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(Mauritius).

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Chemical and bacteriological (Biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818)

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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/8807)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8653, A/8808, A/C.1/L.619)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the Secretary-General (A/8809)

1. Mr. ESPINOSA (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Once again the General Assembly, through its political Committee, is debating the various items relating to disarmament. We might well allow ourselves to be pessimistic. Torrents of words have been spoken and tons of books and documents have been circulated, yet instead of being able to cure the chronic disease of weapon-hunger, the world today is worse afflicted than it was in critical periods when the threat of war itself was about to become a tragic reality.

2. Prior to the First World War, military expenditures were approximately equal to 3 or 3.5 per cent of the combined gross national product of all nations. Today, when we are complacently taking note of the historic event of détente between the great Powers, which has diminished or eliminated the danger of a world conflagration, those military expenditures rise to 6 or 6.5 per cent of the highest gross national product that mankind has ever registered. This corresponds to a multiplication by 20, in real terms, according to well-known analysts, over the last 50 years; and, what is even more serious, it compares a period of pre-war tension with a period of peace.

3. That is so despite the 27 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. This mere fact should really give us pause, should almost lead us to feel guilty because of our failure to carry out one of the main tasks which the Charter entrusts to the Security Council and the General Assembly; it might even impel us to act in such a way that events will have some relationship to the words that we speak in these discussions. Otherwise, this Organization will lose the little confidence remaining in it as a result of its accomplishments in other fields and the support upon which it can still count, since many do feel that it is, or should be, the best instrument to assure international peace and security.

4. I am not ignoring the agreements, treaties and conventions that have been agreed to in the last few years prohibiting or merely limiting certain weapons. Many speakers who have preceded me have mentioned them and have enhanced our debate through their observations and reasoning. I would only take note that some of them were arrived at without the slightest participation on the part of the United Nations and that not all of them have been implemented. But I must go back to the excessive amount of military expenditure, because even though a major war has been avoided, it is not reassuring to realize that the arms fever is much higher than it was on the eve of bloody hostilities. It is just as though we were not constantly speaking of peace here, and were doing nothing effective to ensure full peace, without the painful breaches that have occurred in the last few years as well as the ones we are still deploring, calmly confessing the inability of the Organization to avoid such conflagrations and clashes or to put an end to them.

5. There can be no doubt that outside events follow one another at a breakneck speed, and behind these walls we are barely moving forward, at a rhythm that at times could without exaggeration be termed "geological". Perhaps this is one reason why a well-known statesman, Mr. Godber, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, reminded us at the 1877th meeting that 11 or 12 years ago he had come to this self-same Committee and spoke on the same or similar questions, and he contended that the problems have fundamentally not changed. When I heard him say that, I recalled the acute observation of one of my Latin American colleagues, who, after an absence of 15 years, returned to the United Nations and discovered that this Organization has discovered and keeps the secret of eternal youth. According to him, the subjects that his Committee traditionally discussed had also not changed; identical discussions were taking place on similar problems; the same arguments were being adduced and States were still clinging to their old views. My colleague thought that the clock of history had stopped and he was tempted to pull out of his briefcase one of the old statements that he had made 15 years earlier and to reread it—with but a passing illusion of youthfulness, of course, but with a painful feeling of frustration and anxiety. The problems were multiplying and growing in the world, but this Organization was merely distilling the few drops that after centuries will wear away the stone.

6. Because of the enormous difficulties that must be overcome to achieve progress in any field, we ourselves are doubtless rather prone to exaggerate when referring to such things; we welcome these as historic and outstanding events and, therefore, exaggerated hopes are born, which must very soon be dispelled, in order to give us time to start again from the beginning and, after many years, conclude the task, when faith in the ability of the United Nations is practically lost.

7. That was the case for two truly important treaties—to cite only a few examples—treaties that at one time were considered definitive steps toward peace and disarmament, but that have not been as effective as they were expected to be. At each session we have to go back to these treaties and call for the adherence that is still lacking or insist that those who have ratified them comply with them in letter and spirit.

8. Almost 10 years ago the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was signed in Moscow, and the will was expressed to continue negotiations in good faith in order to achieve the permanent suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests. The results have not lived up to our expectations. And we have almost accepted as routine the annual resolutions calling for compliance with the previous ones. My delegation has had the honour at this session to sponsor two such draft resolutions—the first in association with the Pacific States [A/C.1/L.611], and the other in association with countries of Latin America [A/C.1/L.620]. Those texts are couched in different terms, which may ultimately contribute to achieving a success which thus far has been more than elusive—for instance, there is the suggestion to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of a permanent agreement or even on the basis of unilateral or negotiated moratoria.

9. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was concluded almost five years ago. That Treaty turned Latin America into a zone entirely free of nuclear weapons. It was described by U Thant, the then Secretary-General, as "unique in several respects"¹ and by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency as "the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament which provides for the application of an institutionalized and international control systems."² Despite repeated appeals, thus far only the United States, and the United Kingdom, among the nuclear-weapon States, have signed Additional Protocol II, which would make them parties to the Treaty and commit them to respect the status of the denuclearization of Latin America for purposes of war. But this is not the case for China or France or the Soviet Union. This year again we, the Latin American delegations, will urge the Assembly to appeal to those States to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, because if our Governments decided to create a denuclearized oasis in this world, it is inconceivable that those Powers that are capable of disturbing that peace should refuse to commit themselves to abstaining from bringing misery and suffering to a population for whose benefit and security those lethal weapons were prohibited.

10. I could cite further examples in addition to the two that I have just mentioned. But suffice it to say that almost 15 years ago the General Assembly approved a resolution on general and complete disarmament. We are now in the second year of the so-called Disarmament Decade, with meagre results, or, rather, with negative consequences, since, as I indicated at the outset, military expenditures have risen. And thus it is perfectly logical that we should note that a number of the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have raised their voices in alarm, pointing to the stagnation that has taken place after a decade of very difficult labours and proposing a new approach and new bodies in which to exchange ideas more fruitfully, and thus avoid our era being viewed in the future as an era of neo-barbarism, as prophesied by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal at the 1882nd meeting.

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 33, annex III.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 33, Annex IV.

11. Colombia has never been part of that Committee on Disarmament, but surely this should not be an obstacle to our commenting on the reasoning of its members, nor to our taking full part in this debate. The second of the four unanimous conclusions arrived at by the experts appointed by the Secretary-General reads as follows: "Regardless of their size or their stage of development, all countries share the responsibility of taking steps which will help achieve this goal [of disarmament]."³

12. It is true that it is more a responsibility than a right, since at the time that tragedy strikes it is not only the great who suffer but also and to a larger degree the middle-sized and the small nations, even though they may be innocent of the direct causes of the holocaust. Therefore, they are obliged to participate in anything that will avoid that holocaust.

13. Furthermore, my country has followed a consistent policy on this subject. That was made obvious in June 1969, when the then President of the Republic of Colombia, Mr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, stated the following before the Security Council:

"Without being Utopian, one can envisage that the small and medium-sized nations could well take the initiative so that the Council might give more systematic attention to Article 26 of the Charter and, in accordance with Article 1, take the necessary collective measures to prevent what constitutes a real threat to peace; a threat that not only affects one group of nations that might eventually be involved in a war-like situation, but is also a threat to the general peace of the world.

"It is worth noting that the arms race of the major Powers is accompanied by other activities which to a greater or lesser extent affect other nations: the extension of a vast espionage network . . . the many instances of instigation of subversive movements, and the practice of various forms of intervention in internal affairs."⁴

14. During this year's general debate in the Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, Mr. Alfredo Vásquez Carrizosa contended that:

"One indispensable condition for the correct functioning of the United Nations institutions is that the idea of disarmament should be made a reality. While countries of all the continents spend the astronomical figure of \$200,000 million a year on armaments, . . . no thought can truly be given to the full implementation of the legal processes established in San Francisco for the solution of international disputes that lead to so-called local wars.

"The excess of armaments in the world is one of the main obstacles to the true fulfilment by the United Nations of its political and universal mission and it is one of the reasons for the survival of poverty and misery in many parts of the world. . . .

³ See *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.72.IX.16), para. 120.

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969*, document S/9252.

...

"Disarmament is the corner-stone of the edifice of the United Nations. Any revision of the Charter requires and presupposes this condition which is as imperative for the great Powers as it is for the medium-sized and small States." [2052nd plenary meeting, paras. 68, 69 and 71.]

15. It is now incumbent upon my delegation to express its will to co-operate in the cutting of this Gordian knot standing in the way of effective progress towards disarmament, which has diverted to the armaments industry the labours of so many millions of human beings constituting the labour forces of two of the most important Powers of Europe. The Colombian delegation is not unaware of the fact that four fifths of the world's military expenditure are concentrated in only six countries—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Federal Republic of Germany—and that Latin America accounts for only 1 per cent of the total expenditure and 10 per cent of the sums expended by the developing nations. But the expenditure of the six States affects mankind as a whole, because all mankind is deprived of thousands of millions of dollars that could be invested for its benefit instead of in elements for its destruction. And if 1 per cent is small in absolute terms, it is for Latin America, relatively speaking, an enormous expenditure—particularly if we bear in mind the \$75 million with which the United States has been assisting Latin America annually since 1952. The total aid given since that year amounts to \$1,500 million. It is not difficult to calculate the effect of the investment of such an amount in agriculture, industry or work of a strictly social nature.

16. But partial efforts at disarmament have so far been fruitless. For some time it was thought that it would be convenient to impose strict controls upon trade in weapons, which largely affect the nations of the so-called third world. But the developing countries complained that such a system would be an aberrant discrimination, and pointed out that they would be at the mercy of the powerful ones, that is, the producers, who in turn were subject to many kinds of economic pressure exerted by the contractors.

17. Nor have efforts at the regional level been fruitful. In 1923 the five Central American Republics signed a Convention on the limitation of armaments in the region, but it has not been implemented. Again in 1958 Costa Rica proposed that a limit be set on armaments, with careful controls. The initiative did not succeed because a number of countries observed that while others refrained from doing so they themselves could not reduce their armed forces. Last year Colombia revived the idea in the Organization of American States. The General Assembly of that organization, meeting from 11 to 21 April 1972, reiterated that the intention of the Governments of Latin American States members of the Organization of American States to apply to the requirements of economic development and social progress in each of their respective countries the maximum available resources, and expressed the intention of continuing to limit military expenditure to that which each State deems indispensable for its own security.

18. In other words, fear has been kept alive because of the arms psychosis of others, and that indicates that regional

disarmament is difficult, if not impossible. By a process of elimination we come to the obvious conclusion that the problem of disarmament must be studied and solved at the world level or there will be no disarmament; nor, therefore, will there be full international security, or a lasting and stable peace. Excessive armaments irremediably undermine any peace that may exist, and poverty that is not eliminated or reduced because investments are channelled in such large amounts to the work of annihilation constantly threaten what peace there is. As an eminent economist pointed out more than 30 years ago, poverty anywhere generates a danger to the areas which enjoy prosperity.

19. Inevitably this reasoning leads us to believe that only when all the States of the world decide simultaneously to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in good faith can we come any closer to general and complete disarmament—the only true and valid kind of disarmament. We have seen that it has been impossible to attain such disarmament by means of controls over economic sectors or regional decisions; nor has it been possible through the efforts of the Security Council or the General Assembly, or the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, a body to which the others have delegated their powers. But since the only thing we cannot do is resign ourselves to impotence and, by omission, contribute to the fatal course the world is following, it is imperative that we recognize that the developing countries are right, and have been reasonable in advocating since 1961 the holding of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States without exception.

20. That global participation is necessary because the failure of all the other efforts was due to the fact that many, or some States were absent from the deliberations. Therefore we must make serious efforts to secure such participation. It would be extremely serious if any nuclear Powers were to be absent. The refusal of China and France to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament finally paralysed that body. And it would not be strange if the People's Republic of China were to repeat what it said in 1960: that it would only feel bound by a disarmament agreement which was arrived at with its participation and to which it could adhere formally.

21. May I point out that the delegation of Colombia has taken careful note of the resistance of the United States of America to the immediate convening of the conference and the setting of a date for it. But we also take note that the communication to the Secretary-General reproduced in document A/8817 and the statement of Mr. Bush [1872nd meeting] indicate definite progress towards a more flexible position.

22. It is obvious that if we, the spokesmen for the small and medium-sized nations, call for respect and consideration for our opinion and if we protest and resist when the great Powers try to push us, we should also be ready to respect the motives that underlie certain of the positions of the major Powers, even though we may not support their reasoning. But, as has also been said here, we cannot establish the precedent that the veto, which was forced upon us in San Francisco as regards the Security Council, can be transferred to other organs of the United Nations,

when the victorious nations were unable to impose it when the war ended and the Charter was signed. However, this should in no way lessen our desire to seek agreement, and we should not forget that corporations acquire wisdom by exchanging ideas and by joint action, and what is learned by the exchange of ideas can have no better expression than in the confluence of majority views.

23. The Colombian delegation does not wish to conceal the pleasure with which it heard the statements made by the ambassadors of the only three countries of Latin America that are represented on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In their statements, what is traditional in our continent has been made manifest: namely, a true yearning for peace, an unswerving adherence to the norms of international law, and a marked preference for understanding, harmony and conciliation.

24. In the analysis submitted to the Secretary-General by Mexico [see A/8817], Mr. García Robles stated views which I applauded without reservations when he expressed them in a masterly presentation at a meeting of the Latin American group. His sense of realism and the characteristics that I consider to be Latin American virtues led him in his statement to the Committee [1884th meeting] to suggest alternatives which would make the world conference feasible. In order to achieve general agreement he stated that his delegation would be ready to accept a resolution that limited itself to convening the conference “at the earliest possible date”, to establishing an *ad hoc* body on which all the members of the Committee on Disarmament would be represented, together with others, in order to carry out the preparatory work, and to deciding that at the twenty-eighth regular session the General Assembly would study the report to be submitted by that *ad hoc* body.

25. Mr. Frazão of Brazil, in his statement [1878th meeting] and in the working paper he later circulated [A/C.1/L.618], dwelt upon and defined a number of very valuable ways of arriving at a compromise: the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee that would consider the convening of the world disarmament conference in the light of views expressed in the course of this debate, which that body would endeavour to harmonize, after which it would begin the real preparatory work in order to report back to the General Assembly, which would decide upon subsequent steps. We in the Latin American group of States had occasion to begin a study of these important views.

26. Mr. Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina, in a statement [1873rd meeting] that has earned repeated mention in this Committee, suggested that we move very cautiously towards a world disarmament conference. The General Assembly should not prejudge opinions for or against, but should create a committee, “as a prior step,” to study whether or not the necessary conditions were met for that world conference to be convened. Also, by consensus of its members, that committee would draft a report that would serve as a basis for the General Assembly's final decision. Again, we in the Latin American Group have begun to analyse these suggestions, which we understand are also being considered in other groups.

27. There can be no doubt that there are slight differences in the three proposals. Perhaps I have not been wrong in the order in which I have commented on them, since I was moved to consider them in accordance with the scope that each author has given to his own idea: that is to say, from the convening of a conference this year, without setting the date but with the establishment of a preparatory committee, to a committee that would simply study the question without prejudging anything; and in between, the establishing of a committee that would consider the various views, endeavour to harmonize them, and then go on to the preparatory stage for the as yet unconvened conference. I think it would be unjust not to recognize that in this case, as in many others, Latin American ingenuity has been more than fruitful. The idea of Mr. Vinci of Italy regarding the establishment of a working group which would identify areas of agreement and disagreement, perhaps because of our joint Latin origin, is another valuable alternative in the conciliation process to which I have referred.

28. In line with all that I have said in this statement, the Colombian delegation considers that it is imperative that we extricate ourselves from the deadlock in which we find ourselves. The Committee on Disarmament has done its work, but cannot continue it. This has been stated by the majority of its members. But none of us would wish to waste the experience, the knowledge and the awareness of those who for years have given themselves unstintingly to this difficult task. It is being proposed, with virtually unanimous support, that the Committee on Disarmament should form the nucleus of the new preparatory organ or the study group that is to arrange a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States. What is important is that we should not call a halt here and that we should take the necessary steps to give impetus to a movement that will not stop, that will progress more rapidly than at a "geological" pace and that will be ready within a reasonable time, before it is too late, to arrive at general and complete disarmament, which mankind requires and statesmen advocate although not always with the necessary determination to translate their words into deeds.

29. My delegation is ready to co-operate in any effort to achieve harmony on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, which we have proposed should be revised to consider concrete amendments, but to whose immutable principles and norms, whilst they remain unchanged, we offer unswerving support. In other words, ultimately the General Assembly might have to take a decision on the basis of votes but without vetos.

30. To conclude, I should like to voice a hope. I trust that at this time no one will try to stamp the two faces of Janus on whatever draft resolution we adopt, because that image today does not symbolize the ability to see at the same time both the past and the future but bespeaks uncertainty, inability to take decisions. The two-faced image is always there in the unfulfilled resolutions, because their self-contradictory genesis and the extreme care taken to please everyone has sown the seeds of their complete ineffectiveness. And even though the graveyard of still-born resolutions is invisible, awareness of its moral existence will finally crush us. And thus mankind would lose all hope. But since the elements of the initiatives I have commented upon are so valuable for a feasible and fruitful compromise, the

Colombian delegation trusts that the compromise solution at which we arrive will contain the seeds of vigorous activity and not of complacency, which dashes so many hopes.

31. Mr. MEGUID (Egypt): The many statements that have been made in this Committee clearly demonstrate the special interest the community of nations continues to have in all matters pertaining to disarmament. At the same time, they reflect also a generally shared sense of concern at the failure to achieve further multilateral agreements, particularly those that would, at last, respond to and do away with the anxieties that have been ours for decades.

32. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8818], though voluminous and thus indicative of hard and intensive work, does not, this time, enclose a draft treaty to be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration and approval. True as this is, we should be careful not to impute the failure to do so to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament *per se*.

33. It would be worth while to recall that this multilateral negotiating body has worked without a break since March 1962 and that it has been able to produce a number of important and welcomed agreements, despite an international climate that was far less favourable than it appears to be today. Throughout these years it has gradually turned into a most competent, businesslike and expert body that has accumulated invaluable experience regarding the intricate patterns and techniques of arms control negotiations. Its continuing existence can only be looked upon as an asset to the orderly elaboration and formulation of generally acceptable treaty provisions. The generally desired participation of France and China in the Conference would further enhance its efficacy and be of the greatest possible benefit to the bringing about of new measures of arms control and disarmament.

34. The main difficulty which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and before it the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, has always faced and still faces is the perpetual conflict between what is generally considered necessary and desirable to deliberate upon and what has been realistically possible to negotiate and conclude. The choice has always been between an arms control treaty limited in scope or no treaty at all. This is why we have a partial test-ban Treaty which does not cover underground tests, a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which has not curbed the nuclear-arms race, a sea-bed Treaty which does not ban conventional weapons and a Convention on biological weapons which had to leave a similar ban on chemical weapons to a subsequent stage.

35. These agreements have therefore been both praised and censured, depending on the degree of their response to the concern of individual countries. Undoubtedly, they were conducive to a gradual lessening of the international tension between the two super-powers and their respective allies. Yet, to many they nevertheless fell far short of hopes and expectations.

36. In the year of the summit meetings between China and the United States and between the United States and the

Soviet Union, and with the resulting improvement in the international climate, one felt encouraged to hope that meaningful progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations was finally at hand.

37. The strategic arms limitation agreements [see A/C.1/1026] concluded between the two nuclear super-powers were expected to yield beneficial effects. The comprehensive test ban treaty, the most eagerly awaited of all treaties, would perhaps now, at last, receive the green light. Yet, as the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, aptly said in her statement last week, "There is no . . . disarmament measure which has been so thoroughly penetrated from every point of view. And still no agreement is in sight." [1882nd meeting, para. 92.] Thus the impasse in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on this vitally important treaty remains complete. The issue of what constitutes adequate verification, we are told, has not been satisfactorily solved.

38. Yet the number and magnitude of tests undertaken, which are carried out according to long-range planning programmes, seem to indicate quite clearly that there is no intention at the moment to forgo these tests.

39. With others, we take the view that the issue of verification can no longer be considered as the insurmountable obstacle. National means of verification could be entrusted with the task of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. And efficient international exchange of seismological data could satisfactorily complement national means. To that, we could now add a new element of deterrence against clandestine tests which carries increasing weight as détente progresses. It would seem to us more than doubtful that either of the two nuclear super-Powers would wish to violate a comprehensive test ban treaty and thereby risk the squandering of the substantial strategic benefits accruing to it from the new order of things on the international scene. We therefore hope that the General Assembly will again stress its urgent wish that a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapons tests be brought about speedily.

40. The second arms control item which received close attention in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerns the question of banning chemical weapons. No doubt, much effort was exerted to mark an advance in what proved to be a complex and intricate issue. A complete draft treaty was tabled by the socialist countries [A/8818, annex B, sect. 5] which forms, to our mind, an acceptable basis for negotiations. A considerable number of working papers, many suggestions, and informal deliberations focused attention on this important problem.

41. Egypt has always supported a ban based on the comprehensive scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In our view, a chemical weapons prohibition must be not only horizontal, but vertical as well. This means that the ban we should strive to achieve should cover all possible activities in this respect—that is, the development of chemical weapons and their production—and should provide for the complete destruction of all stockpiles existing at the time the treaty enters into force. It should also cover all chemical agents and compounds of types and in quantities used in the production of such weapons and

include the ammunition, the means of delivery necessary to wage chemical warfare, and all related equipment.

42. We know of the difficulties which lie ahead. We feel that much has already been done by way of clarifying the issue. We are confident that next year the Committee on Disarmament will witness renewed and intensified efforts and active negotiations on the prohibition of all chemical weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all States. We also hope that a draft treaty could be worked out and submitted to the next session of the General Assembly.

43. The Secretary-General has submitted for our consideration an important and well-prepared report entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*.⁵

44. Our attention is now drawn to a weapon of which all of us have often heard, but the truly horrendous effects of which are still widely ignored. In the report, the weapon is described as brutal, savage and cruel, as one of the most lethal weapons in existence today and among the most powerful means of destruction and devastation. This weapon burns, poisons and asphyxiates. Its use is indiscriminate since it is directed against military and civilian targets, and against the human being and his environment. The report makes shocking reading. It should be brought to the attention of public opinion on the widest possible basis and Governments should be requested to offer comments on its contents. My delegation, for its part, has therefore not hesitated to sponsor the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.616 submitted in this sense by Mexico and Sweden.

45. The General Assembly at its last session solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, is designated for all times as a zone of peace [resolution 2832 (XXVI)]. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 27 November 1971, issued by five countries in Southeast Asia, gave expression to their determination to secure recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Egypt welcomes these initiatives, which are aimed at consolidating international security and thus worthy of general support and encouragement. We trust that consultations will be carried out with a view to achieving these objectives.

46. In conclusion, allow me to express the hope that we shall soon be able to achieve results in the field of arms control that would be reflected in a levelling off of military expenditures around the world. Economic and social development in all countries is entitled to priority treatment where the appropriation of financial resources is concerned. To bring this about, the present squandering of human and economic resources on armaments must be brought speedily to an end.

47. Mr. BADURINA (Yugoslavia) (*interpretation from French*): In its statement before this Committee at the 1877th meeting, the Yugoslav delegation presented its position of principle concerning the problems of disarmament in the context of the new trends that are emerging in

⁵ United Nations publication Sales No.: E.73.I.3.

international relations, and laid particular stress upon the convening of a world conference on disarmament. My statement today will, therefore, be devoted to the other questions in the field of disarmament which are on the agenda of our Committee.

48. For some years now our Committee, as well as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has been devoting particular attention to the problems of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. This is entirely understandable if account is taken of the fact that these weapons of mass destruction, the effects of which are well known, occupy an important place in the arsenals of certain countries, while some of these weapons have already been used in recent times. Aware of the danger of the existence and use of such weapons, the international community has focused attention, on numerous occasions, in unequivocal fashion, on the need for the prohibition and elimination at an early date of these weapons from the arsenals of all States. A significant step in this direction was the adoption in 1925 of the Geneva Protocol,⁶ which, unfortunately, some States have not yet adhered to or ratified.

49. The recent intensive efforts to completely prohibit these weapons have yielded only partial results. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly [*resolution 2826 (XXVI) annex*]. Many countries have accepted this solution in the hope that it would be followed by the adoption of urgent and resolute measures leading to the achievement of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Resolutions on the question of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, as well as the letter and spirit of the Convention itself, fully confirmed this hope and this determination. It follows clearly that the Convention is only the first part of a broader international instrument which would cover all of the chemical, bacteriological (biological) weapons.

50. Resolution 2827 A (XXVI) notes that the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological or toxin weapons is an important step towards the achievement of an early agreement on the effective prohibition of chemical weapons, and requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, its negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of these weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all States.

51. This year the Committee on Disarmament has made great efforts to ensure that a step forward might be made towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. The socialist countries presented a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons [*A/8818, annex B, sect. 5*], and this draft has been viewed by a large number of countries as an important contribution to the search for a generally acceptable solution. Many other documents, proposals and suggestions, which are worthy of our attention, have

contributed vitally to the clarification of controversial questions and to the creation of conditions conducive to progress on the road to total prohibition of chemical weapons.

52. The differences of opinion which remain concerning the criteria to be applied to determine the scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as those relating to the control and verification system, should not prevent us from immediately undertaking the elaboration of a draft agreement on the prohibition of all chemical weapons, an agreement which might be submitted to the General Assembly for its approval. If this effort is not made as soon as possible, many countries might reconsider their position regarding the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

53. The Yugoslav Government has always staunchly held that an agreement on an effective prohibition of chemical weapons should be general in character and should not be limited to certain types and categories of chemical agents for military use. The danger deriving from chemical agents does not only depend upon their degree of toxicity but also upon the methods and conditions of their use. It also depends upon the quality and the extent of the medical and technical protection of the armed forces and the civilian populations which might ultimately become victims of an attack by such weapons. In other words, any agreement which would not cover all chemical weapons, as well as all activities involved in preparing and waging a chemical war, would leave the door wide open to subsequent use of chemical weapons and would not remove the dangers to which a large number of countries might be exposed, especially the small countries and the developing countries. For these reasons, the Yugoslav Government considers that the fundamental principle concerning total prohibition of chemical weapons or activities related to the preparation and waging of chemical war ought not to be called into question. It is on this basis that we must seek broadly acceptable solutions and procedures, while recognizing the true state of affairs with which we are confronted.

54. We note with satisfaction that most of the speakers in this Committee have been in favour of such an approach, and this leads us to believe that this attitude or principle will be reflected in the resolutions that we adopt at the present session of the General Assembly, and in the recommendations we make with respect to the future activity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

55. The question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons is closely related to that of chemical weapons and methods of chemical warfare. The report of the Secretary-General on this important problem⁷ may provide an excellent basis for future consideration and the search for appropriate measures both in the field of international law as well as in that of armaments. With this in mind, we must take into account the fact that, in principle, the use of these weapons cannot be limited to military objectives, and that it is the defenceless civilian populations which suffer most. This has been very clearly

⁶ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

⁷ *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.73.I.3).

demonstrated in the war of aggression against the peoples of Indo-China. Every country has access to napalm and other incendiary weapons and these weapons can be used against every other country. The great populated centres in the Second World War underwent, and may undergo even more in the future, all the horrors of a widescale use of these weapons. This is reason enough for the United Nations, in its future activities to pay special attention to this aspect of the preparation and conduct of war.

56. The question of the prohibition of nuclear tests is also one of those that have been examined for many years at the United Nations and in a certain number of other international bodies. However, we must, unfortunately, observe that the great efforts that the international community has made in this respect have so far not produced any encouraging results. The basic reasons for such a state of affairs are technical in nature; they are nevertheless, essentially due to the fact that military force continues to play a preponderant role in international relations, and that the possession of nuclear weapons is considered as one of the principal attributes of force.

57. Every day we are witnessing a continuation and intensification of the nuclear-arms race. The diversification of nuclear arms is accompanied by a perfecting of delivery systems and their penetrating power. Contemporary science and technology make possible a constant acceleration of the pace of the development of these weapons while in a considerable number of countries which do not own nuclear weapons at present, nearly all of the conditions are met for their manufacture. It seems that mankind is now at a crossroads from where it is possible either to go forward towards the cessation of the arms race or else towards further proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons. One thing is certain: attempts to freeze the existing situation and maintain the present state in the nuclear sphere might quickly turn out to be not only unrealistic but dangerous as well.

58. The only solution that is in the interest of all countries, including the nuclear Powers themselves, is the speedy elimination of all nuclear weapons from military arsenals as an essential element in an orientation toward general and complete disarmament, and the creation of conditions favouring guarantees for international security for all. It would, of course, be illusory to believe that such a goal could be attained overnight, but it is absolutely certain that this is an imperative of our times and that the objective possibilities already existing make it possible for us to set out resolutely on such a course.

59. Such a broad approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament makes it possible to harmonize individual interests, which are often extremely contradictory. In this context, we may be much closer to the achievement of the immediate prohibition of all nuclear tests, a goal which the Yugoslav Government has always advocated. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the suspension of all nuclear testing, accompanied by a simultaneous cessation in the development and manufacture of these weapons and a gradual reduction in the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons belonging to the principal nuclear Powers, might turn out to be important steps along the rocky road leading to nuclear disarmament. The international community must

set out along this road without delay, so as to avoid its own annihilation and open up new possibilities in which the results achieved by modern science and technology, and the vast human and material potentials at present devoted to military purposes may be placed at the service of progress.

60. Next year will mark the fifth anniversary of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, in the work of which 92 non-nuclear countries and four nuclear Powers participated. The Conference adopted a Declaration and 14 resolutions containing various recommendations covering the range of nuclear problems, in particular the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁸ In its resolution 2456 (XXIII), the General Assembly gave its full support to the recommendations of the Conference, and ever since then the question of their implementation has been constantly on the agenda of its annual sessions. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was an international gathering of great importance, devoted to questions of vital interest for the international community as a whole. The meeting and the results of the Conference are closely linked to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Yugoslav delegation considers that the General Assembly ought to carry out, at its twenty-eighth session, a thorough analysis of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the obligations flowing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order to determine whether the hopes aroused and the obligations incurred have been fulfilled to such an extent that they might be considered to represent a partial compensation to the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially the developing countries, for their voluntary renunciation of the manufacture or acquisition in any other way of nuclear arms or other installations for nuclear explosions.

61. Regional approaches to problems of security and disarmament are increasingly present in international relations. We are happy to note that preparations for the convening of the Conference on European security and co-operation are progressing favourably. At that Conference, problems of disarmament, as a component of the process of strengthening international security, will occupy a choice spot. This is all the more significant for Europe in that the enormous military potential of the two politico-military groups, a potential which tends to increase, is concentrated on its soil. Although the claim that peace in Europe has in large measure been based, during the last quarter century, upon a relatively stable balance of power seems to be true, there is no doubt that the present positive trends could not continue for long, nor could they expand, unless they were accompanied by appropriate measures in regard to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament, measures which would render no advantage to either of the parties.

62. The attention of the Yugoslav Government has likewise been drawn to the efforts being made to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and co-operation, free from the military competition of the great Powers. The adoption, at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.

of peace [*resolution 2832 (XXVI)*] represented an important step forward in that direction. The most recent developments in the situation in that region, and in the situation in general, make necessary as well as feasible the earliest possible implementation, together with an appropriate reflection in international law, of the aims set forth in that Declaration.

63. To the initiatives and actions mentioned above we must add the efforts to make of the Mediterranean a zone of peace and co-operation, as well as the similar aspirations that have become evident in south-east Asia and other parts of the world. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is an important achievement, representing as it does action designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in new regions. That Treaty may likewise stimulate a search for similar solutions in other areas of the world.

64. Efforts in the field of disarmament—multilateral and bilateral, general and regional—constitute elements of a whole, to which the term general and complete disarmament is often applied. New international conditions, the present situation and the prospects in the development of military technology, together with the results obtained in the limitation of the arms race and the experience acquired in that regard, make it necessary to examine the question of general and complete disarmament in a new light. This might lead to the adoption of a broad platform that could serve, on the one hand, as a basis, indeed as a stimulant, for all approaches and all partial measures, while on the other hand it might make it possible to channel all separate efforts towards a single, clearly defined objective, namely the creation of a world where arms and force would give way to co-operation based upon equality of rights, and to ironclad international security for all countries.

65. Mr. KORHONEN (Finland): This year the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has concentrated largely on chemical weapons.

66. For a number of years the progress in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons was slowed down by the dispute on whether such weapons should be treated together or separately. My delegation has the impression that the negotiations aiming at a chemical weapons treaty have benefited from the fact that this problem was done away with by the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

67. The discussions of the main issues connected with a chemical weapons treaty have in fact assumed a more substantive and concrete character than hitherto. An illustration of this is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted by the socialist member States [*A/8818, annex B, sect. 5*] during the spring session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation has noted that many non-aligned delegations to the Conference subsequently suggested that that draft be taken as a basis for continued negotiations.

68. Other ideas about a possible basis for further negotiations have also been advanced although these have not yet been put in the form of concrete proposals. In this situation the Committee has not yet reached the stage of actual treaty negotiations, a circumstance which is to be regretted. But, in the view of my delegation, it would be short-sighted to consider this tantamount to no advance or to contend that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been bogged down on this issue of chemical weapons.

69. A closer analysis of the work done by the Conference on this issue does not sustain such a contention. The discussions have delineated more clearly than before the three main issues connected with a future chemical weapons treaty: the scope, the definitions, and the verification. By intensive treatment—not least by the means of valuable working papers and a meeting with experts which was generally considered most useful—all these main issues have been brought into sharper focus. The positions of the parties have been clarified to a greater extent than before and in some cases the contours of possible solutions can be discerned.

70. The Finnish delegation therefore ventures to hope that a basis may now have been laid for definite progress in the field of chemical weapons and we expect this to materialize at the next session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Although the Assembly set no time-limit for the achievement of a chemical weapons treaty when it approved the Convention on biological weapons [*resolution 2826 (XXVI) annex*] it is clear that the fulfilment of the pledge given in article IX of that Convention was expected in the not-too-distant future.

71. I should now like to offer some brief general comments on the working paper submitted by the Finnish Government to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on definitions of chemical warfare agents and on technical possibilities for verification and control of chemical weapons with particular regard to a Finnish project on creation on a national basis of chemical weapons control capacity for possible future international use [*A/8818, annex B, sect. 24*].

72. Let me begin by saying that the Finnish delegation was gratified at the reception which this effort received in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We are particularly grateful to the delegation of Sweden, which was good enough to introduce the paper in that Committee.

73. Considering the high standard of expertise which is characteristic of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is admittedly difficult for a Government which is not represented in that body to make a contribution which would meet those standards. But we have approached that problem from another angle. The Finnish Government believes quite simply that all nations, whether members of the Conference or not, have a vital interest in promoting concrete progress in disarmament and consequently have a duty to do whatever can be done to contribute to such progress.

74. In this particular case the intention of the Finnish Government with its working paper was partly to make our views known on the central issues of a chemical weapons

treaty in a more detailed manner than would be possible in the annual debate in the General Assembly. The main purpose, however, was to give a practical expression to our willingness to contribute concretely—be it in a minor way—towards progress in disarmament.

75. The operational part of the working paper has to do with the problem of verification in the context of a future chemical weapons treaty. It deals with a project which has been under preparation in Finland for the past two years for creating on a national basis a chemical weapons verification capacity for possible future international use. The project has proceeded as planned. A survey of the resources has been completed and the necessary budgetary allocations for a research and training programme are envisaged.

76. In the first instance, at any rate, the Finnish project is focused on development of sensitive enzymatic and chromatographic methods for control and verification of organophosphate nerve agents, which are generally considered to be the most potent chemical warfare agents.

77. The enzymatic methods are capable of verifying any nerve agent, even possible new compounds, with extreme sensitivity.

78. The chromatographic methods, especially gas chromatography combined with mass spectrometry and computerized data handling, can unequivocally identify nerve agents, their decomposition products and their precursors—used in the binary weapon systems—as individual chemical compounds, provided that all the necessary standard compounds are available. Synthesis of these standards is a major undertaking in which international collaboration would be of the utmost importance. This co-operation should be truly international and employ leading scholars and experts in the field.

79. If the international scientific collaboration could be extended to an exchange of standards for chromatography, the efficiency of national verification teams using this method could be vastly improved and we could avoid the otherwise necessary but regrettable situation in which every country separately would have to work out the synthesis of all conceivable nerve agents and elucidate their decomposition reactions. Identification of decomposition products of nerve agents comes into question in verification of alleged production of these agents by analysing wastes, or of alleged use of them by analysing environmental and other samples.

80. Analysis of precursors comes into question in verification of binary systems. It is evident that every binary agent can be identified by elucidation of its precursors. Although one of them may be a dual-purpose substance which has legitimate peaceful uses, the other one is likely to contain an alkyl-phosphorus bond which is characteristic of all organophosphate nerve agents but extremely rare in compounds having peaceful uses, like insecticides.

81. International co-operation by experts is especially urgent in clarification of technical questions regarding the binary systems. A public discussion of the verification possibilities of these systems could promote progress in the field of chemical disarmament.

82. In a way, the Finnish project looks beyond the present towards a situation when a chemical weapons treaty may have become a reality. In order to be useful in alternative situations which a future treaty may entail, it has been conceived as a multipurpose project both substantially and functionally. Substantially the planned control capacity could be useful in three different verification activities: verification of the destruction of stocks, of non-production of chemical weapons, and of alleged use. Functionally the capacity could be of service whatever the ultimate solution of the verification problem might be; it would obviously be useful for national verification in Finland or any combination of national inspection with international elements. It could also be of potential use in connexion with an investigation ordered by the Security Council subsequent to a complaint. Finally, it seems to respond to a concern which has been voiced in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by a number of developing countries because of their difficulties in shouldering the tasks of verification by their available national means only.

83. The Finnish Government will, of course, keep the Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament informed about the further advancement of the project.

84. Mr. MAZARI (Pakistan): My delegation enters the general debate in this Committee at a somewhat late stage in the proceedings. I shall therefore deal with specifics straight away and avoid, as far as possible, repetition of views that have already been expressed by other delegations.

85. My delegation would like first to offer its comments on the items that were given priority in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva this year. While doing so we are conscious of the fact that unlike last year, when the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was able to present to the General Assembly agreement on the convention banning the production of biological weapons and their elimination, this year we can only record that the rate of progress towards the banning of the production of chemical weapons and their elimination has indeed been very slow.

86. The Pakistan delegation, in its statement to the Conference on 25 July 1971 [*see CCD/PV.571*], outlined its views on what are in fact the main issues in connexion with a chemical weapons convention, namely, the scope of prohibition and the question of control and verification. Here I shall touch upon only those aspects of these questions which we consider to be the most significant. We are of the view that a ban on chemical weapons should be comprehensive in nature, covering the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their means of delivery, as well as prescribing the destruction of existing stocks. As regards identification of such agents, the "purpose-criterion" appears to be an effective one; however, its application to dual-purpose agents, new agents and the so-called binary weapons would need further elaboration.

87. The issue which has raised the greatest difficulty is that of control and verification. On this our view was

clearly stated in the joint memorandum of 12 non-aligned countries⁹, as follows: "Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system which would ensure effective implementation of the prohibition."

88. We would like to emphasize in this context that, in view of the limited technological and economic facilities available to the developing countries, national means of detection and verification should be supported by international measures. Such an approach would, in view of technological and economic factors, be both more reliable and less expensive. Suitable guarantees can also be found to ensure against industrial espionage.

89. With regard to the question of a complaints procedure in a chemical weapons convention, we are of the view that the initial verification of an alleged violation of the convention should not be made dependent on a decision of the Security Council; instead, such fact finding should be carried out by an independent international body specially created for this purpose.

90. One possible method would be to establish a permanent commission of inquiry, composed of a small number of signatories of the chemical weapons convention, to be elected by all signatory States after the entry into force of the convention. If that procedure is not acceptable, the convention should provide for the establishment of an *ad hoc* commission of inquiry by signatory States, if and when a State requests such an investigation. We feel that some such provision would generate confidence and thereby make a chemical weapons convention more generally acceptable. Of course the international body would only make an assessment of the facts; action on such facts would be a matter for the Security Council.

91. I am convinced that despite the obstacles which stand in the way of resolving these issues, given the necessary goodwill it is possible to reach an agreement on the prohibition and the production of all chemical weapons and their elimination of the near future.

92. I turn now to the other item that received priority in the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year, that is, the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Pakistan's views on that question were given in detail in our delegation's statement in the Conference on 10 August 1972 [see CCD/PV.576]. I shall here mention one aspect that we consider to be crucial in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; that is, the danger that some States may proceed to test nuclear weapons under the guise of so-called peaceful nuclear explosive devices.

93. On this subject the Pakistan delegation last year submitted a working paper to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament¹⁰. The essence of that working

paper is that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not become the means whereby non-nuclear States can develop nuclear weapons. This does not mean that nuclear science and its benefits must remain the preserve of those States which have acquired nuclear weapons. Peaceful nuclear explosives can be used to speed up economic progress in developing countries. The latter should, in our view, be in a position not only to benefit from advances in this field but to share fully in them. This aim would, however, be nullified if peaceful nuclear explosions become a disguise for developing nuclear weapons. International agreements must therefore be devised to ensure the proper utilization of the potential of nuclear energy for the betterment of the human condition and at the same time to prevent its misuse.

94. On the bilateral plane, outside the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet Union and the United States have, with the greater relaxation of tension, especially in Europe, been able through the strategic arms limitation agreements [see A/C.1/1026] to make a start on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and anti-ballistic missile systems. My delegation shares the general feeling of satisfaction at the conclusion of these agreements, although they cannot by any means be described as measures of real disarmament. We hope that the second round of strategic arms limitation talks will enable those Powers to go beyond the very limited scope of the agreements concluded under the first round.

95. My delegation cannot but note and emphasize at this time the fact that the existing disarmament negotiating machinery available to us is a product of an essentially bipolar world. Therefore progress in disarmament negotiations, whether in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or outside it, has up to the present time been made solely in the bipolar context. Another fact that becomes apparent from a survey of disarmament negotiations to date is that, although genuine technical difficulties have been encountered on the way to solutions to disarmament problems, such difficulties have been overcome where there has been the political will to co-operate.

96. I have mentioned the bipolar context of current disarmament negotiations because, in our view—and this is a view that many countries are coming to share—the present division of power in the world is making disarmament negotiations in the bipolar context increasingly unrealistic and even irrelevant. Keeping this fact in mind, my delegation is of the view that it is time to consider whether the existing forum for disarmament negotiations is indeed adequate or appropriate. It is in this context, we feel, that the proposals for the convening of a world disarmament conference must also be viewed.

97. My delegation agrees in principle with the idea of a world disarmament conference; however, in any approach to this question the following considerations would be of crucial importance.

98. First, any new negotiating machinery which it is proposed to create must be genuinely based on the present realities of power. Otherwise it will not be a constructive addition to or substitute for the existing machinery of disarmament negotiations.

⁹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for 1971*, document DC/234, annex C, sect. 22.

99. Secondly, we cannot ignore the fact that two of the five nuclear Powers have expressed reservations about the proposed world disarmament conference and its timing. It goes without saying that such a conference cannot usefully take place without the full agreement and support of all the nuclear Powers.

100. Thirdly, those countries, and we are aware that there are many, which favour the convening of such a conference have themselves indicated that they are not in favour of premature action, realizing that hasty action would only harm the goal we all have in mind.

101. At this stage, what we need to do is to consider and ponder the various views already expressed on the utility and timing of a world disarmament conference.

102. My delegation is of the view that the present time is appropriate to consider the feasibility of a declaration by all nuclear Powers to the effect that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against another country, and a guarantee by those Powers that they would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.

103. Another question to which my country attaches importance is that of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) by a vote of 61 in favour, none against and 55 abstentions. The latter number included four of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This resolution called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in pursuit of the objective of establishing a zone of peace. We know that in the report of the Secretary-General on this question [A/8809] replies are listed from only 10 countries and that none of the great Powers have conveyed their comments. We realize that without the support of the major Powers for this idea its enforcement would indeed be very difficult. We hope that the littoral and hinterland States, on the one hand, and the major Powers, on the other, can now start consultations with a view to reaching an agreement. My delegation would be ready to encourage and participate in such consultations.

104. My delegation considers the ideal of general and complete disarmament to be a worth-while objective towards which we should all strive. We should not be discouraged by the fact that progress so far has been insignificant. We feel that, keeping constantly in view the objective of general and complete disarmament, efforts should be intensified to implement various collateral measures of disarmament and that attention should also be turned to the danger to peace of the armaments race at the regional level.

105. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): It occurred to me while preparing this intervention that had I been able, through the use of H. G. Wells's time machine, to attend now a meeting of this same Committee 10 years ago, I could have read almost exactly the same speech without its being considered as head of its time. No doubt this could in fact be due to my lack of creative vision, but it is also true, alas, that it is due to our lack of progress.

106. Be that as it may, we none the less refuse to be led into pessimism. The slow pace of progress in the field of

disarmament perhaps stems from the very nature of the subject. In an age of sovereign States, whose interests are not always convergent, the question of disarmament is directly related to the security of these States. What we are trying to do is to substitute for a fragile system of security based on the arms race a more stable system of security based on mutual trust and confidence. Such a capital transformation obviously requires an equally drastic change in the political atmosphere and in the system of political values. However, in spite of all the difficulties, we are moving, it seems in the right direction.

107. The strategic arms limitation agreements [*see A/C.1/1026*] confirm this view. Those agreements may not be the end of the arms race, nor are they comprehensive enough to reverse it, but for the first time they place some limitations on strategic nuclear weapons and thus constitute a landmark in its history. Until now, in a world of continuous change, the story of nuclear weapons has not been one of change, but essentially one of repetition. It was a vicious circle in which nuclear Powers were chasing each other's tails. For the first time this circle has become, if I may use such an expression, less vicious. This breakthrough and the favourable atmosphere which has ensued give us fresh hopes for further agreements not only in the field of strategic nuclear weapons but also in other disarmament fields such as that of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

108. In connexion with a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it appears to us that the question has two aspects which are, in fact, corollary. The first is to ensure the adherence of all nuclear States to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the second is to extend the prohibition also to underground nuclear tests.

109. With regard to the first aspect, we believe that the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 marked the beginning of a new era whose characteristics may be summarized as follows: the arms race has been checked, radioactive fallout in the atmosphere has been reduced, further proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discouraged and the way has thus been paved for further agreements. However, the effects of that Treaty remain limited as it did not cover all the nuclear Powers. It is our view that a partial test ban is not an instrument belonging to history; it still maintains its significance for our present efforts at disarmament. Thus, the adherence of all the nuclear States to that Treaty would give a new impetus to our future efforts in the field of disarmament.

110. A noteworthy aspect of the partial test ban Treaty is that it rests on a balance between political advantage and risk. In 1963 it was a fact that there was no absolute certainty that every test explosion which might take place in the prohibited environments would be detected and identified by the national methods available at that time. Despite this uncertainty the parties to the Treaty found the risk acceptable, in the belief that the risk was outweighed by the Treaty's advantages. In this respect the partial test ban Treaty might well set an example today for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

111. As to the second aspect of the question, that is to say, the aspect relating to underground tests, the progress

made in seismic methods of verifying them has lowered the thresholds of both the detection of a seismic event and the identification of its source. It has also narrowed the gap between those two thresholds. Through international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data further improvement can be achieved in this field. In this connexion we noted with satisfaction that working paper submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the United Kingdom [A/8818, annex B, sect. 29] describing new data-processing equipment for use by seismic stations in monitoring underground nuclear explosions, as well as the working paper submitted by Canada, Japan and Sweden [*ibid.* sect. 9] on measures to improve co-operation in the exchange of seismological information.

112. At the same time we have also noted with satisfaction the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed last September, on protecting the environment, the provisions of which contain joint projects for co-operative research in forecasting earthquakes, with each country stationing scientists and instruments on the territory of the other. Although this research project does not deal directly with underground explosions, we nevertheless hope that the exchange of scientists and instruments for seismological research may lead to further co-operation on research on underground explosions.

113. However, it is quite evident that in spite of all the improvements in seismic means of monitoring, a certain threshold is likely to remain. Furthermore, the effectiveness of on-site inspection in uncovering evidence of clandestine testing remains questionable. Since seismic data would be adequate for identifying large earthquakes, on-site inspection would be directed toward smaller events which could probably produce no ground effects. Moreover, with careful planning clandestine tests might perhaps be conducted without any surface manifestations. Therefore, when the progress already achieved in seismological methods is taken into account, together with non-seismic means of monitoring, the question at present is whether both thresholds are low enough to maintain an acceptable level of security in a comprehensive test ban; if not, it should be made clear whether we are trying to achieve 100 per cent effectiveness for verification methods or to determine what level of threshold would be adequate to realize a comprehensive test ban.

114. It should also be asked whether the advantages to be gained from such a ban are outweighed by its risks. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General expresses his view on these questions. He states that "What is now required is the necessary political decision to ensure a final comprehensive test ban agreement."¹¹

115. My delegation attaches importance to an adequate verification system in a comprehensive test ban agreement. With that consideration in mind, we believe the time is ripe to make renewed efforts within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to explore new avenues of agreement on a comprehensive test ban while simul-

aneously giving careful consideration to interim measures. We believe that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.615 adopts a realistic approach to that end, and that is why my delegation has become one of the sponsors of that draft resolution.

116. Let me now turn briefly to the question of chemical weapons. The use of these weapons of mass destruction is banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹² In our view, it is important to strengthen the Geneva Protocol by assuring universal adherence to it and withdrawing the reservations made to it. My country ratified this Protocol in 1929 without any reservations, and in 1934 Turkey passed a law ensuring the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol within its national boundaries. It is unfortunate that this practice has not been a universal one.

117. The horrors of these weapons of mass destruction require that further measures beyond the Geneva Protocol be taken in order to achieve the total elimination of chemical weapons. It is regrettable that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to submit to the General Assembly an agreed draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons. On this question, although my delegation favours a comprehensive approach to the problem, we also believe that if a comprehensive agreement proves to be unattainable in the near future the possibility of achieving that goal by stages should not be excluded. The scope of the convention raises an important question when it is considered that many chemical agents widely used in different peaceful fields may also serve as deadly weapons. We believe that in the convention equal consideration should be given to avoiding hampering the peaceful uses of chemical agents, on the one hand, and to the inclusion of all types of chemical weapons, on the other. In this respect we note with satisfaction that it is a largely shared view in the Committee on Disarmament that the purpose criterion should be made use of at some point.

118. The question of verification poses some more complex difficulties. In fact, the security problem of chemical weapons is more important and complex than that of any other weapon since a greater number of States are involved. In order to ensure an adequate degree of security for all parties to the convention, an effective international system of control should be established, and if the convention is to contain a comprehensive ban it is difficult to see how we can establish an effective system of control without some kind of on-site inspection complementing other control measures.

119. My Government expressed its views on the world disarmament conference in our reply to the Secretary-General [see A/8817]. In this statement at the 2053rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, my Foreign Minister also touched upon this question. In our reply to the Secretary-General we expressed the view that the convocation of a world disarmament conference would be a useful contribution to the work being carried out in the sphere of disarmament. We also share the view that taking

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1A*, sect. VI.

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

up the disarmament question on a global basis might create a new impetus in this field. In our reply we also stressed the importance of adequate preparation and clearly defining the link between the world disarmament conference and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

120. During the general debate in this Committee, we listened with interest to the different views and proposals put forward in relation to the preparation of such a conference. The proposal made by Argentina and the working paper prepared by Brazil both deserve careful study. We hope they will contribute to the forming of a generally acceptable ground for the preliminary stage of the work.

121. If the General Assembly decides to form a study group or an *ad hoc* committee regarding the composition of

such a body, we hold the view—and I quote from the statement of my Foreign Minister to the General Assembly—that “. . . not only the great military Powers but also States belonging to different regions and having special strategic positions should participate.” [2053rd plenary meeting, para. 58.]

122. We hope that the world disarmament conference will constitute a positive step, crowning the Disarmament Decade with a measure of progress toward the goal of general and complete disarmament.

123. The CHAIRMAN: I wish to inform the Committee that Afghanistan is now a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.616.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.