

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.210  
25 August 1964  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 25 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Lij Mikael IMRU

(Ethiopia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. GHELEV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA  
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. R.M. TAIT  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. KLUSAK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN  
Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU  
Mr. S.U. PURUSHOTTAM  
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. R. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:  
Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:  
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI  
Mr. H. SOKALSKI

Romania:  
Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. M. IONESCU

Sweden:  
Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH  
Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV  
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:  
Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. S. EL FATATRI  
Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:  
Mr. Peter THOMAS  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Mr. J.S. BODNAR

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the 210th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): So far this session our Tuesday meetings have been devoted to the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles. In particular we have discussed at great length the possibility of establishing a working group to study this problem. Unfortunately we have not yet achieved any positive results. Progress on the substantive and procedural issues involved in this aspect of our work continues to elude us.

This is, of course, a disappointment to those of us who believe that this Conference can produce results. It is a disappointment to all those who look to this Conference for further agreements, either substantive or procedural, which will help to consolidate the détente exemplified by the various agreements already concluded. There will be disappointment also at the United Nations General Assembly if we have to report our inability to settle even the relatively simple procedural question of establishing a working group. We in the United Kingdom delegation still hope that it will in fact be possible to set up such a group before the recess; but I am bound to admit that the prospects do not now appear too encouraging.

I do not propose this morning to dwell at any length on the reasons for the present impasse, but I am sure that an objective observer of our proceedings would agree that the basic reason has been the increasingly negative attitude adopted by our Soviet and East European colleagues. It is a matter for regret that they have taken a backward step in recent weeks and have reverted to a position of inflexibility sadly reminiscent of their attitude at previous sessions.

If there was any lingering doubt on this score, it was removed by the statements made by our Soviet and Czechoslovak colleagues at the 204th meeting and by our Bulgarian and Polish colleagues at the 206th and 208th meetings respectively. All those statements confirmed our impression that our Soviet and East European colleagues have now equated the so-called "nuclear umbrella" concept with their own particular version of it — that is to say, the proposal put forward by Mr. Gromyko in 1963 (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Thus, in asking us to accept that concept as a precondition for a working group, they are in effect asking us to accept Mr. Gromyko's proposal in principle before it can be examined in a working group.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

We have repeatedly stressed that we are prepared to examine that proposal in such a group. We have even said that we are willing to discuss it first in a working group. But we are in no position to judge, let alone accept, that proposal before it has been clarified and before its validity or otherwise has been properly assessed.

In so far as we understand Mr. Gromyko's proposal, it is certainly, I agree, an improvement on the unrealistic Soviet proposals (ENDC/2) submitted to this Conference in March 1962. Its most significant feature is, of course, the proposed retention of nuclear deterrents by both sides until the end of stage III. It is encouraging that, in that respect at least, the Soviet Government has now apparently recognized the soundness of the Western plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3), which, of course, also envisages the retention of nuclear deterrents by both sides during the disarmament process. Indeed, the Western plan was based on that realistic proposition from the outset.

Mr. Gromyko's proposal therefore means that, as our Swedish colleague pointed out a month ago, "agreement on fundamentals can now be taken for granted" (ENDC/PV.202, p.6) on that important issue. That is why we gave a qualified welcome to Mr. Gromyko's proposal, so far as it goes. But the fact remains that that proposal does not go nearly far enough as a step towards common sense. In a number of important respects it is still neither clear nor satisfactory. Incidentally, our Soviet and East European colleagues have themselves admitted that the proposal lacks clarity. Mr. Zorin, for example, told us that it does not give "any concrete formulation of what is meant by a 'nuclear umbrella' in terms of its specific characteristics." (ENDC/PV.194, p.32) Mr. Kurka also has told us that Mr. Gromyko's proposal "is not a project worked out in detail" (ENDC/PV.204, p.16). That indeed is true. In our view there are far too many aspects of that proposal which are still obscure and which have not been explained to us.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

First of all, it is still not clear how many nuclear delivery vehicles should, in the view of the Soviet Government, be retained in stages II and III. Mr. Zorin himself admitted that Mr. Gromyko's proposal "does not contain any figures" (ENDC/PV.194, p.32). That is no doubt the reason why he told us that a working group should examine, among other things, the "number" (ENDC/PV.192, p.25) of missiles which, in the Soviet Government's view, should be retained until the end of the disarmament process. Soviet representatives have, then, been reluctant to do more than merely indicate some broad ranges of figures. But even those are far too wide to enable us to determine with any precision how far Mr. Gromyko's proposal differs quantitatively from our own proposals. Thus the formula "the retention of a strictly limited and agreed number" could mean almost anything.

Next, there is the question of the kind of missiles to be retained. Here it is not clear why Mr. Gromyko's proposal apparently envisages the retention of only land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. In particular, it is still not clear why the retention of sea-borne missiles is apparently excluded. I need hardly remind the Committee that the relative invulnerability of sea-borne missiles makes them highly suitable for a deterrent or retaliatory purpose.

In a recent address at the Kremlin to military graduates, Chairman Khrushchev also appeared to recognize that very important characteristic of sea-borne missiles. This is what he said:

"Ten years ago [we in the Soviet Union] faced the necessity of rearming our Navy, which at that time was based on cruisers, destroyers and other -- mainly surface -- ships. These weapons have largely become obsolete in present conditions of warfare because all surface facilities are now vulnerable from the air as well as from the shore and can be destroyed at long range. That is why we set out to do our utmost to rearm our naval forces and to make the submarine fleet the 'foundation of foundations' of our naval forces' strength."

Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that the Soviet Union "had to create a nuclear submarine fleet as well as our other armed forces: our Navy received these terrible weapons." (Pravda, 9 July 1964, p.2)

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

If that is Mr. Khrushchev's view, it is still not clear to us, as I have said, why Mr. Gromyko's proposal excludes the retention of sea-borne missiles. Nor is it clear to us why his proposal provides for the retention of anti-ballistic missiles. I am sure the Committee now recognizes that the retention of such missiles could very well undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrents to be retained by both sides.

Let us suppose that State A possessed an effective anti-ballistic-missile system while State B did not. In such circumstances State A might possibly not be deterred from committing aggression by State B's apparent capacity to threaten and inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. That is because it would believe that it could ward off the retaliatory blow from State B by means of its anti-ballistic missiles and thus avoid unacceptable damage. Therefore Mr. Gromyko's proposal seems to contain an inherent contradiction. The retention of anti-ballistic missiles could compromise the purpose and effectiveness of the deterrents to be retained.

So, as I have said, it is still unclear why the Soviet Government should wish to run the risk of upsetting in this way the stability of the balance of nuclear deterrent power on which peace and security will largely depend during the disarmament process.

I turn now to another point. Soviet representatives have not told us what, in their view, should be the approximate number and explosive power of nuclear warheads to be retained. I have noted in this connexion that both Mr. Zorin and Mr. Tsarapkin have implied (ENDC/PV.192, p.25; PV.198, p.30) that it would be only in the working group that we could examine this crucial question of the "power" of the missiles to be retained and the "strength" of the "nuclear umbrella".

Next, it is not clear how declared and legally-retained missiles would be verified under Mr. Gromyko's proposal. Last session Mr. Tsarapkin hinted that control of such missiles at the launching pads would amount to more than merely counting their number to ensure that it corresponded to the number permitted (ENDC/PV.163, p.24). He implied that the control measures apparently envisaged by the Soviet Government would be able in some undefined way to prevent the launching of an aggressive nuclear strike. But he has not explained how in fact this would work. Indeed, if those measures were such as to prevent the launching of missiles in all circumstances, then it is difficult to see how those missiles could be said to constitute effective nuclear deterrents.

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Finally -- and this is a point to which I drew attention at our last session -- it is not clear how, under Mr. Gromyko's proposal, the Soviet Government envisages that the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles would be phased down to whatever level it may have in mind at the beginning of stage II.

These, then, are some of the aspects of Mr. Gromyko's proposal which are still by no means clear to us. To sum up, there is obscurity over the number and the nature of the missiles to be retained, over the power of the retained warheads, over the verification of what would legally remain, and over the phasing of destruction. This list is not necessarily complete; my colleagues could no doubt add to it. Indeed, our Soviet colleagues themselves have mentioned other matters pertaining to Mr. Gromyko's proposal which are yet to be explained. For example, Mr. Zorin suggested that a working group might consider "the manner of distribution" of the missiles to be retained, and "the order of their destruction at the end of the third stage" (ENDC/PV.192, p.25).

I should now like to explain why, apart from being so nebulous in various important respects, Mr. Gromyko's proposal contains certain features which are even now unsatisfactory.

First, this proposal apparently envisages a world in which nuclear deterrents would be retained by only the United States and the Soviet Union. The Committee will recall that we have in the past reserved the United Kingdom's position on this fundamental question. I certainly do so again today.

Our second objection is that Mr. Gromyko's proposal seems impracticable and possibly unsafe. It apparently envisages an immense amount of physical destruction of armaments in the short period of only eighteen months which the Soviet Union proposes for stage I. In our view this would amount to a drastic, unrealistic and unacceptable overloading of that stage. It is quite unreasonable to expect States to destroy -- even if this could be done, which is doubtful -- so much of what they consider to be their main means of security in such a short period of time without first establishing a much higher degree of confidence.

Some representatives may be tempted to believe that the confidence required could be created by massive destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles as soon as possible. That is a view with which I have some sympathy; but it is a view which, unfortunately, I cannot accept. We believe that precipitate destruction of almost

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all nuclear delivery vehicles in such a short period of time as eighteen months could not fail to be disorderly, unbalanced and hence potentially dangerous. Indeed, it could well have precisely the opposite effect to that intended; it could lead to an early breakdown of the confidence built up before the beginning of the disarmament process. I need hardly stress the disastrous results which such a breakdown in confidence would entail. We do not believe that it would be worth running the risk of creating strategic instability solely for the sake of speed.

Our third objection is that, as Soviet representatives have often stressed, Mr. Gromyko's proposal is inextricably linked with other measures in stage I of the Soviet plan which in our view are unsatisfactory. The Committee has not yet completed its examination of those measures; but it is already clear from our discussions so far that, taken together, those measures could place the Soviet Union in a distinctly advantageous position, especially in Europe, at the end of stage I. Let me explain why.

Although I personally do not attribute to the present Soviet Government aggressive intentions towards Western Europe, nevertheless from the point of view of Western security one cannot ignore the fact that at the end of stage I of the Soviet plan the Soviet Union would have in Europe an advantage in tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and rocket launchers. It would have an advantage in the speed with which it could mobilize reserves and reintroduce a large number of front-line formations into its army. It would have the advantage of operating on interior lines. These would provide the Soviet Union with the ability not only to move forces and armaments quickly towards Western objectives of its own choosing but also to reinforce them speedily.

Moreover, the Soviet Union would have an enormous advantage in that its forces and armaments would be established already on the European continent and its military formations would be battle-ready. Finally, although the Soviet plan would mean the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and would prohibit joint military manoeuvres by the Soviet Union and its allies, Soviet numerical dominance in Eastern Europe and the compactness of Soviet armed forces with their unified command structure and planning organization would be factors of enormous advantage.

In contrast, Western Europe would be placed in an extremely disadvantageous position at the end of stage I of the Soviet plan. All United States, Canadian and United Kingdom forces would have been withdrawn across the seas from the

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European continent. Against that, the Soviet Union would be in a position to overrun large parts of Western Europe before Western forces -- and in particular their heavy equipment -- could return. The lack of an existing international command and planning system would be a crucial disadvantage for the West. Western defence would be fragmented into a number of relatively small and widely-separated national armies which would be prohibited from any military co-operation with one another and which would be unable to carry out joint military manoeuvres.

Taken all together, then, Soviet stage I measures could lead to serious imbalance in Europe. They could create a potentially destabilizing shift in favour of Soviet conventional strength in stages II and III, when, under the Soviet plan, land power might become more decisive in its own right. Moreover, Mr. Gromyko's proposal apparently excludes the retention, not only of any significant interdiction capability of a conventional character, but also of tactical nuclear weapons with their means of delivery. Thus the West might have no option in the event of attack but to fall back on strategic nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe.

In the fourth place, Mr. Gromyko's proposal is unsatisfactory because the verification arrangements envisaged by the Soviet Government make no attempt to deal with the crucial problem of clandestine production and retention of nuclear delivery vehicles over and above the number to be legally retained.

Earlier in my statement I referred to the question of control over the legally-retained missiles -- a point on which Mr. Gromyko's proposal is obscure. But that proposal seems to ignore altogether the danger posed by missiles illegally retained or produced, a danger which would become progressively greater as the number of legally-retained missiles is reduced. If the Soviet Government has in mind the retention of merely a very low number of missiles under Mr. Gromyko's proposal -- and that seems to be its intention --, then it poses this particular problem in its most acute form at the very outset of the disarmament process. We have often explained that we do not propose to dismantle our main means of security without adequate assurance that the Soviet Union is doing the same. Mr. Gromyko's proposal provides no such assurance.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko's proposal is unsatisfactory because it is unrelated to adequate and effective peace-keeping arrangements. We have drawn the Committee's attention to this point on previous occasions, and therefore I shall not do so again today.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Those, then, are some of the main reasons why we regard Mr. Gromyko's proposal, in so far as we understand it, as unsatisfactory. I hope that as a result of my remarks today the Committee will understand why we cannot agree in principle to Mr. Gromyko's proposal and why we cannot accept, as a precondition for a working group, the Soviet version of the "nuclear umbrella" concept, which is to all intents and purposes precisely the same as that proposal.

In conclusion, I should like to stress three points. The first is this. The fact that we in the West cannot agree in principle to Mr. Gromyko's proposal and that the Soviet Union apparently cannot agree to our proposals is surely no reason why we should not agree to set up a working group. On the contrary, that is precisely the reason why we should establish such a group -- and do it soon -- in order to help us to resolve the differences which still exist between us after nearly two and a half years of plenary discussions. When all is said and done, these are merely differences about how we should achieve our common and agreed objective.

My second point is this. Although, as I have explained today, Mr. Gromyko's proposal is unclear to us in various important respects, and although we have a number of basic objections to that proposal in so far as we can understand it, we are quite prepared to examine it in a working group in order finally to assess its validity or otherwise. Indeed, much of what I have said today shows how important it is that a working group should be set up to do this, among other things.

That leads me to my third and final point. It is this. We in the West cannot be expected to agree to a working group the terms of reference of which are restricted to Mr. Gromyko's proposal alone, to the exclusion of other proposals, including our own and those which other delegations may wish to submit. This is a reasonable position, which the non-aligned delegations have supported. I do not see why our Soviet and East European colleagues still seem to find it difficult to adopt the same approach. This would give them an opportunity to explain and expound Mr. Gromyko's proposal. At the same time it would provide us with a chance to explain and expound our own proposals. Neither side would be committed to prior acceptance of the other's proposals; but a forum would have been established in which both sides could continue to negotiate in greater and more rewarding detail in order to resolve their present differences.

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The reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles is one of the most crucial problems confronting us in the field of general and complete disarmament. We all regret the lack of progress so far at this session. We still have a chance to make a significant move. Therefore I reiterate my hope that we can agree to set up a working group before the end of our present session.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with great attention to the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, and are compelled to note with regret that he confined himself to summarizing and repeating his previous statements on the subject and that there is nothing new in what he said. Of course we shall study this statement in the verbatim record and, apparently, we shall have quite a number of comments to make on it. But we shall do so at some other time.

Evidently the moment has come to sum up the results of the discussions at the present session of the Committee on the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The recent Tuesday meetings, when our Committee had to discuss topics connected with this problem, were held in a sluggish manner, arguments dried up, and in fact the discussion began to peter out. Everybody felt that the ways leading to agreement were blocked, that matters had reached a deadlock. It is necessary to ascertain the reasons for the deadlock; then the prospects for the negotiations will become clear and perhaps ways to agreement will open up.

First of all, I should like to remind the Committee that the "nuclear umbrella" proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), which by its nature is a compromise one, was welcomed with approval by the overwhelming majority of States, which recognized that this proposal provided a good basis for an agreement in principle between the sides on the question of eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. In this connexion the delegation of the Soviet Union expressed its readiness (ENDC/PV.188, p.17), at the beginning of the present session of the Committee, to examine in a working group, with the participation of experts, the specific problems deriving from the concept of a "nuclear umbrella", if this concept is accepted by the Committee as the basis for solving the problem of eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- the key problem in the whole programme of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That proposal to set up a working group was in fact a further development of a similar proposal put forward by the representative of India at the previous session of the Committee. We have in mind the statement made by the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, at the last session of the Committee, on 24 March, when he proposed that we should adopt the principle of a "nuclear umbrella". Mr. Trivedi declared: "Such acceptance could well break the circumscribing circle in which we find ourselves today". (ENDC/PV.177, p.28). That proposal by the representative of India met with the approval of many delegations.

It was then that the question arose of agreeing on the basis for the activities of the working group. The way the matter stood was that, following agreement on the basis for its activities, the working group would be able even during the present session of the Committee to proceed to the consideration of the practical questions and technical details deriving from the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", and that towards the end of the session it would be able to report to the Committee on the results of its activities.

It is obvious that the reaching of agreement in the Committee, with the help of a working group, on such an important question as the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of the "nuclear umbrella" concept would have been a considerable achievement which the Committee could report to the United Nations General Assembly as a first great success in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. However, it very soon became clear that the task of determining the basis for the activities of the working group, which at first sight appeared comparatively simple and by its nature rather a matter of procedure, came up against serious difficulties. This fact requires explanation.

It is true that some of the Western delegations, for instance, the United Kingdom delegation on 11 August (ENDC/PV.206, pp.15 et seq.), have tried to give some kind of explanation of the situation that has come about. Today the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, also tried to do so. However, if we are to call a spade a spade, we are bound to say that the Western delegations have not gone beyond the most superficial and banal arguments about the so-called "inflexibility" of the Soviet Union, about which Mr. Thomas spoke to us today, or beyond arguments which throw no light on the real state of affairs and can only be calculated to cause confusion. But in such a serious matter as the negotiations on general and complete disarmament what we need is clarity. It seems to us that such clarity

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is now particularly necessary to the Committee since, after two months of discussion on the question of the activities of the working group, the participants in the negotiations need to ask themselves how far we have got as a result of this discussion and where we stand.

After thoroughly analysing the whole course of our discussions on the working group, after weighing all the arguments put forward by the parties, we come to the conclusion that the differences in regard to the question of the terms of reference of the working group reflect much more serious and much more profound differences between the sides in regard to the essence of the actual approach to the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and to the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. The discussions in the Committee, like the discussions between the two co-Chairmen, regarding the basis for the activities of the working group appear only outwardly to have the character of a procedural dispute, whereas actually in the course of these discussions there has been a clash between two basically-different approaches to disarmament.

Of course it may be asked why that is so; why does the Soviet delegation speak of differences of principle in the very approach of the sides to the problem of general and complete disarmament, if the United States and its NATO allies represented in this Committee also declare that their main aim is to rid mankind of the terrible menace of a devastating nuclear war and to ensure trustworthy security for all States? On this point, which is the main one, do not the positions of the sides coincide?

This question can be answered as follows: Yes; as far as words are concerned, in the statements of the two sides regarding their interest in eliminating the menace of nuclear war and ensuring the security of all States there is indeed, if not coincidence, at least a certain verbal similarity. However, the gist of the matter lies not in words, but in the practical steps taken by each of the sides, in the proposals they put forward in regard to the substance of the problem of disarmament, and in the ways they suggest for solving this problem.

And in this respect, we must say quite definitely and frankly, the positions of the sides are as opposed as before: if one of them proposes a way which would really lead to the attainment of the proclaimed goal -- the complete elimination of the menace of nuclear war --, the other side puts forward proposals which put us

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off the track and help towards continuing the arms race. These two different approaches have been given their clearest expression in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2), which was submitted by the Soviet Government to the Committee for consideration two and a half years ago, and in the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted by the United States Government (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3).

The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union is based on the premise that the surest way of freeing humanity from the menace of nuclear war and from war altogether, the most reliable guarantee of the security of States and nations, is disarmament itself. Accordingly the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) provides, over a period of four to five years, for the disbanding of all armed forces and the elimination of all the armaments of States, including the entire nuclear arsenals, all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, all foreign military bases in foreign territories, all conventional armaments, all military establishments and all kinds of military activity. States would retain only limited, agreed contingents of police (militia) equipped with light conventional weapons, and nothing else.

When there is an end to armaments, there will also be an end to the menace of war. When the means and weapons of warfare have been destroyed, the danger of war will have been completely eliminated. To ensure the security of States by eliminating the danger of war -- that is the philosophy of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament.

But that is not all. The Soviet Union's proposals for general and complete disarmament are drawn up in such a way that not only after the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament, but also during that process itself, the security of States would be strengthened from stage to stage, and that at each stage, taken separately, equal conditions of security would be guaranteed for each of the sides.

Let us take the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty envisages, at this stage, the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (with the exception of the "nuclear umbrella"), the liquidation of all foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from such

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territories, and a substantial reduction in the armed forces of States (those of the Soviet Union and the United States would be reduced to 1,900,000 men for each), and a 30 per cent reduction in armaments. Each of these measures separately and all of them taken together would make it possible at the very beginning of the process of disarmament, at the first stage, to establish a world which would be immeasurably safer than the present world and safer for all. There would be, in the first place, actual security from nuclear attack.

Speaking at the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace on 10 July 1962, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, said:

"Without rockets, aircraft, surface warships, or submarines, nuclear arms would no longer be dangerous, even if an unscrupulous Government stowed some of them away. The destruction of all means of delivery would make it impossible for any country possessing atomic weapons to strike a nuclear blow at other countries." (ENDC/47, p.10)

The possibility of aggression by one State against another, or by one group of States against another, using armed forces equipped with conventional weapons, would also be considerably reduced. In fact, the level of the material basis for waging war would be practically reduced to that of a century ago. The greatly-reduced armed forces retained by States would not have any bomber aircraft, submarines, large surface warships, artillery or large-calibre rocket launchers -- that is, arms which would have been eliminated as possible vehicles of nuclear weapons.

Thus armies would be deprived of the basic means of aggression and no potential aggressor would be able to count on the element of surprise, a lightning advance into an adversary's territory, or a massive blow from the air or sea aimed at the vital centres of the other State. Moreover, under conditions of international control it would simply be impossible to concentrate and deploy sufficient forces and military equipment for an attack.

The security of States would be further strengthened as a result of implementation of the disarmament measures for the second stage proposed by the Soviet Government. The elimination of all nuclear weapons together with the

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complete cessation of their production, as well as the total elimination of all other weapons of mass destruction, would ensure the final liberation of all countries from the nuclear menace. The further substantial reduction in the numbers of the armed forces of States (the Soviet Union and the United States would each retain only one million men), in conjunction with the reduction of conventional armaments by a further 35 per cent, would practically eliminate the menace of war with the use of conventional weapons, or at any rate the menace of a world war. With the disbandment, at the third stage, of the remaining regular armies -- in a word, with the breaking-up of the military machine of States -- the nations would be free for all time from the danger of any war, even a limited local war.

That is how we envisage that the security of States will be guaranteed through disarmament. That is how we envisage equal conditions of security being guaranteed to all in the process of the physical elimination of armed forces and armaments.

So far we have spoken only about material factors. But there are also moral factors, and they, too, in the process of disarmament, will work in the direction of strengthening the security of States. Once governments have agreed on general and complete disarmament, once people throughout the world see the most powerful means of modern warfare being thrown on bonfires, and see hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of yesterday's soldiers returning to peaceful labour, there will no longer be any room for war propaganda, or appeals for war, or for the organization of secret or open military activities, even if in some particular country -- and this possibility cannot be excluded -- certain circles or persons might be interested in it.

That is the Soviet plan for disarmament. That is our approach to the question of ridding humanity of the menace of nuclear war. That plan, that approach, really ensures the achievement of that great aim.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The other approach is that contained in the proposals put forward by the United States. On several occasions we have drawn the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that the United States proposals for general and complete disarmament do not at all provide for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles. On the contrary, as the representatives of the United States have themselves frequently explained to the Committee, those proposals do not preclude the possibility of retaining nuclear weapons even after the process of general and complete disarmament is completed, at least, for instance, in order to equip a peace-keeping international force with such weapons.

There are no clear provisions in the United States plan for the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, which are strong-points for aggression and provocation -- I mean military provocation, above all. The plan contains no precise provisions for the complete elimination of the military machine of States. As regards the key question, the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we have already had occasion to show in great detail, at the meeting on 14 July (ENDC/PV.198, p.28), that the United States plan provides for a system of reduction under which the possibility of destroying every living thing on the earth, not only once but several times over, would be retained right to the end of the disarmament process.

There is nothing in the United States plan about the strengthening of the security of States, or equal conditions of security for all States. The plan does not provide for this at all. On the contrary, from the first stage to the last that plan pursues the aim of gaining unilateral advantages for the NATO Powers to the detriment of the security interests of the socialist countries and, of course, other countries as well. United States leaders at the highest level, including the Secretary of Defense, have referred to this. Anyone who is acquainted with the calculations of United States strategists, on which they base their evaluation of the balances of forces in the field of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, is bound to come to this conclusion.

This also applies to the proposals of the United States, to its approach to the question of military bases, and, in fact, to all other questions. We have frequently spoken about this at meetings of the Committee, and we do not think

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there is any need now to go over all the details again. This aim of the United States to secure unilateral military advantages for the NATO Powers in the process of disarmament is camouflaged by the "doctrine" of the maintenance of balance in the field of armaments. This "doctrine" is the quintessence of the present United States philosophy of disarmament, and not only disarmament.

Leading statesmen in the United States have mentioned this "balance of armaments" or "balance of forces" as the basic doctrine of United States world policies. The United States representatives never cease talking about it during the disarmament negotiations. Quite recently, on 7 July, Mr. Timberlake, as you recall, gave us a long lecture on the theory of the "balance of armaments". He told us -- and I quote from the verbatim record:

"We all fully recognize the danger inherent in these terrible weapons," -- he was referring to nuclear weapons -- "and yet we must continue to refine them and retain them in order to deter any potential aggressor. We must continue to do so until we have been able to agree on a safeguarded, balanced method of reducing these arsenals. ...

"However, the level of deterrence depends on existing conditions. Under present conditions each State has made its own determination of its necessary deterrent. In the case of the United States that deterrent represents the minimum necessary for its security. The number of nuclear delivery vehicles may seem too high to some. But our security requirements and the existing military balance are not determined by numbers alone." (ENDC/PV.196, pp. 24, 25)

It is perfectly clear from this quotation from Mr. Timberlake's statement that the essence of the policy pursued by the Western Powers in the disarmament negotiations is not to eliminate the menace of nuclear war as quickly as possible, but to maintain it as long as possible; not to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the earliest stage of disarmament, but to retain the maximum quantity, which Mr. Timberlake calls the minimum necessary for the United States, to the very end of the disarmament process.

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But the doctrine of the "balance of armaments" or "balance of forces" is not a new one; it has its roots in the distant past. And since today we wish to try to ascertain the real causes of the difficulties that have arisen in the negotiations in the Committee, we must recall certain facts relating to that past. These facts show that the doctrine of the "balance of armaments" never guaranteed security for anyone. It did not help to settle a single international question, and never brought the peoples anything but an armaments race and war. It could not have been otherwise. The policy of "balance of armaments" merely led to an intensification of the armaments race and the expansion of military programmes.

It is also well known that the policy of a "balance of armaments" or "balance of forces" has always served as a convenient screen for the activities of those States which at some particular stage of their history have carried out a policy of expansion and aggression, and on this account were concerned to surpass in might and numbers the armaments of their supposed adversaries -- their intended victims of aggression. That is how events developed in the nineteenth century when, after the Congress of Vienna, the doctrine of the "balance of power" was advanced as the main slogan of European and international diplomacy.

Even then, in the nineteenth century, the periods of peace were growing shorter and were being increasingly turned into periods of preparation for the next war during the ever-decreasing intervals between wars. Even then the armaments race had started on its ascending spiral, and rivalry between the imperialist States in the struggle for the division and redivision of the world brought the nations step by step to the First World War.

On the eve of the First World War, General Ludendorff, one of the most prominent representatives of aggressive militarism in imperial Germany, revealed with a soldier's bluntness the simple mechanics of the relationship between the arms race and the outbreak of war. I quote his words:

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"It is necessary to accustom the nation to the idea that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to foil the plans of the adversary ... We must conduct our policy in such a way that under the pressure of powerful armaments, great sacrifices and a disquieting political atmosphere the outbreak of war will be a relief".

The First World War caused the loss of millions of human lives; but unfortunately even that dreadful experience did not induce the governments of the capitalist Powers to renounce the policy of an unbridled armaments race, camouflaged by the doctrine of the "balance of power". On the contrary, they made this fallacious doctrine the basis of all international activity connected with disarmament negotiations and questions of consolidating peace and international security. This could only lead -- and in fact did lead -- to the most negative consequences.

The governments of the States which founded the League of Nations wrote into Article 8 of its Covenant that:

"... the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and ... international obligations".

This meant that it was not disarmament but the reduction of armaments that all the States recognized as the pledge of security. This idea was still further developed in the ill-fated resolution XIV adopted by the General Assembly of the League of Nations, which served as a basis for all negotiations on disarmament in the years between the two wars. That resolution, which was adopted in this very same Palace of the Nations where we are now sitting, read as follows:

"1. No scheme for the reduction of armaments ... can be fully successful unless it is general.

"2. In the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country.

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"3. Such a guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement which should be open to all countries ...

"4. ... previous consent to this reduction [a general reduction of armaments] is therefore the first condition for the Treaty".

(League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 9, October 1922, P. 26)

As you see, disarmament was made dependent upon receiving other guarantees of safety, which, as very soon became evident, implied that same "balance of armaments", "balance of power". Thus a vicious circle was created.

At the Washington Conference of 1921-22 the first practical attempt was made to put into practice the principle of "balance of armaments" with a view to limiting the armaments race. How many eulogies were pronounced at the time in connexion with the Washington Conference, which established a specific balance in naval armaments between the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan! What extensive propaganda was made about the General Conference on Disarmament, which was held from 1929 to 1933 and based its work on the slogans "equality" and "balance" of armaments! At the same time the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union for full and partial disarmament, based not on the fallacious doctrine of the "balance of armaments" but on the principle that disarmament itself was the decisive guarantee of security, were rejected by the Western Powers -- in fact, even without serious consideration.

How all this ended and what it led to you obviously know quite well. You will recall how in the thirties the pace of the armaments race was increased, how the General Conference on Disarmament reached a stalemate, how militaristic Japan used the Washington Agreement merely as a starting-point for developing its aggressive military machine, and how Hitler's Germany acted in the same way in regard to the London Agreement of 1935 on the limitation of naval armaments. Then, just before the nineteen-forties -- and mankind will never be able to forget this -- the world was plunged into the Second World War which caused the loss of many more millions of human lives than the First World War.

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The decisive victory in the Second World War of the anti-Hitler coalition, which had declared its aim to be not only the defeat of the aggressors but the establishment of an enduring, stable peace through the creation of a system of international security, opened up for the first time the prospect of a constructive approach to the solution of the problem of guaranteeing the security of all States. This prospect was inseparably linked with the recognition of disarmament as the true guarantee of security, as the real way of giving all States equal conditions of security. This was laid down at the time in the Charter of the United Nations in the following words:

"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both".

(Article 11, paragraph 1)

Thus, in the new historical conditions that have come about as a result of the victory of the peoples over the forces of aggression and fascism, the founders of the United Nations rejected altogether the discredited doctrine of the "balance of armaments" and for the first time proclaimed disarmament itself to be the guarantee of the security of States. In accordance with the aforementioned provision of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly, in its resolution 41 (1), adopted on 14 December 1946, stressed the close connexion between the problem of security and that of disarmament, and recommended to the Security Council that it should immediately proceed to formulate practical measures in the field of disarmament. It also urged the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations to take effective measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and their removal from the national armaments of States. Subsequently the Security Council, in its resolution adopted in February 1947, emphasized that disarmament was --

"... a most important measure for strengthening international peace and security, and that the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly on this subject is one of the most urgent and important tasks before the Security Council ..." (S/INF/2, p.6)

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However, when it came to practical negotiations the Western Powers unfortunately once again rejected the principle of guaranteeing security through disarmament, and again dragged out the doctrine of the "balance of armaments" that had been condemned by history. All the proposals on disarmament put forward by the Western Powers since the end of the nineteen-forties have been based on this fallacious doctrine; and it has been used to justify the course they have taken of developing and constantly intensifying the armaments race. Basing themselves on this doctrine of the "balance of forces", the Western Powers have tried to cover up the striving of the United States to retain for itself a monopoly of nuclear weapons.

In the new conditions, the conditions of the atomic age, the doctrine of guaranteeing the security of States through the "balance of armaments" -- or, as it is now called, the "balance of fear", the "balance of terror" -- was bound to prove itself even more unsuitable for solving problems of disarmament and even more dangerous to the nations on account of its consequences. It has led all disarmament negotiations into a deadlock; it has turned them into a dialogue between the deaf; it has deprived them in fact of any practical meaning. In these negotiations the Western Powers have substituted for the idea of disarmament -- that is, the elimination of the material means of warfare, and in the first place nuclear weapons and their means of delivery -- the idea of retaining nuclear weapons as a factor in international relations.

This same doctrine of the "balance of armaments", as you are well aware, has been used by certain circles to develop the nuclear armaments race at such a rate that at the present time the world stocks of nuclear weapons are equivalent to several thousand tons of TNT for every man, woman and child. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, has laid bare the aim behind the doctrine of the "balance of armaments" or "balance of forces" in the following words:

"It is said, for instance, that the West must arm in order to balance its forces with those of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But who can assert that at some given period it is really possible to achieve the so-called 'balance of forces?' Would it not be more accurate to say that the old theory of the 'balance of power' is being used to justify a dangerous arms race without an end? Such races have always their logical end: war".

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You will certainly remember that at the beginning of the nineteen-sixties the gigantic increase in the rate of the nuclear arms race, together with the failure of all disarmament negotiations, aroused such great concern among the nations, in world public opinion, in all peace-loving countries, that the problem of disarmament came to the fore in world politics. In this situation the Western Powers found themselves compelled for a time to withdraw from the forefront their doctrine of the "balance of armaments", which was blocking the way to constructive negotiations on disarmament.

In the Joint Declaration of Agreed Principles, unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 (ENDC/5), the Western Powers adhered to the concept of ensuring equal conditions of security through disarmament. Therefore it was possible to include in the Joint Declaration a number of important provisions relating to the scope and nature of measures for general and complete disarmament, and also the very important paragraph 5, which, as you know, reads as follows:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament" -- disarmament, not reduction of armaments -- "should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all".

(ENDC/5, p. 2)

Then, once again, the hope was born that there would be progress in the disarmament negotiations. It was with that hope in mind that our Committee started its work two and a half years ago.

But what happened afterwards, what is happening at present in our Committee, we know all too well. Once again, as before, in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament two opposite positions, two opposite approaches to disarmament and the safeguarding of international security are clashing in the Committee. One of these is based on the sound, realistic concept of safeguarding the security of States through disarmament -- that is through the elimination of the danger of war. The other is based on the ill-fated doctrine of the "balance of forces" which has already caused the nations indescribable sufferings and sacrifices.

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These two approaches clash when we consider the programme of general and complete disarmament as a whole, and when we discuss the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as the key question of this programme, or again when we discuss such a particular point in regard to the basis for the activities of the working group as the "nuclear umbrella". For this reason, and precisely for this reason, we are making no progress.

In the matter of setting up a working group the Western Powers are certainly not acting in a straightforward way when they speak of maintaining the "balance of armaments". It would be more correct to say that in this matter the Western Powers are carrying out fairly complicated strategic and tactical manoeuvres. They agree, you see, to discuss in the working group not only their plan for a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but also the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella". They even tell us that they are prepared to give priority in the working group to discussion of the "nuclear umbrella" proposal.

But all this "flexibility" of the Western Powers has a quite definite purpose. By acting in this way, the Western Powers are striving to involve the Committee in a discussion based on the fallacious concept of maintaining the "balance of armaments", on which as a matter of fact the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear vehicles is based. But to follow that path would be tantamount to renouncing the fundamental interests of disarmament. To follow the path of recognizing the doctrine of the "balance of armaments", if only as one of the bases of our work, would have the same fatal consequences for the present disarmament negotiations as the acceptance of this doctrine had in the nineteen-thirties for the General Conference on Disarmament in the League of Nations.

In these conditions what happens next depends on the Western Powers. If they manage to discard the fallacious doctrine of maintaining the "balance of armaments" as the basis of their policy in the field of disarmament, we shall have business-like constructive negotiations on disarmament; but if they fail to do so, the Committee will inevitably continue to mark time and disappoint the hopes of the peoples.

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That is the position. It will not become any better if we look at it through rose-tinted spectacles, as would seem to be more agreeable to some of us. It will not improve if we seek for some "intermediate" formulations for the terms of reference of the working group which would merely cover up the differences of principle between the approaches of the two sides to this question and to the whole problem of disarmament. The situation will not change for the better if, without reaching any agreement at the political level, we transfer our disagreements of principle to technical experts for consideration. On the contrary, that could only worsen the situation, add confusion to differences of opinion, and substitute for businesslike negotiations on disarmament hopeless discussions by technical experts, to whom in the present conditions we are unable to give any agreed directives for their work.

Obviously we must recognize that, at the present time, the conditions are not yet ripe for the establishment of a working group in connexion with the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. This will only be possible when we have reached agreement on the "nuclear umbrella". We do not lose hope. Life is the best teacher, and life is able to open the eyes of those who wish to see. In all periods of human history those statesmen and governments have succeeded in finding correct solutions to international problems who realized to the fullest extent the requirements of the times, the needs of the epoch. Since the invention of nuclear weapons the imperative requirement of the times, the imperative requirement of life itself, is the physical elimination of the weapons and means of warfare, in other words disarmament, and not the maintenance of the "balance of forces" which leads to the continuation of the arms race.

This is well understood by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as by those of many other countries, and it is precisely for this reason that they are so decisively and consistently in favour of disarmament. The most far-seeing statesmen of the West are also beginning to understand this. "The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us", said that outstanding statesman of the United States, President John Kennedy, on 25 September 1961 at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. He continued - and I quote:

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"Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons --10 million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth --is a source of horror and discord and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes --for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness --for in a spiralling arms race a nation's security may be shrinking even as its arms increase". (A/PV.1013, para.51)

Wise words, words full of sense and significance. We have quoted them today with a feeling of deep respect for the memory of the United States President whose death was so tragic.

If the Western Powers convert those words into practical deeds and bring their position on questions of disarmament into harmony with them, so that it corresponds to the interests of strengthening the security of all States through effective measures to eliminate the menace of nuclear war, then we can say with confidence that we shall be able to achieve a great deal in our negotiations. As for the Soviet Union, it is still prepared to achieve constructive solutions to the basic questions of the programme of general and complete disarmament, on the basis of negotiations, on the basis of an agreement or agreements with our partners, which would guarantee to both sides equal conditions of security throughout the process of disarmament.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): After the statements we have listened to this morning it may seem meaningless to try to make one more attempt to rescue the working group from being put away in moth-balls; but I hope my colleagues will allow me a few general remarks on this subject, which is our topic for today.

The early part of this session was marked by optimism, engendered by the agreement in principle that a working group should be established to tackle in practical, concrete detail the important problem of nuclear delivery vehicles. It is disappointing, therefore, to find the meetings during the latter part of the same session given over mainly to expressions of regret that final agreement on how the working group should

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proceed cannot be achieved. Certainly it should not be beyond the limits of our abilities to get out of this impasse. If one approach does not promise success, another must be tried. To fulfil in one way or another the task which we have set ourselves is a sheer necessity. How could we afford to allow the commentators in the United Nations, in the Press and elsewhere to have a field-day criticizing the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and with it, more generally, all endeavours for planning disarmament?

More important, however, we simply must succeed in finding methods for advancing towards a solution of the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles, because that problem is of central importance for all our work. The more we learn about the fabric of general and complete disarmament -- and I personally must testify that I have learnt a great deal from the clarifying statements of my colleagues -- the more we understand that the problem of retaining "nuclear shields" while eliminating the mass of nuclear delivery vehicles is a crucial element in the whole structure of general and complete disarmament.

That problem really is, or has become, so fundamental that I for one do not believe that we could, even if we wished to do so, abandon our present efforts and proceed to the discussion of another topic. First, as was pointed out by the representative of India on 18 August, no other subject offers us the prospect of arriving more rapidly and more easily at an agreement (ENDC/PV.208, p.20). Secondly, we are in a true impasse. Because of the interdependence of major factors in the disarmament plans, it now appears impossible to deal with any other sector without being confronted immediately with the one we should be trying to run away from: the role of nuclear capabilities during the process of disarmament.

In October 1963, when welcoming the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) as a promising compromise, the Swedish delegation in the United Nations expressed the view that a consequence might be that the whole approach to the disarmament plans would have to be overhauled -- because the acceptance by both sides of the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" influences the very basis of our work, changing it for the better, of course, as is the function of compromises.

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We said then:

"... the most important new element, introducing a fundamental change in the very perspective under which we have to perceive the disarmament process, has, it seems to our delegation, been brought about by the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the concept of the 'nuclear umbrella', that is, the retainment by the two main parties in the present power balance of the world of a nuclear force, considerably reduced in volume and yet sufficiently effective as a deterrent, all through the gradual process of dismantling armaments. ...

"If deterrence is now to be retained until the very end of the disarmament process, we will probably have to view the whole phasing pattern in a new light." (A/C.1/PV.1321, p.56)

Since that statement was made, almost a year ago, the Swedish delegation has devoted some of its homework to the question how the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" affects the disarmament plans as presented in the draft treaties. Our early assumption that it does affect them has been confirmed. In going through the various articles set out in documents ENDC/2/Rev.1 and ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3, we have found that the idea of a "nuclear umbrella" would affect the plans even more decisively than could be surmised at first glance. It is, as a matter of fact, a key element in our disarmament negotiations. Consequently it has to be given priority in our deliberations.

It would, for instance, seem practically impossible to deal with a subject such as that of nuclear disarmament -- appearing as item 5d on our agreed agenda (ENDC/52) -- without having solved the problem of the delivery vehicles, or without at least having a clear conception of what alternative solutions would imply. Both the number and the type of nuclear warheads are factors directly related to what is going to happen to the vehicles which will carry them. In regard to missiles there is even a one-to-one connexion, since they are not capable of "homing" in the sense that they can be used over and over again. The problem of stockpiling nuclear material is in turn associated, although more indirectly, with the previous two. Who would believe that we could successfully deal with those matters if we remained in the dark about the vehicles? And how could the problem of foreign bases -- item 5e on our agenda (ibid.) -- be tackled

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if we did not relate it to the question whether some such bases should be used for deployment of nuclear capabilities, as hitherto -- although, according to the United States proposal, reduced in strength (ENDC/30, p.30) --, or whether the permissible nuclear deterrent being deployed elsewhere would have taken any such function away from them?

Similarly, the existence of "nuclear shields", when determined in one particular way or another, must obviously have some bearing on the readiness of different parties to reduce other armaments. It is true that in regard to conventional armaments and armed forces -- items 5c and 5f, respectively, of our agenda -- the two draft plans are so closely akin that a compromise has appeared easy to design. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that, when such reductions are to be discussed in realistic terms, their implementation at the various stages might depend on what had happened to nuclear delivery capabilities, and thus in fact to nuclear capabilities, in the stage under discussion or in the previous stage.

Other consequences might result in relation to the duration of each stage. If agreement were reached to retain such "shields" which would give last-resort security to the major Powers during the process of disarmament, those Powers might be more inclined to reach a compromise on the time schedule, either meeting at mid-term between present proposals or perhaps further shortening the period required for each stage; or they might even contemplate initiating some real disarmament measures before stage I, in a "pre-stage I".

In doing our homework we in the Swedish delegation have, as I have just said, become more and more aware of the interconnexions between the various elements of the plans for general and complete disarmament. And is it really surprising that questions relating to nuclear strength constitute the one vector on which the position on all other problems depends?

I think that we must face the situation that, as our negotiations have developed, the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles has become the very key to our deliberations on general and complete disarmament. I wish to stress the words "has become", because I do not want to state categorically that we could not have found a different subject

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for our initial attempt at substantive negotiations in regard to general and complete disarmament. We might probably at some earlier time have chosen another key. Since, however, this issue of vehicles is the only intersection in the nuclear field where an agreement in principle has been obtained, it does not now seem that we could afford to abandon it.

Within parentheses I would venture to state -- and here again I repeat what I said on an earlier occasion -- that only a totally different set of problems might be pursued before we had a preliminary answer to the crucial problem of the containment of nuclear capabilities; that is the final framework of the peace-keeping machinery which one day would guarantee the preservation of peace in a disarmed world, including such practical problems as the structure of the international disarmament organization (ENDC/PV.202, pp. 12 et seq.). It is true, as I stressed in my statement four weeks ago, that there must be a close harmonization between changes made in regard to national security forces and changes made in regard to such international forces. But we could, of course, engage in a general debate on the role and requisites of the latter in the world-to-be, after disarmament has been completed.

But that was a parenthesis. For the reasons I indicated earlier, I can see no advantage in now turning, in our Tuesday discussions, to any other subject within general and complete disarmament in order to avoid the crucial one, particularly at this late stage of the present session. We must achieve the task upon which we have embarked. We cannot give up.

Consequently I wish to appeal to our co-Chairmen to establish some area of agreement, if need be by reducing the scope of our ambitions. One might, for instance, consider the immediate establishment of a first, preliminary working group, giving it a very specific mandate and asking it to report shortly -- perhaps as soon as the beginning of our next session, when we could consider how to proceed on the main issue. Such a mandate for a preliminary working group might be restricted, for instance, to scrutiny of the methods to be utilized for analysing the size and composition of a suitable "shield". The group might discuss inter alia the role of the factor of vulnerability, which so far has been hardly mentioned in the context but is undoubtedly of great

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significance for the "mix": would it or would it not be of joint interest to eliminate in the first instance those nuclear delivery vehicles which are most vulnerable?

Generally speaking, such a group might accomplish the primary task of establishing a kind of work plan, or at least a catalogue of questions to be examined at a subsequent stage. It should be asked also to recommend what kind of experts would be needed in the main working group. For example, should they be selected for utilization also of the kind of war-game approach -- reasoning in hypothetical terms -- which is common to experts on national strategy? Or should they even attempt to direct their efforts to a kind of international operational analysis in quantitative terms of the effects of various sizes and compositions of the "shield" -- that is, its "mix"? Of course, it should be clear that their task would not be to recommend a fixed determination of those two parameters, but only to indicate how one would arrive at a series of possible combinations. The terms of reference of such a preliminary working group might read somewhat as follows:

"To study how to determine the composition and size" -- that is, the relative strength -- "of various types of delivery vehicles to be retained in the final stage of the disarmament process as a 'nuclear shield', without regard to the method and timing of the reduction by which it would be reached."

I have not intended to convey the idea that the Swedish delegation would be particularly satisfied with any such minimum agreement. But this Committee may have to accept a second-best. Of course we should much prefer the Committee to rise to the occasion and establish the major working group, in line perhaps with the suggestions offered by delegations of other non-aligned countries and by my own in the course of this session. If I dare to reiterate that appeal, it is because as yet I have not heard any decisive arguments against the suggestion I made on 28 July that the major working group should first concentrate on the "nuclear shield" to be retained until near the end of stage III, the problems of its "mix", its size, its deployment and so on, and then work backwards gradually to determine by what method the reduction should be obtained from the situation which would exist at the beginning of stage I (ENDC/PV.202, pp.9,10). As a matter of fact we have received several partial, but not any comprehensive, answers on the points raised in our interventions.

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Perhaps I may use this opportunity to dispel some misapprehensions or misunderstandings about the Swedish proposal which was made four weeks ago. Mr. Tsarapkin seems to have criticized it as implying a percentage method for the reduction of present nuclear delivery capabilities (ENDC/PV.204, p.9). But that would be to miss a point which I tried to make in order to indicate the possibility of compromise. We have not tried to urge that present nuclear strength should be diminished in any linear fashion by equal percentage cuts on both sides. We would leave that matter open, as well as the question of whether the reduction should occur gradually and slowly.

The main purpose in suggesting that attention should be focussed first on the kind of "nuclear shield" needed in stage III was just to rid our deliberations of the obsession with such questions as whether the method of reduction should be immediate and massive, or slow, gradual and proportionate. Such problems should be examined after clarification has been achieved concerning the kind of "shield" which might be judged to be effective. That element in the United States proposal which constitutes an impediment in the view of the Soviet delegation, but which, I want to stress, the Western delegations have not insisted on including in the terms of reference -- namely, the element of percentage reduction -- has consequently been avoided in our proposal. We want to keep our judgement open on that score.

Similarly, we have tried to be helpful by removing from the conditions set in advance certain specifications in the Soviet proposal which have proved to act as obstructions in the way of obtaining agreement from the West: in particular, the a priori restriction laid on the "mix" in the "shield" by stating that it must consist only of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category.

These are just examples of rather fundamental questions on which we lack conclusive replies from the two sides. I hope I am not being too persistent if I recall the promises given that our suggestions would receive further study. Perhaps there is still time for our co-Chairmen to get down to work on the possibility of making new combinations for the terms of reference which have been suggested by the non-aligned **nations**. If some discussions were begun on the various compromise suggestions proffered, we ourselves should be more than willing to help by bringing in modifications of our own suggestions, which have been highly tentative from the outset.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

To sum up what I have been saying today: the Swedish delegation would deem it premature to write off the attempts to set up a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles; but, being realistic and making allowance for the shortness of the time remaining for this session, we may have to be satisfied with biting off a smaller portion of the task. Thus today's suggestion of a preliminary working group is to be considered only "faute de mieux", to be resorted to as a starter for further endeavours. Perhaps I may express it as an appeal from all of us: as the sterility of our recent debate has left us all with an undeniable feeling of hunger, we do need something more substantial to chew on when we meet again next year.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I am sure that all delegations here have listened with very great attention to what the representative of Sweden has just said, and that they respect very highly the efforts which the Swedish delegation and delegations of other non-aligned countries have made to break the deadlock with which we are now faced over the terms of reference for a working group on how to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapon vehicles. Certainly the Canadian delegation intends to study very carefully what Mrs. Myrdal has said, and we hope that it may have some influence in enabling us to find some way in which we can really enter upon a more helpful and practical discussion and examination of this problem than we have experienced during the past many weeks.

My intention in speaking today was to say something about the long statement we have heard from the representative of the Soviet Union. Towards the end of that statement he quoted the fifth principle of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5); but we find ourselves a little confused concerning what the Soviet Union really understands by that principle. Most of the rather lengthy lecture which we heard about the history, from the nineteenth century up to the middle of the twentieth century, of the iniquities of the principle of balance, as seen through Soviet spectacles, seemed to be intended to denounce and refute the principle of balance as applied -- or as it might be applied -- to disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Then the representative of the Soviet Union went on to quote the fifth Agreed Principle. It appears to the Canadian delegation that a large part of our discussion here in relation to nuclear weapon vehicles or any other topic must be to determine whether the proposals of either side really are in accordance with that Agreed Principle. In other words, are the proposals of one side or the other such that neither side will gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all?

We have heard the Soviet Union criticize the United States proposals for percentage reductions in three stages because they did not provide equal security, or would be harmful to the security of the Soviet Union if they were put into effect. In order to determine whether that principle would be applied if the Soviet Union proposal for a so-called "nuclear umbrella" were put into effect, we must have more information about exactly what that proposal is. That is why we welcomed the original suggestion of Mr. Zorin that there might be a working group precisely to explain these proposals.

At the same time, the West is suggesting that if there is any such working group where proposals are to be explained, especially having regard to the fifth Agreed Principle and also to the principle of verification, there should be an opportunity for examination of the principles and details of the Western plan, which up to now has not been fully explained and possibly may not be fully comprehended by those who now object so much to it. That is why we need a working group: to see whether the principle of balance, the principle of not giving military advantage to any one side, the principle of affording equal security to all States, would in fact be applied.

Therefore I would appeal to the Soviet delegation to consider again whether by closing the door to any general discussion, or to any parallel discussion of both the so-called "nuclear umbrella" and the proposals of the West, it is not doing a disservice to our progress in disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 210th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Mikael Imru, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Sweden and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 27 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.