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Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/2184, A/2216 and Add.1, A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2, A/AC.61/L.25) (*continued*)

[Item 67]*

1. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25) submitted jointly by his delegation and those of Afghanistan and Iran. The sponsors' purpose was to help the Committee to focus its attention on the basic issues involved.
2. Pakistan's position on the Palestine question was based upon three main considerations. First, Pakistan was bound to the Arab States by indissoluble ties of faith and culture. Any event affecting the Arab States had profound repercussions on public opinion in Pakistan and throughout the Islamic world.
3. Secondly, Pakistan was never actuated in any dispute by racial or religious considerations. It was entirely without any anti-Semitic feeling in the present case. It believed anti-Semitism to be as repellent as any other form of doctrinal discrimination. Anti-Semitism had never been an eastern doctrine, but a purely western concept. There had never been a period in their long history when the East and, in particular, the Islamic world, had made a fixed dogma of that criminal idea.
4. Thirdly, Pakistan believed that the Arabs had been made the victims of international power politics at the time of the partition of Palestine and had been unjustly treated. Their legitimate rights had been disregarded. They had been deprived of any means of defending them. The stability of the Middle East, of vital interest to Pakistan owing to its geographical position, had been seriously jeopardized. Pakistan believed that all the current difficulties of the Middle East were purely political and should accordingly be given a political solution satisfactory to all concerned.
5. Israel's position, as given in the plan submitted to the Committee by its representative (29th meeting), could be analysed as follows. The various kinds of action provided for in that plan made up a logical and coherent whole in so far as the purpose was to ensure the economic development of the Middle East through the co-operation of all the States in that area. When such co-operation became feasible, all those interested in the future of the Middle East would be well advised to give the Israel proposals careful attention.
6. However, the structure for which Israel had drawn up the plans would be based on somewhat unstable foundations. Israel was proposing to build the whole structure upon the basis of the denunciation, or at least the disregard, of the General Assembly resolutions on the Palestine question. True, the Israel representative had not said and could not say "all" the resolutions, because one of them had set up the State of Israel, but he had not explained why he was proposing that all except one of the resolutions should be disregarded.
7. Another foundation of the Israel plan was the armistice agreements as a whole. They would enable Israel to control an area which had not been allotted to it by General Assembly resolution 181 (II) which had brought that country into being and gave it grounds for hoping that it could extend its own territory. Israel calculated that it could claim the territory given to it by the United Nations as well as that which it had conquered by force and could disregard any other factor. It was going too far in submitting to a Committee of the General Assembly a plan which was tantamount to a request for the nullification of resolutions adopted by the United Nations; any appeal to the United Nations should at least pay heed to its previous decisions.
8. In that connexion, Mr. Bokhari summed up the main decisions of the United Nations on the Palestine

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

question. They dealt mainly with the future of the Palestine refugees, territorial matters and the internationalization of Jerusalem. The United Nations had been induced to take decisions on those matters when it had seen the early results of the partition of Palestine. Several delegations had foreseen and foretold those consequences, but the General Assembly had seen fit to disregard the well-founded warnings it had received.

9. The plan for peaceful co-operation submitted by Israel could be successful only if all those concerned were enthusiastic about it. He wondered, however, whether Israel's neighbours could be moved to enthusiasm when they were first told that they must accept a situation which they had never wished for or even foreseen. The Israel plan, far from arousing the necessary enthusiasm, could only stifle it at birth; that was its main defect. Any approval it received would mean that some States wished to set up a wealthy and prosperous Middle East by first of all demoralizing the Arabs. Co-operation on the conditions laid down in the Israel plan would be against the laws of human nature.

10. Speaking as the representative of a country outside the present controversy but none the less greatly concerned with the stability of the Middle East, Mr. Bokhari felt compelled to state that the method proposed by Israel was not conducive to peace. As a Member of the United Nations, Pakistan felt that it was in duty bound to uphold the General Assembly decisions, which had been taken after careful thought and sometimes after years of discussion. Any proposal which ignored those decisions would be detrimental to the cause of the United Nations. The smaller Powers had been accused, especially during the current session, of showing misplaced enthusiasm and of asking too much of the Charter, and thus contributing towards the disintegration of the Organization; but surely it was rather some of the great Powers which were contributing to that disintegration by belittling the decisions taken by the United Nations. Despite the warnings of the smaller Powers, the United Nations too often acted only after a situation had become critical and blood had begun to flow. That was the reason for the current conflict of opinion, in particular with regard to problems concerning Africa.

11. When its attention was called to a serious situation, the United Nations usually adopted an energetic resolution, which every one sincerely hoped would be respected. A commission was set up; it set to work; years passed; it gradually fell into desuetude. That was what had happened to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. Its terms of reference had been whittled down over the years, and now the eight-Power resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2) conferred on it a virtually platonic role.

12. Mr. Bokhari was convinced that the sponsors of that draft had been actuated by a sincere wish that a climate of peace should prevail as soon as possible in the Middle East following direct negotiations between the parties to the dispute. Yet, the important point was not whether the negotiations were to be direct or to be conducted through the United Nations, but rather to decide what should be their basis and to find some common ground for agreement at the outset. Such a basis for agreement could not be worked out by disregarding the General Assembly resolutions. The eight-Power

draft resolution merely repeated the General Assembly resolutions. It reaffirmed the principle that it was for the Governments concerned in the first place to reach agreement in seeking a settlement of their disputes; it invited those Governments to open direct negotiations and confined itself to asking the Conciliation Commission to be available for that purpose, if necessary. Thus it appeared that the General Assembly resolutions were recalled only as a matter of form and that the Conciliation Commission was virtually requested to stand aside.

13. Mr. Bokhari then commented on the draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. That draft also provided for negotiations between the parties, but laid down that they should be held under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission and be in conformity with the decisions of the United Nations. If the parties subsequently agreed to modify some of the General Assembly's decisions, there would be no grounds for objection; the essential point was to afford them a basis upon which negotiations could be initiated.

14. The three-Power draft resolution reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 512 (VI), giving particular importance to paragraphs 4 and 5 of its operative part. Incidentally, Mr. Bokhari wondered why the authors of the other draft resolution had been so chary of reaffirming that resolution, although it had been adopted at the sixth session.

15. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the three-Power draft resolution were self-explanatory. There was all the more reason for paragraph 3 in that the Conciliation Commission had expressed its regret at the poor results of its work.

16. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 dealt with the Conciliation Commission's future activities. Paragraph 5 dealt with the headquarters of the Commission, a matter on which no decision had been taken in resolution 512 (VI). Some had hoped that it would establish its headquarters at Jerusalem, but it had done no such thing. The Commission should meet in Jerusalem if only for the moral effect it would have on the peoples concerned. Its mere presence there would show that it was prepared to take an active part in the negotiations between the parties to the dispute. Were the Conciliation Commission, however, to signify that it had always appreciated the importance of Jerusalem as a focal point in its work, the sponsors of the draft resolution would not press for the retention of paragraph 5.

17. Paragraph 6 proposed that the Conciliation Commission's membership should be increased to five. A similar proposal had been made during the sixth session by the USSR delegation (A/2071) but nothing had come of it. One of the reasons for increasing the Commission's membership was that in its eleventh progress report (A/2121) to the General Assembly's sixth session, the Conciliation Commission had stated that its members had received instructions from their Governments which they had felt obliged to carry out. Mr. Bokhari then read the comments he had made on the subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (37th meeting), during the Assembly's sixth session, in order to stress the objective, impartial and truly international character which all United Nations commissions of investigation or mediation should bear. An extension

of the Commission's membership would probably increase confidence in its impartiality. The second reason was that the Conciliation Commission, which had begun to show signs of fatigue during its four years in office, might gain in vigour by the introduction of new blood.

18. Finally, Mr. Bokhari said that the solution of the Palestine problem depended on the creation of a suitable atmosphere. The situation which had been forced on the Arabs against their will should be remembered. It was a mistake to believe, as some did, that the Arab cause was hopeless and that they would do well to bow to the inevitable; any attempt to demoralize the Arabs should be deplored and condemned as being one of the main obstacles to a satisfactory solution of the problem. On the contrary, the utmost faith must be shown in the United Nations and its resolutions must be treated with the respect they merited. That is why he appealed to the Israel delegation to share the common faith in the United Nations and to take into account the Organization's past decisions before asking others to join in its dreams for the future.

19. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that he would begin with a few comments on the Israel representative's statement at the 29th meeting, in which he had been greatly disappointed as it had contained nothing new. Mr. Eban had taken up the favourite arguments of Zionist propaganda, and his plan for settling the Palestine question was not far removed from colonialism. The Arab States were not prepared to exchange European colonialism, which they were still fighting, for Israel colonialism.

20. Mr. Eban's plan was nothing but a plan for the development of the Middle East. That problem was quite independent of the Palestine question and the part of Mr. Eban's speech in which he had set forth his plan was consequently irrelevant to the question under discussion, and could be discussed only after the Palestine problem had been settled. Moreover, it was obviously that it was merely an evasion of the real problem before the Committee, which was that of the rights of the Palestine Arabs. Any proposed settlement of the Palestine question which disregarded those rights was doomed to failure. In any case, the development of the Middle East was within the domestic jurisdiction of the sovereign States of that region and could not be considered by the United Nations.

21. Mr. Eban wished to wipe out all past rights and obligations. Those past rights and obligations were as sacred as were the present ones which could not be separated from the past. He had complained that the Arab States did nothing but air their grievances instead of providing solutions. The problem had already been solved, however, by the decisions of the United Nations. The Arab States were complaining at Israel's failure to observe those decisions.

22. Contrary to what Mr. Eban had said, the two world wars had in no way benefited the Arab countries and the fact that there were now eight independent Arab States in the Middle East had no bearing on the question under discussion.

23. Mr. Eban seemed to believe that the United Nations expected the Arab States to change their attitude in regard to the Palestine problem. The Arab States had not usurped any rights and would never

change their attitude. It was Israel which should change its attitude by respecting the human rights granted to the Palestine Arabs by the United Nations.

24. Mr. Eban claimed that since Israel was a sovereign State, the United Nations could not intervene in the Palestine question. Israel's sovereignty over the territory it claimed would depend, however, on the final settlement of the Palestine question. The boundaries provided for in the armistice agreements were only provisional.

25. The plan submitted to the Committee by the Israel representative had greatly disappointed the Arab States which had expected a conciliatory gesture. The plan was only one more expression of the expansionist propaganda of the Zionists.

26. Turning to the substance of the problem, Mr. Al-Jamali recalled that although the Palestine problem was before the General Assembly for the sixth year it was still unsolved; indeed it seemed to go from bad to worse with each succeeding year and its effects were felt throughout the Arab world. The United Nations was responsible for events in Palestine since 1947; it had agreed to take up the problem and had, by adopting resolutions on the matter, assumed responsibilities which it was now unable to fulfil. It should not slacken its efforts to find a solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Palestine Arabs desired peace, but it was not enough to talk to them about peace; conditions should be created conducive to a peace based upon right and justice. The Zionist movement was launching a peace offensive, particularly in the United States, to coincide with the discussion of the Palestine problem. Peace would not, however, be restored in Palestine through Zionist propaganda, and could only be achieved by a complete change in the attitude of the Israel Government.

27. The Palestine problem could only be understood by going back to its beginning. One of the basic causes of the Palestine tragedy was the western countries' ignorance of the Moslem world, and in particular of the Palestine Arabs. The fact that Palestine had always been inhabited by non-Jews and that its population, until lately, had been predominantly Arab, was too often ignored. Spiritually, Palestine, as a Holy Land belonged to Moslems, Christians and Jews; but from the political point of view it belonged to its rightful inhabitants. Palestine had sometimes been represented as a scantily populated country whose inhabitants had not reached a sufficient stage of development. That was the conception underlying the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The technical and material superiority of a country, however, did not entitle it to occupy a territory which was not its own and to subjugate a foreign population. Another element had influenced the attitude of the western countries towards Palestine after the First World War, namely, the strategic importance of that region in the Middle East. The attitude of the western world was still inspired by that consideration.

28. The Zionist movement, which was encouraging Jews from all over the world to emigrate to Palestine, was based both upon the spiritual ties which bound the Jews to that area and on the political authority which they had exercised there two thousand years ago.

Spiritually, however, Palestine belonged to the Moslems and the Christians as well as to the Jews and there could be no question of redistributing peoples in the world in accordance with the historic ties binding them to the various regions. The Zionists also made play with the notion that the Jews had no country of their own and that accordingly they should be given one. On the basis of that argument, they had undermined the sentiments of loyalty and fidelity of Jews throughout the world for their adoptive countries, but they could not use it to justify the occupation of the lands and homes of another people by the Jews. The Zionist movement had used the sufferings of the Jews under the nazi régime as propaganda for the establishment of a Jewish State and had represented the establishment of that State as a humanitarian measure, but humanity did not require that a million Arabs should be driven from their homes in order to provide a home for half a million Jews.

29. The Zionists had used two methods to secure the support of the western countries for their cause and to obtain successively the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 1947. They had first of all used the powerful means of propaganda at their disposal throughout the world and the influence of their financial undertakings; they had then adopted, in formulating their claims, a humble and conciliatory attitude which had aroused much sympathy for them but which had speedily been replaced by ever-increasing demands. They had adopted the same policy in Palestine. At first the Jewish State was to be quite small and symbolic in character. It had then grown and the United Nations in 1947 had been obliged to produce a partition plan for Palestine. As that plan had appeared inadequate to meet Zionist demands, the Jewish State had seized by force the territory allocated to the Arabs under the partition plan. Israel was now seeking to conclude with the Arab States a peace founded not on recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestine Arabs and respect for General Assembly resolutions, but on the economic domination of Israel in the Middle East. That was the end to which the Zionist movement was working and its action had disturbed the peace of the Middle East and sown confusion in the minds of Jews throughout the world.

30. The Arab States were watching with concern the treatment meted out to the Arabs of Palestine. They had lost confidence in the western Powers because the latter had done nothing to remedy the situation and had shown no reaction when Israel had refused to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly. Those Powers were continuing to provide support and assistance to Israel and were ignoring the fundamental rights of the Palestine Arabs.

31. The Palestine Arabs had an imprescriptible right to return to their homes and lead a free life. They had the right to expect the United Nations at least to secure to them the exercise of the rights which had been recognized as theirs. The Jews were now occupying not only the territory allotted to them under the partition plan but the territory allotted to the Palestine Arabs. They were occupying part of Jerusalem which, in defiance of United Nations resolutions, they had made their capital. They refused to comply with the

General Assembly resolutions concerning the repatriation of the Palestine refugees. The United Nations could not remain unmoved before such a state of affairs, which not only endangered peace and security in the Middle East but was detrimental to the prestige of the entire Organization.

32. Certain delegations, however, which did not seem to have a full grasp of the situation, were now asking Israel and the Arab States to enter into direct negotiations with a view to a settlement of the dispute between them. Mr. Al-Jamali did not think that such negotiations could take place unless Israel was prepared to comply with and implement the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine, and to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestine Arabs. The delegation of Iraq accordingly appealed to the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution to wait until those conditions were fulfilled before submitting their draft resolution. Israel should first of all make its peace with the Arabs of Palestine, because the Arab States had originally taken up arms to defend the rights of the Palestine Arabs.

33. The Iraqi delegation understood the difficulties encountered by the Conciliation Commission and the reasons why it had been unable to achieve any positive results. Its failure was due, in the first place, to Israel's negative attitude to the rights of the Palestine Arabs and to the General Assembly resolutions and, in the second place, to the fact that the members of the Commission were representatives of States which did not wish to take any decision contrary to the interests of Israel and were therefore bound by their Governments' policy towards the Palestine problem.

34. In conclusion, the Iraqi representative addressed an urgent appeal to the members of the Conciliation Commission, to the Governments which they represented, to all Members States of the United Nations, and to public opinion throughout the world to persuade Israel to comply with and to implement the United Nations resolutions on Palestine. The Palestine Arabs had made enough sacrifices and suffered enough to be finally given a hearing and, in the interest of peace and security in the Middle East, to have restored to them the exercise of those rights recognized as theirs by the United Nations.

35. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) noted with regret that the Committee's debates appeared to have resumed the very tone which had led the Mexican representative to make his eloquent appeal (30th meeting). Quarrelling was never a way of finding a solution to delicate problems and, however understandable the feelings of the representatives of Iraq (29th meeting) and Syria (30th meeting), mutual recriminations were undesirable and prejudicial to the success of the efforts to effect a settlement as well as to the prestige of the United Nations.

36. The Ecuadorean representative had no intention of defending either of the two parties: his only concern was to determine the attitude to be adopted by the United Nations and the path which it should take. That was the object of the eight-Power draft resolution of which his delegation was one of the sponsors.

37. Mr. Trujillo recalled the provisions of the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to that draft and,

in reply to the representative of Pakistan, pointed out that the delegations of Canada (30th meeting) and Denmark (31st meeting) had already explained the reasons why the sponsors had preferred to recall rather than to reaffirm previous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. He went on to give some additional explanations. Mr. Trujillo thought that when two parties were urged to negotiate, it was better not to impose strict rules upon them or to define their action too arbitrarily. It was enough to recall certain essential provisions which would be a point of departure and a guiding inspiration for negotiations. The negotiations would thus be more flexible and wider in scope. In order to reach agreement, the two parties would have to accept a compromise; it might well be that they would agree by common consent that certain provisions previously adopted should be modified. If the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee were to reaffirm previous resolutions, it would have to study the problem as a whole all over again in order to decide whether the resolutions retained their value and timeliness despite the development of the situation.

38. The eight-Power draft resolution reminded the parties that, under previous resolutions and in conformity with the Charter, it was their duty to achieve agreement on a final settlement of their outstanding differences, and suggested for that purpose the method of direct negotiation. International law was fully justified in attaching considerable importance to that method, while providing other alternatives in the event of failure. One such alternative was conciliation, but it must be admitted that the Conciliation Commission had not achieved satisfactory results. Furthermore, it was possible that passions might have cooled slightly with the passage of time. It therefore appeared advisable to advocate direct negotiation.

39. The Iraqi representative had stated that negotiations could only take place if Israel was prepared to comply with and implement the United Nations resolutions. That situation arose precisely out of the dispute between Israel and the Arab States and was one more reason for negotiation. No one was asking either of the parties to give way on all points. It was certain that there were conflicting interests and prejudices on both sides: a direct exchange of views would throw some light on the matter and bring out any elements of agreement.

40. The Ecuadorean representative did not consider it advisable to begin dealing with economic, political and cultural problems at the present stage, since the Committee's work might be complicated thereby. The eight-Power draft resolution deliberately confined itself to specific recommendations for the cessation of all hostile acts, for direct negotiations and for possible co-operation with the Conciliation Commission.

41. Certain delegations had alleged that Israel wished to turn Palestine into a country of immigration for Jews throughout the world and that, as a result of that attitude, persons professing the Jewish religion would have two contradictory allegiances, one to their country of origin and the other to Israel, whereas they could have continued to live in the peace and prosperity that they enjoyed in their countries of origin. He doubted whether that peace and prosperity were really assured. The Jews, who had occupied Palestine before

the Arabs, had been subjected for centuries to odious persecutions which had reached their culminating point under the Hitlerite oppression. Although the Hitlerite persecutions had come to an end, it was doubtful whether it could be concluded that anti-Semitic persecutions had been ended forever. It was possible that they might arise again in other countries and in other forms. Recent events in a certain Central European country represented a danger signal. Were the Jews to be condemned to wander throughout the world without a country of their own to shelter and protect them?

42. In the light of those considerations, the parties should be invited to make the maximum concessions to reach a settlement. No problem was insoluble if both parties were genuinely resolved to accept sacrifices to reach a solution. It was therefore regrettable that the plan submitted by Israel had given rise to such an unfavourable reaction that certain representatives had called it a colonization plan, although that plan could serve as a basis for an economic development of the Middle East which would bring prosperity to the Arab and Jewish peoples alike. The Pakistani representative's suggestion that the Conciliation Commission was tired was equally regrettable, for that body was making persistent efforts to fulfil its terms of reference. It seemed inopportune and useless, therefore, to increase the membership of the Commission. Moreover, direct negotiations were still preferable, as they tended to shed light on the precise nature of the complaints of both parties and to define the specific interests concerned. If action were taken through a third party, factors of interpretation, and consequently potential errors, would inevitably influence the conclusions reached. The history of peoples showed that progress could not be achieved without sacrifices and that it was frequently accompanied by tragedy. The Latin-American States had learned the value of direct negotiation as a means of avoiding those tragedies, mitigating their consequences, and bringing about a spirit of conciliation permitting the solution of problems which seemed to be almost insoluble. In that spirit, Ecuador had joined the other delegations in submitting the eight-Power draft resolution. Its only purpose in doing so was to put an end to the Palestine tragedy.

43. Mr. ANSARI (Afghanistan) pointed out that, in spite of the efforts it had made for four years, the Conciliation Commission had not made any appreciable progress; it had not fulfilled its terms of reference with regard to the repatriation of refugees, the compensation which should be paid to them, the internationalization of Jerusalem or territorial adjustments. Each party imputed the responsibility for that failure to the other, and the Conciliation Commission considered that both parties were equally responsible. In any case, it was obvious that the arbitrary and artificial creation of a State inevitably gave rise to considerable difficulties.

44. Yet, it was essential not to give way to pessimism. The twelfth progress report of the Conciliation Commission (A/2216) gave grounds for hope. The Government of Israel had agreed in principle to release frozen accounts held by Arab refugees in Israel banks. Measures had been drawn up for that purpose, and the small accounts, which constituted the majority, would be unfrozen first. Moreover, the Israel Government had agreed to transfer to the refugees securities and other

valuables held in deposit in Israel banks. The Commission had also taken preliminary measures to ensure the payment of compensation to the refugees. The United Kingdom Government had supplied microfilms of land registrations which would form a basis for an estimate of the value of each individual holding. The Afghan delegation wished to congratulate the Conciliation Commission on its constructive efforts in that connexion.

45. Nevertheless, the solution of the remaining problems was indispensable to the stability, peace and security of the Middle East. The first was that of the repatriation of refugees. By resolution 194 (III) the General Assembly had recognized in its resolutions the right of the refugees to return to Palestine. Moreover, if the desire of the Jews to return to their country of origin after two thousand years was understandable, it was difficult to refuse to recognize the desire of the Palestine refugees to return to a country from which they had been driven recently. During the debates in the First Committee on the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea, delegations had unanimously recognized that one of the most natural aspirations of a human being was to return to his own country. The application of that humanitarian principle could not be denied to the Arab refugees.

46. The second problem was that of the internationalization of Jerusalem, on which the General Assembly had adopted resolutions 181 (II), 194 (III) and 303 (IV). It was undeniable that the implementation of those resolutions would improve the situation considerably and would bring peace and security to the region. The Arab States were prepared to co-operate in solving that problem. As the Syrian representative had stated (26th meeting), the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan did not seem to raise any objection to the internationalization of Jerusalem, provided that the refugee and frontier problems were solved first. It was therefore clear that frontier adjust-

ments constituted an essential condition in the improvement of relations between Israel and the Arab States.

47. It was the duty of the United Nations to achieve a just settlement of the existing disputes between Israel and the Arab States. The Organization had assumed responsibility for the problem when it had decided to partition Palestine and was consequently in duty bound to bring about the implementation of the resolution it had adopted. The Conciliation Commission, the membership of which should be extended, must continue to help the parties to the dispute to solve the problem, and its terms of reference should remain the same as those defined by the General Assembly in its preceding resolutions. The parties concerned were also obliged to act in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions and to settle their disputes in strict conformity with the provisions of those resolutions. Finally, the United Nations must continue to offer its assistance to the parties and must constitute a real centre for the harmonization of the efforts made by nations to achieve the purposes of the Charter.

48. The economic, political and spiritual importance of the Middle East necessitated a just solution of the Palestine question, in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions. The repatriation of the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the territorial adjustments would serve to re-establish peace in the region and would give rise to a new era of friendly relations and co-operation among the peoples concerned. Mr. Ansari felt that only the adoption of the four-Power draft resolution would enable the United Nations to achieve those aims.

49. Mr. ISKANDAR (Indonesia) said that his delegation had joined the three sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25), namely, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, in submitting that draft. He reserved the right to speak later in the debate.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.