statement which Mr. Baruch made on 14 June 1946 when presenting the United States plan for international control of atomic energy, and the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union on 19 June 1946, can be cited as evidence.

128. Following this trend of thought, during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, the Ethiopian representative on the First Committee, Mr. Alemayehou, called for a United Nations declaration of principles which would condemn the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. He reasoned that:

“Universal condemnation of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would facilitate the conclusion of an agreement whereby the ‘nuclear Powers’ would renounce the use of such weapons; and it would provide an additional guarantee against any infringement of such an agreement.” [955th meeting, para. 24.]

129. Subsequently, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the Ethiopian delegation formally proposed that the General Assembly should declare, that: “nuclear and thermonuclear energy and materials used in its production, and weapons made from such materials, should not be employed for war purposes; that such use was contrary to the spirit and letter of the Charter and to the aims of the United Nations; and that any country employing such weapons for war purposes would be regarded as using them not merely against a particular enemy but against mankind as a whole, and would therefore be responsible for the effects of its acts upon mankind and civilization.” [1098th meeting, para. 12.]

130. That proposal, which commanded the broad sympathy and active support of a number of delegations, was the object of resolution 1653 (XVI), adopted by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session.

131. Regarding the initial proposal of the Ethiopian delegation, the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, by resolution 1909 (XVIII), requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—now the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Although up to now nothing has materialized in this regard, we note with satisfaction that its central idea—namely, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes—has now been taken up by two nuclear-weapon Powers.

132. There is yet another compelling reason for making every effort to facilitate the active participation of France and the People’s Republic of China in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That reason is the continuation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, in spite of the full content of resolution 2828 (XXVI), adopted by the last session of the General Assembly. Although several working papers and a number of useful proposals were presented during this year’s session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, nothing tangible is as yet discernible by way of the full implementation of that resolution. The pledges made by the nuclear-weapon Powers in the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty still remain unfulfilled. Moreover, the original parties to the Treaties do not seem to have exerted the maximum effort towards the cessation of all underground tests, or even towards limited measures such as agreeing on a moratorium on tests of a specified megaton capacity. Already a number of representatives have lucidly

explained to the First Committee the reasons for lack of concrete results in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the urgent problem of a comprehensive test ban. My delegation fully endorses their presentation and shares the view that a firm and precise programme of action on the disarmament problem should be adopted by the General Assembly at its current session.

133. I should like to stress one more point in this context. If the nuclear-weapon Powers participating in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament are waiting for their nuclear colleagues to join them in Geneva before reaching a comprehensive test ban agreement, then the sooner China and France join in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the better will be the opportunities for success in reaching the primary objective of agreement. Since a comprehensive test ban to which two of the nuclear-weapon Powers are not parties cannot be effective, we must earnestly seek ways of involving China and France in the appropriate negotiations. The prompt engagement by the five nuclear-weapon Powers in negotiations towards an accord not to use nuclear weapons against each other or against third parties may pave the way to the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. As has already been discussed this year, if revision of the procedures and structural organization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should prove to facilitate the participation of China and France, such a course must also be given close attention. The convening of a world disarmament conference would in our view be another move in that direction.

134. Turning now to item 31 of our agenda, I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the constructive, if perhaps over-cautious, manner in which discussions towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and towards their destruction proceeded during the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Thanks to the valuable contributions made from all sides, definite progress has been made in the Conference with respect to the nature and scope of measures prohibiting chemical weapons. Now that the issues on which agreement must be reached have been sufficiently isolated, what we hope for is the completion of the draft convention during the next session of the Conference. As a former victim of the horrors of chemical warfare, Ethiopia attaches special importance to the urgency of this problem and hopes that mankind will never again be subjected to similar suffering caused by more refined chemical agents.

135. While we must, of course, give priority to the most urgent of disarmament problems, my delegation is convinced that we must always hold our ultimate goal to be general and complete disarmament. Unless we do that, we may often mistake the bush for the jungle. We have no doubt that the limited collateral arms control and disarmament measures which have been achieved so far are, indeed, very important in leading us a step further towards our ultimate goal. We should continue to press for ever wider participation in those multilateral treaties and ensure their universal application. Thus alone can their effectiveness be secured and their durability guaranteed. We are convinced that regional armaments and force reductions, widening the areas of peace and of denuclearized zones, and other similar

measures, would go a long way towards solving the disarmament problem. To that end the Ethiopian delegation is fully prepared to co-operate with all members in supporting all the constructive proposals which we trust will emerge from our present discussions.

136. Mr. YANGO (Philippines): My delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.611, which aims at putting a stop to nuclear-weapon tests anywhere in the world and particularly in the Pacific. We are grateful to our colleagues, Ambassador Scott of New Zealand and Ambassador McIntyre of Australia, for their neatly synchronized and very able introduction of this proposal at the 1876th meeting. We associate ourselves with their views and with those of the other sponsors. We share their concern as well as their indignation over the continuing tests of nuclear weapons in our part of the world, with their attendant hazards to our peoples and our environment.

137. We are deeply disturbed by the danger of physical harm and of psychological injury arising from these tests; and even more by the flouting of world public opinion, contrary to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. We have protested against and denounced these tests year after year, in forum after forum, to no avail, but we consider them so objectionable that we cannot lapse into silence or acquiescence.

138. This is why we have sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.611 and will support draft resolution A/C.1/L.615, which seeks universal adherence to a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, as well as draft resolution A/C.1/L.620, which again urges the nuclear Powers to bring to a halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 5 August 1973, through permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria. It is heartening to note that the representative of Sierra Leone, whose statement we listened to with great interest a while ago, has announced the sponsorship by his delegation of draft resolution A/C.1/L.611. We, the original sponsors of the draft resolution, extend a warm welcome to Sierra Leone as it joins our group.

139. My delegation will also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.617 on the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, draft resolution A/C.1/L.616/Rev.1 on the Secretary-General's report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and draft resolution A/C.1/L.619 on the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

140. Our interest in zones of peace was manifested by our adherence in Kuala Lumpur to the Declaration made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on 27 November 1971, designating South-East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers. However, in order to enhance the realistic prospects of their becoming effective, declarations of this nature should result from consensus among the countries in the area which are primarily concerned. In the case of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [resolution 2832 (XXVI)], the reverse occurred. The Declaration was first adopted and then followed by a search for consensus. The results, as

may be gleaned from the few replies to the Secretary-General's request for information regarding its implementation [A/8809], have thus been meagre. Until they become more conclusive we shall, although in principle supporting the concept itself, abstain on the question, as we did last year.

141. Permit me now to speak on what has been described as "the question of questions"—at least for this session—namely, the proposed world disarmament conference.

142. It is worth recalling in this connexion that President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines said in his address to the General Assembly in 1966:

"One of the most ironic facts of our civilization is that while yearly we convene in the General Assembly to speak of peace, we have witnessed at the same time the proliferation of . . . weapons of mass destruction. Nations and Powers seem to be bent upon increasing their capability for war rather than upon utilizing their strength for the attainment of international peace . . . we have gone back to the heresy of traditional politics: that in order to achieve peace, we must prepare for . . . war."¹¹

143. For almost a generation the United Nations has been seized of the problem of disarmament. My Government, from the very beginning, has supported the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, although always cognizant of the complexity of the problem. But its very complexity should prod us to an undertaking that cannot but yield beneficial results for the well-being of all our peoples. Last year the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, General Rómulo, told the General Assembly that the Philippines would lend its full support to all initiatives towards effective disarmament and international control of strategic nuclear weapons and the prevention of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

144. The Philippines has welcomed the progress achieved thus far in working out specific measures in arms control such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the denuclearization of Latin America, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the treaties banning nuclear weapons in outer space and on the sea-bed, and the recent Convention relating to biological weapons.

145. We recognize the significance of the agreements reached between the two super-Powers which limit the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile systems and fix a temporary numerical ceiling for offensive missiles [see A/C.1/1026], agreements which our Secretary-General has referred to as "a first step in efforts to curb the arms race". We can only applaud these partial measures and it is but fitting and proper that we should pursue them to their logical conclusion. At the same time, my delegation is in favour of preserving the advantages gained, particularly by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. My

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1411th meeting, para. 9.

delegation, however, does not believe that these are adequate or sufficient. The momentum of the arms race and the urgency of stopping it require an extraordinary effort on the part of the entire world community to focus its attention on a thorough examination of the continuing accumulation of weapons and on a search for ways to mitigate of its dangers and finally eradicate them altogether. A world disarmament conference would constitute the beginning of such an effort.

146. The issue, moreover, has a dimension that goes beyond the unimaginable dangers arising from the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, and this is the enormous cost in human and material resources that the arms race entails. The Philippines believes that disarmament and international peace and security are two inseparable concepts and that disarmament unrelated to the economic development of the developing countries would leave a gap in the fabric of international security. A world disarmament conference would therefore be a major step in giving meaning and substance to the Disarmament Decade and to the Second United Nations Development Decade as well. It is not an accident that the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade are being observed concurrently. As the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs has said, simple logic can make no sense out of the incredible wastage of world resources which are bound up in unusable machines of destruction.

147. In 1970, the Philippines initiated a proposal which resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2685 (XXV) on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. That resolution sought the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that the link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade should be truly understood and worked out in as practical and comprehensive a manner as possible. In that resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to submit a report on the connexion between the Disarmament Decade and the Development Decade. My delegation cannot overemphasize the indissolubility of that link.

148. A world disarmament conference would enable the international community to thrash out this aspect of the question thoroughly and in detail and help to strengthen the link between disarmament and economic development. With the aim of achieving as much progress as possible towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the world disarmament conference should give consideration not only to the awesome weapons of mass destruction but also to conventional weapons, both on the global and regional levels. In other words, it should attempt to evolve an all-encompassing programme that would lead to an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

149. But in order to achieve this end, the preparation for the conference should be as adequate, complete and thorough as possible. There should be no slackening of preparations if the conference is to succeed. Consultations, informal negotiations, research, studies and other relevant arrangements should be undertaken prior to the convening of the conference in an effort to ensure concrete and fruitful results; otherwise, inadequate and haphazard prepa-

ration could turn the conference into an exercise in futility and thus lead to a serious setback in the over-all disarmament efforts of the United Nations.

150. If my delegation attaches great importance to the preparations for the conference it gives equally serious consideration to the question of participation. We believe that for the conference to achieve really meaningful results all the nuclear Powers, as well as all major military Powers, should participate in the deliberations of the conference; if possible, all States should be allowed to participate. In the course of the debate we have heard almost all the delegations support the recommendation that all the nuclear-weapon Powers, which are also permanent members of the Security Council, should be represented. My delegation, considering the objective of the conference, fully agrees with this almost-unanimous view.

151. It is indeed regrettable that two nuclear-weapon Powers have expressed reservations about the holding of the conference. Although we respect the views they have expressed, we nevertheless hope that they will reconsider their position and accede to the overwhelming sentiment of the international community, which favours the holding of a world disarmament conference. We would not now attempt to counter the arguments they have advanced against the holding of the conference. It suffices to say that my delegation fails to see any useful purpose in a world disarmament conference if not all the nuclear-weapon Powers are involved, because without their participation the conference would not receive the serious regard of world public opinion and would be unproductive.

152. We cannot afford to have such a situation in view of the misgivings already entertained, arising from the non-participation of certain nuclear Powers in some of the more important non-armament treaties achieved in the recent past. For instance, two nuclear Powers have not acceded to the partial test ban Treaty, and for this reason they do not feel inhibited from conducting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, giving cause for grave concern over the deleterious effects of such tests to the environment. The same nuclear Powers also do not participate in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, thus lending support to the belief that the deliberations of that body are becoming more academic and technical than anything else.

153. Another important treaty—the non-proliferation Treaty—does not concern those same two nuclear-weapon States, hence there is no guarantee that the Treaty will achieve its purpose of prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This situation obviously lessens the value of the Treaty.

154. Again, Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America¹² has been signed by only two nuclear-weapon States, so that it cannot be honestly said that the area covered by the Treaty is in fact and in truth a nuclear-free zone.

155. My delegation cites these instances to stress the point that without the participation of all the nuclear-weapon

¹² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

Powers any agreement or treaty concerning nuclear weapons, whether it be testing, limitation or destruction, would leave a serious gap in implementation. It is for that reason that my delegation, although strongly in favour of the convening of the conference, attaches the greatest importance to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers.

156. I wish to offer some comments on the Brazilian working paper [A/C.1/L.618]. In principle my delegation is in favour of the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to consider the convening of a world disarmament conference and to bend all efforts towards the harmonization of the different views expressed regarding the matter. Indeed, the problem that faces us in this Committee is how to harmonize the views we have heard from two nuclear-weapon countries with those of the majority of delegations which are in favour of the convening of the conference. As indicated in the working paper, these tasks should be successfully completed before the initiation of preparatory work as regards the procedures for the convening of the conference.

157. The membership of the *ad hoc* committee should include the five nuclear-weapon Powers plus all the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to which should be added a number of other countries taking into account the principle of equitable geographical distribution. My delegation would be amenable to a membership of 35 or thereabouts, as suggested by a number of delegations. It is understood from the working paper that the *ad hoc* committee would proceed with its task under United Nations auspices.

158. With respect to the report of the committee to the General Assembly, my delegation believes that such a report should be completed and submitted to the General Assembly early enough for the consideration of the item on the world disarmament conference in the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

159. Finally, a target date should be included in the working paper for the submission of the report of the proposed *ad hoc* committee in order that it may be considered by the Assembly as soon as possible.

160. Mr. IPOTO EYEBU BAKAND'ASI (Zaire) [*interpretation from French*]: Most of the previous speakers in this debate have quite rightly reminded us of the lessons that the founding Members of the United Nations drew from the two world wars. Those lessons, which are clearly expressed in the preamble of the United Nations Charter, should, they said in other words, be a constant both in the internal and foreign policies of Member States.

161. Unfortunately, as has been shown by the reports of the Secretary-General and of the experts, enormous expenditures are incurred by certain States for the qualitative and quantitative manufacture of weapons.

162. If the function of these weapons is perhaps that of preserving present and future generations from the scourge of war, I would say, along with many others, that these weapons have largely transcended this function alone and now constitute a grave threat to mankind as a whole. This

grave threat to mankind as a whole has been the object of particular attention for years now on the part of many delegations, including my own. Indeed, speaking in our Committee at the twenty-sixth session on the problems of disarmament, the Zaire delegation stated that "... in view of the level reached by the arms race, a serious effort must be made and sacrifices must be realized by the international community if we truly wish to strengthen international peace and security." [1833rd meeting, para. 107.]

163. If it is permissible, to some extent at least, to believe that the international instruments that at present exist do give us some hope of reaching disarmament, nevertheless one cannot refrain from deploring the hesitation, the slow pace and sometimes even the indifference which render the prospect of disarmament ever more remote.

164. The procedure followed hitherto through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, although it does not offer sufficient guarantees that we will finally attain a solution brought about by all and for all, has the advantage of existing and of having produced international instruments which at least have the characteristic of promising that disarmament will be a possible objective.

165. That is why I would associate my own delegation with the majority of delegations in requesting that all the nuclear Powers, first of all, join the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and then to combine their efforts to make disarmament possible as soon as possible. When this objective is attained, I think it will then be up to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to draw the consequences from it, with particular regard to its method of functioning.

166. Furthermore, in order to avoid from the very outset placing anyone in an embarrassing position in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as expanded, a reasonable time should be given to those Powers which have not yet adhered to existing international disarmament instruments to enable them in due course to adhere to those instruments in full knowledge of all relevant factors and in good faith.

167. On this subject, I would like to remind members of what my delegation said to this Committee at the twenty-sixth session: "to reach a positive result in such a complex field of disarmament, mutual trust and especially the will to achieve genuine co-operation are elements which should guide all the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament." [*Ibid.*, para. III].

168. Disarmament of one particular type of dreadful weapon in itself is not sufficient. That is what prompted my delegation to say last year that, with regard to chemical and bacteriological weapons, we should try to succeed as quickly as possible in agreeing on the text of the convention on this category of weapons. Indeed, being a neighbour of a territory of more than 2,000 kilometres, a territory still under foreign domination, where these dangerous arms are actually being used, sowing death and defertilizing areas of life, the Republic of Zaire would be grateful to the international community if it could succeed without delay both in preventing the use of these arms by any Government and in destroying existing stockpiles under international control, and prohibiting their manufacture.

169. The progress of science and technology, at least on this subject, can assure us that the reconverting of military chemical weapon factories into factories for the improvement of the standard of living of people is possible. All we need now is for it to be desired and hope for.

170. I should like to dwell for a moment on something which, among many others, could, I think, sustain further the importance of disarmament. This is connected with one of the most recent achievements of my country, which makes man the focus of its concern.

171. Research workers in my country have just carried out a technological achievement which is really remarkable—setting up a new atomic reactor which is the biggest reactor used for peaceful purposes in Africa and Western Europe. This fact marks the remarkable advance of the Republic of Zaire in the latest technology and in the mastery of new industrial techniques in order to relieve the sufferings and wretchedness of people. It symbolizes the refusal of Zaire to agree to a new technical alienation and judiciously and genuinely to promote its own creative powers.

172. This reactor was conceived, worked on, studied and built by Zaire scientists. It is an achievement of unparalleled importance in keeping with the superior ideas expressed by our national party, the National Movement of the Revolution, which reserves for science and research pride of place in the hierarchy of priorities and national needs which are called for by the struggle against underdevelopment and our concern to achieve happiness, well-being and prosperity.

173. Far from remaining in the possession solely and exclusively of the so-called developed countries, science, and more particularly modern technology, knows no colour or race or any continental barriers as has just been demonstrated by the scientists and research workers of Zaire.

174. The economic and social interest of this centre is clear indeed. Apart from the production of isotopes and activation analysis, agronomic research, research in soil science, biological and medical research are also undertaken.

175. Agronomic research bears on the creation of new species of plants, and already in Zaire a variety of species of groundnuts which is bigger and more nutritious has just been developed. Thus, the Zaire farmer can produce on one hectare three times as many groundnuts as before. The same will be true for maize, soya and rice in the very near future.

176. Research in soil science will determine for the national Department of Agriculture what are the best fertilizers to use for different kinds of soil.

177. Furthermore, the radio-biological laboratory is attempting to create a new method of enriching our soil without using fertilizer.

178. As to the nuclear medicine laboratory, it has already prepared a method for treating goitre, and its efforts are also being brought to bear on the early detection of liver cancer so that surgery can take place before it is too late.

Thanks to the research work of our doctors, in the very near future the life expectancy of our children suffering from hemocyclic anaemia will no longer be only 20 years.

179. In the light of the fact that the industries of the country, whose research efforts are inadequate or insufficiently effective, are gradually being reduced to mere branches of foreign firms and see their own research potential exploited by those firms, the National Executive Council of Zaire has asked Zairian industries to use the laboratories of the Centre for Nuclear Science in greater numbers. Even in the past, the former Trico Centre carried out some very important analytical work for the industry of our country.

180. The experience of Europe is sufficient evidence that break-even point can only be achieved in the scientific and technological field with considerable mobilization of resources and manpower allotted to scientific and technological development. That is why, since 1967, the first Trico nuclear centre was built in a regional and African centre. There is no doubt that the creation of the regional nuclear study centre is only a first step and in no way foreshadows the organization in the near future of an African common market in the field of science and technology. It is simply the embodiment of outstanding political will.

181. I have ventured to dwell on these achievements of my country in order to provide for our Committee partial evidence that general and complete disarmament, when achieved, will enable man to profit from the tremendous possibilities offered by the conquest of the atom by scientists.

182. Following the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held at Georgetown, in which my country participated, my country declared once again that it favoured general and complete disarmament under strict international control, the destruction of stockpiles of all weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, as well as the prohibition of their manufacture and the introduction of new types of such weapons.

183. Previous speakers have also spelled out this particular part of the Georgetown Declaration, and I do not want to repeat it. I should merely like to state here that Zaire is in favour of convening a world disarmament conference which would bring together all States Members of the Organization and all non-member States, with the participation of independent experts of international standing, if necessary.

184. It is well known that an ill-prepared conference is doomed to failure in advance, that an ill-prepared conference does not offer sufficient guarantees of success; but a conference that has been carefully prepared, with the will of its participants, is an almost guaranteed success in advance. I would therefore endorse the logical proposal of my colleague, the representative of Argentina, that an *ad hoc* committee of the world disarmament conference should be set up which would include as members all the five nuclear Powers.

185. What Zaire wants is to see the world return to an increasing extent to the fundamental interests of man, that is to say, housing, food, clothing and leisure.

186. I reserve my right to speak again when the draft resolutions before the Committee come up for discussion.

187. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Mexico who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

188. Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: The representative of the Soviet Union once again, in the statement he made today, adduced a series of arguments to explain the negative attitude of his Government concerning the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.¹³

189. We find nothing new in his arguments, which are identical to those Ambassador Roshchin has put forward previously, either here or in Geneva, and which I believe I have fully refuted in the past, in particular at two meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 21 and 28 March last.

190. At the 551st meeting, I said:

“To justify this strange position, arguments have been advanced whose validity evaporates before even the briefest objective analysis. These arguments were originally put forward in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 27 October 1967, during the debate on the draft resolution that was to become resolution 2286 (XXII). Three days later, on 30 October, the Mexican representative on the Committee made a full statement of the relevant facts that, in our view, was more than sufficient to dissipate any misgivings that any provision of the Treaty might have aroused. The receptive attitude that appeared to be adopted by the Soviet representative on the Committee, Mr. Mendelevich, who stated publicly that his Government would make a careful study of the Mexican statement, induced us to believe that within a reasonable period the Soviet Union would develop a favourable attitude to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

“Unfortunately it has not, since the attitude of that nuclear Power has continued to be negative, and also last year saw the resurgence of the same arguments as were put forward in 1967. We believed that they had been abandoned permanently, first in a document circulated in New York at the request of the Permanent Representative, Mr. Malik—which led my delegation to request the circulation to this Committee of working paper CCD/342 of 19 August 1971—and later more precisely, in the statement made by the Soviet Union representative to the First Committee at its 1848th meeting on 10 December 1971.

“I should therefore like briefly to review those arguments, both for the benefit of those distinguished members of the Committee who are interested in the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and in the hope that my modest remarks will engage the personal attention of that highly-qualified specialist on disarmament questions, Mr. Roshchin. His opinion may well—at least so we venture to hope—induce his Government to return

to the sound path described some five years ago as the ‘Kosygin Formula’.

“At the meeting of the First Committee to which I have just referred, the Soviet Union representative gave the following three reasons for his country’s refusal to comply with the repeated calls of the General Assembly for the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco: the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; the absence of provisions prohibiting the transport of nuclear weapons; and the provisions of article 4, which defines the area of application of the Treaty.

“With regard to the first reason, the Soviet Union representative stated that ‘article 18 of the Treaty provides that the States parties to the Treaty have the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That means that those States can possess devices comparable to nuclear weapons’.

“The statement I have just quoted is totally groundless. Since no less than five of the twenty statements made by the Mexican delegation with regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco listed in working paper CCD/359 circulated last week—those reproduced in the records of the 287th, 295th, 297th, 374th and 487th meetings—contained a detailed analysis of this subject, I shall confine myself to pointing out that as soon as the Treaty of Tlatelolco was submitted to this Committee, on 21 February 1967, barely a week after it was opened for signature, the Mexican delegation explained the scope of its provisions on this matter. In doing so it stressed that in article 1 of the Treaty the Latin American States had contracted obligations which were defined in such a way that they did not appear to contain any loop-hole, since they expressly bound the States parties, among other things, ‘to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon’. It was also emphasized that article 5 of the Treaty contained a precise definition, corresponding closely to the latest technological developments and containing no subjective elements, which stated that a nuclear weapon was ‘any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes’. Moreover, it was stated that ‘concerning the “explosions for peaceful purposes” referred to in article 18 of the Treaty, it should be pointed out that the Contracting Parties may only carry out such explosions “provided that they do so in accordance with provisions” of that article and “the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5”’ [ENDC/PV.287, paras. 62-64].

“A month later, on 21 March, my delegation reverted to the subject and expanded its original statement: subsequently, on 6 March 1968, after referring to the two earlier statements, it said the following:

‘In other words, the Government of Mexico considers that in order that one of the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco may carry out a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, it will have to show previously that

¹³ *Ibid.*

such explosion will not require a “nuclear weapon”, that is to say, in accordance with the objective definition of article 5 of the Treaty, “any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes”. In view of the objective character of that definition, the experts in this field will very easily be able to say whether such a thing is possible at present or not.

‘...’

‘Because of all that, the Mexican delegation is convinced that there is no conflict, nor can there be any, between the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which we are now discussing, provided that both instruments are correctly interpreted. Far from conflicting, they can and must complement each other usefully and harmoniously for the good of Latin America, the western hemisphere and humanity. By the same token, there is no conflict between article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and article II of the draft treaty on non-proliferation. In this respect, and since we have once again given our interpretation of the former of those articles, my delegation deems it appropriate to state in regard to the latter of them that we understand the words “nuclear explosive devices” as synonymous with “nuclear explosive devices that could be used as nuclear weapons”. Moreover, in our opinion that interpretation corresponds exactly to that given to those words by the representative of the United States... at the meeting held on 14 September 1967...’ [ENDC/PV.374, paras. 9-11].

‘It would seem relevant to add in this connexion that the Mexican Government, in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 26 July 1968 expressly stated—as announced by my delegation in this Committee on 13 August of the same year [ENDC/PV.389, para. 37]—that it understood:

‘1. That, in virtue of what is stipulated in article VII of the treaty, none of its provisions are to be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Mexico as a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), which was opened for signature on 14 February 1967 and concerning which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967;

‘2. That at present any nuclear explosive can be used as a nuclear weapon and there is no indication that in the immediate future nuclear explosives could be produced that would not be potentially nuclear weapons. However, if technical progress succeeds in altering this situation it will be necessary to amend the relevant provisions of the Treaty in accordance with the procedure laid down therein.’

‘This statement was transmitted to the Soviet Union Government as a depositary of the Treaty, and to the other two depositaries, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom; and none of them raised any objection to it.

‘The only conclusion that can be drawn from everything which I have recapitulated is that the scope of article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, if correctly interpreted, is identical in substance with that of article II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

‘That was pointed out, moreover, both by the United Kingdom and the United States in the interpretative statements which they made in signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Those statements were circulated by the depositary Government, namely the Mexican Government, to all States parties and secured the tacit consent of them all—as any similar interpretative statement that the Soviet Union Government might make would surely do.

‘The second matter raised at the meeting of the First Committee of which I have been speaking was dealt with very concisely by the Soviet Union representative, who said only:

‘Also, the Treaty does not provide for the prohibition of the transport of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices through the territory of States parties to it. This again is an obvious flaw and an important gap in the Treaty.’

‘I shall try to illuminate this point just as concisely by merely observing that the Final Act of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission—reproduced in document ENDC/186 of 21 February 1967—gave the following reason for the absence of the term ‘transport’ from the prohibitions laid down in the Treaty:

‘The Commission deemed it unnecessary to include the term “transport” in article I, concerning “Obligations”, for the following reasons:

‘1. If the carrier is one of the Contracting Parties, transport is covered by the prohibitions expressly laid down in the remaining provisions of article I and there is no need to mention it expressly, since the article prohibits “any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way”.

‘2. If the carrier is a State not a Party to the Treaty, transport is identical with ‘transit’ which, in the absence of any provision in the Treaty, must be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international law; according to those principles and rules it is for the territorial State, in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such transit in each individual case, upon application by the State interested in effecting the transit, unless some other arrangement has been reached in a Treaty between such States.’

‘It is doubtless arguable that the Treaty would have been more perfect if the transport of nuclear weapons had been totally prohibited. It must not be forgotten, however, that perfection in matters such as this is virtually unattainable. If the failure of the Treaty to contain that additional prohibition had to be described as ‘an obvious flaw and an important gap’, we wonder what description would be applicable, by an equally strict

criterion, to the fact that the non-proliferation Treaty—of which the Soviet Union is one of the principal co-sponsors—left the door just as far open to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the perpetuation and additional establishment of nuclear bases and installations in all parts of the world.

“On the third matter mentioned by the Soviet Union representative in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the record of the meeting reads as follows:

‘Finally, article 4 defines the zone of application of the Treaty in such a way that in certain circumstances that zone covers enormous areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans hundreds of kilometres beyond the territorial waters of States parties to the Treaty. That is not in accordance with the accepted norms of international law and is not acceptable to the Soviet Union.’

“We do not feel it difficult to refute this statement. In fact we know of no norm of international law, whether accepted or not, which prevents States from prohibiting by agreement the installation or emplacement of nuclear weapons—and this is what the Treaty does, since, as stated above, it contains no provisions relating to transport—through the conclusion of a multilateral legal instrument signed and ratified in the free exercise of their sovereignties.

“For it must be remembered that the zone defined by reference to geographical co-ordinates in article 4 (2) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco will not come within the application of the Treaty until ‘the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1’ are fulfilled. These include, in addition to the signature and ratification of the Treaty by all States situated within that zone, the ‘signature and ratification of . . . Additional Protocol II’ by ‘all powers possessing nuclear weapons’. Consequently there is no question of imposing unilateral decisions, since by signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II those Powers—the only ones which might be interested in and capable of installing or placing nuclear weapons in that maritime zone—would be freely accepting the obligation not to do so. It seems to us that this obligation would be a very modest recompense for the decision taken by the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to prohibit nuclear weapons for all time in their territories—taking these to be not only their terrestrial territories but also their territorial sea and air space. It would be a very modest step towards implementation of the principle of “an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers” urged by the United Nations in its historic General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

“In addition, were it agreed that the provisions of article 4 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are not in accordance “with the accepted norms of international law” because they establish a militarily-denuclearized maritime zone extending some hundreds of kilometres beyond the territorial waters of the States parties, it would be necessary to condemn beyond recall the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof—of which, as

of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Soviet Union was one of the two main co-sponsors—since article I of that Treaty extends its prohibition to thousands, not hundreds, of kilometres of the sea-bed beyond a coastal maritime zone 12 miles wide.

“I venture to hope that this statement may facilitate a response to the appeals launched for the fourth time by the United Nations General Assembly to the nuclear Powers urging those which have not yet done so to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.” [See CCD/PV.551.]

191. At the 553rd meeting, I said:

“What I said a few moments ago about Mr. Basarov’s note, which I intentionally omitted to mention in my previous statement in order not to prolong this, applies equally to the reply which the Supreme Soviet of the USSR addressed to the Mexican Senate on 4 January 1971, namely, that it contains no argument beyond the three which I examined in detail in my last statement.

“Consequently I will confine myself to recalling that the circulation of that reply at the request of the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, Mr. Malik, in document A/8336 of 6 July 1971, led to the request of the Mexican delegation for the distribution to this Committee of working paper CCD/342 of 19 August 1971. When I introduced this document on the same day, at the 531st meeting of the Committee, I ventured to note that from the analysis of the contents of the Soviet document ‘it would appear that the Soviet Government is still reluctant to comply with the repeated appeals of the General Assembly to the nuclear Powers to sign and ratify without further delay Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and seems to prefer a procedure confined to the formulation of a series of unilateral declarations the terms of which and the States to which they would be applied would depend entirely on the choice of the Soviet Government itself’.

“In the same statement of 19 August 1971 I also said: ‘In the light of the relevant General Assembly resolutions this procedure would obviously defeat the purpose of Additional Protocol II. It is appropriate to recall that the General Assembly, in its resolution 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, supported the statement made in 1968 by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which, after recalling in its resolution B that—I quote—“the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary” for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone, went on to emphasize that “such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol”’.

“(Incidentally, I should like to point out that the Assembly, in its resolution 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, apparently wished to emphasize the importance it attributes to this matter, since the provisions I have just quoted were repeated in the very first operative paragraph of that resolution.)

‘Furthermore, it is also appropriate to recall what has been stated in this Committee so many times, and so rightly, by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roschin, who said, for example, at the 493rd meeting on 2 September 1970 that unilateral declarations ‘are not binding in the strict legal sense of the word’ and that they ‘are no substitute for being a party to international agreements’. Much more recently, on 6 May 1971, during the 514th meeting, he made the following categorical statement:

‘On numerous occasions the Soviet delegation has stated that unilateral declarations cannot achieve the same purpose as international agreements. In this respect we fully support the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, to the effect that unilateral decisions can be no substitute for internationally-binding agreements.’

‘The analysis of the theory put forward in the Soviet document to which I have just referred inevitably leads to the conclusion that, if its validity were accepted, one would automatically accept the theory which seems to constitute the implicit premise of the Soviet position, the two essential elements of which could, as I said earlier to the First Committee of the General Assembly on 29 November 1971, be stated as follows:

‘First, it is not the United Nations but the Soviet Union which has exclusive authority to decide whether or not a nuclear-free zone exists in any part of the world, even though the zone has been established by a multilateral treaty which contains the most complete international system of inspection and control and which, as in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has received the repeated praise of the General Assembly and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the praise of the vast majority of the members of the international community.

‘Secondly, in such cases in which the Soviet Union would agree that the territory of one or several countries constitutes militarily denuclearized zones, the State or States concerned could only aspire to receive from the Soviet Union, and even this after certain conditions and reservations, a unilateral promise conceived in the terms which it deems suitable, and in no case a commitment contracted in one of the treaties which is recognized under law as a solemn international instrument, such as Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.’

‘Lastly, I will examine the only argument that could be described as new among those adduced by Mr. Roschin in his statement today, since this is the first time it has been put forward in an international forum: the claim that the Soviet Union cannot accede to Additional Protocol II because it did not take part in the negotiations that culminated in the preparation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

‘I must say that we regard the use of this argument as unfortunate, since in our view it cannot be maintained in the light of the facts, which I will now try to summarize.

‘I must point out first that it was natural and normal that the only States called on to participate with the full

rights of members of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America were the States whose territories are situated within what was to be the zone of application of the Treaty, and who were ready to accept a régime of total absence of nuclear arms from those territories. The Soviet Union not only did not belong to that zone, but it never showed then—nor to our knowledge is it showing now—the least wish to submit to this régime of total military denuclearization; and it therefore could not be invited to participate in the preparation of the Treaty.

‘On the other hand, it was invited not once but many times during the two-year period of work of the Preparatory Commission, from 1965 to 1967, through its Ambassador accredited to Mexico, where the Commission had its headquarters, to appoint an observer to the Commission.

‘It did not accept that invitation, unlike 22 other States from four different continents, including the three nuclear Powers that are members of the Committee on Disarmament—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—together with Canada, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, all members of the Committee. Nevertheless, it could follow the progress of the Preparatory Commission’s work in full detail and without delay; since no document of the Commission was marked for restricted distribution, let alone confidential, and every single one was sent to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico on the same day as it was sent to the representative of the member States and to the observers accredited to the Commission.

‘I should also point out that, even if the Soviet Union had been able to participate in the preparation of Additional Protocol II with the right to speak and vote—a procedure which I believe, for the reasons I have already given would have been regarded as abnormal from every point of view—I do not see how it can claim that the wording of the Protocol would have differed in any way from the present wording. As I said a week ago, but it bears repeating: the two basic commitments that the Protocol involves for the nuclear Powers that sign and ratify it faithfully reproduce those that the Soviet Government stated spontaneously in 1966, through the President of its Council of Ministers, that it was prepared to undertake. This can be seen from document ENDC/167, page 3, in which Mr. Kosygin stated (among other things) that his Government was prepared to undertake not to use nuclear weapons ‘against non-nuclear States . . . which have no nuclear weapons in their territory’—a requirement which, as we all know, was met fully by all the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco—and to undertake to ‘respect the status of any denuclearized zones which may be established’, without any other condition than that ‘other nuclear Powers’ should undertake to do the same.

‘Moreover, it would be highly dangerous for the future status of treaties or conventions on disarmament questions drafted between 1963 and now by this Committee, or by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, or by the nuclear Powers, to accept the validity of the

argument advanced today by Mr. Roschin. With respect to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water—which, as we all know, was drafted and signed in Moscow by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States without the participation of any other State—that argument would mean that the other 129 States that are now Members of the United Nations and were never invited even as observers, and never received any document to inform them about the preparatory work, would be fully entitled to refuse to accede to that Treaty. The same would no doubt be true of the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space, prepared by the Committee concerned, and to the Treaties on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on military denuclearization of the sea-bed, and to the Convention on biological and toxin weapons, resulting from the work of this Committee, regarding all of which over a hundred Member States of the United Nations could advance the same argument and adopt the same negative attitude.

“We cannot agree that the case of those instruments is different, since they were all subsequently submitted to the General Assembly. Such an argument would not fit the facts, since, as we all well know, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was also submitted to the Assembly at the first session it held after the adoption of the Treaty. At that time, during October and November 1967 in the First Committee, the representatives of 46 States situated in every geographical area and having every kind of political ideology and economic system were lavish in their praises for the work successfully

concluded by the Latin American States. The Assembly itself, in its resolution 2286 (XXII), took a view of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that it had never taken of any of the other treaties I have referred to, and stated emphatically that this Treaty constituted an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security.

“In conclusion I should like to make some general comments. First, I wish to point out that Mr. Roschin apparently wishes to emphasize that the position now taken by the Soviet Government is the same position that it took when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was approved. I do not see any difficulty in accepting that statement as correct. Its position has been consistent but has been one of consistent error, in open contradiction to the position of enthusiastic theoretical support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones reiterated *ad nauseam* by the Soviet Government. Moreover, this error challenges the ruling of the world conscience embodied in General Assembly resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, all of which were approved by about 100 votes in favour with none against.” [See CCD/PV.553.]

192. The CHAIRMAN: I wish to inform members of the Committee that, as they are perhaps already aware, the delegation of Sierra Leone has become a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.611.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.