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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 AND 38  
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- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race  
and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and  
security (A/C.1/L.656)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special  
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9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036,  
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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on  
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- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935  
(XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of  
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of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tla-  
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Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report  
of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029,  
A/C.1/L.655)

1. Mr. ENE (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): My  
delegation considers it a pleasant duty officially to submit  
draft resolution A/C.1/L.656 entitled "Economic and social  
consequences of the armaments race and its extremely  
harmful effects on world peace and security". This draft  
resolution has been sponsored by the delegations of  
Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Pakis-  
tan, Romania, Rwanda, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

2. This draft is the result of consultations that were held  
with a great number of delegations concerned in the matter.  
It endeavours to take into account and harmonize the  
concerns expressed in the course of those consultations.

3. I do not intend to go into the details of all the  
provisions of the draft resolution, but I should like to stress  
that it was born of the disquiet that is widely felt at the  
continued increase in the arms race, particularly in the  
nuclear field, since it is a very heavy burden on people all  
over the world.

4. The objective of the draft is to give impetus to the  
efforts to slow down and then halt the arms race and in  
general to facilitate future negotiations on disarmament.

5. We believe that a study of the consequences of the arms  
race should be one of the constant concerns of the United  
Nations, which we believe is called upon to play a primary  
role in the field of disarmament. The purpose of this draft  
is precisely to make the constant study of the consequences  
of the arms race an instrument that can assist the  
Organization and its Member States to take real steps  
towards disarmament.

6. Thus the draft resolution rests upon the conclusions of  
the report on the economic and social consequences of the  
arms race and of military expenditures prepared two years

ago by the Secretary-General. One of the conclusions of this report, which we cite in the preamble, stresses that a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly of those whose military expenditures are highest, should be brought about as soon as possible. Thus the draft requests the bodies concerned with disarmament to place among their high preoccupations the problems aimed at the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, including the identification of the most appropriate ways and means to approach matters regarding the reduction of military budgets.

7. At the same time we felt that we should accompany that request by a more general appeal, addressed to all States, to make renewed efforts aimed at adopting effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field.

8. The draft resolution takes up another of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General's report, namely that in order to draw the attention of the Governments and peoples of the world to the direction the arms race is taking, the Secretary-General should keep the facts under periodic review. That conclusion is also bolstered by the study carried out recently by the group of experts on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, whose work we also mention in the preamble.

9. We attach enormous importance to that conclusion because we consider that undertaking and continuing the study of the consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, particularly in the nuclear field, can to a large extent facilitate progress in the negotiations on disarmament in general and the achievement of agreements on the subject. That is why the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to pursue the study of the consequences of the arms race in order to enable him to submit, upon request by the General Assembly, an up-to-date report on the matter. Finally, the same considerations have led us to reiterate the decision adopted two years ago by the General Assembly to keep the study of the consequences of the arms race under constant review.

10. In conclusion, I would express the hope that the draft that I have the honour to introduce will, like the resolution adopted in the past on the matter, receive wide support in the First Committee.

11. The CHAIRMAN: As it appears that no other representatives wish to speak on draft resolution A/C.1/L.656, it will be taken up for final consideration and voting not later than 22 November, and perhaps before, if there is a pause in the debate on Korea.

12. Mr. NISHIBORI (Japan): I should like to speak on draft resolution A/C.1/L.655, on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

13. Two years ago, at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the aspirations of the nations in the Indian Ocean region to keep themselves out of the great-Power rivalries, to create in the region conditions of peace and tranquillity under which they could devote themselves to the constructive task of developing their own

societies, found expression in the solemn declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

14. Japan, whose very survival is linked with a free and peaceful Indian Ocean, where the principle of the freedom of the high seas is respected, fully understands the noble desires of the nations of the region and shares their vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

15. In that spirit we supported resolution 2832 (XXVI), which proclaimed the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, although we had some reservations with regard to paragraphs 2 and 3. A year later, together with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, Japan joined the *Ad Hoc* Committee established by resolution 2992 (XXVII) to study the implications of the Indian Ocean peace zone Declaration, with special reference to practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of resolution 2832 (XXVI).

16. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean held 11 meetings between 27 February and 4 October 1973, and its principal achievements are listed in its report [A/9029].

17. My delegation believes that in spite of the handicaps which faced the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the initial stage, its endeavours were commendable; and the discussions contributed towards clarifying various aspects of the problem involved.

18. We welcome the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean that would contribute towards relaxing international tension and help to promote complete and comprehensive disarmament in the long run. We are therefore prepared to promote consultations with all interested countries on what would be the most effective and practical methods of achieving the objectives of the Declaration with a view to achieving the agreement of all the countries concerned, including all the major military Powers of the world.

19. We have before us for our consideration a new draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655. The draft resolution, first, requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its valuable work, and secondly, seeks to collect the objective information necessary for the implementation of the Indian Ocean Declaration by requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean. We are all aware of the competence and efficiency of our Secretariat in its survey and analysis of disarmament questions, and I am most sympathetic to the idea that the factual study to be made will receive full co-operation from qualified experts and competent bodies.

20. The Japanese delegation considers that the proposal reflects a willingness by the sponsors to take a steady and practical approach in achieving the objectives envisaged in the Declaration, and we are prepared to vote in favour of this draft resolution.

21. Mr. SAO (Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of the United Republic of Cameroon did not take part this year in the general debate on the various

items on the disarmament question. That in no way implies any slackening, however, slight, in the sustained interest we have in what undoubtedly constitutes one of the major problems of our time. I think there is really no need to stress that the repeated appeal of the United Nations for disarmament reflects the most profound aspirations of mankind as a whole to live in peace and security. The reason for this is that no new important factor has emerged to give us any reason to change our position—which is, in any case, extremely well known—on this virtually perennial question. Of course, the two super-Powers recently reached some agreements in several fields. But the question none the less remains, quite justifiably, whether those agreements will mean any greater degree of democratization of international relations—that is to say, true co-operation that will generate advantages for the international community as a whole—or whether they are just the result of a concern on the part of the super-Powers to establish between themselves a strategic balance based on reciprocal interests. Such a balance can only be precarious, as is shown by the recent bloody events in the Middle East. We are therefore obliged to stress that, no matter how salutary they may be, the recent negotiations to limit certain strategic arms are far from meeting the universal expectation, which is, above all, that in this United Nations decade devoted particularly to disarmament, general and complete disarmament under strict international control will be brought about. In the circumstances, we can only associate ourselves once again with those who are raising their voice against the arms race. Apart from the fact that it continues to confront mankind with intolerable risks of a nuclear holocaust which will produce neither a winner nor a loser but only the extinction of the human race, there is the equally unacceptable fact that the arms race is contributing to the diversion of immense resources from international co-operation, which is so indispensable to the development efforts of the poor countries.

22. It is precisely in order to remedy this situation that we believe it is so urgent to convene a world disarmament conference in which all States—large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear—would participate. Out of that conviction, my delegation inevitably gave its firm support to General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII), which created the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. The obstacles to that Committee's work are not very encouraging; nevertheless, we should not allow ourselves to become pessimistic, because the important thing in this field, as in so many others, is to redouble our efforts, particularly because the marked trend towards détente in international relations must, if that détente is genuine, lead to a manifestation by the nuclear Powers of the political will to bring about general and complete disarmament within the framework of that conference. My delegation will unsparingly give its support to any measure which seeks that objective. In the same spirit we shall also in due course, support the proposal of the Soviet Union that the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council should be reduced by 10 per cent and that a portion of the resources thus released should be devoted to assistance to developing countries.

23. I come now to the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, the subject of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.651 and 652. In this regard, we are

very disappointed to note that no progress has been achieved as yet on the question of banning all nuclear tests in all environments. This has resulted in certain States continuing to produce and experiment with nuclear arms—something that the 1963 Moscow Treaty and the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty were designed to prevent, providing for the conclusion as soon as possible of a general and complete disarmament agreement; but quite the opposite has occurred. Should we be surprised, then, that underground nuclear testing is still going on? It is indeed understandable that, in the face of this unbridled nuclear arms race, public opinion in the countries which are near the areas where testing in the atmosphere takes place should display concern in the face of risks of contamination that are liable to result from radiation and radioactive fallout. While bearing in mind the concern of all parties, we persist in thinking that our efforts should rather be wholly devoted to the implementation of measures for banning all nuclear tests, wherever they may be carried out, to be followed by general and complete disarmament. Should we not, therefore, as 1975 draws near and with the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, channel the moral pressure of world public opinion towards the realization of this noble goal?

24. In this context, we are inclined to think that draft resolution A/C.1/L.651 is the one best in keeping with our concerns in that it brings out clearly and comprehensively the need to put an end to all nuclear tests, whereas that does not seem to be the case with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.652. A revised draft resolution has just been circulated, but my delegation has not yet had time to consider it. We shall therefore continue to talk about the draft which was available this morning. If, as we were assured at the 1954th meeting by Mr. Barton of Canada, this text is not in competition with or does not duplicate the Mexican text [A/C.1/L.651], my delegation would have hoped that in its operative paragraph 3 there would have been the same firm insistence that the nuclear States which are carrying out underground testing of nuclear weapons would also immediately put an end to such experiments—all tests, in our view, having bad effects. It is in this spirit that my delegation takes its stand on this draft.

25. As for the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1, my delegation is pleased to note that France and the People's Republic of China have signed, after the United Kingdom and the United States, Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, providing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. We very much hope that the hoped-for accession to this Treaty of the only nuclear Power not so far to have acceded to it will be forthcoming shortly and that it will thus contribute to satisfying fully the aspirations of the peoples of Latin America to live in an atmosphere of peace and stability. Within the same context, we warmly welcome the initiative of the delegation of Sri Lanka on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [A/C.1/L.655].

26. Faithful to our disarmament policy, my delegation this year again will also give its support to draft resolutions A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 on the banning of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons and A/C.1/L.653, on the banning of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

27. The CHAIRMAN: There still remain to be introduced this afternoon draft resolutions A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1 and 654/Rev.1. It is my intention, if there is no objection from members of the Committee, to bring draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1 to a vote. I understand that the situation with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1 is somewhat less certain. Therefore I think it would be most appropriate if we were to begin by hearing the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, thus allowing members to consider whether or not, in the light of that introduction, that draft resolution also could be put to the vote. Accordingly, I call on the representative of Canada.

28. Mr. BARTON (Canada): In the course of the past few days we have received a number of constructive suggestions for improving our draft resolution, and the sponsors met this morning to consider those suggestions. At the 1955th meeting, we heard the proposal advanced by the representative of Cyprus, but in addition to his suggestion we have received others outside the room which we felt merited consideration. On the basis of the sponsors' examination of those suggestions, we have some revisions to put forward which come under two general headings.

29. The first of these general headings might be summarized as an effort to strengthen that part of the draft resolution dealing with the cessation of underground tests and thus the achievement of a comprehensive test ban, rather than a partial test ban, and an effort to express these ideas in positive and strong but realistic terms. To meet that set of considerations we have redrafted paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft resolution. I think that when delegations read these the changes will be self-evident, and I will not take the time of the Committee to go over them.

30. The second category of changes that we dealt with arose out of concern expressed by one or two delegations that the way in which the draft resolution had been worded could be construed to mean that the achievement so far of a partial test ban was being denigrated. That certainly was not our intention. We believe that, whatever form the final instrument for a comprehensive test ban may take, its effect will be to add a ban on underground testing to the already negotiated and achieved partial test ban. To make this clear we have made a slight change in the wording of the final paragraph of the preamble, and in addition we have modified slightly the language in paragraphs 5 and 7 with respect to the goal we all seek of a comprehensive test ban.

31. We hope that these changes will meet the concern of those who have spoken to us and that with these changes we can go on to the vote on this draft resolution and that it will achieve a large majority. Having introduced these changes this afternoon, I realize that some delegations may want time to consider them, but, on the other hand, I think I reflect the views of the sponsors when I say that if the Committee is ready to put them to the vote this afternoon we shall have no objection whatever.

32. The CHAIRMAN: For the sake of clarity, may I ask the representative of Canada whether the changes appear solely in paragraphs 5 and 6?

33. Mr. BARTON (Canada): The changes are in the last preambular paragraph and in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

34. Mr. ECKERBERG (Sweden): I should like to explain the position of the Swedish delegation with regard to the two draft resolutions on the urgent question of the suspension of nuclear tests, upon which this Committee will soon vote.

35. Sweden is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, which was reintroduced just now by the representative of Canada, Mr. Barton, in its revised form. This draft resolution calls anew upon all nuclear-weapon States to seek, as a matter of urgency, the ending of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Sweden has consistently, through the years, protested against all tests and actively worked for the cessation of all tests, both underground and in the atmosphere.

36. In regard to atmospheric tests, an international treaty already exists. In draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1 the General Assembly, therefore, urges States which have not yet adhered to that treaty to do so without further delay and insists that tests in the atmosphere be discontinued forthwith.

37. I wish to underline that when we, here and in other instances, deplore the continuation of the atmospheric tests, this in no way implies that the Swedish Government finds underground tests acceptable. As many delegations, including the Swedish delegation, have pointed out during this debate, underground tests are being used for a qualitative arms race which threatens the viability of previous agreements in the nuclear arms field and thus the security of the world. A halt to underground tests would significantly restrict the further sophistication of strategic nuclear weapons as well as tactical nuclear arsenals. It would strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty, in which three nuclear-weapon Powers have pledged to seek an end to the nuclear arms race. It would also strengthen the partial test-ban Treaty, which contains a pledge to proceed to a comprehensive test ban.

38. The Swedish Government has actively participated during 12 years in the efforts to achieve a halt to the testing of nuclear weapons by underground explosions. In regard to these tests, no international treaty exists as yet. The Swedish delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in close co-operation with the delegations of Canada and Japan, has made technical and scientific contributions in order to solve the verification issue, and it is our conclusion that the technical problems no longer constitute a real obstacle to a comprehensive test ban. In draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, we therefore vigorously urge the nuclear-weapon Powers which are parties to the Moscow Treaty, and which we therefore consider as having a special responsibility in this respect, immediately to start negotiations on a treaty designed to achieve a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is also requested to continue its deliberations as a matter of highest priority.

39. The representative of Canada, in his first introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, underlined that the two draft resolutions under this agenda item are not competitive and that there is nothing inconsistent in delegations electing to vote for both draft resolutions as an expression of their opposition to continued testing and their desire for progress

in the speedy negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I not only agree with him but also wish to add that in the view of the Swedish delegation the two draft resolutions complement and supplement each other.

40. The Swedish delegation also fully supports and will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, introduced earlier by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, a draft resolution in which the General Assembly condemns all nuclear-weapon tests, reiterates its conviction that there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and urges the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests without delay.

41. Mr. NANDAN (Fiji): Although my delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, we would nevertheless wish to explain our position in respect of this draft resolution.

42. It is self-evident that this draft resolution contains a compromise text and, as such, has all its defects, depending on how one looks at it. From our viewpoint, it is not altogether satisfactory because it does not record in the strongest terms the protests and feelings expressed by the Pacific community against the continued French nuclear tests in the Pacific. We would have much preferred the inclusion of a condemnation of the tests in the Pacific, which are being conducted in a region to which France does not belong. These tests are of no benefit to the dependent people in whose Territory they are being conducted, nor to their neighbours in the region. We would have liked to see a more direct reference to the Pacific tests in operative paragraph 3, couched in terms somewhat similar to those used only last September in the Political Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, at Algiers. Paragraph 73 of that Declaration, in the context of general and complete disarmament, states as follows: "... the Conference demands the suspension of the French nuclear tests being programmed and carried out at Mururoa in the South Pacific." [See A/9330]. The Algiers Declaration, I might add, was supported by the delegations, which included many heads of Government, of some 75 non-aligned States.

43. However, we have accepted the text in document A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, and in particular the text of paragraph 3, as it highlights a matter of immediate concern to us. We consider this an important compromise by some of us in order not to create difficulties for some other delegations in this Committee and in the hope that the general and restrained language of this draft resolution will be supported by a large majority of the delegations here.

44. This draft resolution is in accord with my delegation's views on other aspects of the disarmament question. It reflects our wider concern for an end to nuclear testing in all environments; it urges the adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty by all States and seeks as a matter of urgency the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty which would prohibit the explosion of nuclear weapons for all time.

45. Finally, I should like to make some brief comments on the charges of discrimination in the draft resolution

between atmospheric and underground nuclear tests. It is quite apparent from the text that all nuclear tests, in whatever environment, are to be disapproved. On the other hand, it is true that the problem of continued atmospheric tests is of immediate concern to many delegations, and my delegation, for one, does not wish to make any apologies for highlighting our immediate concern in the draft resolution, just as we would not expect any apologies from the delegation of Sri Lanka, the chief architect of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, if that delegation were accused of—if I may quote the phrase—"blatantly discriminating" against the littoral and hinterland States of other oceans by focusing attention on its own immediate concern over the Indian Ocean; or, in this age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, if one questioned the propriety and efficacy of creating pockets of peace zones in the world's oceans without declaring all the oceans as zones of peace. We can all find such arguments of expedience; it is not the exclusive preserve of some.

46. However, my delegation would wish to make it clear that we do understand the intent and the thought behind the draft resolution under the item "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", and we shall support it.

47. With respect to the statement made at the 1955th meeting by the delegation of France, we would merely say that arguments in favour of the possession of nuclear weapons give neither justification nor licence for any State to conduct nuclear-weapon explosions in regions far removed from its own and at risk to the people in a dependent Territory and their neighbours in the Pacific. Economic, cultural and political, and especially constitutional development would be of greater benefit to the people of that Territory. For of what benefit are nuclear weapons to the poor people of this dependent Territory? Against whom would this peace-loving people wish to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves?

48. The CHAIRMAN: With no disrespect for anybody who has already spoken in this debate, may I say that we are now in the stage of the introduction of draft resolutions and we should, if possible, avoid reopening the general debate.

49. Mr. MOTT (Australia): My purpose in speaking today is to note that Australia is among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, now revised, and to commend that draft resolution to the Committee.

50. At the outset, my delegation would like to state clearly that the purpose of the draft resolution is to help to bring about an end to all nuclear testing. We cannot emphasize this strongly enough. Nor can we affirm strongly enough the adherence of the Australian Government to this objective. My delegation recognizes that in questions as important as this there is often room for a difference of attitude on whether a given draft resolution is or is not well-balanced. We believe too, however, that we should not always become obsessed by the question of balance, which can distract attention from more important, longer-term objectives.

51. In this case we had considered that the draft resolution as it stood was fair and reasonable in its approach.

We have listened, however, both in this Committee and in the corridors, to delegations which say that it poses some problems for them. In the light of their views, the sponsors have agreed to amend the draft resolution in an effort to make it more widely acceptable. My delegation hopes that these amendments, which the representative of Canada has just introduced, will achieve that objective.

52. The Australian representative said in this Committee at the 1949th meeting that the problem of nuclear testing can be considered as a composite whole and on different levels. Whether one looks at the problem as a whole or as parts of a whole, however, the sentiment we are expressing is one of opposition to all forms of testing.

53. World opposition to testing in the atmosphere derived originally from two facts: first, that was where testing was taking place; and, second, there was a justifiable fear that damage to the human environment might result from such testing. That opposition remains sharp and strong today because two Governments have not heeded the urgent and repeated calls of world opinion to halt their tests.

54. The Australian representative in this Committee explained the reasons for our concern in his statement and, in deference to your request Mr. Chairman, I shall not repeat them now. He also posed the question which others have posed and which we have not heard answered by the Powers which are testing: what benefit do we get in return for the risks we run through the deposition of radioactive fall-out on our territory?

55. It is sufficient now to say that in Australia opposition to atmospheric testing derives from consideration that are both specific and general in character. Specifically, we believe that such testing is an unlawful activity. We believe, too, that the people of Australia are entitled to the protection of Australia's sovereignty, which they regard as infringed by the deposit on our soil, without our consent, of radioactive substances from the tests.

56. More generally, we assert the right of every State and people to be free from atmospheric testing. The explosions in the Pacific region might be of smaller moment to the peoples of other regions for the bulk of the debris is distributed over the Pacific region. It is not confined to that region, however, because of the exchange of debris in the stratosphere. The explosions thus essentially affect the whole of our world and every person in it.

57. The concern of mankind at atmospheric testing has crystallized in the partial test-ban Treaty. The Treaty is important because it states international law; but it is mainly important because it expresses in words what is the will of the peoples of the world. That it does so is shown by the fact that the bulk of nations of the world are parties to it.

58. Article 1 of the Treaty requires each party "to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out" nuclear weapons tests in prohibited environments. Against the background of world concern at the danger to our common environment, against the background of this treaty language which formalizes that concern, this Assembly surely has the right—more so, the duty—to insist, as draft resolution

A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1 does, that atmospheric tests be discontinued forthwith.

59. We would also suggest this view to one speaker yesterday, the representative of a State party to the Treaty, who said that he would abstain in a vote on this paragraph of the draft resolution and who, earlier in the day, and quite properly, brought before this Committee a regional initiative for which he sought support, a support, I might add, that my delegation will gladly give.

60. We believe further, that this attitude has gained important backing from the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries which called for the cessation of all tests in all atmospheres and all regions, and which went on specifically to demand the suspension of tests being carried out in the South Pacific. This in fact is the path that the draft resolution is following, and my delegation takes heart from this knowledge.

61. Testing underground is likewise opposed by the bulk of world opinion, and is likewise reprehensible. We call again, energetically and urgently, for the cessation of all such tests.

62. But let us be clear. Our original priority was to stop tests in the atmosphere, because that was where they were taking place. We must hold to that objective; we must continue to press for an end to such tests.

63. As to underground tests, we must acknowledge, unhappily, that the concern of the peoples of the world has not gained expression in the form of a treaty. Testing still continues underground and the Powers responsible for it have not acceded to the wishes of mankind; nor, we add, have the Powers that are testing in the atmosphere joined in international efforts to elaborate a treaty designed to achieve the discontinuance of all tests explosions, including underground.

64. Our priority here and now must surely be to get an effective treaty. Lesser measures might offer temporary help, but in the longer run there is no substitute for a treaty, however much we might wish that there were. When we get a treaty, we will have every right to demand that it be supported and respected. Until then we have no alternative but to express our concern in less effective ways and to continue to work for a treaty with all the power at our command.

65. The objective of the draft resolution is to hasten and encourage the movement towards a treaty by every legitimate means. Surely this objective must be acceptable in this Committee.

66. My delegation believes that a start has been made towards the objective of an end to all tests. The progress made so far, however, is set at a risk both by the continuation of atmospheric testing and by the failure to conclude a comprehensive agreement. It is urgently necessary, therefore, to consolidate what we have achieved and to enlarge the scope of our prohibitions.

67. This is the approach that draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1 takes. It is, as the representative of Japan



pointed out yesterday, a merger of two approaches that won approval last year. We believe that the merger is a successful one and that the draft resolution is positive in its approach.

68. We note that one State yesterday said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.651 had the merit of logic, balance and courage. These are warm words which will be the more welcome if they are translated into support for that draft resolution.

69. In conclusion, we welcome the willingness of that Power to debate here its views on nuclear testing and wish to suggest only that it might extend the scope of the debate to encompass another forum where its policies on the subject are under dispute.

70. Finally, let me say that my delegation has a favourable attitude towards draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, because we are completely in accord with its objective of bringing a halt to all nuclear weapons tests. Our vote, however, will be without prejudice to our positions on aspects of the work of negotiating further prohibitions against nuclear-weapon tests.

71. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): My delegation did not participate in the general debate on disarmament. We did not feel that there was a need for us to express once more views that we have made clear for several years. We felt that we had nothing new or constructive to advance that would help to break the deadlock reached on several disarmament issues or to dispel the clouds of pessimism hanging over our heads. However, we did decide to speak precisely on the points raised in the draft resolutions on disarmament that we are examining.

72. While reserving my delegation's right to intervene on other draft resolutions, I should like now to state the position of my delegation on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.651 and 652/Rev.1.

73. We strongly support draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, for it condemns once again with utmost vigour all nuclear-weapon tests. Operative paragraph 1, which contains this language, does not make any distinction between nuclear tests conducted underground or in the atmosphere. It does not differentiate between one State or another, or between one part of the world or another. The draft resolution urges the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to stop forthwith all nuclear-weapon tests. It stresses in the second paragraph of the preamble that the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons should be for all time. In addition, it recalls 20 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly between 1955 and 1972 which condemn nuclear tests and call for their cessation by all Governments at all times and in all places.

74. This draft resolution is all-embracing and is in accord with our consistent position, for it is directed against all tests undertaken by all nuclear and threshold nuclear States. Consequently, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, which was ably introduced by the representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles.

75. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, my delegation is faced with some difficulties. We certainly

share the apprehensions and concerns expressed by its sponsors in the paragraphs of the preamble concerning all test explosions of nuclear weapons conducted underground and in the atmosphere and concerning the fact that many States—some of them nuclear or threshold nuclear States—have not signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water years after its adoption. We therefore strongly support operative paragraphs 1 and 2, which certainly correspond to the views I have thus expressed regarding draft resolution A/C.1/L.651. However, we consider paragraph 3 to be redundant if it is not directed against any particular State or States, because the principle has been very clearly stated in the two previous paragraphs. But if it should be the intent to direct paragraph 3 against one particular State, then we consider that we are entering a very dubious and discriminatory field where we can apply two weights and two measures, or perhaps more than two. We do indeed appreciate the concern and the fears of certain Governments about the possible effects on their peoples and on the environment of their countries should certain nuclear tests in the atmosphere continue. We should like these tests and all other tests to be discontinued forthwith, but we must also take into consideration the world-wide concern about the prohibition of nuclear testing in its widest context and in all environments. We should also take into account juridical considerations on the basis of which resolutions must stand. We cannot accept the position that two different legal concepts should be the basis of two different approaches in paragraphs 3 and 5 of that draft resolution. In paragraph 3 we call for an immediate cessation of tests in the atmosphere, while in paragraph 5 we only urge the nuclear-weapon States and those which are parties to the test-ban Treaty to start negotiations immediately for elaborating the treaty designed to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This constitutes a juridical contradiction.

76. We support paragraph 4, which urges States which have not yet adhered to the test-ban Treaty to do so without delay. We consider that this reflects the quasi-unanimous, if not the unanimous, opinion of the Members of the United Nations and of mankind. In our opinion, that paragraph, with paragraphs 1 and 2, is sufficient to achieve the objective of paragraph 3. My delegation, therefore, will be guided by these considerations in the vote on the two draft resolutions.

77. Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): I had not expected to speak at this stage about the draft resolutions submitted under item 36, especially as I had spoken at some length about the question of nuclear tests during the general debate. Two of the interventions that we heard yesterday, one of them more or less predictable and one of them rather more unexpected, have constrained me to do so. Therefore, although I shall try to heed the Chairman's admonition, I shall need to touch briefly on points of substance on which those representatives touched.

78. First, however, I should like to comment on draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, submitted by Mexico and other delegations. That resolution is couched in strong terms, and had it been the draft resolution which my delegation is sponsoring, we should perhaps have preferred it to be worded somewhat differently.

79. From our own experience in drafting draft resolution A/C.1/L.652 however, I am well aware of the difficulties the promoters of any draft resolution must encounter in reaching a consensus of the sponsors. In the end it is surely the intention that matters, and that intention of draft resolution A/C.1/L.651 is thoroughly laudable. I earnestly hope that those who may be tempted in relation to either draft resolution to lose themselves in the thickets of linguistic criticism will not, in fact, overlook the wood for the trees.

80. There are just two other points I should like to make about draft resolution A/C.1/L.651. In the first place, the draft resolution refers, in operative paragraph 2, to the question of verification. My delegation does not interpret this paragraph as implying that the problem of verification is unimportant, but rather that a more determined effort needs to be made to bring about a solution during the coming year. I am encouraged to note the conclusion reached by a Government which has given careful study to this problem, namely, that of the Netherlands, that present and potential verification capabilities seem to be sufficient to deter a would-be violator of a ban on underground tests, except perhaps for low-yield explosions. In his speech to this Committee at the 1948th meeting the representative of the Netherlands pointed out that a ban on underground testing will always contain the risk of some explosions going unnoticed, whatever kind of verification is agreed upon. But, Mr. Kooijmans said—and I should like to record my delegation's whole-hearted agreement—that this risk must be weighed against the risk of major testing programmes being carried on without restriction, thus constantly adding fuel to the nuclear arms race.

81. My last point relates to the encomium which draft resolution A/C.1/L.651 received yesterday from what seemed to me an unexpected quarter. It was described by the representative of France as having the merits of logic, balance and courage. Now I was surprised, because this draft resolution bears a striking similarity to resolution 2934 C (XXVII), which was adopted last year by a substantial majority. Like resolution 2934 C (XXVII) it condemns with the utmost vigour all nuclear-weapon tests. Like resolution 2934 C (XXVII) it reiterates the conviction that there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. Like resolution 2934 C (XXVII) it urges the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to halt all tests without delay.

82. Only four countries voted against that resolution: but one of them was France. So I shall be looking with some interest this year to see whether France will again vote against logic, against balance, and against courage. My delegation for its part will pluck up its courage and vote for the draft resolution.

83. I should like to turn to draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, of which New Zealand has the honour to be among the sponsors. I wish especially to speak about the criticism levelled at the draft resolution by the representative of Sri Lanka.

84. I must say that as I was looking through the records of last year's debate I came upon an intervention which that representative made then about resolution 2934 C (XXVII),

and I may perhaps be permitted to quote two sentences of that intervention:

"All that the draft resolution seeks to do is to state the facts and to draw attention to a specific problem, the existence of which cannot be denied. [The sponsors] have every right to express their concern over the tests that are occurring in their region, and every right to endeavour to persuade other Members of this Organization to share their concern." [1891st meeting, para. 112.]

85. That draft resolution was subsequently adopted by 105 votes to 4. What happened thereafter? Atmospheric testing has continued: underground testing has continued. What are we Pacific countries that suffer from the effects of atmospheric testing to do? Are we to do nothing?

86. What we have tried to do, in conjunction with the other sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, is to produce in a single draft resolution an expression of the concerns of those who oppose both kinds of testing, with emphasis appropriate to each.

87. Now, some people say that we have put undue and unfair emphasis on atmospheric testing and have dealt too gently with the danger of underground testing. We do not disagree with those who say that the danger from nuclear war is greater than the danger from nuclear fall-out. But we are talking about two different dangers. The danger of nuclear war is very real, but at least it is a danger in the future. Radioactive fall-out from atmospheric testing, on the other hand, is something that is happening right now, and every time there is a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, there is more fall-out.

88. A second reason why, in our view, we are justified in using different and stronger language about atmospheric testing is that there is a Treaty prohibiting it. That Treaty has been ratified by no less than 122 States. Sri Lanka, I believe, ratified it almost 10 years ago. Whatever one may think about the deficiencies of this Treaty, it must be recognized as one of the few positive and successful initiatives that have been taken in the direction of nuclear disarmament. It is one of the clearest manifestations of the maturing of national and international attitudes towards the development and testing of nuclear weapons. The development of international law is a continuing process: in this particular field, my Government is as anxious as any to proceed to the next step, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. But we shall not reach the goal we desire by criticizing and denigrating what has already been achieved, or by questioning the motives of those who have taken an active part in achieving it.

89. Finally, if it is the complaint of Sri Lanka that the draft resolution does not insist on the cessation of underground tests, what is the logic of an abstention on the paragraph that deals with tests in the atmosphere? If that is the complaint, surely the logical abstention should be on the paragraph that is too weak, not the one that is appropriately strong. Whatever explanation is given, it is difficult to regard an abstention on paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652 as anything but a sop to the nuclear Powers which continue to test in the atmosphere, and there



is no doubt that those Powers will themselves accept it as such.

90. On the other hand, my delegation has every sympathy with those who would like to strengthen those paragraphs of the draft resolution which deal with underground testing, and with the need for a comprehensive test ban. We are most anxious that substantive progress should be made on the drafting of a treaty designed to achieve this objective, and we would hope very much that in spite of the discouraging absence of progress in that direction during 1973, we might be in a position to consider a draft treaty in this Assembly during 1974. The sponsors have considered suggestions for amendments to the draft resolution which would meet the points made by the representative of Cyprus and other speakers and a revised text has now been introduced by the representative of Canada.

91. Our revised draft resolution provides tangible evidence that the sponsors have approached this issue not in a spirit of rancour or intransigence but with a willingness to accommodate the widest possible spectrum of opinion within the basic principles that we espouse. The language that we have used closely accords with that used in other forums, notably in the Political Declaration adopted by the Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers last September. If I may, I shall read paragraphs 72 and 73:

"The Conference declares itself in favour of general and complete disarmament, and especially a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of atomic weapons and warheads and the total destruction of existing stocks, as well as the total cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments and all regions of the world.

"In this connexion, the Conference demands"—and I stress the words "demands"—"the suspension of the French nuclear tests being programmed and carried out at Mururoa in the South Pacific."

92. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652 are mostly small countries, without ambition to be nuclear-weapon States. We have no wish or power to harm anyone, nor have we any means, apart from the logic of our arguments, to persuade members of this assembly to support our draft resolution. We know that powerful pressures have been applied to some countries to withhold their support, for reasons which have little to do with the merits. Those countries which do vote for our draft resolution, on the other hand, will have the satisfaction of knowing that they do so freely, in accordance with their conscience and what they believe to be right.

93. Mr. BEAUGUITTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, I think that the Permanent Representative of France set forth our position regarding defence sufficiently clearly to make it unnecessary for me to add anything.

94. Furthermore, I have before me draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, which refers to the cessation of nuclear tests. I believe that paragraph 5 has been strengthened, or at least that the intention of the sponsors was to strengthen it. However, it still contains the discrimination that my delegation pointed to yesterday. It merely urges—I grant

you that the word "vigorously" has been added but is that enough?—the States that are carrying out nuclear tests underground immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a treaty to halt those tests. Regardless of the vigour of that appeal, it cannot replace an injunction for the immediate cessation of these tests. Why should that injunction be reserved for atmospheric tests? That is the discrimination that we denounce. All the rest is rhetoric. I reiterate our request that the vote on this draft resolution not take place today.

95. Mr. ADJIBADE (Dahomey) (*interpretation from French*): Since this is the first time I have spoken in this Committee, I should like to associate myself with those who have extended congratulations to the officers of the Committee and to say how appreciative my delegation is of the way in which Mr. Borch is conducting our proceedings. He can be assured of our co-operation.

96. Before the vote on the various draft resolutions before us, I should like to make the following statement.

97. The Dahomey delegation has refrained from speaking in the general debate on items 29 and 32 to 38 of the agenda in the conviction that almost all States, large and small, want peace and are determined to eliminate anything which may imperil it. But the national selfishness of some and the sick cupidity of others lead them to obstruct disarmament, thus compromising the chances of attaining this noble objective. It is, in our view, out of selfishness that some Governments, claiming that they are ensuring self-defence, are pursuing the arms race, and, it is also out of cupidity that other Governments are feverishly arming those who are not, because their only purpose is to enrich themselves—there are some who even ask to be paid in cash—through this ignoble enterprise, while the technical value of the arms they provide has not been proved.

98. We have noticed throughout this debate that those States that agree to work without insurmountable difficulties for general and complete disarmament are the very States which do not possess weapons of mass destruction, while the super-Powers interested in the mad arms race, which is placing the burden of a crushing threat on humanity, explain to us with all their rhetoric, of which we are well aware, why they do not participate in complete disarmament, which is a corollary of the peace to which all the nations of the world should aspire.

99. The Dahomean delegation has not been convinced by the reasons provided to justify the arms race. There is no doubt that disarmament will come about when the super-Powers have decided that it should. This reminds us of what was said by a contemporary author at the beginning of the century:

"Universal peace will be achieved one day, not because men will become better—we cannot hope for that—but because there will be a new order, a new science, there will be new economic necessities, and this will impose peace."

100. Throughout this session a great deal has been said without any progress being made with regard to the real problem before us. No progress has been achieved with

regard to disarmament not because we do not want peace but simply because the so-called great Powers refuse to provide it to us at any price. To conclude our debates—debates which have to some extent enabled us to rid ourselves of the inhibitions caused by our impotence to achieve what we want and what is dear to us, that is, peace by complete disarmament—some delegations have presented draft resolutions. We greatly appreciate their gesture and thank them most sincerely. We whole-heartedly support the various principles and considerations which inspire the draft resolutions which go in the direction of our objective. However, like so many others, we are very much embarrassed when we think about the fate of many resolutions of our Organization, and we wonder whether it is really worth while to adopt new resolutions. Our indefatigable attachment to peace allows us to hope, however, and that is why, in a responsible way and fully aware of what we are doing, the Dahomean delegation will vote in favour of all the draft resolutions before us which are in favour of complete disarmament. In particular we shall vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.651, which most firmly condemns all nuclear tests. Indeed, the view of my Government is that all nuclear tests must be found reprehensible, whatever their form and place and whatever the Power undertaking them, because they are contrary to the primary objectives of peace. Our vote is the expression of a principle which we cherish, that is, that Dahomey condemns any test in the atmosphere, under ground or under water, and our vote is in no way a token of hostility towards any country.

101. As to draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, we share the view that it is discriminatory. Indeed, operative paragraphs 3 and 5 of the revised text may be considered as sanctioning underground tests. In those circumstances my delegation would have hoped that those paragraphs could be improved and that the draft resolution would prohibit all nuclear tests, including those underground. But, for lack of something better, we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution when it is put to the vote.

102. The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Sri Lanka in exercise of his right of reply.

103. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): As I have been shown the great honour of being especially referred to by one or two delegations in regard to my intervention on draft resolution A/C.1/L.652, I feel I owe them the courtesy of replying and that is what I propose to do now.

104. The representative of New Zealand quoted from a statement I made on an identical resolution last year. What we stated last year is not in the least inconsistent with what we stated this year, although I too believe that, as someone else has said, consistency is the virtue of fools.

105. The representative of New Zealand drew attention to the fact that we ratified the partial test-ban Treaty almost 10 years ago. May I tell him why we did so. We did so in the honest belief that the promise held out there would be fulfilled. It has not been fulfilled, and that is why we have changed our minds.

106. Again, the representative of New Zealand stated that he could not understand how we could abstain on paragraph 3 of that resolution; that to abstain on it would

be a sop to the nuclear Powers that continue to conduct atmospheric tests, and that they would welcome it accordingly. I believe that those who conduct underground tests will more than appreciate the kid-glove treatment they have received from the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652.

107. As for the Algiers Declaration, it sets out that detailed programme which alone would make any sense of all the profusion of language, denunciatory, supplicatory and conciliatory, contained in the draft resolution. The Declaration of Algiers should be read as a whole, and no single sentence of it should be quoted or taken out of context. The Declaration of Algiers sets out that very four-point programme which we said would alone make sense of all the efforts to stop testing.

108. Like New Zealand, we of Sri Lanka are a small country and have neither the aspiration nor the capacity to become a nuclear Power.

109. I have only one more reference to make, and that is to the statement made earlier by the representative of Fiji. The representative of Fiji has stated that we could be accused of blatant discrimination because we have singled out the Indian Ocean to be treated as a zone of peace. Why have we not strived to make all the oceans of the world zones of peace? It is simply because we know our limitations and are very humble.

110. The CHAIRMAN: I would hope that we have now concluded the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1. The only question that remains is whether that resolution could be taken to a vote today. I believe we agreed yesterday that the draft resolutions in document A/C.1/L.651 and what is now document A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1, should be voted on at the same time. Members will also have heard that the representative of France requested that a vote not be taken on draft resolution A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1 today. I shall therefore take it that members of the Committee are in agreement that we should postpone the vote on those two draft resolutions to 21 or 22 November.

111. The Committee has before it, then, draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1 relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

112. Mr. CHUANG Yen (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese Government and people have always deeply sympathized with and firmly supported the Latin American countries and peoples in their just struggles against the policy of aggression and nuclear hegemony of the super-Powers and for defending State sovereignty and national independence. The Chinese Government attaches great importance to the unremitting efforts made by the Latin American countries for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and firmly opposes the nuclear super-Powers' policy of nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail against Latin America. Proceeding from this principled position, the Chinese Government formally signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America on 21 August 1973. On signing the Protocol, the Chinese representative read a statement on behalf of the Chinese Government, expounding the Chinese Government's respect and support for the just stand of the Latin American countries for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin

America and reaffirming the Chinese Government's principled position on the question of disarmament and nuclear weapons.

113. Now I should like to take this opportunity to draw the Committee's attention to a statement of the Chinese Government contained in document A/9137.

114. The Chinese Government is now making the necessary preparations so as to complete the required procedure of ratification at an early date.

115. Basing itself on the above consistent position of the Chinese Government, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

116. The CHAIRMAN: To avoid misunderstanding may I say that the last days for voting on present and future draft resolutions will be 22 and 23 November, not, as I mistakenly said before, 21 and 22 November.

117. Mr. BEAUGUITTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): At the beginning of this year France decided to accede to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, as requested in several General Assembly resolutions, the latest being resolution 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972. Some may have been surprised at the French Government's delay in acceding to the Protocol when quite clearly it had never intended to impede the operation of the Treaty, to encourage the signatories to violate their commitments or to prompt them to acquire nuclear weapons—or, of course, to have recourse itself in any circumstances whatsoever to the use of nuclear weapons against a Latin American State.

118. However, our accession to the Protocol raised difficult problems of principle for us and went to the very heart of our constitutional rights. Furthermore, we did not wish our signature to be construed as establishing a precedent which could be used as an argument against us in regard to other regions of the world where the establishment of denuclearized zones would raise very delicate questions. However that may be, on the occasion of the visit paid by the President of the Republic of Mexico, Mr. Echeverría, to the President of the French Republic we decided to overcome those juridical objections and in June 1973 our Ambassador to Mexico signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. The French Government will very shortly be submitting that signature to the process of parliamentary ratification.

119. From the very beginning of the negotiations which culminated in the conclusion of the Treaty, France had expressed its approval of the efforts of the Latin American countries, which, of their own free will and independently of any external pressure, had decided to place themselves outside nuclear competition once and for all. Of course, I should like to repeat, our intention had always been to respect such a decision, but what goes without saying goes even better when one says it, and after a detailed study of the subject we wanted to provide the Latin American countries with formal assurances sanctioning and giving concrete form to the status of a denuclearized zone with which they wanted to endow themselves. We would ask

them to see that gesture as one which we believe demonstrates our great esteem for them and our friendship with each of them, hoping that our accession to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty will strengthen those sentiments even further.

120. Of course, the establishment of such denuclearized zones cannot constitute the complete solution to the problem and do away once and for all with the nuclear peril for those who adhere to such a treaty. There is no other solution for mankind—and we should like to repeat this—but that of effective disarmament, and of nuclear disarmament in the first place. As long as the vast arsenals possessed by various Powers continue to grow, increasing their destructive power beyond all limits, the nuclear peril will persist for mankind as a whole.

121. The gesture of goodwill made by the Latin American countries in constituting a denuclearized zone is, nevertheless, of great moral value. That is why the French Government, whose major objective is peace and which wishes to possess nuclear weapons only to ensure its defence in an over-armed world, wishes to associate itself with this gesture. We would like to express the hope that our example will be followed and that the development of denuclearized zones will be an encouragement to disarmament and a call to reason for the Powers which are still putting their best hopes in atomic armaments.

122. Permit me, in conclusion, to wish the organ that is responsible for enforcing the Treaty fruitful activity.

123. On behalf of the French Government, I should like to congratulate also the sponsors of this vast enterprise—the denuclearization of Latin America—particularly Mr. García Robles, the father of the Treaty, who, through his competence and his patient determination, has been able to bring to a successful conclusion a particularly arduous task and in this way has won a right to the gratitude of the Latin American people and to a lasting place in history.

124. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to say a few words now in explanation of the changes that have been made to draft resolution A/C.1/L.654 which now appears in document A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1.

125. The changes relate specifically to two paragraphs of the original draft. Paragraph 1 of the original text has been amended by the addition of the following words after the word "China": "and that the Governments of both countries have already decided to take the necessary measures for its ratification";

126. Representatives will note that in the original text the General Assembly would have, according to paragraph 2, invited the French and Chinese Governments to ratify Additional Protocol II as soon as possible. The representatives of these two countries have, in conversations with the sponsors of the draft, informed us that they felt that that invitation was superfluous, since their respective Governments had already decided to take the necessary measures for ratification as soon as possible. Moreover, the two representatives informed us that they intended to state in public in the First Committee precisely what they had told us in private—and they have just done so.

127. Therefore, when the General Assembly adopts this draft resolution—and we have no doubt that it will—it will also be taking note with satisfaction of the fact that France and the People's Republic of China signed, in 1973, Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and also that these two Governments have already decided to take the necessary measures for its ratification.

128. It is obvious that the addition to paragraph 1 makes the original operative paragraph 2 superfluous.

129. The paragraphs that were numbered 3, 4 and 5 have now been renumbered 2, 3 and 4.

130. A mere comparison of the new text with the old will make any explanation unnecessary on my part. I shall merely say that a number of delegations approached the sponsors and suggested that it might be helpful if the wording of the original text were slightly modified. Since all the sponsors—and my own delegation in particular—are convinced that in these matters what counts is the substance and not the form and that as the old Latin adage puts it *suaviter in modo et fortiter in re*, we had no difficulty in accepting the suggestion made. We trust that the paragraph as now worded will satisfy all the delegations that approached us.

131. I would like to add that I have listened with great gratification—and I do not think that it was the Mexican delegation alone that was gratified, I am sure that the delegations of all the States Parties were equally gratified—to the words of sympathy and support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its purpose that were spoken a few minutes ago by the representatives of China and France.

132. I only hope that this coming year the General Assembly will be able to take note, with satisfaction equal to that expressed today in operative paragraph 1, of the fact that the Soviet Union has also seen fit to heed the courteous exhortation addressed to it in paragraph 2!

133. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now begin the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1. I shall first call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

134. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Previously we have explained the position of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Our position has not changed, nor could it change, since it is based on the just assessment of unchallengeable realities that must be borne in mind if we wish to achieve the objectives of that instrument.

135. We have stressed that we cannot conceive of the denuclearization of Latin America if the commitment in this case of the United States, which is the only nuclear Power in the Western Hemisphere, is not also included. The United States possesses a network of military installations in the Caribbean region and in other areas of Latin America. Militarily it occupies the colonial territory of Puerto Rico, where it possesses two bases equipped with nuclear missiles, including remote-controlled ones. It has established illegal bases in the usurped zone of the Panama

Canal and, against the express will of my people and my Government, it still holds on my own soil the naval base of Guantanamo.

136. These and other military installations are outside the control of those countries that are or might become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Yet these installations are a permanent threat to the peace, security and independence of Latin America. United States imperialism makes use of these in its aggressive and interfering plans against the people of Latin America. There it trains, organizes and stations its intervention troops that more than once have invaded Latin American countries, violated their sovereignty and imposed the will of the Yankee monopolies on them. In these installations the CIA trains its mercenaries and the Pentagon trains its fascists generals. Imperialism there hides the spies and the provocateurs that are used against the Latin American peoples.

137. While those military bases that Yankee imperialism has set up against the will of our peoples subsist, peace and security in Latin America will be under constant threat. Therefore their liquidation is an indispensable condition for the purposes of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to become feasible. The elimination of these bases and the return of the usurped territories to Panama, Puerto Rico and Cuba is a legitimate claim that today is supported by wide sectors of the international community.

138. Thus I would venture to recall, as I did in the course of the general debate, the specific agreement contained in the general declaration of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers last September.

139. The draft resolution on which we are to vote seems to overlook these realities. Its text suggests greater concern about the adherence to the treaty of Powers alien to the zone, while the treaty allows the only nuclear Power in the hemisphere to maintain and expand the situation that I have just described.

140. The idea of sparing the peoples of Latin America the dangers of nuclear weaponry is most praiseworthy and we commend it, but it cannot be implemented while the United States, the nuclear Power that is an immediate neighbour to the region, that possesses belligerent installations in the zone that is to be protected, still maintains an imperialist aggressive and interventionist policy against the Latin American peoples. To denuclearize our peoples while their most ardent enemy is still equipped with all types of weaponry and reserves its own right to install this equipment and transfer it to our territory is not, we believe, the safest way of protecting us from nuclear dangers. To call for the adherence of other nuclear Powers distant from the zone without denouncing the usurpation and the United States control of important portions of Latin American territory, where it has established nuclear weapons, does not to us appear to be the best way of truly prohibiting such weapons in Latin America.

141. My Government at all times has admitted the most laudable intentions underlying this Mexican initiative. We have stated and reiterate now our appreciation of the noble efforts made by the Government of Mexico, and personally

by Mr. García Robles, to achieve the objectives that underlie the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, we have abstained from subscribing to that Treaty, since we understand that the aims of the Treaty will be illusory until it covers the denuclearization of the only nuclear Power in the hemisphere.

142. Our position was repeated in the good offices committee of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which visited Cuba last August.

143. For the reasons I have adduced, my delegation cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1.

144. I should like, in conclusion, to stress that the Revolutionary Government of Cuba is in favour of any efforts that may be made to create a system of world security. However, it feels that the validity of such a system depends on the system allowing no exceptions and no privileges for any.

145. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation wishes to explain its position on the question of the signature of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

146. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the question of denuclearized zones. The Soviet Union bases itself on the fact that the creation of such zones should fulfil the task of truly limiting nuclear weapons as well as ensuring that there should be no direct or indirect proliferation of such weapons. This attitude of principle determines the position of the Soviet Union concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

147. The Soviet Union delegation, like many other delegations which have spoken here, fully understands the reasons which have led the co-sponsors to submit the draft resolution on the question of a denuclearized zone in Latin America. At the same time, the Soviet Union feels that the viability of such a zone will depend first and foremost on the extent to which the obligations of States in that zone guarantee the status of denuclearization and the extent to which the other nuclear Powers are prepared to respect the status of the zone.

148. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America we find—together with provisions which are truly designed for that purpose—provisions that are not in keeping with the solution to the problems that arise in connexion therewith. First of all, under article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco:

“The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—...”.

149. Since at present there is no distinction made between nuclear devices for peaceful purposes and explosions for military purposes, the article I have just quoted from the Treaty in fact allows a particular State party to

the Treaty, on the pretext of conducting explosions for peaceful purposes, to carry out nuclear-weapons tests and thus to develop nuclear weapons. This provision in the Treaty of Tlatelolco is, unfortunately, one way of side-stepping that Treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America.

150. Secondly, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains no provision prohibiting the transit of nuclear weapons over the territory of States parties to the Treaty. From the provisions in the document prepared by the Preparatory Commission of February 1967,<sup>1</sup> it follows that each of the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco has the right to solve independently the question of the authorization for allowing the transit of nuclear weapons over its territory; that authorization—according to the text of the Preparatory Commission: falls within the competence of each State, which freely exercises its sovereign rights.

151. The absence of a prohibition on the transit of nuclear weapons over the denuclearized territories of Latin America offers an obvious possibility for violating the status of denuclearized zone and can mask the deployment and even the use of nuclear weapons on territories in that zone. This, in particular, gives the nuclear Powers the possibility of introducing into the zone, or of transporting over the territory of States parties in that zone, nuclear weapons on the basis of specific agreements with any of the parties to the Treaty.

152. Thirdly, the zone provided for by the Treaty covers the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans over an area hundreds of kilometres beyond the limits of the territorial waters of the States parties. This is not in keeping with a very important principle of international law, namely, the principle of the freedom of the high seas. The existing rules of international law do not provide that either States or groups of States have the right to create, without any agreement with the other States concerned, a particular régime of the high seas based on their own decisions and on conditions to be laid down by those States themselves.

153. Having regard to the considerations I have just put forward, the Soviet delegation has not felt it possible, and still does not feel it possible, to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

154. At the same time, the Soviet delegation wishes once again to emphasize that it fully supports the idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones, including the creation of such zones in Latin America, as witnessed by the contents of the reply of 4 January 1971 from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Mexican Senate.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Government declared that it was ready to assume the commitment of respecting the status of Mexico as a nuclear-free zone, on condition that other nuclear States would assume similar commitments.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 98, document A/8336/Rev.1.

155. If the other countries of Latin America wish to transform their territories into a denuclearized zone, the Soviet Union will respect the status of those countries as part of such a zone. It is understood that there must be a prohibition on the transit of nuclear weapons over the territory of those countries, on the conduct of peaceful explosions contrary to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and on the extension of such denuclearized zones to vast areas of the high seas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

156. For the reasons I have given, the delegation of the Soviet Union is not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1 and will abstain in the vote.

157. In connexion with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, one point was raised concerning the provision that a Power should not be the first to use nuclear weapons. On this question I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the proposal put forward at the last session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Union regarding the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. I should like at this point to emphasize that at its last session the General Assembly adopted a solemn declaration on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That resolution was adopted by 79 votes to 4. Thus it was approved in general by the General Assembly. That resolution placed on a broader plane the whole question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and also the matter of a decision on a very important question, the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. I wished to draw the First Committee's attention to that point.

158. Mr. SCOTLAND (Guyana): Guyana has asked for the floor to explain its vote before the vote on this first draft resolution which is now before the Committee for decision. This request is made since at the end of the vote on all the draft resolutions there would arise an apparently curious inconsistency in the attitude of Guyana when its vote on the draft resolution is compared with that on the other resolutions—that apparent inconsistency being especially underlined by the fact that this draft resolution is one that deeply concerns the region of which Guyana forms a part. It is to anticipate that apparent inconsistency that Guyana now seeks to explain its vote on the draft resolution before us.

159. The draft resolution attracts comments from Guyana since statements on the principal Treaty made by certain delegations during the general debate implied that every State on the Latin American continent that wishes to become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco either has done, or can do so. Furthermore, the language of the sixth preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) lends credence to this implication.

160. It is now some six years since the Treaty of Tlatelolco régime was established, and it was during that period that Guyana embraced the noble purposes of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and supported the desire of the whole of Latin America for that continent to become a nuclear-free zone. It was, too, during that period that Guyana was

seeking to become a party to that Treaty. This desire, alas, remains unfulfilled.

161. As far as participation in the Treaty of Tlatelolco régime is concerned, Guyana's position remains the same today as it was six years ago. Guyana's desire to participate is faced with the discriminatory exclusionary paradox of article 25, paragraph 2, of this Treaty.

162. Guyana speaks of the existence of discrimination and paradox. Discrimination lies in the fact that a particular provision, namely article 25, paragraph 2, of the Treaty can be seen to apply with exclusionary effect to one Latin American State only: Guyana.

163. The paradox of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that while it has as its aim the support of all Latin American States for a continent free from the testing, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, the Treaty nevertheless militates against the legal commitment to this purpose by Guyana. That paradox is also inherent in a position in which the signatories to Tlatelolco seek support for the Treaty among extra-continental, albeit nuclear States, and even urge one such reluctant or unwilling State to become a party to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty, while some of the signatories either support or acquiesce in the perpetuation of provisions in the Treaty that prevent one of the States of Latin America from becoming a party to the Treaty.

164. Guyana noted that in his intervention at the 1953rd meeting, the representative of Jamaica made reference to the existence of article 25, paragraph 2, of the Treaty in a voice which bespoke concern. Guyana is gratified that there is concern within the region at the effect of that paragraph.

165. Finally, Guyana wishes to observe that the understanding of the General Assembly on this question, as expressed in the sixth preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) "that it is the intent of the signatory States that all existing States within the zone defined in the Treaty . . . become parties to the Treaty without any restriction", is far from being a reality. For those reasons, while remaining committed to the purposes of the Treaty of Tlatelolco régime, Guyana cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1 and will abstain in the vote.

166. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 104 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.*

167. The CHAIRMAN: No member has expressed the wish to explain his vote after the vote. I therefore call on the representative of Mexico in exercise of his right of reply. I apologize for the fact that rule 130 of the rules of procedure made it impossible for me to call on him before.

168. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall be very brief.



169. The fact that the representative of the Soviet Union in his explanation of vote a few moments ago was unable to adduce a single new argument in his attempt to justify the negative position of his Government regarding the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco makes it easier for me drastically to curtail the length of my statement. I believe that on this specific point it is sufficient for me to say that the statement I made on 10 November 1972, a year ago, which may be found in the verbatim record of the 1889th meeting of the First Committee, fully proves the total absence of any foundation for the arguments that the

representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roschin, once again presented today.

170. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to state for the record that the delegation of Mauritius, which was absent during the vote, wishes it to be announced that had it been present it would have voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.654/Rev.1.

*The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.*