



SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 19th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana)

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REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

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AGENDA ITEM 89: OFFERS BY MEMBER STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/35/518; A/C.4/35/L.5)

Hearing of a Petitioner - Western Sahara

1. The CHAIRMAN noted that at its eighth meeting the Committee had granted a request for a hearing (A/C.4/35/5) in connexion with item 18.
2. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Mojtar (Frente POLISARIO) took a place at the petitioner's table.
3. Mr. MOJTAR (Frente POLISARIO) said that the United Nations had been concerned with the question of Western Sahara, in particular the decolonization of the Territory, for 15 years and had constantly stressed the need to respect the principle of self-determination. Many resolutions on the matter had been adopted, reaffirming the inalienable rights of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence. Those resolutions had, initially at least, been supported even by the State that had now committed aggression against the people of Western Sahara and had occupied a portion of its Territory. In fact, the representative of Morocco had stated at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly that his country would respect the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants of Western Sahara and the frontiers of the Territory, when independence was achieved. Furthermore, a Visiting Mission of the United Nations, sent to the Territory in May 1975 on the eve of the invasion by Morocco and Mauritania, had reported to the General Assembly that the Saharan people would no longer tolerate the Spanish presence and had publicly proclaimed its support of the Frente POLISARIO, which had for a number of years been leading the armed liberation struggle. The Mission had also reported that the Saharan people were categorically in favour of independence and against the claims of Morocco and Mauritania. In its advisory opinion of October 1975, the International Court of Justice had concluded that the materials and information presented to it did not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the Territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Moreover, the Court had not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.
4. It was clear that the war that had been ravaging the Territory for nearly six years and threatened the peace and stability of the region was caused by the stubborn refusal of Morocco to respect the decisions and recommendations of international organizations, in particular those of the United Nations. Furthermore, the aggression committed against his country and the attempt to recolonize it during a period characterized by decolonization had subjected his

(Mr. Mojtar, Frente POLISARIO)

people to the dire threat of genocide on an unprecedented scale. The brutality and destructiveness of the aggression committed against his country had been well documented in the press. Tens of thousands of people, in particular women and children and the elderly, had been forced to leave the country as refugees with, however, the firm desire to return. Those who had not been able to flee were forced to live under a régime of terror whose cruelty had been documented by Amnesty International in 1979.

5. Those responsible for the crime committed against his people had miscalculated, as they had underestimated the ability of his people to fight for their rights. The situation today proved not only the inability of the aggressor to carry out his evil plan but, more significantly, it revealed that the people continued to be in control over the majority of the Territory. Following the withdrawal of Mauritania, after the peace agreement signed with the Frente POLISARIO in August 1979, the Moroccan army had known only continuous reverses and severe defeats. The Moroccan military command had been forced to withdraw its troops from the major portion of the Territory, keeping only a few entrenched positions along the coast and in the south of Morocco.

6. In that connexion, he cited the battle at Ouarkziz in March 1980, in which a sizeable, heavily armed Moroccan force had been annihilated by the Saharan People's Liberation Army, as had been documented in the world's press. Units of the Saharan People's Liberation Army continued their operations against those who violated Saharan territory, whether on land or at sea, in order to stop the plundering of Saharan national resources. He stressed that such actions were undertaken only in order to preserve the territorial integrity of his country. The forces of the Liberation Army were often compelled to pursue the enemy into the south of Morocco but, as had been stressed several times by leaders of his Government, his country had no intention of intervening in the Territory of other countries and the temporary presence of Saharan forces in the south of Morocco was merely a necessary act of self-defence.

7. Simultaneously with the costly national liberation struggle, the Government of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic was working to restructure and organize the institutions of State. That required the creation of the socio-economic and administrative conditions in which the Saharan people could enjoy health and education services, the supply of necessary goods and services, and freedom and security in the liberated zones. The Government had established primary and secondary schools, literacy and vocational training centres, dispensaries and hospitals at the regional level.

8. It was gratifying to note that international support and solidarity with the just cause of his people increased each day. The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic was recognized by 44 countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and diplomatic relations had been established with them. The isolation of Morocco was particularly evident in Africa, where no State, excepting Morocco, had denied the Saharan people its right to self-determination and dependence. His country had been recognized by 26 States members of the Organization of African Unity, and, accordingly to article XXVIII of the OAU charter, its admission to that Organization as a member State was incontestable and irreversible.

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(Mr. Mojtar, Frente POLISARIO)

9. The refusal of Morocco to participate in negotiations prevented the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the international level, in particular General Assembly resolution 34/37. Unfortunately, each time international organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations, adopted further resolutions on the matter, Morocco responded with a new escalation of its aggression, as could be seen by its efforts to extend its occupation to the portion of the country subject to the peace agreements signed in August 1979 between the Mauritanian Government and the Saharan Government.

10. Furthermore, Morocco had constructed a "triangular" ghetto to isolate and control certain centres of the Sahara and had colonized that area with settlers who were Moroccan nationals. In so doing, Morocco sought to block the implementation of the various resolutions on the question and deprive Saharan citizens of their freedom in the occupied areas. Morocco's stubborn insistence on imposing a military fait accompli was the criminal cause of destabilization in North-West Africa, which could lead to serious consequences. The Moroccan Government was the victim of its false logic, and its dreams of expansionism could only lead to its own destruction.

11. For five years the Moroccan Government had sought to deceive the international community with various theatrical manoeuvres and slogans. Its attempt to deny that the Saharan people wished to be independent had been proved false by the successes of the popular forces in their liberation struggle and the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission. Morocco had also accused neighbouring countries of interference and had proclaimed the right of pursuit. However, in the end it had been the Moroccan army that had been pursued, even into the southern portion of Morocco. Morocco had then given its genocidal aggression an ideological label, seeking thereby to falsify the authentic and national character of the struggle of the Saharan people. The final Moroccan sham was its effort to introduce ethnic subdivisions into the area.

12. However, it was clear that there was only one Morocco and that was the country committing aggression against the Saharan Republic in order to achieve its expansionist claims. It was also clear that the Saharan people resisted that attack and sought to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and independence. As long as the aggressor feigned ignorance of reality and refused to submit to the verdict of the international community, it prolonged the suffering and losses caused by the bloody war, for which it was criminally responsible.

13. Like other African peoples, the Saharan people was fighting for its dignity, which could be guaranteed only through respect for its national independence. The war in Western Sahara would end inevitably in the total liberation of the country, whatever cost was required. It was true that, as a result of the armed struggle, one of the military fronts was now situated inside the enemy territory, a situation that had been forced on the Saharan people by the war itself and which would continue until the enemy had terminated his occupation of Western Sahara.

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14. The two belligerents, the Moroccan aggressor and the Saharan victim, would have to work out a political solution and the Saharan Government invited the Moroccan Government to participate in that process. There were many examples of such political solutions to national liberation struggles and they had been shown to be an effective way of terminating the fighting and working out a solution to such conflicts. That was also essentially what the United Nations sought in its resolution 34/37.
15. Mr. Mojtar withdrew.
16. Mr. PARSONS (United Kingdom) said that the commitment of his Government to bring Belize to independence was well-known; the fundamental considerations underlying that position had been presented to the Committee by his delegation at the 11th meeting. Successive Governments of his country had consistently championed the principle of self-determination and in the course of the past 35 years 42 independent Territories of the United Kingdom, whose total populations now numbered some 1.4 billion people, had acceded to full independence.
17. The normal procedure for a British dependent Territory's moving to independence was a short period of internal self-government followed by a constitutional conference, legislation in the United Kingdom and the achievement of full independence. The internal self-government stage had been reached in Belize in 1964. However, the people of Belize had been prevented from attaining independence, as desired by their governing party, by the claims of the Government of Guatemala to large sections of Belizean territory. It was only the external threat from Guatemala that had delayed the full exercise of self-determination by the people of Belize. The Government of Belize recognized that the difficulties came from outside the Territory and had nothing to do with Belize's relations with the administering Power. However, the Government of Belize was understandably impatient over the fact that each year, despite increasingly strong resolutions from the United Nations, Belize had not been able to exercise its right to self-determination and independence.
18. His Government had consulted continuously with the Government of Belize and had held talks with the Government of Guatemala on a number of occasions, most recently in October 1980. Representatives of the Government of Belize had been present at and participated in the meetings which had served to clarify the respective positions of both sides with a view to continuing the process of negotiation. Some progress had been made and it was hoped that the long negotiation process would bear fruit in 1981.
19. In the meantime, the people of Belize should not have to wait indefinitely for the independence they had been seeking for so long. His Government continued to hope that a satisfactory solution could be found that would be acceptable to all the parties concerned, since it would be unfortunate for any State to come to independence without the support and friendship of all of its neighbours. His Government would examine any specific and realistic proposals aimed at solving the outstanding problems. However, it would be unfair to delay any longer the

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(Mr. Parsons, United Kingdom)

constitutional processes enabling Belize to move on to independence. For that reason, his delegation associated itself with draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 on the subject. His Government would do its utmost to ensure that people of Belize achieved independent statehood with their existing territory intact, their sovereignty assured and in conditions of amity and concord with their neighbours, as was their right. His delegation hoped that all States Members of the United Nations would help to secure that right for the people of Belize.

20. Ms. JACOB (Guyana) said that her delegation recognized that differences continued to exist between the United Kingdom and Guatemala over Belize. The General Assembly had consistently maintained, however, that such negotiations must be pursued without prejudice to the right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity. The negotiating process should certainly be encouraged but should not be allowed to hinder the exercise by the people of Belize of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

21. Her delegation welcomed the statement by the leader of one of the opposition parties in Belize and considered that it had reinforced the statement by the representative of the Government of Belize in so far as it had emphasized the unity of the people of Belize on the question of independence and their rejection of Guatemala's persistent claim to their territory. Her delegation welcomed the request made by the representative of Guatemala, supported by the representative of Paraguay, that the statement of the Leader of the Opposition in Belize should, in view of its importance, be reproduced in extenso in the records of the Fourth Committee. It had clearly emerged from the statement of the Leader of the Opposition that the question of Belize's independence stood above partisan politics and that the entire people of the Territory were united in denying Guatemala's territorial aspirations. In that regard, they had the overwhelming backing of the international community, as expressed in General Assembly resolution 33/36.

22. Her delegation had taken careful note of the outcome of the latest round of negotiations between the United Kingdom and Guatemala and expressed the hope that a satisfactory agreement would emerge which would in no way prejudice the exercise by the people of Belize of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence with their territorial integrity preserved. It was regrettable that draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8, of which her delegation was co-sponsoring, should have had to include a call for the United Kingdom to continue to ensure the security and territorial integrity of Belize and a request to the relevant organizations of the United Nations to take such action as might be appropriate to facilitate the attainment of independence by Belize and to guarantee its security and territorial integrity thereafter.

23. Her delegation expected that, in keeping with the lofty aims expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala in his statement before the General Assembly on 6 October 1980, the Government of Guatemala would join the momentum which the adoption of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 would initiate and would ally itself to those forces which were working for the peace and security of the Caribbean region, based on full respect for sovereignty and independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

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24. Mr. NEIL (Jamaica) said that the Government and people of Jamaica, consistent with their unequivocal support of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), had always supported the legitimate aspirations and inalienable rights of the people of Belize to self-determination and early and secure independence, with their territory intact.
25. It had been clear from the statement of the representative of Guatemala that the position of Guatemala had remained unyielding in that it continued to claim that Belize was an integral part of the national territory of Guatemala; that the rights of Guatemala over the territory of Belize were founded on solid historical, geographical, legal, political and moral arguments; and that Guatemala could not accept the unilateral granting of independence to Belize.
26. His delegation completely rejected the spurious contention that the exercise of a territorial claim, however dubious its origin, should be made the basis for denying a people's right to self-determination and impeding its move toward nationhood. Guatemala's territorial claim was incompatible with the just resolution of the problem of Belize. The inalienable right of the people of Belize to exercise freely and without fear their right to self-determination and early independence within their existing territory must be vigorously upheld.
27. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 had put forward a timely and concrete proposal for ending the current political impasse in a manner consistent with the Charter, with the right of the people of Belize to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and with the legitimate interests of Guatemala. His delegation appealed to the Government of Guatemala to reconsider its attitude with respect to its claims on Belize and the early exercise by the people of Belize of their inalienable rights.
28. His delegation hoped that, through strong support for draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8, the General Assembly and the international community would ensure that the people of Belize secured their independence before the conclusion of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.
29. Mr. JAMES (Australia) said that his Government had welcomed the acceptance by the Special Committee of 24 of the invitation to send a Visiting Mission to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. The Visiting Mission had submitted a comprehensive report (A/AC.109/635) which his Government would take fully into account as it proceeded to implement its policies for the Territory.
30. A central tenet of Australian policy in regard to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands had been to bring about as speedily as possible conditions which would enable the people of the territory to exercise freely their right to self-determination. The Government had therefore actively promoted the political, social, economic and educational advancement of the people in accordance with its obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter. It was actively encouraging self-determination and would facilitate an act of self-determination when the people themselves indicated that they wanted one. The future of the people of the Territory was ultimately a matter for the people to decide themselves. His Government would do all in its power to ensure that the decisions taken were informed and freely made. As had

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been made clear to the Visiting Mission, Australia would continue to co-operate fully with the Special Committee and would continue to keep the Fourth Committee fully informed of developments.

31. The Visiting Mission's report had indicated that enormous progress had been made since the visit of the earlier Visiting Mission in 1974. The earlier mission had made a series of recommendations which had had a significant influence on the framing of government policy. His delegation welcomed the fact that the 1980 Visiting Mission had seen fit to note the initiative taken by the Australian Government in adopting a number of the recommendations of the previous mission. His Government would continue to make every effort to ensure that the decisions of the United Nations on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands were implemented as speedily as possible. The comments of the 1980 Visiting Mission would be of value to his Government and its visit would represent a further benchmark in the evolution of the people of Cocos towards self-determination.

32. Mr. SANI (Indonesia) said that, in its earlier statement, his delegation had made it clear that any discussion of the question of East Timor constituted unwarranted interference in Indonesia's internal affairs, contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Committee had nevertheless continued to echo the same fantastic accusations and unfounded allegations as before.

33. As was well known, East Timor had become an integral part, and the twenty-seventh province, of the Republic of Indonesia in July 1976, following the free and democratic exercise by its people of their right to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV).

34. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)) stated that the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constituted modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. The decision of the people of East Timor to integrate with Indonesia had been taken in conformity with the three aforementioned resolutions.

35. Although principle 9 in the annex to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) did not stipulate that United Nations supervision of the process of decolonization of a colonial territory was compulsory, the Provisional Government of East Timor had invited the United Nations to visit the territory in order to observe the situation. The representative of the Provisional Government had stated before the Security Council on 14 April 1976 that, if the United Nations, the Security Council or the Committee of 24 desired to send a mission to the territory to witness the real situation, they were welcome to do so and that the Provisional Government would do its utmost to facilitate the success of such a mission. At the same meeting of the Security Council, the Indonesian representative had stated that a visit by the

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Special Representative of the Secretary-General or by a United Nations mission would be the easiest way of finding out whether the claims and accusations made by FRETILIN were based on facts or whether they were all lies fabricated by a handful of self-styled leaders who had left East Timor after they had unleashed the tragic fighting in the territory, and who had since lost contact with the people and with developments in East Timor. The Indonesian representative had gone on to say that such a visit would provide an opportunity of obtaining first-hand knowledge of the real situation in the territory and of the wishes of its people. The United Nations, however, had not responded to the invitation.

36. A letter (A/AC.109/526) had subsequently been sent by the Provisional Government of East Timor to the competent organs of the United Nations inviting them to observe the decolonization process in the territory, but the United Nations had failed to comply with that request. The people of East Timor had decided to continue the decolonization process, which had been completed on 17 July 1976.

37. The malicious accusations that had been made were based on wishful thinking, hearsay and plain fabrication. East Timor was a territory in which communications were still extremely difficult; yet the so-called petitioners and some other speakers had spoken as if they had visited every corner of the Province and had witnessed what they had tried to make the Committee believe. Anyone wishing to know exactly what had occurred could consult the United Nations records in which earlier statements by the Indonesian delegation were reproduced. Having itself fought against colonial domination and having paid for its freedom with the lives of its people at a time when there were no United Nations committees to rally to its cause, Indonesia needed no lesson in anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism.

38. His delegation, which had the highest respect for the United Nations, wished to draw its attention to a number of points. Some speakers had criticized Indonesia for the conditions in East Timor. Their unfounded remarks had shown either their complete ignorance or complete bias as to the real situation. They appeared to forget that prior to integration East Timor had been in a situation of extreme backwardness resulting from a long period of negligence under more than 400 years of colonial domination. During the colonial period, more than 90 per cent of the population had been illiterate and less than 10 East Timorese had held university degrees. The territory had been one of the areas with the highest incidence of tuberculosis and malaria in the world and with a high incidence of other diseases, particularly skin diseases, nutritional deficiency diseases and gastroenteritis. Those facts had come from a Portuguese source, and the extreme backwardness of East Timor and the constant threat of hunger and starvation during the colonial régime had been confirmed by the Portuguese Government in a letter addressed to the United Nations on 27 December 1974. That already deplorable situation had been exacerbated by the civil war instigated in 1975 by some criminal elements of the Portuguese colonial administration, which had fled the capital and abandoned its moral and political responsibilities at a time when the civil war had resulted in mass killings among the population.

39. In a letter to the Secretary-General, dated 23 August 1975, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had described how efforts by Australia and Indonesia

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to evacuate people in the port area of Dili had been hampered by FRETILIN, how panic had spread throughout the population as a result of the murder of hundreds of inhabitants, including women and children, how hostages were being held in the interior and how the Governor of Timor had appealed for immediate intervention by international forces designated from one or more countries in the area to put an end to the chaotic situation. A few days later, the Governor and colonial officers had fled the capital and had subsequently left the country.

40. Those were the conditions with which the Government of Indonesia had been confronted at the time of integration of East Timor with Indonesia in 1976. The food situation had been adequately managed by the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Red Cross until 1978, but it had then become critical as thousands of people in wretched conditions had descended from the mountains. Most of them were poor farmers and their families who had been threatened at gunpoint by FRETILIN and forced to flee to the remote mountain areas, and who for some three years had lived in fear of their lives, suffering from starvation and sickness. When the FRETILIN terror had subsided, they had escaped from their guards and had managed to reach the various government reception posts.

41. The Government of Indonesia had accepted international assistance from friendly Governments and international relief agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had begun its relief activities in October 1979 for a six-month period, subsequently extended to October 1980 and again to April 1981.

42. A representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross had stated to the press on 2 February 1980 that the ICRC had earmarked \$US 8 million for the relief programme and that he had been impressed with the effective distribution of relief aid. In a publication of 3 September 1980, the ICRC had reported that the situation of the needy people who had been receiving relief aid had generally improved.

43. The ICRC had stationed a relief officer and a doctor in Dili and a senior relief officer in Jakarta. Nearly 300 persons had been employed, including 11 doctors and 16 nurses provided by the Indonesian Red Cross. The Catholic Relief Services, which had been conducting relief aid activities since September 1979, had employed 93 persons, 75 per cent of whom were from East Timor itself. The Catholic Relief Services also had representatives in Jakarta, who visited East Timor from time to time to supervise the implementation of their assistance programme. Two medical teams sponsored by the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), each composed of a doctor and three nurses, were also employed. His delegation wished to express its appreciation to the international relief agencies and donor countries which had contributed to the relief programme. It would welcome assistance from any country or organization provided such assistance was channelled in accordance with existing procedures.

44. One of the problems created by the 1975 civil war concerned persons in East Timor who continued to regard themselves as Portuguese nationals and who wished to go to Portugal. The Indonesian Government had requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to contact the Portuguese Government and make the

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necessary arrangements for their repatriation, but had been informed that Portugal was reluctant to facilitate their entry into its territory because of the presence of large numbers of other repatriates from its former colonial territories, and that only a small number of requests, which would be subject to certain conditions, would be considered.

45. Another pressing problem faced by the province of East Timor after its independence through integration had been the need for development in order to overcome the legacy of extreme backwardness inherited from hundreds of years of negligence under colonial domination.

46. Special efforts were being made to bring the province of East Timor to the level of development of the other Indonesian provinces. The Government had spent over \$US 110 million since 1976 for programmes in such fields as education, agriculture, health, communications and social and religious affairs.

47. Development efforts in education included the restoration or establishment of schools, provision of more teachers and the sending of East Timorese students to other provinces to continue their advanced education.

48. In the agricultural sector, high priority was being given to increased food production through improvement of such services as irrigation and the use of modern machinery, insecticides and fertilizers. The irrigation system in the Maliana district had been developed to cover 5,000 hectares of agricultural land, and a tertiary irrigation system was under construction to irrigate 7,000 hectares of such land. A large irrigation dam being built in the Maliana area at an estimated cost of \$US 10 million was scheduled for completion in 1983. Development efforts were also being carried out in cattle-breeding and fisheries.

49. During the colonial period, the people of East Timor had generally had to rely on Portuguese military medical personnel for their health care and medical treatment. As a result of the civil war in 1975, only one doctor had remained in the territory while all the paramedical personnel had deserted their posts. In order to cope with that critical problem, the Government, assisted by the Indonesian Red Cross, had launched a number of programmes for the restoration of damaged hospitals, the construction of 150 community medical centres throughout the province, the provision of doctors and nurses from other parts of Indonesia, the supply of mobile community medical centre units and the implementation of an epidemic control programme.

50. The Government was carrying out programmes for the repair and improvement of existing roads and construction of new ones that would also serve to open up isolated areas. Daily air services between Dili and Jakarta were being operated by Garuda Indonesian Airways. The landing strip at Dili Airport was being extended and when completed in 1982 would be able to accommodate larger planes, such as the DC-9. The radio station in Dili had been restored and television had been introduced in East Timor in 1978. Six television relay stations had been built, bringing the major part of the province within reach of television broadcasts, and television sets had been installed in public places. Such

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(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

communication developments had ended the total isolation of the people of the province from the rest of Indonesia and the outside world.

51. When addressing the Indonesian parliament on the eve of the thirty-second anniversary of Indonesian independence, President Soeharto had reiterated that the problem of East Timor was one of self-determination and of abolishing colonialism, that the fate of the people could be decided only by themselves on their own soil, that they had now decided to integrate with the people and State of the Republic of Indonesia and that such integration must be accepted with full responsibility.

52. That decision, which had been taken by the East Timorese themselves in the exercise of their right to self-determination, had been accepted by the Indonesian people through their Parliament and Government, and no baseless accusations or malicious rhetoric by outsiders could reverse it. Indonesia was not prepared to enter into discussion with anyone on that irrevocable decision. The people of East Timor were actively engaged in developing their province so as to improve their standard of living and material and spiritual well-being and to build a better future for themselves and their children as an integral part of the sovereign and independent Indonesian nation.

53. Mr. BEDJAQUI (Algeria) said it was highly symbolic that the Committee was considering decolonization questions at a time when the United Nations was celebrating the twentieth anniversary of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and under a Chairman whose country had suffered under colonialism. The adoption of that resolution had been a historic event. In affirming that the process of liberation was irresistible and irreversible, the international community had taken account of the major phenomenon of the contemporary era: the fight of peoples to regain their right to self-determination. No material force or manipulation of history could stem the desire for freedom, the manifestation of the will for national independence or the awakening of world conscience to condemn colonialism. No repressive machinery could subdue the legitimate fight for national liberation and no misleading propaganda could triumph over the will of people for independence.

54. Since the march of national liberation was irrepressible, only the achievement of the right to freedom could satisfy its demands; only the full exercise of the right to self-determination could stem its course; and only the full enjoyment of the legitimate right to independence could be its ultimate conclusion. It was therefore greatly to the credit of the United Nations that it had perceived that freedom, which could not be conceived of without the right of all peoples to a freely-determined national existence, was the key to peace.

55. Through the Programme of Action adopted a decade earlier, the United Nations had renewed its faith in itself and in the ideals on which it had been established. In doing so, it had directed its activities along the path of decolonization by undertaking to help in bringing in a new era freed from all colonial and racial domination.

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(Mr. Bedjaoui, Algeria)

56. The decade that had just ended had been marked by a considerable reduction in the extent of colonial domination in the world. The accession to independence in 1980 of Zimbabwe, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Vanuatu had confirmed the inexorability of the movement for the liberation of peoples.
57. The persistence of colonialism in South Africa, Namibia, Palestine, Belize, East Timor and Western Sahara nevertheless dimmed the lustre of the twentieth anniversary, which should have signalled the final demise of colonialism.
58. Whatever the geographical area in which it took place, the fight for national liberation was the same fundamental fight for the satisfaction of the unchangeable aspiration of all peoples to self-determination and independence.
59. While the end of the nineteenth century had seen the upholders of the colonial order openly striving to attain the pinnacle of their expansionism, the end of the past decade had been marked by a more insidious subjection of peoples, arising out of paradoxical and anachronistic situations in which countries that had themselves suffered under the colonial yoke in the recent past were endeavouring to dominate others. Such new colonial situations were of the same order as their predecessors. The most striking example was that of the Western Sahara, the details of which were familiar to members of the Committee. For five years, the people of that Territory had been fighting a war of resistance against the occupying Power. Having been dispossessed of their national rights and deprived of the fruits of their struggle against the previous occupying Power, and having seen their sovereignty violated and their territory divided, the people of Western Sahara had had no choice but to resort to violence against the forces of domination in order to regain their dignity and freedom.
60. Just as they had been mobilized under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO against the former colonial Power, so had the people of Western Sahara been obliged to revolt against those who had later threatened their right to life. Their political determination, the keenness of their struggle and the mobilization of their national energies testified to the strength of national feeling of the people of Western Sahara and their refusal to accept the dehumanized status to which the occupying Power had attempted to reduce them in a transaction carried out in total disregard for their existence. The magnitude of the war of national liberation, the ever-growing international audience watching the combat and the increasing number of countries that had recognized the Saharan Arab Republic poured scorn on the "closed case" argument which the occupying Power persisted in upholding against overwhelming factual evidence. The fact that the question of Western Sahara was being discussed in the Committee and had been considered by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned movement in all their meetings on decolonization gave the lie to that argument. It had also been rejected by the people of the territory, whose voice, heard through its armed struggle and its echo in the community of nations, would never be silenced.
61. In adopting General Assembly resolution 34/37, the international community had traced the outline of a political solution based on the following principles:

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(Mr. Bedjaoui, Algeria)

the exercise of the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence; the legitimacy of their struggle under international law; the rejection of the fait accompli and the call on Morocco to end its occupation of the Territory; and the participation of the Frente POLISARIO, as the representative of the people of Western Sahara, in any search for a just and lasting solution to the question.

62. By acclaiming the peace agreement between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO as an important contribution to a final and lasting settlement, and by urging Morocco to associate itself with that move, the United Nations had clearly established the necessary means of reaching a solution. In doing so, it had indicated that the solution must be a political and negotiated settlement in which the Frente POLISARIO, as the representative of the people of the Sahara, must be included.

63. The recognition by the majority of African States of Saharan nationalism showed that they recognized the struggling people of the Sahara as part of themselves and their tragedy as the colonial tragedy in which their own fight for freedom was being relived.

64. Having been born of decolonization, the Organization of African Unity could only fulfil itself in the liberation of the continent. It was thus identified with the struggle for the national liberation of the African peoples against colonial and racial domination. Like the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity had consistently called for respect for the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence. From the beginning of the conflict, it had sought ways and means of securing a just and final settlement in accordance with the OAU Charter, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Its activities and those of the United Nations were, therefore, not mutually exclusive but complementary. Being based on the same principle, all the decolonization activities of the two organizations were mutually reinforcing.

65. It had been observed at the various sessions of the Organization of African Unity and of its Ad Hoc Committee that the situation in Western Sahara was undeniably a question of the non-exercise by the people of the Territory of their national rights. OAU had laid down the principles for a just and lasting settlement of the question, and its Ad Hoc Committee, despite Moroccan obstruction, had formulated a process by which the people of the Sahara could freely determine their future.

66. OAU could only hand down a verdict dictated by the situation, as expected by the people of Western Sahara. OAU had been right in considering Western Sahara as a colonial question and in stating the need for a referendum. Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO should come to the negotiating table and heed the recommendations of OAU in order to create an atmosphere in which the people of Western Sahara would be free to determine their own future.

(Mr. Bedjaoui, Algeria)

67. Both the United Nations and OAU viewed Western Sahara as a case of impeded decolonization, in which a people was fighting against colonial oppression. For both organizations the right of the Saharan people to self-determination was paramount. Any attempt to question the competence of the United Nations and OAU with regard to decolonization was misplaced. It was clear that the United Nations and OAU shared responsibility in the matter. The real question was whether the occupying Power was ready to decolonize Western Sahara in keeping with the wishes of its people. Morocco's attitude, once stripped of procedural manoeuvring, had not changed. It still considered Western Sahara as part of its territory and refused to contemplate consultation with the Territory's population. Morocco still had a status quo policy.

68. Several points needed to be resolved. Was the occupying Power ready to recognize the question of Western Sahara as one of decolonization? Was it prepared to countenance self-determination for the people of Western Sahara? Would Morocco renounce its claim that Western Sahara was Moroccan in character and make a real attempt to find a peaceful solution? Finally, was Morocco prepared to open negotiations with the Frente POLISARIO in order to create an atmosphere in which the people of Western Sahara might determine their own future?

69. Morocco's refusal to answer those questions demonstrated that it intended to persist in its policies. In so doing it was rejecting United Nations and OAU decisions. It was also expressing its opposition to the decolonization of Western Sahara and was eschewing the process of peace initiated by Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO.

70. Draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.7 demonstrated the occupying Power's attitudes. By seeking to apply the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, relating to the settlement of international disputes, Morocco was misrepresenting the nature of the question. It thus hoped to impede the process of decolonization.

71. The mere fact that the question of Western Sahara had been submitted to the Fourth Committee, of which decolonization was the *raison d'être*, should have discouraged any attempt to present the conflict as being one between States, the more so since the question had been raised under the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". The question of Western Sahara was not one of a conflict between States. It was a colonial question.

72. Algeria, concerned by the war on its borders, could not remain indifferent. It was thus ready to assist in seeking a peaceful solution to the matter along the lines indicated by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

73. Mr. CABRAL (Guinea-Bissau) said that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had radically altered international relations. For the third world it represented the dawn of a new civilization in that it lay at the heart of the very existence of the third world.

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(Mr. Cabral, Guinea-Bissau)

74. With regard to Western Sahara, it was the duty of the international community to support a people fighting against the expansionist policies of Morocco. In denying independence to Western Sahara, Morocco was betraying the principles which had inspired its own liberation struggle. The international community, in condemning the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, had renewed its commitment to work for the full emancipation of the Saharan people. How could it do otherwise, when that people was spilling its blood to defend the principles of the Charter of the United Nations?

75. Freedom was indivisible. The fate of the people of Guinea-Bissau was linked to that of the Saharan people. Justice could not be delayed; indeed justice demanded that the Saharan people, under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO, their legitimate representative, be supported in their struggle for freedom and their legitimate rights. His country's sense of equity had led it to recognize the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, which it would support to the full.

76. War was the enemy of all peoples. Yet violence inevitably bred violence, since an oppressed people would fight to the death to defend its right to live. The members of Frente POLISARIO were masters of Western Sahara and well able to defend their homeland. Yet no people, even when victorious, liked war, especially a fratricidal war. The Saharan people wanted a just peace, based on recognition by Morocco of their right to live in freedom.

77. The Saharan people and their allies called upon Morocco to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara and to respect decisions of the United Nations and OAU. Only then would a just and lasting solution be possible.

78. Mr. MRANI ZENTAR (Morocco) said that peoples acquired the right to existence and to dignity and respect by their determination to fight for that right. The Moroccan people had, for centuries, fought to defend that freedom, unity and territorial integrity.

79. Owing to its strategic location at the crossroads of two continents, and to its economic and human potential, Morocco had been the target of rival colonial ambitions. Opposing colonial Powers had marked out spheres of influence, crisscrossing Morocco's territory with artificial frontiers. Yet throughout the colonial period, the Moroccan people had remained united in allegiance to the spiritual authority of their sovereign. That was a fundamental fact which the colonialists had been forced to take into account. Although Morocco had been subjected to six different legal régimes, the Sultan's sovereignty over all his subjects had been recognized in most of the treaties and conventions negotiated with or on Morocco.

80. While each colonial authority had attempted to administer its zone in accordance with its own aims, each had been careful to preserve the link between the people and their sovereign. The French, Spanish and international zones had been headed by high officials owing allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco. The International Court of Justice had been right in stating that the Saharan tribes had owed allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco well before the Spanish occupation.

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(Mr. Mrani Zentar, Morocco)

81. Morocco, after independence, had been the first State to raise the question of the decolonization of Western Sahara before the General Assembly, which had requested the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the nature of the Spanish occupation of the Territory and the links existing between Western Sahara and Morocco. The Court had stated that, prior to the arrival of the Spanish, links of allegiance had existed between the Saharan tribes and the Sultan of Morocco. Those links had been internationally recognized at the time of the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara.

82. Such a clear opinion by the Court would normally have been sufficient to exclude any possibility other than the reintegration of Western Sahara with Morocco. Yet Morocco had been obliged to seek other means of re-establishing its rights. The Green March had finally obliged the Spanish Government to open negotiations with the parties concerned in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter.

83. By the Madrid Agreement of November 1975, Spain had decided to withdraw from the Territory and renounce all its responsibilities and powers therein. That same year the General Assembly had noted the Agreement by which Spain had transferred its powers. After consultation with the Jema'a, as provided for in the Madrid Agreement, Morocco had taken appropriate steps to integrate the Saharan provinces with its territory.

84. The people of Western Sahara had thus had an immediate opportunity to participate in the democratic life of the country. The experience of universal suffrage had been met with great enthusiasm in the Saharan regions, owing to their recently acquired freedom and their pride in participating in national life for the first time. Most of the population of the area was actively participating in the economic life of a free and democratic country. The colonial era was over, despite whatever the opponents of peace in the region might claim.

85. The whole of Western Sahara was now rid of the bands of mercenaries in the employ of foreign hegemonistic elements, apart from the border area adjacent to Tindouf, where they had the use of Algerian bases. It was thus vain to assert that the problem was between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. In fact it was Algeria which had provoked conflict with Morocco. Morocco was thus opposed, not to the people of Western Sahara, but to Algeria's designs.

86. The campaign mounted against Morocco was one of destabilization of its national territory, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of African Unity. Nevertheless, his country had constantly sought negotiations with its neighbours in an effort to re-establish peace, co-operation and traditional friendly relations.

87. The OAU Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara, at its recent session in Freetown, had heard testimony from representatives of all segments of the population of Western Sahara, just as the Fourth Committee had done. Those representatives had convinced many delegations of their sincerity, and had unmasked the mercenaries as Algerian-based pseudo-representatives in the pay of Libya.

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(Mr. Mrani Zentar, Morocco)

88. The men and women of the Sahara had made a free choice long before decolonization, establishing close links with the people to the north over the course of past centuries, as well as during the ultimate struggle for liberation of recent decades. The Committee itself had seen evidence of the determination and fervour with which the patriotic groupings to which they belonged had fought for the decolonization of their territory and reunification with Morocco. Authorized spokesmen for the Saharan people had explained why they regarded that reunification as a historical necessity and a considered act of self-determination. As irrefutable proof that their message was authentic, they had invited the members of OAU and the United Nations to visit the Sahara, collectively or severally, and gain first-hand evidence of the Saharan people's commitment to their newly-regained citizenship. By the same token they had clearly revealed how groundless were the attempts of those who sought to wrest away the benefits of the Moroccan people's endeavours through violence and criminal activity.

89. Since the OAU decision to renew the mandate of its Ad Hoc Committee, Morocco had participated cheerfully in that Committee's work, believing that the chances of arriving at constructive results and, eventually, peace, had never been better. It was odd that parties responsible for preventing the African Group at the United Nations from reaching consensus on a draft resolution that merely sought to enhance the prospects for peace, which had already opened up thanks to the efforts of the African Heads of State, should then claim that Morocco was to blame for obstructing the work of OAU. Any attempt to intervene in the process begun in OAU or to alter its intentions and goals would seriously endanger its chances of continuing. He observed that a draft resolution put forward by a large number of Member States began by welcoming the willingness to co-operate shown by the parties to the dispute, but then went on to make contradictory statements about some States' lack of co-operation in the attempt by OAU to bring peace to the region, and did everything possible to prevent such a miracle from occurring.

90. The Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations, which he was referring to his authorities, were based on two ideas, a cease-fire and a free expression of the will of the peoples concerned. The cease-fire would cause Morocco no problems, since it had never fired first; the question was whether armed bands would cease to cross the border from Algeria, commit acts of provocation and escape back across the frontier. A cease-fire would be effective only when they ceased such activities. As for the free expression of will, Morocco would co-operate with the OAU Ad Hoc Committee. If OAU wished to satisfy itself as to the freedom and authenticity of the Saharan people's choice yet again, Morocco would afford all necessary assistance: the Sahara was open to inspection.

91. Attempts had been made, for the sake of short-sighted, hegemonistic objectives, to use the decolonization of the Sahara as a means of hindering co-operation and development in many African countries. In addition to retarding or jeopardizing many economic undertakings of national and regional importance, such attempts had the effect of diverting funds from the productive sectors that were vital to the whole of North-West Africa, and had brought OAU to the brink of collapse.

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(Mr. Mrani Zentar, Morocco)

92. The recent decision by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU had made it possible for the first time for the parties to work together with the Ad Hoc Committee towards the fulfilment of its mandate: it was essential, therefore, that the General Assembly should leave OAU as much latitude as possible to exercise its responsibilities. Ill-considered efforts to interfere would be likely to destroy the current moves towards peace. While Morocco had had reservations about some decisions that OAU had arrived at, on occasion by dubious means, in the past, the decision which had just been made known opened the way towards a genuine reconsideration of the problem and to peace in the region, and his delegation endorsed it. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would afford all possible support to so promising an initiative.

Question of Belize

93. Mr. ROGERS (Deputy Premier of Belize) said that the secure and early independence of Belize had been the fundamental issue in the People's United Party's political platform during the national electoral campaign of 1979. An unprecedented 90.7 per cent of the Belizian electorate had voted and had returned 13 members of the People's United Party and five members of the opposition United Democratic Party to the 18-member House of Representatives. A resolution adopted by the Belizian House of Representatives on 25 July 1980 had called upon the Government of Belize to initiate the measures necessary to bring Belize to a safe and secure independence with or without the agreement of the Government of Guatemala. The House of Representatives had joined the Government in opposing all proposals for the settlement of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute which might involve the cession of Belizian territory or the erosion of Belizian sovereignty. Both the international community and the people of Belize were convinced that the differences between the United Kingdom and Guatemala did not in any way derogate from the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity.

94. The Government of Belize had participated in Anglo-Guatemalan negotiations for the previous 19 years in an effort to help the United Kingdom and Guatemala to settle their difference without prejudice to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize. During those negotiations, Guatemala had tried to hold to ransom Belize's inalienable right to independence. Guatemala had indicated that it would allow Belize to become independent, provided it gave up territory or gave Guatemala control of the economy and foreign affairs of Belize. Only when such unjust pressure had been removed would an internationally acceptable settlement be likely. His Government was prepared to support any agreement that conformed to the United Nations resolutions on the question.

95. The representative of the United Kingdom had stated that the position of his Government as well as that of the Government of Guatemala had been clarified during the last round of talks and that the negotiating process would continue. Belize was prepared to continue participating in negotiations but was not prepared to allow Guatemala to exercise a veto over Belizian independence. One reason for the failure of negotiations to date had been Guatemala's refusal to abide by the guidelines stipulated in the relevant United Nations resolutions.

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(Mr. Rogers)

96. Belize was a full member of the Caribbean Community and Common Market; it had been accorded special status within the Non-Aligned Movement, which had consistently supported early Belizian independence. His Government greatly appreciated the recognition by Mexico of the paramountcy and legitimacy of the rights of the people of Belize over juridical claims rooted in historical systems that were no longer valid. It also welcomed the support it had received from Panama, Nicaragua and Costa Rica and could not ignore the strong currents of opinion in Honduras and El Salvador urging those countries to afford similar support. Despite a decree issued by the Government of Guatemala on 12 June 1977 declaring it a treasonable offence punishable by death for anyone to support the independence of Belize, the popular and democratic organizations, as well as labour and student unions in Guatemala, had voiced their support for Belizian independence.

97. The representative of Guatemala had been blatantly interventionist in his reference to the internal affairs of Belize. The parliamentary democracy that prevailed in Belize allowed the people to elect their Government in free and fair elections; if, over the past several years, they had chosen by a majority of votes a Government of the People's United Party that did not have the approval of the rulers of Guatemala, it was because of the commitment of the Belizian people to independence and freedom. The representative of Guatemala had presumed to direct Belize as to who should represent Belize at the negotiating table and had suggested that a group which he had admitted was a minority should represent Belize.

98. Draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 would provide a framework for Belize to proceed to its independence. It incorporated two new elements: it would declare that Belize should become an independent State with its territory intact before the conclusion of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and would request the administering Power to initiate the constitutional measures necessary to complete the decolonization process; it would also request the relevant organs of the United Nations to take such appropriate action as might be requested by the administering Power and the Government of Belize in order to facilitate Belize's attainment of independence and to guarantee its security and territorial integrity thereafter. The draft resolution would recognize the desirability of an early settlement of the difference between the United Kingdom and Guatemala but it would also insist that the process of negotiation must be carried out without prejudice to the exercise by the people of Belize of their inalienable right to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity.

99. The Government and people were convinced that the moment was ripe for Belize to assume the authority and responsibilities of independence. The administering Power had signalled its willingness to respect that decision. The Belizian Government intended to apply for membership in the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement upon attainment of independence. He appealed to Guatemala to respect the decision of the people of Belize to proceed to sovereign independence in peace and to all members of the international community to support Belize as it exercised its right to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity.

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100. Mr. SKINNER-KLEE (Guatemala), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he felt constrained to correct some of the most serious distortions in the statement made by the Deputy Premier of Belize. The claim that the Guatemalan delegation's previous statement was interventionist, in that it referred to the domestic affairs of Belize, merely revealed the political immaturity of the Deputy Premier: every fact about Belize that the Guatemalan delegation had mentioned could be found in document A/AC.109/618. The local Government in Belize was evidently incapable of reading, understanding and interpreting the documents produced by United Nations bodies.

101. The audacity of a non-member of the Organization in alluding to matters that were the exclusive internal province of Guatemala was unparalleled. The Deputy Premier's assault on international concord was courageous but irresponsible; he and his Government, which supposedly represented the people of Belize, had evidently been upset by what the representative of the opposition party in Belize had had to say to the Committee. Guatemala obviously had no connexion whatever with that opposition party. On the other hand, the links that the Deputy Premier's party had had over the years with Guatemalan groups, officials and private individuals were well known.

102. Guatemala was the victim of attacks from widely recognized quarters. It was deplorable that the representatives of the Government of Belize should align themselves with groups involved in such attacks. Such a situation was not reassuring, but his delegation ought perhaps to be thankful for having received warning of the onslaught.

103. Mr. ABDULAH (Trinidad and Tobago), introducing draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 on behalf of the sponsors, said that, in a number of resolutions, the United Nations had recognized Belize as a dependent Territory to which the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applied; it had also recognized the United Kingdom as the administering Power of the Territory. The desire of the Belizian people to attain secure independence had been repeatedly stated before the Fourth Committee and had been endorsed, not only by the United Democratic Party, which was the opposition party in Belize, but also by the Deputy Premier of Belize. The representative of the United Kingdom had confirmed the readiness of his Government to grant independence to Belize whenever the Belizian Government requested it.

104. The factor which had prevented the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration had been Guatemala's continuing claim to the territory of Belize. The removal of that threat had been the subject of negotiations between the United Kingdom and Guatemala.

105. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 had been joined as co-sponsors by Belgium, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Romania and the Sudan. The draft resolution would welcome the recent negotiations between the United Kingdom and Guatemala and would state that the continuing inability of the parties to resolve their differences should no longer delay the early and secure exercise of the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self-determination,

(Mr. Abdulah, Trinidad and Tobago)

independence and territorial integrity; it would also recognize the United Kingdom's responsibility to take immediate steps to enable the people of Belize to exercise that right freely and without fear.

106. The operative part of the draft resolution would declare that Belize should become an independent State with its territory intact before the conclusion of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and would call upon the United Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference to prepare for the independence of Belize. Pending the exercise by the people of Belize of their right to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, would be called upon to continue to ensure Belize's security and territorial integrity.

107. The sponsors of the draft resolution believed that the international community continued to have a duty to assist Belize in the attainment of its goal of independence and, to that end, the relevant organs of the United Nations should respond favourably to any appropriate request for assistance and for assuring strict respect for the security and territorial integrity of an independent Belize. On behalf of the sponsors, he commended draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8 for unanimous approval by the Fourth Committee.

108. The CHAIRMAN said that Guinea, Lesotho and Uganda had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.8.

109. Mr. MILLS (Jamaica) introduced draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.2/Rev.1 on behalf of its sponsors. The General Assembly had constantly supported the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, as required under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but that right continued to be denied in 1980 in spite of world opinion and efforts to bring about a principled solution to the problem. The clear result of that denial was tension and instability in North-West Africa. The draft resolution presented a balanced assessment of the situation, and offered the most acceptable approach to solving the problem. It took account of all efforts to reach a solution, including those by OAU, and repeated previous years' appeals to Morocco to align itself with the international consensus and terminate its occupation of the Territory, joining instead in efforts to find a just and definitive settlement.

110. Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire), intervening on a point of order, said that he had expected all delegations to be given an opportunity to state their positions in the general debate before any draft resolutions were introduced. His delegation was always prepared to co-operate with the Chairman, but felt that deviations from the published schedule for any meeting of the Committee should be brought to delegations' attention before they were permitted to take place.

111. Mr. DABO (Guinea), introducing draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.7, said that its sponsors were prompted by a desire for peace with justice rather than peace under any terms. Some States apparently chose to take a very one-sided and convenient view of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); since the colonies

(Mr. Dabo, Guinea)

that had united to form the United States of America - and the countries that had become the Soviet Union - had essentially exercised the rights established in resolution 1514 (XV), he could see no reason why those nations should now wish to deny the people of the Western Sahara the same privilege. Draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.7 was intended to leave to OAU the initiative for bringing about peace, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, and to provide an opportunity for dialogue to replace fratricide and war.

AGENDA ITEM 88: UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (continued) (A/C.4/35/L.4/Rev.1)

112. The CHAIRMAN said that Ghana and New Zealand should be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.4/Rev.1.

AGENDA ITEM 89: OFFERS BY MEMBERS STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES (continued) (A/C.4/35/L.5)

113. The CHAIRMAN said that Fiji, Guinea and Uganda had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.5.

AGENDA ITEM 84: INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (continued) (A/C.4/35/L.6)

114. The CHAIRMAN said that Guinea had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.6.

AGENDA ITEM 85: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued) (A/C.4/35/L.9)

115. The CHAIRMAN said the Trinidad and Tobago had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/35/L.9.

REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS

116. The CHAIRMAN said that he had received three communications containing requests for hearings concerning Namibia. He suggested that, in accordance with the usual practice, they should be circulated as Committee documents for consideration at a later meeting.

117. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.