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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 42ND MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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A statement was made by:

Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico)

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A/C.1/34/PV.42

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA LITEMS 31, 32, 35, 39 and 42 to 45 (continued)

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.38 and Corr. 1 relating to agenda item 45 cal estitled "Strategic arms limitation talks", which is sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden and my own delegation.

The draft resolution deals with a question which, was shown by the many resolutions mentioned in its preamble, the General Assembly has been concerned with in an uninterrupted marner since the bilateral talks in question began in Helsinki ten years ago.

On this occasion it is particularly important that the General Assembly, the most representative organ of the international community, should take a stand yet again on this question. In fact, on 18 June last, seven years after the conclusion in May 1972 of the negotiations referred to as SALT I, and four years after the Vladivostok agreements concluded in November 1974, the SALT II agreement, which bears the official title "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms", was finally signed. The text has been reproduced in document CD/28 of the Committee of Disarmament, together with this texts of a protocol and a joint statement, both signed on the same date as the Treaty, and of a joint communiqué issued also on 18 June 1979.

After recalling the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly between the twenty-fourth and thirty-second sessions - that is to say, between 1969 and 1977 - the draft resolution reaffirms resolution 33/91 which was adopted last year and which is of special significance since it reproduced verbatim certain paragraphs of the solemn declarations formulated in 1977 by the Heads of State of the two countries that had been participating in the SALT meetings. In those statements both countries declared their readiness to move towards the "complete, total destruction" of nuclear weapons with a view to "a world truly free of nuclear weapons". In addition, the resolution stressed the fact that one of

the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority included in the Final Document of the first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, and the need to achieve qualitative reductions and limitations of strategic weapons on both sides was stressed since

"in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament all nuclearweapons States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenal, bear a special responsibility".

In regard to the operative part of the draft resolutions, I believe that in order to view it in its proper perspective it would be desirable to recapitulate briefly some of the main conclusions adopted by consensus by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as follows. First, nuclear weapons constitute an unprecedented threat to mankind. Secondly, the stockpiling of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from contributing to the strengthening of the international community, weakens it. Thirdly, lasting international peace and security can be neither based on the stockpiling of weapons by military alliances nor maintained through a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Fourthly, it is indispensable to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects to avert the danger of nuclear war. Fifthly, the nuclear disarmament process should be carried out in such a manner as to guarantee the security of all States at progressively lower levels of nuclear armament.

Sixthly, in matters of nuclear disarmament the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those possessing the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility.

Seventhly, all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of the disarmament negotiations.

Eighthly, the United Nations has a central role and a primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.

It is in the light of those pronouncements of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.38 have made an objective analysis of the documents signed in Vienna on 18 June this year by the Heads of State of the United States and the Soviet Union and, as a result of that analysis, in which we have kept very much in mind the solemn declarations made by those Heads of State in 1977 which are recalled in the preamble to the draft resolution, we have set down on paper the seven paragraphs of the operative part of that draft.

Since all the paragraphs are sufficiently explicit, I shall confine myself to a few general remarks relating to the three basic ideas which, in our view, the draft reflects.

First of all, we cannot deny that what is in the SALT II treaty is not what we had expected. Therefore it follows that, although during our informal talks with the representatives of the two super-Powers we had agreed to replace the word "regrets" - which originally appeared in the draft and is still the verb that more faithfully reflects our feelings - with the more neutral term "notes", we cannot fail to mention that the treaty does not go beyond certain limitations which taken together - and "taken together" are the key words - permit considerable increments both quantitatively and qualitatively in relation to the levels of the nuclear arsenals existing at present, as stated in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

I shall not tax the patience of the Committee by making a technical and detailed analysis of the various provisions of the treaty or of the numerous "agreed statements" and equally numerous "joint agreements", both of which are reproduced in document CD/29 of the Committee on Disarmament, on which

that assertion in our draft is based. I shall simply mention, by way of illustration, the four following examples, which are readily understandable and speak for themselves sufficiently eloquently as regards the soundness of such assertions.

First, the number of nuclear warheads - which are the ones which in the last analysis constitute the so-called "nuclear weapons", since land, submarine or air launches could more appropriately be defined as nuclear-weapon carriers - at present possessed by the United States, according to the most authoritative informal calculations, since unfortunately on this matter there is no official figure in the documents of 18 June, stands at approximately 10,000. That figure, in accordance with what is allowed by the provisions of the SALT II treaty, could be increased to 17,846 warheads, which represents an increase of approximately 90 per cent. Of course, none of those figures includes warheads of so-called tactical weapons. Although we also lack official information with regard to the Soviet Union, it seems that, if one takes into account the importance the latter attaches to the principle of equality, it can be asserted that its situation must be very similar, if not identical, to that of the United States as regards the proportional increase in warheads allowed by the treaty.

Secondly, the importance of the provisions of paragraph 9 of article IV of the treaty, which allows both parties to test in flight and to station a new type of light intercontinental ballistic missile, its importance from the point of view of the considerable increase in the nuclear arsenals of the two States indicated in that paragraph is axiomatic if one reflects on the fact that through those provisions the United States has been authorized to develop the underground mobile missle known as MX, whose manufacture and deployment will entail a cost estimated at the astronomical figure of \$60,000 million. The Soviet Union, of course, will have a similar authorization.

Thirdly, the so-called "cruise missiles", the offensive effectiveness of which has been so much praised and emphasized in the past few years and of which so far neither of the two super-Powers has stationed a single one, are allowed for each State up to a total of 2,400, that is, the equivalent of 20 missiles for each of 120 bombers.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Fourthly, limitations on the emplacement at land-based or sea-based launching sites of cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometres, and on the flight-testing of such missiles equipped with multiple independently targeted warheads (MIRV) from such launching sites, are due to expire on the not too distant date of 31 December 1981, which is the contemplated cut-off date for the term of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty.

The four aforementionel examples, as I said a moment ago, demonstrate clearly, in our view, the validity of the assertion we make on this point in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

The second basic idea inderlying our draft resolution is that of the role of SALT II as a necessary stage and point of departure for SALT III. From this point of view we consider it unwise to overlook the complexity of the problems involved in those negotiations, or the fact that SALT II is not an end in itself but merely an instrument which would enable us to continue on our course towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

That is why, by adopting our proposed draft resolution, the Assembly would, on the one hand, be emphasizing by virtue of paragraph 4 (a) that, "although it is an arms control measure rather than a disarmament measure", the <u>/SALT II</u>/ Treaty "constitutes a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons", and, on the other hand, would be defining its position on the essential points of the future SALT III Treaty.

In this connexion, we thought it desirable also that the Assembly - which, it has to be admitted, is not often given cause by the super-Powers for rejoicing in the disarmament field - should now express in warm terms its gratification at several of the bilateral statements appearing in the Treaty and in the Joint Statement subscribed to five months ago.

Thus we venture to suggest that the Assembly, under operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, should state that it

"Shares the conviction expressed by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ... that 'early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce a risk of outbreak of nuclear war'".

We propose further that the Assembly, under paragraph 3, should welcome with satisfaction the agreement reached between the two parties to continue to pursue negotiations in order to achieve, <u>inter alia</u>, the objectives of "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms", and

"qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms".

We also felt it desirable to highlight, again in paragraph 4, the undertaking assumed by the Governments of the two super-Powers to initiate active negotiations, "intended to achieve, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures

for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, /which/ will begin 'promptly after the entry into force' of the /SALT II/ Treaty, ... with the objective of concluding 'well in advance of 1985' the new agreement which will replace the Treaty and which is usually referred to as 'SALT III'".

The third and last of the ideas we felt it essential to formulate appropriately in the draft resolution is the one that was included by consensus in the Final Document of 1978, concerning the obligation to keep the United Nations duly informed of all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - that may originate beyond the aegis of the Organization. The objective pursued by operative paragraphs 6 and 7 of the draft resolution is precisely that of ensuring compliance with that undertaking.

Before concluding, I should like to express my view that draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.38 is, above all, an act of faith. If, as has so rightly been stated, faith moves mountains, we believe that the very faith hinted at in some of the provisions of the draft may well exert influence on those to which those provisions are mainly addressed.

We thus hope that the confidence expressed in operative paragraph 4 (a) will be reflected in each and every sector of the governmental apparatus of the two super-Powers and that they will endeavour without delay to do everything in their power to ensure that the Treaty shall go into force as soon as possible, as provided for in its article XIX - that is to say, by its urgent ratification. MP/mtm/mcb

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We also hope that both contracting States will this time scrupulously comply with all agreements and provisions expressly referred to in the draft resolution in order, as indicated in its paragraph 5,

"that the SALT III Treaty constitute an important step toward the final goal described by their respective Heads of State as that of achieving the complete, total destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and ensuring the establishment of a world free of such weapons".

We must not overlook the fact that that would require a radical change in the attitude which, in essence, still predominates between the two super-Powers, and with respect to which very recently, as a result of the signature of the SALT II agreement, one of the six disarmament research institutes which were invited to take part in the 1978 special session of the Assembly stated the following:

"The actual arms limitations that have emerged from ten years of SALT are not encouraging. Why is this? That we have the talks at all is at least a sign that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have begun to recognize that nuclear confrontation could lead to mutual disaster and that co-operative action to meet the common danger is desirable.

"At the same time, the Governments, and particularly the military bureaucracies of the two sides, still have not come fully to grips with the revolutionary implications of nuclear weapons for international relations. Among the leaders of both sides the idea lingers on that nuclear war could be conducted like previous wars. In their view nuclear war would not be a war without winners: the side that is militarily better prepared will be the winner.

"Each side acts partly on the understanding that nuclear war is so unthinkable that we must put aside traditional military thinking and control nuclear weapons before they destroy us ..."

"Both sides, then, have failed fully to accept the consequences of nuclear weapons for the traditional practice of international power politics. Each still seeks to acquire a feeling of security through unilateral measures of preparation for war. Arms control regulates the competition up to a point, but the rules of great power behaviour do not change significantly. Neither side fully acknowledges that nuclear weapons have placed it irrevocably at the mercy of the other's self-control. Neither side is quite convinced that co-operation for mutual safety has become the only rational course."

We should like to believe that the adoption by the General Assembly of the draft resolution we are introducing today in this First Committee and which, we venture to hope, will be adopted by consensus, may constitute a modest but clearly constructive contribution towards the favourable evolution of the survival of mankind. As long as the present state of affairs continues, that survival will be potentially threatened as the Assembly itself so rightly stated in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament. AW/5/km

The CHAIRMAN: The extension of the deadline for the submission of resolutions on items 122 and 126 has been extended to 27 November, tomorrow, at 6.00 p.m.. Consultations are going on in this regard. However, on item 46 the deadline remains the same, 3 December.

It is now my intention to begin the voting procedure on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.15/Rev.2, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session".

<u>Mr. MIHAJLOVIC</u> (Yugoslavia): May I remind the Chairman that when I introduced draft resolution L.15/Rev.2, I asked for it to be adopted by consensus. I trust that will be done.

<u>The CHAIRMAN</u>: This draft resolution has 36 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia at the 35th meeting of the First Committee on 15 November. The sponsors are: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cubs, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Ghans, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

The representative of Yugoslavia has asked that draft resolution L.15/Rev.2 be adopted without a vote. If I see no objection it is so decided.

Draft resolution A/C. 1/34/L.15/Rev.2 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take a decision on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.23, entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present". It has 15 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of the USSR at the 37th meeting on 19 November 1979. The following are its sponsors: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byrlorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

I shall now call on representatives who have indicated their desire to explain their votes before the voting.

<u>Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA</u> (Brazil): My delegation understands and shares the objective of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23 which amounts to a ban on the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding that, my delegation will not be able to support it, because by omission it makes no reference to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of countries which possess them. To us, that omission might imply a sort of recognition or legitimacy of the possession or stationing of such weapons in the countries which have them. For that reason, my delegation will not be able to support the draft resolution and will abstain in the vote on it.

<u>Mr. MESHARRAFA</u> (Egypt): I refer to draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present".

While voicing support of the idea, we believe that we cannot deal with such an objective alone but must link it with our main objective of the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons; otherwise, it would amount to recognition and acceptance by Member States of the doctrine of strategic superiority and of the freezing of the nuclear military balance of power, better known as the "balance of deterrence".

(Mr. Mesharrafa, Egypt)

Our legitimate demand stems from our concern and conviction that we must halt the arms race and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as our belief that we must all work hand in hand to remove the threat of a nuclear world war through the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

To make it possible for my delegation to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, therefore, I should like to propose an amendment to the fourth preambular paragraph by the addition of the following phrase at the end of the present text: "leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons". The paragraph would then read:

"Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons."

I hope that my proposal will be viewed positively by all delegations here and by the sponsors of this draft resolution.

<u>Mr. OKAWA</u> (Japan): My delegation will cast a negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23. We feel that, under the current circumstances in the world, any measure imposing restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons, as proposed in this draft resolution, might destabilize the international military balance and thereby prove detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security. Furthermore, the means for effective verification on the stationing or non-stationing of nuclear weapons vital to such an agreement are far from clear in the proposal.

My delegation believes it more important that the nuclear-weapon States instead proceed step by step to realize concrete and effective nuclear disarmament measures and it would therefore like once again to appeal to those countries to adopt such an approach.

As a matter of national policy, Japan has consistently upheld the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not manufacturing and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons. From a global perspective however, my delegation, for the reason I have just stated, is not able to support the draft resolution which is before us. <u>Mr. DJOKIC</u> (Yugoslavia): The halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are the two most important tasks facing us today in the field of disarmament. Therefore, every measure likely to contribute to their solution or to the creation of more favourable conditions for resolving them deserves to be carefully considered. Bearing that in mind, Yugoslavia was among the first countries to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as other international agreements in the field of disarmament. For the same reason, my country has always supported all initiatives directed to that end, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world where conditions exist for the creation of such zones.

We interpret the concept of non-stationing of nuclear weapons more broadly than is implied in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

The non-stationing of nuclear weapons cannot be limited only to the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. It must necessarily also encompass the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States where nuclear weapons have already been introduced. Otherwise it would mean that we accept the present <u>status quo</u> with regard to the presence of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon States.

Mon-stationing should encompass also all the other areas and spaces where there are no nuclear weapons at present, such as international air and maritime space. Only in this way is it possible to contribute effectively to the achievement of the basic objectives envisioned by the draft resolution as it is precisely these areas which are now the object of the most intense nuclear nuclear arms race that would be exposed in the future to a constant accumulation of nuclear weapons and to their further geographical proliferation.

Last year, my delegation voted in favour of the resolution calling upon all nuclear weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and inviting non nuclear States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories. The character and content of this year's draft on non-stationing, however, has been substantially changed in comparison with last year's resolution. Operative paragraph 1 now stipulates that it is

"necessary to examine possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States

where there are no such weapons at present". $(\underline{A/C.1/34/L.23}, para.1)$ This could mean the legal sanctioning of the present status quo, that is, exoneration from the obligation incumbent on those non-nuclear-weapon States on the territories of which nuclear weapons are already stationed, as well as exoneration of nuclear weapon States from the obligation to withdraw nuclear weapons from the territories of other States.

The principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is universal in character, and precisely because it is universal, it should provide for the mutual obligation both of non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States. Only in this way is it possible to contribute to the attainment of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The framework laid down in operative paragraph 1 for

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

the non-stationing of nuclear weapons is inadequate and too narrow, because it is concerned only with the territories of those non-nuclear weapon States where there are no nuclear weapons at present, and all the more because the draft is concerned with possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons which makes it essential to consider all the aspects of this problem.

My delegation would support the draft if its operative paragraph 1 read as follows:

"<u>Believes</u> it necessary to examine possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon States."

As this is not the case, and in view of our aforementioned stand concerning the content and framework within which the non-stationing of nuclear weapons is to be considered, my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23.

<u>Mr. LIDGARD</u> (Sweden): The Swedish Government attaches great importance to measures aimed at preventing the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We consider that such measures can constitute a significant contribution to the non-proliferation effort and to progress in the field of nuclear disarmament.

In conformity with this view, we strongly support existing international instruments by which the parties concerned are committed to refrain from actions which would lead to the stationing of nuclear weapons on territories where there are no such weapons at present. The question of non-stationing, however, is extremely complex since it concerns the general military situation in the world, fundamental aspects of existing security arrangements and the doctrines and force postures of the leading military Powers. Against this background the Swedish Government has some doubts and reservations as to the idea of seeking a solution to a complex problem by dealing with only one of its aspects in an international agreement.

It seems to us that the specific problem of non-stationing could best be dealt with in the context of regional disarmament arrangements. The Swedish delegation will therefore abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23. EMS/7/km

A/C.1/34/PV.42 28-30

The CHAIRMAN: The representative of Egypt has proposed an amendment to the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23.

<u>Mr. PETROVSKY</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has listened attentively to the amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt to the final preambular paragraph of the draft resolution entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present". The Soviet Union has always believed that measures to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States would promote general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. If the amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt is in the interest of the substance of the matter and if it is not objected to by the other sponsors of the draft resolution, then we are prepared to accept it.

As to the comments made by the representative of Yugoslavia that the so-called "new" Soviet proposal undermines the substance of what has been said at previous General Assembly sessions, I venture to disagree because this draft resolution represents a certain stage in the logical development of the position endorsed at the last session of the General Assembly in the relevant resolution. I remind the Committee that in the resolution adopted on 16 December of last year, it was stated that the General Assembly

"<u>Calls upon</u> all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present". (<u>resolution 33/91 F, para.1</u>) This is the way in which the question is referred to in draft resolution

This is the way in which the question is referred to in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, which is now before us for consideration.

<u>The CHAIRMAN</u>: Based on the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like to ask the other sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23 whether or not they can accept the amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt. As I hear no objection I take it that the draft resolution is so amended.

<u>Mr. CHERKAOUI</u> (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I should like to point out that in the French text of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, in paragraph 1, there is a mistake that I consider important. Instead of the word "non-proliferation", what is certainly meant is "non-implantation".

<u>The CHAIRMAN</u>: The French text will be corrected accordingly. I now put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.23, as amended by the representative of Egypt.

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, as amended, was adopted by 85 votes to 18, with 22 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call upon those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

<u>Mr. RUDOFSKY</u> (Austria): My delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

In the past my delegation has on several occasions supported the idea of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones if and when, as pre-conditions, certain requirements were fulfilled. To my delegation it seems that an idea similar to that underlying the proposal for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is contained in the draft resolution just adopted. However, the relationship between the proposal aiming at an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones seems to be less than clear.

As my delegation has pointed out with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, we can support the creation of such zones in the context of regional disarmament measures if and when the over-all balance of power is not adversely affected, when the zone covers a larger geographical area, when all the countries of the region support the proposal, and when the agreement is subject to adequate verification.

We feel that in the proposal aiming at an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons, elements of the sort I have just mentioned have not been taken into account. Therefore my delegation felt constrained to abstain in the vote. BE/S/meb

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<u>Mr. ADENIJI</u> (Nigeria): My delegation has always supported the idea of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. If a separate vote had been taken on operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, my delegation would have abstained, because we believe that, in the examination of possibilities of an international agreement, the scope of examination should have been broadened to embrace the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon States, not merely on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

<u>Mr. RAJAKOSKI</u> (Finland): The Finnish delegation voted for draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23, or the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. In explanation of vote, I wish to make the following points.

First, we support the objective of achieving a world-wide zone of countries that are permanently free from nuclear weapons. That is, however, an objective that requires a carefully considered and balanced arrangement of obligations and responsibilities, including appropriate security assurances.

Secondly, in our view it follows from the concept of State sovereignty that only the Government of the country concerned, be it small or big, aligned or non-aligned, can be qualified to interpret its own security needs. This should be kept in mind, in particular, when the possibility of an international agreement are examined, as is mentioned in the first operative paragraph.

Thirdly, Finland, for its part, has foregone the option of nuclear weapons and has consistently worked for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Consistent with its national position as a small neutral country, Finland will not receive on its territor; nuclear weapons on behalf of other countries. My Government has endeavoured to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and has supported the concept and practice of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as other measures aimed at lessening the danger posed by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, my Government has made proposals that aim at entirely excluding the Nordic countries from any nuclear speculation. RH/8/mcb

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A/C.1/34/PV.42 33-35

<u>Mr. W. RAHMAN</u> (Bangladesh): My delegation voted for the draft resolution just adopted by this Committee. It is the understanding of my delegation that this resolution relates, <u>inter alia</u>, to the question of the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bangladesh is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the transfer by nuclear-weapon States to any recipients whatsoever of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of any control over them. However, our larger objective remains the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of all States, leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

<u>Mr. DUMEVI</u> (Ghana): We have always supported the idea of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in countries where no such weapons exist. Consistent with that stand, we supported General Assembly resolution 33/91 F, adopted last year. We were, however, obliged to abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.23 because we have some difficulties with operative paragraph 1. They stem from recent pronouncements by key Government officials which make it seem to us that the idea of proposing an international agreement at this stage is premature. That is why we thought we should abstain in the vote. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has concluded its consideration of $A/C.1/3^{4}/L.23$.

It is my intention to turn now to draft resolutio A/C.1/34/L.26, under agenda item 42, entitled "Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session". This draft resolution has 12 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of India at the 36th meeting of the First Committee on 16 November.

<u>Mr. GHAREKHAN</u> (India): I should like to inform the Committee of a slight amendment to this draft resolution. The phrase in the second line of operative paragraph 2, "along with other related items on its agenda" should be deleted, and the word "appropriate" should be inserted between the words "into" and "consideration" so that the paragraph now reads:

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament to take those views into appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session".

This small amendment is in response to suggestions made to us by some delegations, and I hope that it will facilitae the task of those delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 are: Argentina, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and Yugcslavia. The draft resolution as just amended by the representative of Irdia, will now be put to the vote.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I wish to request a recorded vote.

The CHAIRMAN: A recorded vote has been requested. A recorded vote was taken.

- Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon. Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico. Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia Against: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal
- Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- <u>Abstaining</u>: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Mongolia, Poland, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26, as amended, was adopted by 100 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

<u>Mr. PETROVSKY</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): With respect to the vote just taken on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, we should like to state the following.

From the time when nuclear weapons had just emerged, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated and still advocates the implementation of practical steps to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons together with parallel measures to strengthen international peace and security. We recognize that the main danger for international peace and security stems from the nuclear arms race and the Soviet Union considers that the central place in the efforts of States should be taken by measures aimed at the halting and then the reversal of the arms race, to ban forever the use of nuclear weapons and at the same time to refrain from using force in international relations.

To attain real results, the Soviet Union believes that the elaboration and implementation of measures in this field should be part of the organic process of strengthening legal and political guarantees of the security of States. An important step in this direction would be the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. The parties to such a treaty, naturally including the nuclear Powers, would undertake to refrain from the use of force and the threat of the use of force from the use of any types of weapons, including nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

The advantage of resolving the question of nuclear weapons in the context of banning all types of weapons is that all States - both nuclear and non-nuclear States - would be put on an equal footing. That approach is fully in line with the decisions taken by the United Nations, in particular resolution 2936 (XXVII) adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and the Permament Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. That resolution contains an appeal by the General Assembly to States to renounce the use of such weapons and to prohibit permanently the use of such weapons. In the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the need is noted to take measures

"... to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations". (resolution S-10/2, para. 19)

As nuclear weapons are still maintained in the arsenals of States and the nuclear arms race continues unabated, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to exclude the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war and to prevent the threat of such a war. On these lines, we have concluded a number of agreements with other nuclear States to prevent the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts which might arise.

In order to prevent a nuclear war, further efforts should be made by States Members of the United Nations so as to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to expand the number of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to create nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world and also to implement, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, the resolution on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

The Soviet Union thus sees the solution to the non-use of nuclear weapons in war first and foremost in the halting of the nuclear-arms race, the cessation of the production of such weapons and the cutting down of arsenals of them. Secondly, and parallel with this, we would strengthen international legal guarantees for the security of States, envisaging the prohibition of the use of nuclear and other types of weapons and in fact of force in general in international relations. Thirdly, we would advocate adopting measures to strengthen the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent the danger of conflicts arising which would use nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, the draft resolution that we have just adopted refers to resolution 33/71 B which calls for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons but artificially separates it from the other measures which should be taken, namely, the provision of international legal guarantees and the renunciation by all States of the use of force in international relations. For that reason the Soviet Union abstained in the vote on this draft resolution.

EC/9

WW/spm/mcb

<u>Mr. MULLOY</u> (Ireland): Ireland regards draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 introduced by India, entitled "Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", as a procedural resolution; first, deciding to transmit proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters to the Committee on Disarmament; secondly, requesting the Committee on Disarmament to take those views into appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Ireland, in voting for the procedural draft resolution, believes it necessary to say that we regard it ε s important that all views formally notified on this issue should be fully taken into account in the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament.

Our views on the substantive issue arising were expressed in the position we took on last year's resolution 33/71 B, which Ireland voted against.

<u>Mr. LIDGARD</u> (Sweden): Sweden has voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/3⁴/L.26. This positive vote does not imply that we are not aware of the role of nuclear weapons in the current military doctrines of certain States and military alliances, or the interrelationship between nuclear weapons and conventional forces and the relative sizes of such forces. Unfortunately, we do not think that there is sufficient ground to imply that the use of such weapons is prohibited by present international law. Deficiencies in last year's resolution in these respects led us to abstain in the vote which then took place.

But our positive vote today should be seen as an expression of our deep conviction that the use of nuclear weapons, in all circumstances, should be prohibited, taking into account their utterly inhumane effects and their threat to the very survival of civilized society. This objective must remain our central concern.

It is our firm belief that a more resolute effort to achieve that objective is urgent. This should take place through gradual and balanced reductions of nuclear-weapon stockpiles with the aim of their total abolition. Such an effort holds greater prospects for increasing everybody's security than the present seemingly never-ending build-up and the modernization beyond any reasonable limit of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, within nations and both major alliances.

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The PRESIDENT: The Committee will now take action on the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/34/L.29 entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".

The draft resolution has 46 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Canada at the thirty-ninth meeting of the First Committee on 21 November 1979.

The sponsors are as follows: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Italy, India, Ireland, the Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

The sponsors have asked that the draft resolution be adopted without a vote. If there is no objection, it is so decided.

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.29 was adopted.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

<u>Mr. FISHER</u> (United States of America): The complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction is an important objective of the foreign policy of the United States - one which we think will enhance the security of all States.

While a large measure of agreement exists among the nations of the world on this general objective, I must point out that significant and substantive differences remain. In our view, these differences are so great that attempts to elaborate a multilateral treaty text at this time would be unhelpful and could well delay the achievement of our goal.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

For this reason the United States supported efforts in the Committee of Disarmament to clarify the issues to which Governments must address themselves. It is indeed difficult to reconcile divergent views when the positions of many on specific substantive issues are unknown. This process of identifying concrete issues and clarifying them is the necessary initial stage of negotiations on any complex subject, including this one. There is not, however, agreement on how this task should be handled in the Committee on Disarmament, and we must recognize that this is an item to which the Committee must return.

Our joining the consensus resolution in no way prejudges the views of the United States on the merits of the various proposals to structure the Committee of Disarmament's consideration of this question. For our part we have intensified our preparations for the next round of bilateral chemical-weapon negotiations, which we expect to start in Geneva in mid-January. NR/km/tg

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Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): With reference to the adoption by consensus of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.29, my delegation would like to note that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to prohibiting the manufacture, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, since we believe this is a realistic step by which tangible results in the field of disarmament can be achieved in one of the most important directions, which would help us to prevent the threat of war in which such weapons of mass destruction might be used.

The Soviet Union is actively participating in talks on the banning of the manufacture, production and accumulation of chemical weapons and on destroying their stockpiles. Those talks have been going on in the Committee on Disarmament and on a bilateral basis between the Soviet Union and the United States. We have made some progress on this matter, and the Committee on Disarmament has been informed of that progress. It is now our deep conviction that we must achieve real results. We should go forward with that intention so that we can achieve concrete and tangible results. Therefore the Soviet delegation intends to resume the bilateral consultations in Geneva in mid-January.

<u>Mr. WU Zhen</u> (China) (interpretation from Chinese): With regard to the draft resolution just adopted on chemical and bacteriological weapons, contained in document A/C.1/34/L.29, the Chinese delegation is in favour of it. We have always recognized and strictly abided by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. However, with regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, we have on many occasions expounded our position. Therefore, we will not repeat it here.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.29. It is now my intention to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/60". This draft resolution has 34 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Australia at the 34th meeting of the First Committee on 14 November. The sponsors are as

(The Chairman)

follows: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Eorocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Sweden, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay and Venezuela, I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. WU Zhen (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation understands the sincere desire of the third world and other peace-loving countries in asking for a cessation of nuclear weapon tests so as to maintain world peace and oppose nuclear arms race and nuclear threats.

But the super-Powers are calling for a ban on all nuclear weapon tests out of a completely different motive. The facts of history tell us that while they were spreading the idea of halting nuclear weapon tests, they were going all out at the same time to engage in nuclear arms race. When they completed enough tests in the atmosphere, they got together a so-called "partial nuclear test ban" to move their tests from out of the atmosphere to below the ground. They continue to step up their nuclear arms race and the quantity of nuclear weapons increased at an alarming rate and there are qualitative improvements as well. After they had made hundreds of subterranean tests and had accumulated masses of nuclear technological data, they began to talk about a ban on all nuclear tests. Just as some representatives have correctly pointed out, even during the process of negotiations on a ban on all tests, the amount and scale of their nuclear weapon tests, instead of dropping have been on the increase. All these facts clearly show that the super-Powers' clamour for a nuclear test ban is only to restrict others while they themselves never wanted to stop their nuclear arms race. Quite on the contrary, the reason for their playing various test ban games is to maintain and consolidate their position of monopolizing nuclear weapons.

NR/km

NR/km/km

(Mr. Wu Zhen, China)

China has always stood for nuclear disarmament and consistently wanted a total ban on and destruction of all nuclear weapons. We believe that while the two super-Powers have such immense nuclear superiority, a genuine nuclear disarmament must start with the reduction of their super arsenals. After major progress in their reduction of nuclear weapons has been achieved, other nuclear States can join them in the reduction of nuclear weapons on a rational basis and negotiations should be started for the destruction of all nuclear weapons. Only this is a genuinely effective way to nuclear disarmament and the removal of the threat of a nuclear war.

In view of the position outlined above the Chinese delegation will abstain in the vote on document A/C.1/34/L.14/Rev.1.

<u>Mr. PETROVSKY</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): I believe there is no need to speak at length on the great importance of the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, since delegations have already had an opportunity to speak about this during the general debate on disarmament. In fact the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing has been discussed and is still being discussed in various international forums. To resolve the question in a practical way, talks have been going on among the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom with the aim of elaborating a treaty on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests. During these talks, we have taken a number of constructive steps to bring the matter to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The draft resolution before us in document A/C.1/34/L.14/Rev.1 contains a number of important and useful provisions. We note with satisfaction in particular the provisions with regard to the need for the speedy cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments and to conclude an agreement on this subject. On the whole, the draft in its essence aims at achieving results as speedily as possible on this question, and we fully share that basic desire. However, we consider that we should avoid actions which might impair the tripartite talks on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing.

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(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Therefore, my delegation has proposed to the sponsors of draft resolution $A/C.1/3^4/L.1^4/Rev.1$ that an amendment be incorporated in operative paragraph ⁴ which would make it clear that the current nuclear test-ban talks in the Committee on Disarmament should not impair the tripartite talks. Inasmuch as our amendment was not adopted, however, our delegation would request a separate vote on paragraph ⁴, a vote in which, for the aforementioned reasons, we shall be compelled to abstain.

<u>Mr. FISHER</u> (United States of America): Although the delegation of the United States takes exception to several specific elements of the draft resolution, we are prepared to support it as a whole, because we fully share its over-all objective of promoting the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. As we have stated on many previous occasions, we are determined to bring the ongoing negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. But we wish to emphasize that, if a comprehensive test-ban treaty is to serve its objectives effectively, it must provide for measures capable of promoting confidence that its provisions are being faithfully implemented. And while the trilateral negotiations have made considerable progress, a significant number of critical questions remain to be resolved, specially in the area of verification.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

It is the conviction of the United States that the negotiation of effective measures of verification is an indispensable requirement for the successful conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are working hard in Geneva to reach agreement on such measures, as well as on other remaining issues in the negotiations. But we would not wish to imply by voting for the draft resolution that we would be prepared to conclude the negotiations with any particular provisions or by any particular deadline or target-date, regardless of the progress that had been achieved in resolving these critical matters.

We understand the strong interest of the entire world community in the sucess of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban, but we are convinced that the only practical means of achieving our common objective of such a comprehensive test-ban is for the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States to continue their efforts to resolve the remaining differences in their negotiations.

<u>Mr. SUMMERHAYES</u> (United Kingdom): As my Minister of State told this Committee when he spoke here on 17 October, the British Government fully understands the disappointment of other United Nations Member States over the time which negotiations are taking on this question, and we affirmed our determination to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.

My delegation will vote for the draft resolution as a whole in order to endorse the importance we attach to such a successful conclusion of the negotiations. However, we shall abstain in the separate vote on operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution because we consider that confidential negotiations are the best way through the remaining complex issues still to be resolved.

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The CHAIRMAN: In connexion with draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14/Rev.1, a separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 4, which reads:

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations

on such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority."

I now put that paragraph to the vote.

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 111 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I now put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Lyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finlan1, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Loast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

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United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. Against: None.

Abstaining: China, France.

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14/Rev.1, as a whole, was adopted by 128 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

<u>Mr. de LA CORCE</u> (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation wishes to make two remarks by way of explanation of its abstention on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14/Rev.1.

First of all, we must note that over 30 underground nuclear tests have taken place during the first ten months of the current year. The majority were recorded in the northern hemisphere and were carried out by Powers at present involved in negotiations on the prohibition of such tests. We find it difficult to believe that those Powers can continue such tests, endangering the health of present and future generations as stated in the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

Moreover, we are not convinced that a possible future treaty on the total cessation of nuclear tests concluded outside the framework of a genuine process of nuclear disarmament could contribute significantly to solving the problems of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. The halting of underground nuclear tests will not prevent the two most highly armed Powers from increasing their qualitative and quantitative advantage thanks to the accumulation of data obtained over the course of the ten years of tests which both have carried out since the beginning of the negotiations. There would be no qualitative constraint for them and hence a possible interruption of tests would have no real impact on the arms race. AW/13/tg

<u>The CHAIRMAN</u>: I should like to announce the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: Australia, A/C.1/34/L.38 and Corr.1; the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, L.39; and Brazil, L.34

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

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