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FOURTH COMMITTEE  
11th meeting  
held on  
Friday, 17 October 1980  
at 10.30 a.m.  
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. LEROTHOLI (Lesotho)

later: Mr. PEŇÁŽKA (Czechoslovakia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS (A/C.4/35/3/Add.9-10)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to two new requests for hearings contained in documents A/C.4/35/3/Add.9-10.
2. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia) said that his delegation's consistent position, stated on several occasions in the Committee, was that it strongly opposed any discussion of the so-called question of East Timor and the hearing of petitioners on the subject. He requested that his delegation's opposition be reflected in the summary record.
3. The CHAIRMAN said that the statement made by the representative of Indonesia would be duly reflected in the record of the meeting and that if he heard no further comments he would take it that the Committee decided to grant the requests for hearings.
4. It was so decided.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS

Question of East Timor

5. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that, at its 7th, 9th and 11th meetings, it had granted requests for hearings contained in documents A/C.4/35/3 and Add.7 and Add.9.
6. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Da Costa Amaral (União Democrática Timorense), Mr. Xavier (Movimento Nacional para a Libertação e Independência de Timor-Dili) and Miss Traube took places at the petitioners' table.
7. Mr. DA COSTA AMARAL (União Democrática Timorense) said that his organization had stressed in its statement before the Committee at the thirty-fourth session the following three facts: the integration of Timor with Indonesia, proclaimed by the Government of Indonesia, did not express the wish of the Timorese people; the Indonesian Government had been unable to carry out a policy of economic and social development in Timor but had merely taken steps to eliminate half of the population of the Territory; and the actions of the Indonesian Government, such as the establishment of an assembly in Dili to provide the basis for integration, were merely farces and did not correspond to reality.
8. His presence now before the Committee was possible only thanks to the sacrifices and contributions made by numerous Timorese refugees living in exile, most of whom had lost one or more members of their families during the oppression and killings on the island. He wished to report that the war of resistance in Timor was finished, although the Timorese soldiers had fought bravely against well-equipped soldiers of the Indonesian army. The new "peace" was based on immense

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(Mr. Da Costa Amaral)

bloodshed, poured out in vain, in which more than 300,000 people, some 50 per cent of the population, had been killed. Although there were small isolated groups of resistance in the mountains, they would also soon disappear. The wounds were still very deep and the memory of the killings and bombings preserved the feeling of revolt in the people forever. In that connexion he cited the abortive attempt at armed rebellion in Dili and other villages in the Territory on 10 June 1980. Those involved had been put in prison and the whereabouts of the leaders were unknown.

9. Having forced the Timorese people into submission, the Indonesian authorities now sought to gain its loyalty. To that end they had instituted a costly plan of economic, social and educational development, but only a small part of the funds allocated was actually being used for the plan, as a few opportunists had managed to divert the money for their own interests. Happiness or friendly relations were no longer possible in the Territory, which showed that material gains would not buy the loyalty of the Timorese unless accompanied by profound political and social transformations. Part of the problem was based on the fact that the Portuguese had introduced cultural ways that had become traditional in the Territory and were very different from those of the Indonesian invaders.

10. It should be remembered that, although Indonesia had proclaimed the integration in 1975, Portugal was legally still the administering Power and had even declared that it considered itself still bound by its obligations to promote the right of the Timorese people to self-determination and independence in accordance with international law. The communiqué issued by the Portuguese Government in that connexion (A/C.4/34/2) contained the lines along which Portugal wished to seek a solution to the problem of East Timor, in both its humanitarian and its political aspects. According to that document, the Portuguese Government was ready to initiate consultations among the interested parties and the national movements representing the Timorese. The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his recent statement to the General Assembly, had stressed that Portugal had no territorial claim over East Timor but wished to fulfil its historical responsibilities. That position corresponded to the wishes of the Timorese people, who hoped that all nations would co-operate with the Portuguese Government in working out a solution to the problem along the lines suggested. The Timorese people also appealed to Indonesia to show more willingness to begin negotiations with Portugal and other interested parties immediately and without conditions.

11. Various political alternatives had been suggested as solutions to the problem of Timor: integration, independence, and the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty. It was easy to recognize that de facto integration had already been achieved at the cost of 300,000 lives, which suggested that integration did not and would never express the wish of the Timorese people. The conditions obtaining under integration could be improved, however, if the Indonesian authorities modified the obsolete administrative system that they had introduced and if they gave the Timorese people more high-level representation and responsibility in running their own affairs, allowed significant popular participation in government decision-making, and respected the local culture and traditions, such as language and the procedures

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(Mr. Da Costa Amaral)

for choosing traditional authorities. Independence as an alternative had not been accepted by Indonesia or by other Powers for political reasons and because of little economic and social development. Yet East Timor was very rich in natural resources, including possibly immense oil deposits. Rationally organized agriculture could produce sufficient food for both internal needs and export. Before the tragedy in 1975 the school network had been significantly expanded in order to achieve social transformation. At that time more than 90 per cent of the officials in public administration had been Timorese. As to the possibility of maintaining Portuguese sovereignty, he noted that Portugal was legally still the administering Power and pointed out that the Timorese people did not reject that alternative, in view of the tragic outcome of integration with Indonesia and the infeasibility of immediate independence.

12. Although East Timor was no longer a battlefield it had become a dead and unpopulated island, with the surviving population concentrated in valleys, villages and camps. He appealed to the Committee to find a solution that met the wishes of his people and was in accordance with the sacred principles of the United Nations.

13. Mr. XAVIER (Movimento Nacional para a Libertação e Independência de Timor-Dili (MLITD)) said that the problems of Timor-Dili were, in the view of his movement, based on ethnic, historical and cultural considerations. Timor-Dili had its own identity, which had been established when the Portuguese colonists arrived on the island nearly 500 years earlier. The colonization had begun with religious indoctrination, which had later developed into a mixture of evangelism and mercantalism. The continuous human contacts between the Portuguese and the people of Timor-Dili had resulted in a natural mixture of cultures, much influenced by Christian civilization, unlike Timor-Kupang to the west, which had followed the cultural lines of India and Islam.

14. The Portuguese colonizers, initially missionaries, had been reinforced by soldiers and sailors, who had settled, intermarried and worked in agriculture. A close companionship between the people of Timor-Dili and the Portuguese had been established, in particular because the people of Timor-Dili needed protection from the invading Macassares. Social and economic progress had come with time, as the communications, medical and educational services had expanded. The civil service and the army had gradually come to include many officials and other personnel chosen from among the people of Timor-Dili. A cultural identity completely different from that of the Indonesians had evolved under the influence of the Portuguese and the Catholic Church. In 1951 Timor-Dili had become an overseas province of Portugal in which all people had the same rights. The evolution of Portuguese colonization would have led Timor-Dili to natural independence, once the necessary conditions and structures had been established, and Timor-Dili would have become a nation, much as Brazil, with traditional links to Portugal.

15. An important question was why Indonesia, which had never laid claim to Timor-Dili before, had invaded the Territory in 1975. Following the change of régime in Portugal in 1974, the new Government of Lisbon had stated that the people of Timor-Dili should be granted independence. However, the decolonization process had been interrupted by the Indonesian invasion. It was his view that the United States, which had been heavily involved militarily in Viet Nam for several years,

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(Mr. Xavier)

had been concerned about stability in the region and Indonesia had been entrusted with the role of "regional policeman". An independent Timor-Dili under a non-aligned and progressive régime would have posed a serious challenge to the military and economic situation in the region. Indonesia feared that a popular government in Timor-Dili would kindle revolution in Indonesia. Furthermore, to the north of the island lay the Ombai Strait, of vital strategic importance to the United States.

16. Thus, in 1975, motivated by desires to exploit the island's resources and also to defend Western strategic interests and preserve regional stability, Indonesia, which had repeatedly defended the self-determination and independence of people in the United Nations, had invaded the Territory, bombing and killing more than 300,000 Timorese, and had set up a neo-colonial occupation.

17. The Indonesian schemes to annex Timor-Dili were of the same nature as its manoeuvres to prolong minority rule in the South Moluccas and West New Guinea (Irian Jaia). Indonesia's exploitation and oppression of the peoples of the many islands constituting that country were well documented. It was incomprehensible that Indonesia could be allowed to flout the Charter and yet remain a Member of the United Nations. He appealed to all Member States to demand the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the Territory so that the people of Timor-Dili could exercise fully their right to self-determination.

18. A related question was why the Portuguese Government had abandoned Timor-Dili. An American professor, Benedict Anderson, had expressed his view in February 1978 that the situation which had precipitated the civil war in East Timor had been a coup by the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) at the instigation of the Indonesian intelligence service. It would seem then that there had been an international plot against the Portuguese presence in Timor-Dili. The Portuguese Governor and his administration had been forced to leave Dili, the capital of the Territory, and had been unable to return, despite the entreaties of the Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (FRETLIN). The Timorese had been left without protection against the invading Indonesian armed forces. Thus, international intrigues against the Portuguese presence had destroyed the identity of the people and had led to the imposition of a neo-colonialist régime, a step backwards of 500 years. He appealed to the international community not to be indifferent to the tragedy in Timor-Dili. The Portuguese Government was still recognized as the administering Power of the Territory, and its authority should be re-established in order to prepare for the Territory's self-determination and independence.

19. The position of his movement, MNLITD, was based on nine main principles. First, Timor-Dili must attain total independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Second, the invasion of Indonesia and its continuing occupation of the Territory was an impediment to the implementation of that resolution. Third, Indonesia had neither legal nor historical rights in Timor-Dili. Fourth, the invasion of Timor-Dili was a violation of the principle of self-determination for colonial countries and peoples, as well as a serious violation of internationally recognized territorial frontiers. Fifth, Timor-Dili was a Portuguese province occupied by force by Indonesia. Sixth, Timor-Dili must

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(Mr. Xavier)

be returned to Portugal, so that the regular decolonization process could be carried out. Seventh, Timor-Dili has its own identity, created during its long association with Portugal, and it must be permanently linked to Portugal, on the model of Brazil, with the same rights granted to the Europeans, the Timorese and the other peoples in the Territory. Eighth, MNLITD appealed to the Government of Indonesia to comply with its international obligations and to accept an internationally supervised referendum in Timor-Dili on the basis of universal suffrage. Ninth, MNLITD was willing to establish friendly relations with Indonesia and to seek co-operation and peace in the region, once Indonesia had recognized Timor-Dili's sacred right to independence.

20. Miss TRAUBE said that her opinions on East Timor were her own and that she was speaking as an anthropologist familiar with that Territory.

21. In reproducing the ideas of certain East Timorese, and in setting before the Committee the terms in which the East Timorese conceived of and reflected on their political situation, she was endeavouring to elicit the Committee's attention and respect for a foreign way of making sense of the world.

22. By November 1974 the issue of decolonization had been posed in East Timor. Of the three political parties that had been formed, FRETILIN had appeared to be achieving predominance, under the guidance of an efficient, restrained, intelligent and dedicated leadership. However, she did not wish to offer partisan support for any of the parties.

23. Two points were of concern: the capacity of the East Timorese people to exercise self-determination, and the legitimacy of the Indonesian "integration" of East Timor. Having studied, among other things, the collective decision-making of the peoples of East Timor, she was of the opinion that they were fully capable of determining their own political future. Other anthropological studies endorsed that opinion.

24. The largest ethnic group in East Timor was the Mambai, whose social thought made no distinction between religion and politics. The Mambai conceived of the political order of the realm as being necessary to cosmic well-being, and that premise underlay their concern over the issue of decolonization. The departure of the Portuguese and the termination of colonial rule had had profound significance for the Mambai, who regarded the Portuguese as legitimate sovereigns and who construed colonial rule as part of a cosmic order.

25. Mambai mythology located the Portuguese in that cosmic order, identifying them as the younger brothers of the Timorese. Father Heaven, the divine regulator of the cosmos, had authorized the Portuguese brothers to rule over the human realm. To the elder Timorese brothers Heaven had entrusted the ritual custodianship of the cosmos. When the Portuguese had abandoned their obligations and vanished overseas, one of their Timorese brothers had pursued them and called them back to rule over Timor. Thus had colonial rule first been established. In that mythological model Portuguese and Timorese had performed interdependent functions.

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(Miss Traube)

26. Thus, the Mambai interpreted political change in terms of its consequences for cosmic order. They therefore viewed the issue of decolonization as a matter of universal concern, and had no intention of leaving the determination of the future to others. If their Portuguese brothers had "grown old and weary", a successor had to be found. The Mambai, regarding themselves as the elder masters of the cosmos, were obliged to play an active role in that succession. By late 1974 they had begun advancing to meet the forces of change, committing themselves to active involvement in the self-determination process, one which had been tragically interrupted by the Indonesian invasion.

27. To evaluate the legitimacy of the Indonesian claim to sovereignty, the colonial history of the island needed to be considered. Timor had been divided between the Dutch and the Portuguese. The different historical experience of the two parts outweighed the resemblances between their cultures. In particular, the cultural identities of the peoples of East Timor reflected their historical involvement with the Portuguese: they had not been culturally prepared for integration into Indonesia.

28. The foundations for a national identity, laid under colonial rule, worked against indigenous legitimization of Indonesian intervention. Although the East Timorese had once responded to the challenge of an alien civilization by integrating the foreigners into their world, that solution had been created under radically different conditions. Firstly, the character of the Portuguese occupation, which had unfolded gradually and had involved relatively little use of military force, contrasted sharply with the sudden and violent imposition of Indonesian rule. Secondly, the Portuguese had dealt with isolated local groups to whom an alliance with the Portuguese had often seemed economically and politically advantageous. The Indonesians, in contrast, confronted a population bound by a common past. Thirdly, FRETILIN, a dedicated national independence movement, had come into being and was engaged in mobilizing national resistance.

29. The post-invasion political situation was one in which the Indonesians were set against the forces of resistance coalescing around FRETILIN. The East Timorese population was inevitably caught between two antagonistic sides. If even partially accurate, the reports of Indonesian atrocities against the civilian population indicated hysterical hostility, doubtless sustained by a sense of political insecurity. There was still hope for the physical survival of the East Timorese people, given a continuing flow of international humanitarian aid to a population ravaged by war, starvation and disease; their cultural survival, also greatly threatened by the hostilities, was another matter.

30. The only party able to mediate in the crisis was the Portuguese Government, supported by the United Nations. A peaceful solution necessitated the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces and the return of the Portuguese administration to resume a peaceful process of decolonization. It should be noted that FRETILIN leaders

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had repeatedly called for the Portuguese to return. In 1974 the Mambai had been adamant in espousing Portuguese-supervised decolonization. Nevertheless, in abandoning Timor, the Portuguese might have sacrificed their old legitimacy.

31. She wished to appeal to the Portuguese Government and to the international community in general. Her appeal was grounded in the particular nature of Mambai thought. The Mambai were particularly concerned with what they perceived as the constant threat to the cosmic order posed by human forgetfulness. They regarded forgetfulness and negligence as being associated with movement away from the origin place. In Mambai mythology, the wanderer who abandoned his homeland was prone to neglect his obligations and the ties which bound him regardless of his movements. In 1974 what had troubled the Mambai had been not the prospect of decolonization, but rather the possibility that the Portuguese might forget their final obligations and steal away before the shape of the future had been determined.

32. It might be claimed that the Mambai had been victims of "false consciousness", that they had been deceived by a symbolic distortion of reality which had long served the interests of the colonial Power. In her view, however, the Mambai had creatively appropriated such senseless events as foreign conquest and rule and had used them to construct a culturally satisfying, coherent and liveable reality. Yet history might still prove the Mambai conviction wrong. The outcome had passed beyond Mambai control. It was up to others to create a new sense of obligation to the people of East Timor, and to express it by reaffirming their right to determine their own future. They deserved the international community's continuing moral, political and material support.

33. Mr. Da Costa Amaral, Mr. Xavier and Miss Traube withdrew.

AGENDA ITEM 18: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued) (A/35/23 (parts III and V); A/35/222, 223, 261 and 413; A/C.4/35/5 and Add.1-10; A/AC.109/593-597, 602, 603, 606, 608, 610, 613, 615, 617 and Corr.1, 618 and 621)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

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(a) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)



- (b) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 85: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued) (A/35/23 (part V); A/35/233 and 524; A/C.4/35/2, 3 and Add.1-10, A/C.4/35/6 and Add.1; A/AC.109/623 and 634)

- (a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

- (b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 87: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (continued) (A/35/23 (part III), A/35/178 and Add.1-4)

- (a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

- (b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 12: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (continued) (A/35/3/Add.30)

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AGENDA ITEM 89: OFFERS BY MEMBERS STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/35/518)

34. Mr. FUTSCHER PEREIRA (Portugal) said that it was particularly significant that the Fourth Committee was welcoming, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the delegations of Zimbabwe and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Their presence bore witness to the record of the United Nations in the field of decolonization and constituted a glimmer of hope to all those still struggling for liberty, dignity and self-respect.

35. In 1974 and 1975 Portugal had spared no effort to decolonize the Territories under its administration, in compliance with the principles of the Charter and with the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

36. His Government had hoped that the decolonization of East Timor would have followed the same pattern. Unfortunately that had not been so, and the events of 1975 had forced his Government to bring the matter before the United Nations. It had been his country's hope that, through the United Nations, it might be possible

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(Mr. Futscher Pereira, Portugal)

to find a solution that would meet the aspirations of the Timorese people while being acceptable to the international community.

37. Yet no progress had been made over the past five years. In an endeavour to break the impasse, his Government had now decided on a new approach, as outlined in document A/C.4/35/2. It would include wide consultations conducted at various levels and embracing Portugal's political parties, the movements representing the Timorese people, and representatives of the countries directly concerned with the problem of East Timor. He trusted that the combined efforts of all those endeavours would create the necessary conditions for a lasting settlement. That would, however, be possible only if the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned were taken into consideration.

38. In addition, the population of the Territory had pressing humanitarian needs. The medical co-ordinator of relief efforts in East Timor of the International Committee of the Red Cross had stated that the situation in East Timor was among the worst he had ever seen. ICRC had tried to provide for some of the basic needs of the population, but the aid programme started in 1979 had been able to cover only a limited number of Timorese in a few urban centres. A massive humanitarian effort was needed throughout the Territory. His Government would spare no effort, together with the rest of the international community, to alleviate the situation.

39. Mr. Penázka (Czechoslovakia) took the Chair.

40. Mr. MANSFIELD (United Kingdom) noted that 1980 had been a significant year in terms of decolonization. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had joined the United Nations: free and fair elections had resulted in the first democratically elected Government of Zimbabwe; and the Republic of Vanuatu had also achieved independence. It was important to keep in mind the very difficult problems which faced Territories coming to independence. Each had its own economic, social and political structure, and it was essential for its problems to be understood in all their complexity. It was unhelpful and counter-productive to see them in terms of any particular model, ideology or theory of decolonization.

41. There was, however, one criterion which always had to be applied: the principle of self-determination. His Government recognized that principle as crucial. Constitutional change in the remaining United Kingdom dependencies would take place to the extent that the people of those Territories decided, and at the pace they chose. There was frequently some misunderstanding at the United Nations of the meaning of self-determination: some delegations continued to maintain that self-determination was synonymous with independence. There were of course alternative forms which self-determination might take. The United Kingdom Government always considered closely with the elected representatives of each Territory what constitutional arrangements corresponded to the wishes of the people. His Government would not impose changes on them against their expressed will.

42. His Government welcomed the opportunity to explain to the Special Committee

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(Mr. Mansfield, United Kingdom)

the situation in each of the United Kingdom dependent Territories. It particularly valued the Special Committee's practice of sending visiting missions. It had invited the Special Committee to send a mission to observe the elections due to take place in November 1980 in the Turks and Caicos Islands. The current political controversies in that Territory illustrated that independence for all dependent Territories was no panacea. Some wanted independence; others did not. Some economies were ready to take the stresses of independence; others were not. Small island economies, in particular, faced challenges far removed from those facing countries richer in resources.

43. There were still Territories which, with their unique historical and geographical identities, could not fit into any stereotype. His Government was primarily concerned with the wishes and aspirations of their respective peoples.

44. The United Kingdom Government was committed to self-determination. That had been the guiding principle in the decolonization policies of successive Governments and would continue to shape the United Kingdom's policy towards its remaining dependent Territories.

45. Mr. KASEMSRI (Thailand) said that it was a matter of regret that the so-called question of East Timor had been brought before the Committee. Thailand had already expressed in the General Committee its strong reservations on the inclusion of the item in the work of the thirty-fifth session.

46. The process of decolonization in East Timor had already been fully implemented by the Government of Indonesia in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and of the relevant General Assembly resolutions; the colonial status of the former Territory had thus been terminated.

47. His country attached the greatest importance to the principle of self-determination for peoples under colonial rule and foreign domination. In the case of East Timor, his delegation fully supported Indonesia's position that it had fulfilled its obligations under the Charter and relevant United Nations resolutions with respect to the process of decolonization in that Territory. Self-determination could take many forms, and should take into consideration such factors as popular aspirations, local characteristics, historical background and the level of development. The people of East Timor had already had an opportunity freely and democratically to express their will through their elected representatives. In May 1976 they had chosen to end East Timor's colonial status through integration with Indonesia. East Timor had subsequently become the twenty-seventh province of the Republic of Indonesia.

48. Indonesia was making every effort to alleviate conditions and improve the standard of living in that province. Consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee clearly constituted interference in matters which were essentially within Indonesia's domestic jurisdiction. His delegation would therefore vote

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(Mr. Kasemsri, Thailand)

against any measures which could be construed as contravening the spirit and letter of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

49. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan) said that it was his country's steadfast policy to support the earliest possible achievement of independence by Non-Self-Governing Territories in accordance with the principle of self-determination, while stressing the importance of the faithful fulfilment by the administering Powers of their obligations under international agreements in co-operation with the United Nations. It also firmly maintained that the rights of self-determination and independence should be realized peacefully, through realistic measures which would guarantee the maximum welfare of the people, in conformity with the actual conditions in each area. That criterion should be applied to the case of East Timor.

50. The change of régime in Portugal in 1974 had created a power vacuum in East Timor, leading to a civil war among various political groups. In August 1975, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal had noted that the armed conflicts between such rival political factions were spreading and that the involvement of almost all native-born military personnel in the fighting made it impossible for the Portuguese authorities to control the situation. In November 1975 FRETILIN had declared the independence of East Timor and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. A coalition of other political parties had immediately proclaimed the independence of the Territory and its integration with Indonesia. Indonesia had thus been obliged to become deeply involved in the decolonization of East Timor and, in May 1976, the provisional Government of East Timor, formed by several political groups but not including FRETILIN, had submitted a formal request to the Indonesian Government that East Timor become independent as an integral part of Indonesia. Indonesia had accepted that request in July 1976.

51. In the case of East Timor, two elements should be taken into consideration, namely, the course of previous events and the situation currently prevailing in the Territory. On the latter point, the Territory was being effectively governed by Indonesia. His delegation therefore sincerely hoped that, whatever decision the Fourth Committee might take during the current session, it would give due consideration to those factors and would gain the co-operation of all parties concerned, including Indonesia.

52. The most urgent current task was to render humanitarian assistance to the people of East Timor, who were the innocent victims of several political rivalries there. His delegation welcomed the work done by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Indonesia and urged the international community to contribute generously to the joint relief operation. In September 1979 and again in July 1980 his Government had contributed to that operation, which, it was hoped, would help to alleviate the suffering of the people in East Timor. In that connexion, his delegation acknowledged the efforts made by the Indonesian Government for the promotion of the welfare of the people of East Timor and the development of their society.

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53. Mr. DIENE (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) said that his agency attached importance to assisting liberation movements, because of the dual need of colonial peoples to consolidate the fruits of liberation and to assume the full responsibilities of independence, particularly in the fields of education, culture, science and information.

54. UNESCO's assistance was given in various forms and included the education of members of liberation movements at schools and universities in Africa and elsewhere; provision of teaching materials and publication of school books. Full information on the character, form and amount of UNESCO financial assistance was contained in the Secretary-General's report (A/35/178/Add.1).

55. Colonialist and racist ideology in southern Africa had been based on the cultural breakdown of the colonized peoples, in order not merely only to carry out a policy of "divide and rule" but, in particular, to separate peoples of different ethnic backgrounds into antagonistic groups and so to make it impossible for them to express a collective political will. The bantustan policy in southern Africa was an example of that strategy.

56. Material assistance was not in itself enough to counter such a strategy, and UNESCO had therefore devoted attention to a critical analysis of the ideology and expression of apartheid and to the wide and systematic dissemination of the results of such research to the general public. Through its studies and publications, UNESCO had emphasized the cultural identity of the peoples struggling for liberation and had shown that those peoples, in particular in southern Africa, shared traditions, values and life styles which represented a sufficiently broad basis for the building of an independent nation.

57. UNESCO had also made a critical and scientific study of the concept of race, so that liberation movements and the international community would have effective intellectual and juridical weapons with which to combat racism. In that context, the twentieth General Conference of UNESCO had adopted the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudices as well as a declaration on the fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the communications media to the strengthening of international peace and understanding, to the promotion of human rights and the struggle against apartheid and incitement to war.

58. UNESCO had also published a study entitled, Apartheid: power and historical falsification. The need for such a publication had been stressed by Steve Biko in 1972, when he had drawn attention to the extraordinary factual distortions contained in then current history books. On the fundamental question of the settlement of peoples in South Africa, the official ideology of apartheid was based on the theory that the white and black migrations had been simultaneous. That theory had been used in order to justify the unequal distribution of land in South Africa and to remove any claims by the black masses of South Africa. Apartheid ideology was based on a historical-religious web which even those white South Africans who opposed apartheid found impossible to unravel because it had become part of their collective conscience.

(Mr. Diene, UNESCO)

59. The study Apartheid: power and historical falsification had analysed the myths of official South African history as reflected in official texts of the South African Government and in school textbooks. In collaboration with the University of Dar es Salaam, UNESCO was preparing a study on the impact of apartheid on African women in South Africa. In 1975 the first volume of a study on racism and apartheid in southern Africa had been published for the guidance of teachers and the public at large; in it, special attention had been devoted to Namibia and South Africa. A project in preparation would deal with the theme of South Africa and its attitude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

60. Another pending study would examine the presentation of apartheid ideology in educational books for white pupils in South Africa and its impact. Further themes for publications would analyse the methods employed by South Africa for the creation and support of lobbying groups in different countries; the impact of racial discrimination on women in Southern Rhodesia and the future role of women in Zimbabwe.

61. UNESCO had also undertaken public informational activities on the liberation movements. Radio programmes on apartheid had been produced and distributed throughout the world. UNESCO had also produced a film on the inaugural ceremony for the International Anti-Apartheid Year, for distribution to all national depositaries, and a 30-minute film on apartheid had been produced by the French television network Antenne 2 under a UNESCO contract. UNESCO had also contributed to the weekly United Nations broadcasts to South Africa.

62. In addition, it had recently initiated a study on South Africa and the press which would analyse such aspects as the information on South Africa disseminated by press agencies during the past 10 years; the selection and presentation of such information by newspapers in different countries; the scope and orientation of editorial articles concerning South Africa; the light in which the liberation or anti-apartheid movements were presented; and the type and source of South African advertisements. The study would also attempt to analyse the readership of the anti-apartheid and liberation-movement press, its size and the obstacles in the way of creating such a press.

63. Mr. ISMAIL MANSOR (Malaysia) said that colonial Territories had attained self-Government and independence through varying methods and processes, one of which had involved integration with neighbouring States. There was little need to stress that, on 31 May 1976, the people of East Timor had overwhelmingly declared their wish to become part of Indonesia through integration. In response to that request, the territory of East Timor had been formally accepted as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia on 17 July 1976, having equal rights and opportunities with the other provinces. In the judgement of the Malaysian Government, the decision of the people of East Timor to integrate the territory with Indonesia, reflecting their own free choice, had been taken through consultations and in conformity with traditional institutions of the territory. Self-determination had therefore been exercised by the people.

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(Mr. Ismail Mansor, Malaysia)

64. What the province of East Timor currently required was not further futile discussion on the question but rather the marshalling of its economic resources to uplift the socio-economic status of the inhabitants. His delegation had therefore welcomed the statement by the representative of Indonesia at the 117<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Special Committee of 24, on 14 August 1980, to the effect that the relief operation conducted jointly by the Government of Indonesia and the International Committee of the Red Cross had already benefited the East Timorese, that Indonesia had embarked on a long-term project of economic and social development of the province, and that substantial progress had been registered to date.

65. His delegation was convinced that the best prospects for East Timor's development and progress lay in its association with Indonesia, and would like to reiterate that, since East Timor had become part of the sovereign territory of Indonesia, it should cease to be an issue in the United Nations and other international conferences. Discussion of the issue would constitute interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia and his delegation would vote against any draft resolution on the subject.

66. Mr. CHEW (Singapore) said that, at the thirtieth session, his delegation had drawn the Committee's attention to the fact that observers had generally agreed that significant improvements in education, social amenities, health care and the economy had taken place since East Timor's integration into Indonesia. During the past year, visitors to East Timor had noted further improvements in socio-economic conditions. Like all Indonesia's immediate neighbours, Singapore was satisfied with the improvements in East Timor and hoped that that process would lead to the further development of the territory.

67. The General Assembly should take cognizance of the expressed wish of the peoples of East Timor to be integrated into Indonesia, the more so as their desire for integration had been strengthened by the improvements to which he had referred.

68. Dr. MALAFATOPOULOS (World Health Organization) said that the Director-General of the agency had reported to the World Health Assembly in May 1980 on co-operation with the newly independent and emerging States in Africa and the liberation struggles in southern Africa, and had informed that Assembly that WHO had made special arrangements to facilitate co-operation with national liberation movements recognized by OAU. Subsequently, the World Health Assembly had unanimously adopted resolutions WHA 33.33 and WHA 33.34.

69. The former had requested the Director-General: to intensify co-operation in the health sphere with the Front-Line States, which had been subjected to repeated aggressions by the racist régime of South Africa, and with Lesotho and Swaziland, the victims of provocation and economic blackmail by that régime; to give special priority to the Front-Line States, Lesotho and Swaziland in programmes of health assistance in the African region of WHO; to continue making every possible effort to obtain necessary governmental and non-governmental support for an emergency programme of assistance to the Front-Line States, Lesotho and Swaziland; to sustain and continue assistance in improving the health conditions of the peoples



(Dr. Malafatopoulos, WHO)

participating in the liberation movements recognized by OAU; and to report to the thirty-fourth World Health Assembly, in May 1981, on the implementation of that resolution.

70. Resolution WHA 33.34 had expressed satisfaction at the achievement of independence by Zimbabwe as a new member of WHO, and had requested the Director-General: to extend, in collaboration with the United Nations, specialized agencies and other bodies, all necessary assistance in the health sector to Zimbabwe, including the training of health personnel, co-operation in the technical field and provision of medical supplies; to take all possible measures to encourage and facilitate co-operation between all Member States and Zimbabwe, especially in the field of technical co-operation among developing countries; and to report to the thirty-fourth World Health Assembly on the progress made in implementing that resolution.

71. The Regional Director of the WHO Regional Office for Africa had subsequently appointed a senior officer to co-ordinate all health activities dealing with southern Africa, and assistance to the front-line States and Zimbabwe. A programme of intercountry activities had been implemented by the WHO Regional Office for Africa to ensure health co-operation with the South West Africa People's Organization, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and the African National Congress.

72. WHO would continue to provide assistance to national liberation movements through the UNDP-financed multinational training centre at Morogoro. Fellowships were being awarded for attendance at the centre, and increasing emphasis had been given to practical field training in primary health care and basic sanitation. The project would cost \$1.8 million over five years.

73. WHO and OAU had strengthened their collaboration and, in particular, were making every effort to increase the awareness of policy- and decision-makers and planners of the prime importance for Africa of attaining the goal of health for all by the year 2000. WHO had also participated in the thirteenth extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers, in the preparatory meeting of the Council of Ministers in March 1980, and in the OAU economic summit meetings in March and April 1980. At the latter, WHO had presented a document which concerned the regional strategy for attaining the goal of health for all by the year 2000 and which had emphasized the important role which health would play in the establishment of the new international economic order.

74. WHO participated actively in the joint FAO/WHO/OAU Regional Food and Nutrition Commission for Africa, and the agency's contribution to the programme had amounted to \$151,800 for the biennium 1980-1981. OAU was a member of the WHO group set up to mobilize the necessary resources for achieving health for all by the year 2000. Prospects for strengthening co-operation between OAU and WHO had further improved following recent discussions between the WHO Regional Director for Africa and the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU. Negotiations between the two organizations were under way to conclude an agreement which would strengthen their collaboration in the field of primary health care as a means for achieving health for all by the year 2000. In April 1980, WHO, in collaboration with UNHCR, had sent a public health specialist to Zimbabwe to study and report on that country's special needs.

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(Dr. Malafatopoulos, WHO)

75. In September 1980 the Regional Committee for Africa, at its thirtieth session, had adopted a resolution on the close interrelationship between political independence and health for all by the year 2000, the latter goal being unattainable unless the populations of Namibia and South Africa achieved their national freedom. The Regional Committee would recommend that the Executive Board of WHO should adopt a resolution which would invite the World Health Assembly to continue its invaluable support to the national liberation movements recognized by OAU, the front-line States, Swaziland and Lesotho, and would request the Director-General to continue to co-operate in the health sphere with such liberation movements and States, in collaboration with the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other bodies.

76. WHO would also continue to give its fullest co-operation to UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, other specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations in order to assist the emerging States in Africa and the national liberation movements recognized by OAU to meet the public health needs of the populations concerned.

77. Mr. NAVARRO (Philippines) said that his Government would always give its full support to any move to help non-self-governing peoples in their efforts to achieve self-determination but that the decolonization process must follow the guidelines established in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as well as in the Charter of the United Nations. His Government was fully convinced that the people of East Timor, in a free and untrammelled expression of their will, had fully exercised their right of self-determination. By the vote of the democratically elected assembly, decolonization had been completed in East Timor in conformity with the Charter and the Declaration. Moreover, the Indonesian Government had fully and without reservation respected the wishes of the people of East Timor.

78. If confusion continued to exist on the situation in East Timor, it was certainly not on the question of the validity of the exercise of self-determination but rather because the people of East Timor had chosen to exercise that right under circumstances which did not conform to the classical concept of self-determination. The act of self-determination had differed from one Territory to another, depending on historical, political, social and economic background, traditions and customs.

79. The situation in East Timor had been no exception. East Timor had been under colonial rule for approximately 450 years and had suffered six months of civil war. The former administering Power had been unable to keep the peace and had subsequently withdrawn from the country. The transition of power could not therefore be achieved smoothly. Indonesia had consequently viewed the situation prevailing in East Timor as a threat to its own security and had been compelled, in the interest of regional stability, to respond to requests for assistance from the parties in the territory. That response had been made only after the complete collapse of the duly constituted authority in East Timor. In opting for integration with Indonesia, the East Timorese, in the exercise of self-determination, had thus become the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. Since that time, a programme of reconstruction and development had been implemented and the Indonesian Government had allocated some \$107 million to bring economic and social conditions in East Timor to the same level as that of the other provinces.

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(Mr. Navarro, Philippines)

80. The more affluent Members of the United Nations should therefore contribute to the social and economic development of the people of East Timor, in co-operation with Indonesia. To persist in viewing the question in the context of decolonization was, in the view of his delegation, a futile exercise and both Indonesians and Timorese would rightly regard continued consideration of the question by the Fourth Committee as an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign Member of the United Nations. The question of East Timor no longer fell within the purview of decolonization.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.