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**Chairman: Mr. Radha Krishna RAMPHUL**  
**(Mauritius).**

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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);**
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**Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the Secretary-General (A/8809)**

1. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic): Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, considered by the Charter to be a cornerstone in the building of international peace and security, has been very slow. Despair of attaining any significant measure of real disarmament and the armaments race, which has escalated in quantity and quality, compelled the forums of the United Nations to be content with more modest objectives: the reduction of armaments or their limitation.

2. On reduction, nothing has so far been achieved. On limitation, agreements between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on a quantitative ceiling for anti-missile missiles have been concluded at the strategic arms limitation talks [see A/C.1/1026]. Thus, the limitation is partial, as it deals only with the most advanced phases of nuclear weapons, of an "over-kill" nature, and only with the systems of the Soviet Union and the United States. The hope is entertained that the value of these agreements will lie in the fact that they generate negotiation instead of confrontation and stimulate a process of further agreement which may be more and more comprehensive. Even so, misgivings are echoed that the absence of restrictions on the improvement of the quality of strategic arms may cancel the effects of the quantitative restrictions and that the safety sought from the limitations is really the safety of deterrent weapons rather than the safety of human beings.

3. However, the central fact remains that existing stocks are capable of obliterating humanity several times over; that is to say, that mistrust and fear have so penetrated international relations that the armaments race itself is the most expressive symptom of insecurity. It has become obvious that unless the roots of insecurity are tackled the singling out of measures of disarmament becomes an academic exercise. Hence the success so far obtained by the United Nations is only partial and fragmentary. Consequently the Conference of the Committee on Disarma-

ment, in spite of its extensive efforts and good will, has been unable to go further, as is shown by its report [A/8818].

4. The many initiatives taken in order to tackle simultaneously the problems of international peace and security and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations were attempts to go deep into the problem of the division of mankind and to see if any overriding principle can guide the behaviour of all.

5. We tend to classify the item on the convening of a world disarmament conference with those initiatives, seeking in every imaginable way to break the deadlock. But in that perspective we have no reason to think that in proposing the item the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was guided by ulterior motives. We think the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in breaking the deadlock, for, on the one hand, we have the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament laying the groundwork for disarmament discussions, exchanges of views and consideration of points of agreement and points of difference and, on the other, we have declarations such as that on the programme for peace adopted on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 2625 (XXV), annex] and the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)]. Therefore, why not synthesize all these elements which the international community has available and assess, in a world conference, the degree to which they have permitted general disarmament? In this respect, the inscription of the item on the non-use of force and permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons stems from the same preoccupations.

6. We wish to stress that we do not minimize the importance of the comments made on the item on the world disarmament conference by the representative of the People's Republic of China [1873rd meeting]. Disarmament cannot be conceived of as abdication by subjugated peoples of their personality or abandonment of their struggle for liberation and self-determination. Disarmament cannot be conceived of as an institution within an international framework of injustice wherein territories are occupied by forces of aggression and wars are waged by the forces of imperialist expansion arming settler colonialism with sophisticated weapons and enhancing its racial fanaticism. Indeed, disarmament cannot be conceived of as a monopoly of strength by the strong and the further debilitation of the less strong or the weak.

7. A world conference on disarmament must necessarily proceed from a clear vision of the kind of orderly world for which the component States are called upon to disarm. In his cogent analysis of misgivings concerning a conference of this sort, the Chinese representative set out the propitious conditions under which a conference would be fruitful: first, relinquishment by the nuclear Powers of the first use of their nuclear weapons; secondly, the dismantling of foreign military bases; thirdly, non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Should we not, therefore, seize this opportunity to ponder these and similar conditions and confront these vital problems in the process of

serious preparations for the world conference on disarmament?

8. In contrast, the objections of the United States to the convening of the conference seemed to be procedural [1872nd meeting]. The fear that a conference may do harm to the existing bodies dealing with disarmament is, we think, greatly allayed by the fact that the preparation for the conference has necessarily to take into account all the groundwork laid by these various bodies. The conference would thus strengthen their task, and not undermine it.

9. On the need to have an effective group of a limited size, endowed with expertise and experience, this factor raised by the representative of the United States can be met in the preparatory phase, so that the conference would have before it highly qualified studies reviewing the work achieved, the tremendous work still to be done and the impediments to progress which the conference is called upon to surmount.

10. Of course, all nuclear Powers should participate in the conference; otherwise it will be a failure. That is why our Committee must contribute to making such participation possible by way of devising the appropriate means to meet the objections, whether they be substantial or procedural, in a way satisfactory to all.

11. In thinking, therefore, of a preparatory group, we should think in terms of consolidation. It should not be a group to discuss mere procedure and practical arrangements, but a group to lay the political, expert and legal groundwork: political, in the formulation of principles on which the conference on world disarmament is based; expert, in so far as the devices for implementing the resolutions on disarmament are concerned; legal, seeking the best procedures to be adopted for the debate, the decision-making process and the ensuing obligations upon Member States to show results.

12. Whether one group would be divided into various sub-committees to tackle each one of those specific topics, or whether three groups would be formed is, in our view, immaterial, the objective being in the last analysis to make the conference, first, possible; secondly, universal; thirdly, smooth-running; and fourthly, fruitful. If the end result is positive, the spirit of the Charter would be vindicated and the functioning of the United Nations enhanced, the conference in any case being held under the auspices of the United Nations and the United Nations Secretariat having a substantial say in its preparation. Perhaps then the United Nations would be able to transcend the necessarily partial approach which has so far marked the achievement in this area: a ban on nuclear tests, but not horizontally or vertically comprehensive; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but leading to no destruction of nuclear stocks nor an abandonment of nuclear production; a ban on biological weapons, but not on chemical weapons. Perhaps also the United Nations could overcome the paradox involved in discussing how to avoid threats to the future of mankind while neglecting the atrocious present for, as nuclear weapons are the most massively destructive, they monopolize—and rightly so—the attention of the United Nations bodies. However, by virtue of their large-scale destructive nature, there has arisen, so to

speak, a balance of terror that has made the use of those weapons non-profitable, as the representative of Algeria, has eloquently pointed out [1880th meeting]. Yet this has not prevented wars of annihilation, waged with the most sophisticated weapons which, though not nuclear, are none the less effective. Witness their brutal use against the Indo-Chinese, the Palestinians, the subjugated African peoples and against Arab countries. What relation to reality has a debate on the holocaust while it disregards the plight of refugees pursued in their camps, dwellings and villages by Phantoms and napalm? The greater the number of their victims, the prouder are the merciless persecutors of the efficacy of their bombs, the accuracy of their guided missiles, the extent of their achievements and the consolidation of their faits accomplis which they establish against the elementary norms of justice. Never has international morality sunk to such a low level.

13. The Nazi practices, long condemned, are now being copied and even improved upon. Should we therefore be surprised to hear from the public at large cynical remarks about what we in the United Nations are accomplishing, whether in the field of disarmament or the establishment of right and justice? In this respect, no words are adequate to express our gratitude to those members who sponsored the call for a study on napalm and its effects, thus giving the United Nations a task connected with the present sufferings of the Indo-Chinese, the Arab and African peoples, against whom napalm has been and is being used and bids fair to be used with still more accuracy, larger-scale destructiveness and a mounting toll of human victims and material resources.

14. We are deeply grateful to the Secretary-General and the group of experts who made possible this valuable report<sup>1</sup>. If napalm is used militarily, the group of experts tells us in its conclusions in paragraph 187:

"When judged against what is required to put a soldier out of military action, much of the injury caused by incendiary weapons is therefore likely to be superfluous."

If napalm is used against civilians, the group of experts states:

"In terms of damage to the civilian population, incendiaries are particularly cruel in their effects."

On the condemnation by public opinion of napalm, the group of experts states in paragraph 190:

"Incendiary weapons, in particular napalm, are already the subject of widespread revulsion and anxiety, and because they are weapons of great destructive potency, they are a fitting subject for renewed efforts of this type."

The group was here alluding to the essential need to apply vigorously the principle of restraint in the conduct of military operations and in the selection and use of weapons.

<sup>1</sup> *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.73.I.3).

15. Finally, the group of experts ended its report with the following conclusive judgement in paragraph 193:

"...in view of the facts presented in the report, the group of consultant experts wishes to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons."

16. In this connexion we thank the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and others for sponsoring a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.616] welcoming the report of the Secretary-General. In the preambular paragraphs the draft has the merit of embodying the main conclusions of the group of experts. But when it comes to the operative part, it merely commends the report and requests its wide circulation and comments by member Governments. We think that this is procedural and diplomatic language and that the gravity of this item would warrant stronger language or at least a reference to the desire eventually to prohibit the use, production and stockpiling of napalm, as the group of experts clearly recommends.

17. On the other draft resolutions my delegation may have some further comments to make at the proper time, but I would not like to conclude this brief intervention without fully sharing the appeal made by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, dedicated personally to humanity, at the end of her moving speech the other day, when she has this to say: "I know I speak for the majority of mankind when I urge that something must be promised, and something must be done by way of disarmament, and done soon" [1882nd meeting, para. 102.]

18. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): This is the first opportunity that I have had to make a substantive statement in this Committee; therefore, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf I should like to offer you our very sincere congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. At the same time I should like to extend our congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen and to the Rapporteur.

19. I must apologize, Mr. Chairman, for sometimes stealing the credit due you owing to mistaken identity, but I assure you that I have protected your reputation. It is deeply gratifying to me personally to see you occupying the chairmanship of the First Committee because we have been associated in another field of United Nations activity, that of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, where I learned to appreciate your great diplomatic skill and ability and to value your consistent co-operation. I wish you every success in your efforts to bring the work of this Committee to a successful conclusion.

20. The annual debate in the First Committee on the question of general and complete disarmament is an event of historic significance. I say "historic" because disarmament negotiations have secured a special place in our time ever since the League of Nations saw fit to treat disarmament as the direct path to peace. Its insignificance is due to the fact that the debates we hold here annually have little or no impact on international peace and security or on the lessening of international tensions. The greatest perils to

international peace have not been removed nor have they been mitigated in the least. The reasons for this are abundantly clear to us.

21. The first reason is the fallacious assumption that peace depends upon disarmament. It is quite the opposite. It is disarmament that depends upon peace. No country is going to disarm unless it has an assurance of peace and security and that is what we should strive for.

22. The second reason is the utter futility of attempting to strike a proper balance or equilibrium between the military prowess of States so that at no stage would any State or group of States enjoy a military advantage, and security would be ensured equally for all. This, as the Committee will recall, was the overriding principle of disarmament as expressed in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations presented to the United Nations by the United States and the Soviet Union 11 years ago.<sup>2</sup>

23. The third reason is the acceptance of the concept of the arms race and the erroneous belief that the cessation of this race could, in some mysterious way, lead to peace. In this race, as we are all aware, there are only two contenders, and it is a marathon the like of which has never been known. The end of the race does not mean the attainment of the goal of disarmament as defined by the two super-Powers. A new phenomenon has now appeared on the disarmament scene, and that is the macabre arithmetic of the strategic arms limitation agreements. That dedicated, indefatigable and diligent champion of real disarmament, Mr. García Robles of Mexico, has reminded us in his letter to the Secretary-General in which he conveyed the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the convening of a world disarmament conference:

“...that the nuclear bombs amassed in the arsenals of Powers possessing those terrible instruments of mass destruction today represent the incredible equivalent of about 15 tons of dynamite for every person on earth”  
[A/8693, para. 23]

24. I do not think it is the intention of those who possess these destructive weapons to distribute them in equal measure to the 3,000 million inhabitants of this world. If the cessation of the arms race means anything at all it must mean the outlawing and destruction of these weapons, and not the reduction of their volume to the limits necessary to destroy the users of those weapons and the rest of the world only once. Even those who believe in re-incarnation would, I am sure, be content with one annihilation.

25. The answer must be found in a radically different approach to the question of international peace and security. It is, however, characteristic of our Organization that it is content to deal with symptoms only and not with causes. Disarmament is a treatment of the symptom of the malaise that afflicts the world. It pays no attention whatsoever to the causes of armament.

26. The causes are, first, the lust for power, a chauvinistic philosophy often cloaked in the uniform of an international

gendarme, which impels a nation to seek to be the greatest and the most powerful nation in the world regardless of the competition from elsewhere for the same distinction. Secondly, the lack of mutual tolerance. Thirdly, mutual suspicion and mistrust. And fourthly, and most important of all, the existence of gross injustices and inequalities.

27. Peace in any community depends on the guarantee of justice to all, in equal and even measure, and in fundamental freedoms for all. The United Nations would do better to devote its energies to the removal of the causes of war, to the elimination of injustice and inequality, whether economic, social or political, and to the creation of conditions of peace and a climate of peace. In such conditions and in such a climate armaments would lose their relevance; they would serve no purpose; and they would wither away. What we need even more than a world disarmament conference is a world peace conference, greater attention to the means of achieving peaceful coexistence, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and abstention from interference in the internal affairs of States.

28. We do not in the least suggest that the efforts towards general and complete disarmament should be abandoned. But it is imperative that the Powers concerned should give an earnest of their good faith by agreeing to certain specific measures in the absence of which there can be no progress but the adoption of which would permit the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to function more effectively and to bring in those nuclear Powers that find it impossible in present conditions to participate in what they consider to be a beguiling charade.

29. The programme of action which we would propose now—as we have repeatedly proposed in the past—and which conforms in substance to the programme of the non-aligned group in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is as follows: first, a categorical undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States; secondly, an unequivocal and total renunciation of the right to use nuclear weapons; thirdly, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty by the prohibition of underground tests; fourthly, a moratorium on all testing, which would be more acceptable to the less formidable nuclear Powers if the super-Powers were to set an example by desisting from further underground testing, that moratorium to be combined with a moratorium on the deployment of new strategic weapons systems; fifthly, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the freezing of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons; and, sixthly, the dismantling of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear Powers. Those nuclear Powers that have a manifest and established superiority over other nuclear Powers, some of which have only an embryonic nuclear arsenal, should have nothing to fear from the adoption of the first five steps in that programme of action. Their only concern might be the threat to the balance sheets of the vendors of death, who now make handsome profits out of the production of those weapons. They would not, we are sure, be lacking in the ingenuity to find other and more peaceful uses for their talents and resources, uses which would be no less profitable.

30. I have deliberately omitted reference to the proposal that we presented last year, regarding the declaration of the

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.



Indian Ocean as a zone of peace—a proposal which the great Powers, with one notable exception—China—found unpalatable. We regard the proposal as constituting a positive approach to the maintenance of international peace and security and not as a measure of disarmament as that term is understood in the United Nations. It is fully consistent with the avowed aims of even the super-Powers, and even of those that wish to have their own regions treated as zones of peace and neutrality, but, regrettably, the abstentions on our proposal came from both those categories. We reserve the right to speak on that proposal at a later stage, by which time we hope we can reach an understanding with the abstainers regarding the next step towards the attainment of our objective.

31. I have only a few more points to mention: they relate to certain aspects of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the last year, the proposals regarding its reconstitution and procedural reforms, and the suggestion that a world disarmament conference should be convened.

32. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8818] reads like the record of a dialogue of the deaf. It is a matter of acute disappointment to us that the Conference has failed to make progress on a convention on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. We appreciate the renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons and incapacitating chemicals, but even to contemplate, and much worse to resort to, the use of chemicals that destroy the natural means of human subsistence is unacceptable and totally inconsistent with an elementary regard for environmental protection. When we were urged last year to accept the convention on bacteriological weapons<sup>3</sup>, we were led to believe that it would be followed immediately by a similar convention on chemical weapons. We have been taught what reliance we are to place on such assurances, made avowedly in good faith. As we stated in the general debate in the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has broken faith with this Organization [2061st plenary meeting].

33. The second point I should like to mention concerns the procedural reforms within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which are referred to in its report. We are not especially enthusiastic about the enlargement of that body. If a small body has failed to produce results, a larger one is not likely to succeed. Regarding the rotation of the chairmanship, there is some slight merit in that suggestion, and we have no objection to it.

34. I come now to the last point I wish to make, which has to do with the proposal for a world disarmament conference. It is a confession of the failure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that we need a world disarmament conference and that many of us are convinced that it should be convened at regular intervals

to review the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to prod it into effective action.

35. As far back as 1964, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo, declared its conviction that the convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited would provide powerful support to the efforts being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and to secure the further and steady development of this process. The Conference urged the participating countries to take at the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations all the necessary steps for holding such a conference and any other special conferences for the conclusion of special agreements on certain measures of disarmament.

36. The annual debate on disarmament in the First Committee is really a world disarmament conference, and it has the advantage that all the nuclear Powers do participate in it. It would seem anomalous, therefore, to convene a special conference in which certain nuclear Powers would be unable to participate for what they consider to be a lack of an earnest of good faith on the part of other nuclear Powers, or because it could not contribute to the achievement of concrete arms control agreements.

37. It is precisely because the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other forums have not made sufficient progress that we consider it timely for the General Assembly to assume the responsibility assigned to it under Article II of the Charter of considering the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. A world conference devoted solely to disarmament could give its undivided attention, free from the pressure of other business such as we have in the First Committee, to the entire range of problems falling within the purview of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, without being unduly selective in the treatment of the question. We agree with those who maintain that to be successful the conference must be attended by all the nuclear Powers and be open to all States, and also that it requires careful preparation.

38. We therefore support the initiative taken by a group of non-aligned countries to secure the appointment of a special preparatory committee for that purpose.

39. The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Amerasinghe for his compliments to me and the other officers of the Committee.

40. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand): The current proposals for holding a world disarmament conference have provided an opportunity for this Committee to review the results obtained from disarmament negotiations in the 27 years since the United Nations was founded. In our statement on the disarmament items last year, I said that while some progress had been made in a limited number of fields, notably in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and the complete elimination of biological weapons, the arms race as a whole was accelerating. Important aspects of the arms race, such as the stockpiling of conventional

<sup>3</sup> Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

weapons, have not even been considered by the international community, much less curbed.

41. The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, has already noted that negotiation of disarmament and arms control measures has accompanied periods of reduced international tension. She suggested that successful disarmament negotiations, far from being the cause of such periods of reduced tensions, were more likely to be a result. If that is so, then the current trend towards détente among the major Powers could, and we hope will, lead to renewed efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

42. At the moment the situation does not look very hopeful. Two of the major Powers have declined to participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Each insists that disarmament negotiations be carried out in a particular way acceptable to it before it can join in the type of work conducted by the Conference. Let us frankly admit that both are refusing to be bound by international restraints in the field of armaments and arms control so as to gain time while they proceed to develop their own nuclear capabilities. Let us also state with regret that the two super-Powers, as Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, show great reluctance to engage in negotiations that would lead to qualitative restraints on their development of even more sophisticated and lethal nuclear weapons or to undertake a comprehensive ban on the testing of such weapons.

43. The Committee on Disarmament is at present considering a treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. This is an important treaty which will have a great deal of humanitarian value even though it is a partial disarmament measure. My delegation hopes that some way may be found to hold discussions on the important topic of banning chemical weapons with the participation of all major Powers.

44. One of the ways in which it has been suggested that we might end the current deadlock on participation in disarmament negotiations is to convene a world disarmament conference. My Government's views on this proposal are included among those reproduced in document A/8817. While we generally support calling such a conference, I should emphasize that my delegation considers that the participation of all the nuclear Powers in the preparation work would be essential to its success. If that is not possible, then my delegation would find it difficult to support a resolution setting up a preparatory committee. The proposals made by the representatives of Argentina [1873rd meeting] and Brazil [A/C.1/L.618] would then seem to provide the best basis for an interim solution.

45. Although a world disarmament conference may lead to a fresh start in disarmament negotiations, we should be careful not to think of it as some kind of panacea. Success in disarmament negotiations lies, not in the institutional arrangements under which they are conducted, but in the attitude of States taking part in them. If some States are unwilling to give up their armaments to attain a commonly accepted state of disarmament, then conference trappings, no matter how elaborate, will not be able to hide the failure

of the negotiations. We must also guard against the temptation of thinking that disarmament can be achieved by a majority vote. If the failure of past efforts has made one thing clear, it is that agreements in this field which have not been reached by a process of consensus have little chance of being really effective.

46. Our best chance of achieving general and complete disarmament seems to rest on the hope that the trend towards friendly relations among the great Powers will continue to the point where agreement on fundamental disarmament measures becomes possible. There are certainly a number of encouraging signs which point in this direction. Among them I would enumerate the success of the first phase of the strategic arms limitation negotiations the movement taking place towards a general relaxation of tensions in Europe, and the friendlier relations developing between the United States and China.

47. Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that we should wait for disarmament to drop into our lap as a result of a relaxation in international tension. While it is true that general and complete disarmament can be achieved only in a suitable international atmosphere, there are a number of arms control and partial disarmament measures we can pursue in the meantime. We have now successfully outlawed biological weapons and toxins and there is every chance that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will be able to conclude a treaty banning the acquisition, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons by the beginning of the next session of the General Assembly. The representative of Sweden has suggested that we could also consider banning other types of weapons which have a particularly indiscriminate or cruel nature, and my delegation believes that we should make every effort to do so.

48. We must also reinforce and extend the measures we have adopted to control nuclear weapons, such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is obvious that the most important step which could be taken in this field would be the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This is a measure which will not only help prevent the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, but will fulfil the promises made by parties to the partial test ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty.

49. The non-proliferation Treaty itself has now been in force for over two and a half years. Many States with important nuclear capacities have not, however, become parties to it and this is a matter for the expression of growing concern. In this respect, my delegation is pleased to note that a safeguards agreement has been concluded between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community. We understand that this important step will enable a number of European States to become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, and we express the hope that other States which are not already parties will follow their example.

50. I now wish to devote the remainder of my statement to consideration of item 32. At the 1876th meeting, I introduced the draft resolution on nuclear testing contained

in document A/C.1/L.611, which is sponsored by Australia, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines and Thailand. In introducing it, we drew the attention of this Committee to some of the expressions of concern about the effects of nuclear testing which have been voiced by governments in the Pacific region. Today I want to explain the attitude of my Government to this important question at greater length.

51. In an age which is increasingly conscious of the effects of man-made pollutants on the environment it is impossible to treat atmospheric nuclear testing as a legitimate activity in which any State can indulge whenever or wherever it chooses. The explosion of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere is known to result in the generation of large quantities of radioactive isotopes. These are eventually dispersed all over the world, although they tend to be confined to the hemisphere where the explosion occurs. Such isotopes are absorbed by the human population in various ways and this absorption eventually leads to a measureable increase in the radiation dosage in organs of the body. An excellent review of this aspect of nuclear testing is given in the latest report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.<sup>4</sup> This report brings out the fact that the world average radiation dose commitment to the year 2000 from all the nuclear tests carried out before 1971 would be equivalent to doubling the background radiation for a period of two years.

52. In spite of there being valid arguments against pollution by radioactive isotopes, we are confronted with a situation in which a State is dumping huge quantities of radioactive waste into the atmosphere thousands of miles away from its metropolitan area. That State nevertheless claims with every appearance of Olympian detachment that it has the right to do so because its defence interests are involved. And it is exercising this pretended right in an overseas territory, in clear opposition to the wishes of the people of the South Pacific. Yet when we examine the way in which highly developed countries set policies for the handling of radioactive materials from power stations; elaborate picture emerges. Strict limits are set for the emission of radioactive materials from power stations; elaboration codes are drafted to ensure that radioactive materials do not escape into the environment, and, quite logically, any process which scattered such materials throughout the country without returning a commensurate benefit would immediately be shut down. The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons also has this effect, but for some reason the admirable rules controlling the dispersion of radioactive substances within a State are not applied. Indeed, we find that such tests tend to be conducted in a part of the world remote from the testing State's metropolitan area. We have no doubt that if they were conducted nearer home the domestic disapproval would be uncomfortably evident.

53. I have spent some time discussing the environmental aspects of atmospheric nuclear testing because they are central to my Government's position on the question of nuclear testing. We do not believe that any State has the

right to scatter our lands with the radioactive by-products of its attempts to develop a national over-kill capacity. This applies whatever the considerations dictated by so-called equity among nuclear-weapon Powers.

54. Before I leave the environmental issues may I make one further comparison. Much has been said about the radioactivity hazard resulting from the increasing use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Millions of dollars are being spent to reduce these hazards. Yet the recent report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation reveals that one year of nuclear power production at the rate reached in 1970 will lead to an average extra radiation dose equivalent to doubling the world's background radiation for five minutes. By the year 2000 the expected huge leap in our peaceful use of nuclear power will mean that one year of nuclear power production will lead to an extra radiation dose equivalent to doubling the background radiation for one day. Yet the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted before 1971 will by the year 2000 cause an extra average radiation dose equivalent to doubling the background radiation for two years. Further tests have been held since the beginning of 1971 and this last estimate may already be out of date.

55. From this point of view alone we feel we are fully justified in calling upon all States to sign the partial test ban Treaty and negotiate an end to all nuclear tests. But there are other arguments, continuously heard in this Committee, calling for an end to all nuclear tests so as to stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, in an endeavour to halt the nuclear arms race. Further nuclear-weapon testing can only work against efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. In the draft resolution we have sponsored, close attention is paid to that point, and the dual objectives of an end to all nuclear tests and the concluding of a comprehensive test ban treaty are carefully balanced against a call for an immediate end to atmospheric testing and the signature of the partial test ban treaty by all States.

56. Major emphasis is given in other draft resolutions before the Committee to the need to put an end to underground testing and to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. While we give full support to this approach, we have felt it imperative to draw attention to the atmospheric testing that two major Powers, non-signatories to the partial test ban Treaty, continue to carry out, because of the mounting public concern in our region and because it is undeniable that atmospheric testing is demonstrably more harmful to the human environment and vastly more destructive of public morale than underground testing.

57. My delegation hardly needs to emphasize that our deep concern about the atmospheric tests held by France in the South Pacific has been one of the motivating forces behind the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.611. However, we have not restricted the first part of our draft to this aspect alone, because we believe that atmospheric nuclear testing is a problem that concerns everyone, as is underground nuclear testing, which we have dealt with in the second part of the draft. We have, therefore, proposed a text that, while drawing attention to atmospheric testing in the Pacific, calls for an end to all atmospheric testing anywhere else in the world. It is hardly necessary for me to

<sup>4</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 25.



point out that all the nuclear Powers presently engaged in testing are Pacific Powers.

58. We must insist on our right to draw attention to the nuclear testing that is taking place in our part of the world, while not losing sight of the overriding need to end all nuclear testing everywhere. The draft we are sponsoring does just that. My delegation is, therefore, surprised to discover that some States clearly feel that our references to the nuclear testing occurring in the Pacific should be so generalized as to remove their immediate impact. It is not without significance that some of these same States were equally opposed to resolution 1379 (XIV), which sought to end nuclear testing in Africa. To my delegation that attitude smacks of support for any atmospheric tests, especially where they are carried out at a distance and preferably on the other side of the world.

59. Resolution 1379 (XIV), which my delegation had the honour to support, called for an end to nuclear testing on the African continent. We appeal to our African colleagues to give us the same consideration in our endeavour to ban these tests from our area. The people of the Pacific—and there are many small States in that region not represented here—reject nuclear tests; they demand an end to them. They are disturbed and angered when they read reports that more tests are scheduled for next year and that the explosions in this series will be larger than ever. The former director of the French Nuclear Testing Centre has said, in an article reproduced in *Le Monde*, that its testing programme does not have an immediately identifiable end-date. He added that he personally felt that testing should continue. The people of New Zealand find this prospect intolerable. The test series held this year led to an upsurge of public protest and demonstration against nuclear testing in the Pacific area which exceeded anything we had experienced previously. In this situation my delegation is not prepared to accept any amendments to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.611 which either imply that nuclear testing in the South Pacific is not a problem or which question the right of countries to raise matters of regional concern in the United Nations.

60. My delegation has for many years spoken in this forum strongly against atmospheric testing wherever it is carried out. Nothing less than suspension of atmospheric testing would now be an adequate response from all the Governments concerned.

61. Mr. DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...”—so begins a document entitled “Charter of the United Nations”. It was signed barely a quarter-century ago, but it would appear that men, or at least States, have forgotten the reasons for the signing of that document. History seems to show that such has always been the case.

62. At the painful end of every conflict in which men have slaughtered one another, after every war of extermination, over what is left—the rubble, the ruins, the desolation and the misery—the victors and the vanquished—although we cannot say for sure which is which—have usually signed

declarations full of promises and good intentions to proscribe war as the only way of solving our problems.

63. The last of those declarations, which I quoted at the beginning of this statement, had its origin at the end of one of the most bloody and merciless of wars, a war that ended with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It would seem as if men, terrified at their own power of destruction, had finally come to realize where their true interests lay: certainly not in domination exercised by some over others, but in co-operation and brotherhood, in peaceful interchange, to the benefit of all equally.

64. The Charter had hardly come into force when the provisions of its Article 2 were violated. Powerful Members of the Organization formed for the creation of peace resorted in their international relations to the threat and the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of other States, defenceless States, while the machinery provided in the Charter remained unable to get under way for the purpose of stopping them. But the fact is that war carries within itself the seeds of great power. Once victorious, States accumulate power so that they can apply it to secure the economic and social welfare of their own peoples. Those peoples, who have been subjected to the will of power, are then sent off, with no possibility of protest, to conquer other peoples. What one great Power does in this way inevitably provokes a reaction from the competing Power. That struggle of power and for power engenders what we have called “the arms race”. This phrase has been used so frequently in the course of the centuries that it has become a mere academic phrase employed to trigger off debates, equally academic, in assemblies such as this one. But we seem also to have forgotten the content and the meaning of the words. History shows that it is sufficient for one of the all-powerful States to find a leader who will turn all the powers he has assumed for purposes of social welfare into means for waging war, for all the other States to be forced to imitate his conduct. And this is so because the more complete the state domination over national resources, the deeper, the more unforeseen and the more irresistible is the invasion that an armed community can unleash against a peaceful community. We saw that historic fact demonstrated with dramatic eloquence during the last world conflagration, in the form of “total war”. We are witnessing it today, when we see how, against a small people, in a conflict which has ironically been termed “local”, a formidable arsenal is turned, an arsenal without equal in the history of mankind, as if what was involved was a modern Carthage.

65. The great Powers that were the victors in the last world war, however, seem not to have learned the lessons of history and stubbornly seek to resolve problems of a political or economic nature by military solutions. This obviously results in the multiplication of armaments and, what is even more terrible, in the ruthless and massive use of such weapons for the purpose of destroying any alleged enemy who opposes such solutions. Victory over such an enemy cannot be obtained through war, which only increases the misery, but through peace and the fraternal and human interchange that can cure that misery. The millions devoted to destruction would serve as a far stronger barrier against misery and the presumed enemy,



were they to be used for economic, social and technical development, for improving the standards of living, the progress and the education of the disinherited areas of the world. As an eminent Japanese sociologist, Yoshizaka Sakamoto, put it:

“Three hundred thousand dollars are spent in Viet Nam to kill one man, in a country where the *per capita* income reaches an annual average of \$US 50 . . . If in Viet Nam, in the form of assistance for economic development, the \$US 60 million that is being spent daily in the war had been invested, even assuming that the beneficiary were a government different in ideology from that of the investor Government, a decisive victory would have been won over that ideology”.

66. One fact alone is clear: after 20 years of efforts aimed at finding a military solution to the problems of South-East Asia, the sole result has been the failure of those who have advocated such a solution, and misery, suffering and backwardness for the innocent victims.

67. Could we say that the will of the peoples hungers for expansion, desires war, and that the man in the street wants to pay for war and enlist in the army?

68. The answer can only be no. All peoples, with very few exceptions, are peace-loving, for peace implies the full and complete enjoyment of life. Perhaps the evil springs from those who call themselves the State. They reserve to themselves the right to speak for the nation, without acknowledging interests of the nation that differ from those of the State. The people that form the nation is then unable to defend itself. Perhaps, therefore, the Soviet writer, winner of the Nobel Prize, Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, was right when, in an article recently published in *The New York Times*, he said:

“A quarter century ago the United Nations was born amidst the high hopes of humanity. But alas, in a world without morality it was born without morality. It is not a United Nations Organization but a United Governments Organization . . .”.

Without going as far as the Soviet author I have just mentioned, I would venture to say that the word for the opposite of “arms race”, that is to say “disarmament”, will not run the same risk of losing its content and becoming an academic word, which it seems about to do after 11 years of discussion on the matter, as the representative of Sweden pointed out, if the States, the Governments, those which today make up the United Nations—and I refer particularly to the super-Powers and the great Powers—show a minimum of goodwill in trying to solve the problem.

69. If I say “States” and if I say “Governments” it is because no one can possibly think that the peoples, the nations, desire war. This has been the case right through history. In the eighteenth century Montesquieu, in the *Spirit of the Laws*, wrote:

“A new disease has spread over Europe: it has afflicted our princes and forces them to maintain an excessive number of troops. This disease multiplies and obviously becomes contagious, since as soon as one State increases

what it terms its troops, others do likewise, and thus we gain nothing from this but common ruin. Each monarch keeps the biggest armies he can maintain, as though his people were in danger of being exterminated, and we call this condition of force confronting force peace.”

70. The 1914-1918 war caused the deaths of 8 million persons and the wounding and mutilation of 6 million. Among all the European belligerents, 8 per cent of the male productive force was annihilated. In France and Germany that figure rose to 10 per cent, and the atomic weapon did not then exist.

71. The enormous number of human lives sacrificed in the last war—or perhaps, I should say, the penultimate war, if I am to be more exact as far as wars of extermination are concerned—speaking only of the actual battlefields, can be compared only with those of the victims immolated in the concentration camps and in those cities and camps turned into targets for classic or conventional and incendiary weapons of destruction.

72. But today people can no longer turn a blind eye to war. In mediaeval days they could do so as long as they were far from the theatre of military operations. At present, on the contrary, enemies and friends alike see their homes burned, their families massacred, and count their victories in terms of destroyed acreage. The very intellect, formerly indifferent to those conflicts, today is galvanized and used in the enterprise of conquest to proclaim the civilizing virtue of the artillerymen and the incendiaries.

73. The super-Powers and the great Powers are inevitably, in turn, the greatest producers of weapons. They begin to manufacture them to meet their own weapon requirements and to swell their arsenals. For some of them, the manufacture of weapons is part and parcel of their programmes of economic development. Obviously they must find a market in which to sell either their surplus or their obsolete weapons. Thus among the smaller nations—a natural market since they do not manufacture their own—in a lesser degree a new arms race has started, mirroring that of the greater nations but usually limited to buying the left-overs, thus undermining and weakening economic and social development programmes. In the saddest cases the epilogue is war among the small nations, incited to this by those who sell weapons. As Mr. Taittinger, the representative of France, pointed out when he cited those well-known figures of the sums devoted to nuclear and conventional weapons, two thirds of the total amount devoted to the manufacture of arms in the world is spent by the super-Powers and the other third by the third world.

74. I see no point in dwelling on these matters or with the meagre results, however sensational they may be made to appear, achieved on the bilateral level. This has already been done, with figures and in minute detail, with greater authority and precision, by many other speakers who have taken part in this debate, and particularly by the representative of Mexico [*1884th meeting*], in his outstanding statement, and the representative of Sweden [*1882nd meeting*].

75. For all these reasons we are convinced that the only feasible formula for putting an end to the uncontrolled

arms race and to the evils it creates for mankind, is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. That has been the position of my delegation since this item was first included in the agenda of the General Assembly. It is also what has been affirmed by the General Assembly time after time.

76. We also believe that the appropriate framework within which to devise ways and means of achieving that end can only be that of the United Nations. We know that its competence is established in the Charter in Articles 11, 26 and 47.

77. Despite the efforts made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the results obtained have been few. As far back as the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, that body, in resolution 2826 (XXVI), requested the depositary Governments of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

78. Venezuela voted in favour of that resolution because we are convinced that an agreement of this nature is a first positive step towards an agreement on effective measures to prohibit also the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons; therefore in July of this year we signed the above-mentioned Convention in Washington and soon expect to decide upon its ratification.

79. We have also condemned atomic tests in the Pacific wherever that question has been raised. Furthermore the Venezuelan Congress approved a communiqué condemning such tests.

80. General and complete disarmament is not only a humanitarian goal that will save peoples from the danger of mass destruction and the grim horrors of war; it also specifically meets the interests of developing countries, since resources no longer spent on armaments can be used to assist development by multilateral means and without conditions.

81. It is obvious and cannot be denied that bilateral conversations on disarmament among the great Powers constitute positive and praiseworthy steps, but it would be desirable for such conversations to be included as far as possible in multilateral machinery in which the small nations have a voice and participate.

82. That is why we believe in the legitimacy of and the need for international control over disarmament measures—reasonable control that in no way violates the national integrity of the different States and that should preferably be exercised by small nations and be limited to the supervision of weapons which are not of a simply territorial defensive nature.

83. Because it is in keeping with our anti-colonialist position, Venezuela supports the effort to eliminate foreign military bases so long as that effort is objective and not partial.

84. We feel that this cannot be achieved without the participation of the nuclear-weapon super-Powers. We

admit and acknowledge that disarmament measures must begin with an agreement among those Powers. Yet the elaboration of such an agreement without the participation of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which might even be stopped from manufacturing such weapons, would, as we see it, be tantamount to handing over to the super-Powers, in addition to the many monopolies they already possess, the monopoly of terror.

85. That is why my delegation agrees that a world disarmament conference should be open to all States without restriction.

86. In his statement at the beginning of our debate, the representative of Mexico with his usual precision told us that an immense number of countries had expressed agreement to the convening of such a conference [*1872nd meeting*]; in the course of this debate we have seen that figure increase further.

87. The non-aligned nations, in reiterating their previous resolutions when they adopted the resolution at the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 12 August this year, again advocated the holding of a world disarmament conference.

88. Therefore, there can be no possible doubt regarding the will of peoples for such a conference to be held. However, we understand the apprehension, even the scruples that may be felt by some great Powers regarding the holding of such a conference. We are, furthermore, convinced that for such a conference to be successful a *sine qua non* condition must be the ability to count on the participation of all Powers without exception, be they super-Powers, great Powers, medium-sized Powers or small Powers.

89. It is equally evident that a conference of the scope and importance of the one suggested must be very carefully prepared. Thus we believe that an appropriate organ should be established to prepare for the conference provided that that organ is given precise terms of reference to be carried out within a given time. We are ready to support any proposal consistent with Venezuelan hopes. We could therefore support the suggestion of Argentina [*1873rd meeting*] and the additions to it contained in the working paper of Brazil [*A/C.1/L.618*]—namely, that such an organ, which could be called an *ad hoc* committee or a preparatory committee or by any other name, should include, in addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council—which are, in fact, the five great nuclear Powers—the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a limited number of other States equitably representing the different geographical regions of the world. We do not believe that even those nuclear Powers that deem the holding of a world disarmament conference either premature or inappropriate could possibly refuse to participate in the work of such a committee. Indeed, it is there, in such a committee, that those States' views and proposals would find their most appropriate forum and echo; it is there that States can express their approval or their disapproval. In particular, with regard to the People's Republic of China, which has stated it would not be first to use atomic weapons and that it is at all times shoulder-to-shoulder with the developing countries, it is in that forum

that that statement of the People's Republic of China could be reaffirmed, and those countries which, like my own, belong to the developing nations of the third world, would be most gratified to hear that at least one of the atomic Powers speaks our language and is ready to associate itself with the points of view of the smaller nations.

90. But we must make it very clear that the General Assembly should unequivocally pronounce itself on the will expressed by the majority of delegations in the course of this debate on the matter of finding solutions to put into practice the provisions of the Charter concerning disarmament. I therefore wish to conclude this statement in the way the representative of Syria concluded his this afternoon—and this is a fortunate coincidence; we have not conversed on the matter—by citing the words of one of the persons most experienced in and having the highest moral authority on these matters. I refer to Mrs. Alva Myrdal, representative of Sweden, for whom we have the greatest admiration. She said:

“I know I speak for the majority of mankind when I urge that something must be promised, and something must be done by way of disarmament, and done soon”. [*1882nd meeting, para. 102.*]

91. My delegation reserves its right to speak again when the Committee proceeds to the consideration of the draft resolutions on the question of disarmament, since two among them are sponsored by my delegation.

92. Mr. LUKINDO (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time that I have taken the floor, allow me on behalf of my delegation to extend our congratulations to you, Sir, on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of this Committee. We wish to extend similar congratulations to the other officers of the Committee on their unanimous appointment to their respective posts. My delegation has every reason to feel confident that, under your good chairmanship and with the assistance of your colleagues, our work will be an unqualified success. To that end my delegation pledges its full co-operation.

93. As the Committee on Disarmament is at the end of the first 10 years of its work there is a temptation to review the achievements in the field of disarmament. My delegation wishes briefly to comment on what have been referred to as achievements in disarmament efforts. A few treaties have been concluded within the United Nations. My delegation would be the last to say that these treaties mean nothing. They do mean something. But what is that something?

94. The representative of Nigeria, speaking in this Committee on 26 October, pointed out that disarmament procedure could be divided into three categories: first, non-armament measures; secondly, arms limitation; and thirdly, actual disarmament. He observed that: “Agreements so far concluded in the field of disarmament and arms control measures . . . have been confined to the first category, that is, non-armament measures”. [*1875th meeting, para. 92.*] My delegation shares the view of the Nigerian delegation. What it means in the final analysis is that while those who have had no arms have agreed not to have them, those that already have them have made no

corresponding gesture. Instead they have taken advantage of the situation by having even more than they will ever need. Alas, it so happens that it is the very first advocates of disarmament, those that waged the last two world wars and were the first signatories to the Charter, that have pursued a policy of reckless production of arms. It is to the subsequent signatories, those that have been the victims of the arms race, that credit is due for whatever achievement has been realized in this field of disarmament.

95. Look at the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. What does it seek to do? Not to disarm those that are already armed but to deny arms to those who are still unarmed and to preserve the monopoly of arms for those that have them.

96. Look also at the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Again, merely the prevention of the spread of nuclear arms to other countries is achieved here. What guarantee is there that, if war erupts, those who possess nuclear weapons will not direct their missiles to that part of the world, albeit on some flimsy excuse?

97. Recently a Convention banning biological Weapons was concluded. What does that Convention really achieve? We know that resort to biological weapons is feared even by the owners of such weapons themselves for its effects on the user cannot be guarded against. This is the main reason, it seems to me, why it was so easy to conclude the Convention. Is there really any indication of courage and sacrifice in agreeing to ban the use of bacteriological weapons?

98. Why were chemical weapons not banned at the same time, as called for by the majority of nation? Yet we know that chemical weapons are much more frequently used than biological weapons. Again the reason is that there is really no serious intent on the part of those that have and use chemical weapons to do away with them, for while biological weapons are not really useful for their purposes, chemical weapons on the other hand are useful and are used for their purposes.

99. The same thing can be said of the Treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In truth, the reason why it was easy to agree upon that Treaty is that testing nuclear weapons in the three environments was no longer necessary in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, since it can be done underground. Did such an agreement really call for any courage at all on the part of the signatories? Why did they not also agree to ban underground testing? My delegation is not at all convinced that the problem of verification was the obstacle, and even less so today when devices for the detection of underground nuclear explosions have been developed to a stage sufficient to serve the purpose of detection.

100. The reason for the very existence of the United Nations and the subject matter of the very sacred Charter of our Organization is peace, security and justice.

101. It was not merely a display of linguistic art on the part of the authors of the Charter when they opened the provisions of the Charter with solemn and graphic words. Here I quote, by coincidence, the same words that have



been quoted by the representative of Venezuela before me, as follows: "We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . .". It is the expression of a serious decision against a repetition of the ghastly world-wide terror which they had experienced during two most destructive and widespread wars. It was a determination to turn all the military hardware they possessed into ploughshares and redirect and apply all their resources towards the realization of the economic prosperity and spiritual enrichment of all mankind.

102. With the spirit of the first signatories in mind, any activity to develop, manufacture, produce or possess any military weapons cannot but be a negation of the aims and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the dishonouring of the pledge undertaken when signing it.

103. Yet what do we now witness, 27 years after the end of the last world war? The truth, ironical as it may be, is that of the arsenals of arms now in the hands of the peoples of the United Nations, particularly those belonging to the super-Powers were to be put, which God forbid, to the use for which they were intended, they would make the combined effects of the first and second world wars look like a mere skirmish. Indeed there would probably be nobody left to tell, or hear, what it was all about.

104. So we are now on the threshold between this totally bleak future—if future there might indeed be—and prospects for meaningful and even permanent world-wide peace. The choice is entirely ours—to wipe ourselves off the face of this earth or to give other generations the chance to continue living in it. This is a very grave responsibility, deserving the most serious treatment by all of us.

105. At least in our desire for peace, this seriousness does not appear to be lacking. What is lacking is positive measures to assure us that peace is at hand. The nations of the world have turned away from each other and pinned their hopes for peace and security on building up their military might. This is a totally false foundation for peace and it only increases tension, fear, suspicion and restlessness in relations among nations. It also deprives world populations of the basic requirements for meaningful human existence. One only needs to look at the report of the Secretary-General, *Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditure*<sup>5</sup> to see that bizarre picture. Therefore, my delegation joins those of many other countries who, in this and other forums, have advocated the convening of a world disarmament conference as a logical answer to this crucial problem.

106. Disarmament, of course, does not necessarily mean an end to hostilities and we know that so long as hostilities remain there will always be a tendency for man to fight, whether with nuclear, conventional or primitive weapons. However, we also know that the more sophisticated and dangerous the weapons are that we use in fighting, the more widespread and indiscriminate will be the destruction which we bring on ourselves, not to mention the corresponding

diversion of funds and skills from essential and sane human needs. Therefore let the nation disarm.

107. In the prevailing atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion it would be futile to leave the problem of disarmament to the initiative and voluntary will of individual nations. It is, in fact, this distrust and suspicion which understandably make some nations, few as they may be, feel that there might be no sense in convening a world disarmament conference. However, it is facing each other and engaging in honest and frank discussion, rather than turning away from each other and avoiding discussion, that holds promise for dispelling the heavy fog of suspicion and distrust which constantly drives nations into blind conflicts and brings so much misery and suffering on this earth.

108. Talks on disarmament have been taking place in bilateral and other restricted forums for many years, but so far their results have been very limited, minimal and unsatisfactory, and their contribution towards relieving tension negligible. Only a disarmament conference on a world-wide scale would measure up to the universal cry for an end to the senseless arms race.

109. Overwhelming support has been given to the call for a world disarmament conference. The non-aligned group of countries, during the last decade or so and in four conferences within that period, have unanimously called for the convening of such a conference. This support has been voiced here in this Committee by almost all countries—all, that is, but two, the United States and China, which have stated the reasons for their reluctance or reservations. But my delegation believes that whatever differences and hurdles may exist on this matter should be carefully examined with a view to reconciling and overcoming them.

110. That is why the Tanzanian delegation, like many others, agrees with the proposal made by the Argentine delegation, that a study group be set up immediately to examine the conditions for the convening of the proposed conference and to try to disentangle the factors which stand in the way of that conference. It would be useless for such a conference to be convened in the absence of conditions which would ensure its success.

111. Thorough preparations are therefore necessary before such a conference could be held. It should also be ascertained that the nuclear Powers and permanent members of the Security Council would participate in the conference. Without them there would be no meaning in any negotiations. The recent contacts and treaties which have brought about some measure of détente between East and West made some of us feel that there may be prospects for the super-Powers to be less rigid in their positions. This may be so.

112. But détente in Europe and elsewhere between the big Powers, welcome as it is, is not enough. So long as the evils of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and economic exploitation are being perpetrated, peace and, therefore, disarmament will remain only a dream. After a long appeal to reason seems to be of no avail, resort to violence may be seen as the only way of ridding the earth of those evils, and there is no telling to what limits such a conflict may extend.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.72.IX.16.



113. A few days ago this Committee was discussing the question of peaceful uses of outer space, including the desirability of making any resources that may be found on the moon the common heritage of mankind. The Powers which have conquered space, the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed to co-operate rather than compete in the further exploration of outer space. This newly found, enlightened approach will probably help to restore to all of us sufficient sanity and sensitivity so that when we turn our vision back to our own earth we may see with revulsion the horrors we bring upon ourselves—the conflict in the Middle East, the barbaric bombings in Indo-China, the dehumanizing practices of racism and *apartheid*, and the inhumanity of colonialism, neo-colonialism and economic exploitation—and then make an honest and serious effort to rectify them. If this does not happen, no degree of détente in Europe or elsewhere between the big Powers will sufficiently dispel the tension which puts obstacles in the way towards the goal of disarmament and peace, for it is hypocrisy on the part of those States that we know talk about peace in the United Nations but go away to commit the evils I have just mentioned or to give support to those who commit them.

114. At this juncture my delegation would like to reaffirm once more its commitment to co-operate fully in the efforts towards disarmament. To that end we have signed some of the relevant treaties and last year we sponsored an item which sought to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. We will work actively with any other States, particularly those of the third world, towards the complete demilitarization of that area as a useful contribution towards world peace and security.

115. Let me say in conclusion that it is a despicable and fatal mistake to dangle our hopes for peace on the unreliable and monstrous scales of the so-called balance of terror, the mere thought of which inspires horror and insecurity rather than calm and assuredness. We know for certain that only a light touch on this balance may send the scales crashing around us with devastating results.

116. The two super-Powers which designed and created this monster owe this and future generations of mankind the inescapable obligation to come forth and co-operate fully with all other nations—large, medium-sized and small—to destroy it before it destroys us. To succeed in this undertaking we have to open up the springs of political goodwill and human understanding which have long remained blocked by the pursuit of selfish interests and an inordinate greed for power and influence.

117. Mr. GRIGOROV (Bulgaria): At the 1874th meeting, my delegation stated its position with regard to the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference. I should like now to make some brief comments on the other disarmament items on our agenda.

118. The problem of disarmament has continuously been a subject of consideration in the United Nations ever since this Organization was established—and rightly so. There is no other problem that affects so deeply the vital interests of mankind and is so closely linked to the ultimate goal of the Charter of the United Nations: the attainment of international peace and security.

119. Progress in this field has been slow, and it could not have been otherwise. There are many factors that make disarmament not an easy task. Let me enumerate some of them: the forces which opposed the very idea of disarmament, and are still at work now; the complicated international situation, characterized by deep contradictions; the sensitive and intricate nature of the problems involved; the existence of apprehension and suspicion left over from the cold war period; the need to guarantee equal security for all States; and so on. However, the persistent efforts of the peace-loving nations, coupled with the growing sense of reason and realism on the part of many Governments in the West, have yielded positive results. It may suffice to mention but a few: the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,<sup>6</sup> the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, the sea-bed demilitarization Treaty of 1971,<sup>7</sup> the biological weapons Convention of 1972.<sup>8</sup> Those achievements, accomplished over the 10-year period of existence and continuous labour of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, gave good reason for the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, to call that Committee "... the most effective and productive organ for multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations available to the international community." [see CCD/PV.545.]

120. To the list of accomplishments should be added the two bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms limitation [see A/C.1/1026], which were signed last May and came into effect 2 months ago. Those agreements represent important practical steps towards curtailing the nuclear arms race and a significant contribution to international security. The next round of the negotiations on strategic arms limitation, scheduled to begin later this month, is awaited by my Government, and I am sure by a broad majority of States, with the hope that it will produce new, positive results and facilitate the solution of other outstanding problems in the field of disarmament.

121. What has been accomplished up to now is undoubtedly far from satisfactory. The progress achieved has been mainly in the sphere of so-called collateral or partial measures. The pace of advance has been slow. The arms race has not been brought to an end. It is quite clear, however, that in the present circumstances, and in view of the factors I mentioned earlier, the method of a step-by-step approach to disarmament is the only realistic one. That is why we cannot agree with some views expressed here which tend to belittle the accomplishments, cast doubts, and reflect a feeling of negativism regarding the whole problem of disarmament. The Bulgarian Government and the Bulgarian people—and surely all peoples in the world—would prefer to have general and complete disarmament accomplished this very day.

<sup>6</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

<sup>7</sup> Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

<sup>8</sup> Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

122. Ten years ago the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including Bulgaria, submitted in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a proposal containing a comprehensive plan for stage-by-stage measures, accompanied by strict control machinery, aimed at the unqualified abolition of all weapons. There were no serious or reasonable objections to that plan. It was the lack of will on the part of some Western Powers that blocked the way to the carrying out of that plan. Had it been accepted and acted upon, the world could by now have achieved the desired goal.

123. Yet we continue to hear voices blaming the two so-called super-Powers indiscriminately for the unabated arms race, disregarding the records of history, which show that one of those super-Powers, the Soviet Union, has for the last 55 years been the sole champion of the idea of general and complete disarmament and has repeatedly made concrete proposals to that effect, not only at the time when the Soviet Union was not in possession of nuclear weapons but also later, when it was forced to produce them, and up to the present day. It is an undeniable fact that all the major successful steps in the disarmament field have been initiated by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

124. It is deplorable that some nuclear Powers, while expressing dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs, find it preferable to stand aside from the efforts of the world community in its search for a realistic solution to the vital problem of disarmament. Such a position can only harm this noble cause. The Bulgarian delegation, like many others, expresses the hope that all countries which have not yet done so will accede to the international agreements in the field of disarmament thus far concluded, and join in the efforts to achieve further progress on the road to peace and security in the world.

125. Experience has shown that world disarmament is a realistic task. The conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is eloquent proof that measures of a real disarmament nature can be achieved. For the first time in history we have an international agreement providing for the total abolition of a weapon of mass destruction. Bulgaria was one of the first countries to sign the Convention in Moscow. We welcome the fact that up to now almost 100 countries have done so.

126. Further efforts are needed to take another important step on the road to disarmament—a total ban on chemical weapons. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted much attention to that question in the course of its proceedings this year. That was in line with General Assembly resolution 2827 A (XXVI), which in its paragraph 2 requested the Committee to consider the question of chemical weapons as an item of high priority.

127. On 28 March this year the socialist countries members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to that Committee a draft convention on the prohibition of the development production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. [A/8818, annex B, sect. 5] Not only the sponsors but also some

other delegations found that draft a sound basis for elaborating a chemical weapons convention.

128. It is regrettable that the Committee has not yet arrived at an agreement on the draft convention. The major obstacles which impeded the speedy progress of work on this item were two main problems: first, the definition of the scope of prohibition and, secondly, the securing of an effective control mechanism.

129. With regard to the scope of prohibition, the Bulgarian Government advocates the criterion of the objective contained in the draft of the socialist countries. That criterion allows the extension of the scope of prohibition to all kinds of chemical weapons whatever their degree of toxicity. We stand for such a comprehensive ban. The criteria suggested by some other countries leave certain types of chemical weapons outside the pale of prohibition. That is the major negative feature of those criteria and that which makes them unacceptable.

130. As for the problem of verification, we are in favour of using for that purpose national forms of control supplemented by international procedures, including recourse to the Security Council, as provided for in the draft of the socialist countries.

131. My delegation is firmly convinced that the speedy conclusion of an agreement on effective measures for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of States is easy to reach. The over-emphasis on technical difficulties is unfounded. We see the major obstacle to this goal in the absence of political will on the part of some Western Powers. It is our hope that the current session of the Assembly will adopt a clear-cut resolution which will urge the Conference on the Committee of Disarmament to exert all efforts with a view to reaching an early agreement on this paramount issue.

132. Another important problem on which the attention of the Conference on the Committee of Disarmament was focused this year was the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Here, too, the main obstacle which impeded progress towards the early conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests was the refusal of the United States to accept the idea of detection and identification of nuclear tests by national means. Rapid scientific and technological progress has made seismological methods the most effective means of verification. Let me refer to the working paper of Canada and Sweden [*ibid.*, sect. 23], of July this year, which proves that the possibility of a correct identification of a seismic phenomenon through seismic means exceeds 95 per cent. It is not difficult to substitute the less than 5 per cent uncertainty by the same degree of trust which constitutes an indispensable element of any international treaty and was already demonstrated in previous agreements, including the SALT agreement. We fully agree with what the Secretary-General states in the introduction to his report on the work of the United Nations: "What is now required is the necessary political decision to ensure a final comprehensive test ban agreement".<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1A, sect. VI.

133. In conclusion, I would like to express the hope that the current session of the Assembly will live up to the expectations of all the peoples of the world by taking decisions which will further enhance the fruitful efforts in the field of disarmament. The present movement towards a détente offers a propitious climate for new steps in that direction. While working for the solution of partial disarmament problems we should always have in mind the final objective—attainment of general and complete disarmament—which can bring the desired peace and security to the world.

134. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will recall that at the twenty-sixth session Ambassador Tarabanov, who was then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Bulgaria, was my distinguished predecessor as Chairman of the First Committee. I had the great honour and privilege of serving Ambassador Tarabanov as his Vice-Chairman and consider myself very fortunate for having received the paternal advice and guidance of the great veteran diplomat, of one so mature and experienced as Ambassador Tarabanov—advice and guidance which are making it possible for me to conduct the deliberations of our Committee and for which I feel very grateful.

135. Mr. MOLINA (Costa Rica) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: Very briefly, but I trust clearly, I would like to make known the position of my country regarding the items being examined in this Committee. The first condition, as has so often been stated here, for true peace based on mutual tolerance and general and complete disarmament is a minimum of trust among the nuclear Powers. This trust is necessary both to stem the arms race and to put an end to nuclear and thermonuclear tests, as well as to plan a world disarmament conference that will not end in failure and lead to total despair for the overwhelming number of peoples of the world who have nothing whatever to do with nuclear, thermonuclear, biological or any other weapons of mass destruction.

136. We want to overcome the enormous internal and external difficulties which prevent us from emerging from under-development. But we also bear responsibility in the disarmament venture, since we are part of the human conglomerate that benefits from peace and is destroyed by war.

137. We advocate general and complete disarmament which, by our own example, we can prove is possible. Yet, we realize that to begin disarmament with the smallest nations is to avoid the true solution to the problem. That can be achieved as the final stage. It is not a Utopian dream and Costa Rica has done it: we have no army and, with pride, we can show that one can live in peace and within an unalterable institutional order by living under true democracy without either army or arms. But the logical and realistic beginning for disarmament must lie in an effective commitment to eliminate all nuclear, thermonuclear, toxic and chemical or biological weapons, or all style of weaponry. To reach this, not only must a willingness exist, not only must a purpose be established, not only must words be spoken, but there must exist a minimum of confidence among the nuclear Powers which will lead to action. Too much has been spoken on the subject and for too long.

138. We can accept all the wise recommendations that have been made here to achieve general and complete disarmament, to stem the arms race and to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, as well as all other types of weapons, or to take all these subjects to a world disarmament conference. If there is suspicion, if there is doubt, if there is mistrust among the five nuclear Powers, then resolutions will never be implemented, will be a mere dead letter, like other resolutions that the United Nations has adopted and that do nothing but undermine its prestige. The Organization is running the risk of becoming an ineffective, immobile and useless body. It is we, the Members, that must inject mobility, agility and decision in the Organization. And if our diplomatic actions and political persuasions fail to convince the nuclear Powers of the essential need to deal confidently with the question of deciding on general and complete disarmament, the world will continue to be threatened with destruction, and social and economic needs will increase as still further proof of the fact that we men lack the capacity to solve our differences in civilized fashion.

139. I would prefer not to be pessimistic but, rather, persuasive. Much has already been said. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is many years old. We are now in the second year of the Disarmament Decade and time is alarmingly short, and we have not yet come to practical decisions. The Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, in his introduction to the report on the work of the Organization, told us that:

“The balance-sheet of the first decade shows that the declared goal of general and complete disarmament has not yet been achieved. Neither has the arms race been halted nor perceptibly slowed down. In fact, the armaments race has spiralled to a level higher than ever before.”<sup>10</sup>

140. I should like to evaluate what has been said, with somewhat undiplomatic frankness but with political reality. Almost all speakers on this subject have agreed that for any agreement on disarmament or on the world disarmament conference to be effective, a consensus of the five nuclear Powers is necessary. But let us look at matters realistically: China, in order not to collaborate, states that it doubts the sincerity of the United States and the Soviet Union; the United States feels that the world disarmament conference may become a propaganda forum; France continues to carry out nuclear tests; the United Kingdom confesses that the technical problems involved in disarmament must be tackled with patience, and the Soviet Union proposes disarmament resolutions, but has not signed, for example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco; therefore the majority of the resolutions have not been put into effect. Fortunately, it would appear that the differences are not insurmountable, but what we really lack, if we look at the matter seriously, is confidence. That is the *sine qua non* for any effective action towards disarmament.

141. Therefore, the words of our former Secretary-General, U Thant, are still valid. He said:

“There is an urgent need to make even more determined efforts to adopt effective measures that are conducive to

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

nuclear disarmament. All nuclear-weapon Powers have the duty to work out and implement a practical programme for the total prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the world manages to survive in a precarious balance of nuclear force while material and human resources, which could immeasurably improve the standards of living and the quality of life for all people, have been diverted from productive peaceful purposes to an unproductive and dangerous arms race.

"In the final analysis, disarmament must remain unattainable and all blueprints remain scraps of paper unless all negotiators cast aside unwarranted fears and suspicion and proceed with determination towards achieving essential security at ever lower armament levels. During my years in office there have been signs that such a spirit is developing. This offers some hope that both the real and imagined obstacles to concrete progress in disarmament may be overcome."<sup>11</sup>

142. For all the reasons I have given my delegation supports general and complete disarmament, the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, and the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as the diversion of the millions of dollars squandered on weapons to the solution of the economic and social problems that beset the great majority of the peoples of the earth.

143. The CHAIRMAN: There are no further speakers inscribed on my list for this afternoon. However, I will now make a short but, I hope, significant statement.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, paras. 43 and 44.

144. I am forced, once again, to remind the members of the First Committee to be punctual. I ask all members to consider carefully the implications of the loss of working time. So far the time we have lost has already cost the United Nations a considerable amount of money—I understand at least \$10,000. Considering the fact that the total annual budget of the United Nations is less than the budget of the Fire Department of the City of New York, it is very clear that we cannot afford to waste time and, consequently, money.

145. We must consider the fact that our budget in the United Nations comes from the contributions of our Members. We must consider further the labours of our Secretary-General to improve the financial situation of the Organization. It becomes very clear, then, that a new approach is necessary. The punctuality I urge upon you will be particularly important in the next few days. For instance, we shall have no less than 10 or 12 speakers for each of our meetings on Thursday and Friday. I therefore once again ask for the co-operation of each and every member of the Committee in being here on time. We must begin all our meetings on time, all of the time. We cannot afford to do less.

146. Before adjourning, I wish to remind the Committee that the plenary meeting tomorrow will consider the three items on outer space, that is, items 28, 29 and 37, which were before our Committee, and will discuss those items on the basis of two reports, documents A/8863 and A/8864, which will be introduced by our Rapporteur, Mr. Santiso-Gálvez.

*The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.*