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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 6 November 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

<u>Chairman:</u>	Mr. GHORRA	(Lebanon)
<u>Rapporteur:</u>	Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA	(Venezuela)

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /31/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 7 NOVEMBER 1975, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 12 NOVEMBER 1975.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/ (continued)
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- General and complete disarmament /41/ (continued):
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- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /47/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific /120/ (continued)
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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 and 126 (continued)

Mr. KOOIJMANS (Netherlands): Last year, when addressing this Committee, I had to acknowledge that 1974 could not be considered a propitious year for the cause of arms control and disarmament. 1975 hardly offers a more promising picture.

True, we have been offered a number of proposals comparable to treaties, such as the sea-bed Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty and the outer-space Treaty. I have in mind the recently introduced Soviet-American draft convention on the prohibition of environmental warfare and the Soviet proposal on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

To be sure, the agreements and proposals I have just mentioned could lead to positive steps towards a less dangerous world in so far as they restrain, or in some cases even prohibit, certain military activities. With the actual arms race, however, they have little to do. These treaties and proposals deal with peripheral subjects which are of marginal interest to most military strategists. At the same time, however, such moves tend to sustain an impression of progress in disarmament matters and may even lead to a diminished anxiety over the possibility of a nuclear war. Whether such conventions promote a real sense of security, particularly among the smaller nations, seems, however, highly questionable.

The improvement in understanding between the two leading nuclear Powers over the last decade has opened a new era of negotiations between them, the most important of which are the SALT I accords of 1972 and, more recently, the follow-up agreements of Moscow and Vladivostok. Important as these understandings may be in putting a "cap" on the offensive-arms race, I am not yet convinced that they have contributed to a genuine restraint of the arms race. Both parties have continued to increase and refine their strategic arsenals in all fields, except where the express prohibitions of the SALT

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agreements are effective. Moreover, SALT I has had no effect whatsoever on already-deployed levels of armaments.

Since strategic parity between the super-Powers is now a generally recognized reality, the primary objective should be to halt the quantitative and qualitative strategic arms race and, in addition, to achieve a significant reduction in strategic weaponry on both sides. Whether Vladivostok makes a positive contribution to arms control depends on whether the high numerical ceilings agreed upon, especially with respect to MIRV-ed vehicles, will be converted at an early date into a basis of negotiation leading to real reductions and qualitative restraints. I may add that, at least with anything like present force-levels, numerical differences in strategic nuclear forces need not be of direct military significance. Therefore, a precise technical or numerical equality need not per se dominate the negotiations.

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My Government is also worried about certain tendencies towards a greater probability of the use of nuclear weapons. The possible introduction of new types and systems of nuclear weapons, changing nuclear doctrines and the fact that the main nuclear Powers are apparently hesitant to assume under certain conditions additional obligations concerning negative security guarantees towards non-nuclear-weapon States all point somewhat in the same direction. In this respect, it is, for example, revealing to read a Soviet disclaimer on page 96 of the study of nuclear-weapon-free zones (A/10027/Add.1) concerning negative security guarantees towards such zones. I admit, of course, that these questions are very complicated; a more positive approach seems necessary since the perception by States of their security has relevance for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This became abundantly clear during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Turning to that Conference we can say that the practical results, which were considerable, were overshadowed by differences of views on political and security issues. In particular, it was widely felt that unless the main nuclear Powers accept their responsibilities under the NPT and give up something real and tangible the non-proliferation régime is in danger in the long run. On many practical problems, including safeguards, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions and other issues, my Government considers the recommendations of the Conference a success. However, we must not close our eyes to technological developments which at the same time undermine the barriers against the spread of atomic weapons.

This situation is particularly alarming, as other speakers have also pointed out, if we look at the rapid progress and inevitable spread of advanced nuclear technology. For example, there is a growing recognition that a number of countries are acquiring a considerable scientific and technological capacity in nuclear matters also. The ominous potential of this development was made clear last year by India's explosion of a nuclear device -- the first additional State to do so in almost a decade.

The increasing importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the fulfilment of the energy needs of this world is an understandable development, and the benefits thereof may not be denied to any country. From the viewpoint

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of "equal chances for each State", it is therefore proper that the less developed countries also gradually acquire the necessary scientific and technological knowledge. At the same time, however, all States should be fully aware of the risks involved in this "democratization of knowledge", and take the necessary precautionary measures. A number of less developed countries not yet bound by the NPT, and in view of their attitudes towards the NPT not likely to be so in the future, are presently considered to possess to some degree the potential for developing nuclear weapons. If we extend our horizon, say, to 1980 the list of countries capable of producing nuclear weapons would be considerably longer. The estimated plutonium production in 1980 will be 80,000 kilograms; in 1990 this will have grown to 450,000 kilograms. Gigantic amounts of this dangerous and highly poisonous material will probably accumulate over the years to come. This, as we know, is one of the most urgent problems that the international community will have to cope with in the near future.

Moreover, spurred by the energy crisis international trade in nuclear power equipment and know-how is rapidly expanding. It is therefore of the utmost importance that strict common export requirements be agreed upon among the nuclear supplier countries, in particular with respect to sensitive parts of the fuel cycle such as enrichment and reprocessing plants. In any case, we would favour arrangements under which suppliers would make it a condition for the delivery of nuclear equipment and materials that the entire nuclear activities of the importing country not a party to the NPT be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Only under common export requirements will conditions for commercial competition be genuinely equal and the risk forestalled that commercial interests would interfere with considerations of security. At any rate, we must do our utmost to avoid the establishment of a nuclear infrastructure which could easily be misused, even if the nuclear materials involved are under IAEA safeguards.

From what I have said so far, it would appear that in this increasingly complex and dangerous world the sting has been taken out of super-Power confrontation, strategically and politically. In this same world, however, the legitimate expectations and needs of the less developed nations will continue to grow. In such a world we face not only the problem of nuclear weapons in

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the hands of the existing nuclear Powers but to an increasing extent that of nuclear weapons potentially in the hands of other States as well.

In these circumstances, revitalizing and strengthening the existing non-proliferation régime is a matter of great practical urgency.

As the Netherlands Foreign Minister pointed out during the general debate, we therefore whole-heartedly support, as a step in the right direction, the five-point programme put forward by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom to add new vigour and impetus, as he put it, to our non-proliferation objectives. I note with particular satisfaction that according to this programme there should be a common system of international inspection through the International Atomic Energy Agency and one set of rules for all countries in the world. The Netherlands also fully subscribes to the idea that all civil nuclear materials and facilities should be brought within the common inspection system.

My Government will fully co-operate in the working out of proposals which the British Government intends to make on this subject, either here or in the IAEA. In the same context, my Government fully supports the idea of setting up regional nuclear fuel centres. I refer to the lucid description concerning the advantages of such centres given by the representative of the United States last week.

(Mr. Kooijmans, Netherlands)

I would like now to comment on questions of a more general nature.

Although little progress was made during 1975 in arms control and disarmament negotiations in the CCD, there is reason for some satisfaction. Useful studies have been completed on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and on arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. A joint USA/USSR draft treaty prohibiting environmental warfare was submitted in August and will be discussed next year. My Government will give its views later in the CCD on this draft, both on the scope of the envisaged prohibitions and on the proposed complaints procedure.

The success of non-proliferation policy will be considerably promoted if nuclear-weapon-free zones are set up primarily in areas where nuclear weapons have not yet been introduced. This is why the Netherlands has taken a positive stand towards the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and southern Asia. We will also pay close attention to the proposal, introduced by the distinguished representative of New Zealand, dealing with the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

I welcome the study undertaken during this summer by a group of governmental experts within the CCD. I regard this study as a valuable tool to assist countries in setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Netherlands considers it important that the nuclear Powers respect well established nuclear-weapon-free zones by an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries taking part in such a zone. We would not consider it appropriate for the United Nations to formulate rules of a legislative nature for this purpose, but would welcome meaningful steps by the nuclear Powers themselves.

The nuclear test ban issue has bedevilled disarmament negotiations for nearly 20 years. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, although satisfactory from an environmental point of view, did not restrict the development of new nuclear weapons. More than 10 years later, a modest agreement was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union, which has still not been ratified, pending negotiations on how peaceful nuclear explosions can be conducted under the threshold test ban. Even if a satisfactory solution for this problem can be found, the agreement will only

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come into effect in March next year. In the meantime, the situation is apparently being used for more high yield testing than originally planned.

Many proposals have been made concerning a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban, while detailed studies on the verification of underground testing were undertaken by several countries. This year the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty based on positions taken in recent years in the CCD.

Let me briefly comment on that draft. First of all, I do not think that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions has been adequately dealt with. Already under the threshold test ban, it is difficult to set up a system to prevent peaceful nuclear explosions being misused for weapons tests, in particular for those peaceful explosions which have a yield above the threshold. The Soviet draft treaty is, in our view, too easy-going on this question.

Secondly, I do not consider it realistic to expect that all nuclear weapon Powers will now be willing to accept a comprehensive test ban. If this should be regarded as a pre-condition for the entry into force of a comprehensive test ban, as the Soviet draft treaty seems to do, there would be no hope for any further restraints on nuclear testing in the near future. On the other hand, nobody can deny that the main nuclear weapon Powers possess a tremendous lead in the field of nuclear weaponry, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Netherlands therefore supports the idea, expressed by many States during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, that the main nuclear weapon Powers could permit themselves to enter into an agreement to halt all nuclear weapons testing for a specified time. The terms of such an agreement could be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. I urgently appeal to the nuclear weapon Powers concerned to undertake such steps. As I repeatedly pointed out on earlier occasions, the Netherlands Government does not think that the verification issue need be a problem, if a solution is found for the peaceful nuclear explosions question.

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In the CCD, the Netherlands suggested that the temporary cessation of weapons tests should be combined with an interim ban on peaceful nuclear explosions. A ban on peaceful nuclear explosions would remove a serious stumbling block towards realization of a comprehensive weapons test ban, since it would prevent peaceful nuclear explosions being misused. Such a suspension of peaceful nuclear explosions, together with test explosions for military purposes, could strengthen the non-proliferation régime considerably. Because of its temporary character, no country would have to be afraid that the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, if any appeared in the future, would be banned permanently.

At the beginning of my speech I referred to the proposal made by the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons. While agreeing in principle that it may be important to forestall once and for all the possibility of the development of new, probably even more horrible weapons than the ones already in existence, I must say that in order to enable us to take a more definite position with regard to this proposal, we should like to receive more clarification from the initiators. Moreover, I share fully the feeling of the representative of Canada that discussions about future weapons systems should not detract our attention from the primordial necessity of curbing the present arms race.

As long as the evil of war cannot be banished, efforts should be made to keep human suffering to a minimum. My Government, therefore, takes great interest in the proceedings of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which, inter alia, has already adopted a new formulation of an old criterion in article 33,(2):

"It is forbidden to employ weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."

Next year, in the context of the reaffirmation of the laws of war, an expert conference in Lugano will study possibilities of specific restrictions or prohibitions of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects. For the first time in many decades, detailed studies are under way in several countries on the possible effects of certain weapons on human beings, weapons many of which already form part of the arsenals of modern armies.

My Government strongly supports these developments on strengthening humanitarian law in armed conflicts. We hope that next year substantial progress can be made with respect to internationally accepted prohibitions or restrictions of certain weapons. Our detailed views will be presented during the conferences in 1976. Internationally accepted prohibitions or restrictions are, of course, desirable, in order to prevent one-sided military advantages. In the absence of internationally accepted measures, however, each country still has the obligation to determine whether the employment of its weapons is in conformity with existing and future rules of international law.

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In talking about conventional weapons, I should be less than frank if I did not express the growing concern of my Government about the ever-increasing arms sales in our world. Although no country can be denied the right to acquire the means to defend itself, so long as collective security is not sufficiently ensured, the growing rate of arms sales leads to greater insecurity and therefore to a less safe world, apart from the fact that financial means are diverted from other, more commendable and certainly more essential needs. Self-restraint on the part of weapons-exporting countries is necessary, but in the light of past experiences certainly not sufficient. I fully realize that of the matters we have to deal with, this could well be the most complicated one. This should not, however, be a justification for not tackling it. My Government would welcome any initiative, either on a regional or on a world-wide scale, which could enable us to untie this seemingly Gordian knot. In this connexion my delegation took note with interest of the statement made by the representative of the United States on 10 April 1975 in the CCD.

The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, referred in her speech this week to a review of the role to be carried out by the United Nations in the disarmament field. She proposed the establishment of an intergovernmental committee which would report its findings to the next session of the General Assembly. My Government has taken note with interest of this proposal and we will comment on it after further clarification.

As a result of technological revolutions now in process, some basic traditional concepts of international politics, such as the reliance upon security through military power, buffer zones or spheres of influence and control, may well become obsolete. The unprecedented levels to which present arsenals have been raised and the absence of any sense of proportion in their present dimensions and scale of deployment are just too dangerous.

I am therefore firmly convinced that disarmament and arms control should be an integral part of rational policies for any nation. These alone are not enough. We should also aim at removing the causes of tension and situations of injustice. An essential requirement for lasting security is the development and strengthening of international institutions and mechanisms based on justice, that can accommodate processes of change in a peaceful way. That should be the ultimate objective of all our efforts.

Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): Each time before my delegation speaks on the subject of disarmament it feels the need to preface its statement with a simple thought. It is somehow presumptuous for the representatives of small and developing countries to participate with the big and the mighty in a dialogue about nuclear mathematics and the taming of unimaginable destructive power. But it is also most suitable and appropriate for the representatives of small and developing countries to show eagerness about the need to control this unimaginable destructive power and avert possible mutual annihilation. We have an intimate knowledge of insecurity and the sense of vulnerability to superior technology of destruction and unchecked massive force. My country's region, the Middle East, is a very good example. Nor are we in the developing countries less aware of the present incredible waste of resources on armaments at a time when the question of development is in the forefront of national and international concern and the determination is near universal regarding the establishment of a new world economic order based on equity, justice and common well-being.

Unfortunately, the dialogue on world disarmament on all levels remains limited and agonized. There have been no major breakthroughs seen during the last year in any area of disarmament. There are some positive signs but no breakthroughs. We were vividly reminded of that during the Conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last May. It was obvious during that review that little progress has been made in the concrete implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Treaty, particularly by the nuclear Powers. In the two major areas indicated in the Treaty -- the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and concrete disarmament commitments -- there has been no progress. The smaller Powers have been active in urging concrete steps in these areas and several proposals were presented by them in this regard. We hope that an adequate response to these proposals of the smaller Powers will be made by the nuclear Powers in the spirit and direction embodied in the Treaty.

The following observations must be made regarding the general area of nuclear disarmament. First, although the United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in bilateral negotiations on strategic arms limitation, progress seems comparatively limited. No qualitative limits have been

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agreed upon and no reductions have been agreed upon or seem to be impending.

Secondly, there is an urgent need to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference recommendations relating to safeguards. All practical measures to strengthen the safeguards system must be taken, including such measures relating to the peaceful nuclear activities of all States that are conducting them, as well as to the supply of nuclear material and equipment.

Thirdly, international attention must be focused now on the goal of complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Several ideas and proposals were made in this regard within the CCD and outside it, and within the United Nations framework. A certain measure of progress must be achieved in this area soon because of the urgency of the problem and our increasing awareness of its potential for getting out of control.

Fourthly, the concept of the nuclear-power-free zone must be further developed in all its legal, practical and technical aspects. It is a complex of vast potential for narrowing and isolating what the representative of Mexico calls the "nuclear epidemic". I shall deal more specifically with this subject in a moment.

Finally, it must be stated that on the more conventional level certain important tasks await the international community. There is still little progress in the implementation of the task of reinforcing the Convention on bacteriological, biological and toxin weapons by an instrument applying to chemical weapons. For several years now my delegation has been stressing this problem, particularly in the specific area of napalm and other incendiary weapons. It is obvious that in our imperfect world the use of incendiary and chemical weapons in many areas of the world, including my own, has a more widespread effect than does the present controlled, if ever imminent, danger of nuclear war.

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I come back now to the important area of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This is a relatively new and creative concept in the field of disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and international security. We have a valuable document before us in this regard, the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects" (A/10027/Add.1). It is a most enlightening document. It underlines the need to define and refine the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the obligations of States, nuclear and non-nuclear, under it.

It is obviously a concept that is closely linked to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and all practical measures undertaken to this effect. It cannot be isolated from the measures discussed earlier in regard to safeguards. We have seen the concept of denuclearized zones spread from Antarctica to the sea-bed and ocean floor, to Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

In my country's own region, the Middle East, there is a certain urgency in the consolidation of the measures proposed last year in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 3263 (XXIX), on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. As you may recall, that resolution provided in its two main paragraphs, operative paragraphs 2 and 3, that it was indispensable for the realization of the purposes of the resolution that "all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;" and it called upon "the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;".

In conformity with this resolution, my Government transmitted its agreement with the goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and expressed its readiness to undertake the necessary reciprocal obligations towards the achievement of this purpose. It made the solemn declaration requested in paragraph 2 of the above resolution. It also recorded the fact that it had already conformed with the provision of paragraph 3 of the resolution by having acceded to the

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It stated in its reply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that:

"The goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region will remain unattained as long as a principal party fails to accede to the Treaty and abide by its provisions". (A/10221, p. 5)

That was a reference to the fact that Israel has adamantly refused so far to sign and ratify the Treaty.

We have reached now a new phase in the process of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. What we need now is moving another concrete step towards this goal. In the spirit of the specific resolution 3263 (XXIX) and the more general final Declaration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the General Assembly needs to enunciate two broad guidelines. First, it must call upon all nuclear States to refrain from supplying any nuclear weapons and any delivery weapons with a nuclear capability to any State in the region of the Middle East which has not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Secondly, it must call upon nuclear States to refrain from supplying any nuclear material or equipment or nuclear technical assistance of military potential to any State in the region of the Middle East which has not acceded to the Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. These are complete and necessary measures that must be adopted if we are to give the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East any actual meaning. I hope that our Committee will not fail to act in this direction during this session.

The issue of disarmament in all its aspects is complex and perplexing, but the world will not begin to be secure and peaceful until it begins to unravel its complexity.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, as one of those people from Geneva present here, I think I can only repeat the reasons which have been given by my colleagues which explain why I, as well, would like to congratulate you, Sir, for having assumed this important office which is so demanding and which involves so much responsibility. The talent, the skill and the patience with which you have been conducting the work of the First Committee to date guarantees that we will be able successfully to discharge the duties which have been entrusted to us.

I would also like to express my best wishes to the other officers of the Committee who, with you, are responsible for conducting the work of this Committee.

The year which has elapsed since the last session of the General Assembly has been marked by a number of events and efforts directed towards disarmament. Apart from numerous and bilateral talks, a number of international forums have also been concerned with curtailing the arms race.

The number of disarmament items on the agenda of the General Assembly and, consequently, on the agenda of our Committee, has reached a record figure. All this shows quite clearly that the search for a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament, as well as other partial issues, remains a matter of urgency. At the same time, it demonstrates the determination of the Member States of the United Nations to continue to seek ways likely to spare mankind from the danger of armaments and the unwarranted squandering of resources which they entail.

In my statement today I should like to set forth the position of my delegation on some of the items appearing in this most abundant work programme. But before doing so, I think it would be advisable to refer to some anniversaries as well as events that have occurred in international life which are, without any shadow of doubt, closely related to our work, in other words to disarmament.

It was precisely this year that we had occasion to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The success of the

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concerted struggle waged by the anti-fascist coalition provided undeniable proof that if peace-loving forces act in unison they are capable of stopping even the most dangerous and brutal aggressor in his tracks.

This anniversary could, at the same time, provide a motive for justified optimism because we have for a long time succeeded in preventing the outbreak of a new world war notwithstanding the fact that we were often faced with critical situations.

(Mr. Domokos, - Hungary)

No one can deny today that the danger of military confrontation between the great Powers, between countries of different social systems has been substantially reduced. Relations between the two major great Powers -- the Soviet Union and the United States of America -- are now governed by a number of bilateral agreements. These agreements are of particular importance in the present international climate and their conventions on arms limitation continue, as we see it, to represent important steps towards strengthening peace throughout the world and to have a positive influence on the international situation as a whole.

It is our hope that their talks on a new treaty and the subsequent limitation of strategic weapons will be crowned with success. These negotiations, which fundamentally affect the vital interests of the countries concerned, will have to be conducted with care and a special sense of responsibility. It is not easy to reach an agreement, but the fact that the political will of the two Powers concerned still exists will, we hope, lead to a final solution of the outstanding problems.

Another event of historic importance this year was the victory of the Viet-Nameese people against domestic oppression and foreign intervention. The liquidation of this hotbed of war is of far-reaching importance not only because the peoples of Indo-China have been able to embark on the work of peaceful rehabilitation and reconstruction of their economic and cultural life in order to build a new society but also because it has created conditions conducive to a further strengthening of the process of détente.

We believe that a détente mainly based on military balance is not a sufficiently sound basis for the maintenance of peace and the necessary strengthening of international security. That is why, like all other socialist countries and progressive forces, we urge that political détente be supplemented by military disarmament. We are convinced that an effective halt to the arms race will serve as a point of departure for placing international political life on a sounder footing.

The most significant result of détente has been the successful conclusion in Helsinki of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It was not a coincidence that this unprecedented event has been dealt with at length even in the statements made by representatives of countries which were not directly involved in that Conference.

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The Final Act reflects the clear signs of a lowering of tension on the European continent and shows how a subsequent broadening of détente can be achieved. In signing the final document the Governments of the countries of Europe have politically and morally committed themselves to the idea that their future relations will be based on dialogue rather than on armed might and that they will opt for comprehensive and mutually advantageous co-operation in economic and cultural matters and also in the realm of human contacts. We are convinced that the practical implementation of the recommendations contained in the Final Act will help to usher in a new era in relations among the peoples of our continent.

There can be no doubt that implementation of the provisions contained in the Helsinki document will have a favourable effect on the strengthening of security in Europe and will also have a beneficial effect on disarmament as a whole. We believe that, following on the success of the Helsinki Conference, the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe will be further stimulated.

Although we very much value the positive changes that have occurred in the international situation, we cannot remain silent concerning problems in the solution of which no tangible progress has been made. The introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization states in this connexion that

"... despite a number of important agreements for the limitation and control of armaments, it has not proved possible to halt or limit the arms race in either nuclear or conventional weapons ...; weapons are increasingly sophisticated and deadly, and the technological arms race continually promises new and more horrible developments." (A/10001/Add.1, p. 7)

Unfortunately, these circumstances to which I have referred fully justify our Committee's decision to include so many items on its agenda in order to speed up solutions to these problems.

Among disarmament questions, nuclear disarmament must still have pride of place. Ever since the first atomic bomb was dropped and mankind learned of its terribly destructive effect, there has been a steady campaign to ban it.

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Unfortunately, every method used and every attempt made has failed to produce decisive results. Instead of nuclear weapons being abolished, nuclear armament continues, ever more sophisticated weapons are being manufactured on an increasing scale and nuclear-weapon tests are being held even in the atmosphere.

Hence, the over-all picture is by no means a favourable one. My delegation nevertheless feels that in the field of disarmament there are certain encouraging signs and partial results which should not be overlooked. Contrary to the opinion expressed by many delegations, but in agreement with many others, we believe that the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was one of the most significant events of the year in the field of nuclear arms limitation.

The prevention of nuclear proliferation is the primary condition for reducing and eventually avoiding the danger of nuclear war and for increasing the chances of disarmament. Accordingly, the main aim of the Conference was to strengthen the régime of the Treaty and to increase its effectiveness. It was with this aim in mind that the Hungarian delegation which took part in the work of the Conference directed its activities.

Was the Conference in fact able to meet these requirements? Despite the fact that the positions of certain participants did not coincide on certain points, we would say that it was. The Conference was clearly successful in so far as its two main tasks were concerned. In the Final Declaration of the Conference, which was adopted by consensus, the countries parties to the Treaty stated that they

"... reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions."

(NPT/CONF/35/I, annex I, p. 2)

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

The importance and the viability of the Treaty has been underlined by one of its indirect successes, that is, 10 countries -- including several near-nuclear States with a developed atomic industry -- have become parties to the Treaty. We are fully justified, therefore, in addressing an appeal from this forum of the General Assembly to all countries that have not yet acceded to the Treaty.

The discussion and some of the recommendations appearing in the declaration and in the working documents can help to speed up the eventual strengthening of the non-proliferation system, and contribute to general or regional arrangements for limiting nuclear armaments, more effective co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a more secure physical protection for fissile materials, and the intensification of the future activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

During last year's debate in the General Assembly, the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) was the target of lively criticism. This year also, some delegations have not been sparing in their unfavourable comments on the CCD.

Even though we may not be entirely satisfied with the results achieved by that Committee, at least as far as real disarmament is concerned, it must be acknowledged that the activities of the CCD have gained momentum and become more practical and more effective. This is a very welcome development after many years of stagnation.

In addition to examining the usual disarmament issues, the CCD also gave detailed consideration to new measures which might shortly end the arms race in a particular field. The Committee thus fulfilled the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

These further efforts have yielded results in cases where there was a real basis for agreement, and where the situation was ripe for further progress. The report and the other documents submitted by the Committee to the General Assembly bear this out.

One of the areas in which progress has been achieved is the draft resolutions and the draft convention submitted last year by the Soviet Union concerning the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. The proposal submitted in the First Committee, which was subsequently

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

adopted as General Assembly resolution 3264 (XXIX), and which, inter alia, requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text of a convention, was very favourably received, despite the fact that geophysical and meteorological methods of warfare were not yet easy for the human mind to grasp. Even at the beginning of this year's session of the CCD, certain misgivings were voiced in the statements made by a number of representatives as to whether there was any point in dealing with such proposals to limit weapons which had not yet been widely developed and whose possible future applications were open to doubt, at least as regards some of these arms.

A year has now elapsed since the Soviet documents were submitted, and we can already welcome the appearance of similar Soviet and American drafts and proceed with an exchange of views on the texts of those drafts.

The discussion in the CCD was both useful and constructive: it helped us to get a clearer picture of the military application of this new means of warfare that we propose to prohibit; it also gave us new practical knowledge and information useful for purposes of classification concerning this type of weapons, in terms of the various devices and methods that could be used for military purposes.

Detailed analysis of the statements made at the CCD meetings makes it easier for us to define the scope of the restriction. We are very pleased that among the experts participating in the work a Hungarian representative had the opportunity to contribute in shedding light on the numerous aspects of this problem which have made people more aware of the potential danger inherent in this means of warfare, and thus of the need to prohibit it without delay.

We agree that the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military purposes should not at the same time deprive mankind of the possible benefits to be derived from the peaceful use of this technique, particularly since some methods of influencing the environment could be useful or even necessary in peace-time. On the contrary, a convention should encourage international co-operation in this field. We hope that the results of research will be made more easily accessible to everyone, provided that they cannot be used against others for hostile purposes.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Quite obviously, regulating the application of this technique for peaceful purposes will not be the task of those forums dealing with disarmament. But the military utilization should be kept carefully separate and apart from the peaceful application so as to ensure that only such techniques are used to influence the environment as do not produce any negative consequences, in either the short or long term; and that if any such effects did occur, they would not be harmful to neighbouring or more distant countries. There is a very real danger that even research carried out in favourable circumstances and after very careful preparation may lead to a final result which is quite the opposite of what had been envisaged.

Finally, I believe that, as has been abundantly demonstrated, the conclusion of a convention would be highly relevant, and that the similar drafts submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States can serve as an appropriate basis for the drafting next year of the final version of that convention by the CCD.

In order to restrict the dissemination of atomic weapons, States are trying to develop further the methods used. The creation of denuclearized zones occupies an important place among these methods. A number of items on the agenda of the General Assembly touch upon this question. For the time being, I should like to deal with item 44 in a rather general way, reserving my right to speak later in more detail on this subject and on other disarmament matters.

As we all know, on the initiative of Finland, the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session adopted resolution 3261 F (XXIX), which requested the CCD to submit a study on nuclear-free zones at the thirtieth session. The special report of the CCD, which was prepared in accordance with the terms of reference laid down by the General Assembly, under the competent direction of Professor Korhonen, is now available to delegations in the First Committee. This study is one of the concrete results of the increased activity of the CCD, in addition to the submission of the draft conventions on environmental warfare.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

The drafting of the study was preceded by an extensive debate and a close examination of the question by the governmental experts and by the CCD itself. It reflects agreement on a large number of issues but it also records differences of view. We feel, however, that the CCD has done an excellent piece of work; it has drawn together a number of ideas, which have been included in a very comprehensive study reflecting all aspects of the problem. It will be a useful document which will provide valuable guidelines for those States which are interested in the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

I should like to take this opportunity to confirm our general support for the idea of establishing such zones. Nuclear-weapon-free zones can, through the exclusion of such weapons from their territories, strengthen the security of Member States and supplement the Non-Proliferation Treaty measures. Consequently, my delegation would like to emphasize that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be closely linked with the strengthening of the non-proliferation system, and should not be considered as an isolated method of limiting nuclear weapons.

Continuing our analysis of the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we must also admit that the picture is not wholly encouraging. No specific and concrete negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons were possible, although an item on that question has been on the Committee's agenda for some years now. Some new documents were submitted, and the previous documents are still relevant, including those presented by the socialist countries, but there has been no tangible progress in solving the problem, although we might well have expected some advance. It seems to us that there is still no political will on the part of the Western Powers to reach a rapid agreement, and thus most of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3256 (XXIX) have remained unfulfilled.

However, there are some favourable signs to be seen in this field. The United States has become a party to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 prohibiting the use of such means of warfare.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Another favourable development was the coming into force, on 26 March this year, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

My delegation has already had an opportunity of dwelling in some detail on the scope of the two draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union. In considering the over-all situation relating to disarmament problems and the efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament I cannot omit a reference to those two very important Soviet proposals, which provide for the conclusion of treaties on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, on the one hand, and on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of those weapons, on the other hand. Those are two new Soviet proposals which provide for the prohibition and/or limitation of existing and future nuclear weapons, which are the most frightful weapons known to us, and new systems of nuclear and conventional weapons which might make mankind even more vulnerable to unforeseeable dangers.

My Government would like to welcome all proposals having as their aim the halting of the arms race, and which could serve as a point of departure for bringing about general disarmament. In this context we were pleased last year to welcome the conclusion by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of a treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear testing, because it meant a certain degree of voluntary restriction at a time when other Powers were continuing their tests without any set limit and in a specific environment where they directly imperilled humanity.

We consider it a very fortunate development that the Soviet Union is prepared to replace that partial arrangement, reached by the Treaty of 3 July 1974, with another which would prohibit, once and for all, all States possessing nuclear weapons from carrying out military tests.

The importance of that initiative is all the more significant since this is the first time that a proposal made by a nuclear Power has been accompanied by a specific draft treaty. The general and complete cessation of nuclear

explosions for military purposes should be followed by effective nuclear disarmament. We entirely concur with the idea that the main purpose -- and I would add the most immediate aim -- should be general and complete nuclear disarmament, but, as the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Issraelyan, aptly stated on 3 November 1975:

"Since, in view of the position of other nuclear Powers, difficulties have appeared in the way of the complete prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons, the gradual -- that is, a stage-by-stage -- approach to the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war has become the only one practically feasible."

(A/C.1/PV.2075, p. 57)

We consider that every opportunity should be seized to achieve that final aim. The adoption and implementation of the Soviet proposal would be a substantial step forward towards that end. We hope that the other nuclear Powers will respond favourably to the draft treaty, which is fully in accordance with the wishes expressed by most countries for many decades, since atomic bombs first came into existence.

We would address ourselves to those who, instead of participating in measures designed to halt the arms race, do nothing but criticize the proposals of other countries, particularly those of the Soviet Union, and ask them to join in the common effort to find a solution to problems which are often described as technical in nature.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

In this connexion I should like to quote what was said by our colleague, Ambassador Nishibori, representative of Japan, on 31 October:

"... the more technically complicated the problems become, the more important will be the political judgements that are made regarding these problems". (2074th meeting, p. 28)

We also attach considerable importance to the other Soviet draft resolution and draft convention which provide for the prohibition of new types of weapons and new systems of such weapons. The fact that at the outset it was not easy to grasp the vast scope of the Soviet initiative is understandable, but after the detailed and very well documented information offered by the delegation of the Soviet Union everyone can now entirely subscribe to the idea that this draft resolution should have preference over the other subjects relating to disarmament. This proposal provides effective measures for limiting the arms race and at the same time will help to ensure that the fruits of the human mind and new achievements in science and technology will thus be exclusively devoted to serving the well-being and progress of mankind.

We fully support this very valuable initiative, and we express the hope that all the other members of our Committee will give it their total support.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his very kind words about me and for his congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

Mr. MALDONADO AGUIRRE (Guatemala) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to express to you our appreciation for the diligent manner in which you are conducting the work of the First Committee and which guarantees that under your experienced guidance we shall achieve interesting results. I am especially happy to address these words to you, Mr. Chairman, since among the great men who contribute to the progress of my country are Guatemalan citizens who were born in Lebanon or whose forefathers came from that country.

I also address my greetings to the other officers of the Committee who assist you in your work.

(Mr. Maldonado Aguirre, Guatemala)

This thirtieth regular session affords us an opportunity to tackle an extremely heavy agenda where matters relating to peace will more frequently occupy the attention of the General Assembly. It may be remembered that the emphasis laid by the Charter on the maintenance of peace and security stemmed from the circumstances immediately preceding the San Francisco Conference and from the document produced during the Second World War advocating the idea of founding an organization of nations committed to the achievement of peace.

During this Organization's 30 years of existence, peace has occupied a very considerable part of its deliberations, both in regular and in special sessions and specifically in the Security Council, an organ that appears not have had a moment's rest.

Disarmament, for instance, appears under several titles in the work programme and has always been included in every agenda of the General Assembly. Perhaps not too much progress has been achieved in this field, but the mere fact that the question is discussed points to the possibility that progress may be achieved on some of its aspects. My delegation will support initiatives aimed at obtaining effective results in this field, and believes that this Committee's suggestions to the General Assembly could well be embodied in solemn agreements to be implemented or complied with essentially on a voluntary basis.

My country, a signatory to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America universally known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has expressed its interest in having the nuclear-weapon States proceed to the signature and ratification of the corresponding protocols to the Treaty in order to ensure respect for the denuclearization of Latin America while giving effect to provisions seeking to keep that region out of the arms race and maintaining its inhabitants free from any fears of total annihilation.

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco seeks to ensure that certain territories in the zone of application which are under foreign occupation may enjoy the benefits to be derived from the Treaty. In this connexion my delegation wishes specifically to state that the north-eastern territory of my country, known as Belize, should be protected from the nuclear terror notwithstanding the fact that it is at present under the usurping dependency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

(Mr. Maldonado Aguirre, Guatemala)

a nuclear-weapon State. My delegation cannot but express its satisfaction at the fact that one part of its territory will enjoy such benefits and will not be converted into an arsenal of lethal weapons, on the one hand because there is a danger that, against the will of Guatemala, it could become a part of a strategic military zone of the allies of the super-Powers and, on the other hand, because of the constant danger of environmental pollution.

Repeated appeals have been addressed to States to reaffirm their political will to promote general and complete disarmament which we believe should be strengthened through the existing international machinery to which reference has been made in this debate in the First Committee. However, apart from the intrinsic measures that could be adopted, we still believe that support should be given to concomitant measures which would ensure the maintenance of peace and which would be reflected in the realization of a new, more equitable international economic order and in the rigorous observance of a juridical system based on compliance with the United Nations Charter. We believe that it would be pointless to promote disarmament which the military Powers are not inclined to accept readily if, on the other hand, we are not in a position to strengthen or rearm that juridical system.

The Preamble of the Charter establishes a philosophical framework whereby, among other political purposes, it speaks of the need to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.

(Mr. Maldonado Aguirre, Guatemala)

In stating the aims of the Organization, paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter states that one of its purposes is "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". In Article 2, the Charter enumerates the fundamental principles for the realization of these lofty objectives.

Among these principles, it is important to cite paragraph 3, which lays down the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means. This paragraph substantiates the purpose enunciated in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter, but in addition it complements and defines it in a very wise and clear manner, since the wording of that purpose would appear to indicate that it recommends the use of peaceful means to solve international disputes or situations on the assumption that they are likely to lead to a breach of the peace, whereas the principle extends the recommendation to those cases where security and justice are in jeopardy. In accordance with the wording of that principle, the Charter provides for a number of situations which should be solved by peaceful means; first, when the dispute is likely to lead to a breach of the peace; secondly, when it endangers international security; and thirdly, when it endangers justice.

In support of its diplomatic offensive against Guatemala, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland recently announced that it was sending a military unit to the Guatemalan territory of Belize, no doubt in order to give support, through hostile powers, to its manoeuvres which seek to debar from the negotiating process the solution of a dispute for which it bears great legal and moral responsibility.

These are sound reasons for insisting that the subjects of peace and security, dealt with in this Committee, should be approached as a whole, since very little progress can be made towards disarmament, denuclearization, the control of harmful chemical and bacteriological weapons, the eradication of environmental warfare and other lethal instruments if the system of legality is destroyed by denying the principle of legal equality of States, their territorial integrity and national unity.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Maldonado-Aguirre for the kind remarks he made about me and the officers of the Committee.

I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. MISHRA (India): Earlier this morning the representative of the Netherlands referred to -- to use his own words -- "India's explosion of a nuclear device". He said:

"The ominous potential of this development was made clear last year by India's explosion of a nuclear device ..."

There was nothing ominous about the peaceful nuclear explosion experiment carried out by India in May last year. That experiment has not released any potential for proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States.

No non-nuclear-weapon State which had declared its opposition to the manufacture of nuclear weapons has deviated from such a declaration. No non-nuclear-weapon State which had declared its intention to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has changed its intention. There has been no proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States. All the proliferation, during the last 18 months or so, has been by nuclear weapon States, and we are not a nuclear-weapon State. Our experiment was designed for peaceful purposes. Our intention not to manufacture nuclear weapons is unchanged.

We do notice, however, that there is a development which has a dangerous potential. It is now being said that unless a country adheres to the NPT or accepts NPT-type safeguards, no nuclear material or equipment should be permitted for export to them by exporting countries. To this end, there is talk of common export requirements. In other words, talk of imposition of a boycott on those who are not favourably disposed towards the NPT. And yet it was barely two years ago that these very same countries denounced the imposition of an oil boycott. Politics must not enter the sphere of trade, they said.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

The supply of essential raw materials must not be withheld on the basis of political considerations. We recognize that logic and a balanced perspective are not to be expected from ardent votaries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but we do hope that serious consideration will be given by those States to the dangerous potential which they might be unleashing. We do hope that when things are thought out coolly and calmly, when it is taken to heart that the only proliferation of nuclear weapons is by nuclear weapon States, then we might expect from them a sense of justice and fair play in international relations.

Mr. TAYLOR (United Kingdom): The representative of Guatemala made, in the course of his speech, certain observations reflecting on United Kingdom policy which my delegation cannot accept. We are reluctant to burden this Committee with the discussion of a subject which we regard as extraneous to our proper task, but I hope, nevertheless, it will be understood that we must reserve our right to reply subsequently, either in this Committee or possibly in another place in this Assembly.

Mr. KOOLJMANS (Netherlands): In the first place, I should like to stress the fact that, in my statement, I did not imply that India or any other country had developed into a nuclear State. I only drew attention to the ominous potential because of the fact that, as we have said in the past and as I said today, in our opinion it is not possible to make a clear distinction between the explosion of devices for peaceful or for military purposes. We have not developed the technological criteria to make that distinction. I again welcome, as I did last year, the reassurances given by the representative of India on the intentions of his Government.

In the second place, I am afraid there has arisen a misunderstanding of what I said about common export requirements. The only thing I did was to underline what was said in the resolution adopted by the Review Conference, namely that it is necessary to develop common export requirements which contribute to a system which is applicable to all countries in the world.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to inform the Committee that we have no meeting scheduled for this afternoon, for the chronic reason that we have no speakers on our list. But I am happy to state that the momentum is picking up and we will have two meetings tomorrow. On Monday we will have a full programme. We have enough speakers now and I hope that we will continue to through all of next week.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.n.