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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 11 November 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. SIDDIQ (Afghanistan)
(Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
(Chairman)

Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued)
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued) /...

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3089 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary General /30/ (continued)

Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)

Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)

Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)

AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103, 107 (continued)

REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY BUDGETS OF STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 10 PER CENT AND UTILIZATION OF PART OF THE FUNDS THUS SAVED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (A/9565, A/9713, A/9770, A/9800):

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708; A/C.1/L.683)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3079 (XXVIII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLAHELCO):

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9718, A/9797: A/C.1/L.685)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE:

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (A/9585, A/9629 and Addendum)

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9698 A/9708)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLAHELCO)

(A/9692; A/C.1/L.686)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.675)
DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): In the absence of Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, the representative of Argentina, Chairman of this Committee, I would request you, Sir, to convey to him our warmest congratulations on his election as Chairman of the First Committee and our best wishes for success in his efforts to bring our work to a successful conclusion. No testimonial of mine is required to add lustre to his record as a diplomat of conspicuous ability.

I did not expect to be called upon to speak at this morning's meeting. I shall not attempt to speak generally on the question of disarmament but shall confine myself to the item in which my delegation is principally interested -- namely, the Indian Ocean peace-zone concept and the action that has been taken during the past year in regard to the Declaration and its implementation.

By way of introduction, I should like briefly to trace the history of the Indian Ocean peace-zone concept. In seeking the inscription of this item on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, we stated that -- and I must be forgiven for quoting from my own letter to the Secretary-General of 1 October 1971 -- recent developments had shown a noticeable trend in the development of international law and practice towards the principle that areas not assimilated into national jurisdiction constituted an international domain that should be subject to international regulation and international responsibility. We cited as cases in point the Agreements on outer space and Antarctica, and stated that the principle had been further elaborated in the United Nations Declaration on Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which recognized the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind. We said that in seeking the inscription on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

of the item on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the purpose of the Government of Ceylon -- as Sri Lanka was then called -- was to secure United Nations approval of an international domain subject to international regulation and international responsibility covering the entire high seas of the Indian Ocean. We said that the existing circumstances in the Indian Ocean, as distinct from those of other oceans of the world, were specially conducive to the application of that policy to the area, as the presence of the military and naval forces of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean had not yet assumed significant proportions. It is quite different today. We said that none of the great or medium-sized Powers were contiguous States. Happily, their geographical position has not changed; the major maritime nations are geographically remote from the Indian Ocean area, and the economic interests of the great Powers are not involved in the area to any appreciable degree. We added that the countries of the Indian Ocean needed conditions of peace and tranquillity in which to transform and modernize their economies and societies, and that it was therefore imperative to the success of those efforts that the Indian Ocean should be preserved as an area of peace. We considered immediate action necessary to arrest and reverse the trend that had lately become manifest, which, if allowed to continue unchecked, could render the progressive militarization of the Indian Ocean unavoidable.

On that occasion we stated that the main features of Ceylon's proposals were that the entire high-seas area of the Indian Ocean should be declared a peace zone to be used for peaceful purposes, and that that would entail the exclusion of armaments, defensive or offensive, and military installations of the major Powers in the prescribed area, adding that warships and ships carrying warlike equipment would exercise the right of transit but might not stop other than for emergency reasons of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian nature. The use of the sea-bed area by submarines, except for reasons of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian nature, was to be prohibited. We added, in passing, that there would be a prohibition of naval manoeuvres, naval intelligence operations and weapon tests in the area. As regards naval manoeuvres and naval intelligence operations, we had in mind the major Powers.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

The next stage was the adoption of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI)). Once again, to refresh the memories of those present, I should like to state that, when we took that step, we had already consulted others. There was the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka in 1970. Earlier, there had been the Cairo Declaration of the non-aligned summit, and later the item was discussed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in Singapore.

The Declaration expresses the Assembly's conviction concerning "the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the Indian Ocean area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for the diversion of the limited resources of the States of the area from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions".

The Declaration expresses concern

"at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions" -- that is, peace and tranquillity -- "in the area."

It adds that

"the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security."

We want others outside the Indian Ocean to respect those feelings and fears of ours and enable us to achieve our purpose.*

*The Chairman took the Chair.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

We went on to state that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Those who believe in the gradual approach to disarmament should not cavil at this proposition.

Therefore we solemnly declared the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, to be designated for all time as a zone of peace, and called upon the great Powers, in conformity with the Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further escalation of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.

The Declaration further stated that the General Assembly:

"Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations".

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

However, the Declaration recognizes the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations, subject to the preceding provisions and to the norms and principles of international law, and added that appropriate arrangements should be made to give effect to any international agreement that might ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

At that stage the only action we took was to request the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress that had been made with regard to the implementation of the Declaration. The Secretary-General's report was a skimpy one, because he had received replies from only four Governments: those of Bahrain, Madagascar, the Philippines and Yemen.

The next stage was the adoption of resolution 2992 (XXVII), in which the General Assembly called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to support the concept that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace. As far as the permanent members of the Security Council were concerned, with one single exception, the appeal fell on deaf ears. The ears continue to be deaf.

The resolution stated:

"Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of no more than fifteen members, to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session".

The first report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean is contained in document A/9029. With regard to this report, I should like to draw attention to the working paper prepared by the delegation of Sri Lanka, in which we dealt with the principal aspects of our concept which had to be more carefully examined in order to promote its implementation. We stated:

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

"The peace zone Declaration contemplates the establishment within the Indian Ocean area of a zone of peace free of nuclear weapons in which conditions of peace and tranquillity would be ensured by the exclusion of great Power rivalries... The Declaration was also intended to serve as a contribution to the relaxation of general international tensions and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as to ensuring conditions of security within the region which would render redundant and superfluous the need for military alliances with outside Powers and the maintenance of military bases and appurtenant establishments and facilities."

(A/9029, annex I, para. 4)

We indicated that it would be necessary first of all to decide on which States would qualify to be considered littoral and hinterland States for purposes of the proposal. That requirement is still very much in the forefront of our thinking, and it is a gap that has to be filled. We did set out in that working paper a list of what we considered were, geographically speaking, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, but we also added:

"If any State that has a part of its seaboard on the Indian Ocean has been omitted from the list, it is because its primary concern has been deemed to be with regard to the Atlantic seaboard. It would be necessary, however, to keep even such a State informed of the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee. A suitable procedure for this purpose could be determined at the appropriate stage." (ibid., para. 5)

One other essential requirement for the purpose of the realization of this concept we considered to be the renunciation of the use of force. We stated:

"The creation of a peace zone in a region must presuppose the renunciation by States of that region of the threat or use of force against any other State in that region and the affirmation of their resolve to settle their disputes with one another by peaceful means and without resort to force, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." (ibid., para. 6)

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

We went on to add that the main danger in regard to the arms race in the Indian Ocean region, or anywhere else, related to the presence of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and we suggested that those littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean which had not yet done so should, as an earnest of their good faith and good intentions, consider acceding to or ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof -- the sea-bed arms control treaty. To that we would also add the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

In that working paper we referred to the need for defining the limits of the peace zone as requiring early attention -- that again is something that is repeated in the report that I shall be introducing in this Committee -- and said that we regarded the definition as falling within two aspects, territorial and geographical.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

I should like now to draw attention to certain further observations that we made, which I hope I can trace, in a statement made by me to an informal meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. This is of some topical interest, but I hope my reference to it will not be misconstrued or exploited in a manner contrary to our intentions. We said on that occasion, as I have just indicated earlier, that denuclearization or the prevention of nuclearization would logically form the first step in a gradual approach to the realization of our objective. We said that countries of the region, namely, the littoral and hinterland States as well as countries outside the region but militarily active in the region, would have to assume certain commitments if any stable agreement were to be reached. And we added that so far as the countries of the region were concerned, it would be reasonable to call upon them as an earnest of their good faith to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization which would entail the permanent renunciation by them of a nuclear-weapon option and the assumption of an obligation to deny the use of their territories, their territorial waters and their air space for the deployment of nuclear weapons belonging to other States. On the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, we consider that their contribution should take the form of the assumption of an obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the peace zone area. These two requirements we considered were interrelated but not necessarily dependent upon each other. The first was more difficult than the second. It would be necessary, therefore, to concentrate our efforts initially on securing from the nuclear-weapon Powers the commitment that we seek of them as their contribution towards the attainment of our objectives.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

We added that not all the nuclear threshold countries in the Indian Ocean region seemed ready or willing to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and that, if a new nuclear-weapon Power were to emerge in the Indian Ocean region, the denuclearization and also the demilitarization of the area would be seriously jeopardized. I feel that it is time that the States in our region stopped looking over each other's shoulders to see who was going to act first. Any action taken by them would be a good example which others would do well to emulate.

The next stage was reached in resolution 2992 (XXVII), adopted at the twenty-seventh session, which appointed an Ad Hoc Committee of 15 members to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI). Fifteen members were appointed for that Committee and I am happy to state that they included, in addition to littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, one nuclear Power, China, and one country that is a major maritime user but is not a littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean, namely, Japan. We are grateful to them for their participation in the work of that Committee and the efforts they have made to further the realization of our objectives.

After the first report of the Ad Hoc Committee was presented, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3080 (XXVIII), the main feature of which was that it requested the Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence, in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry, and recommended that the statement should be based on available material and prepared with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by the Secretary-General.

In response to this request, the Secretary-General engaged the services of three experts, Mr. Frank Barnaby of SIPRI, an institution that has a most enviable record in regard to disarmament matters, Admiral Shams Safavi of Iran, and Mr. K. Subrahmanyam of India. The first report prepared by this committee of experts and submitted to the Secretary-General was contained in document A/AC.159/1.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

As the Ad Hoc Committee's report to the Assembly at this session indicates, certain objections were raised to this factual statement, and on these representations the Secretary-General decided to have the bases of certain parts of the statement clarified and made arrangements for the statement to be reviewed by the experts with the assistance of a special consultant.

For my part, I must express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the action he took in deference to the representations made to him by several countries which considered that their position had been perhaps misrepresented in the original report. I must also express my own thanks to the three experts for the diligent attention they paid to the representations and for the revision of their report. Not every report of this type is likely to satisfy everybody in every respect. And as the report, document A/9629, indicates, there were some delegations that continued to have their reservations on certain aspects of it. These are mentioned in the report itself, so it is not necessary for me to dwell on them.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

But the point was made that the factual statement would have been more useful if it had not been limited to the great Powers' military presence, in the context of great Power rivalry. According to that point of view, it would have been preferable if there had been a complete and unqualified statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean region.

It is sufficient for me to state that the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean is obviously a matter of competition, and whatever they do is conceived in the context of their mutual rivalry. If they were friends and not competing, they would not be there in that manner and would not daily be trying to improve the sophisticated nature of their armaments in that region.

Also, the view was taken that it was not merely the great Powers' military presence that should be considered, but also the question of military alliances. Now a military alliance need not take the form of a physical presence.

I do not know whether it takes the form of a metaphysical or a spiritual

-- perhaps it does -- but for our purposes I should think it was quite sufficient if we adhered to the text of our resolution and obtained a clear idea of the great Powers' military presence, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.

One of the points stressed during our deliberations this year was that it is important to convene at as early a date as possible a conference of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. On this there has been a complete consensus.

Another point that was stressed was the need at this stage for the definition of certain terms. We were aware of the need for a definition when we first presented the draft declaration to this Committee, but we did not think that at that moment an attempt at a legal definition would have helped very much or was absolutely necessary. It might have kept agile legal minds busy for quite a long time, without, first of all, creating the political atmosphere necessary to be created in order to proceed with attempts to realize the concept. However, there was agreement that we should seek a clear definition of certain terms: first of all, the limits of the Indian Ocean in the context of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace;

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

secondly, the term "littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean"; and thirdly, the term "foreign military bases". It was here that the point was raised that it was not sufficient to define the term "foreign military bases", but that in seeking a definition we should also take into account the idea of foreign military alliances. I think I shall leave it to experts to decide how they are going to handle that thorny problem.

I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, which again were reached by consensus, and which appear in paragraph 35 of the report (A/9629). There are four recommendations.

First is the obvious one that:

"The Ad Hoc Committee should continue and intensify its efforts in accordance with its mandate, as stated in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII)."

Secondly, that:

"The Ad Hoc Committee should proceed with its consultations with the four permanent members of the Security Council which are not members of the Ad Hoc Committee, as envisaged in paragraph 31 of this report."

With regard to the second recommendation, I must once again reiterate my appeal to those four permanent members of the Security Council that what we expect of them is a clear statement of the problems that confront them in giving effect to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We do not find it profitable to proceed with our deliberations on premises that are unjustified, untenable or unrealistic. We hope that the four permanent members will see their way to co-operating with us and to informing us of their problems so that we can more clearly envisage the possibilities of realizing this concept.

The third recommendation was that:

"The Ad Hoc Committee should give priority attention in 1975 to the definition of terms, as indicated in paragraph 34 of this report."

I just referred to those terms in my statement.

Finally, the fourth recommendation is that:

"Consideration should be given for the convening, as early as possible of a conference of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean as envisaged in paragraph 33 of this report".

In presenting this report formally to the Committee, I should also like to present, again formally, a draft resolution on which the Ad Hoc Committee was unanimous. The text of the draft resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee held on 1 November. I should like to read out the text of this draft resolution in full. It reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also General Assembly resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972 and 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973,

"Firmly convinced that further and continuous efforts are required to fulfil the objectives of the Declaration, and thus to contribute to the strengthening of regional and international peace and security,

"Noting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,^{1/}

"Further noting the factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry,^{2/} prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII),

"Deeply concerned that the competitive expansion of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean would constitute a serious intensification of the arms race, leading to an increase of tension in the area,

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9629 and Add.1).

^{2/} A/AC.159/Rev.1.

"Considering that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires

(a) The elimination of all manifestations of great Power military presence in the region conceived in the context of great Power rivalry,

(b) Co-operation among the regional States to ensure conditions of security within the region as envisaged in the Declaration,

"Further believing that for the realization of the objective of the Declaration it is necessary that the Great Powers enter into immediate consultations with the States concerned, with a view to adopting positive measures for the elimination of all foreign bases and of all manifestations of great Power military presence in the region conceived in the context of great Power rivalry,

"1. Urges the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to give tangible support to the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;"

Here I should like to interject the observation that the appeal is made not merely to the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, but also to the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, because the primary obligation rests with them to give tangible support to the concept.

"2. Calls upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing and strengthening their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean as an essential first step towards the relaxation of tension and the promotion of peace and security in the area;"

It might appear to everybody that it is only an optimist who would expect self-restraint on the part of the great Powers, but I hope that some day or other that optimism will be justified.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

"3. Endorses the recommendations for the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, as contained in paragraph 35 of the report of the Committee.

"4. Requests the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, to enter, as soon as possible, into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean;

"5. Invites all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions;

"6. Expresses its thanks to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the preparation of the factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean;

"7. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

"8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee."

And here I would add that the assistance we would expect from the Secretary-General would also apply to the convening of the conference of the littoral and hinterland States referred to in operative paragraph 4.

There were several moments during our discussions when we were divided by controversy, but it is a tribute to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee that they were able to subdue those differences of opinion and subordinate them to the greater interest of securing a unanimous draft resolution, and this draft resolution I now have the honour to present to the Committee and commend for its acceptance.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I am informed that Mr. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka addressed very kind words to me at the beginning of his statement. I am sorry I was not present to hear him. I promise to read his statement in the verbatim record and I thank him most warmly, as though I had heard him myself.

Mr. FARTASH (Iran): Only a few days ago, in the course of introducing my Government's proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, the Head of the Iranian delegation elaborated in some detail the basic philosophy that underlies our thinking and our actions in the field of disarmament. Hence I shall confine my remarks today to an examination of some of the specific issues now being considered by this Committee.

My country has recognized the imperative necessity of preserving the Indian Ocean -- one of the great waterways of the world -- as a zone of peace. That international rivalries must be excluded from the Indian Ocean and that the security of the region must be bolstered and enhanced through co-operation among the countries of the region has provided the fundamental framework of our policies concerning this matter.

In consistency with this policy, my Government was a sponsor not only of the draft resolution that became General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), which declared that the Indian Ocean was designated for all time as a zone of peace, but also of the subsequent resolutions adopted in connexion with this item. Hence, our concern and our interest in this area is of long-standing duration, and this subject is of paramount importance to us.

Most recently my Government has called for wider economic ties and closer co-operation among littoral States of the Indian Ocean, so that in their unity of purpose the security of the region may be enhanced.

It is this deep concern for the maintenance of genuine peace in the region that has motivated my country, as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to lend its support and co-operation in furthering the work of that body.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee (A/9629) reflects the viewpoints expressed by the member countries ... most of which are littoral States ... during the course of its long and arduous deliberations. Despite the wide range and diversity of opinions expressed on some issues of vital importance to the parties concerned, the report, nevertheless, is the result of a clarity of vision regarding their common interest in securing and perpetuating peaceful conditions in the region. It was this unity of purpose as far as the ultimate objective was concerned that led to the formulation of the recommendations of the Committee, among which are those dealing with the need for the definition of certain terms of reference and consideration of the question of convening a conference of the littoral and hinterland States.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

The voice of reason also prevailed with respect to the draft resolution recommended by the Committee for adoption by the General Assembly at this session. As a result of unsparing efforts by all members of the Ad Hoc Committee and under the vigorous leadership of its Chairman, Mr. Amerasinghe, who just preceded me and so ably expounded his views on this subject, a draft resolution has emerged which, while moderate and balanced, is constructive and forward-looking.

Thus, while expressing our satisfaction with the draft resolution, we also that it will receive unanimous approval.

It is this same type of positive attitude towards the whole question of disarmament that determines our posture with respect to the world disarmament conference. We continue to believe that at the right time a world disarmament conference with universal participation and adequate preparation could result in notable gains in the field of disarmament.

Already a modest measure of progress has been achieved in the conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. We must now ponder on how best we can advance the idea without losing our sense either of realism or direction.

To act in precipitate fashion and without paying due attention to the practical realities surrounding the question of holding such a conference would only damage the prospects for a successful outcome. The complexity of the issues involved in this field demand that we adopt a careful and step-by-step approach. The concept of a World disarmament conference should be nourished carefully with a view to allowing it in due course to ripen and mature into reality. Any undue haste or pressure could only result in negative repercussions which would adversely affect the fragile progress achieved thus far.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference must be looked upon in the light of this cautious approach. The final character of the document was influenced by the Committee's mandate, which required that it produce a document that had the unanimous approval of the members. And yet, by merely being successful in producing this report, the Ad Hoc Committee took a significant stride and laid down the cornerstone around which we may now proceed to build in a gradual manner.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

In this connexion, I wish to take this opportunity to say that the Working Group that drafted the report ... and particularly its Chairman, Mr. Elias of Spain ... deserves a great deal of credit for a job so ably accomplished.

Turning now to a review of developments in the field of disarmament, we find that, however haltingly at times, the process of détente has continued to move ahead.

It is to be hoped that, in addition to SALT II, the negotiations now under way in Vienna on mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe and on certain confidence-building measures in the military field at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, are merely prologues to more significant events.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

And fulfilment of the world's hopes continues to be denied also with regard to a comprehensive test ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. Both those subjects have dominated the discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) for a number of years, since the Committee was asked by the General Assembly to consider those two questions on a basis.

Reasoned and eloquent voices have been raised in this forum and elsewhere the immense dangers involved in the continued testing of nuclear nations fail to pay heed to what seems obvious to reasonable men everywhere -- that there will have to be a final reckoning some day and a dear price may have to be paid for this glaring example of human folly.

the representative of Mexico pointed out during a recent debate in the CCD the average number of nuclear-weapon tests yearly -- in the decade since partial test ban treaty was concluded in 1963, was 60 per cent higher than the 1945 to 1963 annual average (CCD/PV.627, p. 23).

Time and again hopes for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement have been dashed because of the lack of agreement on what constitutes an adequate system of verification. Various attempts have been made to overcome the impasse prevailing on that issue. These have included proposals regarding interim measures and confidence-building techniques. But success has so far eluded all the efforts exerted in that direction.

However, advances in seismological techniques, accompanied by satellite navigation and measurement of vented radioactivity, have tended to dilute the persuasiveness of arguments in favour of on-site inspection. In any case, neither of the nuclear-weapon Powers can be said to have demonstrated the requisite political will to achieve final agreement on the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests.

With regard to the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, one notes with satisfaction the fact that more than 100 States have signed the 1971 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological (Biological) Weapons. That is indeed a positive step. Nevertheless, our enthusiasm is tempered by the realization that the Convention has not yet come into force.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

We have followed closely the detailed and comprehensive discussions that place in the CCD on the question of chemical weapons. The various and working papers which have been submitted in the CCD, including sting initiative taken by the Japanese Government in submitting a ention regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, have been the object of careful study by my Government. We are confident that in time forts will lead to the formulation of a text which will command the of the international community.

we note with satisfaction also that in a joint communiqué issued in Moscow on 3 July the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to consider a joint the CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an convention dealing with the most dangerous and lethal means of re. We hope that such joint action will be forthcoming at the ble date so that the deadlock on this question may finally be

Any discussion regarding the cessation of the nuclear arms race must necessarily rivet our attention upon the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons. The lag in the implementation of some of the provisions of aty has indeed been disappointing. Equally disquieting is the fact that few of the so-called threshold Powers have become parties to the Treaty. As my Foreign Minister pointed out during the debate in the plenary Assembly, progress in this respect has not been "as thorough or wide-ranging as expected" (A/PV.2264, p. 36).

In that connexion it is our hope that the forthcoming conference to review non-proliferation Treaty will provide the opportunity for a genuine and objective evaluation of its strength and weaknesses. Attention is bound to focus at that conference on, among other things, the degree of fulfilment of obligations undertaken under the terms of the Treaty. Every attempt should be made to assess how best all its provisions -- in particular, articles IV, V and VI -- might be implemented or what practicable and realistic might be introduced to make it more universally acceptable.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

I turn now to the Soviet proposal regarding "the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health". The question of possible meteorological and environmental warfare in the future has gained some prominence in recent years due to significant research being conducted with respect to manipulation of weather and climate with a view to alleviating the ravages of nature. Such attempts at environmental modification can, if uncontrolled, be mobilized for military purposes. It is imperative, in our opinion, to take proper measures before technology outstrips man's ability to impose the requisite control mechanisms in this field. We therefore believe that this proposal should form the subject of careful study in CCD. Appropriate recommendations, we hope, will subsequently emerge as a result of the discussions held in that forum.

With respect to the question of the prohibition or restriction of the use of napalm, and other incendiary weapons, we note the opportunity offered for a discussion of this matter by the recent diplomatic conference in Geneva on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. Useful work towards enhancing our knowledge regarding this subject was also accomplished by the meeting of Government experts which was convened at Lucerne under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

My delegation notes with interest that as a result of last year's Soviet proposal for a reduction in arms expenditure and the application of part of these savings in providing assistance to developing nations, a most instructive report has been submitted by the experts appointed by the Secretary-General. The report gives evidence of careful and in-depth analysis of many complex issues involved in any attempt to implement this proposal.

The conclusions of the report bear out our earlier concern that whereas such proposals are worthy of careful attention by the international community, they nevertheless require the existence of a congenial environment without which no real measure of disarmament can prosper. Barring such requisite political conditions and in the absence of an effective mechanism to guarantee and safeguard peace and security, nations have no alternative but to look after their defence requirements.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

Finally, it only remains for me to express our sincere thanks to the co-Chairmen and to the members of CCD for agreeing to invite my country to become a member of the enlarged Committee, beginning 1 January 1975. I also wish to thank those members of this Committee who have graciously offered their felicitations to my Government in connexion with this matter. Should the General Assembly decide to endorse this decision, I can pledge now that Iran will shoulder its new responsibilities to the best of its ability, in the sure conviction that every effort in the cause of peace is an ennobling experience, rich with the promise of potential benefit to all men.

Mr. TANKOUA (United Republic of Cameroon) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I have spoken in this Committee since the beginning of the session, I should like to associate myself with previous speakers, in extending to you the warm congratulations and the satisfaction of the Cameroon delegation upon your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. We are convinced that, with your intelligence and your habitual calm, your well-known diplomatic qualities and your experience of the problems we are discussing, the Committee will honourably discharge its task. We should also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee, particularly our Rapporteur, the representative of Portugal, a country whose historic bonds with Cameroon are well known, and we should like to express our proper appreciation of the new African policy of that country.

In the view of my delegation, the present state of affairs with regard to disarmament is in defiance of the most elementary common sense. From 1914 to 1918 -- to go back only as far as that -- the First World War inflicted upon mankind unprecedented atrocities, in the light of which both the victors and the vanquished, who had suffered more or less equally, believed that they should avoid a repetition of such a situation by a solemn undertaking in the League of Nations. Hardly 20 years later, for the same reasons, economic problems and dreams of supremacy, the same Powers dragged the world into the holocaust of 1939-1945. Aghast this time at the disastrous consequences of their miscalculations, those responsible considered that in order to eliminate for ever the possibility of a repetition of such sufferings,

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

they should reject the idea of a mere League of Nations and create an organization -- and I quote the Charter here -- of:

"... the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small ..."

Then those former adversaries, confronted once again with the realities of war, chose the holy and peaceful spot on the west coast of the United States of America to embrace each other, wipe away each other's tears, bathe their wounds in the ocean and sign this new act of marriage, the Charter, in which they solemnly undertook:

"... to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest ..."

Hardly 30 years have gone by since then, and now we are told that the world is once again on the brink of war, a war which will have no survivors.

We are told, indeed, that the level of armaments and the technology of armaments developed since 1945 is such that it needs only a madman, a miscalculation or an act of blackmail to hurl the whole world into the abyss; and that in spite of the praiseworthy efforts to achieve disarmament, particularly since the signing in 1968 of the non-proliferation Treaty:

"... the cost of a nuclear submarine rose by more than 700 per cent ... there was an increase of 400 per cent in the number of intercontinental missile nuclear warheads for firing from land bases, submarines or long-range bombers, and an increase of 50 per cent in military budgets" (CCD/444, p. 2)

-- which will amount in 1974 to more than \$250,000 million.

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

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(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

My delegation has no reason or way to doubt the astounding statistics which have certainly come from the most authoritative sources; nor are we raising any questions about the intentions of those who originally compiled them, before Mexico and CCD had an opportunity to take cognizance of and report to us on them. However, we do raise the questions: Why were these arms manufactured? Why is the arms race still continuing? If it is an accident, why have those who find them so terrifying to the whole of mankind and who possess them not destroyed them or at least stopped increasing them?

Someone taught me from a small ancient history book that the world, after having almost achieved wisdom, relapsed into ignorance. This childhood memory prompts me to wonder whether in the twentieth century we are not actually going through the same process and are doomed to repeat history. Because, how can we believe that man has wilfully and deliberately built up such stockpiles of arms that all it would take for our planet to be wiped off the map of the universe is a miscalculation or an accident? How can we believe that anyone who is aware of this danger to himself and as the builder of these stockpiles and this danger would not make up his mind to eliminate the danger?

When in 1960 my country acceded to the San Francisco Charter -- a document, incidentally, which was prepared without its participation or co-operation -- it was convinced that along with it all peoples, which had directly or indirectly suffered the unprecedented ills which the imagination of man or a group of men was ever able to impose on mankind, those peoples which twice in the period of 30 years had made monumental errors and sworn never to commit them again, should fulfil the momentous obligation to respect that document to which they had so freely subscribed. While the Charter is actually being infringed today by some of its authors Cameroon, for its part, continues to believe in it and to honour its commitments -- even if it is not perfect; even if it is both egalitarian (Chapter I, Article 2 (1)) and inegalitarian (Security Council right of veto).

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

We have therefore always favoured general and complete disarmament, advocated the urgent need to stop nuclear and thermonuclear tests, the conclusion of a treaty totally banning those tests and transferring stockpiles of those weapons and the factories that produce them to peaceful purposes of economic and social development. Similarly, we have always supported efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear arms. We are in favour of the denuclearization of geographical zones, the reduction of military budgets and utilization of the funds thus saved for humanitarian purposes. We condemn napalm and all other chemical or bacteriological weapons.

That is the attitude of principle of my Government on the items under consideration and I should like now to make a few remarks on them.

As is known, in ratifying the non-proliferation Treaty, my country was, as it were, taking a leap in an expression of faith and thereby a positive step towards general and complete disarmament. But that option in no way signifies that we have excluded for ourselves any possibility of undertaking theoretical or laboratory research in the nuclear field or, possibly, exploiting peaceful technological applications which may evolve from this form of energy which we are told has such a promising future. Nor can there be any doubt that if, in the final analysis, it turns out to be true that that Treaty remains a discriminatory, fallacious, illusory and, above all, ineffective instrument -- as was stated here by a delegation -- Cameroon, following the example of many other countries, will of course have to revise its position accordingly. That is why we expect a great deal -- and somewhat impatiently -- from the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and find its efforts praiseworthy. We are also patiently awaiting the results of the Conference on the review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1975.

With regard to the denuclearization of zones, my delegation considers that that problem, like all other disarmament problems, should be studied carefully. The delimitation of zones should be precise so as to avoid corridors or non-denuclearized enclaves which could constitute, for the nuclear Powers not parties to the Treaty, firing grounds for the peripheral zones and which would be dangerous for those areas. We are thinking in particular of

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

Territories which are subject to rival claims or are still colonized and where there are foreign bases and enclaves; and we are also thinking of the possibility of using the colonial, annexationist notion of "vacant and unowned land". Similarly, the protection of denuclearized zones adjacent to those which are not denuclearized should be given clear guarantees against the latter.

My delegation hopes that the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference will not lose sight of those important details of the problems of zones, and we shall support any initiatives to promote a serious study of the matter.

Specialists of our Organization have said that the United Republic of Cameroon is among the poorest countries of the world and those which have suffered most from the immediate consequences of the most recent energy crisis. We have also been victims of the Sahelian drought. In addition, we are very much alarmed at the fact that more than \$250,000 million are now being swallowed up annually by various military programmes throughout the world while millions of men are perishing from hunger and natural disasters and when specialized international organizations foresee alarming prospects in the very near future.

In the circumstances, we hope that all delegations here will support the Soviet Union proposal on the reduction of military budgets and utilization of funds thus saved for humanitarian purposes, because, in our view, this would be one way, among others -- but a good one -- of discovering whether or not the intentions of the proposers are as insincere as some people claim. Similarly, we are sympathetic to the draft resolution on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health (A/C.1/L.675).

Our position, as I have just explained it, is, we realize, a modest contribution to the difficult problems being discussed by the Committee; but it is a necessary and sufficient contribution to encourage concrete initiatives

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

that we expect from the great Powers, which bear primary responsibility for bringing the world out of the psychosis of terror resulting from an international situation that was already more than alarming at the time -- 30 October 1974 -- of the consideration of the relationship between our Organization and South Africa, when the Security Council added a deteriorating element to the international situation.

If the First Committee -- the political committee of the United Nations -- treats lightly the matter of mankind's survival, the question will arise whether the twenty-ninth session will not in fact toll the knell of our Organization. The failure of the Organization would be all the more contradictory and regrettable because all delegations which have spoken in the general debate at this session have in fact laid stress on international co-operation based on interdependence, a complementarity which, as if by magic, other challenges -- the energy and food crises -- have revealed to us.

The example of the Security Council with regard to the policy of apartheid of the South African Government has eloquently confirmed what other speakers have said before in this room: that in spite of the relevant provisions of the Charter, in spite of the many resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other relevant United Nations bodies, adopted for 29 years, the political will by States for true international peace and security is still lacking.

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

But that will is indispensable if we want to elicit and identify the various factors neglect or oversight of which would be likely to deal a death-blow to our enterprise by hindering an objective search for solutions to this crucial problem of general and complete disarmament.

In the view of my delegation, the following are the four conditions which seem to be essential to that objective.

We should, in our view, eliminate all causes of the need for research into the development of ever-more deadly weapons and, in the final analysis, the production, acquisition, stockpiling and improvement of those weapons. In other words, we must put an end to the policy of supremacy and resolve all open or latent conflicts which are pockets of resistance to any disarmament policy.

We should decide upon the international authority appropriate to supervise the process and control disarmament -- that is, a disarmed world. Those Powers that are armed or possess the technology and arms factories should agree no longer to produce them, improve them or to allow them to be spread, or to use their stockpiles for military purposes. Rather, they should destroy them or convert them so that they may be used for praiseworthy purposes.

Countries other than those I have mentioned should in turn and in parallel fashion agree to refrain from acquiring armaments or undertaking any enterprise -- or research having military purposes.

In other words, if the first two conditions are fulfilled, the key to the problem would be in the hands of two groups of countries, which would have simultaneously to accept some conditional obligations.

Our analysis may seem simplistic and Utopian, but we firmly believe that whoever willed the creation of those arsenals can also will their destruction. It is only a matter of conscience and will.

The question of which of the two groups should begin is answered by the fact that all the developing countries and medium-sized Powers that have ratified the non-proliferation Treaty, have accepted the denuclearization of zones and the world disarmament conference, have condemned all nuclear tests but undertake none, have condemned napalm and all other chemical or bacteriological weapons, and so on, -- all those countries, I say,

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

are already doing enough towards general and complete disarmament, even if the absence of the appropriate control authority has as yet made it impossible to check the truthfulness of their claims. Since the Charter of our Organization has entrusted the great Powers with special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security it would be natural to expect that a meaningful gesture in the direction of disarmament will be forthcoming from them. We should like to make it quite clear that we hope they will make that gesture, in the form of calling a halt to the production of those weapons and destroying or reconverting the stockpiles. Otherwise, they would seem to be telling the other countries to simply fold their arms and remain forever small under big-Power domination -- in other words, to remain at their mercy. That could be called macroslavery, and in any case no one could willingly accept it. It would certainly lead us into insurmountable difficulties.

Indeed, the non-proliferation Treaty and other measures of the kind would be respected by no one, not even by those who had signed the Treaty; it could be slighted with impunity, since, it being a matter of the maintenance of peace, it would fall within the competence of the Security Council and would obviously lead to a veto by a permanent member.

We also doubt whether those Treaties and Conventions can be as universal as some claim, because we wonder whether, for example, the people of Palestine, a nation whose territory is occupied, would agree to them. We have the same doubts concerning the black majorities of Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique and all world communities that possess and might still need weapons to affirm their national identities and their fundamental rights under the Charter, but to which we are still obstinately closing our eyes. Even the racist minorities would never agree to those texts, because they too are frightened and for that reason armed to the teeth, allegedly by certain great Powers, which are in turn frightened that Pretoria will refuse to supply them with enriched uranium, plutonium, gold, diamonds and the primary commodities they badly need for their armaments industries.

(Mr. Tankoua, Cameroon)

In the circumstances, it will be understood that the world would indeed be on the brink of the abyss because the act of folly or blackmail of the kind mentioned this very year by the United States Secretary of State himself, in his statement to the General Assembly -- might be the act of a Palestinian, a South African, a Viet Nameese or an unsuspected sympathizer having access to the secrets of the nuclear arms arsenals.

It is for all those reasons that my delegation very sincerely believes that in order to avoid the worst, the irreparable, the great Powers will soon be displaying the political will necessary to turn from the present state of precarious détente to true peace in a world where justice reigns. Lack of that will be fatal to mankind because in itself it would constitute an important element in acceleration of the arms race and would be an unnecessary risk which in our view no one should be called upon to take unless as a form of blackmail or an attempt to make people become mad enough to press the doomsday button.

My delegation reserves its right to speak again if necessary on details of various items of our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cameroon for the very kind words he was good enough to address to me and to the other officers of the Committee.

We had in principle agreed that the Committee would adjourn so that members might attend the plenary meeting to hear the speech of His Excellency Dr. Bruno Kreisky, the Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria. I think we can do so now, provided the next three speakers on the list agree to that procedure. They are the representatives of Chile, Brazil and India. I see that, very courteously, they do not object. I shall therefore call upon them, in that order, at this afternoon's meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



PROVISIONAL

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12 December 1974

ENGLISH AND SPANISH ONLY

Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 11 November 1974, at 3.p.m.

CORRIGENDUM

Page 111, third paragraph, third line, for commando read refugee

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



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11 November 1974

ENGLISH

Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 11 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:	Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS	(Argentina)
<u>later:</u>	Mr. NEUGEBAUER (Vice-Chairman)	(German Democratic Republic)
<u>later:</u>	Mr. SIDDIQ (Vice-Chairman)	(Afghanistan)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 percent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued)
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General
 - Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)
 - Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)
 - Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued)
- /...

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

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- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3089 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)
- Programme of work

AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103 and 107 (continued)

REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY BUDGETS OF STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 10 PER CENT AND UTILIZATION OF PART OF THE FUNDS THUS SAVED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (A/9565, A/9713, A/9770, A/9800)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708; A/C.1/L.683)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3079 (XXVIII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO): REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9718, A/9797; A/C.1/L.685)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (A/9585, A/9629 and Addendum)

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9698, A/9708)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO) (A/9692; A/C.1/L.686)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1: A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)

Mr. HUERTA (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): It is with pride that the delegation of Chile speaks on the items regarding disarmament which appear on the agenda of this First Committee, because my country, together with her sister Republic of Argentina, which you, Mr. Chairman, so worthily represent, on 28 May 1902 signed the first treaty on disarmament and arms limitation known in the history of the world, thus setting an example of peaceful vocation which, in the course of the years, has but strengthened. It is precisely because of this vocation for peace that my delegation cannot fail to express its concern at the arms race in which the world is engaged, both at the level of nuclear weapons as at the level of conventional weapons.

The deplorable consequences which this arms race generates both for international stability and for the process of economic and social development to which our peoples aspire, make it urgent that the role which the United Nations is called upon to play should take concrete form. A first priority, which as in past years my delegation wishes to emphasize, relates to the urgent need to halt nuclear and thermonuclear testing. The repeated appeals to those States which are not yet parties to the Treaty which prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to accede to it have proved to be fruitless. Accordingly, it becomes essential to make a renewed effort to ensure the full effectiveness of this instrument as well as to improve on it by prohibiting underground nuclear tests.

In regard to the last aspect we note with satisfaction the agreements reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of underground tests which, despite their restricted scope, constitute a positive step within this procedure. However, the possibility of a treaty intended to achieve a general prohibition of these tests is still remote, not because of the difficulties in regard to supervision procedures, which have been

(Mr. Huerta, Chile)

invoked more as a pretext than because they really exist, but because there is as yet no firm will on the part of the nuclear Powers which have primary responsibility in this field.

In close connexion with the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests, we must also refer to the need to further the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty by encouraging the participation of a larger number of States by demanding compliance on the part of the nuclear Powers with the provisions of articles V and VI and, above all, the strict application of safeguards measures which constitute the corner-stone of the non-proliferation system. Only in this way will it be possible to arrive at an effective system of non-proliferation, particularly at a time when technology makes the differences between military and peaceful application of nuclear tests more theoretical and more difficult to determine every day. It is our hope that the conference which will consider and review this Treaty will provide an adequate framework for its improvement.

Consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament is still trailing along with no set course. The scant and practically non-existent progress indicated in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is discouraging. We still believe in the essential usefulness of that multilateral forum, but we also believe that it is necessary to transform it into an effective vehicle to achieve the objective of disarmament. An undoubtedly positive step in this direction has been the invitation to join the Conference extended to the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire. My delegation also would be extremely pleased to see Australia join this important forum.

The agreements reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear war, on basic principles for negotiations of new limitations of strategic offensive weapons, on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles and on other points, together with the limitation on underground tests which I have referred to, do undoubtedly represent

(Mr. Huerta, Chile)

ough partial progress in disarmament. Nevertheless, bilateral do not exempt the United Nations from its primary responsibility. The ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. In connexion, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should maintain under constant study and analysis the progress and of negotiations between the nuclear Powers.

On the other hand, it is indispensable for any policy leading to disarmament to be progressively subject to control procedures which would ensure a real guarantee as to compliance with the commitments entered into.

On 31 October last, Senator James L. Buckley, in the Overseas Press Club of New York, made specific denunciations regarding violations of the SALT agreements. Problems of this kind can become more frequent

since the development of the technology of warfare will facilitate the discovery of mechanisms which will ingeniously make it possible to

perpetrate any commitments that have been assumed. Only strong control can prevent such situations. Here again, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has the unique responsibility of promoting the appropriate solutions.

The delegation of Chile received with satisfaction the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference of which my country is a member. In the opinion of my Government, the Committee has efficiently discharged its mandate which, as is known, was limited exclusively to the study of the opinions and suggestions made by Governments in connexion with the convening of and conditions for holding that conference. This important initiative, the origin of which is to be found in the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries was held in Belgrade in 1961, has always had the support of my country. We consider that its objective must be general and complete disarmament under strict international control, for the achievement of which the active participation of the nuclear Powers is indispensable.

(Mr. Huerta, Chile)

On the other hand, we also consider that the preparation of this conference should not preclude active continuation of disarmament negotiations among the nuclear Powers themselves. Without prejudice to the global efforts to achieve the objectives of general and complete disarmament, my Government attaches the greatest importance to regional efforts in that direction, which have proven to be viable and effective collateral measures.

Consistent with this policy, my Government, as was announced to the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, has proceeded to complete the ratification procedures with respect to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thus joining that exemplary and useful instrument of denuclearization.

For the same reason, we were very happy to learn that France and China, in the course of this year, adhered to Additional Protocol II of that Treaty. We must only regret, therefore, that one of the great nuclear Powers continues to be the main absentee in this policy of denuclearization. Once again the General Assembly should issue an appeal to that Power to comply with the provisions of six previous resolutions of this body. My delegation also supports the initiative to issue an appeal to those States which, although prospective parties to Additional Protocol I, have not yet acceded to it.

The policy of denuclearization at the regional level, which Latin America inaugurated some years ago, is now beginning to be studied from the standpoint of its feasibility for other regions of the world. Without prejudging the problems and specific characteristics of other regions, we take note of the initiative to create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia and the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We have also taken note of similar initiatives sponsored by the Organization of African Unity.

Furthermore, my delegation was pleased to learn of the joint communiqué issued by the Prime Ministers of Japan and New Zealand in the city of Wellington on 30 October last, in which they reaffirmed the non-nuclear position of their respective Governments and their objection to any type of nuclear

(Mr. Huerta, Chile)

testing. Chile, as a coastal State in the South Pacific, considers these statements to be most positive.

The trends toward regionalization, which I have mentioned, at present warrant requesting the Secretary-General to submit a report in which, in consultation with high level experts, he can inform us of the feasibility of, and the problems involved in, these initiatives and in other efforts which may be undertaken at the same level as well as of the manner in which these are related to the non-proliferation Treaty and other multilateral instruments.

With respect to regional initiatives related to the problem of armaments, we believe that they also can be supplemented by various other measures which would not apply exclusively to nuclear weapons but to conventional weapons as well. Thus, referring to the positive proposal of the Head of State of Peru on freezing the acquisition of arms, the representative of Chile stated in the Ad Hoc Committee for a World Disarmament Conference that:

"The Government of Chile considers as a positive step the proposal of the Head of State of Peru designed to achieve a subregional agreement to freeze the acquisition of arms, and shares the hope that Peru and its neighbours will reach an agreement on freezing their defence expenditures and thus be able to use the funds thus released to combat under-development."

I am pleased at this time to reaffirm these concepts, as well as the permanent policy of friendship between the sister Republics of Peru and Chile. Consistent with this policy of the regional limitation of arms, as early as 1959 the Government of Chile proposed a general arms limitation in Latin America and the use of the funds thus saved to promote economic development.

What I have just said clearly shows the position of my Government to be the promotion of any initiative that will make it possible to reduce arms expenditures and allocate the resources thus saved to the needs of economic and social development. For that reason, we reaffirm the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 3093 (XXVIII) on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries.

(Mr. Huerta, Chile)

While in the period 1971-1973 the developed countries allocated 5.9 per cent of their gross national product to military expenditures, official assistance for development amounted to only 0.26 per cent of that gross national product, according to the tables which appear in the report of the Secretary-General on this subject. This is highly indicative of the gravity of the situation for the developing countries. In order to implement the policy of the reallocation of funds it is necessary for the General Assembly to establish an effective machinery. Chile agreed to be a member of the Special Committee provided for in resolution 3093 (XXVIII). The reasons which have so far prevented the functioning of that Committee are well known. Until this situation can be remedied, my delegation considers that it would be a positive step if the country that originally proposed the reallocation of funds would proceed to implement that unilaterally as an expression of their concern for the needs of the developing countries.

The proposal regarding the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health is certainly of great interest, since it anticipates problems that will appear if scientific and technological advances are applied to non-peaceful ends. These problems already exist to some extent. The proposal, which is intended to prevent a worsening of the situation, deserves careful study and the consideration of effective means to implement it.

Finally, my delegation cannot fail to refer to the serious problem posed by napalm and other incendiary weapons. We trust that very soon the use of weapons will be categorically prohibited. Similarly, we believe that the General Assembly must again appeal for the ratification and effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, as well as of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

With regard to the important draft convention submitted by Japan on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, my delegation regrets that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not achieved concrete results in this field. We trust that the subject will again be given high priority.

All the disarmament items are closely interconnected. That is why my delegation preferred to refer to them jointly, rather than treating each one individually. We believe that a matter of substance that is common to all of the items is the necessity for effective control. Since the time of the League of Nations, successive efforts towards disarmament and the limitation of armaments have failed because of the absence of effective control. Hence, we believe that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and, in due course, the world disarmament conference should focus their action on devising strong international controls applicable not only to the non-nuclear-weapon countries, which have already demonstrated their goodwill through the signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other instruments, but also to the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves. The only true guarantee of the success of measures for the total prohibition of nuclear tests, non-proliferation, general and complete disarmament, the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare, and so forth, is the opening up of the frontiers of the great Powers to international control. We are perfectly well aware that that is the greatest obstacle. Nevertheless, we are prepared to persevere in the efforts to achieve that goal.

Mr. ALVARES MACIEL (Brazil) (interpretation from French): In a detailed statement several days ago the head of my delegation set forth the Brazilian Government's position of principle on the question of disarmament and gave an analysis of that question. I shall therefore limit my statement today to some brief comments on the ideas that have been put forward during this general debate and on some specific items of our agenda.

One first element that emerges from what has been said by the majority of representatives here is the firmness with which they have set forth the objectives to be sought with a view to real, effective general and complete disarmament under international control. The reiteration of the very sincere intentions to seek solutions to the distressing problem confronting us is in contrast, however, with the general support for the rather sombre and pessimistic view of the progress recently achieved in this field, and is in contradiction with something that is fully conceded by the nuclear Powers themselves -- that is, that the armaments race is still in full swing and, indeed, is achieving a rate and nature hitherto unknown.

The majority of representatives here have stressed the primary responsibility of the great Powers, and particularly the nuclear Powers, in the sphere of disarmament, in the light of the quantitative and qualitative increase in the threat of destruction hanging over the world. I shall not repeat the many examples of terrifying vertical proliferation that have been cited during this debate. I would simply call attention to the fact that the perfecting of nuclear weapons not only disturbs the precarious nuclear balance but also renders ever more remote the possibility of an agreement between the super-Powers to limit strategic armaments, an agreement which is an indispensable precondition to general and complete disarmament. Nor shall I dwell on the contradiction involved in the fact that the expenditure for the production of armaments is maintained at an astronomical level at the very moment when there is so much talk about the serious economic difficulties facing nations and the world.

That gloomy picture is made even more gloomy by the feeling of discouragement arising from the absence of proposals designed to settle the problem of disarmament as a whole and by the inadequacy of the partial and collateral measures suggested.

Underlying that assessment is the fact that the political phenomenon of détente has not yet been translated into effective military measures likely to lead to general and complete disarmament and to ensure the security of the non-nuclear States. One might even suspect that if détente does not in the final analysis lead to genuine understanding, it will have simply had the effect of trying to make acceptable the mere balance of terror established by the super-Powers, which is directly opposed to the true international security we all seek.

Within that context, the response to the threat of horizontal proliferation -- a problem whose importance and scope cannot be minimized -- can be satisfactory only to the extent that conditions of security are created that will reduce the possible motivations of States to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, the question of non-proliferation must be placed within the over-all context of general and complete disarmament.

Presenting the question of horizontal non-proliferation as a primary and almost unique element in our discussion is tantamount, in this context, to distracting us from our final aims and relegating the consideration of crucial problems of disarmament proper to a secondary level. The adoption of that viewpoint can serve only the aims of those who would like us to confine ourselves to the consideration of partial and collateral disarmament measures.

(Mr. Alvares Maciel, Brazil)

It is reducing the sensitivity of world public opinion to the absence of progress, for example, in negotiations between the super-Powers on the limitation of strategic arms, nuclear arms testing, or mutual force reductions between them, at the very time when we are witnessing an acceleration of the arms race, an increase in vertical proliferation, and an increase in the nuclear threat itself. Finally, it serves to distract our attention from other important individual problems -- chemical weapons or napalm, for example -- or questions which are fundamentally deadlocked because of strategic, military and political implications which they have for the great Powers. I am thinking particularly of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The problem of the spread of nuclear weapons has been taken up with much emphasis in the general debate from the standpoint of the non-proliferation Treaty. I do not believe it is necessary to repeat here the position of my country with regard to this international instrument: it is sufficiently well known. Suffice it to say that, like other States we are refraining from making undertakings which might result in hindrances to our economic and technological development.

The treatment of the question of non-proliferation by means of that Treaty does in fact involve limitations on the idea of the sovereign equality of States, which are not offset by real guarantees of security. The non-proliferation Treaty is selective and discriminatory. It accentuates political, economic and technological differences within the present world power system. But what is perhaps even more serious, apart from its inequitable character, is its ineffectiveness as an instrument for nuclear disarmament, something which has been pointed out by other delegations in this debate.

The establishment of an international régime to govern peaceful nuclear explosions conceived in the spirit I have just described could only have the final effect of granting a monopoly over this important technology to the great Powers, to the detriment of the development prospects which it could offer to the economically and technologically less privileged countries.

(Mr. Alvares Maciel, Brazil)

The arguments which have been put forward along these lines are entirely in favour of those who have styled themselves the champions of the technological status quo. Unless we can now arrive at an absolutely clear cut definition of the scope of peaceful nuclear explosions, it is futile to attempt to prejudge the course of technological development in this field.

The nuclear option of each country is determined by a whole range of factors. The treatment of the question of exclusively peaceful explosions should not therefore be confused indiscriminately with the essentially political problem of nuclear disarmament. The question is already under study by the IAEA. Suggestions which have been put forward here that the question should be referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for consideration seem to me rather out of place, since this would mean asking that body, which deals with disarmament, to undertake a task which goes beyond its particular field of competence.

I should like to add to these points a few brief comments on the question of the creation of denuclearized zones in the Middle East and in South Asia.

In the view of my Government, the creation of such zones could represent a very important step towards the final aim of general and complete disarmament. It is of the utmost importance, however, for the proposals which are put forward in this spirit to be in keeping with realistic criteria: first, the establishment of denuclearized zones with clearly defined limits should correspond to the wishes of all the countries in the region concerned. It is for those countries alone to conduct negotiations, without outside interference, in order to agree on the terms. Another essential point is respect on the part of all nuclear countries for the denuclearized status of the region. A third precondition would be the subsequent conclusion by all the countries in the zone of safeguard agreements with IAEA. In a word, the conditions I have just mentioned are fundamentally those stipulated by article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

I would not like to conclude my statement without expressing the hope of my delegation that progress will be made very soon in the study of the necessary regulation of the use of certain weapons with cruel or indiscriminate effects; I am referring here to napalm and other equivalent conventional weapons. My Government is following with interest the examination of the question by the Conference of Experts in Lucerne.

We are also studying with interest the new Soviet proposal to prohibit action to influence the environment and the climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security and human well-being and health, although this proposal may perhaps be rather premature in view of the high priority which should be accorded to other questions.

As I conclude, permit me to change the somewhat gloomy note of the comments I have made by bidding a warm welcome on behalf of my Government to the five new future members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The admission of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire, which has been submitted for endorsement at this session of the General Assembly will, I am sure, contribute much to the attainment of our disarmament objective within CCD.

Mr. MISHRA (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has already extended its congratulations to you on your election to this high office. May I add my own to those and wish you all success in the performance of your task. We are confident that with your wisdom and tact at our disposal we shall successfully conclude the consideration of disarmament items within the time allotted to us.*

Indian scientists conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment on 18 May this year. Several delegations have expressed views on its implications and consequences as they see them.

Some representatives have asserted directly or indirectly that at present there are hardly any peaceful applications of nuclear explosion technology. As I have stated in this Committee earlier, we do not claim to have achieved a break-through in explosion technology. The announcement of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission had this sentence in it:

"As part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosion, the Government of India had undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments of this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earth-moving operations."

It is clear that the Government of India is not alone in this respect. Peaceful nuclear explosions carried out underground, over a period of several years, by other States have confirmed the feasibility of this technology, although many problems still remain to be solved. Their experiments have been oriented towards gas and oil stimulation, and have shown promising results and are even reported to have increased oil production by 30 to 60 per cent. It should not, therefore, be a matter of surprise or regret if India, without contravening any of its international obligations, were to experiment and try to develop this technology for exploiting the natural resources within its own territory. We are not prepared to wait for others to perfect the nuclear explosion technology and thereby lag behind by a decade or more in its development in India.

I should like to quote the Declaration on Disarmament adopted at Lusaka on 10 September 1970, by the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference. The Declaration had this to say;

* Mr. Neugebauer (German Democratic Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

"The Conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including peaceful nuclear explosions can make to the economy of the developing world. It is of the opinion that the benefits of this technology should be available to all States without any discrimination."

There are enormous possibilities for harnessing atomic energy for developmental purposes. Our attitude is in conformity with the recommendations of the IAEA panel discussions in 1970, 1971 and 1972 on peaceful nuclear explosions. In the panel discussions in 1970 in which many countries including Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States participated, the first conclusion in the summary of the discussions, as published by IAEA, read as follows:

"There is general agreement that the results obtained in experimental projects on the application of nuclear explosions to industrial projects, justify continuation, even an intensification of the programme."

Recently, the Soviet Union and the United States of America have given fresh indications of the trust they put in the usefulness of this technology by excluding underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes from the proposed limited ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons.

Another strange argument we have heard is that India, by exploding a peaceful nuclear device has broken some kind of a barrier to proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have solemnly declared for the last 20 years that we intend to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. Even after exploding a nuclear device, we have reaffirmed our solemn declaration. If other non-nuclear-weapon States follow us in reaffirming their resolve to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, is it to the benefit or to the detriment of mankind? If, on the other hand, one or more non-nuclear-weapon States proceed to acquire nuclear weapons, they certainly will not be following India's example.

It is quite wrong to imagine that the Indian explosion for peaceful purposes has somehow damaged the non-proliferation Treaty. India has not campaigned and does not intend to campaign against that Treaty. The Treaty stands or falls on its own merits or demerits. Even after India's peaceful nuclear explosion, we are not aware that any so-called near-nuclear State, which had

(Mr. Mishra, India)

intended to become a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, had decided not to do so now. The others in the same category, which from the beginning had refused to accept the obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty, did so for their own reasons.

For many years, India has been campaigning against the nuclear arms race and nuclear-weapon testing. Only by tackling this problem can we hope to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. We should not take the nuclear arms race for granted. But this is exactly what some delegations are doing. They seem to imagine that if restrictions are placed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy the fundamental problem will be solved. We should not ignore the fact that there are hardly any negotiations going on concerning nuclear disarmament -- and I emphasize "disarmament". Two nuclear-weapon States are engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Three nuclear-weapon States participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which for some years now has been unsuccessfully engaged in elaborating a comprehensive test ban treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States are outside the CCD.

We can make a beginning in controlling the nuclear arms race by agreeing on a comprehensive test ban. We feel that there is no justification or excuse for continuing nuclear-weapon testing. Our approach to the general question of the comprehensive test ban is that there should be a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. As the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 already prohibits nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in the underground environment will accomplish the objectives of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Therefore, the first priority should be accorded to achieving universal adherence to a régime of prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Only in the context of a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests could consideration be given to the possibility of concluding an agreement on the regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to be signed by all States. The accompanying system of international safeguards which will have to be devised should be based on objective, functional and non-discriminatory criteria. It should be universal in application.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

India remains firm in its opposition to nuclear armament. Our policy has been stated and restated in this forum. We are opposed to all proliferation -- vertical and horizontal -- of nuclear weapons. We are for nuclear disarmament. It is our hope that all States, nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, will, like India, commit themselves to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in this matter.

India has supported the General Assembly resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Latin America because conditions were suitable for their establishment and, furthermore, they were proposed on the initiative of and with agreement among the countries in those zones. In both cases there were prior consultations leading to agreement among the countries concerned before endorsement by the General Assembly. At the same time, India has also consistently maintained that any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a particular region has to be considered on its specific merits. Conditions for the establishment of such zones differ from continent to continent, and it is not possible to devise a single formula or procedure to cover all cases.

As regards Pakistan's proposal, no consultations among the States in the area took place before the item was inscribed on our agenda. Therefore, it would be premature, indeed it would be prejudging future consultations, to declare South Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone or even to endorse the concept. My delegation has already pointed out in the plenary Assembly that any proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in any part of the world has an important bearing on the vital interests of all the countries of that region. It is therefore natural that the first prerequisite to the creation of such a zone is an agreement among the countries concerned.

Africa and Latin America are separate and distinct continental zones, geographically and politically. In that sense, South Asia cannot be considered a zone. The South Asian countries are surrounded by nuclear-weapon States or countries belonging to their alliances. It is clear that South Asia cannot be treated in isolation for purposes of the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone because South Asia is an integral part of the Asian and the Pacific region.

The presence of nuclear weapons in the region, the alliances with nuclear-weapon States and the existence of foreign military bases have to be taken into account in the examination of any proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Asia and the Pacific.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute only a collateral measure; they are not and should not become a substitute for nuclear disarmament.

In 1974, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was able to discuss the question of a chemical weapons convention at great length. Many of the technical questions involved were also examined thoroughly with the help of experts. A number of working papers and statements on the various aspects of that question by several delegations are also available to us. The Soviet Union and other socialist States members of CCD have submitted a draft convention on chemical weapons, and more recently Japan also presented another draft convention on this subject. Furthermore, at the Moscow Summit Conference this year the United States and the USSR agreed to consider a joint initiative in CCD with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare.*

We feel that our objective should continue to be to achieve a comprehensive prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. If a phased approach is to be adopted, it becomes all the more necessary that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 should be adhered to by all.

The CCD should continue to deal with the question of a chemical weapons convention as a high-priority issue. If the working out of a convention is delayed, technological developments, particularly in the field of binary weapons, could make a ban almost impossible.

It is our firm conviction that a world disarmament conference will promote the cause of general and complete disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in by providing a new impetus to our efforts. Having had the privilege of being a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, established

* The Chairman returned to the Chair.

pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII), we have naturally followed its deliberations with great interest, and have also contributed our ideas to its work. We would like to record our appreciation of its Chairman, Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, for the skilful way in which he piloted the meetings of the Committee and maintained contacts with the nuclear-weapon countries which did not attend the meetings. We are, however, disappointed that the Committee could not come out with positive and concrete recommendations and would urge further efforts in this direction.

We also have before us the valuable report of the Secretary-General on the question of reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council. We should like to reiterate our support for the ideas contained in resolution 3093 A (XXVIII). We regret that thus far it has not been possible to establish the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets. We consider reduction of the military budgets as proposed in the resolution will contribute to the slowing down of the arms race and prevent the waste of much needed and scarce resources.

We welcome the initiative taken by the Soviet Union to draw the attention of the world community to the dangers of the use of techniques to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. Although these techniques do not seem to have much utility in warfare at present, one cannot rule out the possibility of their development and utilization in the not too distant future. It is desirable to start thinking about that problem now.

The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2832 (XXVI) on 16 December 1971 was a historic act. That resolution declared the Indian Ocean a zone of peace for all time to come and asked the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the region all bases, military installations and any other manifestations of the great Powers' military presence, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry. This recognition and acceptance by the General Assembly of the ardent wish of the littoral and hinterland States to keep the Indian Ocean free from tensions and threats to their security arising from the great-Power rivalry in the region, was indeed extremely significant.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

Nearly three years have elapsed since this epoch-making Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly and now is perhaps the time to review, in brief, developments that have since taken place. It will be recalled, that by resolution 3080 (XXVIII), the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by him, to prepare

"... a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry".

That statement, as subsequently revised, is contained in document A/AC.159/1/Rev.1. While the statement has its limitations, as it was based on published material only, it has been useful in that it indicates the extent of the great Powers' naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It is with great regret that one observes that on the whole the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean area has not lessened but in fact seems to have increased.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, created pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII) has been performing a useful, although by no means exhaustive, task. The goals that the Committee has set for itself for the next year, as they appear in paragraph 35 of its report (supplement No. 21, A/9629), are important, although modest. That in itself is not to be criticized, because it reflects the realism with which the Committee apparently approaches its task. We are aware that the Committee's task was not easy and yet the success it has been able to achieve in its deliberations is in no small measure due to the very able stewardship of its Chairman, Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka. We sincerely hope that the Committee's mandate will be renewed and that in its future work it will be able to pursue all the urgent tasks facing it without allowing itself to be deflected from its mandate as contained in the Declaration.

To conclude, we welcome the agreement reached in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to invite Peru, Zaire, Iran, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in the work of the Committee. We are confident that they will make a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his good wishes.

Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal): Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to fulfil the pleasant duty of congratulating you on your election as Chairman of this Committee. Your wide knowledge of the complicated issues before the Committee will be of great benefit to all those of us who will have the opportunity to work under your able guidance. I should also like to congratulate the two Vice-Chairmen. We are happy to see that the representative of a country whose leadership has shown bold initiative in many spheres of current world trends has been elected as the Rapporteur of the Committee. We congratulate him and express our full co-operation.

My delegation has had the opportunity to hear a number of delegations, particularly those delegations whose statements assume a special noteworthiness because of their technical capability and which, therefore, can be an augury of hope or despair in the Committee. We are happy to note that the sombre horizon of the past years has been penetrated by a silver lining and hopefully a general atmosphere of détente seems to have emerged to stay. However, in the absence of a trustworthy commitment that could bind the nations of the world together and particularly bind those which have the capability for the destruction of the whole world, the so-called atmosphere of détente remains vulnerable and volatile.

Unless some concrete step is taken in the direction of curbing the armaments race, the cessation of the nuclear tests, checking the use of incendiary weapons, and prohibiting actions that might influence the whole environment, there can be no assurance of an atmosphere of continued peace and international security. Even promises of peaceful intentions every other day cannot rule out the possibility of a sudden eruption of conflicts of dangerous dimension.

Out of the twelve items which have been bracketed together to be considered as disarmament items, five are related to the cessation of nuclear tests, thus making the questions of the cessation of nuclear tests, the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, of great importance and of an urgent nature. Therefore, at this stage, my delegation would like to concentrate mostly on the subject of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

The Assembly has been seized with the question of the cessation of nuclear tests and related matters for years. Yet, the temptation to carry out new tests has not ceased. The exclusive club of five has been extended this year and there are at least 20 which have achieved the standard that can make them claimants of the right to membership of the club. The exclusiveness of the club has been threatened and there seems no way to maintain the status quo.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Rt. Hon. David Ennals, rightly observed in the meeting of this Committee on 5 November 1974:

"The question we must ask is: will 1975 be the year in which the non-proliferation régime was finally destroyed, or will it be the turning point when the new dangers were recognized and contained, with proper provision made for the extension to all States of the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology?" (2008th meeting, p. 21)

Those who refused to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty had over the years consistently underlined the discriminatory nature of the Treaty which put curbs on non-nuclear-weapon Powers while allowing the nuclear-weapon Powers to pursue an unbridled and unprecedented arms race. Nepal signed the Treaty six years ago relying on the good faith of the nuclear-weapon Powers which had given assurances that they would do all within their means to achieve a balance of mutual obligations by living up to the provisions of article VI of the Treaty. Nepal had at that time also strongly urged the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty as a quid pro quo. Let me recall what our representative stated at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly in 1968:

"We feel that, once the non-proliferation treaty is concluded, the political decision required for a ban on underground explosions cannot be postponed any longer under the convenient pretext that it is the other side that is holding up agreement. It is imperative that all States be prohibited from conducting underground nuclear explosions, not just the non-nuclear Powers, in the same way that the Moscow Treaty prohibits all countries from conducting tests in the remaining (1559th meeting, p. 26).

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

Our representative had also suggested at that time that the question of peaceful explosions be separated from the non-proliferation Treaty and be dealt with within the context of an underground test ban that would prohibit all underground nuclear explosions by all States and set up a parallel régime to deal with the question of peaceful explosions. Our representative then elaborated on that proposal by stating as follows:

"Exemptions under the underground test ban agreement would be made for peaceful explosions that would be managed and controlled by an international body, perhaps the International Atomic Energy Agency. No country could then unilaterally conduct any underground explosions, peaceful or military. The sole discretion to permit peaceful explosions would rest with this international body, which would assess the feasibility of the proposed project and then request one of the nuclear Powers to carry out the explosion. This would apply equally to nuclear Powers." (ibid., p. 26-27)

Had the nuclear-weapon Powers agreed to an underground test ban at that time and divorced the question of peaceful nuclear explosions from the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty would have been greatly strengthened and perhaps would have secured the adherence of all those who had the potentiality of going nuclear. By continuing to test under ground and in the atmosphere at a frenzied pace and in utter disregard for world opinion, these Powers have not only increased vertical proliferation but have contributed to the situation that has now opened the door to horizontal proliferation. Nepal is, of course, against all forms of proliferation, vertical and horizontal, and is against all nationally conducted nuclear explosions. However, we believe that only when the cancer of vertical proliferation is contained, can one begin to deal with the dangers of horizontal proliferation. The latter is clearly the consequence of the former.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

The recently concluded threshold Treaty between the USSR and the United States would be highly commendable if it had arrived 10 years earlier or if it were coupled with a moratorium on tests under the threshold. Ten years ago, it might have served a useful purpose in conjunction with the partial test-ban Treaty; but now, to have any meaning, it must be coupled with a moratorium on tests not covered by the Treaty.

I recall that at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly in 1967 Nepal proposed the conclusion of a threshold treaty coupled with such a moratorium and in conjunction with Sweden's idea of verification by challenge. We should like to reiterate that proposal once again and urge the United States and the Soviet Union to include in the threshold Treaty the provision for a moratorium and to open the Treaty for signature by all States, including the other three nuclear-weapon Powers and countries that are now engaged in or contemplating the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Simultaneously with the threshold Treaty and the moratorium, negotiations must start on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Needless to say, any such treaty must make exemptions for peaceful nuclear explosions and would have to provide for an international régime to govern such explosions.

It is fairly clear that, as long as an underground test-ban treaty is not agreed upon and in the absence of an international body to manage and control peaceful nuclear explosions, non-nuclear-weapon States in need of peaceful explosion services have no alternative but to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions themselves. It is in this light that we should view the predicament of non-nuclear-weapon States that have nowhere to turn for obtaining peaceful explosion services. Were an underground test ban now in effect, with a parallel body to provide peaceful explosion services in a non-discriminating manner and at advantageous cost, there is no question that non-nuclear-weapon States would not have to expend their scarce resources to conduct these explosions themselves. The forthcoming review conference relating to the non-proliferation Treaty will undoubtedly have to look into the matter. The continued absence of an international régime governing peaceful explosions cannot but erode the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty. Without such a régime, non-nuclear-weapon countries that adhere to the Treaty and that need

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

peaceful explosion services would now have to renounce the Treaty in order to conduct the explosions themselves. But the existence of such a régime would obviate the need for countries to renounce the non-proliferation Treaty in order to conduct these explosions, since they could obtain the services elsewhere.

For these reasons, we cannot stress enough the paramount need for the nuclear-weapon Powers to agree on a comprehensive test ban, to live up to the provisions of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty and to make arrangements whereby all non-nuclear-weapon States, whether parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or not, can obtain nuclear explosion services without discrimination.

By making this service available to both the signatories and the non-signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty, and on attractive terms, we would be ensuring that countries in the latter category do not in the future take it upon themselves to conduct peaceful explosions. Given the choice between taking advantage of the availability of low-cost and efficient explosion services, on the one hand, and doing it the harder and more expensive way by exploding its own device, on the other, it stands to reason that a developing country with scarce resources would opt for the first alternative.

From what I said above, it is apparent that the survival and the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty depend on the conclusion of an underground test ban. There would be no greater incentive for countries to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty than the conclusion of an underground test ban. And while an underground test ban is being worked out, the United States-Soviet Union threshold Treaty should be expanded to include the provision for a moratorium and should be opened for signature and ratification by all States. Failing that, we see no alternative to non-nuclear-weapon countries conducting nuclear explosions themselves for whatever purpose.

Since underground nuclear explosions can have both military and civilian applications, and in view of the fact that the technology for conducting peaceful explosions is indistinguishable from that for explosions for weapon purposes, we welcome India's repeated assurances of its peaceful intentions in carrying out its nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

My delegation is expressing its view on the subject very candidly and consistently. We have always opposed proliferation, and, so, on the subject of nuclear explosions, we are firmly opposed to all explosions contributing to nuclear proliferation. We should like to urge restraint and patience so as not to create a situation that would endanger international peace and security.

Before concluding, I should like to make a few brief remarks on some other items under discussion in this Committee.

First, my delegation would like to reiterate its full support of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and would like to place on record its appreciation of the excellent work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

Secondly, on the question of banning chemical weapons, my delegation is happy to note that the delegation of Japan has come out with some constructive proposals which could be a very good basis for an acceptable formula to solve this problem.

Thirdly, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the Soviet initiative in introducing an entirely new and meaningful draft resolution on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. Though my delegation feels that all the implications of this proposal have to be further studied and carefully considered, it would be inclined to support it as a matter of principle.

That is all I have to state today. However, my delegation reserves its right to intervene at a later stage if and when the occasion arises.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Upadhyay of Nepal for his cordial congratulations to the officers of the Committee.

Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity last Friday to offer my delegation's congratulations to the officers of the Committee, but I should like now to congratulate you personally on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. Although we are more than half way through the session, perhaps the most difficult part of the Committee's work still lies before us. But we have every confidence that the impartiality and firmness which you have already demonstrated will bring the Committee's work to a successful and timely conclusion.

As this year's disarmament debate draws to a close, my delegation finds it possible to discern several main themes in the many thoughtful and penetrating statements to which we have listened.

In the first place, there is a widespread concern that the world stockpile of armaments, and especially nuclear armaments, continues to grow unabated. Frightening statistics have been presented to the Committee. For example, Senator Symington has told us that the United States alone now possesses the equivalent of over 600,000 Hiroshima-size bombs. Mrs. Thorsson has told us that world armaments expenditure is now running at some \$275 thousand million a year.

Secondly, we have detected a growing disappointment that super-Power détente, and the limited bilateral agreements in the armaments field that form part of that détente, have not led more quickly to new agreements on disarmament in which all of us can participate and from which all of us can benefit. The representative of the Soviet Union, in opening our debate, spoke rather optimistically about the effects of détente, saying that the first perceptible steps have been taken towards the easing of the threat of a nuclear war and that the process of relaxation of tension and the normalization of relations among States belonging to different socio-political systems are creating favourable conditions for further progress.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

It seemed to me significant, however that the United States representative who spoke immediately afterwards did not echo this optimistic note, but warned instead that world peace rested on a knife edge:

"One miscalculation," ... he said -- "one sudden terrorist activity, one paranoid leader could set the spark to a world-wide nuclear holocaust."
(1998th meeting, p. 23)

Nor was the representative of France especially reassuring about the progress of our work. He spoke of:

"... a wild proliferation of useless projects" (2005th meeting, p. 13) and said that France had decided to equip itself with its own nuclear force because it had decided that nuclear disarmament was an unlikely eventuality.

The representative of China was even more pessimistic. According to him, the super-Power arms race has not abated at all, but has intensified; the danger of war has not been reduced in the least; and it is simply not possible to talk about détente in the present international situation.

When the nuclear-Powers themselves make such widely different estimates of the prospects of progress towards nuclear disarmament on the basis of improved great-Power relationships, small countries may surely be excused for some scepticism as to whether nuclear disarmament will ever come about on the initiative of the Governments which own these weapons. Yet it is unavoidable that the prime responsibility in the pursuit of agreement on measures of disarmament should remain with the nuclear Powers. Their conspicuous failure to co-operate in a search for agreement on a multilateral basis is, we believe, generating mounting impatience among the non-nuclear majority.

The third trend which we have noted in this debate is a direct reflection of this mounting impatience. Disappointed in their hopes for early progress towards world-wide measures of nuclear disarmament, more and more non-nuclear States are looking at the possibility of co-operating with their neighbours to establish nuclear-free zones on a regional basis. It is a noteworthy feature of this year's debate that all five States possessing nuclear weapons have indicated their support, or at least their acceptance, of the

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

nuclear-free zone concept, although with varying degrees of enthusiasm, and subject, in some cases, to certain conditions.

A fourth trend which has impressed us this year is the growing realization that widespread proliferation of the capacity to produce nuclear weapons is no longer an academic possibility, but an imminent danger. Until this year, the development of nuclear weapons has been confined to the five permanent members of the Security Council, and while such membership confers no special rights to develop a nuclear capacity, there may have been some illusory comfort in the fact that these countries have a special status and responsibility under the Charter to act together for the maintenance of international peace and security. We may have hoped, without any logical basis for that hope, that the development of nuclear weapons would stop there. The explosion of a nuclear device in a sixth country this year has effectively destroyed that hope, because it has demonstrated that proliferation is not something that could theoretically happen, but something that does happen and is bound to go on happening if the so-called neo-nuclear-Powers are not prepared to adopt a self denying ordinance by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty.

A fifth point that has become clear in the course of this debate is that the question whether a State which explodes a nuclear device does so for peaceful purposes or for military purposes is not really relevant to the proliferation danger, if the State concerned is not prepared to conduct its nuclear programme under recognized international procedures and safeguards. As the representative of the United States has pointed out, it is impossible for a State to develop a capacity to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon. The motive force behind the proliferation of nuclear weapons capacity is distrust and suspicion, and distrust and suspicion will not be allayed by declarations of intent alone.

It is deeply discouraging that at a time when the world is facing a major food crisis, and indeed at the very time that a Conference is meeting in Rome to seek ways of averting starvation for the hungry millions in many developing countries, resources, energy, money and brainpower continue to be

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

squandered on the development and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. How can we have got our priorities so wrong?

My country for its part completely rejects the myth that possession of nuclear weapons in some way enhances a country's status or prestige. It amazes us that any country under responsible management would wish to join a club whose entrance fee is so ruinously expensive, whose sole purpose is the perfection of the means of mutual self destruction, and whose members immediately become the objects of the suspicion and fear of non-members without even the compensation of eliminating suspicion and fear of one another. It used to be thought that the main attraction of any club for its members was the satisfaction to be gained from excluding others, but the nuclear club does not even offer that advantage.

In my delegation's view, the countries which have earned a special status and merit are not those which have forced their way into the nuclear club, but those which, having the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, have voluntarily renounced the intention to do so. It is such countries as Canada, Sweden, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and others which have the resources and know-how to develop a nuclear-weapons capacity, but which, as we understand it, have taken the decision, as parties or prospective parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, to remain as non-nuclear weapon States, that deserve our gratitude and our admiration. Perhaps we should establish among the parties to that Treaty which are not already nuclear weapons States a non-nuclear club. After all, membership would be free.

What I have said already will indicate the great importance which my Government attaches to maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty. Every new accession contributes to that objective; and, conversely, failure to do so, more particularly on the part of States with the potential for developing a nuclear capacity, detracts from it. The present position in this regard is a matter for some concern. The Review Conference which is to be held next year is, in our view, most timely. Not only do we hope that participants in the Conference will propose and agree upon intensified efforts to implement the purposes and principles of the Treaty,

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

but also that by focusing world attention on those purposes and principles we may give a new impetus to the objective of securing their universal observance.

While we expect that the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will be the major conference on armaments control during 1975, we do not overlook the importance of the proposal for a world disarmament conference. It continues to be our view that such a conference should be convened as soon as there is evidence that the nuclear Powers are ready to participate. Although this condition has not yet been met, we believe that preparatory work for the conference should be actively continued.

I have already referred to one issue which has burst its way into the forefront of our attention during 1974, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. The potential value of peaceful nuclear explosions is a subject which remains shrouded in mystery for the vast majority of States. For our part, we have yet to be convinced that peaceful nuclear explosions have practical applications of sufficient importance to counterbalance the complications which they undoubtedly create in the field of nuclear weapons control and disarmament. Since, as we are told, the technologies of peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear weapons are indistinguishable, it is imperative that an international policy on peaceful nuclear explosions be formulated with great care, but as a matter of urgency. We look forward with confidence to the early introduction into this Committee of a draft resolution which is designed to fulfil that objective.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

I have only a few further comments on certain items in which New Zealand has taken a particular interest. The question of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or are indiscriminate in their effects is one of deep concern to my Government. We participated actively in the Conference of Government Experts which recently met in Lucerne under the auspices of the International Red Cross. We agree with the conclusion recorded by the President of that Conference that the session increased knowledge and understanding of the subject. It is also our view, in the light of that new knowledge, that the need to up-date the existing norm of international law by new and specific prohibitions has become more urgent than ever. We said last year, and we see no reason to change our view, that we saw substantial difficulties in the implementation of prohibitions on the use of incendiaries and similar weapons in particular circumstances or against particular targets. Therefore we continue to believe that there is a strong case for a total prohibition of such weapons.

The New Zealand Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the general debate last September, declared that the Assembly should stand ready to encourage positive proposals from countries of a given region to increase regional stability and security. We therefore approach with special sympathy the proposals to which I have already referred, and which have been such a feature of this year's disarmament debate, that the Assembly support or study the institution of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions of the world. The fact that five items on this question are before the Committee is a clear indication of the degree of interest that the concept of nuclear-free zones has generated. We appreciate that such proposals may raise complex issues, about which there may be different views both in general and within a particular region: we therefore welcome the suggestion put forward by the representative of Finland for a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-free zones. We hope that such a study might examine the conditions which would make it profitable to consider the establishment of nuclear-free zones in particular regions and, if it uncovers difficulties, suggest solutions to them.

One aspect of the development of this concept which New Zealand for its part will follow closely is the effect which the creation of such zones, and

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

the conditions under which they are created, may have on the world-wide structure that the nuclear proliferation Treaty is intended to establish. The objective must of course be to avoid weakening the non-proliferation Treaty structure, and rather to strengthen it. When States become parties to a regional agreement for a nuclear-free zone, it will not become less important for them to accede to the non-proliferation treaty, if they have not already done so, but in our view, more important.

Finally, I should like to make one or two comments about item 29 of our agenda, concerning the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The New Zealand Government has for some time maintained a vigorous policy directed towards putting an end to all nuclear testing in any environment, and its views are, I believe, well understood in this Committee. An end to nuclear testing is not the ultimate objective; it is merely one rung on the ladder, one step further towards nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all nuclear weapons... But it is, in our view, a most significant step. A cessation of testing would immediately increase the chances of total nuclear disarmament. It would improve relations both between States and between peoples by reducing the apprehension of those subjected to the hazards of radiation and the possibility of damage to the environment and to health.

We in New Zealand have been obliged to pay special attention to this problem by the fact that, although the world's nuclear capacity and armaments have up to now been concentrated in the hands of a few large countries situated in the northern hemisphere, there have been a considerable number of nuclear tests in the southern hemisphere, relatively close to the shores of a number of countries in the South Pacific region. If there were any doubt that these tests continue to cause the gravest apprehension among the peoples of South Pacific countries, this would surely have been dispelled by the eloquent statement delivered by the representative of Fiji in this debate last Friday. However, our concern is not limited to our own neighbourhood. As the Prime Minister of New Zealand said last month:

"Our objective will continue to be the end of all nuclear tests that expose peoples and the global environment to radio-active fallout. We see no justification for the continuation of nuclear weapon testing by any nation".

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

Accordingly, New Zealand co-sponsored the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683, which stresses once more the urgency of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty to stop nuclear weapon testing of any kind. An internationally agreed comprehensive test ban treaty would be an important landmark on the road to nuclear disarmament and a roadblock to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this Committee last year I said that New Zealand saw the comprehensive test ban as the next achievable step in the disarmament field. Unfortunately, in the year that has passed we have not moved much further towards attaining our objective. We are encouraged, however, by the strong support that has been given to the objective of a comprehensive test ban by a large number of other speakers during this session. We most earnestly appeal to the members of the Committee on Disarmament, to which the preparation of a treaty has been entrusted, to approach this task with a real sense of urgency during 1975.

The representative of the Netherlands reminded us on Friday that on the cover of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists the hands on the doomsday clock had been moved forward five minutes closer to midnight. Some 28 years ago, Bernard Baruch, six months after making the famous proposal that bears his name, said:

"Time is two-edged. It not only forces us nearer to our doom if we do not save ourselves, but even more horrendous, it habituates us to existing conditions which, by familiarity, seem less and less threatening".

Let us, during the coming year, make a new effort to rouse ourselves from the torpor which threatens to overcome us, before the clock strikes.

Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian):

The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic has already had occasion to express its views on the problems connected with the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, that is, nuclear and chemical weapons, and also to express its support for the new proposal of the Soviet Union to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. Today we should like to devote our brief statement to some other items on the Committee's agenda.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic is of the view that the convening of a world disarmament conference would be an important incentive for the concertation and intensification of the efforts of all States directed towards finding new ways and means for resolving the vital problems of disarmament. We believe that, if, such a meeting were successfully held and full use were made of all the favourable possibilities created by the current positive course of events, there might be a new turning point in disarmament efforts. On the basis of these considerations, the Mongolian delegation continues to favour the earliest possible convening of a world disarmament conference, with the participation of all States of the world without exception.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

The urgent need for holding such a broad international meeting on disarmament questions has been stressed in the statements of representatives of an overwhelming majority of States both at the three previous sessions of the General Assembly and at this session. In these statements and in the comments submitted by Governments to the Secretary-General in answer to his letter, there was a detailed reflection of the position of States with regard to the purposes and tasks of a world disarmament conference, its agenda and the place and time for it to be convened.

In a word, in a certain sense it can be claimed that a considerable amount of work has already been done towards preparing for the conference. Everyone is well aware that the question of convening a world meeting to discuss disarmament problems has recently been actively discussed at a number of international meetings, and the idea has met with broad approval on the part of world public opinion and all peace-loving forces. I will just give two examples. The Moscow World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces, in which the representatives of more than 120 international governmental and non-governmental organizations and about 1,000 national organizations and movements from 143 countries of the world took part, supported the idea of convening a world disarmament conference as soon as possible. The Central Committee of the International Co-operative Alliance, at its meeting in October 1973 in Budapest, on behalf of the 270 million families belonging to the co-operative movement from 60 countries of the world, called upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to convene a world disarmament conference as soon as possible in order to call a halt to the arms race and thus free vast sums of money to meet the vital needs of mankind.

So the question arises, why do those who have claimed to be "the real representatives" of the interests of the broad masses so strenuously oppose the convening of such a world meeting? This unrealistic attitude continues to be maintained, in spite of the encouragingly positive fact that the United Nations and many of its organs have begun to co-operate even more closely with the non-governmental and public organizations and have been paying more attention to the voice of world public opinion in such important areas as the strengthening of peace, the struggle against colonialism, apartheid and so on.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

The report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee once again testifies eloquently to the broad support that exists for the proposal to convene a world conference in the early future, a conference which can become such an important step towards the fulfilment of the hopes and aspirations of the peoples to live in a world free of weapons and wars. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic on the whole supports this report and would like to take this opportunity to express its gratitude to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Hoveyda, for the useful work done by the Ad Hoc Committee under his skilful leadership. Our delegation, like many others, considers that the time is now ripe, as has been pointed out in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, for convening the world conference. It supports the idea of expanding the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee so that it can proceed to the practical preparations for convening the conference.

As we know, at the last session of the General Assembly a decision of fundamental importance was adopted on the question of reducing the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and using part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. Our delegation, from the very beginning, has wholeheartedly supported the initiative of the Soviet Union and views it as a timely and topical step which combines three of the problems which are of the greatest concern to world public opinion. That is, the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament and economic development. In the interesting report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of a group of expert consultants on the reduction of military budgets, there are, we believe, three important conclusions. These are, first, that international conditions for considering the question of reducing military budgets are more favourable than they were before; secondly, that the reduction of military budgets is a partial disarmament measure and, as such, would promote a strengthening of mutual understanding among States; thirdly, that the initiative of the Soviet Union linked the question of disarmament organically with the question of development.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate our colleague, Ambassador D. K. Banerjee, under whose Chairmanship the experts made a start in the practical study of this important matter which, we believe, has very promising prospects. In our view, the implementation of the General Assembly decision on this subject would be a real contribution to curbing the arms race primarily in regard to the armaments of the nuclear Powers, that is, the permanent members of the Security Council who, under the United Nations Charter, bear primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, to our deepest regret, we have to point out that some of the permanent members of the Security Council, on various pretexts, are putting a brake on progress in this important matter and are virtually disregarding the view of the overwhelming majority of States of the world, as well as the responsibility which they bear under the United Nations Charter. The Mongolian delegation believes that the formation of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets should be completed so that it can get down to work as soon as possible.

Permit me to say a few words on another item of the agenda. The Mongolian delegation favours the prohibition of napalm and other incendiary weapons. Of course, there is no such thing as a humane weapon. But this kind of weapon which is being used ever more widely against the peoples who are waging their liberation struggle, is extreme in the cruelty and destructiveness of its effect. We think that because of the effects, particularly the long-term effects on human health and the human environment, these weapons essentially are really very little different from some types of weapons of mass destruction. The Conference of governmental experts recently held in Lucerne, in our view, did some useful work in studying further incendiary weapons, which are very complex in nature, and also many aspects of the problem of banning their use.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

This kind of work, in the view of our delegation, is useful in preparing the ground for a comprehensive consideration of the problem of banning all forms of this weapon in the appropriate competent international bodies, particularly at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In concluding this statement today, I should like to set forth briefly the position of my delegation on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its work. My delegation shares the feelings of dissatisfaction which have been expressed here and in that Committee itself with regard to the lack of perceptible progress in the work of that body over the last three years. At the same time, we believe that it is difficult to expect continuous concrete results from a multilateral negotiating body which deals with extremely complex matters such as the problems of disarmament. To this we should add that the Committee, like other similar international bodies, mirrors the actual state of the world political situation. In this regard it is worth pointing out the fact that two nuclear Powers have excluded themselves from the work of the Committee. Their positive participation would do a great deal to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee's work.

We believe that the lack of concrete results for a certain period of time should not serve as a pretext for overlooking the former achievements of the Committee and for disregarding the useful experience, skill and knowledge it has accumulated. As we might have expected, the majority of the Member of the United Nations do understand this objective fact and are in favour of strengthening the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and making it more effective. One piece of evidence for this is the interest displayed by many States in taking part in the Committee's work. In this regard, my delegation welcomes the expansion of the Committee's membership, as a result of which the talks on disarmament will include a few more States, including States which possess considerable economic and military potential.

The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic sincerely congratulates the new members of the Committee: the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaire. We express the hope that these States will make a worthy contribution to the Committee's work.

Mr. TRAORE (Mali) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, before stating the views of the delegation of Mali on the items under discussion in the First Committee, I should like to express to you our great satisfaction at seeing you preside over our work. Your special interest in disarmament problems, your personal contribution to the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, your eminent qualities as a diplomat, and the competence of the other officers of the Committee, will undoubtedly guarantee the success of our work.

It is said that the world is in a state of détente. The happy initiatives taken to bring about a meeting of minds, and understanding and co-operation among peoples and States will nevertheless bear no fruit as long as their destiny is haunted by the dangerous and terrible threat of the ultimate weapon.

The hecatomb which mankind barely escaped in the course of the last war is still something more than a remote possibility.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the international community, although aware of the danger, have nevertheless not managed to reverse the trend towards the overkill.

Interventionist action and the infernal cycle of violence which has resulted and which has continued to create upheavals in the world since the end of the Second World War have regrettably proved that military power still remains the only guarantor of nations. That is the sad and cruel reality of our times.

It is reflected in a general spread of the arms race in its most disquieting aspects, that is to say, the further improvement of the weapons of mass destruction and their dissemination throughout the world -- in the seas, in the oceans and very soon, if it has not already taken place, in outer space.

The fear that we may destroy ourselves, our proclamations, and treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have not helped reverse this trend. On the contrary, haunting fears of instability have led small- and medium-sized States to give priority to strengthening their arsenals, to the detriment of their economic development. Today at least 20 States have become possessors of the nuclear secret. Instead of non-proliferation, we are therefore witnessing the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

The arms race continues at breakneck speed, as though the threat of the destruction of our universe, the hunger and deprivation which are already knocking at our door were not sufficiently disturbing to lead us to give up wasting enormous sums on the manufacture and development of weapons of death.

Talks on disarmament and the agreements reached have covered not the qualitative limitation of arms, but only their quantitative limitation. And here again the approach to solutions was not universal, as it should have been to be effective. Furthermore, this approach takes no account of the relationship between disarmament and development, which is one of the paramount elements of the Second Development Decade.

Is that not one of the reasons why the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament moves from session to session in almost academic discussions, in particular on halting the nuclear arms race and the prohibition of nuclear weapons?

It is true that in the course of 1974 efforts towards disarmament and in the more general direction of lessening tensions between nations have been made. We need only recall the continuation of talks on European security and co-operation, the European-Arab dialogue, and the signing on 31 July of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union forbidding any tests over a certain threshold, together with the Additional Protocols.

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

But we are bound to recognize that the hopes aroused by the promise made in 1973 that SALT II would achieve substantial results are far from having been fulfilled. The latest agreements do not refer to the perfecting of strategic weapons.

Furthermore, the agreements concluded on the prohibition of nuclear tests on land and in the atmosphere were made possible by the improvement in the techniques for underground nuclear explosions; similarly, in the future the limitation of underground tests will doubtless be proposed when other, less ostentatious methods have been perfected.

The present level of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, terrifying in itself, could certainly be reduced by the proper implementation of those agreements, but the spectre of a holocaust would not thereby be removed. Furthermore, the annual increase in military budgets and the perfecting of nuclear weapons destroy in advance the effects of such agreements.

Unlike the situation that prevailed in past decades, the most deadly weapons of destruction are now spread throughout the world, under so-called mutual defence agreements which, in fact, are nothing but alliances to dominate the world. What is more, the sea-bed and the surface of the oceans have not escaped this deployment of force. For example, it is most regrettable to note that despite the adoption by the General Assembly of its resolution 2992 (XXVII), which declared the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, the presence of warships continues to disturb that region. The plan to strengthen the air and naval base at Diego Garcia constitutes in that respect non-application of the foregoing resolution and is therefore a challenge to the international community. And, as we see, the trend of the arms race is far from having been reversed.

It was that hard and sad fact which was reflected in the following words spoken by the Foreign Minister of Mali in the General Assembly on 7 October 1974:

"... no substantial agreement on disarmament has been concluded and ... in fact, the arms race has intensified, the club of nuclear Powers has expanded and the rate of research and development of nuclear weapons has accelerated. The two major Powers have passed from the second generation nuclear arms, that is, the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), to the third generation, that is, the tridents (MARVs), which are capable of evading the anti-missile missile barrages".

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

Our Committee must face that fact and redouble its efforts to ensure respect for the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and of the resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa and the Indian Ocean. These measures would gain by being extended to other areas of the world which are the object of greed and rivalries. That is why the delegation of Mali firmly supports the idea of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia. The successive crises that have shaken those regions-- the most recent crisis almost led to a general conflagration -- should induce us to consider these proposals favourably.

Thus, although the Government of Mali adhered to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we have constantly pointed out that the Treaty is insufficient. The serious gap could have been closed, not by mutual security agreements among the super-Powers but by universal guarantees of non-recourse to these weapons, in conformity with resolution 2936 (XXVII) adopted by the General Assembly.

The atomic umbrellas of the two large military blocs dominating the world certainly do not suffice to reassure the majority of the States members of the international community, which do not belong to those alliances. In a word, the problems of nuclear disarmament have so far been considered in terms of relations of force, or, if you prefer, in terms of hegemony. It follows that all the agreements concluded so far are only arrangements peripheral to disarmament. The political will to negotiate general and real disarmament continues, unfortunately, to be lacking. The reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) have always stressed that. The Secretary-General's report (A/9770) on the reduction of military budgets has confirmed it.

With regard to the CCD, my delegation has already had occasion to emphasize the need to give it a new breath of life. Furthermore, although that body has been strengthened numerically, we continue to believe that its present system of an immovable co-chairmanship needs to be modified in order to give more dynamism to the Committee's work. Indeed, that is one of the proposals made by the non-aligned countries with a view to giving the CCD renewed vigour by making its structures more democratic.

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

Be that as it may, the problem of disarmament as a whole remains with us. The initiatives taken to solve it have been timid up to now, whether nuclear weapons or chemical weapons such as napalm are involved.

An examination of paragraphs 98 to 142 of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9708) indicates once again that the discussions in the CCD on chemical weapons are liable to go on indefinitely so long as there is no political will to conclude new agreements to prohibit the use of toxins as weapons of war.

With regard to the control of chemical disarmament, my delegation believes that the institutional machinery envisaged to undertake that control should in the first place concern itself with the localization of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and with the control over their use for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes. That is why we support the proposal already made on those lines by the delegations of the non-aligned countries in the CCD. Before setting up institutional machinery to control the use of chemical weapons, the General Assembly should have before it specific proposals on the prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted in Geneva by the socialist countries members of the CCD; the working paper submitted there by the delegations of the 10 non-aligned countries; and the most recent draft convention, submitted by Japan, should make it possible for the CCD to pass from the stage of technical considerations and statements on the establishment of a control mechanism to the phase of negotiations that should rapidly succeed in formulating an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

We venture to hope that the joint Soviet-American statement of 4 July 1974 in which the two super-Powers undertake to place before the CCD specific proposals on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles will very soon be put into effect.

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

As we know, the General Assembly has been concerned with the problem of napalm since 1972. The various reports of CCD and of other interested bodies have sufficiently emphasized both the deadly nature of that weapon of mass destruction and the atrocious effects on the human body for the international community to decide to forbid its use.

The arms race is as harmful for the political conduct of States as for their economic and social future.

In general, the rate of increase in military expenditures bears no relation to the funds allocated for the struggle against poverty, disease and ignorance.

The developing countries naturally bear the expense of the unbridled arms race and over-arming which we are witnessing and they are being ruined by it.

The amount of this monstrous waste becomes even clearer when one links disarmament to development, as provided for in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) on the disarmament decade and resolution 2626 (XXV) on the strategy for the second United Nations Development Decade.

In fact, in 1970 the developed countries allocated 6.70 per cent of their gross national product for arms, as against 0.35 per cent for assistance to developing countries.

It is likewise estimated that, during that same period, budgets for research amounted to \$60,000 million, of which \$25,000 million were for military purposes and only \$4,000 million for health research.

The report of the Secretary-General on the reduction by 10 per cent of military budgets indicates that military expenditures amounted to \$275,000 million in 1973 at current prices. Still according to this report:

"This figure is larger than the combined estimated product of the developing countries of South Asia, the Far East and Africa combined, and much larger than that of Latin America." (A/9770, p. 10)

The problem of disarmament, however complex it may be, is far from being essentially technical. Disarmament conferences could multiply and succeed one another, but they will never achieve conclusive results unless:

"... leaders ... change the direction of the policies which have led to arms races; if they reject external policies of intervention; if they reject international competition for power and prestige expressed through military might." (ST/ECA/174, p. 2)

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

This conclusion, from the Report of the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, is an entire programme in itself.

My delegation appeals to the members of this Committee to consider these guiding ideas.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Traore of Mali for the kind words he was so good as to address to the officers of the Committee.

Mr. PEREZ de CUELLAR (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I could not start my first statement in this Committee without expressing to you my satisfaction as a Latin American and as a Peruvian on seeing, as Chairman of this Committee, a brilliant and experienced representative of a country with which we have such fraternal friendship. I express to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other officers of the Committee, our warmest congratulations and our best wishes for success in your important task.

We are drawing to the end of this general debate on the disarmament items which are on the agenda of the First Committee. I bow to the desire of the officers of the Committee that we should conclude at the beginning of this week and accordingly my statement shall be both concise and selective. Therefore I shall not touch on every item, and I reserve my right to comment on specific aspects when we consider the draft resolutions submitted on those items.

The delegation of Peru was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee for the World Disarmament Conference and we were then able to observe how difficult was the task before it. It is true that its mandate was limited to a mere compilation and study of the opinions and suggestions on the desirability of convening the conference, to such an extent that we could almost say that its best efforts were devoted to the preparation of the report. But this was precisely the most difficult part of its work, since resolution 3183 (XXVIII) provided that the report had to be adopted by consensus; and consensus, as we know, included not only the 40 non-nuclear Powers who are members of the Committee, but also -- and this is essential -- the five nuclear Powers. As everybody knows, their positions were very different regarding the desirability of the conference, prior requirements and the timeliness of convening such a conference.

(Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Peru)

My delegation continues to believe that we must take advantage of the fact that no country rejects the principle itself of the usefulness of a world disarmament conference. We believe that the very fact of holding such a world conference with the participation of all the nuclear Powers would in large measure justify the effort of preparation, because, in our opinion, by focusing the attention of Governments and public opinion on the very serious problems of the arms race, the effect would be to give new impetus to the concrete measures which of course could not be negotiated in detail. A world disarmament conference, by setting the major guidelines, the broad general direction for disarmament, would serve as a catalyst for disarmament negotiations at every level.

For those reasons, my delegation will give its full support to any initiative which will bring us a step nearer to the conference. We consider it highly auspicious for disarmament in general that the idea of the conference remain alive.

We have received with great interest the new proposal submitted to the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, entitled "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health". My country has directly experienced some of the serious blows of nature due to ecological disturbances, disturbances in the environment caused by nature. We need only mention earthquakes, radiation from atmospheric nuclear explosions, changes in marine currents which result in the virtual disappearance of certain species of fish which are vital to our economy, and others which it would take too long to enumerate. We are gravely concerned that these uncontrollable phenomena of nature may come to be administered and used deliberately by human action. We can but be in favour of having the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament consider those problems and of the desirability of a convention on the subject being adopted, by which States will refrain in future from using such means of warfare.

Certainly, on welcoming the initiative of the Soviet Union, we are taking no position in regard to the priority which this proposal should have in relation to other items which are before CCD.

(Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Peru)

A brief review of our agenda indicates that a new approach is being evolved in regard to disarmament or arms control, principally in the nuclear sphere: this is the zonal or regional approach. No less than 5 of our 12 items adopt this approach in one form or another.

There cannot be any major doubt that the pattern set at Tlatelolco, namely by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, is an important source of inspiration. That is as it should be. The Tlatelolco Treaty has for some years been going through which I might call a period of expansion if not one of gaining strength. A major part of the region is now covered by the provisions of the Treaty, and there are grounds for expecting that in the near future all the States of America, including the Bahamas and Grenada which have recently joined the United Nations, will be able to join the régime of denuclearization. Two of the four Powers which were in a position to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I have already done so, and all nuclear weapon States except one are parties to Additional Protocol II; and we appeal to the remaining State to become a party also.

But the success of the movement towards denuclearization in Latin America -- and it is important to emphasize this -- was achieved largely because the prevailing political circumstances in Latin America made it possible. We could wish that this model could be used automatically in other regions of the world, but we are not sure whether circumstances elsewhere are equally propitious.

Peru has received with gratitude the invitation extended to it by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate in its work as of 1 January 1975, as soon as the General Assembly confirms our membership in CCD.

My country will endeavour to live up to the responsibility it assumes in the certainty that the invitation of CCD has been influenced in some measure by the position of Peru concerning certain current problems of disarmament and arms limitation.

(Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Peru)

Today we can but reaffirm and re-emphasize, in this connexion, our firm position of principle as regards the priority item before CCD, namely, the urgent need for the cessation of all nuclear arms tests. Our position in this regard is perfectly well known and remains unalterable. I am pleased to affirm here that it is in the light of this position that we shall consider the draft resolutions submitted on this subject at the present session of the General Assembly as well as the proposals in CCD.

On the other hand, we cannot doubt that in the proposal of Peru as a member of CCD, account has been taken of the position of my country on arms limitation at the regional level, which is reflected in the proposal of the President of Peru, General Juan Velasco Alvarado that the countries of Latin America reduce their military budgets and devote the savings thus obtained to purposes of economic and social development that are vital for our peoples.

This initiative not only reflects the friendly attitude of Peru regarding the friendly countries which are our neighbours but also -- if that were necessary -- it proves my Government's firm and active vocation for peace. This position will be expressed unflaggingly in the august negotiation forum in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank my friend, Ambassador Perez de Cuellar, for the very courteous and kind words addressed to my country and to me.

Mr. MIKANAGU (Burundi) (interpretation from French): One of the former Presidents of the United States said that you can fool some of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.

The question of general and complete disarmament affects all the peoples of the world.

The peoples of Africa, who must, however, defend themselves against colonialism, imperialism, exploitation and neo-colonial pillage, do not produce a single cartridge and consequently have no armaments to reduce. Our peoples love peace, justice and liberty. That is why we are in favour of genuine disarmament, the total destruction of stockpiles of all arms of mass

(Mr. Mikanagu, Burundi)

destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, the prohibition of their manufacture and of the development of other types of arms of this kind, and also the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from all parts of the world.

It is on the basis of this genuine commitment that a world disarmament conference could take place, because that conference must not be a mere rostrum for propaganda or misleading utterances made in order to camouflage the arms race and thus deceive the people of the world. Nor should we be in too much of a hurry to convene a world disarmament conference lest it lead finally to the failure of the objective in view, that is, genuine, general and complete disarmament.

We are convinced that at the very beginning that conference must have good chances of success because all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of the world disarmament conference. There is no point in being in too much of a hurry, we must start out at the proper speed. We cannot accept the idea of the failure of a world disarmament conference. That is why it is necessary for all the nuclear Powers to agree to participate in the conference.

If the most powerful nuclear Powers of the world are tempted to get together behind the backs of other countries by means of bilateral negotiations in order to bring about a balance of their armaments so that all the other peoples of the world will bow to them, they may be sure in any case that they will not succeed in fooling all the people all the time. The world disarmament conference can only succeed in an atmosphere of mutual confidence among peoples, free from suspicion and distrust.

Today we are witnessing the advent of a new era in international relations. The last Middle East war, and also the energy crisis which followed it, have opened the eyes of the peoples of the third world.

(Mr. Mikanagu, Burundi)

These people are now beginning to raise their heads. They are demanding the end of exploitation, alienation, colonial and neo-colonial pillaging of their natural resources.

We hope that the most powerful countries in the world will not attempt to put back the clock by using their traditional weapon of the law of the strongest in this jungle of international relations.

(Mr. Mikanagu, Burundi)

We suppose that they will not try to use the bogey man of fear and terror and have recourse to a nuclear threat by setting in motion their navies, which are sailing over the seas and oceans. And, if a new war were to break out, it does not necessarily follow that we would stand to lose the most. The experience of the Second World War teaches us that: thanks to it, all the peoples of the world have finally won their political liberty.

However, we are quite aware that a planetary catastrophe might be entailed by nuclear war. But the fact remains that the violence which prevails in the world is particularly localized in the countries of the third world. Here I would venture to quote what my Foreign Minister said on 7 October last in the general debate in the General Assembly:

"The great Powers of this world should first of all renounce their policy of domination and hegemony which is at the basis of the incessant arms race, whose aim is eliminating the weaker States. It is no mere chance that all the conflicts and hotbeds of tension are located not within the spheres of the super-Powers or of the industrialized countries, but in the developing countries.

"It therefore appears clear that the true victims of the arms race are indeed the countries of the third world..." (A/PV.2259, p. 71)

Within the same context, we deplore the close military co-operation between certain NATO countries and the minority racist régime of South Africa. These imperialist countries are continuing a tragic and absurd situation which has changed that part of southern Africa into a veritable powder keg. This situation threatens international peace and security.

My Government is still in favour of genuine disarmament, the objective being, within the framework of a world conference, the total destruction of nuclear stockpiles. We are gratified by the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, whose task was to consider all views and suggestions put before it by Governments on the subject of convening a world disarmament conference. This work has been accomplished thanks to the exceptional intelligence and skill of Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Mikanagu, Burundi)

I should also like to express my delegation's gratitude to the Rapporteur of that Committee and the Chairman of its Working Group, Mr. Elias of Spain, for his tireless efforts.

The unbridled arms race and the accumulation of nuclear weapons by the super-Powers will prompt other nuclear Powers in their turn to equip themselves with comparable military power, while the non-nuclear Powers are going to try to acquire nuclear weapons in order to break the monopoly and to be able to rely on their own resources for the defence of their vital interests. Where will this get us? While these vast sums of money are being spent on armaments they could be used for the highly humanitarian cause of improving the well-being of all peoples and in particular the economic and social development of the third world.

That is why we remain convinced that the peoples of the world -- those of the nuclear Powers and those of the non-nuclear Powers -- will one day succeed in overthrowing the fascist, belligerent Governments whose short-sighted politicians are incapable of understanding the course of history.

What sufferings, what privations and sacrifices have been imposed upon these peoples while millions and millions of dollars are being swallowed up every day in the industries of death!

The Burundi delegation believes that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for creative purposes, for the development of economic progress and human well-being.

The implementation of the Declaration making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace is of concern to my delegation. The growing rivalry between the great Powers in the Indian Ocean is a grave threat to the Afro-Asian countries and to international peace and security.

My delegation also supports the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and South Asia. We are also in favour of Additional Protocols I and II of the Tlatelolco Treaty for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

(Mr. Mikanagu, Burundi)

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to tell you how encouraging it is for the Burundi delegation to see you conducting the proceedings of this important Committee. We are not at all surprised at the way in which you have so effectively been conducting our proceedings, because we have long known your competence, diplomatic skill and political flexibility.

I should like also to take this opportunity to convey our congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

It might have been noted that my delegation has failed to refer to several of the items on our agenda and we therefore reserve our right to speak again at a later stage when specific items are being examined.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Burundi for the kind words addressed to the officers of the Committee.

Mr. HYVÄRINEN (Finland): As delegations will recall, in my statement of 29 October I proposed, in the name of the Finnish Government, that a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-free zones in all its aspects be initiated. The Finnish delegation has been gratified by the positive response that proposal has received. Several speakers have commented favourably on it in their statements in this Committee. The response has been equally favourable in consultations which my delegation has conducted with a great number of other delegations, particularly those which have expressed a special interest in the question of nuclear-free zones. During those consultations a number of points have been made with regard to the drafting of an appropriate resolution. My delegation will deal with them in due course in connexion with the introduction of a draft resolution.

In its statement of 29 October, the Finnish delegation dealt exclusively with the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons -- a question of unequalled importance at this time. Today I should like to speak briefly on three questions: the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, chemical weapons and ecological warfare.

(Mr. Hyvarinen, Finland)

Our interest in CCD is well known. The Finnish Government has closely followed its work by dispatching, on a regular basis, special observers to Geneva. Furthermore, it has tried to make an active contribution to the disarmament efforts within the CCD. In the field of chemical weapons, for example, Finland has submitted to the Committee working papers on a project for the creation of a control capacity on a national basis for possible future international use. I shall come back to this particular question in a few minutes.*

* Mr. Siddiq (Afghanistan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Hyvärinen, Finland)

The Finnish Government continues to consider CCD the major organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations. Through the years, CCD has proved its usefulness by producing four important multilateral arms control agreements. At the same time, it has given impetus to other disarmament negotiations, notably the SALT talks. The regrettable fact that for the last three years CCD has not been able to report new treaties for the approval of the General Assembly is not due to any inherent weaknesses in its structure or working methods. It is due to differences in the substantive positions of the parties concerned. The Committee on Disarmament remains the best place to overcome those difficulties.

As from the beginning of next year, CCD will have five new members. This enlargement will bring a positive new element to CCD, while maintaining its basic balance and preserving its character of a negotiating body of manageable proportions.

We also note that CCD can expect an active, busy and, it is to be hoped, productive session next year. It will, however, remain the task of its members -- and particularly its major military Powers -- to translate those expectations and hopes into concrete progress. The work of CCD on chemical weapons has received new impetus through the Japanese draft convention, as well as through the declared intention of the two co-Chairmen to take a joint initiative in the same matter. It has been proposed, further, that CCD should deal at its next session with the new Soviet proposal concerning environmental warfare. We furthermore hope that the General Assembly will request CCD once more to make a renewed effort to find the right formula to induce the major Powers to accept a comprehensive test ban treaty.

On the question of chemical weapons, it may well be that next year will at last bring that breakthrough for which CCD itself has worked so intensively and which all of us have been expecting for the last three years. The makings are unquestionably there for an agreement on this question.

I referred earlier to the impetus which the work of CCD in the field of chemical weapons received from the Japanese draft convention on the subject. Once the joint initiative agreed upon by the United States and the USSR materializes, CCD will have an opportunity to enter into concrete negotiations with a view

(Mr. Hyvärinen, Finland)

to elaborating a draft treaty on the subject. We hope that the negotiating process will be initiated in all seriousness and that concrete progress can be registered at the next session of the Assembly.

I referred a moment ago to the effort of the Finnish Government to make a concrete and practical contribution to the work of CCD on chemical weapons. This has taken the form of a project on the creation, on a national basis, of a chemical weapon control capacity for possible future international use. Work on the project has now been continuing for three years and has progressed as planned. The Finnish Government has kept CCD continuously informed about the project by submitting detailed working papers on it. The latest of these is annexed to this year's report of the Committee on Disarmament.

The proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes -- one of the three new items on our disarmament agenda -- is both timely and important. The problems related to that question give rise to a few general remarks on the uses of advanced science and technology. The vast research and development effort for military purposes nourishes and maintains the qualitative arms race, and vice versa. This waste of human talent and expertise takes place at a time when all the energies and resources available should be channelled to serve constructive instead of destructive purposes. Yet, on the level of basic research the dividing line between the two is rather delicate. Many of its results may have both civilian and military applications.

Measures to influence the environment and climate are a case in point. Man has hoped that some processes of nature could be harnessed for human benefit -- as in the control of destructive natural phenomena like hurricanes, or in the discovery of means to induce rain in areas plagued by drought. Indeed, our Committee in its consideration of the outer space resolutions approved a request to the World Meteorological Organization.

"... to pursue actively the implementation of its tropical cyclone project, continuing and intensifying its other related action programmes, including the World Weather Watch, and, especially, the efforts being undertaken towards obtaining basic meteorological data and discovering ways and means to mitigate the harmful effects of tropical storms and to remove or minimize their destructive potential..."

(Mr. Hyvärinen, Finland)

Modest as the present achievements may be, the promises of new breakthroughs in science are great. Yet, these new inventions could, either now or in the foreseeable future, be utilized as methods of warfare to influence the climate and the environment destructively. The time has come, therefore, to act against that danger, however hypothetical. We agree that a pre-emptive action in this question is appropriate.

There is also concern that methods of warfare of this kind undermine the principles of existing international law. This has caused some Governments to take up the question of environmental war in the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, in order to include a prohibiting clause to the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention. That process is still under way.

The concern caused by the prospect of environmental war is shared by ecologists. They know that intentional efforts to destroy some elements of the fragile ecological systems, or efforts to manipulate the sensitive mechanisms of nature for destructive purposes, could have incalculable and irreparable consequences. That warning was strongly voiced only two years ago by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.

As the report of CCD tells us, the question of environmental warfare was touched upon by some delegations during the past session. The joint statement by the United States and the Soviet Union where the two countries expressed their desire to undertake

"... the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes..." (CCD/431, p. 8) has been widely acclaimed. We welcome the initiative taken to bring this important question to the attention of the General Assembly. We also endorse the idea of requesting CCD to discuss this issue and report back to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. We wish to stress the importance of including environmental experts in the deliberations of CCD on this question.*

* The Chairman returned to the Chair.

Mr. PENJOR (Bhutan): Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for calling on me even at this stage of our debate. My delegation also wishes to join previous speakers in congratulating you on your election as Chairman of this important political Committee. The bulk of the agenda is devoted to disarmament, and it is fitting that you should preside over the deliberations on a subject so familiar to you and in which you are well versed. You have already very ably demonstrated your capacity and experience in guiding the debate and harmonizing different viewpoints so that a widely acceptable pattern may emerge. I also offer our congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur. I asked to speak as I deemed it essential to express the views of my delegation on some of the items to which we attach importance. The Kingdom of Bhutan is a peace-loving State and we follow the developments on disarmament with keen interest.

The arms race -- nuclear and conventional -- on which astronomical sums of money are spent, frightens all mankind. Several previous speakers furnished full details of the rising expenditure and of the inventory of the arsenals of the super-Powers and that of the medium and small Powers as well. Although it is necessary to avoid repetition, yet, in order to highlight the dimension and magnitude of the fear which grips humanity, it is essential to mention again that as much as \$270 thousand million have been spent each year on armaments. Staggering as this amount is, it is no exaggeration to say that it has not benefited any person either in the developed or in the developing or poor countries. Vast additional sums of money are to be spent both on sophisticated conventional weapons to replace those made outmoded and obsolete, and on proliferation of nuclear weapons simultaneously with the improvement of the mechanics of the delivery system. If the development of new and more lethal weapons continues unabated, it will weaken the fragile fabric of the international order.

While a stable level of expenditure is to be preferred to a rising trend, the fact remains that an annual expenditure of some \$270 thousand million not only represents a colossal waste of resources but also permits the refinement and expansion of an already enormous capacity for destruction. Despite the well-intentioned levelling off in world military expenditure, the technological arms race -- the development of new and more lethal weapons -- continues unabated. In view of this, my delegation last year supported the reduction in military

(Mr. Penjor, Bhutan)

budgets in the hope that the production of destructive armaments could be minimized and that the developing countries would to that extent benefit. In spite of these efforts, certain nuclear-weapon Powers are unfortunately proceeding to accumulate deadly nuclear weapons. In the summary of the contents of the SIPRI Year Book, 1974, it is stated that world military expenditure is running at about \$207 thousand million per year, which is over 6 per cent of the gross national product of the world and equivalent to fully one-third of the combined output of the 2,000 million people living in the world's underdeveloped regions. The report goes on to say that the military expenditure of those countries which provide development aid is estimated to be approximately 6.7 per cent of their gross national product, which is nearly 30 times greater than the official development aid that they provide. The report notes that the transfer of resources from military to peaceful uses could significantly raise standards of living and promote faster growth.

The corner-stone of the United Nations Charter was laid "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind". It is due to a curious combination of circumstances that the present generation has not yet been annihilated by the nuclear holocaust, and we should indeed thank Almighty God for his mercy. To strengthen the steps towards disarmament, various proposals have been advanced in the recent past. We shall not advocate their rejection without carefully examining their import as well as the impact that they can make.

Nevertheless, being of serious concern to mankind, disarmament is taking on a new urgency. The present decade is for both disarmament and development, and they are of the greatest importance to the world community. It has been observed by many intellectuals that we have to learn to live with the bomb, as we are indeed doing every year. These remarks do not mean that we should be lulled into a complacent mood and that we should allow things to drift beyond control. At the same time, we should encourage new ideas and initiatives intended to accelerate the much needed development process, so that we do not leave the solution of the problem in the hands of a few.

(Mr. Penjor, Bhutan)

Some previous speakers characterized the progress made in the field of disarmament within the framework of the United Nations as halting and disappointingly slow. There is some justification, but we must recognize the complex nature of the subject. It is also evident from the report that the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is at a crawl, but the significant point is that the debate is proceeding and we believe that nothing should be done to stall this debate. The achievements of this Committee are by no means impressive, nor has its performance brought the world back from the brink of catastrophe and disaster. We therefore urge that, until other feasible arrangements are brought into existence, the Committee should continue with its work, intensifying its activities if necessary.

A comprehensive disarmament conference has become more urgent than ever. My delegation would welcome the holding of a world disarmament conference to create conditions under which real progress could be made. Such a conference might, in our opinion, strengthen the foundations for a lasting peace, which is the highest aspiration of mankind.

In this context we have read the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. We recognize that careful preparations should be made if the conference is to meet with success. The goal should be universal and complete disarmament. The conference should undoubtedly be universal in character. All the Member States, without exception, should whole-heartedly participate in it. The deliberations should take place in a free and cordial atmosphere. The issues should not be prejudged. Above all, there should be a pervading and complete trust among the participants. Then one can hope for a desirable outcome.

(Mr. Penjor, Bhutan)

Be that as it may, the trend towards détente and relaxation of international tensions appears to be holding. It is to be noted that small gains have resulted from this trend. The second stage of SALT is to be resumed soon. If and when a firm understanding is reached, it should, if possible, embrace the remaining nuclear weapon Powers so that the nuclear threat, hanging like the sword of Damocles, is banished forever. It is also hoped that the results of the mutual force reduction negotiations could bring significant consequences for nuclear policies.

My delegation regrets to note that progress towards outlawing chemical and biological weapons is very slow. This area, in the view of my delegation, offers a real opportunity for the Member States concerned to show a high level of statesmanship by reaching an agreement not to produce any chemical or biological weapons and to destroy those already in existence. It is realized that a quick result cannot be expected. However, keeping the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as the basis, a step-by-step approach, especially in the Committee on Disarmament, should yield worthwhile results. The use of napalm and other incendiaries in modern warfare is most untenable.

Another area to which Bhutan attaches great importance is the preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This question has been engaging the attention of the Assembly since 1971. The Secretary-General's factual statement of the effect of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean has been available, and we hope it has facilitated the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. My delegation fully recognizes that the Indian Ocean should be maintained as a zone of peace. If great Power rivalry is allowed to have its effect, it will affect the vital interests of all the littoral States; and acute and serious effects, such as to lead to political instability and social and economic miseries, will also be felt by the hinterland States.

In this regard we compliment Ambassador Amerasinghe for his relentless efforts as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. We read the report of the Ad Hoc Committee with interest. There is a great need for co-operation among the States of the Indian Ocean as envisaged in the Declaration.

(Mr. Penjor, Bhutan)

For this purpose it will also be essential to mention with clarity the littoral and hinterland States. We sincerely hope that the great Powers will co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions. Such co-operation would enhance the activities of the Committee immensely.

The question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones is also before us. We believe that all proposals deserve careful consideration. Bhutan has always felt that the highest priority ought to be accorded to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament with a view to promoting the cause of general and complete disarmament. In this connexion, the proposal of the representative of Finland that a comprehensive and analytical study of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones be undertaken deserves consideration. In fact, two nuclear-weapon-free zones are in existence now. Many delegations that have spoken so far seem to accept it in principle. Several previous speakers have also outlined certain criteria for the establishment of these zones. These criteria deserve careful examination and evaluation. The consensus appears to favour consultations first, amongst the States in the particular region, and an agreement before further action is initiated under the auspices of the United Nations. In this connexion, my delegation agrees with the views expressed by the representative of Bangladesh. In his statement before this Committee on 7 November 1974, he said:

... the countries of the region should consult among themselves about the desirability of such an idea Without a careful and thorough examination of these ... pertinent points, it would be unreasonable to expect a successful outcome.

...

"Let us ... approach the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an opportunity that would help to promote regional co-operation and not become a source of disruption." (2011th meeting, pages 11 and 12)

In conclusion, my delegation trusts that disarmament as a method of preserving international peace and security will be given the highest priority in our deliberations of the political issues confronting the world today, and we believe that through disarmament the economic and social development in the third world will be accelerated to bring about peace, progress and social justice for all.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Bhutan for his cordial congratulations.

Mr. RALPHUL (Mauritius): Sir, it is not out of sheer courtesy or protocol, but with profound sincerity, that I warmly congratulate you, distinguished colleague, on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of our most important Committee, namely, the Political and Security Committee of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. For many years now, I have had the privilege and honour of working closely alongside you in the interests of the world community. During that time, we have forged for ourselves, as well as for our respective countries, a strong bond of friendship, mainly under the banner of non-alignment. This in turn naturally led to the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between Mauritius and Argentina.

Earlier this year, together with other African brothers, I had the pleasure of visiting your great and proud country. I shall never forget the hour-long fruitful discussions we had with the legendary late President Perón, in the gracious presence of Señora Isabellà, then Vice-President, and aided by Señor Vignes, your distinguished and learned Minister of Foreign Affairs.

We pray that Argentina will continue to prosper in regained internal peace to become the most important granary of the world, certainly of the third world, thus contributing in an even more effective manner towards the strengthening of international security.

My delegation fully shares the view repeatedly expressed in this Committee, as well as in other gatherings, that a new course towards détente and co-operation has developed in international life as a consequence of the deep, on-going changes that have taken place in the world.

While welcoming the growing trend towards mutual understanding between States and peoples, and also towards the further expansion of international trade and economic, scientific, technological and cultural co-operation, we cannot help but notice that in spite of a marked relaxation of tension in recent years, particularly among the big Powers, the arms race continues unrestrained.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

The depressing picture of the world today, faced with a multiplicity of economic and social problems, contrasts sharply with the unrestricted waste of resources, both material and human, on arms.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

As the recent report by the Secretary-General on military budgets indicates, the world military expenditures in 1973 reached the enormous amount of \$275,000 million, a figure which, as was pointed out earlier by the representative of Mali, is larger than the combined estimated product of the developing countries of South Asia, the Far East and Africa combined, and much larger than that of Latin America. The upward spiral in world expenditures for military purposes contrasts both in size and in trend with the aid to developing countries. In total, the developed countries' appropriations for military purposes are some twenty times their appropriations for development aid.

Faced with the prospect of self-destruction and having to solve economic and social problems which are overwhelming, mankind has no choice, no sane alternative, but to start the long-awaited process of disarmament. Regardless of their size or their stage of development, all countries share the responsibility of taking steps which would help achieve this goal.

Thus, our participation in the debates on disarmament stems from our vital interest in world peace, in which a central place is held by the struggle for general disarmament that should allow the material and human resources to concentrate on economic and social development and on raising the welfare of its peoples.

Nuclear weapons constitute the most fearful category of armaments and they pose the greatest threat mankind now faces. We place great hope in international bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed at the prevention of a nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. This field should have priority over any other subject in international negotiations.

The non-proliferation Treaty reduced the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, and its universal acceptance is in the best interests of the world community. Although the non-proliferation Treaty is discriminatory against non-nuclear-weapon States, we should admit that, if fulfilled bona fide, the treaty could mean a corner-stone for the prevention of a nuclear war and for making available to mankind the great benefits atomic energy and technology are capable of. The Review Conference scheduled to take place in May 1975 should consider seriously the operation of the Treaty with a view to strengthening it in the interest of all countries.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

The prohibition of nuclear weapon testing is a traditional item on the First Committee's agenda. While agreeing that the 1963 partial test ban Treaty and the 1974 threshold Treaty constitute steps in the right direction, my Government continues to hold the strong view that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is urgently needed, particularly against the background of the series of nuclear tests, both in the atmosphere and underground, which we are still witnessing. The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in starting the motion towards this end.

The regional approach to disarmament has become an important element in the international search for security. Mauritius gave its support to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace when that Declaration was adopted three years ago. Together with the other countries bordering the Indian Ocean, we are deeply concerned that the competitive expansion of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean would lead to an increase of tension in the area, and we call upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing and strengthening their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean. Of particular concern to us littoral States of the Indian Ocean is the recent agreement announced in the British House of Commons on 5 February 1974, under the provisions of which the United States would establish support installations on the island of Diego Garcia for warships and aircraft. Any decision by the United Kingdom and the United States to extend communications and military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia would constitute a flagrant violation of the United Nations resolution on the subject. We appeal once again to those directly concerned, especially the United States of America, to reconsider their present policy, which certainly is conducive to the creation not of a zone of peace but rather of one of tension. The peoples of the countries of the Indian Ocean must be allowed to live in peace and security. Therefore Mauritius will continue to explore with others every possibility of maintaining peace in the area.

It is in that spirit that my country approaches also the initiatives regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. At this session of the General Assembly, this question is being dealt with under several agenda items. We support the creation of such zones whenever there is an agreement

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

in regard to them among the countries concerned. This presupposes, of course, prior consultation and agreement among all the States of those regions. Regrettably, that did not occur in the case of South Asia, as proved by the debates that have taken place so far.

We are living in an epoch which is characterized by revolutionary changes in science and technology. Unfortunately, the achievements of this revolution, because of the duality of their functions, are increasingly used in the military field. We cannot but fully subscribe to what our colleague from Ireland said in this Committee about the "tyranny of technique". Each major advance in military technology seems to impose its own domination and demands upon Governments, and as a result policies cease to be guided by rational political choice and become, instead, imperatives dictated by technical innovation.

Against this background, one should admit without hesitation the great merits of the initiative of the USSR regarding prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. The frightening picture of the real possibilities of putting into practice certain methods of environmental warfare presented by Ambassador Malik in his speech on 21 October makes it completely clear that we should act before the possibilities become realities. Our attention was drawn to the fact that a particular danger of geophysical warfare exists in the fact that the aggressor can secretly, without declaring war, for many years use some of the methods of such a war against its intended victim. Mauritius shares the concern expressed here by many speakers on the possibility of employing the forces of nature for purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, and had the privilege of co-sponsoring the draft resolution submitted by the USSR on this item as contained in document A/C.1/L.675.

There is unanimous recognition of the fact that the big Powers bear a special responsibility for the strengthening of peace and security in the world. We, the non-aligned, the small and medium-sized countries, are also aware of our responsibility to contribute to the forward march of contemporary

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

mankind on a new, progressive road. That is why we regard as extremely important the active participation of all countries in the debates on disarmament. The universalization of the disarmament talks could spur disarmament negotiations and facilitate the adoption of disarmament measures. With this conviction, Mauritius has fully supported the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference and would spare no effort to further promote this proposal at this session. We are of the opinion that a world disarmament conference should be adequately prepared and that participation in the conference should be universal, including the major military Powers.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

It is certainly true that the last few years have seen a proliferation of the bodies dealing with disarmament, both inside and outside the United Nations. But the increased activity has not led to the kind of effective action that is so urgently needed.

Among other things, we would have liked to see implemented General Assembly resolution 3093 A (XXVIII) on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries.

In concluding, I would like to pledge the entire co-operation of my delegation in making this session of the General Assembly a turning point in disarmament negotiations, a landmark in the United Nations efforts to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Ramphul of Mauritius very specially for the kind and moving words he addressed to me, to my country and its authorities. It is auspicious that he has addressed these words to me today when the Ambassador of Mauritius submitted his credentials in Buenos Aires, thus cementing the very close links existing between our two countries.

Mr. KASASA CINYANTA (Zaire) (interpretation from French):

Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted at this late hour to join with all those who congratulated you on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. May I also congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their brilliant election. As the speakers before me have said, I should like to express the hope that our work will be successful. I should also like to point out that diplomatic relations have very recently been established between your country and mine, and I feel sure that your country and mine will both promote their development.

(Mr. Kasasa Cinyanta, Zaire)

The delegation of Zaire in this First Committee has hesitated a long time before speaking on the various items on our agenda. Indeed, my delegation thought that all that could be said on (a) the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries (b) napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, (c) chemical and bacteriological weapons, (d) the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, (e) the world disarmament conference, (f) general and complete disarmament, (g) the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health -- all that could be said has been said by the eminent speakers who spoke before me.

So could I really add anything new? Perhaps an original approach to the presentation of these matters in the spirit of the statement made on 4 October 1973 by our President, Citizen Mobutu Sese Seko at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, who, referring to the policy of a return to authenticity, said:

"Thus strengthened by this experience, we believe that Zaire can now modestly show the world its own interpretation of problems that confront us all." (A/PV.2140, p. 51)

and this is what I intend to do very briefly.

Before proceeding any further, may I recall in our Committee a passage in the important statement by Citizen Mobutu Sese Seko at the General Assembly on environment and disarmament:

"I believe also that it is my duty to draw the attention of this August Assembly to the collective responsibility of the human race. All leaders are not responsible only to their own nationals but also to all their counterparts. Indeed, it is no longer enough to sweep the streets outside your own house to have done your proper duty; you also have to see if your neighbour has done the same as you and particularly if he is not passing over to you the dirt he is causing in his own household.

(Mr. Kasasa Cinyanta, Zaire)

"Now the whole world is talking of the disappearance of the human race because of the pollution in all environments. The misfortune in such cases is that we are witnessing a true inflation of texts and books which, in their desire to draw attention, in fact do the opposite.

"Without any doubt, it is a matter of prestige to possess the atomic bomb or even more the thermonuclear bomb, but to make it operational, and particularly to miniaturize it, you obviously have to carry out tests with it, and that is not always convenient. We condemn all nuclear tests wherever they may be and we do not condemn any one country more than another. In this particular area, we do not agree with the atomic countries which are asking all others to ratify the non-proliferation Treaty. For our part, we have ratified it with enthusiasm, but we do not manufacture bombs or even bullets. But the countries concerned are telling us every day about the invention of ever more sophisticated armaments. Now what is responsible about this?" (A/PV.2140, p. 76)

This is the crux of the matter. Where is the sense of responsibility of the international community and of those mainly responsible in this matter who, while very well aware of this terrible evil and its causes, refuse to meet it with effective remedies that they are also very well aware of? Indeed, whether it is a matter of napalm and other incendiary weapons, chemical or bacteriological weapons, nuclear weapons or, soon, meteorological weapons, the radical solution lies in their total elimination from our planet and the total and definitive commitment of all States in the world not to manufacture them any more. Therefore, we have to accept the idea of general and complete disarmament as advocated in the United Nations Charter in its Article 11, paragraph 1, as well as in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly.

But herein lies the difficulty because some do not wish to accept such disarmament accompanied by effective international control. Rather, the great military Powers impute ulterior motives to each other and each suspects the others of a lack of sincerity. Thus, for example, it will be said

(Mr. Kasasa Cinyanta, Zair

that it seems that the nuclear club wishes to reserve its right to arm and to over-arm. Or else, that a sound defence system is essential to intimidate the aggressor. Or, that we recognize that the world disarmament conference will play a useful role at the proper time, but we do not believe that such a conference could lead to useful results now or in the near future. Or even, that a particular threat resides in the fact that the aggressor can, over a long period, work secretly without declaring war and use some of the methods that I have referred to against his appointed victims, and so forth.

Thus, we ascertain that it is easier to manufacture weapons of excessive destructive potential than to part with them. We realize that the question is a complex one and that it has to be tackled by indirect means, which do not convince everybody: accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty; a conference to review this Treaty; the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council; prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health; the demilitarization of certain regions, and so on.

(Mr. Kasasa Cinyanta, Zaire)

But all these initiatives bypass the real problem: the imperious need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In referring to all these matters, my delegation wishes to place the problem in the context of Zaire's analysis of the problem of disarmament. Zaire is a party to the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation Treaty and will participate without doubt in the conference to review that Treaty as envisaged in 1975, as it has participated in the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, in the diplomatic conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict and in the Conference of governmental experts on weapons which can cause indiscriminate harm, which was recently held in Lucerne, Switzerland.

By its participation in all these conferences, and in those to come, Zaire wishes to demonstrate its loyalty to the Charter of the United Nations and to the international community. Zaire does not wish to side-step any initiative launched by the latter in its efforts to promote the cause of peace and international justice. That is why Zaire is pleased at its admission to the Committee on Disarmament, where it hopes to bring its authentic and creative imagination as well as its sincere and frank collaboration, free from any ulterior motives. May its innocent voice receive a sympathetic response in that Committee. In conclusion, I should like to thank all the representatives who voted in favour of the admission of Zaire to that Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Zaire for his cordial remarks concerning the officers of the Committee and for his reference to the relations that exist between our two countries.

I now call on the last speaker on my list in the general debate, the representative of Bahrain.

Mr. AL-KHALIFA (Bahrain) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, I should like to join the previous speakers in extending congratulations to you on the occasion of your election as Chairman of this Committee. Your excellent qualities as a prominent and experienced diplomat are clearly evidenced by your unanimous election as Chairman of the First Committee, and we are fully confident that under your wise guidance this Committee will be able to achieve fruitful and constructive results.

The United Nations, as a centre for co-ordinating international efforts, has contributed positively and effectively to the attainment of the objectives and principles embodied in the Charter which are aimed at safeguarding international peace, security and progress. However, despite the achievements of the United Nations, we find ourselves today facing grave conditions created by the absence of security, a situation which still faces humanity.

The continuation of the armaments race and the increase of expenditures on arms, which are intensified by the rapid consumption of stockpiles of weapons and the technological obsolescence of those weapons, has induced the big Powers to increase their spending on armaments and on attempts to improve the technological efficiency of those weapons. In other words, the consumption of stockpiled weapons plus their technological obsolescence have led to increased expenditures on armaments and to the improvement of their technological efficiency. This has resulted in a vicious circle which is difficult to break. That vicious circle cannot be broken unless the big Powers provide guarantees and just and permanent solutions.

The international community is facing a difficult task which calls for guarantees to limit the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and to put a halt to their production as well as efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, which would enable each country, whether large or small, to live in international peace and security.

(Mr. Al-Khalifa, Bahrain)

Therefore, my delegation believes that it is the duty of the international community, in suitable circumstances and in this era of détente, to discuss in a fruitful manner the question of disarmament and the need to consolidate international security, and to take action that would contribute to the elimination of tension and the solution of the economic crisis.

We believe that the solution of problems of disarmament and economic development are closely interrelated. Therefore, my delegation welcomes the important international conventions which have been concluded with a view to limiting armaments, particularly nuclear weapons.

Bahrain, as a small country, believes that economic development cannot be achieved unless stability and international security are guaranteed. Therefore, we have supported the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the appeal to maintain the Gulf area free from the competition of the big Powers and free from foreign interference in order to guarantee peace and stability in this sensitive region of the world. The area of the Indian Ocean consists of peace-loving peoples, and my delegation therefore supports the Declaration on this area as a zone of peace. At the same time, my delegation supports the creation of a nuclear-free area in that part of the world.

On this occasion my delegation would like to express its deep faith in the need to keep the Indian Ocean in general, and the Gulf area in particular, free from the rivalry and competition of the big Powers. Bahrain's support of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace stems from its deep faith in the need to spare the region and its people the sufferings of a destructive war that would not be in the interests of the region or of humanity at large.

References to the Indian Ocean region and the armaments race leads us to speak of the Iranian initiative concerning the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone. My delegation supports the important statement made here by Her Highness Princess Ashraf Pahlavi of Iran, which could pave the way to the desired goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Al-Khalifa, Bahrain)

Dealing with the Middle East region as a nuclear-free zone leads us also to refer to the attempts by Israel to acquire nuclear weapons. We call on the international community to exert pressure in order to prevent Israel from producing those weapons and to call on Israel to sign the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation Treaty.. My delegation supports the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone and hopes that this initiative will meet with the full support of the countries of the area and that it may lead to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, under effective international control.

The common aspirations of humanity for peace, security and progress in our age call for putting a speedy halt to the armaments race, particularly the nuclear armaments race. The adoption of immediate and effective measures to bring about general and complete disarmament would be likely to give a strong impetus to economic and social development, thus helping to achieve prosperity for the peoples of the world.

The question of disarmament cannot be solved by mere wishful thinking or by ineffective measures, but only by genuine and common efforts to solve this problem. The economic discrepancies are clearly manifested in our contemporary world between the advanced and the developing countries. The conditions of economic instability prevailing in the world cannot be removed in an atmosphere permeated with the nuclear armaments race. World public opinion attaches great importance to the achievement of disarmament. It is therefore incumbent on the Members of the United Nations to hasten to sign the agreements and conventions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to implement the resolutions on the cessation of nuclear tests. The technical resources used in the field of armaments could be directed to peaceful purposes so that mankind could benefit from them.

(Mr. Al-Khalifa, Bahrain)

In that connexion I cannot but thank Ambassador Hoveyda, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, for the efforts he has exerted, which have made it possible, despite the difficulties faced by the Committee, to achieve some progress.

My Government has on more than one occasion stated its opposition to the continuation of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and chemical weapons and has constantly called for the cessation of nuclear tests. The cessation of nuclear tests would, in my country's opinion, certainly contribute to a relaxation of international tension. It would also contribute to preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

Incendiary weapons have always been and still are the most horrible means of waging war. Their use has been rejected by the countries of the world, because they are contrary to human rights and human dignity. The bombardment of commando camps by Israel has had shocking and permanent consequences. My delegation thinks that the international community should spare no efforts to remove dangers of that kind.

Convinced of the harmful effects which actions designed to influence the environment and climate for military purposes can have for the present and future generations, my delegation thinks that the Soviet proposal for the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health -- the proposal to be found in document A/9702 and Corr.1 -- is indeed worthy of careful study.

I have made only a few observations on certain aspects of the problems facing the world today, in the hope that the international community will embark on a path that will take us away from the brink of a destructive war that we cannot afford.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Bahrain for the congratulations he extended to the officers of the Committee.

I now call on the representative of Sri Lanka.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): I am greatly beholden to you, Mr. Chairman, for the indulgence you have shown me in allowing me to speak at this late hour, despite the fact that I let you down once by inscribing my name on the list of speakers but not appearing. Had there been here a stock of those over-ripe vegetables which are often used against unpopular speakers, I am sure I would have been a victim of that form of attack today.

Having spoken in disarmament debates here during the past seven years, I cannot pretend that I have anything new to say, especially as nothing new has emerged from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

I thought I heard one speaker say that general and complete disarmament was in the interests of peace, chastity and liberty. I felt that the first and the second were quite compatible with each other, but not the second and the third. It was only later that I realized that, under the pressure of oratory, my sense of hearing was being steadily impaired and that the speaker had referred not to chastity but to justice. I must confess I was greatly relieved.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has no reason whatsoever to congratulate itself on its performance. It has only one achievement to its credit: it has added to its numbers. I congratulate the new members of the Committee on their admission to that very exclusive club. I hope their presence at least will help the Committee to change its ways and to produce better results. If the trend of the past few years continues, we may soon find the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament consisting of the entire membership of the United Nations, with the exception of two nuclear Powers.

When it comes to disarmament, the excuse is given that there has been no agreement on verification procedures and that therefore you cannot disarm. When it comes to a reduction of military expenditure and the diversion of a percentage of the resources thus saved to development, the excuse is that there is no agreed definition of what constitutes military expenditure. So that at every turn we find those who are chiefly responsible for the present state of affairs very solemnly and piously declaring their interest in disarmament and the reduction of military expenditures, but always finding some

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

excuse for not proceeding towards the fulfilment of that goal. The proposal must therefore remain purely academic in character and consequences.

How much more practical it would be if those whose military strength is phenomenally superior to that of others were to set an example by making at least a slight reduction in their military budgets. That would be a real earnest of their good faith.

In my delegation's opinion, it is not by reducing military expenditures that we reduce armaments. There is, I fear, a pathetic fallacy in that argument. It is by reducing armaments that we are more likely to reduce expenditure.

Every year some new item is introduced into this debate, in order, it would appear, to introduce some oxygen into the rarefied atmosphere. Like the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their continued sophistication and refinement, so every year a new item is inscribed on the agenda -- lest we forget, lest we forget. This year the Soviet Union has introduced a new item: "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health".

I must confess that I was terribly alarmed by the revelations made by the Soviet representative in his statement introducing that item. I have an uneasy feeling that this type of radioactivity has already had its adverse effects. I have no other explanation for the frenetic competition that is now going on in regard to the refinement of nuclear weapon systems to proportions capable of annihilating several planets the size of planet Earth. That does not, however, detract in the least from the credit the Soviet Union deserves for having brought this matter to our attention. The item merits consideration, but I think that the remedy is in the hands of those who do conduct these tests and do create this menace to life and to mental stability among human beings.

This year some concern has been expressed over nuclear testing for peaceful purposes. This is admittedly a delicate and controversial problem.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

It is easy to condemn such tests; it is equally easy to sympathize with those who conduct them. The representative of India, in his statement this afternoon, said that they were not prepared to wait for others to perfect nuclear explosion technology and thereby cause a lag of a decade or more in its development in India. He pointed out that the experiments in nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes:

"... have been oriented towards gas and oil stimulation, and have shown promising results and are even reported to have increased oil production by 30 to 60 per cent." (supra, p. 21)

The question we must ask ourselves is whether countries which do not have this technology at their disposal are to be precluded from conducting tests in order to acquire such technology, or must be dependent on the charity and good will of those who possess this technology for the transfer of such technology, which might result in the entry of a new competitor in all fields in which such technology offers the promise of profitable exploitation of a natural resource. This is an aspect of the matter that deserves special attention and that must be examined dispassionately.

In our opinion -- the opinion we have consistently held -- it is the duty of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to concentrate on the real programme of general and complete disarmament, without allowing its attention to be distracted by other matters which are only the side effects of nuclear explosions and the development of nuclear technology. These are, as we have said, a comprehensive test ban treaty, the complete cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the categorical renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons for warlike purposes and the dismantling of nuclear arsenals. The total prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of all such stockpiles should be an additional step in this process of eliminating the possibility of the use of those devastating forms of warfare. As a first step, as I have also previously stated, there must be universal adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

These are some of the thoughts I wished to offer on the subject. They are by no means new, and I make no apology for repeating them. I must thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this Committee once again for the indulgence they have shown in listening to me at this late stage.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Tomorrow, we shall begin consideration of and voting on specific draft resolutions under this item. I would accordingly urge those delegations which for days have been preparing draft resolutions, and which therefore deserve the gratitude of the Committee, to submit them as soon as possible so that they can be translated into all languages and circulated to delegations for their consideration. I would venture to ask those delegations which already have texts ready, but are still waiting for co-sponsors, to submit those texts, because co-sponsors will be added as the proposals are examined.

I would also ask delegations which have already come to a conclusion on draft resolutions that we already have before us, or that will be circulated shortly, to put their names down on the list as soon as possible to speak on the items of interest to them. This request is addressed in particular to members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is not based in New York, who wish to return home as soon as possible. The request is addressed to all other delegations as well, of course.

I think that the best way to proceed in the discussion of specific proposals is for delegations that speak to refer in the course of their statements to one or more draft resolutions, so that they will not have to take the floor repeatedly to refer to various draft resolutions. A single statement will then cover all comments by delegations on matters of interest to them. The interest of the Chair is to make maximum use of our time by acting with flexibility, that is, by permitting the broadest possible exchange of views. But whenever there are no speakers and whenever we have time to do so, we can vote on those draft resolutions which are not controversial. Thus we shall dispose of those drafts quickly and can continue with our consideration of those that require more comments.

Naturally, when we come to vote on items on the agenda on which there are two or more draft resolutions, we shall abide strictly by the rules and put the draft resolutions to the vote in the order in which they are submitted. For instance -- and it is not because Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, who introduced this draft this morning, is here -- I believe that the draft resolution on the Indian Ocean should not give rise to too many difficulties and if, tomorrow afternoon, we do not have enough speakers to fill the three hours allotted to us, we could vote on that draft resolution, contained in addendum 29 to document A/9629.

(The Chairman)

Tomorrow we shall meet only in the afternoon, and on Friday only in the morning.

I would urge delegations to use the free time tomorrow morning to prepare their statements.

I should like to remind the Committee that the deadline for consideration of and voting on proposals is 22 November, and that I shall do all I can to adhere strictly to that date.

I thank the Committee for its co-operation during the general debate.

Before adjourning, I should like to announce that at tomorrow's plenary meeting of the General Assembly the report on outer space will be dealt with.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.



UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



PROVISIONAL

A/C.1/PV.2017
12 November 1974

ENGLISH

Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 12 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS

(Argentina)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries [24] (continued)
- (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [27] (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [28] (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [29] (continued)

/...

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 13 NOVEMBER 1974, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 18 NOVEMBER 1974.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

74-71186/A

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General [30] (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean [31] (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference [34] (continued)
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [35] (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) [100] (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East [101] (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health [103] (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia [107] (continued)

AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103, 107 (continued)

REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY BUDGETS OF STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 10 PER CENT AND UTILIZATION OF PART OF THE FUNDS THUS SAVED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (A/9565, A/9713, A/9770, A/9800)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708; A/C.1/L.683)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3079 (XXVIII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLAHELLOCO):

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9713, A/9797; A/C.1/L.685)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE:

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (A/9535, A/9629 and Addendum)

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9698, A/9708; A/C.1/L.684, L.688)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLAHELLOCO)

(A/9692; A/C.1/L.686)

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

(A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): It is my impression that we shall have a very short meeting today, since there are no names on the list of speakers.

It had been my firm intention to put to the vote today, so as to gain time, the draft resolution in the addendum to document A/9629, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. However, some delegations have expressed the wish that no vote be taken yet on that draft resolution. That being so, we shall postpone the vote on it. But may I once again draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that there are only 14 meetings left before 22 November. After this very brief meeting, only 13 meetings will be left for these items. The number of meetings cannot be increased, since I intend scrupulously to abide by the deadlines on which we have agreed. Accordingly, I would once again request that draft resolutions now being negotiated be officially submitted and introduced to the Committee as quickly as possible.

Since it seems that what I said yesterday was not sufficiently explicit, I should like to make a clarification. Any delegation may speak in the course of these meetings in reference to any of the draft resolutions that have been submitted to the First Committee on the disarmament items.

Since there would be only one speaker at the meeting scheduled for tomorrow morning namely, the representative of Pakistan, I think that if his delegation has no objection we could transfer his name to the list of speakers for tomorrow afternoon and cancel the meeting scheduled for tomorrow morning. If the delegation of Pakistan has no objection, and I see the representative of Pakistan is graciously indicating that it has none, we shall meet only once tomorrow, in the afternoon.

The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675, on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, under agenda item 103, have indicated that they would be prepared for the Committee to proceed to the vote on that draft on the afternoon of Thursday, 14 November. Since the sponsors have made that request, I should like to advise the members of the Committee that, in order to make full use of our time, on Thursday afternoon we shall proceed to vote on that draft, to which many delegations have referred in the course of the general debate.

(The Chairman)

As I understand it, at tomorrow afternoon's meeting the representative of Mexico will introduce the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.685 and L.686, both of which refer to the Tlatelolco Treaty though they differ from each other. That delegation has also stated that it would have no objection if the Committee were to proceed to vote on those drafts after the respective introductions have been made. I wanted to inform the Committee of that, so that it could be ready to vote on those two draft resolutions, either tomorrow afternoon or on Thursday.

May I also ask the delegation of New Zealand, which is representing the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683, on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, whether there would be any objection to our proceeding to a vote on that draft, either tomorrow or on Thursday?

Mr. CRAW (New Zealand): So far as my delegation is concerned, there would be no objection. I cannot speak for all the sponsors, but I should be happy to see the draft put to the vote. There are, presumably, so many other draft resolutions coming up that it would be good to dispose of the one in document A/C.1/L.683. That would suit us.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Unless any of the sponsors of the draft resolution expresses a contrary view, then I shall also take it that, in principle, we would be able to vote on this draft resolution, too, either tomorrow afternoon or on Thursday afternoon. This then would be the working plan, in principle, which I submit to the First Committee. Of course, I would be very willing to hear any comments so as to organize our work as best we can.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, we are very sympathetic about your problems and we want to do all we can to expedite the matters in this Committee. I have a slight problem with regard to the possibility of a vote on environmental modification taking place on Thursday. I should like to reserve our right to request the Chair tomorrow to postpone that vote until a later date if we have been unable to get proper instructions by that time.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The right to request a postponement is a right which every delegation has, but could I ask the representative of the United States if he could indicate any set date when he might proceed to the vote, because this draft resolution, it so happens, was the first that was submitted to the First Committee and it was submitted a long time ago. Given the speed of communications between New York and Washington, we really do not believe that, in principle, there should be any major impediments to his receiving instructions.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Let me say that it is not always the speed of communications between New York and Washington which is determinative in these matters. We may possibly be prepared to vote on Thursday. I am not saying that we will not be. But I do think, quite frankly, that we do have to take very recent developments into account and that we have to make decisions as to what our actions will be. I merely raise this point because I did not want to mislead the Chair into thinking that we were unconditionally acquiescing in the choice of Thursday at this point.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): May I take the liberty of suggesting, in as friendly a way as possible, that the representative of the United States inform his authorities that it is the wish of the First Committee to carry out our work as effectively as possible. So that, if there is no major obstacle, it would be very useful if we could vote on Thursday afternoon; and I await the reply of the representative of the United States tomorrow.

Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, I also propose, subject to your approval, to submit on behalf of your great country, India, Liberia, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and Zaire, a draft resolution on the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade. I wonder whether you could accommodate us in your time-table for tomorrow afternoon or Thursday morning?

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If the delegation of Nigeria, on behalf of the sponsors, was prepared to introduce that draft resolution tomorrow afternoon, I think this would be most helpful in assisting us to make more use of our time.

Are there any other comments on the tentative ideas which I have put before the Committee?

Mr. YANGO (Philippines): Mr. Chairman, I am sorry if I came in a little bit late and you were already speaking when I came in. Please correct me if I am wrong, but my understanding is that you propose to have voting next Thursday on draft resolution A/C.1/L.675. If that is the situation, I should just like to say that my delegation is in the process of consulting with other delegations concerning some amendments which we should like to propose to this draft resolution. If those consultations reach their conclusions today or tomorrow, we will formally present those amendments. We hope that we shall be able to co-operate with you with regard to the vote on the draft resolution on Thursday afternoon; but if not, my delegation would appreciate it if it could be postponed to some later date. We will try our best to conclude our consultations so as to be able to present our amendments in time for your schedule.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Philippines for his co-operation and, if any delegation wishes to introduce amendments to this draft or to any other draft, I would urge them to do so as soon as possible, because amendments, in accordance with the rules of procedure, should be circulated 24 hours before the vote on the draft resolution in question. So, if there are any amendments, the sooner they can be presented the better it will be for our work.

Accordingly, to sum up, I will repeat that it would be a very good idea for those delegations which wish to make comments on draft resolutions that have been officially circulated and properly presented to the Committee, to put their names down as soon as possible for this purpose. I repeat, too, just in case it was not made sufficiently clear, that in their statements delegations may refer to one or more draft resolutions.

With reference to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675, in principle, we agree that it can be put to the vote on Thursday afternoon, unless those delegations which have expressed a desire for a possible postponement insist on having it. In any case, I want to make it clear that the postponement cannot be for too long.

If there is no objection, and this is the wish of the sponsors, we could vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.683, A/C.1/L.685 and A/C.1/L.686 either tomorrow afternoon or perhaps at the latest on Thursday afternoon.

If there are no further comments, the meeting is adjourned until tomorrow at 3 p.m.

The meeting rost at 3.50 p.m.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
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PROVISIONAL

A/C.1/PV.2018
13 November 1974

ENGLISH

Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 13 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic)
(Vice-Chairman)
later: Mr. CRTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
(Chairman)
Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued)
- (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued) /...

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 14 NOVEMBER 1974, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 19 NOVEMBER 1974.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)

AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103, 107 (continued)

REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY BUDGETS OF STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 10 PER CENT AND UTILIZATION OF PART OF THE FUNDS THUS SAVED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (A/9565, A/9713, A/9770, A/9800)

(a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS;

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9726)

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9708)

URGENT NEED FOR CESSATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9593, A/9650, A/9698, A/9708; A/C.1/L.683)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3079 (XXVIII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO):

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9718, A/9797; A/C.1/L.685)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE:

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (A/9585, A/9629 and Addendum; A/C.1/L.689)

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/9590, A/9628, A/9636)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9698, A/9708; A/C.1/L.684, L.687, L.688, L.690)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2286 (XXII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO) (A/9692; A/C.1/L.686).

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (A/9693 and Add.1-3)

PROHIBITION OF ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE FOR MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH (A/9702 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.675)

DECLARATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA (A/9706)

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the decision of the Committee, we come now to the discussion on the draft resolutions. I now call on Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico to introduce a draft resolution.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is my honour formally to submit to the Committee the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.685, sponsored by 19 Latin American delegations -- in other words, by the 18 member States of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and an additional State which, having already signed and ratified the instrument, only needs to take advantage of the waiver provided for in article 28 to become a member -- and I should like to begin by emphasizing the two items referred to in the preamble of the draft resolution.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

First, the fact that since 1967 six resolutions have already been adopted by the Assembly in which that representative organ of the international community has ever more insistently urged the States possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- which, as is known, implies for the States doing so only three commitments which, as stated in resolution 2666 (XXV), of 7 December 1970 -- and I quote the terms of that resolution:

"are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations, which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter" (General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV)).

Those commitments are as follows:

"(a) To respect, in all its express aims and provisions, the statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

"(b) Not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies,

"(c) Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties of the Treaty" (ibid.);

Secondly, as the Assembly has constantly maintained since 1970 -- and here I quote once again the terms of the Assembly resolution:

"for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and ... such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol" (ibid.).*

The operative part of the joint draft resolution also has basically two objectives, besides that of ensuring, as is done in operative paragraph 3, the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth Assembly session of a topic that would permit assessment of the implementation of the resolution to be adopted at this present session.

* The Chairman took the Chair.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The first of these two basic objectives is to enable the Assembly to record its satisfaction at the fact that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- a Protocol which, as will be recalled, came into effect for the United Kingdom and for the United States in 1969 and 1971 respectively -- has come into effect in 1974 for France and for the People's Republic of China, the Governments of which deposited their respective instruments of ratification on 22 March and 12 June last, respectively.

The second objective is again to urge the Soviet Union -- the only one of the five nuclear-weapon States which has yet to heed the appeals of the General Assembly -- appeals it has been addressing to them for six years now -- to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The sponsors of the draft resolution cannot understand the refusal of the Soviet Union to listen to the repeated appeals of the most representative body of the United Nations -- a refusal which has resulted in what appears to us to be a position of total isolation in this connexion. We find this attitude even more inexplicable and untenable when account is taken of the fact that, of the five so-called nuclear Powers to which General Assembly resolutions have been addressed, the Soviet Union is the State which has most frequently expressed its unreserved support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nor should it be forgotten that it was precisely the Soviet Government which, through no less a person than the President of its Council of Ministers, Mr. Kosygin, solemnly proclaimed in 1966 -- as can be seen on page 3 of the document of the Disarmament Committee ENDC/167 -- its willingness to undertake not to use nuclear weapons:

"... against non-nuclear States ... which have no nuclear weapons in their territory" (ENDC/167, p. 3).

This is a requirement which, as is well known, is with which all the States Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco strictly comply.

The Soviet Government also declared itself:

"prepared to assume an obligation to respect the status of any denuclearized zones which may be established" (Ibid.),

on the sole condition that "other nuclear Powers" commit themselves to work in the same direction, a condition which has already been fully complied with, as demonstrated by operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The arguments adduced by the Soviet Union, whether in the Geneva Disarmament Committee or in this First Committee, in an attempt to justify its negative attitude, and those alluded to in the brief communication of 9 July 1974 sent by its Permanent Representative to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, circulated in document A/9797 of 10 October last, do not stand the test of even the most summary analysis made by an impartial observer.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I am convinced that by demonstrating this in detail, and in breadth as well, in a statement which I made at the 1889th meeting of the First Committee held on 10 November 1972 -- which can easily be referred to in the official records -- it is not necessary for me to repeat today the incontrovertible facts which I felt necessary to state at that time.

The delegations of Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico trust that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.685 which I have had the honour to present, will receive, in view of the circumstances described in it and the meaning and scope of what I have tried to put forward in this statement, even more votes in favour than has occurred on earlier occasions with regard to similar draft resolutions.

Mr. KOOIJMANS (Netherlands): It is a great pleasure for me to be able to introduce, on behalf of the co-sponsors, draft resolution A/C.1/L.690. The subject of the draft resolution is the problem of horizontal and vertical proliferation and the interrelationship of peaceful nuclear explosions with such proliferation.

Before entering into greater detail, I should like to emphasize that the draft resolution is the result of a collective effort by a number of countries. The draft resolution constitutes a combination of ideas developed in the course of this year in several capitals and brought together during intense consultations here in New York and elsewhere. In this respect, I should like to mention in particular the essential role which the delegations of Japan, Canada and Sweden, among others, have played in the formulation of the draft now submitted.

It is clear that the question of non-proliferation in a broad sense is in the forefront of our thoughts this year. I only have to refer to the many items on our agenda on this subject and to the numerous statements we heard in the course of the debates. Several reasons can be indicated for this concern. The ongoing quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race between

(Mr. Kooijmans, Netherlands)

the main Powers cast a shadow on our efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament. The coming Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reminds us that many hopes in respect of this Treaty have not yet been fulfilled. How to deal with the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions is a new challenge we have to face. Our draft resolution must be considered as a contribution -- in the view of the sponsors an essential one -- to the policy of the prevention of vertical and horizontal proliferation.

The draft resolution deals with two closely interrelated subjects. First of all, it addresses itself to the problem of horizontal and vertical proliferation in general. Secondly, it highlights the steps to be taken on the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions so as to counter the possible risks which such explosions can pose for the achievement of an effective system of control of nuclear weapons.

Perhaps this is the moment to comment on a remark made by the representative of India at the beginning of this week. He said that some delegations took the nuclear arms race for granted and seemed to imagine that if restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were placed, the fundamental problems of the nuclear arms race and nuclear weapon testing would be solved. Frankly, I do not know which delegations Ambassador Mishra had in mind. In any case, the co-sponsors certainly do not belong to those, since they are all fully convinced that the ongoing nuclear arms race is a threat to mankind. This found its expression clearly in the text of the resolution and, inter alia, in other resolutions before this Committee.

Of course, there are many other aspects of proliferation. Some of these are dealt with in other draft resolutions under several items on our agenda. I may refer to the draft resolution on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and to the proposals on denuclearized zones. In our draft resolution we ask in particular your attention for the problems connected with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Since the text of the draft in document A/C.1/L.690 is quite self-explanatory, I shall only briefly touch on certain paragraphs.

(Mr. Kooijmans, Netherlands)

The third preambular paragraph sets out our basic considerations. In this paragraph it is recognized that both the acceleration of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons is extremely dangerous to mankind.

In the fifth preambular paragraph we have explicitly stated that an effective comprehensive test ban, although it deals with only one part of the problem, is an essential prerequisite to stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The sixth to tenth preambular paragraphs make it clear why international arrangements have to be developed for the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions. If peaceful nuclear explosions are a worthwhile goal, which we still have to find out, all people in the world have the right to benefit from these. Since it is, however, not yet proven that it is possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for peaceful nuclear explosions, there is a need to devise a system that peaceful nuclear explosions cannot be misused for weapons development and nuclear armament.

The ninth preambular paragraph underlines that also in other aspects the dissemination of nuclear know-how and materials is a potential danger for mankind, as was so eloquently described by Senator Symington at the beginning of our debate this year.

The last preambular paragraph notes the view of the Secretary-General that the time is ripe to consider the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in an international context.

The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution can be divided into two parts. The first operative paragraph appeals to all States, and of course in particular to nuclear weapon States which bear a special responsibility for the security of mankind, to work hard on all possible steps to stop vertical and horizontal proliferation. This includes the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, activities in the United Nations, including the Security Council, and all other bodies where it is appropriate to tackle certain questions.

Operative paragraphs 2 to 5 deal with the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. We think that, before the world community will be in a position to decide on the future of such explosions, certain questions must first be dealt with in the appropriate competent bodies.

First of all, in operative paragraph 2 we ask the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to continue its technical studies on many aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. Members may be aware of the excellent work the Agency has already done in this field. I might also recall the recent decision of the Board of Governors of IAEA to establish within the secretariat a separate organizational unit for services related to peaceful nuclear explosions when the number and nature of requests for peaceful nuclear explosions indicate the need for this.

Secondly, in operative paragraph 3 the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) is asked to study the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. As I pointed out at length in my statement on Friday of last week, CCD should study, inter alia, the possible risk that peaceful nuclear explosions could be used to disguise nuclear-weapon tests. Especially in the context of a test ban, such a risk would be detrimental to peace and security, and we must study carefully how this can be avoided.

In this context, I may say that I did not quite understand why the representative of Brazil thought it improper for CCD to study certain aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. In the view of the sponsors, CCD, as an arms-control and disarmament body, is the most appropriate organ to study the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Thirdly, in the draft resolution the General Assembly expresses the hope that the non-proliferation Treaty review conference will carefully consider the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

All the above-mentioned bodies -- IAEA, CCD and the non-proliferation Treaty review conference -- are requested to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session. Thus next year all lines on the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions will come together in our world Organization. In operative paragraph 5 the Secretary-General is invited, if he should wish to do so, to present his own views on the question, taking into account the reports submitted to the Assembly. In any case, the General Assembly at its thirtieth session will have before it reports on all the problems in this

area and, it is hoped, many suggestions for solutions, so that it can decide in all freedom what should be the next steps with regard to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. This seems to us the most clear and simple way of handling this problem.

On behalf of the sponsors, representing all regions of the world, I highly recommend this draft resolution to the Committee. I am pleased to announce that Costa Rica has just become a sponsor of our draft. Of course, other sponsors would be welcomed.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With regard to the last sentence of the representative of the Netherlands' statement indicating that new co-sponsors are welcome, I think I should mention that Finland has also been added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.690).

Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): It is a great honour and privilege for me to introduce on behalf of the sponsors -- namely, Mr. Chairman, your great country, Argentina, Ghana, India, Liberia, Mexico, my own country, Nigeria, of course, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire -- the draft resolution on an item entitled "Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade" in document A/C.1/L.687 of 12 November 1974. It is a simple procedural draft resolution which calls for no additional obligation or burden to be assumed by Member States. It carries no financial implications or consequences beyond the very minimum required in routine reporting to the General Assembly on an ongoing activity. It envisages no special meetings or conferences. It is not polemical. It is not directed at or against any Power. It only aims at strengthening our acceptance of general and complete disarmament as a goal of the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, when you were kind enough to call on me to speak during the general debate on our 12 agenda items on disarmament I echoed the regret of many delegations at the folly of nations' spending human and material resources which are urgently needed for economic and social development on purposes that could only lead to mankind's own destruction, on arms they dare not use against each other. I also sought to draw attention to the moral bankruptcy of world Powers which have the responsibility under the

the Charter of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security and which at the same time amass nuclear weapons which threaten that very international peace and security.

When recalling the numerous resolutions and declarations of the United Nations aimed at promoting "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources", two resolutions come quickly to mind. The first deals with the Development Decades: the other relates to the Disarmament Decade. The link between the two ideas, besides being enshrined in Article 26 of our Charter, was stressed by our former Secretary-General, the much respected U Thant, when he said in his introduction to his annual report on the work of the United Nations for 1968-1969 that:

"The diversion of enormous resources and energy, both human and physical, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to unproductive and uneconomic military purposes was an important factor in the failure to make greater progress in the advancement of the developing countries during the First United Nations Development Decade.

"The world now stands at a most critical crossroads. It can pursue the arms race at a terrible price to the security and progress of the peoples of the world, or it can move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that was set in 1959 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the eve of the decade of the 1960s.

"If it should choose the latter road", U Thant continued, "the security, the economic well-being and the progress not only of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries and of the entire world, would be tremendously enhanced." (A/7601/Add.1, paras. 40-

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

Those were wise words. They were prophetic. They offered a challenge. They led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, which declared the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. That resolution is referred to in the first preambular paragraph of our draft resolution, which is before the Committee, as our frame of reference. That resolution called upon Governments to intensify their concerted efforts regarding effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Since the adoption of that resolution, we have received about five annual reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It was propitious that the Disarmament Decade was proclaimed at a time when the membership of the Committee was enlarged from 18 to 26 by the well-deserved addition of Argentina -- your great country, Mr. Chairman -- and Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. The reasons for that enlargement are well known. By next year, the membership of the Committee will have again risen by the timely and necessary addition of Iran, Peru, Zaire, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. In effect, each enlargement is an historic landmark in the life of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in our appreciation of its vitally important work. It will be helpful, therefore to pause, to reflect, to take stock, to plan and to assess the achievements so far attained in the field of disarmament. Mid-way through the Disarmament Decade seems to us, the sponsors of the draft resolution, to be the right and proper time to do so.

Proceeding from the reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament referred to in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution to the third preambular paragraph, which emphasizes the grave dangers involved in the continuing development of new nuclear weapons through a spiralling nuclear arms race and proliferation of nuclear weapons, is not only logical but equally portentous. Every speaker in the general debate of this Committee has unfailingly remarked that technically there already exists

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

an explosion of nuclear activity in the world, and that the hands of the doomsday clock must be turned back before it is too late.

The fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is self-evident. Both developed and developing countries are haunted by the fear of nuclear warfare. They are overburdened by inflation. Rumours of recession, of mass unemployment, of great human suffering, are in the air. Indeed, when a non-productive activity of States -- I am referring to armament -- consumes more than \$270,000 million annually at the same time the United Nations Food Conference is wrestling frantically with the crisis of hunger and malnutrition, a crisis threatening millions in large sectors of the globe, a crisis that can be wiped out by the reallocation of a small percentage, a mere 5 per cent, of the armaments budget, the time has come to work earnestly for a generation of peace and less and less for new generations of nuclear weapons.

I have already spoken of the link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade referred to in the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. It is our responsibility and our resolve to work continuously to bring about a substantial improvement in the lot of mankind. Thanks to the initiative of Romania, we are now more familiar with the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures as revealed in the Secretary-General's report (A/8469). There is obviously a correlation in the deliberate allotment of available resources between armament and sustained economic growth. It is no accident that the 1970s have been designated as both the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade. The strategy for the latter recognized that the success of international development activities will depend in large measure on improvement in the general international situation, particularly on concrete progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. My delegation's conviction, which is shared by others, that there is a shocking discrepancy -- a fact highlighted by the Alva Myrdal report (ST/ECA/174) -- between international expenditure on armaments and international expenditure on aid to the developing countries enabled us to support the Soviet initiative on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. I am, of course, referring to item 24 of our agenda.

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

The four operative paragraphs of our draft resolution need no explanation. They are clear and specific. The purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade are to secure peace and security in the world -- peace and security which, like development, are indivisible. Operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 envisaged that the United Nations and its Member States would mobilize world public opinion against the nuclear arms race by reiterating the dangers to all mankind of nuclear weapons, by stressing that general and complete disarmament would benefit present and future generations economically, socially and culturally. Needless to say, public outcries against atmospheric nuclear tests contributed more to the partial test ban Treaty than a conviction on the part of the super-Powers that the Treaty was a necessary step towards nuclear disarmament. If public opinion can be aroused in favour of both disarmament and development, we may move some way towards achievement of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade. Hence operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution.

Operative paragraph 3 is only of a reportorial nature. Since we are all for disarmament, just as we are all for love and weight-watching, let us inform ourselves more clearly on what progress each and every one of us is making or has made in the field of disarmament.

Operative paragraph 4 must be seen in the context of the calendar of the United Nations for next year. Coming, as we do, from a developing country, the age of 30 is of immense significance to us. It is almost a lifetime. And so, as we approach the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations next year, we see the proposed mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade in the light of the projected special session of the General Assembly to be devoted to development and international economic co-operation. We see it in the light of the mid-term review of the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade. By having on the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade", we shall be able to focus closer attention on the twin problems of disarmament and development and thereby forge a common rubric to cover them both.

Before I end, it is my honour and great privilege to announce that Brazil has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): If I venture to request to speak a second time, I am doing so because I thought the Chair would consider this request as a demonstration of co-operation to expedite the work of the Committee.

I have the honour to act on this occasion as spokesman of the 19 Latin American delegations sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.686, namely, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico.

This draft is designed to assess the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) with regard to the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

In that resolution, as will be recalled, the Assembly stated, among other things, that that Treaty -- the complete text of which, together with those of its two additional protocols, can be consulted in the First Committee's document A/C.1/946, dated 3 October 1967:

"... constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security ..." (General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII), para. 1).

That the Assembly's judgement was correct is proved by the fact, mentioned in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, that as a result of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which 18 sovereign States are already parties, there exists in Latin America a zone of increasing extent and population in which the total absence of nuclear weapons is enforced and which at present comprises some 8 million square kilometres with a population of approximately 150 million inhabitants.

Since the Treaty, as is stipulated in article 25, is only open to signature by the sovereign States specified therein and that within its zone of application there are certain territories which are not sovereign political entities, it was deemed necessary that an additional protocol be annexed to the basic Treaty, Additional Protocol I, to which States which de jure or de facto have international responsibility for such territories, can be parties, and which the Assembly itself, in resolution 2286 (XXII), urged:

"... to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application ..." (ibid., para. 3).

The importance of the fact that as stated in article 1 of the Protocol, "the status of denuclearization which is defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13" of the Treaty applies to the above-mentioned territories was evident from the very outset to OPANAL -- the initials by which the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is known -- as is demonstrated by the fact that its principal organ, the General Conference, has already approved, in this connexion, during the three sessions it has held since it began to function in 1969, four resolutions.

In the first of these resolutions, the Conference pointed out that:

"... it is universally believed that a nuclear weapon-free zone redounds to the benefit of the security and the economic development of States and territories within the zone, since it removes from them the threat of nuclear attacks and prevents their resources being wasted in the production of nuclear weapons."

Both in this resolution as well as in all the later ones, the Conference urged States to which the Protocol was open, to take the necessary steps to become parties to it, so that the inhabitants of the territories concerned "could receive the benefits of the ... Treaty", as was stated at the first meeting of the Conference and, as was stated at the third meeting, so that the Latin American zone:

"... might be wholly integrated and protected against the vicissitudes entailed by the presence of nuclear weapons."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Since up to the present time only two of the four States to which the Protocol is open -- United States, France, Netherlands and United Kingdom -- have heeded the appeal of that Conference, the Council of OPANAL, which is one of the principal bodies of the organization, adopted on 8 March 1974 a resolution emphasizing the desirability of having the General Assembly of the United Nations consider this question.

Pursuant to the recommendation to that effect made at that time, the 18 States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco requested that the provisional agenda of the Assembly should include an item -- which has become item 100 -- under which, as I said at the outset, I have the honour to present the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.686.

I believe that I have sufficiently explained the contents of the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution.

The first operative paragraph notes with satisfaction that the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I on 11 December 1969 and that the Netherlands did likewise on 26 July 1971.

Operative paragraph 2 urges the other two States which under the Treaty are eligible to become parties to Additional Protocol I to sign and ratify it as soon as possible so that the peoples of the territories coming within the scope of the Treaty which are not sovereign political entities may "receive the benefits derived from the Treaty", as the paragraph states.

Operative paragraph 3 is drafted in similar terms to those utilized by the Assembly in earlier years in resolutions relating to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It requests the Secretary-General to transmit the resolution, when it is approved, to the two States to which paragraph 2 is addressed and to inform the Assembly at its thirtieth session on any measures that may have been adopted by those States.

Finally, the last paragraph of the draft resolution is designed to ensure that the Assembly will have an opportunity at its next session to consider the extent of compliance with the resolution, which we are convinced will be adopted at this session.

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution trust that, as in the case of Additional Protocol II, this will be generally accepted and that the invitation

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

contained in it will be accepted soon by the two Powers which have not as yet signed and ratified Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That would not only redound to the benefit of the inhabitants of the territories concerned, who in this connexion should not be placed in a position of inferiority with regard to the peoples of the sovereign States of Latin America, but also imply a significant contribution towards strengthening the encouraging trend towards the establishment of more nuclear-weapon-free zones. The importance of that trend for disarmament and for peace cannot be exaggerated. We believe that is why favourable references have been made so frequently to it in the discussions of this Assembly; why, as occurred in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and in the new initiatives included in our agenda. That is why, of the representatives participating in the general debate in the First Committee those of Romania and Uruguay devoted entirely to this question the considered statements they made last week. That is also why I said in the debate in the plenary Assembly on 8 October, and repeated on 29 October in this Committee, that we should attempt to achieve a gradual broadening of the zones of the world from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of Powers which possess those terrible tools of mass destruction will become "something like contaminated islets subjected to quarantine". (A/C.1/PV.2003, p. 31)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Garcia Robles for having introduced the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.686. It is indeed a positive contribution towards accelerating the Committee's work and we thank him for his co-operation.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): Since the beginning of the preparatory work which led to the drafting of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America my country has made it known to those who took that initiative that we viewed with sympathy their efforts to establish a denuclearized zone on the South American continent and that we would study the possibility with regard to that zone, of entering into commitments with respect to the non-use of nuclear weapons. However, at the same time we did not attempt to conceal that for France such a commitment represented the

(Mr. Mistral, France)

absolute limit to which it was prepared to go. The Treaty of Tlatelolco which was discussed among the Powers of the South American continent finally became a reality. The text of the Treaty, as it stands, did give rise to a certain number of reservations on our part, and I shall refer to them later.

(Mr. Mistral, France)

These reservations caused us to hesitate a long time before signing Additional Protocol II, a decision which we were invited to take by repeated resolutions of the General Assembly.

However, setting aside a number of political and legal considerations, the French Government, motivated essentially by the desire to give the nations and peoples of South America concrete evidence of the high esteem in which it holds them and its sincere friendship towards them, agreed to sign Additional Protocol II, thereby undertaking that -- if I may quote the actual text of this diplomatic instrument --

"The statute of denuclearization of Latin America ... shall be fully respected ..." (article 1)

and

"... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty ...". (article 3)

This undertaking became final when the constitutional formalities of ratification were concluded by France on 22 March 1974.

My delegation would very much have hoped that the States signatories of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would have been satisfied with this and would not have called upon the French Government to enter into additional commitments as laid down in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty, which consists essentially of having those States which are described as having possessions in the area

"... undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization ... as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty ... in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible ...". (article 1)

This invitation did cause us some difficulties and gave rise to considerable objections, and we informed the authors of the Treaty of these difficulties and objections some time ago. I shall mention some of them. First of all, I should like to point out that Additional Protocol I imposes on the Powers which have adhered to it obligations similar to those which have been assumed by the Contracting Parties. These obligations have of course been discussed among the Parties themselves, but the countries with possessions in the area, which are

(Mr. Mistral, France)

mentioned in Additional Protocol I, were not invited to take part in these discussions; they are now being asked simply to assume these obligations. We believe that this is by no means a proper procedure in the field of international relations; in principle, it is not to be conceded that a group of countries can, a priori, establish, without consulting the countries concerned, rules which they will subsequently be invited to accept. The French Government wants to be consulted when a study is made of provisions which affect three of its départements. This is the case because Additional Protocol I would apply to Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guiana.

This consideration seems to me also to be in keeping with the views of our Committee in the area of denuclearized zones. I have listened attentively to representatives who have explained their views on the creation of denuclearized zones in the Middle East or South Asia, and I believe that all, without exception, made it quite clear that the creation of such zones required prior consultations and the agreement of all the countries concerned. This principle, which the French Government fully endorses, is not respected here to the extent that we are now being asked to accede to a text to which we were asked to give our approval only after it had been finalized. Another difficulty flowed naturally from the first difficulty: although the Treaty of Tlatelolco applies to the territories of the Parties mentioned in Additional Protocol I, it is unequal and in actual fact these Powers are badly treated compared with the Contracting Parties. I shall give you three examples of this. The first relates to the coming into force of the Additional Protocol. Article 3 provides that

"This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification."

However, under article 28 of the Treaty, the coming into force of this text for the Contracting Parties is subject to certain suspensive conditions, among them, the accession of all the Powers concerned to Additional Protocols I and II annexed to the Treaty. I am quite aware that, under paragraph 2 of article 28, the signatory States have the right to waive these conditions.

I am also aware that some Latin American States have in fact waived this provision. However, all have not done so, and, in any case, the inequality remains in principle.

The second example relates to the ability to denounce the Treaty, an ability granted to the Parties under article 30 of the Treaty, while Additional Protocol I, which contains no provision to this effect, cannot in principle be denounced by a signatory State.

The third example relates to the body set up under the Treaty -- OPANAL, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America -- whose task is "to ensure respect for the obligations flowing from this Treaty". This agency is made up of the Contracting Parties, but States signing Additional Protocol I, while assuming all the obligations of the Treaty, are not invited to become members of this agency.

Another consideration which deters the French Government from signing Additional Protocol I is that it cannot agree to certain provisions of the Treaty which are not in keeping with the normally accepted concept of international law.

(Mr. Mistral, France)

Here again I shall mention just one example: it relates to the zone of application of the Treaty as defined in article 4, paragraph 2. If one traces on a map of the world the lines defining the zone of application, one notes that it would include vast stretches of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The French Government cannot agree to such ideas or that a State or group of States may claim to define a special status for territories or parts of the high seas over which they have no jurisdiction.

The difficulties and obstacles I have just mentioned are not only legal in nature, they go to the very essence of the matter, which is the application to territories under French sovereignty of the status of denuclearization. That is an issue I have no wish to evade. In matters of defence, the French Government has and can only have one doctrine applying to all of its territory. That doctrine, the essential elements of which were recently recalled by the President of the Republic in terms which the Vice-President of the Senate, Mr. Taittinger, quoted in a speech he made in our Committee, implies that no distinction is drawn between the various parts of French territory and that, in particular, no part of this territory, since France is a nuclear Power, can be given a denuclearized status. In matters of defence which touch on the very fundamental principles of security and national independence, the French nation still follows a formula dating from the first Constitution of the French Republic -- one and indivisible. For the reason given, which is of itself sufficient, the French Government is not in a position to sign Additional Protocol I to the Treaty and my delegation will abstain on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.686, while we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.685 relating to Additional Protocol II.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I do not wish to engage in any polemics with the representative of France, and I should like to consider carefully the comments he has just made and, perhaps at some later meeting, comment on them if necessary. But since this draft resolution may be voted on today I should like to refer briefly to some factual inaccuracies.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The representative of France said that there is no provision whatsoever for denunciation of the Protocol. I believe that there are. Additional Protocol I states in article 2:

"The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it."

That is one point. The other is that it is quite correct that France did not participate as a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America, but we did have the honour and pleasure -- I do not recall whether it was in all of them but perhaps in the majority of the meetings held by that Preparatory Committee -- of having an observer from France present, an observer to whom all of the documents of the Preparatory Committee were transmitted at the same time as they were distributed to all of the members. When Ambassador Vimont wished to make some comments, he did so and they were immediately reproduced and circulated as documents of the Preparatory Committee. I myself was a member together with the representatives of Ecuador, Ambassador Benites, and Brazil, Ambassador Sette Camara, who are members of what was called the Negotiating Committee. In 1965 or 1966 when the General Assembly was meeting I spoke frequently with the representatives of the United States as well as those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. I recall that it was always said that the position of France was similar to that of the other Powers, that before assuming any responsibility with regard to the Treaty they would wish to see the text which would be approved by the Latin American republics.

Lastly, there is a third point, although this is merely a matter of appreciation since the sovereign decisions of each State are decisive. If I am not mistaken the present Secretary-General of CPANAL, a very outstanding Uruguayan jurist, Dr. Hector Gross Espiell, recently published a study and cited some precedents of territories or portions of several metropolitan territories -- not overseas territories -- for which France had accepted not a system of military denuclearization but one of total demilitarization. Those are the only points I wish to make at this time.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I have some comments to make on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.690. If we are proceeding to a vote, then I shall withhold that comment until we have finished voting.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): At the moment we are not going to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690, so the representative of India can now make any comments he wishes. I call on him.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I did not mean that we would vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 but on any other draft resolution. However, I shall make my comments at this stage on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690.

The representative of the Netherlands, in introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.690, referred to some remarks which I had made earlier this week. He said that he did not know which delegation I had in mind when I made those remarks, and he went on to say that the co-sponsors certainly did not belong to that category. I am indeed very glad to hear that comment.

During my statement on Monday of this week I had also said, with your permission, I should like to repeat, that:

"We should not ignore the fact that there are hardly any negotiations going on concerning nuclear disarmament -- and I emphasize 'disarmament'. Two nuclear-weapon States are engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Three nuclear-weapon States participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which for some years now has been unsuccessfully engaged in elaborating a comprehensive test ban treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States are outside CCD." (2016th meeting, pp. 23-25)

The international community has time and again stressed in its deliberations and resolutions that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution which was introduced this afternoon by the representative of the Netherlands, for all its good intentions, will have the effect of transferring the attention of the international community to other, less important, matters such as the regulation of peaceful activities connected with nuclear technology.

We feel that to consider the question of peaceful nuclear explosions as contributing to the nuclear arms race and to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not proper. We feel that only nuclear-weapon testing has a bearing on the nuclear arms race; it is wrong to put the blame on peaceful nuclear explosions for this.

In the seventh preambular paragraph of this draft there is mention of six States having engaged in nuclear testing. A correct reflection of the facts would be that five States have carried out nuclear-weapon testing during the course of this year, while one State has exploded a peaceful nuclear device. They cannot be lumped together in the context of the nuclear arms race.

May I also quote one more passage from my statement of Monday last. I said: "Our approach to the general question of the comprehensive test ban is that there should be a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. As the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 already prohibits nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in the underground environment will accomplish the objectives of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests in all

(Mr. Mishra, India)

environments. Therefore, the first priority should be accorded to achieving universal adherence to a régime of prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Only in the context of a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests could consideration be given to the possibility of concluding an agreement on the regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to be signed by all States." (ibid.)

Now, in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.690, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is called upon:

"... to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions" while "submitting its report to the thirtieth session of the ... Assembly on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban" (A/C.1/L.690, p. 2).

What is the effect of that paragraph, and what can the CCD achieve: a comprehensive test ban? The CCD is certainly not capable of doing that: two of the nuclear-weapon States are not even members of it. In effect, there will be no recommendation on a comprehensive test ban, but there will be a section on peaceful nuclear explosions. Perhaps that is the intention, because I notice that in the statement made by the Netherlands representative this afternoon in introducing this draft resolution there is the following paragraph:

"All the above-mentioned bodies -- IAEA, CCD and the non-proliferation Treaty review conference -- are requested to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session. Thus next year all lines on the different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions will come together in our world Organization." (supra, p. 16)

It goes on:

"In any case, the General Assembly at its thirtieth session will have before it reports on all the problems in this area and, it is hoped, many suggestions for solutions, so that it can decide in all freedom what should be the next steps with regard to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions." (ibid.)

Perhaps the General Assembly next year will consider this question again, and perhaps a resolution on the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions will be adopted. Will that prevent the testing of nuclear weapons? Will that make a contribution to stopping the nuclear arms race, much less to nuclear disarmament? The non-proliferation Treaty did not prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, precisely because it was not designed to prevent the nuclear arms race. Any regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions at this stage which is not placed in the context of universal adherence to a comprehensive test ban treaty or agreement, any such regulation will make no contribution in that direction. All it will do is detract in a significant manner and in a significant measure from the single-minded efforts needed to unify opinion against the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. This is what I meant when I said on Monday last that the nuclear arms race seems to be taken for granted, and that the efforts of some delegations are only in the direction of regulating peaceful nuclear explosions.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): I listened attentively to the indications given by the representative of Mexico and his comments with regard to some of the points in my statement. Of course I do not wish to start an argument here. This is neither the place nor the time. But with regard to three points, I should like to give some explanation.

The first concerns one of the points which I raised: namely, the ability to denounce the Treaty. I take note of the words and indications given by Mr. Garcia Robles. His interpretation, I must say, does not seem to be quite self-evident in that I believe that a priori the obligations assumed by States signing Additional Protocol I are those, and only those, stipulated in its first article, which refers to articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty, and which therefore exclude other articles as a whole. But in that connexion, opinions may be divergent.

I should also like to notify the representative of Mexico that during the preparatory work we were indeed kept abreast of the drafting of the Treaty. But it is one thing to be an observer while a diplomatic instrument is being drafted, and something quite different to participate in the negotiations. The responsibilities arising from these two different types of status cannot be compared. That is what my comments were about.

As for the third point, I admit that I did not understand very well the allusion of the representative of Mexico to different systems that might exist in different areas of French territory with regard to defence. I am not sure what he is referring to. The only example that comes to mind is that of our overseas territories in the Antarctic continent which are subject to a statute of denuclearization, because we signed the Treaty on that subject.

But I think that there it might be conceded that we are in quite a different situation. The Antarctic continent is a desert, uninhabited except by a few penguins; it is not a State peopled by citizens. It has no connexion whatsoever with what might occur in the countries of South America which fall under this denuclearization Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As no other representative has asked to speak, I should like to make two announcements. First, Peru is a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Germany has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690. I did ask the Committee if it would be able to vote on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.685 and A/C.1/L.686. At that time I heard no objections. If that still holds, we might proceed to the vote.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): We would like to request, Mr. Chairman, that you postpone the vote on the draft resolutions to which you just referred, on the denuclearized zone in Latin America; that is, on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Protocols I and II.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I might ask the representative of the Soviet Union the same question that I asked the representative of the United States yesterday, because both of them are in the Disarmament Committee. For how long must we postpone this? Perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union could give me some indication.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I can answer your question very soon, but, unfortunately, I cannot give you any specific date now. I can just assure you that the Soviet delegation will do everything within its power to be ready to vote as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Unfortunately, we find ourselves in a rather unusual situation, because we already have various draft resolutions submitted and distributed. In my view they could be put to the vote because it may be presumed that they would cause no further difficulties. But if some delegations do have difficulties, we could not, of course proceed to the vote. Thus, I must stress the fact that we are losing some time. I would have thought that we might have been able to vote on those two draft resolutions this afternoon. However, in view

(The Chairman)

of the request for postponement, rather than the objection, made by the representative of the Soviet Union, and as we have agreed to postpone the vote with regard to other drafts, we shall not in this case proceed to the vote.

I should like to ask the Committee whether perhaps tomorrow morning, if there is no problem, we might vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683.

The sponsors have told me that they themselves have no difficulty in doing so.

(The Chairman)

I should like to point out, so that delegations can organize their positions in this respect, that there will be no meeting tomorrow morning but there will be one in the afternoon.

As I have said, if there are no objections -- and here again I am asking the Committee for its opinion -- we might be able to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683 tomorrow afternoon.

I believe we might also be able to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687 which was introduced by the Nigerian delegation this afternoon, and on the draft resolution concerning the Indian Ocean contained in t Addendum to document A/9629. Members will remember that in connexion with this latter draft some delegations indicated that they would prefer the vote to be postponed. Those delegations have now told me that they will be in a position to vote if the Committee decides to vote tomorrow.

I think that the Committee can agree to vote on these three drafts tomorrow, while continuing consideration of the draft resolutions which have been submitted and hearing the various comments on them, in the same way as we have done today. When we have come to the end of the list of speakers we can vote on the three draft resolutions I have mentioned.

It would also be very desirable if at our meeting on Friday morning, which is the only one the Committee will have, we could vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.685 and A/C.1/L.686, which the Soviet delegation has just requested should be postponed. Also -- and I am still consulting the Committee -- perhaps the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.684 and A/C.1/L.688 could be introduced and discussed, and if we receive the reply which has been promised by the representative of the United States for today then we might also be able to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675.

In this respect I am in the hands of the representatives. I do not want to hurry our proceedings unduly and I wish to give all delegations an opportunity to study the drafts and consult their Governments, but it is my duty and responsibility to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that time is passing and on Friday we must conclude our consideration of and voting on the draft resolutions concerning disarmament and vote on them.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): The Swedish delegation would certainly be ready to go along with most of what you have just suggested to us, Mr. Chairman, in relation to our discussion and voting on the draft resolutions. We have just one difficulty which I should like to submit to you and this relates to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675. The fact is that there are a number of delegations which are involved in consultations on the text of this draft resolution, and it is my feeling that we shall require a day or two to finish those consultations. I would, then, very respectfully ask you if it would be at all possible to postpone the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675 until early next week.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The view of the representative of Sweden coincides with the others I have heard. We shall therefore postpone consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675 until next week. I should like to ask delegations which are carrying out consultations to indicate when they will be ready to proceed to the vote because the co-sponsors of the draft are ready for this to be voted on at any time.

Are there any further comments on the programme which I have just put before the Committee?

As there appear to be none, I take it that the Committee will be ready tomorrow afternoon to vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.683, A/C.1/L.687 and the Addendum to document A/9629.

We shall begin our meeting tomorrow afternoon by listening to all the delegations which wish to refer to the various draft resolutions, whether the ones to be voted on that afternoon or others which have been submitted.

I should like now to refer to a matter which I want to put to the Committee for its consideration. In 1969 the First Committee reached an understanding, which was ratified by the General Assembly, on the advisability of updating every five years the publication entitled "The United Nations and Disarmament".

(The Chairman)

Five years have elapsed, and I should like to read an estimate of the publication costs and machinery so that the delegations can study and consider these and subsequently, perhaps next week, it may be possible to reach a decision on this matter.

As I shall read this document, my words will, of course, be reproduced in full in the record of this meeting. Thus delegations will have an opportunity not only of hearing what I am saying but also of studying it subsequently.

The Committee may feel it advisable to study two possibilities with regard to updating the publication entitled "The United Nations and Disarmament". The first would include printing and publishing 200 pages as a five-year supplement to the present document. The second would entail printing and publishing a new volume of more than 700 pages which would cover the years 1945 to 1975 and would include new material equivalent to the 200 pages of the supplement referred to above. As in 1970, the publication would be printed in English, French, Russian and Spanish.

The Secretary-General informs me that the respective costs of these proposals would be as follows. As regards the single supplement -- that is, the 200-page addition: \$US 30,000 for printing and \$US 12,000 for external contractual translation making a total of \$US 42,000. If a new edition were published -- that is, the 700 pages to which I referred, the costs would be \$US 102,000 for printing and \$US 24,000 for external contractual translation, making a total of \$US 126,000.

(The Chairman)

Those estimates of printing costs based on current costs in New York -- or in Moscow in the case of the Russian edition -- for the printing of the following numbers of copies for official distribution: Spanish, 450; French, 850; English, 2,500; Russian, 400. The number of copies for sale would be as follows:

Spanish, 800; French, 500; English, 3,000; Russian, none. The respective totals would be as follows: Spanish, 1,250; French, 1,350; English, 5,500; Russian, 400.

In this connexion, the Secretary-General wishes to indicate that the following quantities of the 1970 edition still remain: Spanish, 250; French, 600; English, 2,600; Russian, 100.

In the estimated translation costs, which include typing account is taken of the fact that a large part of the documentation has already been translated. At present it is impossible to estimate accurately how far the work of translation could be paid for out of existing resources. Therefore the estimates I have given should be considered rough averages; in view of the heavy workload of the regular staff the translation would be carried out by contract.

If the document is also published in Arabic and Chinese, the costs would increase as follows. For the 200-page supplement, printing costs would increase by \$6,000 and the contractual translation costs by \$8,000 -- a total of \$14,000. With regard to the 700-page edition, printing costs would increase by \$20,500 and translation costs by \$28,000 -- a total of \$48,500. The estimated number of copies needed would be 500 in Arabic and 200 in Chinese for official distribution, and 250 in Arabic and 100 in Chinese for sale.

I have brought that information to the attention of the Committee so that delegations may study it. It will appear in the verbatim records tomorrow. Next week I shall draw the attention of representatives to this point, so that we may come to an understanding similar to that adopted in 1969.

I wish to announce that the delegation of Upper Volta has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution on the question of Korea in document A/C.1/L.677.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



PROVISIONAL

A/C.1/PV.2019/Corr.1
19 November 1974

ENGLISH ONLY

Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND NINETEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 14 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Corrigendum

Page 52, third and fourth paragraphs

For the existing text substitute

Now I should like to make a brief comment on the statement just made by the Soviet representative.

Whether a country is truly for disarmament does not hinge on how many proposals it makes or how many conferences it participates; rather this depends on what concrete disarmament measures it adopts. When China expressed support for the efforts of the numerous medium-sized and small countries for the establishment of peace-zones and nuclear-free zones, we undertook due obligations with regard to these zones. When we set forth two prerequisites for the convocation of a world disarmament conference - namely, that all nuclear countries, especially the two super-Powers, undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they dismantle all military bases on foreign soil and withdraw all military forces from abroad - China has done exactly what it advocated. We have declared that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and we do not have a single soldier or a single base abroad. Facts have shown that China's attitude on the disarmament questions is serious and earnest, and that its deeds match its words.

Page 53-55, first and second paragraphs

For the existing text substitute

It is true that the Soviet Union has put forward many proposals, but what has it done? It has talked about disarmament for so many years, but who has seen it disarm a single warship, a single plane, or a single warhead? I would ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether he can answer this question: Do you dare to declare that you will withdraw all military forces from other countries and that you will no longer interfere in the internal affairs of others? We do not think you dare to do so. What the people of the world want is not empty talk but concrete action.

On the question of international tension, many representatives have correctly pointed out in the plenary Assembly and in the First Committee that the root-cause of international tension lies in the aggression, interference and contention of the super-Powers. Only by resolutely opposing the policy of aggression and war of the super-Powers can we effectively oppose their creation of tension under the guise of "détente".

Page 56, first paragraph

For the existing text substitute

In this regard, together with the numerous third world countries, China has made its own contributions. It is utterly futile for the Soviet representative to distort facts and to try to shift to China the blame for the creation of international tension.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



PROVISIONAL

A/C.1/PV.2019
14 November 1974

ENGLISH

Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 14 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued)
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)

/...

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. This final text will be distributed as soon as possible.

Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be sent in quadruplicate within three working days to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room LX-2332, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 15 NOVEMBER 1974, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 20 NOVEMBER 1974.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)

AGENDA ITEMS 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103, 107 (continued)

Mr. LIN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation has carefully studied the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the draft resolution contained in the addendum to it and has listened attentively to the statements made by representatives of various countries on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We should like to make a few observations now in this regard.

First, the Chinese Government and people have always sympathized deeply with and firmly supported the struggle of the people of various countries to safeguard State sovereignty and national independence and to oppose super-Power aggression and expansion. Proceeding from this position, we actively support the just proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In our opinion the desire of the countries in the Indian Ocean zone to maintain peace in the region should be respected.

Secondly, it must be pointed out that the root cause of the turbulence and unrest in the Indian Ocean region lies mainly in the policy of aggression and expansion in the region pursued by the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. It is precisely these two super-Powers that have in recent years frantically pursued their "gunboat" policy, massed a large number of warships for a show of force and vied with each other in installing military bases there. In its attempt to realize its ambition for world hegemony one super-Power, which flaunts the banner of socialism, has in recent years set up a permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean and dispatched large numbers of naval ships to ply in the Indian Ocean and even to carry out large-scale military exercises there. In the past few years its ship-days in the Indian Ocean have increased almost fivefold. It is seeking by all means to establish military bases along the coasts of the Indian Ocean and is engaging in interference and subversive activities. The other super-Power in its intensified contention has also made tremendous efforts to augment its military strength in the Indian Ocean and expand its military bases there. The facts show that it is precisely the two super-Powers' activities of contention for hegemony that have seriously menaced peace and security in the Indian Ocean region and the independence and sovereignty

of the countries in the region. This cannot but arouse the grave concern of the countries and peoples in the region and will naturally meet with their strong condemnation and resolute opposition.

Thirdly, the Chinese delegation maintains that in order to implement the just proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace it is imperative first of all to put an end to the two super-Powers' military expansion and contention for hegemony in the region, to withdraw all foreign naval fleets from the region and to dismantle all foreign military bases and installations there.

Furthermore it must be pointed out that the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone also depends on the countries in the region basing their mutual relations on the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. However, in pursuance of the policy of expansion and blackmail a certain country in this region has recently openly annexed a small neighbour. This runs entirely counter to the purpose of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

Finally, we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in the addendum to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. MERENNE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): It is very difficult to put forward practical ideas on the serious problem of global disarmament. Fortunately the task is easier when the ground has already been worked over, as, for instance, in the case of the special problems of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the control of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, which are the subject of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 of which my Government is a sponsor.

Realizing that the preservation of world peace is an objective which takes precedence over all others, the Belgian Government agreed to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, which it signed on 20 August 1968.

(Mr. Merenne, Belgium)

Indeed, Belgium felt that the risks to peace would be seriously increased by the proliferation of nuclear-weapon States. We said that the non-proliferation Treaty, in spite of the imperfections inherent in any human undertaking, bore within it the hopes of the overwhelming majority of the international community, for it was the first genuine step towards a cessation of the nuclear arms race.

More than four years after the entry into force of the Treaty, Belgium's fundamental stand on this political choice taken in 1968 remains unchanged.

At that time, the communiqué of the Belgian Government already stressed the universal character which the Treaty should have. Indeed, my Government was aware that the participation of a sufficient number of countries, particularly of those which might relatively soon be able to produce nuclear weapons, was indispensable for the total effectiveness of the Treaty. The deeper meaning and the political significance of the Treaty indeed depend on that condition being met.

It is true that more than 100 countries have signed the Treaty and that more than 80 have ratified it. Some signatories are still hesitant to accede to it, and we know that a number of them are waiting for the States members of EURATOM that are directly concerned to ratify the Treaty before doing so themselves. Unfortunately, approximately 30 other countries have thus far not wished to be associated with the Treaty.

In 1968 Belgium, like its non-nuclear partners of the EURATOM Treaty, decided that its ratification of the Treaty should depend on the outcome of negotiations between the European Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the controls provided for in article III of the Treaty.

The successful outcome of these negotiations made it possible for Belgium, as, indeed, for its other European partners, to start the procedures for parliamentary approval of the Treaty and of the agreement between the member countries of EURATOM, on the one hand, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the other. We hope to complete this procedure before the end of the year.

In so doing, Belgium believes that it has discharged its responsibilities as regards world stability.

(Mr. Merenne, Belgium)

Yet, the people of Belgium, like those elsewhere in the world, are troubled by real concern over the events which have occurred -- or, indeed, which have not occurred -- these past few months, namely, the underground nuclear explosion carried out by the Indian Government, on the one hand, and the lack of agreement by the five nuclear Powers recognized as such under the Treaty to limit their nuclear weapons, on the other.

That concern will be shared by the conference to review the Treaty, which in May 1975 will focus attention on the possible short-comings of this agreement and on what can be done to overcome them.

The reasons invoked by countries for not acceding to the Treaty, are many and various. I should like now to examine the chief among them.

The essential and immediate objective of the Treaty is to limit the number of nuclear-weapon States to the number in existence when it was drafted.

Since the Treaty is essentially one of disarmament, it must be considered as a stage and not as the final result with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It was therefore logical that, to make it possible to curb proliferation, certain States should assume obligations more rapidly than others, that is to say, that the first step in the process of nuclear non-proliferation should consist in preventing an increase in the number of States possessing military nuclear explosive devices.

In other words, the idea was to prevent, in the first place, the so-called horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, in order to maintain a certain balance between the rights and the commitments of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, it is provided in some of the paragraphs of the preamble as well as in article VI of the Treaty that each of the Parties to the agreement -- and this is meant essentially for any military nuclear Power --

"... undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith ... relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race ...".

That is in fact intended to put an end to vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Merenne, Belgium)

A major difficulty no doubt lies in the fact that no negotiations have been started in which all the nuclear-weapon States would take part.

Agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons have been concluded between two of the Powers parties to the Treaty, the full significance of which we have recognized, but which have barely begun the process of putting an end to the nuclear arms race.

Concrete steps regarding vertical proliferation would constitute one of the means essential for the motivation of the States which are still unsure as to what to do next in order to assure their security. We hesitate to take too hard and fast a position on this situation. However, Belgium believes that it is now more than ever necessary for the nuclear Powers, whose duties and responsibilities have increased simply because of the entry into force of the Treaty, to carry out concrete actions.

And we are not expecting decisive actions on the part of the nuclear States only as regards vertical proliferation. They can also contribute to better ensuring horizontal non-proliferation.

Belgium, together with the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and with other countries, has been advocating international supervision of all peaceful underground nuclear explosions, not only within the framework of article V of the Treaty but also, more generally speaking, over the explosions carried out by nuclear States. If those States would agree to that kind of supervision, then one of the reasons that some countries put forward for acceding to the Treaty would be eliminated. We hope that current negotiations on that point between the United States and the Soviet Union on additional matters relating to the so-called "threshold" agreement concluded in Moscow on 3 July, will bring new and encouraging elements to bear.

One of the major concerns of the non-nuclear Powers ever since 1968 has been to ensure the protection of their national security against any nuclear action. Their efforts at the time led to Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 which was based essentially on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that one of the ways of further developing guarantees for non-nuclear Powers would be to create non-nuclear zones patterned after the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That Treaty in an annexed Protocol contains the commitment of the nuclear Powers to respect the status of a nuclear-free zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any of the Contracting Parties.

Article VII of the non-proliferation Treaty provides expressly that groups of States may conclude regional agreements completely to ban nuclear weapons on their respective territories. The Treaty has been drafted in such a way as to take into account the Treaty of Tlatelolco and is a type of invitation to conclude similar treaties, which we have been discussing in our debate, in parts of the world which are suitable for agreements of this kind. That would strengthen the impact that the non-proliferation Treaty would have.

The safeguards provided in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty have been one of the most critical aspects of the system of non-proliferation set forth in the Treaty.

But things have got off to a fairly good start because the International Atomic Energy Agency has already concluded, or is in the process of concluding, control agreements with those countries which have acceded to the Treaty. The EURATOM/IAEA verification agreement has also been prepared on this point.

(Mr. Merenne, Belgium)

Furthermore, Belgium was one of those countries which, last August, decided on certain rules of conduct regarding uniform rules with which exporters would have to comply in respect of exports covered in article III, paragraph 2, of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Belgium intends to act in accordance with that agreement as soon as it ratifies the non-proliferation Treaty, and it will do so now to the extent that our regulations permit, while bearing in mind the requirements of the Rome Treaty.

Finally, when the non-proliferation Treaty was being negotiated, it was clearly understood that the agreement should in no way impede the full and free development of the civilian use of nuclear energy but that, quite on the contrary, the guarantees that the Treaty contains regarding the non-use of nuclear energy for military purposes should, as a matter of fact, promote the civilian development of that form of energy.

The problem of energy in the world is a very timely and relevant one that makes article IV of the Treaty particularly significant. All States, particularly developing countries, must be allowed to assimilate the sophisticated forms of technology represented by nuclear power. Assistance and co-operation, particularly action by the International Atomic Energy Agency, are essential given the present international situation.

The review conference must strengthen the balance which has at times been challenged between, on the one hand, the right of everyone to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and, on the other hand, the need to avoid using nuclear energy for military purposes. Only if there is national and international control under the guidance of the International Atomic Energy Agency can there be a harmonious use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world.

I am now reaching the end of my statement and my main point. I represent a small country which has nevertheless acquired a considerable knowledge of nuclear technology applied in the service of mankind. On behalf of Belgium, which has achieved that objective without resorting to peaceful nuclear explosions, I have adduced a number of arguments and expressed

(Mr. Merenne, Belgium)

a few thoughts and I have done so in the hope that many members of the Committee will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 and that those who are hesitant will ask themselves whether their scepticism is warranted.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) (interpretation from French): The Romanian delegation is one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687 on the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade because of its constant interest in this question and in the intensification of efforts of all States with a view to the adoption of effective disarmament measures, primarily in the area of nuclear disarmament. In the General Assembly as well as in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the Romanian delegation has consistently supported the idea that the preparation of a programme for immediate and long term disarmament negotiations and measures would stimulate the political will of States and would open broad horizons for disarmament negotiations thus making possible a judicious order of priorities for the various measures.

It was in this spirit that, on 3 April 1969, Romania suggested for the first time in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in document A/7741 (DC/232), paragraph 57, that we should consider proclaiming a United Nations Disarmament Decade, from 1970 to 1980, concurrently with the Development Decade.

One of the fundamental motives for my delegation in 1969 and still valid today is the need for a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures in the context of a decade and the close relationship between disarmament and development.

(Mr. Melescanu, Romania)

It was that idea which led Romania to request the inclusion of a separate item on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security." The Secretary-General's report on this subject (A/8469), the debates that took place at the twenty-sixth and twenty-eighth sessions of the General Assembly and, indeed, the work of other United Nations bodies on the subject -- all have underlined the urgent need to take joint action that would make it possible, through effective disarmament measures, to release vast resources at present swallowed up by the arms race so that the necessary means can be made available for the economic and social development of all peoples, particularly the peoples of the developing countries.

Those ideas were introduced in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in the adoption of which Romania made an active contribution. That resolution proclaimed the decade beginning in 1970 as the Disarmament Decade.

As was stressed yesterday by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Clark, the draft resolution now before the Committee is based upon the idea of reviewing, mid-way through the Decade, efforts and action undertaken in order to follow up the provisions of the resolutions adopted five years ago. Indeed, while reaffirming the objectives and purposes of the Decade, the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General and Governments to report to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly on the action and steps which they have taken so far to publicize the Disarmament Decade in order to acquaint the general public with its purposes and objectives. This provision derives from operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 1969, which reads as follows:

"Calls upon Governments to intensify without delay their concerted and concentrated efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

(Mr. Melescanu, Romania)

In the view of the Romanian delegation such an examination is in keeping with the constant concern of our Organization, which has been highlighted once again at this session, regarding the intensification of everyone's efforts to bring about a halt to the arms race and to take effective steps towards disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament.

As we know, the next session of the General Assembly is to deal with the results achieved in the first part of the Development Decade. The question of the economic and social consequences of the armaments race will once again be included on our agenda, and it therefore seems entirely natural that in this context the General Assembly should be able to take an over-all view of efforts being made in a related area -- that of disarmament -- after the first five years of the Decade.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): I shall in this statement make some observations on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675, originally submitted by the USSR, and the annexed draft convention.

As is certainly well known, Sweden has for many years given great attention to environmental problems and has devoted both time and resources to finding effective and practical solutions at the international level to the ever increasing threats to the environment, our common heritage. In the course of the general debate my delegation had the opportunity to make a few preliminary comments on the interesting and highly topical proposal of the Soviet Union on the "prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with maintenance of international security, human well being and health." Given the great Swedish interest in environmental matters, I should now like to elaborate on my preliminary comments. If what I have to say could be regarded as rather critical, it should none the less be viewed as a positive attempt to secure an international prohibition of environmental changes for military or other hostile purposes. Let me also say that my comments should not be interpreted as indicating a wish to initiate a discussion on the substance of the Soviet proposal at this session of the General Assembly.

My comments are addressed to the draft resolution and draft-convention in order to illustrate the extremely complicated character of this matter. For that very reason I deem it most important that, should the question be referred to it, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament obtains clear guidance from the General Assembly on how to approach the problem of environmental modification for military and other hostile purposes. Another reason is that other international bodies, particularly UNEP, with its broad co-ordinating mandate in the field of the environment, are actively involved in the question of environmental modification for peaceful purposes, and the International Committee of the Red Cross is at the same time making efforts to forbid certain methods of warfare. So let me repeat that we need a clear-cut definition, on the one hand, of environmental modification for military and other hostile purposes, and, on the other hand, of environmental activities for peaceful and positive aims.

It seems to us that two main aspects merit particular attention by the General Assembly at this stage. The first and most urgent is what action the Assembly should take at this session. Here I am thinking mainly of the draft resolution proposed by the Soviet delegation. As can be seen from the draft, however, this question is closely connected with what I see as the second main aspect -- namely, the desired substantive direction of the further study and consideration of the Soviet proposal.

The text of the draft convention as it now stands raises several difficult questions of interpretation. The delineation between military and civilian action is one such issue.

The broad wording of article I seems to include almost any type of action influencing the environment, whether military or not. When proceeding further with the consideration of this text, it is very important to clarify the intended relationship between several measures proposed in article II and ongoing activities in the same general field in the United Nations system and elsewhere.

It must, of course, be of fundamental interest for the General Assembly when dealing with the present proposal to avoid inviting any duplication of efforts already under way or, as could even be the case, exerting any negative influence on those efforts. A rewording of article I might be helpful in this regard. One solution could be to make it clear that two types of purpose criterion are foreseen, that is, action to influence the environment and climate in armed conflicts or as a means of exerting pressure on other nations, something which would indeed imply hostile purposes.

Another problem of interpretation concerns the phrase in article I "incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health" (A/C.1/L.675, annex, page 1). This general and broad wording would, it seems to us, create insurmountable obstacles when an attempt is made to define whether a particular action falls under the convention or not. We feel that the phrase in question should be clarified in such a way that it becomes clearer what types of measurement of effects are envisaged.

The procedures envisaged in articles VI and VII for complaints, investigations and sanctions are closely related to the matters of interpretation I have mentioned. The proposal to entrust to the Security Council the sole responsibility of determining what action should be taken when a complaint is lodged, is not acceptable to my delegation. These procedures should, as a matter of principle, be organized in such a way as to guarantee a full investigation. I do believe that for many countries besides my own, it cannot be acceptable that matters of possibly vital importance to them, should be dependent for their solution entirely on the attitudes of one or several of the permanent members of the Security Council.

If we turn now to article II of the draft convention, it is clear that the enumeration in subparagraphs (a) to (1) of measures damaging to the environment involves many highly complex issues. A fundamental question to be asked is what guiding principle should be applied when drawing up such a list. It is not possible to draft, and to reach international agreement on, a comprehensive list covering all possible aspects of these immense problems. We see the list in article II (a) to (1) as a series of examples indicating the main types of activity to which the convention should relate. A suggestion, which could

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

be explored, would be to try first to create a general framework by formulating certain broad and general principles and then to try to reach agreement step by step on specific measures.

Concerning the substance of article II, suffice it to say that the list of environmental modification activities is indeed very illustrative and thought-provoking. Depending on what definition is adopted, this list could be expanded or reduced. When that time comes, my country will actively participate in the substantive discussion. It is clear that it is extremely difficult to draw up a comprehensive list. At this stage, and merely as an example, I should like to point to one type of problem not mentioned in article II. I am thinking of the problem of genetic manipulation which, in view of its relevance to human health and well-being, might well deserve a place there. It is important that research in this rapidly developing and potentially dangerous area should come under some type of international inspection.

My final remarks on the substance of the draft convention concern articles V and VIII. The wording of article V could be interpreted as a sort of general reservation or escape-clause by which States could avoid their obligations under the convention. This could, in our view, significantly reduce the relevance of such an international instrument. We would find it difficult to accept such a generally worded provision. Another problem of interpretation occurs in article VIII concerning amendments to the convention. We would have difficulties in accepting a provision which would in effect give the depositary Governments a right of veto in this regard.

It appears that the proposal covers a very broad area and gives rise to many problems of interpretation. As I have already said, a possible way out would be to change the perspective, in the sense that the mainly military aspects of these important problems would be considered in this context. If a consensus can be reached in this regard, the matter might well be referred to CCD for study. The Disarmament Committee should in such a case have access to ex advice from the United Nations system and particularly from the United Nations Environment Programme. The General Assembly would then revert to the question next year in the light of the findings of CCD.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

From what I have said, I hope that it is abundantly clear that we want work on this important issue to continue and to progress successfully. Therefore, I hope that we shall be able to reach a common agreement on how to proceed from here. But, at the same time, no one should have any illusions that the successful tackling of the question of bans on the military uses of the techniques discussed would relieve us of further problems in this area. Indeed, the civilian aspects, involving the use of large-scale techniques, in many cases appear to have much wider implications and perhaps an even greater urgency than the military aspects. It is very important that these issues be given increased and prompt international consideration in the proper forums, particularly the United Nations Environment Programme, with a view to reaching concrete agreements.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): I wish to intervene briefly to speak in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690, of which my delegation has the honour of being a sponsor.

I listened closely to the statement made yesterday by my friend and colleague from India. As was evident from his statement, there is indeed a basic point of difference between his Government, and I suppose some others, on the one hand, and the more than 80 nations which subscribe to the non-proliferation Treaty on the other. I attempted to identify this issue in my statement in the general debate, and at the risk of trying the patience of the members of the Committee, I should like to make a brief quotation from what I said:

"... let us consider the position of those Governments which have rejected the Treaty for reasons of principle and because they feel that it imposes unacceptable limitations on their freedom of action which would be detrimental to their defence arrangements or their economic development.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

"There is some justice in their position. Measured by all the regular norms and relations between sovereign States, it cannot be disputed that the balance of obligations and rights leaves much to be desired. But individual Governments have to come to terms with the world as it is. On the one hand, we have the reality of the nuclear Powers. We may not like their self-election to a special status, and we dread the consequences of a mis-step by any one of them. But even if the nuclear-weapon Powers will not themselves accept the same constraints at this time, the rest of the world must still seek to prevent the virus of nuclear proliferation from spreading further.

"We believe that the development, testing and possession of nuclear explosive devices should stop with the existing nuclear Powers, in the hope that ultimately they too will see the logic of abandoning them. We believe, moreover, that to the extent that peaceful nuclear explosions turn out to be useful -- which, in our view, is a very doubtful proposition that has yet to be proven -- they should be carried out under international arrangements of the type envisaged in the non-proliferation Treaty. No matter how peaceful the intent of such nuclear explosions, there is no way at this time to distinguish between the development of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes; and thus, if nuclear explosions are carried out by countries not now possessing nuclear weapons, they encourage unacceptable nuclear proliferation." (2000th meeting, p. 46)

It follows from those words that we agree whole-heartedly with the representative of India that the highest priority should be accorded to achieving international or universal adherence to a régime of prohibition of all nuclear tests in all environments, but we differ from him in his view that only in the context of a complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests could consideration be given to the possibility of concluding an international agreement on the regulation of underground nuclear explosions, to be signed by all States.

We shall continue to do all in our power to bring to an end so-called vertical proliferation, but we do not accept the view that, unless or until we are successful in that effort, nothing can be done about the other concern, horizontal proliferation. In this respect, our goal is to ensure that, if or when peaceful nuclear explosions take place, they are carried out under auspices which

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

will satisfy all the Governments concerned that they are in fact what they purport to be. Furthermore, we think that in the present circumstances the procedures set out in the non-proliferation Treaty are the best way of achieving that aim.

Those, in our view, are the underlying issues which should influence delegations in making their assessment of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): At the last meeting, Mr. Chairman, you pointed out that today we would be voting on three draft resolutions: on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban (A/C.1/L.683); on general and complete disarmament (A/C.1/L.687); and on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace contained in the addendum to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9629). Since we are to vote on those three items today, the Soviet delegation would like to confine itself to explaining its vote on those three matters.

And so, I should like to ask whether it would be appropriate and convenient to the Chairman and the Committee if the Soviet delegation expressed its views simultaneously on the three draft resolutions on which we are to vote today? I see, Mr. Chairman, that you indicate a positive response to my question and therefore I shall begin with the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683.

As we pointed out in our statement in the Committee on 26 October this year, the Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the question of banning the testing of nuclear weapons, and supports the demand for halting those tests by everyone, everywhere. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its readiness to become a party to an agreement on this problem, that would include the prohibition of underground testing, with the proviso that control over the observance of the obligations flowing from such an agreement would be carried out by national means of detection and identification.

We pointed out that an important step in connexion with the problem of halting nuclear weapon testing was the Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of underground testing of nuclear weapons of 3 July this year.

In connexion with the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683, the Soviet Union entirely shares the concern expressed by its sponsors with regard to the continuing testing of nuclear weapons, particularly in the atmosphere, and expresses its total solidarity with the wishes of the sponsors of the draft resolution to ensure accession to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty on the part of all States which have not yet acceded to it. We also share the view of the sponsors of the draft resolution that there is an urgent need for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement.

However, the draft resolution contains a number of provisions the existence of which amounts to an attempt to impose responsibility for the lack of progress in the field of prohibiting nuclear weapon testing on the Soviet Union, among other Powers. The Soviet Union cannot agree with such an approach to the question. We believe, in particular, that a solution to the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapon testing can and must be sought primarily by means of concluding appropriate agreements on the subject and not by means of adopting one-sided obligations on the part of individual nuclear States, since such an approach could lead only to a violation of the principle of the equal security of States.

Since the draft resolution which we are now considering provides precisely for the adoption or the assumption of unilateral obligations which, in our view, are incompatible with the principle of equal security of States, the Soviet delegation should like to state here that it will be unable to support this draft and that we will abstain when it comes to the vote.

Now a few words about the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687, relating to the Disarmament Decade, confirming its purposes and objectives, which has just been explained by the representative of Romania. The Soviet delegation should like to state that it agrees with the provisions of this draft resolution and will therefore vote in favour of its adoption.

May I now state the views of the Soviet Union in connexion with the vote about to take place on the draft resolution on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in the Addendum to document A/9629. On the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, the Soviet Union proceeds from a position of principle designed to support proposals that would really promote the strengthening of the peace and security of States and the reduction of international tension. Speaking at a dinner in honour of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Bandaranaike, on 11 November this year, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Alexei Kosygin, stated as follows:

"We have an attitude of respect for the political initiative of the Asian countries dictated by their concern for peace, including, for example, the idea of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the proposal for the neutralization of South-East Asia.

"It is important that all these initiatives should at the same time actually promote the step-by-step conversion of Asia into a continent of peace and co-operation among peoples."

The Soviet position with regard to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has been repeatedly set forth at sessions of the General Assembly, including the twenty-eighth session. The Soviet Union is ready to take part, on an equal footing with all other interested States, in the search for favourable solutions to this problem, provided, of course, that there is observance of the generally acknowledged rules of international law. The USSR is ready to consider, on an equal footing with others, and without prejudice to the security of any of the parties, the question of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. But in resolving this problem there should be no artificial delineation of groups of countries that would enjoy particular rights with regard to the preparation and establishment of a régime governing the Indian Ocean.

In drafting the provisions of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, there must be no infringement of the principle of freedom of navigation. - The Soviet Union deems unacceptable any proposal designed to limit freedom of navigation, particularly when it comes to the carrying out of scientific research by means of naval vessels, because the Indian Ocean is an important line of communication for the Soviet Union, and research is being carried out to study the world's oceans and their space.

According to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the high seas, freedom of navigation applies to all vessels. The Soviet Union has always given considerable help to the Indian Ocean countries in their national liberation struggle and in the struggle for economic independence against reactionary and aggressive forces. The Soviet Union has never had or created, and is not now creating, military or naval bases of any kind in the Indian Ocean region. Soviet vessels and ships in that area have never threatened anyone. In accordance with generally acknowledged international practice and the rules of international law, they are carrying out scientific voyages, including the search for Soviet space objects, in the Indian Ocean region.

In addition, Soviet shipping also crosses the Indian Ocean from the European part of the Soviet Union to the Soviet Far East.

Since there are military bases of the imperialist States in the Indian Ocean region, to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace while allowing the retention of those bases would be to place the Soviet Union in an inferior position vis-à-vis those States, to the detriment of the interests of both the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist community, as well as the countries of the area, which are struggling to strengthen their national independence.

Therefore, the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace requires primarily the elimination of all foreign bases in that area. The Soviet Union is guided by this standpoint in its attitude towards the question of United States military bases on the island of Diego Garcia.

In a statement at the last session of the General Assembly, the Soviet delegation pointed out that the proposal that the Secretary-General prepare a report on the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean region from the point of view of their rivalry was designed to complicate even further a discussion of the question of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This view of the Soviet delegation's has been fully confirmed, since both in the first and in the revised versions of this report the Soviet position has not been properly reflected, and the actual policy of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean region has been presented in a distorted light.

In letters addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on this subject, the Soviet Union has set forth its views on the report of the Group of Experts on the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, and pointed out that in revised form it is still marked by lack of objectivity and by prejudice. In this regard, the Soviet delegation cannot agree with the provisions of the draft resolution relating to that report.

(Mr. Roschin,

Nor can the Soviet delegation agree with a number of other provisions in the draft on the basis of which an attempt is being made by its sponsors to promote a decision on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

For all those reasons, the Soviet delegation will abstain from voting on the draft resolution on the Indian Ocean to which I have referred.

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have some brief comments on the statement made today by the representative of China. We have occasion to regret once again that the representative of China is using every opportunity to distort and misrepresent the position of the Soviet Union on any question. We think that this attempt is to be explained by the wish of the delegation of China to conceal its reluctance to co-operate in matters of disarmament. Indeed, if we took any attempt on the part of the Soviet delegation, or many other delegations, to invite the delegation of China to co-operate in disarmament matters, we have always, unfortunately, received a negative response which blocks the proposals. I would even call it a simple sabotage of the proposals which have been put forward by the delegations.

We have proposed solving the problems of disarmament at a conference of nuclear Powers, so as to come to an agreement about the problem of nuclear disarmament. I should like to stress that two or three nuclear Powers in the present circumstances cannot resolve nuclear problems. Nuclear problems must be resolved by all nuclear States. Otherwise, an unequal situation would be created. China, unfortunately, rejects all those proposals. We proposed convening a world disarmament conference. That proposal stemmed from the desire to bring the non-aligned and developing States into the conference.

The conferences in Cairo, Belgrade, Georgetown, Lusaka, Algiers, all favoured the convening of a world disarmament conference, every single one of them. An urgent solution of this problem was asked for. So why can we not resolve this problem? Because China is disregarding those proposals, because it is sabotaging them, because it is blocking them, because it is erecting obstacles to them.

Of course, we explain this position by the fact that China does not want to co-operate on questions of international settlement of the problem of reducing armament. Similarly, it does not want an easing of international tension, unfortunately, because the principle of reducing international tension is in contradiction to the principles of China's foreign policy. That is the explanation of the fact as to why many initiatives which have been taken here by many States, including

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

the Soviet Union, cannot, unfortunately, get any further, and that is the factor in the face of which we find ourselves today. It is useless for the Chinese delegation to attempt, without rhyme or reason, to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in matters of disarmament. The Soviet Union has always expressed its full readiness to co-operate internationally, on a bilateral basis, with other States with regard to reducing armaments, both nuclear and conventional. We have repeatedly invited China to associate itself with this international co-operation, but, unfortunately, we have had a negative response. That is the position to this very day and I wanted to make that point.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now give the floor to the representative of Japan to speak on specific proposals, not as an explanation of vote since his country is a member of the Indian Ocean Committee which, as a whole, proposed the draft resolution. In accordance with the rules, the sponsor of a proposal cannot explain his vote, but he can speak in favour of the draft resolution which he is co-sponsoring. Therefore, I shall now call on the representative of Japan, as a co-sponsor, to make known his views on the draft resolution, but not by way of an explanation of vote.

Mr. NISHIBORI (Japan): I should therefore like to explain my delegation's views on the draft resolution contained in the Addendum to document A/9629, concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. That draft resolution was approved unanimously by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean of which my country is a member, for adoption by the General Assembly. It is hardly necessary for me to point out that this development is entirely due to the able guidance and statesmanship-like leadership of Ambassador Amerasinghe who, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, introduced the draft resolution before us. My delegation wishes to pay the highest tribute to him. My delegation will welcome the constructive implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, which aims at easing international tension and will eventually help to realize the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

My delegation, which is fully sympathetic with the sincere desire of the regional States to establish such a zone, has voted in favour of the resolution to this end since 1971. That position remains unchanged and I wish to recommend that the First Committee adopt the present resolution.

I wish to take this opportunity, however, to make clear my delegation's view that in establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace Member States should give full consideration to the following points to which Japan attaches great importance. They are, inter alia: the preservation of the freedom of the high seas; the obtaining of the widest possible agreement of the States concerned regarding the implementation of the Declaration; the need to take appropriate measures to enhance the security of littoral and hinterland States, as well as to ensure the security of other States concerned which have significant interests in the preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

On this occasion I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General, to the experts he appointed, and to the staff of the Disarmament Affairs Division of the Secretariat, for the preparation of an elaborate factual statement of the great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean, and also to express my earnest hope that further deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee next year will continue to produce fruitful results.

Mr. SULEIMAN (Libyan Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): I should like to explain the vote of my delegation on the draft resolution introduced by the representative of the Netherlands on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

When my country approved and ratified the Moscow Treaty of 1967 and when it signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 it was aware that those international Treaties had certain shortcomings. We were convinced that those shortcomings would have to be rectified and that joint efforts would be made to achieve an international treaty that would ban all nuclear tests and prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the indications are disappointing. There are still some countries which are conducting nuclear tests either in the atmosphere or underground, ignoring the protests from sections of the international community calling for the cessation of these tests which endanger the environment and eventually threaten other natural resources.

My delegation took a positive attitude during the last session when the draft resolution banning tests in all environments was submitted. Taking that position as a point of departure, the delegation of the Libyan Arab Republic fully supports operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution now before us concerning the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underground or in outer space. We also demand the immediate cessation of those nuclear tests which are being conducted under certain pretexts by some countries.

My delegation considers that the basic responsibility for achieving a comprehensive test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons lies with the nuclear States. They were the ones which started the production and development of nuclear weapons and conducted tests in all environments. They are the countries which supply others with the nuclear facilities and technical expertise which would put them in a position to conduct nuclear tests for military or peaceful purposes. As has been said already, the difference between the two types of test cannot be determined and it is not possible to differentiate between tests for military purposes and those for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Suleiman, Libyan Arab Republic)

Despite the lapse of more than 10 years since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty in Moscow, the two super-Powers and the other nuclear States have not taken any positive steps towards the conclusion of an international treaty on a comprehensive test ban. Nuclear tests are still conducted in the atmosphere and underground and measures for the prohibition of underground tests were only taken by the two super-Powers in 1974 when the threshold Treaty was signed. We had expected that that bilateral Treaty would constitute a comprehensive test ban for the two countries. However, that Treaty did not achieve that lofty objective but only banned as from the end of March 1976 tests whose destructive power exceeded 150 kilotons. This means that underground tests have not been banned and the two countries have given themselves the authority to develop these weapons qualitatively. In addition, that bilateral Treaty reaffirmed that inspection should be carried out by national means, and this is one of the basic factors still obstructing the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty under effective international control.

We believe that the first step towards creating mutual confidence between the peoples, a basic element in the establishment of an international climate of peace and security, can only be taken by the nuclear countries, which should destroy their nuclear stockpiles and refrain from producing further nuclear weapons. Until this distant hope is achieved, these countries should cease to conduct any nuclear tests and promise not to use nuclear weapons against other States.

The fifth conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic countries held in Kuala Lumpur during June 1974, which is mentioned on page 15 of document A/9708, demanded that nuclear countries should pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons against other countries and to continue serious negotiations to stop the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament at an early date. This is requested in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution which calls upon nuclear countries to shoulder their special responsibility and to submit proposals on the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

In view of these observations, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683.

(Mr. Suleiman, Libyan Arab Republic)

Finally, I should like to refer to a drafting point in the Arabic text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683. In operative paragraph 1 it says that the General Assembly "deplores" nuclear tests, while in the English text it says "condemns". So there is a discrepancy between the Arabic and the English texts. We think, therefore, that operative paragraph 1 in the Arabic text should be corrected to read "condemns".

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The paragraph in the Arabic text to which the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic referred will be corrected in the final version and will reflect precisely the language in the English version.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): I felt it to be my duty, before we proceeded to a vote on the draft resolution regarding the Indian Ocean peace zone concept to reply to some of the observations that have been made on the draft resolution.

First of all, may I make it clear -- and I should have thought it would not have required any assurance on my part for this to be clear -- that the draft resolution is purely procedural in character. Support for it could not imply and cannot be construed as unqualified endorsement of the Declaration in all its aspects. On the other hand, support for the draft resolution would be an indication, and a clear indication, of the interest of a country in advancing a process which we hope will find its final consummation in the fulfilment of the concept of the treatment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

Nowhere in the draft resolution is it stated that anyone voting for it accepts the concept of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and, therefore, there is not much substance in the argument that by voting for it one would be supporting the Declaration. But I am surprised that anyone should have any hesitation about supporting the concept. Everyone speaks here so ardently about the cessation of the arms race and the reduction of tensions. There are many who want the arms race to be slowed down and to cease; there are many who express their determination to take all possible measures to relax tensions. But, I regret to say, their actions do not suit their words. Therefore, not much faith can be placed in their protestations or their sincerity regarding disarmament, the reduction of tensions and the cessation of the arms race.

It has been stated that, in translating into reality the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, there should not be any interference with the freedom of the high seas. I have stated more than once -- and it is in the records of this Committee -- that there will not be any interference with the freedom of the high seas. On the contrary, we have stated quite clearly -- even the Declaration does so -- that the use of the commercial shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean would remain unimpeded and unrestricted. Therefore, that argument also goes by the board.

It has been said that, since one major Power has no bases in the Indian Ocean, it would be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis another Power which is said to have such bases, if the Indian Ocean zone of peace became a reality. May I draw the attention of those who advance this argument to the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, which reads as follows:

"Further believing that for the realization of the objective of the Declaration it is necessary that the great Powers enter into immediate consultations with the States concerned, with a view to adopting positive measures for the elimination of all foreign bases and of all manifestations of great-Power military presence in the region conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry."

We ask them to enter into immediate consultations in order to adopt positive measures for the elimination of those bases. Why are they so bashful about

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

entering into such consultations? Why do they shrink from consulting with one another? Who is stopping them, except themselves? They must not, therefore, use their own reluctance as an argument against the draft resolution.

It has been said that the report of the experts is unsatisfactory as it presents a distorted picture of the presence of a certain great Power or certain great Powers. The objections to such distortions are clearly reflected in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. The members of the Ad Hoc Committee itself, and a Member of the United Nations not a member of that Committee, stated what their objections were to the report and what they considered to be inaccuracies. So it is not a matter of our having ignored those representations. We have stated them quite clearly and brought to the notice of this Committee and of the General Assembly the reservations that have been made.

But it is not the content of the report that is called into question in the draft resolution. In the draft resolution, we are only seeking to secure -- as we have sought in vain to do these past two years -- the co-operation of the great Powers. All that we ask of them is -- and I have said this before -- that they should co-operate with us by at least entering into a dialogue with us to state what their problem is. But we have not heard anything favourable from them. In other words, they have shown a total indifference to this concept, which is completely inconsistent with their professed interest in disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. If they could be interested in the SALT negotiations and in the mutual and balanced reduction of forces, then I do not see why they should not be interested in the proposals that are made here. These proposals only amount to an appeal to them to consider this matter and to come before this Committee. And if they do not want to come before this Committee, they should at least communicate to us what their problems are, so that we could have discussions and consultations with them under any conditions which they might wish to dictate, in order that, as I said, we may not proceed further on false premises and on a misunderstanding of their position.

It has been stated by one representative that his delegation accepts the desirability of zones of peace but does not accept the creation of régimes in areas that would give certain countries the right to lay down conditions which

(Mr. Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka)

cannot be internationally accepted. It is precisely with the intention of determining conditions that are internationally acceptable that we have put forward this draft resolution and asked them for their support.

It baffles me -- and I am sure that my colleagues in the Ad Hoc Committee find it equally baffling -- why these major Powers are so reluctant to co-operate with us. I hope that the rest of this Committee will clearly demonstrate its interest in the concept of a zone of peace as one of the most important and vital contributions towards the promotion of peace, the cessation of the arms race and the reduction of tensions, by voting in favour of this draft resolution, despite the resistance shown to it in certain quarters.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): There are no further speakers on the proposals before the Committee. We shall therefore proceed to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683 on agenda item 29, "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban". This draft resolution is sponsored by the delegations of Australia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Iceland, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand and Venezuela.

I shall now call on those representatives who have expressed the wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. LIN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The position of the Chinese delegation on the question of halting nuclear tests is known to all. We understand the desire of the numerous small and medium-sized countries to oppose super-Power nuclear arms race and blackmail and to see the cessation of nuclear tests. However, we must point out that, when the super-Powers possess a huge arsenal of nuclear arms, the mere halting of nuclear tests can neither prevent them from continuing to possess and produce nuclear weapons nor forbid them from using nuclear weapons. Instead, it will only serve to prevent non-nuclear countries and countries with few nuclear weapons from developing their defence capabilities.

(Mr. Lin, China)

The threat of a nuclear war will not be lessened in the least; on the contrary, it will only increase. Therefore, we consider that the proposal for an isolated prohibition of nuclear tests, whether partial or total, is no measure for genuine nuclear disarmament if it is not linked up with the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Far from settling any problem, it will only play into the hands of the two super-Powers in their pursuance of the policies of nuclear monopoly and threat.

Over the past decade and more, the two super-Powers have played one trick after another on the question of halting nuclear tests. After they had conducted hundreds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere and built up a huge nuclear arsenal, which could be used as capital for nuclear threat and blackmail, they concocted the partial nuclear test ban Treaty. Not long ago, when they had conducted enough underground nuclear tests, they produced a threshold Treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. No sooner had this Treaty made its appearance than its fraudulent nature was seen through by many people. Some international personages penetratingly pointed out that far from restricting their nuclear race this Treaty would only prompt them to step up a new round of nuclear tests before the Treaty came into force. The facts have proven this to be true. On the question of halting nuclear tests, the super-Power which flaunts the banner of "socialism" is particularly brazen in its behaviour. On the one hand, it babbles that these treaties are "the first bricks laid in the foundation of the edifice of universal peace and security" and have made contributions to the "checking of the arms race". It also clamours that it is for "the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests". But on the other hand, over the past decade and more, it has never stopped its nuclear tests but has continued to increase the number and enlarge the scale of the tests. Not only is the quantity of its nuclear weapons constantly on the rise, but their quality is also being improved with redoubled efforts. The facts have exploded its deceptive propaganda. People have come to see ever more clearly that the super-Power proposal for the so-called halt of nuclear tests is in essence aimed at preserving their own nuclear monopoly and binding the numerous small and medium countries under their threat hand and foot.

(Mr. Lin, China)

to use nuclear weapons and we do not have a single soldier on foreign soil or a single military base. Facts have proved that China's attitude on the question of disarmament is serious and earnest and it honours its word.

Of course, the Soviet Union has made many proposals on the question of disarmament, but what has it done? They have talked about disarmament for so many years but who has seen the Soviet Union disarm a single warship, a single plane or a single warhead? Can the Soviet representative answer that question? Do you dare declare that you will withdraw all your troops from foreign countries and to cease interfering in the internal affairs of other countries? We think that you do not dare to do so. What the people of the world want is not empty words but actual deeds.

As for the question of international tension, many representatives have pointed out very clearly at the plenary Assembly and in the First Committee that the contention, aggression and interference on the part of the super-Powers are the root causes of international tension. Only by firmly opposing the policy of war and contention of the super-Powers can we effectively oppose their creating tension under the banner of disarmament.

(Mr. Lin, China)

In that respect, China, together with the numerous third world countries, has made its contribution. The attempt by the Soviet delegate to distort facts and to shift the blame for the creation of international tension on to China will be completely futile.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In connexion with the second part of the statement of the representative of China, I should like to draw his attention to the fact that it was more an exercise of the right of reply than an explanation of vote. All representatives will be allowed to exercise their rights of reply later, if that is deemed necessary. Out of procedural considerations, however, I should appreciate it very much if representatives would exercise their rights of reply at the appropriate time. At present members are explaining their votes. Later on I shall call on those representatives who wish to exercise their rights of reply.

Mr. TRAORE (Mali) (interpretation from French): Three days ago I stated the views of the Government of the Republic of Mali on the question of disarmament, so this explanation of vote will be very brief.

We understand very clearly what has been in the minds of those who have sponsored the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683, and we fully understand their objectives. Their concerns and objectives are ours also. Just by way of example, I may say that the Government of Mali has agreed to accede to certain international treaties on disarmament, in particular the Moscow Treaty. But we also think that treaty has certain shortcomings. The hopes born of that treaty have not been realized, and generally speaking, ever since the question of disarmament was brought up the problem has been dealt with as a peripheral matter.

We completely agree with the sponsors that nuclear tests of any kind for military purposes should be opposed. That is a perfectly legitimate stand. But I think the problem between my delegation and the sponsors is more a matter of language than one of differences of principle. We would have liked to see some sort of link between the language of operative paragraphs 1 and 6 of the draft

(Mr. Traore, Mali)

in document A/C.1/L.683. The feelings expressed in operative paragraph 1 lead one to expect them to be picked up in the recommendations, thus establishing some sort of balance, if only a linguistic one. We believe that to ask States to refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons, pending conclusion of such an agreement, maintains a balance between that request and our intense desire to achieve a total ban. At the same time, there are the significant stockpiles of dangerous weapons of which I spoke in my statement of 11 November.

Although the nuclear-weapon States have a certain special responsibility concerning agreements limiting nuclear tests, we still believe that the problem of disarmament concerns the international community as a whole.

Therefore, if the draft resolution is put to the vote, my delegation will be obliged, although we have the same cares and concerns as the sponsors, to abstain on operative paragraphs 1 and 6.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since no other delegations wish to explain their votes before the vote, I wish to announce that the voting procedure on the draft in document A/C.1/L.683 has begun. From this point on, rule 128 of the rules of procedure is in effect. That rule states:

"After the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion with the actual conduct of the voting. ..."
A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: Albania, China, France

Abstaining: Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire

The draft resolution was adopted by 72 votes to 3, with 30 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now call upon representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote after the vote.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): My delegation agrees with the sense of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683 in so far as it stresses the importance of progress towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We also agree on the desirability of wider adherence to the Partial Test-Ban of 1963, and we continue to place the highest value on that Treaty. Therefore I should like to explain why the United States abstained in the vote on the draft resolution

(Mr. Martin, United States)

As we have pointed out on many occasions, the question of a comprehensive test ban does not lend itself to easy and immediate solutions. We all know that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban depends on the resolution of the complex and stubborn problem of verification. In the absence of progress towards general agreement on effective verification, my Government does not believe it is useful to call for the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. Nor can my Government accept a moratorium on nuclear testing pending conclusion of such an agreement, as called for in operative paragraph 6, since a moratorium which was not adequately verified would have many of the same problems as a formal agreement that did not contain adequate verification provisions.

Although the United States did not support this draft resolution, I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm my country's long-standing commitment to a comprehensive test ban pursuant to an adequately verified treaty, a commitment which, we believe, was advanced this year by the conclusion between my Government and that of the Soviet Union of the Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. MERENNE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683. However, we feel obliged to state that we would have abstained if a separate vote had been taken on operative paragraph 1. This paragraph on which my delegation would have abstained reads as follows: "Condemns all nuclear weapons tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted". My Government regrets the choice of words, because they are so strong as to weaken the effectiveness of the resolution.

Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): My delegation could not vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.683) which has just been voted upon. My delegation has several reasons for taking this position.

(Mr. Dagersuren, Mongolia)

First of all, the draft, which is now a resolution, fails to give a balanced evaluation of the meaning and significance of the Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests, which has been favourably received here by a great number of representatives as a positive step towards the goal we are seeking to achieve. Even some of the co-sponsors duly evaluated this instrument in their statements during the general debate in this Committee. I note further that the Prime Minister of one of the co-sponsoring countries spoke favourably about that agreement. Notwithstanding these facts, operative paragraph 2 of the resolution claims that there has not been any kind of progress in reaching an agreement limiting nuclear weapon tests. That does not truly reflect the real state of affairs.

Secondly, my delegation cannot endorse a stipulation which lumps together different categories of countries. That is to say, countries which have done or are trying to do something about the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have been lumped together with those which are carrying out atmospheric tests in defiance of widely accepted international instruments. I have in mind here operative paragraph 1 of the resolution. I might add that sweeping condemnations cannot help to attain the aim the co-sponsors intend to achieve, an aim which my delegation wholeheartedly shares.

These, inter alia, are the main reasons why my delegation had to abstain on the draft resolution in question.

Mr. KAUFMANN (Netherlands): The Netherlands delegation, in explaining its vote, would like to put on record certain misgivings it has in regard to the draft resolution that has just been adopted.

The Netherlands delegation wishes to dissociate itself from the wording of operative paragraph 1, which condemns -- and I should like to stress this word "condemns" -- all nuclear tests. Of course, we are in favour of a cessation of all nuclear tests and we fully share the concern at the continuance of such testing as expressed in operative paragraph 2, but it is open to question, to say the least, whether

in the present circumstances and given the stated policies of the countries concerned, a blanket condemnation is justified. Besides, my delegation wonders whether such strong language as is used in this paragraph is conducive to the aim that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution have in mind, that is, a comprehensive test ban. In our view, progress towards that aim cannot be enhanced by condemning the very States on whose co-operation such progress really depends. In this respect, I wish to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of the Netherlands for the decision of France to stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This is to be regarded as an important decision and a step in the right direction. My delegation feels that this particular paragraph does not serve any practical purpose and could turn out to be self-defeating. Therefore, if operative paragraph 1 had been put to a separate vote, the Netherlands delegation would have abstained.

Secondly, we are not very happy with operative paragraph 6, in which the idea of a moratorium is put forward. To be effective, the countries involved must have confidence that the moratorium is complied with. A treaty which ensures reciprocity and which includes an agreed verification system is considerably to be preferred to a moratorium which by its character does not include such a system.

(Mr. Kaufmann, Netherlands)

We admit, however, that progress in seismology has reduced this problem, in that many underground tests can already be identified by national means of verification. However, for the same reason, we feel that a treaty banning underground nuclear tests is feasible now.

Another objection is that the lack of binding obligations in a moratorium can lead to disappointments, as we have seen in the past.

On the other hand, my delegation deems it appropriate for the General Assembly to address an urgent appeal to all concerned to strive for a comprehensive test ban. No other measure could contribute more to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since in our view this is to be regarded as the basic purpose of the present resolution, the Netherlands delegation, notwithstanding its serious reservations on operative paragraph 1, has voted in favour of the resolution as a whole.

Mr. ANDREAE (Federal Republic of Germany): I should also like to explain my delegation's vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683.

As my country's representative, the Minister of State, Mr. Karl Moersch, pointed out in his statement in this Committee on 24 October, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has always been in favour of a cessation of all nuclear, weapon tests in all environments, of a universal membership of the partial test ban Treaty of 1963, and of the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. My Government would regard such steps as a decisive contribution towards limiting the nuclear arms race and strengthening the policy of non-proliferation.

We feel, however, that more balanced languages in the resolution would better have served the purpose of this initiative, the aims of which we fully support in principle.

It is for this reason that we abstained.

Mr. SCALAERE (France) (interpretation from French): My delegation voted against the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683. Certainly, it is not discriminatory in contrast to some others that have been submitted in past years. Its very severity spares it from being criticized for that, since

it condemns all nuclear tests equally and requests all Powers who carry out those tests to observe a general moratorium.

However, we wanted to show by our vote that the real problem is not stopping nuclear weapon tests but beginning genuine disarmament in this area and in the area of conventional weapons. Let us assume for a moment that all States agree to put an end to all nuclear tests. What would be the result? Let us not talk about atomic pollution for a moment; there has been enough of a debate on that in another Committee under another item. Let us only consider here the consequences of a complete cessation of nuclear tests with regard to disarmament.

To begin with, it can be asserted that such a cessation would take place only when the major nuclear Powers no longer needed to carry out any more tests. What would happen then? Would the number of nuclear weapons be reduced? Would a single rocket be destroyed? That would certainly not happen, and nuclear arsenals would continue to develop, since for the major Powers it is no longer so much a question of making new nuclear explosive devices or of reducing the size of missiles. The problem is to develop the carriers -- rockets, submarines and bombers; to improve the range and accuracy; and to increase the number of warheads transported by the carriers. A complete cessation of nuclear tests, unfortunately, would have no effect on the development of those programmes.

A complete cessation of nuclear tests is desirable and we would be quite in favour of it provided that it formed the culmination of a methodical undertaking of genuine disarmament, or that it took place within the framework of such an undertaking. Otherwise it would just turn out to be one more deception among so many. By adopting useless resolutions we are now hiding from ourselves the truth that we have not dissipated the nuclear threat which weighs more and more heavily on the world. But that is the real problem that needs to be confronted, one which needs to be tackled more vigorously than we have been doing. That is the problem of genuine disarmament and of effective and controlled destruction of weapons. The rest, unfortunately, is mere fiction.

Mr. di BERNARDO (Italy): As was said by my delegation in our statement on 7 November, the Italian Government holds the view that the achievement of real progress on the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests is of vital importance.

(Mr. di Bernardo, Italy)

"Indeed, a complete ban on all forms of nuclear experiment represents a small step along the road leading to nuclear disarmament and to general and complete disarmament." (2011th meeting, p. 51)

We said that we were of the opinion that expressions of condemnation that contained in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683, serve any really constructive purpose or prove useful for real progress in disarmament negotiations.

Consequently, we have regretfully found ourselves in the position of not being able to support the resolution in question. Therefore the Italian delegation has abstained.

Mr. ELIAS (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation voted in favour of the resolution in document A/C.1/L.683. We are convinced that cessation of nuclear tests and the conclusion of a general agreement to achieve that goal are necessary and urgent steps to prevent the very serious dangers in the arms race and nuclear proliferation.

However, the language used in operative paragraph 1 of this resolution seems excessive to my delegation because of the moral tone of the word "condemn". The inclusion of that term does not enhance the effectiveness of this important resolution. If the first paragraph had been the subject of a separate vote, my delegation would have abstained on it.

Mr. ZULETA (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): Although Colombia's position on this subject has been stated on a number of occasions, I should like to say that a procedural vote in the plenary of the General Assembly made it impossible for us to come here in time for the vote. But we should like the record to show that if we had been present we would have voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.633.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): In previous years we have refused to single out for condemnation those countries which were engaged in atmospheric testing. In condemning such countries we felt that we appeared to be discriminating between them and those which were conducting tests underground. Countries conducting underground tests do not deserve any credit for what would appear to be a measure of self-restraint, that is, avoiding atmospheric testing. They do not need to do so because by the conduct of underground tests they are able, as they clearly demonstrated, to maintain and increase their commanding superiority over others which are endeavouring to catch up with them.

We have, however, this year supported the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.633 because it does condemn all tests in whatever environment they are conducted. Our policy remains that there are five elements to a sound policy designed to eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery: first of all, the complete cessation of all tests; secondly, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty; thirdly, the total cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; fourthly, categorical and unequivocal renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; and fifthly, the dismantling of nuclear armaments. Unless we agree on all these five points there will be no progress whatsoever made in this direction.

It is in the hope that we can work towards the realization of such a five-point programme and that this draft resolution is a step in that direction, that we have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. GUVEN (Turkey) (interpretation from French): If operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.633 had been voted upon separately, I would have abstained because of the use of the word "condemns". With regard to operative paragraph 6 of this draft, I should like to add that we consider that paragraph as a sincere appeal on the part of the majority of members for the cessation of all nuclear tests. But what should be essential to everyone is to achieve a final cessation of all nuclear tests under effective international control.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If there are no other representatives which wish to explain their vote I shall consider that we have concluded consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.633.

We shall now proceed to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687, relating to item 35 of the agenda, entitled "General and complete disarmament", co-sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, India, Liberia, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and Zaire.

As a result of consultations that I have had, I have gathered the impression that as far as this draft resolution is concerned it appears to me that it would hardly be necessary to take a vote. Of course, if any delegation so wishes, we could proceed to a vote.

If there is no objection on the part of members of the Committee, I shall take it that the draft resolution is adopted unanimously.

The draft resolution was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of China in explanation of vote after the vote.

Mr. LIN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): When the resolution on the "Disarmament Decade" was adopted in 1969, my country did not participate in the discussions. Since we have reservations with regard to certain contents of the resolution, we would not have participated in the vote had the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687 been put to a vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If no other representative wishes to explain his vote, I shall consider that we have concluded consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.687.

Let us now proceed to the last draft resolution that we will be considering this afternoon, which is contained in the Addendum No. 29 to document A/9629, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

In this connexion, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the administrative and financial implications of this draft resolution which appear in document A/C.1/L.689. All of this concerns item 31 entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean".

I call on the representative of Bangladesh to explain his vote before the vote.

Mr. KARIM (Bangladesh): I have asked to speak to explain our vote on the draft resolution in the addendum to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9629/Add.1) and to raise a matter of direct and vital concern to Bangladesh.

In the course of his statement in the general debate in this Committee the permanent representative of Bangladesh had occasion to stress this point strongly. I need hardly emphasize the importance of the Indian Ocean to my country, possessing as it does a long coastline and having that Ocean as its only seaboard. In a very real sense the Indian Ocean is an essential lifeline for my country. Given our size, our population, the configuration of our coastline, our strategic location in an area which is gradually becoming the crucible of great-Power confrontation and which has a history of endemic conflict, as demonstrated in the recent past, and given its vital dependence on the seas for resources, food, transportation and navigation, Bangladesh's interest in the Indian Ocean is inevitable and genuine. It is integral to our national interest, therefore, that matters pertaining to the Indian Ocean, and particularly the practical implementation of the concept of a zone of peace, are of crucial significance to us. For those reasons we have welcomed the proposal to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The Prime Minister of Bangladesh has on several occasions spoken in support of that concept. Addressing the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly in September of this year he said:

"We therefore welcome every effort aimed at advancing the process of détente, relaxation of tension, limitation of armaments and promotion of peaceful coexistence in every part of the world, whether in Asia, Africa, Europe or Latin America. In pursuance of this policy we have consistently supported the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area, which has received the powerful endorsement of this Assembly." (A/PV.2243, p. 9-10)

Therefore, while wholeheartedly supporting the draft resolution the hope that due consideration will be given to our desire argument of the Ad Hoc Committee's membership so that those

(Mr. Karim, Bangladesh)

countries which were not Members of the United Nations at the time of the establishment of the Committee may have the opportunity of securing a place on the Committee. My country is not the only one which may be interested in securing membership. The march towards decolonization will bring more littoral States into this world body in course of time.

Already one country occupying a very vital position in the Indian Ocean region is on its way to statehood. There will be many more such countries in the future. The membership of the Ad Hoc Committee should therefore be enlarged with a view to keeping pace with the increased membership of the countries of the Indian Ocean.

Mr. PAMPHUL (Mauritius): I should like to take this opportunity to clarify a situation which is often misunderstood regarding Diego Garcia, which is in the Indian Ocean, the area we are discussing. Several delegates have referred to this island. I should like to inform the Committee that there has never been any signed agreement between the United Kingdom and Mauritius so far as Diego Garcia is concerned. The island was detached from Mauritius long before Mauritius became independent on 12 March 1969. Mauritius still retains the rights of exploitation of the mineral resources of Diego Garcia, as well as fishing rights. Moreover, Air Mauritius utilizes the landing strip on Diego Garcia.

It is often said that Diego Garcia was sold by Mauritius to the United Kingdom for the price of, I believe, £3 million sterling -- I am not very sure about this; it is a moot question, which I shall certainly not go into at this stage and in this Committee. Is it possible that a colonial Power would sell to itself part of a territory before granting independence to that territory? But, as I say, this is not a matter that I am prepared to go into at this stage.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mauritius for his clarification. If he would now tell us how he intends to vote, that would be a proper explanation of vote before the vote.

Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): If I have not made an explanation of vote before the vote, I have certainly clarified the position of Mauritius before the vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9629/Add.1).

The draft resolution was adopted by 79 votes to none with 27 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now call upon those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote on the draft resolution just adopted..

Mr. BARTON (Canada): My delegation abstained in this vote. I should like to make it clear, however, that this does not in any way indicate a lack of positive appreciation of or sympathy towards the intention of the co-sponsors. We have every desire to see fruitful consultations among the Littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the principal maritime users. We remain strongly sympathetic, in principle, to concepts of denuclearized or demilitarized zones where these are feasible and would promote stability, and we continue to welcome the efforts being made to apply those concepts to the Indian Ocean area. However, as I have explained in previous years, we believe also that the responsibility for elaborating specific proposals for such zones rests primarily with the States of the area most directly concerned and that this goal should be substantially achieved before other States with no direct or immediate interest in the regions concerned are called upon to endorse such arrangements.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

The concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace also touches on the interests of maritime users. Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution which has just been adopted requires Canada and other Member States to urge all States with a direct interest in the Indian Ocean to give tangible support to the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

But the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace has been defined only by resolution 2832 (XXVI) at the twenty-sixth session. Canada abstained from voting on that resolution because we had reservations as to the definition of the obligations it implied. The fact that we continue to have these reservations was a further reason for my delegation to abstain from voting on the present resolution.

Mr. ALLEN (United Kingdom): My delegation fully respects the principles which we recognize to have inspired the resolution upon which we have just voted, but nevertheless we have felt obliged to abstain.

We understand and we share the desire of the sponsors and their supporters to maintain and enhance peace and stability in the region of the Indian Ocean. This basic objective underlies British treaty and other commitments and responsibilities within and beyond the area. Our commitments, of course, present no threat whatever to any State in the area.

We nevertheless consider that the resolution might have the effect of preventing the United Kingdom from fulfilling some of its commitments.

In the second place, we must admit to some concern lest some of the arrangements contemplated in the resolution might affect our lawful commerce and that of others upon the high seas, since it could prejudice the facilities which that commerce requires. Any arrangement affecting an area of the high seas is, of course, the legitimate concern not only of the littoral States and the major Powers but also of the whole international community; and in this connexion we have been happy to note the reassurances which the representatives of Japan and Sri Lanka have given on this point today on behalf of the sponsors of the resolution.

(Mr. Allen, United Kingdom)

In the third place, we believe that in one respect the resolution implies a reversal of priorities. It seems to us that the definition of the limits of the zone, and the question which States are littoral to it, should precede rather than follow the declaration of any peace zone. I was interested to see that the representative of Bangladesh had raised this same question on 7 November.

Having said all that, I should like to repeat that we recognize with sympathy the wish of many of the States concerned for a greater measure of security than they enjoy at present. We do not want the area to be the scene of rivalries or tension: we want to see international tension relaxed, and international peace and security strengthened; and we want to see the problems of the States bordering on the Indian Ocean resolved in conditions of peace and tranquillity.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): My delegation abstained from voting on the draft resolution that was before us, and has often had occasion to state its position on the subject of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. We fully understand the anxiety of the States bordering on the Indian Ocean and their desire to rid that area of the seeds of conflict. However, we feel that the essentially praiseworthy objective of establishing a régime of peace in the Indian Ocean area cannot be sought by establishing arrangements that would lead to modifying the essential principles of international law -- in this particular case, the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas, which is one of the oldest and most unchallenged principles -- by a resolution of our General Assembly.

My delegation also would like to make known its views on the consideration of the report of the Secretary-General, drawn up with the assistance of qualified experts, on the specific situation of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, in all its aspects. I refer to document A/AC.159/Rev.1. That document, in its originally published version, gave rise to protests, and my delegation had to send the Secretary-General a letter, dated 13 June 1974, in which the French Government expressed the most explicit reservations in regard to the contents of that report.

(Mr. Mistral, France)

My delegation would like to state that it is fully convinced that the distinguished experts appointed by the Secretary-General did perform the task entrusted to them with all possible competence and impartiality and in perfect good faith. I should like to state this publicly. And if my Government, like other Governments, had to note that the report submitted to us contained "errors, inaccuracies and omissions", it was because the task which our Committee saw fit to call for was obviously impossible to achieve. I would add that, in our view, it was not in keeping with either the objectives of our Organization or the resources available to it.

It is axiomatic that all military Powers wish to keep confidential facts about their armed forces in general, their chain of command and the movements of their land, air and sea units. This is all a matter of military secrecy, and States legitimately consider this to be a prerogative which affects their sovereignty and security. No doubt, certain indications are given by States themselves; no doubt, certain military movements are obviously noticed and become the subject of reports in newspapers or specialized journals; and of course, too, independent experts, on their own, do undertake over-all comprehensive studies with regard to the armaments of States or their military operations.

(Mr. Mistral, France)

But everyone can see that these indications, when they are not from official sources, are liable to be piecemeal, inadequate, wrongly interpreted, if indeed they are not purely and simply erroneous.

The United Nations, mercifully, has no intelligence service, and does not act as an espionage office for its members, and I hope it never will. So how in those circumstances can we ask it to gather information on facts which at least in part are a matter of military secrecy for States?

Those are the reasons that made us object to the reference to the report of the Secretary-General, which, together with what I have just said about our general position with regard to the zone of the Indian Ocean, prompted our delegation to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution before us.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Would any other delegation like to explain its vote on the resolution which has just been adopted?

As there are no more delegations which wish to speak, this concludes our consideration of the draft resolution contained in the addendum of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9629).

I would now like to make an announcement. Grenada is now to be considered one of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 on the question of Korea. Tomorrow we shall be having just one meeting in the morning. I am confident that the afternoon will be devoted to consultations, to speed up the procedure of submitting resolutions, and I understand that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.684 will be voted on at the beginning of the morning meeting.

I should also like to ask the Committee whether it is prepared to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690, on general and complete disarmament, which was introduced a few days ago by the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. MERRBURG (Netherlands): I think that it is a little too early to vote on it.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If none of the sponsors object, we will postpone the voting until a later date. I hope it will be soon. We must make some progress. It is very late. Today we voted on three draft resolutions, but there are consultations going on with regard to many others. So I repeat that our deadline is Friday of next week.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.