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Chairman: Mr. Radha Krishna RAMPHUL
(Mauritius).

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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/8807)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8653, A/8808, A/C.1/L.619)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the Secretary-General (A/8809)

1. Mr. BANERJEE (India): The views of the Indian delegation on the question of convening a world disarmament conference were presented to the Committee in my last statement [*1880th meeting*]. In my present statement I shall address myself to the other questions on our agenda relating to disarmament.

2. In our statement before the First Committee last year I had the privilege of drawing the attention of this Committee to the two principal disquieting features in the present situation concerning disarmament; these are the ever-spiralling arms race and the growing disappointment over the lack of any genuine progress in disarmament. I am afraid the year that has passed since then has produced no improvement in the situation; on the contrary, as is evident from the many statements made in this Committee during the last two weeks, disappointment is fast giving way to despair.

3. The arms race is constantly spiralling upwards to threatening new heights, taking an ever-increasing share of the world's much needed resources and spreading a sense of helplessness and gloom everywhere. The continuing production of sophisticated weapons and the stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have been consuming the scarce resources of the world. This is contributing to the increase of fear and tension; it is also exposing us to the inherent danger of nuclear war. This arms race has not ensured the security of States; on the contrary, it threatens humanity with the grave and unprecedented danger of total destruction.

4. We are witnessing in the world today a new regrouping of interests and the emergence of new power centres and equations. At the same time, the past year was marked by significant détente. The process of dialogue, particularly among the major Powers, undoubtedly offers hope for the future. In this improving situation we must ensure that the momentum towards an expanding area of understanding is

maintained and directed towards reduction of tensions, leading to eventual disarmament.

5. Negotiation will lead to stable peace and international security only if it embraces all parts of the world and results in genuine universal reduction of tensions. It can have a salutary and permanent impact only when it does not ignore the interests of countries, particularly smaller countries, that are yet to participate in it. Mutual accommodation among the major Powers should not be at the cost of others. World peace and security cannot be assured on the basis of a mutually acceptable balance of deterrence which preserves their existing arms superiority.

6. The agreements signed in Moscow [*see A/C.1/1026*] as a result of strategic arms limitation talks must be seen against this background. The talks between the United States and the Soviet Union aroused great expectations; however, as many delegations have pointed out already, no perceptible slowing down in the arms race is as yet evident. If the promise of SALT is to be fulfilled there should be evidence of more concrete progress towards halting and reversing the arms race. My delegation joins others in expressing the hope that the second stage of SALT will make more constructive progress towards this objective.

7. The delegation of India believes that the crux of the problem of curbing the arms race and making progress in disarmament lies in the field of nuclear weapons. Realizing this, the international community has repeatedly called for the highest priority to be given to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States, naturally, have a special responsibility in this connexion. Measures of self-restraint and reduction of their nuclear arsenals could give a new impetus to efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

8. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. India's views on this subject have been consistent and have been clearly set out in our previous statements.

9. The goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved only through a step-by-step approach whereby a series of partial or collateral measures should be negotiated. However, it should not be forgotten that they are only steps leading towards the ultimate goal. They are designed to take us towards the final objective and are not regarded as ends in themselves. Therefore it is essential to bear in mind that any such measures should be conceived only within the larger framework of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such partial measures include measures to prevent armaments as well as to limit them and measures of actual disarmament. But it is imperative that an appropriate balance be maintained among these various categories of partial measures, with particular emphasis being laid on measures of actual disarmament.

10. The general order of priorities to be followed in disarmament discussions, in our view, should be as suggested in the Declaration on Disarmament issued by the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka in September 1970.

This was as follows: first, measures in the field of nuclear disarmament; secondly, other measures of priority in the field of disarmament; and, thirdly, non-armament or confidence-building measures.

11. In our statements in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament over the last few years we have emphasized the danger of not seeing the wood for trees. Therefore we have been urging an early resumption of active negotiations on general and complete disarmament. It is in this context that the suggestion has been made to submit up-to-date and new versions of draft treaties on general and complete disarmament. The new draft treaties should take into account the various developments which have taken place in the world and the many suggestions which have been put forward in recent years. Every effort should be made to revive interest in and reactivate negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

12. The desire of the international community for the participation of France and China in disarmament negotiations has become stronger now. This desire has found expression in the many statements made in the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the course of the current session of the General Assembly. We hope that such participation will become possible in the very near future. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament needs to be strengthened and revitalized in terms of new realities and with a view to making it a more effective instrument for negotiating agreements in the field of disarmament.

13. The question of the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons has been in the forefront of discussions in the Committee on Disarmament in the past few years. The delegation of India has always supported these efforts and firmly holds the view that bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction and immediate priority should be given to the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling. As a first result of these discussions the General Assembly was able to consider and adopt last year the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*].

14. The question of the elimination of chemical weapons, however, still remains and continues to be a high-priority item. It should be noted that in the Convention on biological and toxin weapons the link between biological weapons and chemical weapons has been clearly recognized. Also, the need to conclude a convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible has been accepted as a binding commitment. This fact was also underlined in resolution 2827 A (XXVI) adopted last year. This resolution requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, its negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all nations. We regret that the Conference during its session this year has not been able to reach agreement in this regard. My delegation hopes that our current deliberations in the General Assembly will also provide the necessary impetus for expediting fruitful work

on the prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction.

15. Another perennial issue which has lost none of its importance is the question of a comprehensive test ban. The greatest difficulty in this regard lies in the fact that nuclear-weapon testing is being continued with a view to the development and further production of nuclear weapons. The rationale behind the continued production and testing of nuclear-weapon systems is the so-called theory of the balance of deterrence and the supposed belief that international security rests on such a balance. The international community has never accepted such a rationale. International security can be based only on disarmament. The continued qualitative as well as quantitative development of nuclear weapons poses a threat to international peace and security.

16. India has consistently been in favour of a comprehensive and universal nuclear-weapon test ban and has supported efforts to put an end completely to the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments. India intends to abide by that policy.

17. Despite many pressures, we in India have steadfastly adhered to our decision to use the atom only for peaceful purposes. We are aware of the tremendous contribution which the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, can make to the economy of a developing country like India. We are convinced that the benefits of this technology should be freely available to all States without discrimination. In this context we also believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency should seek to extend its technical information and assistance programme, including services in connexion with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to all countries without discrimination, in accordance with its Statute.

18. Mankind has never known disarmament. Yet this has remained the ardent and cherished goal of all humanity. This has found expression in the large number of resolutions we have adopted in the General Assembly over the years and in other international forums. A world without war, a structure of international relations based on universal security and peace, cannot be realized without concrete progress in the field of disarmament. For too long have we talked about disarmament; the time has now come for us to take concrete action.

19. The cancerous evil of the arms race threatens to engulf all of us. Let us remember that the one sure way for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing. The delegation of India stands ready, as always, to co-operate constructively in all efforts aimed at bringing about genuine, balanced and effective disarmament.

20. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: Having in my two previous statements already dealt with the convening of a world disarmament conference [1872nd meeting] and the signing and ratification of the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, providing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America [1884th meeting], this statement will be devoted to a consideration, within the strict limits imposed upon us

by the programme of work of the First Committee, of three more of the eight disarmament questions on the agenda of this Committee for the present session of the Assembly. I refer to the elimination of chemical weapons, the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons and the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

21. The enormous amount of information on the question of chemical weapons that is contained in the very many working papers annexed to the voluminous report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8818], which enumerate and analyse, at times with amazing fertility of imagination, all the possible problems that would have to be overcome for the elimination of such weapons, indicates, we feel, that the Geneva Committee may have embarked on the wrong road in dealing with this matter.

22. Had a similar procedure been applied in the case of microbiological and toxic weapons—and we must bear in mind that the latter are partially chemical weapons—I believe that by the year 2000 we should still be trying to prepare the Convention the text of which is annexed to resolution 2826 (XXVI) and which we approved here last year.

23. I think it appropriate to recall that it was precisely some of those delegations that insisted most strongly that chemical weapons be dealt with in a different instrument from the one which deals with microbiological and toxic weapons which stressed often in the Committee on Disarmament not only that the verification of the prohibition of biological weapons was—and I quote from the records of the Committee—“simply impossible” but also—and this is particularly pertinent for the rest of my remarks on this matter—that these biological weapons—and I quote again from the records—are “powerful weapons” that might become “the most effective way of wiping man off the face of the earth”.

24. If, in order to verify the observance of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of weapons that possess such frightening destructive power as we have been told the biological weapons possess, and to ensure their destruction, the very Powers that possess these weapons have considered sufficient the very elementary control system defined in articles V, VI and X of the Convention to which I have just referred, we certainly do not understand why a similar system, with certain additions and improvements, based, according to what the Group of Twelve of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament suggested in 1970, “on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other”,¹ would not be sufficient.

25. We must further bear in mind the fact that the example of the Convention on microbiological and toxic weapons is not the only, or even the most radical, example. The practice followed in the case of the treaties on so-called collateral measures of disarmament that have been agreed to both before and after the Second World War is a very

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.

significant practice in this matter. It shows that, although in some of these instruments, such as the Treaty on Antarctica² and the Treaty of Tlatelolco,³ very comprehensive control systems have been established, there are others, such as the Geneva Protocol,⁴ the Moscow Treaty on the partial test ban⁵ and the Treaty on the exploration and utilization of outer space,⁶ which do not contain any provisions on this subject.

26. Another matter which we feel is worthy of consideration is that—as is the case in regard to the use of microbiological weapons—the use of all chemical weapons without exception has been prohibited since 1925 by the Geneva Protocol. If there could have been any shred of doubt on the matter, the General Assembly of the United Nations surely removed it altogether when it adopted resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969. In that resolution the General Assembly declared that the use of such weapons was contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol, and defined the extent of that prohibition by stating that it included—and I quote from the resolution—“any chemical agents of warfare” and “any biological agents of warfare” without exception. For any State that values its reputation as a responsible member of the international community, respectful of the law of nations, there does not seem to be too much encouragement to develop, produce and stockpile chemical weapons; nor would that State seem to have much to lose by destroying the weapons of this nature that it already possesses, particularly if we recall that these are weapons which, as far as we know, no one has contended could modify or endanger the strategic balance.

27. Thus my delegation is convinced that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament next year should consider very seriously its express commitment to come to an “early agreement” on the elimination of chemical weapons, as set forth in article IX of the Convention on biological weapons, and also the appeals to that end by the Assembly in its resolutions 2826 (XXVI) and 2827 (XXVI).

28. We are fully convinced that, as the Government of Mexico made clear when it signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the success of that Convention will ultimately depend on the fate of the commitment to which I have just referred.

29. What is required is that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament change the approach that it has adopted in this matter of late, that it put an end to the period of academic exploration of all foreseeable and

unforeseeable hypotheses and that it endeavour, by utilizing a procedure similar to the one that was used in the preparation of the Convention on biological weapons, to submit to the Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, a draft convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. We do not believe that this implies any undue haste, since one must not forget that the question of the elimination of chemical weapons has been under study since the date on which the consideration of biological weapons began, that is, approximately four years ago.

30. If since last March there has been a draft convention which presumably reflects the views of the States members of the Warsaw Pact, it would be advisable, as was the case with other questions, for another draft to be submitted as soon as possible reflecting the position of the countries belonging to NATO. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could then devote itself to the work of endeavouring to merge those two drafts into one document that would receive general support.

31. If another draft treaty was not submitted, the most effective method of work might be the presentation of working papers containing specific amendments to the only document in existence.

32. Now that we have begun consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*,⁷ I think it would be appropriate for us to comment briefly on its most recent history.

33. As a consequence of resolution XXIII of the United Nations Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968, the Secretary-General initiated and the General Assembly continued to study both “the steps which could be taken to secure the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts”, and of “the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible revision of existing conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare”.⁸

34. The results of those studies are contained in a number of reports of the Secretary-General and in a series of Assembly resolutions whose title is almost identical with that of resolution XXIII of the Teheran Conference, that is, “Respect for human rights in armed conflicts”. Assembly resolution 2852 (XXVI), which was adopted on this subject on 20 December 1971, requested the Secretary-General to prepare two reports for consideration by the Assembly at the present session, one on the results of the second session of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, and the second on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use.

35. The first of those reports was allocated to the Sixth Committee. The second was allocated to the First Com-

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

⁴ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

⁵ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁶ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁷ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

⁸ See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2).

mittee. The report which we are considering was requested by the Assembly because, as we read in one of the paragraphs of the preamble of that resolution, the Assembly was deeply concerned over

“the terrible suffering that armed conflicts continue to inflict upon combatants and civilians, particularly through the use of cruel means and methods of warfare and through inadequate restraints in defining military objectives”.

36. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to prepare this report “as soon as possible”, with the assistance of “qualified governmental consultant experts”.

37. The Government of Mexico, which fully shares the concern of the Assembly, and this was pointed out by the Secretary for External Relations of Mexico in the course of the general debate [2050th plenary meeting], was among the first to make its modest contribution when, in response to the request of the Secretary-General, it nominated a Mexican governmental adviser, Brigadier-General and Engineer Manuel Vásquez Barete, Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of National Defence of my country.

38. Since the report has been in the hands of all delegations for over a fortnight, I do not believe that it is necessary for me to go into a detailed analysis of its extremely valuable contents, particularly if we bear in mind the fact that the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in submitting to this Committee exactly a week ago the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.616 which my delegation had the privilege, together with her own, of being one of the two original sponsors, has already made that analysis for the benefit of the Committee in a manner which I should not hesitate to term masterly [1882nd meeting]. I shall therefore limit myself to making a few comments of a general nature.

39. The first of these comments is intended to stress that what is so soberly stated in the penultimate and the antepenultimate paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resolution is only a pale reflection of the comprehensive and detailed description, scientifically proven with irrefutable facts, of the fatal and extremely cruel effects of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons on civilian populations, particularly in the case of the majority of countries that lack indispensable resources.

40. The report makes grim reading indeed, and the facts described in its pages seem to spell a return to the barbarism of the darkest periods of human history. We believe to be well founded the fear expressed by Mrs. Myrdal here regarding the judgement which, in the light of those facts, may be passed on our era by future generations.

41. A second comment which I think I ought to make is that the conclusion arrived at in paragraph 190 of this report, a conclusion which has in the last five years so often been proved by communiqués published in the press, is of such importance and has such terrifying consequence that although it has already been condensed in the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution in document

A/C.1/L.616, it deserves to be read out *in toto*, and I shall now do so:

“The rapid increase in the military use of incendiary weapons, especially napalm, during the past 30 years is but one aspect of the more general phenomenon of the increasing mobilization of science and technology for war purposes. New weapons of increased destructiveness are emerging from the research and development programmes at an increasing rate, alongside which the long upheld principle of the immunity of the non-combatant appears to be receding from the military consciousness. These trends have very grave implications for the world community, which, through the widespread deployment of nuclear weapons, already has the possibility of complete destruction poised over it. It is therefore essential that the principle of restraint in the conduct of military operations, and in the selection and use of weapons, be reasserted with vigour. Clear lines must be drawn between what is permissible in time of war and what is not permissible. Incendiary weapons, in particular napalm, are already the subject of widespread revulsion and anxiety, and because they are weapons of great destructive potency, they are a fitting subject for renewed efforts of this type.”

42. On thinking about this conclusion of the report of the Secretary-General, one is inevitably forced to recall the words that were spoken a short time ago by the President of Mexico and, although they were pronounced in a different context, that is, during the inaugural ceremony of the sixteenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it seems to me that, because of the pressing invitation they contain to a return to serenity and wisdom, they apply equally to the matters of which I have been speaking. President Echeverría said, at the 151st plenary meeting of the Conference:

“Faced with the rapid advance of science and technology, man should pause and reflect for a moment. The technological capacity of man to transform nature would turn to his detriment unless he revised his fundamental values and clearly defined his historic aims.”

43. But we believe that, for that pause and that time of reflection that are so necessary, as the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.616 states, it may be very helpful if all peoples and Governments give that report the careful attention it deserves and that, in order to make this easier, the Secretary-General give the report the widest possible circulation.

44. Very little, if anything, can be added to what has been stated and repeated time and time again, both in this Committee and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, regarding the obvious need and the appropriateness of putting an end to all nuclear-weapon tests. In order not to tax the patience of the members of the Committee, I shall limit myself to citing a few recent authoritative statements which I believe accurately sum up the views of an overwhelming majority of the peoples and Governments of the States Members of the United Nations.

45. The first of these declarations will be found in a study entitled *Extending the Nuclear-Test Ban*, published in the

January 1972 issue of that prestigious magazine of long standing entitled *Scientific American*. The author of the study is Dr. Henry R. Myers; not least among his various distinguished qualifications in the subject, is the position he held for six years as technical adviser to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. Myers, after showing clearly why the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear-weapons testing cannot at present jeopardize the so-called "strategic balance" of the super-Powers in any way whatsoever, concludes by stating, *inter alia*, the following:

"The failure to prohibit underground tests plays into the hands of those in the non-nuclear nations who press for the acquisition of nuclear forces; it tends to reinforce the contention that the statements of the super-Powers are not matched by actions . . .

"The attainment of a treaty banning underground tests would demonstrate to the non-nuclear countries that the major nuclear Powers would accept substantial restrictions on their own nuclear activities, a demonstration that would strengthen arguments against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries. As a result of its symbolic value, a cessation of underground testing . . . would more than any other likely step signify an almost irrevocable commitment to seek security through arms control agreements rather than through the never-ending cycle of weapons and counterweapons that has characterized the period since World War II."

46. A similar statement was made public also at the beginning of this year by no less important a body than the *ad hoc* Committee on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests of the Federation of American Scientists. The final paragraph of that statement is couched in the following terms:

"The advantages of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests are obvious and do not need to be explained in detail. The treaty would indirectly slow down the strategic arms race. It would considerably strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and lessen the probability of new nations endeavouring to develop nuclear weapons. It would eliminate the ecological dangers of increased tests. It would inhibit research on the manufacture of cheaper weapons, the technology of which might then be extended to other nations. And finally it would contribute to creating an atmosphere conducive to new steps towards nuclear disarmament."

47. Finally, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in the statement he made in Geneva at the opening meeting of this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972, also dealt in detail with this matter and arrived at the following conclusions on the subject:

"No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement. . . . It is my firm belief that the sorry tale of lost opportunities that have existed in the past should not be

repeated and that the question can and should be solved now." [See CCD/PV.545.]

48. Sharing convictions similar to those I have just mentioned, the delegations of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela have decided to sponsor a draft resolution on the item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", which has been circulated as document A/C.1/L.620, which I now have the honour to submit to the Committee on behalf of the sponsors.

49. This is a very simple draft resolution, closely linked to resolution 2828 A (XXVI) which the Assembly adopted on 16 December last. Its contents are very clear and to understand it completely one does not have to be an expert on the subject.

50. In its preambular paragraphs it reaffirms the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of nuclear-weapon tests for the acceleration of the arms race and for the health of present and future generations. It deplores the fact that neither the 21 successive resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly nor the commitments assumed by all parties to the Moscow Treaty have had so far the desired result of a general and complete ban on such tests, and it recalls two other resolutions, adopted in 1962 and 1971 respectively, both of which condemned all nuclear-weapon tests without exception.

51. The operative part of the draft resolution reiterates once again and "with the utmost vigour" those condemnations and—that which we believe to be particularly important so that it is fully realized who bears the responsibility for the lack of positive results—the draft resolution reaffirms that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban" of the nature contemplated in the preamble to the Moscow Treaty.

52. The draft resolution concludes by once more urging the governments of nuclear-weapon States, as was done in resolution 2828 A (XXVI), "to bring to a halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973"—the date which, it will be recalled, will mark the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty. But, as compared with last year's resolution, we have now added a new concept: that if it is not possible to bring those tests to an end through a permanent agreement it should be achieved at least "through unilateral or agreed moratoria". In paragraph 4 the Secretary-General is requested to transmit the resolution adopted by the General Assembly to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session of any measures that such States may have taken to implement it.

53. Since the provisions of that final paragraph are very similar to those of draft resolution A/C.1/L.619 relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, I think it only appropriate to conclude this statement by saying, as I did at the 1884th meeting, when dealing with the latter draft resolution, that we hope that in this case too we shall be able next year to have before us a report showing that the nuclear Powers

have finally heeded the pressing appeals of all peoples of the earth, appeals that have been repeated so often in the resolutions of the General Assembly.

54. Mr. GREKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) [*translation from Russian*]: The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR spoke on 26 October, at the 1876th meeting, on the question of the convening of a world disarmament conference, stating that we fully supported the convening of such a conference, which should be open to all States, and that we were in favour of the establishment of a preparatory committee to deal with the essential preparations for the conference. We are happy to note that that position is shared by the overwhelming majority of States which have taken part in the discussion on disarmament. In our opinion that position, which the majority of States have set out in their answers to the Secretary-General, which appear in document A/8817 and Add.1, and in the course of the discussion in the First Committee, must be expressed in an appropriate draft resolution, and we hope that such a draft resolution will receive the support of Member States of the United Nations and that the will of the overwhelming majority will not be frustrated by any obstacles.

55. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR wishes today to speak of some of the other important questions of disarmament that are before the First Committee for its consideration.

56. As was appropriately pointed out in the course of the present discussion, the problem of disarmament remains in the forefront among the most important problems of modern times. This is entirely natural. Disarmament affects the interests of not only the present generation but also of future generations of all peoples that bear upon their shoulders the heavy burden of military expenditures. The solution of the problem of disarmament will in large measure determine the over-all nature and prospects for the development of the international situation, and the fate of mankind as a whole.

57. It is therefore logical that the peoples of the world are becoming aware of the need to adopt new measures to halt the disastrous arms race and are expanding the movement in favour of disarmament, which is now truly assuming general dimensions.

58. Disarmament is closely connected with the task of supporting and strengthening the international situation. This has been emphasized in the Charter of the United Nations and also in numerous instruments adopted by the United Nations, in particular, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*], the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [*resolution 2627 (XXV)*], the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [*resolution 2625 (XXV)*], and other documents.

59. On the initiative of the Soviet Union, a new and important item, entitled "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", has been included on the agenda of the

twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. The essence of the proposal of the Soviet Union, as emphasized in the general debate by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, lies in the fact that

"... it provides for the renunciation by States of any use of force to resolve international disputes, including the use both of nuclear weapons and of such types of weapons as are commonly called conventional" [*2040th plenary meeting, para. 77*].

There can be no doubt that adoption of the above-mentioned proposal, in addition to imparting mandatory force to this decision, will have a definite effect in improving the international situation and ensuring the security of peoples and will contribute to progress along the way to disarmament.

60. Disarmament and cessation of the arms race, as has been shown by experience, despite the existing difficulties, is a fully realistic and attainable goal if the attempt to reach it is conducted purposefully and persistently by the united efforts of all peace-loving and progressive forces. Much of what only recently appeared to be completely improbable, in fact unattainable, in the field of disarmament is today being put into practice in a number of international legal instruments.

61. There is no doubt that a great role was played in this by the Committee on Disarmament, which this year marked its tenth anniversary. The activities of the Committee on Disarmament make a positive contribution to the development of international collaboration among States. During the past decade there have been concluded, and are now in operation, a number of international agreements and treaties that have exerted a positive effect upon the international situation and limited the arms race, as they have prevented its extension into new areas.

62. The past year has seen additional steps in the field of disarmament. In April of this year, in Moscow, Washington and London, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, elaborated last year in the Committee on Disarmament and adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session [*resolution 2826 (XXVI)*], was opened for signature and signed by approximately 100 States. The Byelorussian SSR was among the first States affixing their signatures to that Convention.

63. On 18 May of this year, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and in the Subsoil Thereof came into force. Our Republic ratified that Treaty in September 1971.

64. Special significance is to be seen in the agreement, in May of this year, between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the limitation of strategic weapons, which took the form of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and in the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons [*see A/C.1/1026*] that have recently come into force. The Soviet-American agreements

are a reflection of the interest of not only the Soviet and American peoples but of all peoples of the world, and contribute to decreasing the threat of nuclear war and curbing the arms race, and serve as a stimulus to further progress in the campaign for disarmament.

65. It stands to reason that peoples are well within their right in expecting more in the field of disarmament; that is why, in the view of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, it is necessary to intensify talks in the field of disarmament and to employ all forms of negotiation so that the results of the efforts of States in this field may be more concrete and may contribute to the attainment of broad and practical measures of disarmament.

66. Another important factor is the political atmosphere surrounding the talks on questions involved in halting the arms race and achieving disarmament. If we analyse from this standpoint the atmosphere and situation as they now exist, it is possible to see further evidence of a growing desire, indeed a clamour for disarmament. The overwhelming majority of forces, understanding the threat to the cause of peace and security of peoples that resides in the accumulation in the arsenals of States of weapons, with their constant perfection and sophistication, give their firm support to the idea of disarmament and are now bending every effort to the achievement of practical measures in this field. In this connexion it is necessary to emphasize that an important condition for the success of all talks on disarmament is the attainment of fruitful co-operation on the part of all permanent members of the Security Council, those who possess the most powerful military potential and who, under the Charter, bear primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is important that individual permanent members of the Security Council avoid raising any obstacles to talks on disarmament and refrain from acting counter to the general aspiration of peoples to put an end to the perilous arms race, and that they manifest a readiness, in a spirit of goodwill, to co-operate in the achievement of general disarmament.

67. The greatest concern among peoples is caused, above all, by the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of States. Recently, considerable attention has been paid, both in the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to the problem of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. At its twenty-sixth session the General Assembly adopted resolution 2827 (XXVI) in which it emphasized the urgency of reaching "agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare", and requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to continue, as a matter of high priority, its negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all States".

68. Proceeding from their policy of principle in the field of disarmament, and guided by the provisions of this resolution, the socialist countries represented on the Committee on Disarmament, acting on behalf of the nine socialist States, including the Byelorussian SSR, submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament a

draft convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and providing for the total prohibition and elimination of all forms of chemical agents of warfare [A/8818, annex B, sect. 5].

69. In preparing that draft, the socialist countries took due account of the experience derived from the drafting of the convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons and on their destruction, in particular with respect to the amount of control over the prohibition and the extent to which the prohibition applies.

70. As a basis for the approach to a definition of the extent of chemical substances subject to elimination, the socialist countries proposed that the criterion should be the purpose for which the chemical agents were intended. Guided by this criterion, the socialist countries proposed the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons intended for military purposes, and their destruction. Such a formula would be clear cut and comprehensive and would eliminate the possibility of excluding from the scope of the draft convention any existing chemical agents of warfare, as well as any new agents which might be produced in the future. In offering the criterion of purpose as a basis for the definition of the extent of chemical substances subject to prohibition, the socialist countries also took into account the formula adopted in the Geneva Protocol of 1925,⁹ which prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices". In spite of the fact that almost half a century has elapsed since the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol, this formula has not become outdated and extends prohibition to the use of all modern chemical substances which were prepared after the conclusion of the Protocol. This is confirmed in resolution 2603 (XXIV) adopted in 1969.

71. During the discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, other criteria were advanced to define the extent of the chemical weapons subject to liquidation, such as the establishment of a threshold of toxicity and of a general formula for specific types of chemical agents, as well as the drawing-up of lists of chemical substances subject to prohibition.

72. Discussions in the Committee on Disarmament showed that the criterion of purpose proposed by the socialist countries is gaining support among countries as being the most practical and realistic because it encompasses all forms of chemical agents and reflects a general approach towards the elimination of chemical weapons. This is set out in particular in resolution 2827 (XXVI) to which I have already referred, and also in the joint memorandum of the 12 non-aligned countries,¹⁰ which was supported by many Member States of the United Nations and recommended by the General Assembly to the Disarmament Committee in the above-mentioned resolution as a matter which should be taken into account in its work.

⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

¹⁰ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971*, document DC/234, annex C, sect. 33.

73. As for settling the problems of controlling the implementation of the agreement, which was also the subject of special discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, the socialist countries have proposed the use of a reasonable combination of national forms of control and international procedures—in particular, recourse to the Security Council, which might, if necessary take a decision to hold an investigation. Certain States cast doubt on the effectiveness of such a system of control and insisted on the necessity of on-site controls. The expansion of international control will affect the problem of patent protection of scientific discoveries and scientific research for civilian purposes and might thereby introduce further complications in relations between States. Such a point of view was shared by numerous delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

74. In the view of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, the elaboration of the draft convention on the basis of criterion of purpose—in other words, the elimination from military arsenals of all chemical agents for military purposes, taking into account the qualitative factor, that is, such quantities as would not have any application for peaceful purposes—as proposed in the draft convention of the socialist countries, as well as the adoption of the control system proposed in that draft, which would be based on a reasonable combination of national measures and international procedures, would meet the purpose of total prohibition of chemical weapons and would ensure reliable guarantees for such a prohibition. That is why the draft proposed by the socialist countries is an entirely acceptable basis for the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

75. For the successful solution of the problem of the liquidation of chemical weapons, the political will of States to move towards such an agreement is essential.

76. In these circumstances the General Assembly must call upon the Governments of all States to take all steps towards facilitating talks to attain agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will, as a matter of high priority, continue its talks with a view to the speedy attainment of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

77. Among the problems of disarmament, special concern among peoples proceeds from the problem of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons; and here an important role is played by the existing treaties concerning the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ban on their emplacement on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in outer space. The overwhelming majority of States are parties to these treaties. However, it is to be pointed out that not all States—among them, some which are quite significant in the military sense—have as yet become parties to them.

78. Of course, for the international agreements that have been concluded to fulfil the tasks for which they were intended, all States—especially the nuclear and “near-

nuclear” States—must accede to these treaties. It is equally obvious that if we did not ensure the effectiveness of existing international treaties it would complicate the conclusion of treaties on further disarmament measures.

79. The question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests still remains one of the unresolved problems. The Byelorussian SSR, together with the other countries of the socialist community, is in favour of the cessation by all States of all nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, including underground. Here we proceed from the proposition that verification of the ban on underground tests should be carried out on the basis of national means of detection and identification.

80. It should be pointed out that as time elapses the position concerning the adequacy of national means of detection receives ever wider support. Scientists of various countries have stated authoritatively that the contemporary level of seismic science and technology has made it possible to rely fully on national means of control. This is also more widely recognized by the political personalities of the Western countries, including the United States.

81. Thus, for instance, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, James Schlesinger—as was reported in the American newspaper *Newsday*—likewise recognizes that the United States now has a highly sophisticated potential for supervising compliance with a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear tests. At the same time we cannot fail to be interested in the words of Mr. Schlesinger to the effect that at present the prohibition of atomic weapons “may be possible but is not necessarily desirable”.

82. For the present the technical aspects of the problem have been sufficiently well studied. All that is required for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests is a political decision. A ban on all nuclear tests and compliance with it by all nuclear States would significantly hold back the nuclear-arms race, improve the prospects for talks in the field of disarmament and create further opportunities for seeking ways to end that race. It would have a salutary effect on the entire international atmosphere.

83. We must note with satisfaction that talks on disarmament are encompassing an increasingly broader range of questions. The Byelorussian delegation welcomes this positive development and declares itself in favour of an intensification of efforts towards the total demilitarization of the sea-bed, the establishment of non-nuclear zones that would be totally free of any nuclear weapons, and the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, which would definitely contribute to the further normalization of the situation throughout the world.

84. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR wishes to emphasize the need for keeping constantly within our field of vision the task of achieving general and complete disarmament, for which purpose all disarmament talks are being conducted. All efforts should be directed to stimulating the activities of all States in this field.

85. In conclusion, may I emphasize that our Republic has always been an active champion of disarmament and the adoption of practical measures for its implementation. The

Byelorussian SSR stresses the hope that the present session of the General Assembly will adopt further positive decisions that will constitute a constructive contribution to the attainment of those goals which the United Nations has set itself in this important sphere.

86. Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: Today the Argentine delegation will speak on a series of disarmament questions that were not dealt with in its previous statement [*1873rd meeting*].

87. One of the matters that has earned the greatest attention from the General Assembly in the past few years is the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has done important work in this field on which it gives an account in its report [*A/8818*]. The Committee's informal meetings with the attendance of experts have made available valuable information for arriving at political decisions on this matter although a number of particularly important questions are still pending.

88. The first of these refers to the need for a precise definition of what would be prohibited and what permitted, and this acquires particular significance if we recall the numerous peaceful uses of chemical agents. The second matter that calls for an adequate solution concerns the need to ensure an effective and acceptable procedure for verification. We believe that flexible international machinery should be established, which would not be subject to the veto of any great Power. To extend the veto to such machinery would be to grant an unacceptable privilege to a few, which furthermore would not be in keeping with the realities of the problem of chemical weapons. These weapons are within the reach of many countries and therefore it is not possible to agree that the permanent members of the Security Council alone should be able to decide whether a procedure of verification should or should not be applied.

89. In the course of the conversations held in the Committee on Disarmament the Argentine delegation examined very carefully the programme of work outlined by the United States and the draft convention submitted by nine socialist countries [*ibid.*, annex B, sects. 4 and 5]. I shall not, therefore, return to those matters.

90. However, we do believe it appropriate to repeat that the goal of the Committee's work is a broad prohibition of chemical weapons. If this proves impossible, we must point out that the Argentine delegation, whether in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or in the General Assembly, will oppose any partial measure that implies a discriminatory approach and establishes a kind of monopoly over chemical weapons. Argentina has repeatedly stated in all competent bodies that it is a question not of securing the "disarmament of the unarmed" but of reversing the arms race. Therefore we shall not accept any formula that fails to respect the principle of an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations among all States.

91. We believe that this comment is pertinent since the Conference does not as yet possess all the elements to initiate a true negotiating process. In this respect we noted

with satisfaction the information given us at the 1872nd meeting by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Bush, when he said that his Government hoped to be responding to the proposals already made at the forthcoming session of the Committee.

92. Since this subject is to be examined further, we would be pleased to see the First Committee come to an agreement on a single resolution which would urge the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work on the subject, giving it the priority it warrants.

93. Another question that has been studied in the Committee is that of nuclear-weapon tests. We have very often stressed our concern over this situation. Today the General Assembly is confronted with a number of draft resolutions stressing the gravity of the problem. Even though it may appear redundant to do so, I must again stress the need to obtain a total prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, and this attitude will dictate our position on the draft resolutions we are considering.

94. The First Committee must also examine the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.¹¹ It is unfortunate that at the very moment when this debate was beginning the Assembly in plenary meeting saw fit to take up that valuable document and to adopt a resolution on the subject, thus depriving delegations of an opportunity to benefit from the exchanges of views that take place in this Committee. In future it would be desirable for the report to be considered in plenary meeting after the deliberations in this Committee have sufficiently advanced.

95. Fortunately, since the report of IAEA is linked with the application of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, we have an opportunity to return to any aspect that we consider to be of particular significance. I refer to the technical co-operation activities of the Agency. Although there has been a significant increase in the resources, we should still recall that the report, in paragraph 8, makes clear that the percentage of Member States' requests that could be met dropped considerably between 1971 and 1972, and then adds: "The Board hopes that the over-all expansion in resources available to the Agency for technical co-operation will continue". We believe it would be helpful if the General Assembly were to take into account this statement of the Board of Governors of the Agency.

96. I believe it also appropriate to recall in this matter that an increasing number of developing countries are taking the crucial step towards nuclear industrialization. The new stage that those countries are thus initiating bears special characteristics, since it is aimed primarily at the application of the technological level achieved to productive purposes and no longer to the preparation of their basic infrastructure. This difference bespeaks a fundamental change in the requirements of technical assistance since the objective is to obtain an adequate capacity to ensure effective participation of the country in the nuclear electricity industry. The greater participation of the United Nations Development Programme is, to a certain extent, a reflection

¹¹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1971-30 June 1972* (Vienna, July 1972).

of an adaptation of the technical assistance of IAEA to the new requirements that I have just mentioned. However, that is not sufficient. We firmly believe that the Agency should consider ways and means of allowing effective assistance to be given to the developing countries which are starting or are already in this stage of nuclear industrialization.

97. Another matter that is linked to the application of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is the establishment, within the framework of IAEA, of an international service for peaceful nuclear explosions under adequate international control. We have very often expressed our opinion on the matter and therefore at the moment I shall limit myself to pointing out that my delegation considers that it behoves the Agency, whose experience and recognized capacity to tackle this problem is indisputable, to assume responsibility for that service. As a logical corollary of the non-discriminatory provisions of the Agency's Statute, that service should be made available to all the member States of the Agency, whether or not they are parties to other treaties.

98. Both in plenary meetings and in the first statement that we made in this Committee on the question of general and complete disarmament we referred to the priority that should be given nuclear disarmament and to the results obtained in the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

99. The agreements signed in Moscow [*see A/C.1/1026*] deserve praise, since they are an effort to stabilize the arms race. But it is obvious that they must be followed by negotiations to limit qualitative developments possible in both countries and to achieve a reduction of the levels of strategic weapons. Otherwise, far from reversing the arms race, that race will enter a new phase whose gravity will seriously jeopardize the objectives of the measures already agreed upon.

100. Before I conclude I should like to revert to a suggestion that I made in our statement at the 1873rd meeting. It will be recalled that at that time we proposed the creation of a special committee entrusted with examining the opinions of all Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference.

101. That initiative has been echoed by a significant number of delegations and I wish to express my appreciation to them for their valuable support and for the attention they have given that idea. In his statement at the 1883rd meeting, the representative of Zambia, Ambassador Lusaka, spoke with his usual precision of the unofficial consultations taking place on this matter and very correctly defined our suggestion as a compromise proposal. That was indeed its tenor, and we trust that it will point a way that will be acceptable to all and that it will allow an open exchange of views and a convergence of positions.

102. Therefore, it is not a question of imposing a solution that impinges on the rights or opinions of anyone; rather, it is a way of achieving a consensus that will ensure the participation of all, particularly of those that already have an outstanding position in our Organization. It is for that reason that we repeat once again that the international

community has a right to insist upon a positive reaction from all the nuclear-weapon States, particularly when it is a question of ensuring their participation in an undertaking which in no way affects or prejudices their respective positions but, quite the contrary, offers them an appropriate framework in which to make known those opinions and views and allow other delegations adequately to assess them. To participate implies being present and expressing views—that is precisely what those five Powers do daily in the United Nations, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. To fail to participate implies cutting to pieces the co-operation which is desired and sought by almost all the delegations which have given constructive opinions in this debate. The choice is clear, and the responsibilities that it entails will be equally clear.

103. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to congratulate the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, on his initiative, to which he has just referred. He is well known for his sincerity of purpose.

104. Mr. WODAK (Austria): This Committee is considering a number of items that all relate to the question of disarmament. What they have in common is, I believe, that they express the desire of all of us to proceed in the direction of general and controlled disarmament—an objective to which my Government fully subscribes. Consequently—and this is the first observation I should like to make—we are prepared to co-operate in every way possible to attain the high goals which inspire this debate.

105. My delegation has listened with great interest to the many impressive statements that have marked the discussion in this Committee. In singling out one, which I should like to do, I beg all the others who have spoken before me to forgive me for doing so. I wish to refer to the statement at the 1882nd meeting made by the gracious and distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who has devoted a large part of her life to the struggle for disarmament. I believe that we all owe a debt of gratitude to Mrs. Myrdal for her untiring efforts, and we are sure that she will continue her valuable work.

106. The representative of Sweden, in her statement, noted that unfortunately measures of disarmament follow political crises. I believe that this statement of fact should in no way deter us from continuing our efforts, for historical experience shows—as it does in the case of individuals—that great ideas, and indeed practically all human progress, follow experiences and do not precede them. It was thus after the tragedies of the First and Second World Wars that the question of disarmament received the highest priority.

107. I have referred to the link between experience and progress and the interaction between them. May I pursue this matter a little further as it may be of some importance for our discussion and our future work.

108. The question of disarmament has been discussed for many years and in various forums and intelligent and devoted people have spared no effort in this cause. Some progress has undoubtedly been made but the decisive breakthrough has not been achieved. That seems to be the reason for a certain pessimism to be found in some of the

statements made in the course of this debate. This pessimism is, in my view, hardly warranted because disarmament cannot be regarded as an isolated issue. Disarmament is closely connected with several other questions, but especially with three factors. Looking realistically at the present situation we realize that a number of pre-conditions have to exist or must gradually come into existence to allow progress in the field of disarmament. The first factor I wish to mention in this context is the dramatic development of weapons of mass destruction, which in itself has proved to be counterproductive. The countries possessing means of mass destruction may well have come to the conclusion that these weapons cannot be used without raising the danger of self-destruction. It is therefore hardly accidental that the two countries with the greatest arsenal of atomic weapons took a decision of principle some time ago first to set a ceiling on the production of these weapons and then to proceed to their reduction. I think that we all have been encouraged by the results of the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks and we hope that the next round, which is about to begin, will lead to further progress.

109. The second pre-condition for real progress in the field of disarmament is what we usually call an atmosphere of détente. It is particularly in this field that progress has been made over the last two years—progress which will allow for the holding of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe so as to continue and further this process of détente. My Government believes that measures of disarmament, even at this stage, should be discussed on a regional basis.

110. In its memorandum of July 1970 my Government stated the following:

“Austria believes that a favourable and lasting progress on détente can be reached only if the conference on European security also considers and solves the question of balanced and mutual force reduction, which is the focal factor of security in Europe. Such a force reduction would also constitute a concrete measure as well as conforming with and drawing the right conclusions from an agreement on the item on the agenda which speaks of the ensuring of European security and the renunciation of the use or threat of force in the mutual relations of European States.”

Although my Government intends to propose, at the proper time, the inclusion of an item to this effect in the agenda of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, we cannot but welcome the early debate on this problem, which my Government was amongst the first to propose for discussion on the European level, even outside the Conference. We are convinced that détente, security and disarmament are interlinked.

111. Yet there is a third element which we have to take into account: neither détente nor disarmament nor security may be preserved in the long run if they are not crowned by the development of an international community based on law. I wish to refer in this connexion to the following statement made by the Austrian Foreign Minister in the general debate:

“Security presupposes a credible renunciation of force and the threat of force, credible for all States, large,

medium-sized and small. It will therefore be the task of the conference to provide the appropriate basis for security in Europe.

“A step in this direction could be a treaty which would codify, in a legally binding and politically feasible way, the duties and rights of States and would set up machinery to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes.”
[2054th plenary meeting, paras. 55 and 56.]

112. Although the Austrian Foreign Minister was referring to the conference on European Security in his statement, I believe that he mentioned this also as an example, as a basic consideration to be applied to the community of nations.

113. Last year I had the honour to address this Committee during the debate on international security, and I made it clear then that we do not view these matters from a narrow, parochial point of view. We feel, on the contrary, that all these principles and considerations should apply to the international community as a whole. In last year's statement I said that technological progress has eliminated distances and that a conflict in one part of the world cannot fail to have consequences for all of us.

114. I have spoken of a world community based on law, and we have to proceed, as the Austrian Foreign Minister did in his statement from which I have just quoted, from the realistic assumption that force or war has had a certain function in international affairs in the past. In outlawing force, in proceeding towards disarmament, we have to replace the function which force or war had in the past, by the rule of law. I have already observed, at the beginning of my statement, that we all, individuals and States alike, learn by experience. When the League of Nations was created after the First World War, the victorious Powers were unable to agree on effective machinery for peace-keeping. After the Second World War the United Nations was established and the framework for peace-keeping machinery was incorporated into the Charter. Certainly, this machinery is hardly complete and perfect but it has the advantage of being realistic in placing decisive responsibility for the maintenance of peace on the great Powers. We, therefore, do not believe that at the present time anything can be gained from changing the Charter of the United Nations or from any redistribution of responsibilities between the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Charter, in Chapters VI and VII, contains clear provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for action with respect to threats to the peace.

115. Among the items for discussion before us is the proposal concerning the convocation of a world disarmament conference. Looking at the debate in this Committee dispassionately, I believe that we are already, for all practical purposes, at the beginning of a preparatory process towards such a conference. All the items discussed so far would logically appear on the agenda of a world disarmament conference. Many of the suggestions which have been made in this Committee, like the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons—which we would support whole-heartedly—or a declaration that no State possessing nuclear weapons would use them first, would have to be dealt with in the preparatory stage of a world disarmament conference.

116. My delegation is, therefore, in favour of the idea of a world disarmament conference. We are convinced that such a conference must be carefully and thoroughly prepared, not only from the technical point of view but from the point of view of the substantial discussion itself. We should, therefore, be prepared to consider various suggestions regarding the establishment of a preparatory committee or a study group. The precise designation of such a body would seem to be of marginal importance only; clearly, the terms of reference are of primary significance. The work of such a committee or study group should in no way interfere with existing machinery, especially the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other bodies.

117. Thus disarmament has many facets. Its different aspects are, therefore, dealt with in different bodies and at different levels. The world disarmament conference, when it becomes politically feasible—and this seems to me the essential pre-condition for convening it—would be able to draw on the material, the ideas, the personnel and the achievements of the various bodies and institutions which so far have dealt with questions of disarmament. Let us not be deterred by the fact that progress will be slow. In appraising the results attained during the last decade—I have referred to some of them—I think there is no reason for special pessimism. As realists we know that in an enterprise such as this, which, as I have tried to point out, encompasses all politically relevant aspects of international relations, progress can be made only step by step. In spite of moderate progress and even set-backs, I firmly believe we are on the road to an international community based on the observance of law.

118. In conclusion, let me refer to the statement of the representative of Hungary, who has suggested that the world disarmament conference might be convened in Vienna. I wish to thank him very much for this suggestion and I can assure him that, whenever the time is ripe for having this conference and if it is the wish that it be convened in Vienna, my Government will be only too happy to do everything it can to receive it and to contribute to its work. Austria is prepared to contribute its share in the field of disarmament and is prepared to offer its full co-operation and active participation in these efforts. It is in this spirit that my delegation will give most careful consideration to all the proposals before this Committee.

119. Mr. SUJKA (Poland): In its statement at the 1874th meeting the Polish delegation presented its views on some general questions of disarmament and in particular on the convening of a world disarmament conference. Today I should like to confine my statement to some specific problems related more directly to the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

120. The negotiations being carried out on disarmament are accompanied by both positive and negative developments. Technological advances in nuclear and conventional weapons continue at an unabated rate, and the devoting of huge sums to research and development in the field of armaments leads to the production of more and more sophisticated, costly and destructive weapons. However, it seems that, owing to certain positive developments in the international situation and a desire to avoid military

confrontation, there exist favourable conditions for negotiating key problems of disarmament. Poland is particularly interested in further consolidation of stability and the strengthening of détente in Europe, the sensitive area of political-military confrontation. We expect that the forthcoming Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will begin a process of establishing a durable system of peace and security conducive to regional disarmament measures. The agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States [*see A/C.1/1026*] as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks contribute significantly towards reducing the danger of nuclear war and are a major step in slowing down the nuclear-arms race. We note with gratification that a new phase of the strategic arms limitation talks will begin in Geneva later this month. We wish them every success. We express our conviction that the impact of improved political relations will be duly reflected in disarmament undertakings.

121. In March of this year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament began the second decade of its work. On that occasion a general appraisal of its activities was made. A certain diversity of opinions notwithstanding, there was a general consensus concerning the usefulness of this multilateral organ of disarmament negotiations. Whatever its deficiencies, resulting as they do rather from factors beyond its power, no one can deny the value of its accomplishments. The Polish Government shares the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his address to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at the opening plenary meeting of the 1972 session when he described it as "the most effective and productive organ for multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations available to the international community" [*see CCD/PV.545*].

122. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8818*] now before us reflects, on the one hand, the potential possibilities and, on the other hand, the difficulties inherent in disarmament negotiations. The Polish delegation does not regard the results of the activities of the Conference in the current year as entirely satisfactory, inasmuch as no agreement has been worked out on the elimination of chemical weapons and no substantial progress has been registered in another priority question, that of a comprehensive test ban. We think, however, that the work of the Conference has been, if taken altogether, of benefit. Thorough discussions and examination of various aspects and approaches have given valuable material for further, more advanced negotiations. This is true particularly with regard to the negotiations on chemical weapons. It is to be regretted that the discussions have not yet produced a final agreement.

123. In our opinion, this is not due—as is maintained in some quarters—to the intricate nature of chemical weapons but to the reluctance of the military-industrial complexes of some Western Powers to do away with these weapons of mass extermination. The discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were not fruitless, however. The various suggestions, proposals and working papers and, above all, the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction [*ibid.*, annex B, sect. 5] submitted on 28 March by Poland, together with other

socialist States, helped in a thorough examination of different aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Those substantive discussions sufficiently clarified whatever technical ambiguities may have existed.

124. The draft convention of the socialist States reflects the consistent stand upholding the generally accepted principle that both bacteriological and chemical weapons should be dealt with together. It recalls, in fact, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons [see resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex]. Thus the draft meets the basic requirements put forward by many delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly. As the discussions in the Conference, as well as in this Committee, have dealt mainly with the scope of prohibition and with verification, I should like to say a few words on those two issues.

125. The approach to the scope of prohibition as expressed in the draft convention is in conformity with the goal pursued, namely, to ensure total prohibition of all chemical weapons. The comprehensive prohibition of all chemical agents of warfare and of all activities—that is, development, production and stockpiling—as the only way to achieve the real elimination of chemical weapons would be fully consistent with the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹² the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use*,¹³ the report of the World Health Organization group of consultants entitled *Health aspects of chemical and biological weapons*¹⁴ and the respective General Assembly resolutions. That approach has again been recognized as right in the recent discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the present debate in this Committee by the majority of Member States.

126. Much attention has been devoted to the criteria for defining chemical weapons. In our opinion it has been clearly demonstrated that, of the various methods of approach to the question of the scope of prohibition, that of a comprehensive ban expressed by a purpose criterion offers the simplest and most rational solution, since it is based on the most inclusive definition covering all existing and future agents, binary systems and dual-purpose agents. The purpose criterion is intended to avoid possible loopholes which would be inevitable in the case of any solution based on partial measures, such as lists of chemical agents or formulae of highly toxic agents. I should like to reiterate here what the Polish delegation said in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of lists of highly toxic agents, namely, that the degree of danger represented by different chemical agents for warfare purposes depends not so much on their level of toxicity as on the means of protection available. When such means do not

exist or are inadequate, as is the case in most countries, even the less toxic agents are sufficiently dangerous and destructive weapons. The scope of prohibition should also include all kinds of activities, that is, all stages of preparation and possession of chemical weapons. Fragmentation in this respect, as suggested by one or two delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which would, for instance, exclude destruction of stockpiles, would be discriminatory with regard to States not possessing chemical weapons and incompatible with the Geneva Protocol. It has been the prevailing opinion in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that to be effective a prohibition cannot be related to certain activities or categories of chemical agents only.

127. As to the verification issue, the draft convention provides for an adequate balance between appropriate national and international measures complementing each other. That approach was objected to by some delegations, but was not met with constructive counterproposals. Discussions on this complicated issue have shown that it can be resolved only through a balance between verification procedures and mutual trust. The Polish delegation considers that the basic solution as envisaged in the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons—that is, national means of verification and control plus complaint to and investigation by the Security Council—is the most reasonable and practical one. The Polish delegation shares the opinion expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Roschin, in this Committee on 30 October, that “The national forms of verification could . . . be carried out on the basis of a unified programme” [1878th meeting, para. 44].

128. The majority of delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, like many delegations which have already spoken in this Committee, recognized that the draft convention submitted by the socialist States deserved careful consideration and should be accepted as a basis for concrete and final negotiations. For our part we have expressed our readiness to listen and give careful consideration to all constructive proposals or suggestions. In our opinion many technical aspects have already been thoroughly explored. The Conference has sufficient material to pursue and complete its task during its next session provided that all States members are willing to take the necessary political decisions. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the Assembly should request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons.

129. Nuclear disarmament continues to be of primary concern to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to the General Assembly, as it is, in fact, to the whole international community. While no substantive progress has yet been achieved, one cannot overlook the fact that prospects have generally improved as a result of the strategic arms limitation agreements. It is now the moral obligation of all States concerned to make the effort necessary to create favourable conditions for progress in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In the opinion of the Polish delegation there are two prerequisites: first, all nuclear States should participate in these efforts; and secondly, all States which have not yet done so,

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

¹³ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

¹⁴ World Health Organization, Geneva, 1970.

particularly the nuclear ones and those with advanced nuclear technology, should adhere to existing agreements concerning disarmament, such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other agreements.

130. For many years the verification of an underground test ban treaty has been debated at length. The scientific and technological aspects of this problem have been exhaustively examined. We regret all the more that there are still tendencies—though they are nearly isolated—to focus discussions on technical aspects of verification, while it is recognized by more and more States that the considerable advances in seismic methods of detection and identification make it possible to discriminate between nuclear explosions and earthquakes without on-site inspection. We see, therefore, no need to seek substitutes, in the form of transitional steps or partial measures, for a comprehensive treaty banning all tests, in all environments, and by all nuclear-weapon States.

131. Concentrating its work on the priority problems of chemical weapons and the comprehensive test ban, in accordance with the Assembly's resolutions, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devoted comparatively less attention to other disarmament items. The Polish delegation considers that the preparations for the convening of a world disarmament conference should substantially promote negotiations and progress on such questions as the elimination of foreign military bases, creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, further measures to achieve full demilitarization of the sea-bed and reduction of military expenditures. More advanced negotiations on these and other measures coupled with the solution of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons and with progress in nuclear disarmament would bring us tangibly closer to general and complete disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal. We are also of the opinion that consideration should be given to incendiary weapons, in particular to napalm weapons. As the report of the Secretary-General, entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*,¹⁵ states the situation with regard to these weapons is gradually deteriorating and this underlines the urgent need for international consideration of effective measures of disarmament concerning incendiary weapons.

132. The Polish delegation is of the view that the requirements deriving from the present situation demand more vigorous undertakings in the field of general and complete disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons.

133. Before concluding I should like to reiterate that Poland is determined and ready actively to contribute—in the United Nations, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere—to disarmament negotiations and to take part in disarmament measures. This stems not only from our historical experience but, foremost, from the fundamental principles of the internal and foreign policies of Poland as a socialist State. We are vitally interested in securing the best possible conditions for the implementa-

tion of the ambitious programme of socio-economic development of our society aimed at a steady increase in the material and cultural standard of living of our people. We are also vitally interested in further, continuous improvement of the situation in the region we live in, and in the world at large until it becomes a world free from the burdens of armaments and the dangers of military conflagration, a world where the balance of fear, with the spiralling arms race accompanying it, will be replaced by mutual confidence, collective security and peaceful co-operation.

134. Mr. NANDAN (Fiji): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to take this opportunity of congratulating you on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of this Committee. Our congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee. We are confident that under your wise and able guidance the work of this Committee will be successfully concluded.

135. My delegation's intervention on this occasion will be confined to item 32 of the agenda, entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests".

136. It is some nine years now since the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was signed in 1963. It is therefore, most disappointing to note that some major States with nuclear capabilities have still not become parties to this Treaty. Since 1963 the world has been striving for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, which it is hoped would pave the way for the eventual elimination of all nuclear-weapon stockpiles. It is a matter of great regret that little progress has been made towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Fiji is very much aware that in this day and age, given the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, no nation, however small or remote, can be expected to be spared in the event of a nuclear holocaust. It is with this in view that my delegation welcomes this opportunity to add its plea to the universal demand for the establishment of a safer world for all mankind through general and complete disarmament.

137. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, to which my country is a party, is the epitome of world-wide opinion against the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This universal concern of man to safeguard himself and his environment against the dangers of nuclear contamination was echoed again as recently as June this year at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm by the adoption of principle 26 of the Declaration on the Human Environment, which states without qualifications or conditions that:

"Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons."¹⁶

138. In addition the Conference also adopted resolution 3 (I)¹⁶ condemning nuclear-weapon tests, especially

¹⁵ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

¹⁶ See *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14).

those carried out in the atmosphere, and called upon those States intending to carry out such tests to abandon their plans to do so, since they might lead to further contamination of the environment.

139. It is ironical, however, that that plea of a unique international gathering in Stockholm should have been celebrated, only a few days after the Conference ended, by the beginning of the 1972 series of French nuclear tests in the Muroroa Atoll in the South Pacific. Those tests were carried out in defiance of world opinion and in disregard of the protests of the countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. The Government of Fiji has individually and collectively with other States in the South Pacific region whose environment is most immediately involved made urgent appeals to the French Government to desist from its wilful pollution of the South Pacific. Fiji does not stand alone on this issue. It is one which has an impact on the whole of the Pacific region, and most of the countries and territories of that region have made their attitude unmistakably plain. The delegations of New Zealand [1873rd meeting] and Australia [1876th meeting] have in their statements on this item already referred to the various collective protests made by the South Pacific countries.

140. Protests from individual bodies and persons throughout the Pacific region are loud, strong and clear, and they will continue as long as the tests do. The protests of the States comprising the Association of South-East Asian Nations and that of the Andean group of States of Latin America [A/8740] have also been referred to, and I do not wish to repeat them. However, the most deplorable fact is that the French Government chose to ignore completely the widely expressed opposition to the testing and deliberately carried out its series of atmospheric tests, in June and July of this year, in the Muroroa Atoll in the South Pacific.

141. The dangers of atomic radiation are well known. A very useful review of the health hazards from environmental radiation is to be found in the most recent report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.¹⁷ It is equally well known that the explosion of nuclear devices in the atmosphere generates large quantities of radioactive isotopes in the human environment. These isotopes, when absorbed in the human body, lead to a measurable increase in the radiation dosage to the organs of the body. My delegation submits that it should be recognized that there is a risk of induced disease or disability from even the lowest levels of exposure to radiation. That consideration is of particular significance to the peoples of the South Pacific that are being increasingly exposed to radiation by the wilful acts of one permanent Member of this Organization, which crosses the earth's surface to conduct its tests in our surroundings.

142. In case it should be said that our apprehension over health hazards is unfounded, I should like to refer this Committee to but one example in the report of the Scientific Committee. In paragraph 14 the Scientific Committee unequivocally records a significant increase in radioactive iodine levels in milk in the southern hemisphere after each of the 1970 and 1971 series of French tests in

the Pacific. That report is not up to date, of course, as it does not take into account the 1972 series of French tests. I might mention that in high doses radioactive iodine causes thyroid tumours, especially in infants.

143. The Government of Fiji has already drawn the attention of the French Government to the potential hazards which these tests in the Pacific pose to health and safety and to the marine life which is a vital element in island subsistence and economy. It is no comfort to us, the peoples of the Pacific, to observe that despite the assurances about the precautions taken to minimize the ill effects of these explosions to life and to the environment, the French Government continues to conduct them, at a point on the earth's surface as far removed as possible from the mass of its own native soil and people. We have no doubts of the adverse domestic reaction that would be generated if these tests were conducted closer to France.

144. My delegation views with deep disappointment and concern recent reports in the world press emanating from Paris, indicating that France is planning a new series of nuclear tests in the Pacific. The London *Sunday Times* of 8 September 1972, for instance, reported that the bombs to be exploded in the new series would be considerably larger than the nuclear devices the test explosions of which caused world-wide protests earlier this year. The information on a further series of tests is confirmed by an article which appeared in a Paris magazine of 6 November 1972, and was written by one General Paul Rigail, who is reported to be in charge of atomic affairs at the French General Staff Headquarters. To the knowledge of my delegation, no official denials of those reports have been made.

145. Fiji would therefore like once again to urge the Government of France to reconsider before further wilfully polluting the Pacific environment, and to call a definitive halt to its programme of atmospheric tests in the Pacific region. In view of the reports of a further series of tests, the adoption of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.611 is even more imperative. Fiji is a sponsor of that draft resolution, which was so ably presented to this Committee on 26 September 1972, by the representative of New Zealand, on behalf of the 13 sponsors from the Pacific region. Since that draft resolution is a regional effort it is not surprising that the tests in the Pacific are specifically mentioned. The draft does, however, stress the desirability of bringing to a halt all nuclear-weapon testing in the atmosphere and in other environments everywhere in the world. We should like to make it clear, however, that the delegation of Fiji would strongly oppose any attempts to delete the reference to the Pacific tests from this draft resolution, for it cannot be denied that only recently tests have been conducted in the Pacific.

146. Finally, my delegation would support any resolution promoting the cause of disarmament in a reasonable and practical way.

147. The CHAIRMAN: I express to the people of Fiji my good wishes for their health and safety.

148. Mr. PEREZ de CUELLAR (Peru) [interpretation from Spanish]: A year ago Peru was one of the sponsors of resolution 2833 (XXVI) and therefore we support the view

¹⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 25.

expressed therein—which is indeed supported by all Members of the United Nations—that a world disarmament conference could encourage and help us to reach the objectives of disarmament, as prescribed by the Charter, and particularly the objective of nuclear disarmament.

149. Peru did not consider it necessary to send a direct reply to the Secretary-General's questionnaire regarding the organizational aspects of a world disarmament conference, not because we underestimate the importance of such a procedure but because we feel that if the political will, particularly that of the nuclear Powers, to hold such a conference is confirmed that will naturally be reflected in procedural terms. Although the desire expressed in resolution 2833 (XXVI) that the conference should be open to all States is explicit, it is necessary to stress emphatically that it is indispensable that all the nuclear Powers participate from the very first stages of the conference.

150. If we start optimistically from the premise that all nuclear Powers consider themselves bound—as they are—by the terms of resolution 2833 (XXVI), adopted by acclamation, and that they agree with the conference in principle, then what we, at the present session of the General Assembly, have to devise is a procedure that will make it possible for all of them to participate.

151. With this end in mind, a number of countries not involved in the main military pacts are engaged in a praiseworthy effort to which we give our full support. In fact, since the positive proposal advanced by Mexico for the establishment, here and now, of a preparatory committee [1872nd meeting]—a proposal which we favour—more than one suggestion has been made that might be useful, above all the constructive proposal of Argentina for the creation of a study group [1873rd meeting], and also the interesting working paper submitted by Brazil [A/C.1/L.618].

152. Now, it is no secret to anyone that the emergence of a whole spectrum of procedural possibilities, together with constant activities behind the scenes, is due to the reluctance on the part of certain nuclear Powers to participate in the conference.

153. A reminder that the world disarmament conference is an old non-aligned idea may perhaps help to influence one great Power or another in its reaction.

154. My delegation deplores the fact that this reluctance extends to the participation of these Powers in a stage envisaged in the above-mentioned resolution, particularly when, in itself, the participation sought from them does not in the least constitute a commitment to the convening of the conference unconditionally and on a set date. It would appear thus far that, while three of the nuclear Powers have expressed their support of the conference, two of them do not favour its being convened at the present moment. We prefer to believe that these two differing positions of the nuclear Powers, which are precisely the five permanent members of the Security Council, do not arise from conceptual motivations but rather from situational considerations. For it would not be accurate to state that the position of a nuclear Power with respect to the Conference—which is only a means—indicates to what extent it favours or opposes disarmament as such—which is the end we are seeking.

155. May I be permitted to say, from the regional standpoint, that if, as an academic exercise, we were to make a graded classification of the genuine will of nuclear Powers to disarm, a better way of determining this would be to consider their responses to the appeals of the General Assembly that they sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco providing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America,¹⁸ so long as that will has led such a Power to pursue a consistent line of conduct.

156. Be that as it may, we note with bitterness that that division of opinion among the nuclear Powers will not lessen, indeed will aggravate, the frustration we feel at the present fictitious and fruitless efforts at disarmament, and our dissatisfaction with the nuclear *status quo*, both of which feelings Peru shares with countries that pursue an independent foreign policy.

157. Our discontent lies, first of all, in the fact that in the negotiating body established for that purpose by the Assembly—the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—only three of the nuclear Powers participate, and in the fact that that body indisputably lacks any genuinely representative membership of small and medium-sized States; and secondly, our dissatisfaction arises from the scant examination we annually devote to the work of that organ, an examination which, when it is expressed in draft conventions of a merely peripheral nature, is nothing more than the “autumn ritual” to which Ambassador Benites of Ecuador has referred. Furthermore, the disappointing bipolar negotiations seem to aim at a tighter freezing, if such is possible, of the nuclear *status quo*, aside from the fact that the United Nations takes no part whatsoever in them.

158. Obviously something is wrong in the system or in its functioning. And it is something that cannot be remedied within the present framework, the alarming shortcomings of which were clearly brought out, in full knowledge of the facts, in the reply of the Government of Mexico to the Secretary-General's enquiry. To remedy the shortcomings we have to resort to bold measures. My delegation considers that in setting in motion machinery for preparing a world disarmament conference, the United Nations can find an exceptional opportunity to analyse itself as a function of the disarmament process.

159. Although it may be true that the establishment of appropriate machinery for the conference, whether it be for preparation or for study, is not intended to replace the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in its functions, we should endeavour to ensure that it have some repercussions on that body, even if only by contrast. It can serve to emphasize and to make up for the present absence of two of the five nuclear Powers from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru stated in the general debate, it can serve to bring about a

“restructuring of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to provide for the participation of all the nuclear Powers, and an increase in its membership so as to allow equitable representation for developing countries” [2054th plenary meeting, para. 181].

¹⁸ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

160. The fears of some nuclear countries that the Conference itself, if it were to meet, would affect the present course of their negotiations on disarmament cannot be dispelled. This may be the intention of the small and medium-sized Powers. But to "affect" in this case does not mean to slight or undermine. The conference and the mere setting in motion of the machinery leading to it, as we have stated, is solely intended to provide the necessary incentive for bringing about general and complete disarmament, which is a fundamental mission of our Organization.

161. I should now like briefly to refer to item 32 of our agenda, entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests". The length of time since this item, described as "urgent" in its title, was first proposed and its repetition on successive agendas of the General Assembly justifies the feeling of disillusion with which we tackle it. We have tried—from a discreet suggestion for possible ways out to the pure and simple condemnation which we sponsored in resolution 2828 A (XXVI)—and yet we have had no results. In the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.611, a group of Pacific Ocean coastal States which share a legitimate regional concern request the General Assembly to give specific consideration to this matter, without in any way hindering an organic approach as suggested in other draft resolutions. We trust that the General Assembly will welcome this call for strict justice, which is addressed to any Pacific Power, whether or not it is coastal, which might select that zone for its nuclear tests.

162. I am firmly convinced that if this regional appeal of the States of the Pacific falls on deaf ears, the General Assembly will be seeking refuge in a level of abstraction that will present it to the world as inexplicably shirking its responsibilities.

163. It was doubtless this same just regional concern that underlay the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We are in favour of that principle.

164. Finally, I should like to make a brief reference to item 30(c) of the agenda, under which the Assembly considers the report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2852 (XXVI) on respect for human rights in armed conflict. At the last session of the General Assembly Peru sponsored that draft resolution and a Peruvian expert participated in the work of the group which prepared the study of the Secretary-General on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*.¹⁹ Regarding that matter, I wish only to say that, as a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.616, we believe that the proposal to request States Members to submit opinions on that report is an idea that warrants support, since it will allow us to obtain a much more thorough understanding of the matter.

165. Mr. Chairman, to co-operate with your capable and dynamic direction of our debates, and out of respect for the Committee members' awareness of the subject of disarmament, I have kept my statement brief and selective. I have not wished to cover repetitively ground already covered by other representatives. However, I should like to reserve my right to ask for the floor again, if necessary, when we discuss the draft resolutions at present before the Committee.

166. Mr. DIAZ CASANUEVA (Chile) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: If you would allow me, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a short statement on a specific subject, namely, napalm.

167. At the past session of the General Assembly the Chilean delegation sponsored resolution 2852 (XXVI) in which the Secretary-General was asked to prepare, with the assistance of qualified government experts, a report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. We have considered this report¹⁹ and we should like to express, through the Secretary-General, our appreciation to these distinguished experts for the work which they carried out, with accuracy, objectivity and seriousness, without any propagandistic or accusatory aims.

168. The report only gives us data and background and conclusively establishes a system of well-defined and systematized facts. But this is a problem that possesses such serious characteristics that, willy-nilly, the report goes beyond its scientific objectives and implicitly levels one of the most terrible accusations against man today, against all of us, since in some way, actively or passively, by our silence or by our indifference, we contribute to the consideration as obvious and inevitable of something which constitutes a crime against humanity and reduces the moral values of our civilization.

169. This report should be widely distributed beyond the halls of our Organization. It should be placed like a manual in the hands of youth. This report should be followed up with a provisional report on the same subject, issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Following its consistent approach to this problem, my delegation sponsored the draft resolution originally submitted by Mexico and Sweden [*A/C.1/L.616*]. We should have preferred a more vigorous draft resolution, with more definitive provisions, but we understand that we are at the very outset of a process which will lead us to the condemnation and absolute prohibition of the use of napalm by all nations on the earth.

170. I have decided not to analyse the report and to abstain from extensive remarks unless, in due course, the circumstances of the debate call for a further statement on my part. But without wishing to be melodramatic, I must say that napalm, with its infernal effects, places upon the face of the earth Dante's Inferno in a perfected fashion.

171. Basically napalm is an incendiary weapon, but more destructive and more cruel than the nuclear bomb itself. Atomic attack is explosive, final—particularly now, with the power and improvement of the nuclear bomb. But the fire storm of the napalm attack is a cause of horror because man feels the agony of burning to death. The nuclear bomb is extremely costly and only very few Powers possess it and can launch it. Napalm is cheap. It does not call for special materials. It is easy to manufacture. It can be produced in any part of the world. It can be spread with flame-throwers, or as part of a large bomb, or of a very small one.

172. The report gives us an example: A kilogramme of napalm soap is more than enough to convert 30 litres of

¹⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.1.3.

gasoline into portable flame-thrower fuel. Napalm is so violent and so brutal that it can be considered the most ghastly weapon of the present day, particularly among the incendiary and devastating weapons. It penetrates structures, machines, buildings. It wipes out rustic or cultivated areas. I quote from paragraph 75: "Forest fires have even been known to smoulder on all winter under a blanket of snow, becoming active again the following summer." Mass fires in urban areas can become at times torrents of fire, moving at 25 metres per second or more. Temperatures can reach 1,500 degrees C. Napalm, at one and the same time, exterminates by burning and commits genocide.

173. In man, it burns not only the epidermis but also the dermis, that is, the dense conjunctive tissue, nerves, blood vessels and sweat glands. Half the burns are fourth degree; the oxygen required by the brain, the heart and the liver is consumed. The person suffers shock through pain, shock which can also kill. After the shock comes carbon-monoxide poisoning. So we have burns, shock, and toxic and asphyxiating effects. And against this gamut of refined and sadistic suffering which leads to death, air-raid shelters can offer no protection. We must recall that the damage is greater among civilians than among soldiers, and among civilians is greater among children, women and the aged. Only 5 per cent of those who died in the First World War were civilians; in the Second World War the figure was 48 per cent; in Korea it was 84 per cent; and it is even worse in Viet-Nam. The Nazis were vanquished but their concept of "total war" and of harassing civilian populations by means of horror in the end gained ground.

174. Pyongyang in Korea was destroyed by incendiary bombs. In Viet-Nam the destruction has been concerted: human beings, animals, land, trees, water. While ecology is raised to the level of a universal religion, ecological damage in Viet-Nam has been gigantic: defoliants and herbicides to destroy rice and other crops, plantations and forests. Mr. Fukushima of the Agronomic Section of the Council of Sciences of Japan said in 1967 that 3.8 million acres of arable land in South Viet-Nam had been destroyed by napalm. Where napalm falls it is as if the foot of Attila had trodden there. Not only do the plant and the plant's roots die, but the land itself is made ash and infertile forever. In the interior of Algeria I have seen black, bare, spectral hills worse than any desert, hills which had been flourishing until burned with napalm. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute gives us the following figures on napalm: in the Second World War 14,000 tons were used; in Korea, 32,357 tons; in Indo-China between 1961 and 1971, 338,237 tons. It is well to recall that in article 6 of the Judgement of Nuremberg "extermination" appears as a crime against humanity.

175. In its resolution 2826 (XXVI) the General Assembly commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The Convention, in its preambular paragraphs, states that it is an initial step towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross is updating the Geneva Conventions and a conference on an additional protocol will be held in 1974. I could cite other legal instruments, such as the Hague Convention of 1907; the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which has not been

ratified by very important States; the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims. I should also cite resolution 2827 (XXVI), in which the General Assembly requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, its negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all States. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has received drafts on this subject from the socialist countries as well as from 12 non-aligned members of the Committee on Disarmament, all with a view to the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. With regard specifically to napalm, international law is extremely out of date and deficient. Napalm is a very special weapon and its effects are multiple. It is not only a chemical weapon; it possesses such dastardly and complex properties that in our opinion this ghastly means of destruction calls for a special legal instrument, or at least an article devoted exclusively to napalm in the convention which is drafted. It must not be forgotten that during the past 30 years napalm has developed enormously and its destructive power has increased, as well as its production and stockpiling. It is urgent that the United Nations adopt all necessary measures and arrive at a legal instrument prohibiting its production, stockpiling and use. Thus we would be making a concrete contribution to the solution of one of the gravest problems of present-day armaments and freeing future generations from one of the most inhuman and ferocious scourges that man has created in order to wipe out his fellow human beings and his natural environment.

176. Mr. WAPENYI (Uganda): Mr. Chairman, allow my delegation to associate itself with previous speakers in expressing to you our congratulations on your well-earned election and the praiseworthy manner in which you have conducted the deliberations of this Committee. Our congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee.

177. My brief statement at this stage is primarily to comment on the first item on our agenda, namely, the world disarmament conference. Both in the spirit of the Organization of African Unity and in keeping with the stand taken over the last 11 years by non-aligned countries, Uganda has subscribed to and associated itself fully with their advocacy of the need to hold a world disarmament conference.

178. The conference at this stage would be a fitting climax to a decade of partial measures to prohibit or limit nuclear tests and conventional armaments. A positive decision would also be in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2828 A (XXVI), in which all Governments were urged to "... bring to a halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973". It would consolidate the current bilateral and multilateral efforts in a global attempt to find peaceful areas of contact and deliberation.

179. The Chairman of the Ugandan delegation, when speaking in the Assembly in plenary meeting this year, reminded Members that:

"the existence of great armaments must surely underline the eventuality of using them. As long as they exist,

despite all the well-meant steps taken to establish peace, they could be used to devastate our world.” [2057th plenary meeting, para. 202.]

Such a prospect can only lead to one logical desire on the part of the non-aligned and non-nuclear States: the wish to deliberate with those Powers which hold the fate of our very existence, since a nuclear war would respect no sovereignty or national boundaries.

180. While we accept the premise that many useful forums exist, such as the strategic arms limitation talks and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, many countries like mine have not been able to participate fully in those bodies, and we can only look to the world disarmament conference as the venue where we can all air and exchange views on the latest armaments issues and on measures to curtail the production and proliferation of armaments.

181. We have been reminded by many speakers in this debate that, within the next decade or two, possibly more than one-third of the Members here may have the scientific capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Considering the enormous costs of producing those weapons such a development would surely be very detrimental to the economy of many developing countries like mine. The expenses incurred for those armaments would go a long way towards creating jobs and welfare benefits for our people. Thus, unless there are deliberate and concerted efforts made at this stage to stop this spiralling of the armaments race, both nuclear and conventional, thousands of millions of dollars will continue to be spent by nations which would do better to concentrate their efforts on the economic welfare of their citizens.

182. It is not surprising to note that two of the most highly advanced nations—Japan and Germany—have surpassed many of their rival industrial Powers in economic achievements because they have had very little or no

defence budgets. The economic miracle they have achieved in the last 25 years could be emulated by us all.

183. Self-restraint at the national level would be very slow in achieving disarmament, but international obligations and binding treaties can go a long way towards providing a collective umbrella of security.

184. My delegation believes that without the participation of the United States and China the conference would not achieve many of the desired results, since any nuclear Power which chose not to go along with others could frustrate efforts to find peaceful means to put mankind's fears at ease.

185. My delegation has no strong feelings about the venue for the conference and feels that that question could be left open until more consultations have taken place.

186. My delegation also supports the Argentine representative's suggestion which was made at the 1873rd meeting and repeated today and which has already received support from most non-aligned nations and most of the members here. We believe that such a compromise may eventually provide a means acceptable to all the members and my delegation will continue to give such efforts our unreserved support.

187. In conclusion, my delegation believes that all the great Powers will not turn a deaf ear to the call made by most of the non-nuclear members, which want this conference to take place.

188. The CHAIRMAN: Finally, I wish to announce that Pakistan has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.616/Rev.1 and that Italy and Ireland have become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.617.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.